Venona: Soviet Espionage and The American Response 1939-1957

Forward

In July 1995, in a ceremony at CIA Headquarters, Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch released the first group of NSA's Venona translations to the public. The DCI announced that a public conference on the Venona story would be held in 1996 as soon as the declassification of the translations had been completed. This conference is now at hand and follows the release of the last set of Venona translations. Some 2,900 Soviet intelligence messages are now on the Internet and in hard copy at major archives around the country.

While the cryptologic side of the Venona story belongs to NSA and its partners, the overall achievement is one of Intelligence Community cooperation. NSA and its US Army predecessor worked with FBI, CIA, the British, and allied services. This conference volume is itself a cooperative effort in keeping with the spirit of the times. It provides the public with information that had been closely held until recently and which is of extraordinary interest and importance.

It may be some time before historians and the general public sort out the full meaning of Venona. Lou Benson, co-editor of this conference volume, has prepared five historical monographs about the program. Considerable research, discussion, and writing by journalists and historians is already in progress, making this volume and the presentations at its accompanying conference potentially all the more timely and valuable to these scholarly efforts.

There can no longer be any doubt about the widespread and successful Soviet espionage operations against the United States and Great Britain during the 1940s, and that, aside from their own professional skill, Soviet intelligence services could count on the aid of the Communist parties of the target countries.

Earlier in my career I had the opportunity to supervise and participate in the last stages of the Venona program. From that experience I learned of the incredible determination and great skill of the analysts who made Venona possible. The result of their work was the body of translated messages, each one produced with the most painstaking and, I might add, honest effort. This is authentic material deserving of the most careful study.

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Preface

The muggy Washington summer of 1948 grew even hotter when news media reported that a “blonde spy queen” three years earlier had given federal investigators convincing evidence of widespread Soviet espionage in America during World War II. In a few days the world learned her name—Elizabeth Bentley—and heard her and another ex-Communist agent, Whittaker Chambers, repeat their charges before Congress. Republican congressmen and candidates cited the stories as further evidence of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations’ softness toward Communism and neglect of national security. Outraged officials both in and out of government, as well as Democrats fearing a campaign issue that would sink President Truman's apparently foundering re-election chances, insisted that Bentley and Chambers were peddling hearsay and innuendo.
Espionage in America

The United States made a tempting espionage target for allies and adversaries alike in the 1940s. Berlin, Tokyo, and Moscow all wanted to discover Washington’s strategic plans and the progress being made in American factories and laboratories. Axis spies fared poorly in North America, however, in part because allied civilian and military counterintelligence services rolled up Axis nets and agents early in the war. Soviet intelligence fared much better. Indeed, the tensions and crises in East-West relations in the 1940s and 1950s unfolded along patterns determined in no small part by the success of Soviet intelligence officers, and, belatedly, by the growing ability of Western services to counter Moscow’s espionage campaign.

Several advantages helped Soviet intelligence succeed where the Axis services failed. First, Soviet intelligence services, in many respects, were stronger than their Axis counterparts, with better leadership and more resources. Second, operating conditions in America were easier for several reasons, the foremost being the fact that the Soviet Union was an ally and therefore was able to post large numbers of officials on American soil in various liaison capacities. Beyond this, many Americans regarded their Russian allies as comrades-in-arms who should be helped with material as well as rhetorical support. There were some instances of American citizens volunteering actual secrets to Soviets during the war, and Soviet officials in the United States sometimes enjoyed considerable hospitality and access. Finally, Soviet intelligence benefited directly and indirectly from the activities and infrastructure of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA).

Moscow collected secrets in the United States through overlapping organizations. The Communist International (better known as the Comintern) monitored the CPUSA and supervised the Party’s clandestine apparatus. The CPUSA had reached the peak of its strength and limited influence in American life in the late 1930s, when the Great Depression and Stalin’s opposition to Hitler and Mussolini convinced thousands of native-born Americans that capitalism was doomed and that the socialist experiment in Russia represented the world’s only reliable bulwark against fascism. Party leaders and some trusted members gathered political and industrial information, most of which probably made its way to Soviet intelligence services. Although the CPUSA lost perhaps a third of its members after the Hitler-Stalin pact of August 1939 temporarily made the USSR a junior partner in Nazi aggression, a committed core remained in the ranks. In addition, military intelligence (GRU) officers based in Soviet consular posts worked with the Comintern and with Party-controlled agents in US Government agencies and private industry.

