12th February, 1952

APPENDIX Q

ORGANIZATION OF U.S.-BRITISH COMMUNICATION

INTELLIGENCE COLLABORATION IN WAR

INTRODUCTION

1. The U.S.-British Communication Intelligence Agreement of 1946, the Appendices thereto, and the operating arrangements based thereon will continue to be the main basis of relations between the two parties in war.

2. In interpretation of this Agreement and as an additional Appendix thereto, the general principles and considerations stated below provide for particular spheres of wartime collaboration between the two parties.

3. The implementation of these principles will be conditioned by theatres of operation involved, by international agreements in specific cases and by enemy communications and cryptographic practices. These factors will affect such important particulars as geographical locations, the responsibilities of the COMINT units involved, and the degree and scope of exchange and COMINT distribution.

4. The aim of the two parties is to ensure that the greatest possible contribution consistent with security is made by their combined COMINT effort to the prosecution of a war.

5. Normally, collaboration will be affected through co-ordination of the appropriate COMINT organisations. However, where necessary and feasible, COMINT organisations may be integrated on a U.S.-British basis.

6. Arrangements in national territories or in theatres in which the forces of only one of the nations are engaged are not subject to
the special principles stated in this Appendix.

PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. NATIONAL COMINT CENTRES IN WARS.

7. Both parties will remain free to require their national COMINT Centres both at home and overseas to undertake any task relevant to their national worldwide interests, and to set up such additional centres as may be necessary. Subject to this overriding principle, there will be a broad division of tasks between the national Centres which will undertake the greatest possible number of fixed commitments, in accordance with the principles set forth in the Introduction to these Appendices.

8. In view of the geographical location of GCHQ with respect to the European theatre, and in consideration of the U.S. Forces involved, the U.S., in the event of a general war in Europe or the Middle East between the Western Powers and the Russian Bloc, will immediately undertake to augment that part of GCHQ producing COMINT relevant to the war in these areas by the provision of a substantial number of COMINT processing personnel as required, and of such equipment as may then be determined to be both feasible and profitable. The U.S. will participate with an equal voice in the determination of priorities and allocation of resources with respect to the combined COMINT effort at GCHQ. The intercept resources of the U.S. and U.K. which are essential for coverage of EUROPE and contiguous areas will become available to the combined COMINT effort at GCHQ, except for those required and reserved for direct support of the field forces of either nation or reserved for other purposes by either party. That part reserved for the latter purpose will be co-ordinated with those supporting the combined effort at GCHQ. Traffic from all sources will be made available to both NIA and GCHQ to the extent required and possible. The complete end-product
of the combined effort at GCHQ will be made immediately available to the intelligence organizations of both nations.

9. In the event of GCHQ being disabled for any reason during the war, the combined effort will be transferred to such other centre as may be mutually agreed.

10. In addition to undertaking tasks on a worldwide basis, NSA will in particular be the principal centre for US and UK exploitation of all grades of COMINT relevant to the UK personnel may be integrated in it to assist in this work. The US will take account of UK views in the determination of priorities and allocation of resources with respect to the effort relevant to a general war in that area. It is recognised that NSA's greater invulnerability to enemy action will make it necessary for it to duplicate much of the work undertaken at GCHQ.

PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION AMONG COMINT CENTRES OF THE U.S., U.K., AND OTHER BRITISH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

11. Other British Commonwealth countries may be included in the collaboration of U.S. and U.K. National COMINT Centres as agreed by the National COMINT authorities of all parties concerned. Within the limits so agreed, exchanges of end-product, traffic, and technical material with other Commonwealth centres will be as complete as required and mutually agreed. In addition, working parties of one nation may be assigned to national COMINT centres of another nation as mutually agreed.

PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION AMONG THE U.S., U.K., AND OTHER BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OVERSEAS NATIONAL COMINT CENTRES

(Note: "Overseas National COMINT Centre" as used in this section is
intended to mean any centre of one nation not provided solely for the direct support of a single service, regardless of the authority or agency responsible for local management of such a centre.)

12. It may be necessary to establish overseas national COMINT centres to ensure timely processing of certain high level COMINT intercepted there. This includes establishment by either party of additional centres to support the prosecution of the war in the European and Middle East areas. Where necessary or desirable, working parties of one nation may be assigned as mutually agreed to overseas centres of another. Exchange of end-product, traffic, and technical material will be as complete as required.