Another Soviet organization, the NKVD (later to become the KGB)—Moscow’s secret police and quasi-civilian intelligence service—had its own foreign intelligence arm. The service had long busied itself with internal repression and with foreign counterintelligence that helped guide covert action against émigré Russian factions. In other types of foreign operations it had been overshadowed by the GRU, at least in the United States. This relationship would be reversed during the war.

The KGB and GRU ran parallel “legal” and “illegal” intelligence networks in the United States. One set of operations was run by intelligence officers working under legal (usually diplomatic) cover in the “residencies” located clandestinely in Soviet diplomatic missions, trade, and media organizations—for example, the Amtorg Trading Corporation, the Soviet Purchasing Commission, and the Tass news agency. Other KGB and GRU networks, in contrast, had no apparent connections to
Soviet establishments and were run by “illegals”—Soviet intelligence ofﬁcers usually living under false identities. In addition,
some GRU and KGB agents were themselves CPUSA ofﬁcers whose clandestine activities were known, to a greater or
lesser extent, to the CPUSA leadership and the Comintern. KGB ofﬁcer Jacob Golos (covername SOUND), for instance, ran
the Soviet-sponsored World Tourists corporation in New York and allegedly also served on the central control commission
of the CPUSA. His lover, Elizabeth Bentley (covernames SMART GIRL and MYRNA), had moved from the open Party into
underground work in the late 1930s. She helped Golos service various agents and run the World Tourists business.
Stalin wanted his intelligence ofﬁcers in America to collect information in four main areas. He directed Pavel M. Fitin, the
34-year-old chief of the KGB’s First Directorate, to seek American intelligence concerning Hitler’s plans for the war in
Russia; secret war aims of London and Washington, particularly with regard to planning for a second front in Europe; any
indications that the Western allies might cut a separate peace with Hitler; and, ﬁnally, American scientiﬁc and
technological progress, particularly in developing an atomic weapon. (9)
Soviet espionage operatives in the United States during World War II funneled information to Moscow through a handful of
professional intelligence ofﬁcers who sent reports to the Center and relayed orders and questions from the Center to
agents in the ﬁeld. Operations in America were led by experienced hands such as Vassili M. Zarubin (covername MAKSIM),
who served as rezident in New York and later in Washington, and Iskhak A. Akhmerov (covernames MER and ALBERT), the
senior illegal. Some Soviet case ofﬁcers, however, were raw recruits recently brought into the services in order to ﬁll out
ranks depleted during Stalin’s purges of the late 1930s.(10) For many of these ofﬁcers, America was their ﬁrst overseas
post. Elizabeth Bentley described her initial meeting with “John” (Anatoli A. Yatskov, Venona covername ALEKSEI), who
turned out to be

a thin, pale, blond, young man of about my height, who was dressed in badly ﬁtting clothes of obviously European make… . He had
that half-starved look so characteristic of new Soviet arrivals, his English was so meager I had difﬁculty in understanding him, and
he displayed an astounding ignorance of American life.

“John,” despite his unpromising debut, would play a key role in Soviet espionage against the atomic bomb.(11)
During the latter part of the war, the KGB gradually took over assets and networks originally established by the GRU and
the Comintern (particularly after Stalin dissolved the latter body in May 1943).(12) A general re-division of labor among the
Soviet services appears to have given political tasks to the KGB, while focusing the GRU more on military collection; both
collected scientiﬁc and technical data. In addition, agents hitherto run in cooperation with the CPUSA were turned over to
direct Soviet control. This streamlining effort faced daunting operational security challenges; Bentley and others who had
worked with the Soviets had learned far more than they needed to about other agents and operations—and resented the
change in direction.

A Slow Response
The US Government had grown concerned about reputed fascist and Communist subversion in the late 1930s. The war in
Europe—and the Nazi-Soviet nona˜ression pact of 1939—gave J. Edgar Hoover’s Federal Bureau of Investigation an
opportunity to move against individuals and organizations suspected of working with the Russians. Tipped by a State
Department probe that had uncovered American and foreign Communists traveling on fraudulent American passports, FBI
Special Agents in 1939 raided the facilities of several organizations linked to the CPUSA and found sufﬁcient evidence to
arrest General Secretary Earl Browder on charges of passport fraud.(13) In 1940, leads developed by British and Canadian
investigators in the Woolwich Arsenal spy case pointed the Bureau toward the senior KGB ofﬁcer in America, New York
rezident Gaik Ovakimian (covername GENNADI), whom the FBI arrested in May 1941 for violating the Foreign Agents
Registration Act.(14) Information on Soviet intelligence contacts and methods obtained by the Bureau in these early
investigations would prove valuable during and after the war.
American authorities, nonetheless, did not act as decisively as they might have at the time. At least three defectors from
Soviet intelligence were in the United States (Alexander Orlov, Walter Krivitsky, and Whittaker Chambers) and have given
the Bureau relatively current information, had they been questioned in depth—and well protected—by federal ofﬁcials.(15) In
addition, the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941 virtually reversed American attitudes toward the Soviets. The State
Department quickly reached an understanding with Moscow that allowed Ovakimian to leave the country. Similarly,
President Roosevelt commuted Browder’s sentence in May 1942 in the interest of inter-allied relations. The FBI remained
watchful, but the raids and prosecutions ceased.
Any foreign intelligence service needs secure communications channels between its headquarters and its ofﬁcers abroad.
Although Soviet intelligence services had clandestine radio transmitters in diplomatic missions located in several American
cities, these apparently were to be used only in emergencies.(16) In consequence, KGB and GRU stations cabled their
important messages over commercial telegraph lines and sent bulky reports and documents—including most of the


information acquired by agents—in diplomatic pouches. As a new European war loomed in 1939, the US Army had begun collecting enciphered Soviet telegrams, and soon thousands of cables were piling up in the offices of the Army’s Signals Security Agency (SSA). A June 1942 agreement with the Navy and FBI gave the Army exclusive responsibility for analysis of foreign diplomatic and military ciphers, and the Army consequently had general responsibility for studying diplomatic traffic.

SSA analysts, based at Arlington Hall in Northern Virginia, soon began to explore whether the collected Soviet diplomatic messages might be readable. The Army and Navy had sporadically studied Soviet codes and ciphers over the preceding decade, but with little success.(17) Decrypted 1942 cables between the Japanese Army’s general staff and its military attaches in Berlin and Helsinki showed that Finland’s excellent cryptanalysts had made progress on some Soviet military ciphers, had determined the characteristics for sorting the still unsolvable diplomatic messages, and were sharing results with the Japanese.(18) This information was probably the immediate inspiration for SSA’s examination of the Soviet telegrams. On 1 February 1943, SSA created a small program to examine the encrypted Soviet telegrams on orders from Col. Carter Clarke, Chief of the Special Branch of the Army’s Military Intelligence Service (MID). Clarke seemed particularly concerned that Moscow and Berlin might negotiate a separate peace, and wanted to be able to warn his superiors of such a development.

Gene Grabeel, a Virginia schoolteacher who had recently arrived at Arlington Hall as part of its large civilian contingent, began the effort to read the Soviet diplomatic messages (and would continue working on the project for the next 36 years). She and others assigned to the project in 1943 spent months sorting stored and incoming telegrams by communications circuits. They gradually expanded their knowledge of the characteristics that separated the messages into the groups that the Finnish cryptanalysts had investigated. Five separate cryptographic systems became apparent. More than half the telegrams belonged to a system that analysts dubbed “Trade” because it carried the messages of the Amtorg Trading Corporation and the Soviet Purchasing Commission—most of which concerned the transfer of Lend Lease materiel to the USSR. The other four systems were used by the KGB, GRU, Naval GRU, and Foreign Ministry, but these users would not be fully identified until the mid-1940s.