13. The degree of integration of COMINT activities within any theatre involving both U.S. and British Commonwealth forces will depend on the degree of integration of operations and command in that theatre. Upon this basis local co-ordination and co-operation will be effected in accordance with the policies of the national COMINT authorities concerned.

14. Normally, lateral exchange and other direct lateral co-operation among U.S., U.K. and other Commonwealth service COMINT units provided for direct support of Combat Forces will be carried on at the highest levels that will meet essential operating requirements.

15. National Centres will provide appropriate technical support for, and obtain necessary material from, service units of other nations as required and as mutually agreed.

16. Subject to the agreement of the appropriate authorities the parties concerned may operate in any theatre of war interception and exploitation units working for their national COMINT Centres.
DISSEMINATION OF END-PRODUCT

17. In any command involving U.S. and U.K. forces, levels of dissemination for both forces will be identical as agreed by the U.S. and U.K. national COMINT authorities. Such dissemination of end-product will normally be via national channels; any other means of dissemination will be mutually agreed upon by the national authorities. For purposes of such dissemination, a common secure crypto-channel is essential.

COMMUNICATIONS

18. Implementation of the provisions of this Appendix will require extensive communications, plans for which should be drawn up at the earliest feasible time.

PLANS FOR COMINT W.E.R MOBILIZATION

19. Following upon the determination of the command structure for any theatre involving both U.S. and U.K. forces, the parties concerned will proceed forthwith to draw up plans for the COMINT structure for the theatre in question.

20. Although arrangements in national territories or in theatres in which the forces of only one of the nations are engaged are not subject to the special principles stated in this Appendix, each party will inform the others of plans made and organizations set up in these areas.

21. The parties concerned will from time to time review the plans made for COMINT war mobilization; insofar as the U.S. and U.K. are concerned, this has special reference to the scale of the anticipated U.S. COMINT effort in the U.K. and vice versa.
APPENDIX Q

ANNEXURE Q1

COLLABORATION BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. NATIONAL COMINT CENTERS

INTRODUCTION

1. This Annexure sets forth agreed arrangements for the implementation of the principles of collaboration contained in paragraphs 7 - 10 of Appendix Q to the BRUS Agreement. Although these principles apply in particular to a wartime situation, at least two stages are involved in the effective implementation of the provisions of this Appendix. These are:

   a. Peacetime Augmentation Program - to be effective up to the day of full mobilization.
   b. Wartime combined effort at full scale.

PEACETIME AUGMENTATION PROGRAM

2. During peacetime, combined NSA-COHE efforts will be established on specific problems, as agreed between USCIB and ISIB. Arrangements for combined efforts will be made for those problems which under existing conditions can be most effectively processed at one center. These arrangements will be kept under continuing review and are subject to change by either party. Any additional increases in the peacetime augmentation program will be as agreed upon between USCIB and ISIB.

WARTIME COMBINED EFFORT AT COHE

3. That part of COHE producing COMINT relevant to a war in Europe and contiguous areas will be augmented with U.S. COMINT resources.
E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b), (b)(3), and (b)(6)

**TOP SECRET**
TO BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH IISIG

and will form a combined operation to be named the Combined Center, Europe (CCE).

**ORGANIZATION**

4. The organization of the CCE will be as follows:

b. Director, GCHQ, will be assisted by two Deputy Directors, one appointed by the Director, NSA, and the other by the U.K. The U.S. Deputy will be primarily concerned with the groups assigned to the CCE, the U.K. Deputy primarily with those GCHQ elements which will remain outside the CCE.

c. Director, GCHQ, will be further assisted by a number of Assistant Directors, of whom one, appointed by the Director, NSA, will have major responsibilities for production within the CCE.

d. Below Directorate level, the CCE will be organized into a series of groups, each responsible for a specific sphere of operations.

**CONTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES TO THE CCE**

5. a. i.e. Investigation of transmissions with unknown technical characteristics.
E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6)

b. Small portions of COMINT may be retained outside the
CCE for such purposes as special exploitation or
dissemination tasks required by U.K. intelligence
consumers, particularly with reference to subjects
outside Europe and contiguous areas.

c. The U.S. will contribute substantial COMINT resources
to the CCE, details of which are given in Exhibit 1 to
this Annexure.