Moscow had already learned from well-placed agents that both enemies and allies were trying to read its diplomatic cables. Finnish troops found scorched codebooks and cryptographic materials in the USSR’s Petsamo consulate in June 1941, and before the end of that year a Soviet agent in Berlin reported that the Germans were trying to exploit a Russian codebook acquired from their Finnish allies.(19) These developments in themselves were not alarming to Moscow, because the security of messages enciphered by one-time pads lies in the cipher and not in the codes per se (see inset). In any event, the compromised KGB codebook was not replaced until late 1943.(20) Another important piece of information came from British intelligence officer and Soviet agent H.A.R. “Kim” Philby in 1944, when he told the KGB that British cryptanalysts had turned their attention to Soviet ciphers.(21)

Philby probably reported nothing at that time about American efforts against the Soviet messages. (US analysts did not begin to collaborate with their British counterparts on Soviet communications in general until about August 1945.) Nevertheless, senior KGB officials may have become worried when White House aide Lauchlin Currie apparently told Soviet contacts (possibly in spring 1944) that the Americans were about to break a Soviet code. Currie had access to signals intelligence at the White House and could have heard overoptimistic rumors that Arlington Hall would soon be reading Soviet messages. Currie’s tip probably was too vague to have alarmed Soviet cryptographers, but it might have worried higher-ups in Moscow. Indeed, the only change observed in the characteristics of the Soviet messages around that time appeared to be a cosmetic correction implemented to please higher authority. On 1 May 1944, KGB code clerks began using a new message starting-point indicator for telegrams—a change that ironically would make work easier for Arlington Hall crypt-analysts.(22)

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What Made Venona Possible?

The messages broken by the Venona program were both coded and enciphered. When a code is enciphered with a one-time pad, the cryptographer who designed the system expects the encipherment to provide absolute security—even if an adversary somehow obtains an underlying codebook or debriefs a defecting code clerk (such as Igor Gouzenko). A flaw in the encipherment, however, can leave such messages vulnerable to analysis even in the absence of a codebook. Such was the case for the Soviet diplomatic systems from which the Venona translations came. Arlington Hall’s Venona breakthrough in 1943-46 was a purely analytic accomplishment, achieved without the benefit of either Soviet codebooks or plain-text copies of original messages. The 1944-46 messages—which yielded the early translations and the bulk of all translations—were recovered over a period of years by ArlingtonHall cryptanalysts and decoded from a “codebook” that crypto-linguist Meredith Gardner reconstructed by using classic codebreaking techniques.

A Soviet code clerk preparing a message first reduced its text into numeric code groups drawn from a codebook (a kind of dictionary in which the words and common phrases correspond to four-digit numbers). After encoding the plain text with
The flaw in the Soviet messages resulted from the manufacturers’ duplication of one-time pad pages, rather than from a malfunctioning random-number generator or extensive re-use of pages by code clerks. For a few months in early 1942, a time of great strain on the Soviet regime, the KGB’s cryptographic center in the Soviet Union for some unknown reason printed duplicate copies of the “key” on more than 35,000 pages of additive and then assembled and bound these in one-time pads. Arlington Hall’s Lt. Richard Hallock analyzed Soviet “Trade” messages in autumn 1943, producing evidence of extensive use of duplicate key pages (often with different page numbers) assembled in separate one-time pad books. Thus, two sets of the ostensibly unique one-time pad-page sets were manufactured. Despite the opinion that a single duplication was insufficient for solution, Hallock and his colleagues continued to attack the Trade messages and made considerable progress in understanding the cryptographic basis of the diplomatic systems. From Hallock’s original discovery, additional analysis yielded techniques for finding duplicate pages separated in time and among different users. The duplicate pages began showing up in messages in mid-1942 and were still occurring in one circuit as late as June 1948. Nevertheless, most of the duplicate pages were used between 1942 and 1944—years of rapid expansion of Soviet diplomatic communications.

We do not know how and when the Soviets discovered the flaw, but we believe Moscow learned of it through agents William W. Weisband and Kim Philby. By the time the Soviets saw the consequences of the manufacturing flaw in the late 1940s, however, most of the duplicate one-time pad pages had already been used. The set of potentially exploitable messages thus was bound by the production of the duplicate pages and the West’s ability to spot duplicate uses. Finding duplicates, however, only made the messages potentially readable; indeed, some messages and passages remained unexploitable even after 37 years of effort.