 TASKS OF THE CCE

6. The main tasks of the CCE will be:

a. Technical COMINT support of U.S., U.K., and other
British Commonwealth field resources in Europe and
contiguous areas.

b. Technical COMINT support of the Y units of Third
Party Nations participating in the Y structure of
Allied Commons in Europe and contiguous areas, in
accordance with the provisions of Appendix F.

c. Operational control of U.S., U.K., and other British
Commonwealth field resources essential to the
coverage of Europe and contiguous areas, except
those required and reserved for close support
of the field forces of the contributing nation
or otherwise reserved by the contributing nation.

d. Processing and exploitation of COMINT material
relevant to Europe and contiguous areas.
E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)1, (b)(3), and (b)(6)
E.O. 12958, as amended 
Section 3.3(b)1, (b)(3), and (b)(6)

**DISSEMINATION ARRANGEMENTS**

a. Paragraph 8 of Appendix G provides that the complete end product of the COE will be made immediately available to the intelligence organisations of both nations. To this end, the US intelligence liaison officers at the COE will receive the end-product of the COE.

b. The COE will endeavour to produce end products in the form or forms acceptable to the US and the UK for dissemination to all authorized intelligence recipients and this will be the form in which the information will normally be disseminated.

c. The US intelligence liaison officers will be responsible for dissemination to US Commands and other US recipients abroad and for the dissemination of selected items to their parent US intelligence organisations; GCHQ will continue to be responsible for dissemination to UK Commands and UK Intelligence Organizations.

d. The US service intelligence liaison officers and GCHQ will collaborate in dissemination to Allied Commands, and combined cryptographic channels will normally be used. In exceptional cases where there is disagreement between GCHQ and US service intelligence liaison officers on addressees or on the substance of the information to be disseminated to Allied Commands, either may disseminate provided that it is made clear that the other is not consulted and that the relationship to any other disseminated version is stated. Every effort will be made to avoid or to resolve such disagreements. Copies of COE end products disseminated by electrical means to Allied Commands will be immediately disseminated to the appropriate intelligence...
E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)1, (b)(3), and (b)(6)
E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)1, (b)(3), and (b)(6)

INTEGRATION OF PERSONNEL EXCHANGED BETWEEN CENTERS

10. Personnel exchanged between NSI and GCEP will be integrated organizationally within each center, will remain assigned to their home agency, and will be otherwise responsible to a resident head from this home agency. In the case of a problem which is to be worked as a primary commitment at one center by a combined NSI-GCEP group, the exchanged personnel will be integrated in both technical and operational management positions within the group. In the case of a problem worked jointly at both centers, exchanged personnel will be integrated technically into the groups at each center. An equal voice in technical and operational management will be exercised only on those problems being worked as a primary commitment at one center by a combined group.

ESTIMATE OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR WARTIME AUGMENTATION PROGRAM

11. Exhibit 1 to this annexure contains the estimate of personnel and equipment required for the wartime augmentation program. Its details will be reviewed from time to time by both parties and revised as necessary.
STANDBY...  RE: SECURITY FOR CONTINUATION OF CO-OPERATED OPERATION IN THE EVENT OF DISRUPTION THROUGH ANY ACTION

12.

E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6)
E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)1, (b)(3), and (b)(6)

1. It is estimated that a total operational strength of 9000 will be needed for the OCM in war to deal with the problems assigned to it. The UK intends to contribute about 6000 of this total. In view of the importance of the OCM to the US intelligence effort it is felt that the US should endeavour to supply the additional 3000 persons who would be required.

2. Existing UK mobilisation manpower plans allow for an increase of 5500 to GCHQ's peacetime establishment of 4000 in the first twelve months of war. Of this 5500, 3200 will be provided during the first three months of war.

3. The bulk of the increase is intended for the reinforcement of the OCM and supporting groups, which may be expected to give these groups a total strength of about 4000 by M / 3 months, and of the final 6000 by M / 12 months.

4. A small proportion (at present estimated at 300) of the GCHQ staff may be sent overseas and would thus not be available to the OCM.

5. During the period M / 12 months, the U.S. target should be to reinforce the OCM by 2000 persons. It is recommended that this increase be phased as follows:

(a) By M / 6. The provision of at least 500 persons, of whom the majority should have had training and experience in OCMINT production and reporting activities.
(b) By 1/12. The provision of a further 1500 persons. It is realized that for practical reasons the majority of these will not have had extensive training or experience in COMINT activities. Nevertheless, every effort should be made to ensure that as many as possible have at least had basic COMINT training and that a cadre of trained COMINT personnel be included in this group to ensure the effective integration of the group with the CCE.

6. It is recognized that the U.S. contribution to the CCE may be reduced in accordance with any allocation of personnel to other national or combined centers in working on COMINT problems pertaining to Europe and contiguous areas.

7. Equipment requirements for the Centre should be considered in detail as far as possible in advance of war by N.O.E. and G.O.H.Q. In this connection it is intended that G.O.H.Q. should make the maximum possible contribution in the development and use of analytical machinery for research and exploitation. The U.S. contribution of standard IBM equipment should be commensurate with the U.S. contribution of personnel to the CCE, based upon existing proportions of such equipment to processing personnel within NSI.
APPENDIX Q

ANNEXURE Q2

PRINCIPLES OF WAR-TIME COLLABORATION AMONG COMINT CENTERS OF THE

U.S., U.K., AND OTHER BRITISH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES.

1. In the event of hostilities involving the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, hereinafter referred to as collaborating nations the COMINT collaboration among these nations will be such as to ensure the greatest possible contribution to the prosecution of the war consistent with security.

2. Normally, collaboration will be effectuated through direct coordination between the appropriate COMINT organizations. Where necessary and feasible, however, COMINT organizations may be integrated as mutually agreed.

3. Field COMINT resources of one or more of the collaborating nations operating in a theatre supported by a national or combined center will be provided by that center with such technical assistance as may be required and mutually agreed. In order to facilitate such arrangements the national authorities may assign liaison and working groups to these centers as necessary.

4. Arrangements in theaters in which the forces of only one of the nations are engaged are not subject to the special principles stated in this annexure.

5. The COMINT authorities of the collaborating nations will remain free to require their National COMINT Centers both at home and overseas to undertake any task relevant to their national worldwide interests, and to set up such additional Centers as may be necessary.
Subject to this over-riding principle, there will be a broad division of tasks between the National COMINT centers in order to ensure the maximum timely interception and production of COMINT information.

6. In accordance with the above the following arrangements are projected:

a. In view of the geographic proximity of the Canadian and the U.S. National COMINT Centers, and of the close relationships which will exist between the military forces of the two nations in time of war, an integrated effort on specific problems may be required. Such collaboration may involve an exchange of technical personnel between the two Centers and the provision by the U.S. of technical support to the integrated effort to the extent desirable and feasible.

b. In the Pacific area collaboration is required to minimize the need of duplicate interception and processing facilities. The U.S., rather than establishing a National COMINT Center in the Southwest Pacific, will coordinate its COMINT operations in this theater with the center in Australia as required.

c. The U.S. National COMINT Center(s) concerned with the Pacific area will have direct communication with the COMINT authorities of the collaborating nations in order to effect rapid exchange of COMINT material as required and as mutually agreed.

d. The U.S. envisages the assignment of a U.S. working party to the center in Australia immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities involving both parties. This working party will take part in the operations of the Center.
in Australia and will serve as the core for any further augmentation of the center in Australia which may become desirable as the war progresses.

e. The U.K. will increase its contribution of personnel to the center in Australia on the outbreak of hostilities.

ESTABLISHMENT OF OVERSEAS NATIONAL COMINT CENTERS

7. Current plans consider the possible establishment of COMINT Centers as set forth in Exhibit 1 to this Annexure. Its details will be reviewed from time to time by the parties concerned and revised as necessary.

ESTABLISHMENT OF OVERSEAS COMBINED CENTERS

8. With reference to U.S. and U.K. plans to establish National COMINT Centers in (see Exhibit 1, para. 1 and 6) circumstances may require the establishment of a combined UK-US center in this area.

E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6)
E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)1, (b)(3), and (b)(6)
E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)1, (b)(3), and (b)(6)