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In November 1944 Arlington Hall analysts solved this new starting-point indicator problem and soon expanded their effort against the “Trade” messages to encompass a second, still unidentified Soviet system. This was the breakthrough that eventually made the cables readable. The method revealed hundreds of instances in which individual pages of additive digits from KGB one-time pads were duplicated by key used for Trade messages. Over a period of years, cryptanalysts were able to determine the one-time pad additive values for significant parts of hundreds of enciphered telegrams, leaving the coded texts vulnerable to crypto-linguist codebuilders trying to recover the meanings of the four-digit words and phrases. (23)

American authorities inferred during World War II that the Soviets were engaged in espionage, but as yet there was little coordination among the various counterintelligence organizations. A June 1939 Presidential directive gave the FBI responsibility for domestic counterintelligence with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division (better known as the G-2). (24) The three organizations comprised a body known as the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and stood together to protect their monopoly on domestic counterintelligence work from other agencies, particularly the new Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and its activist chief, Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan. OSS eventually developed a capable counterintelligence apparatus of its own in Europe—the X-2 Branch—but it had no authority to operate on American soil.

In keeping with the limited extent of interagency cooperation, American counterintelligence organizations made uneven progress in integrating signals intelligence leads during the war. OSS and the FBI separately launched their own cryptologic intelligence operations, but these were short-lived. (25) (Neither OSS nor the FBI, incidentally, was shown the Army’s “MAGIC” intercepts of wartime foreign diplomatic messages.) The X-2 Branch of OSS had been created to provide British intelligence services with a point of contact in OSS for sharing certain sensitive “ULTRA” reports derived from decrypted German military and intelligence communications. (26) Unfortunately for OSS, however, X-2 monitored the agents of Axis—not allie—services. It had little influence over security clearances for OSS personnel (some of whom indeed spied for the Soviets). (27)

Coordination was little better between the military’s cryptologic services, which in any event had left domestic security
largely to the FBI. The Army and Navy signals intelligence organizations barely cooperated with one another, jealously guarding their reports and their access to President Roosevelt. Outside of the Oval Office there was no collation and analysis of the totality of the intelligence information—let alone the counter-intelligence leads—collected by the US Government.

Hoover’s FBI monitored the CPUSA during the war but did not always share its leads with other agencies. In April 1943, FBI agents began to collect solid information on current KGB activities and personnel. New York consular officer Vassili M. Zarubin (a KGB general operating under the alias Zubilin) called on senior CPUSA officer Steve Nelson in Berkeley, California. Unbeknownst to both, the FBI had been watching Nelson for weeks. Zarubin’s conversation made it obvious to Bureau eavesdroppers that he was an important KGB officer (although they could not yet know that he was Gaik Ovakimian’s replacement as senior KGB rezident in America). The FBI watched Zarubin from that day until he left the United States in 1944 (although he occasionally gave his trailers the slip), and Bureau agents catalogued hundreds of contacts and leads developed by this operation.

More leads dropped into the Bureau’s mailbox in August 1943, in the form of an anonymous letter drafted on a Russian typewriter and mailed in Washington, DC. This extraordinary note—the author’s identity still is uncertain—denounced Zarubin and 10 other KGB officers in North America, along with two of their assets. Special Agents quickly concluded that the letter was genuine and largely accurate, although they gave little credence to its claim that the Soviets were passing secrets to Japan. The FBI subsequently increased surveillance of persons named in the letter and even doubled two agents recruited by one of them, KGB officer Andrei Shevchenko. Nevertheless, the FBI did apparently not pass copies of the anonymous letter to other agencies until after World War II, nor did Special Agents try to recruit Soviet officers named by its author.

The Atomic Era

US Government agencies ran a wartime security system that was porous for Soviet agents and yet opaque for American counterintelligence agencies charged with protecting secrets. FBI Director Hoover allegedly knew nothing of the super-secret Manhattan Project before Steve Nelson inadvertently informed him in the spring of 1943. High-level political and strategic motivations in Washington also hampered US efforts against Soviet espionage. President Roosevelt wanted to strengthen a distrustful Stalin in his fight against Hitler, and his lieutenants had no desire to antagonize Moscow by suppressing the CPUSA or publicly probing rumors that members of the Party had infiltrated government agencies. Hoover, for his part, kept a close eye on the CPUSA but did not, at least before 1945, try to convince the White House that Soviet officials in the United States were actively engaged in espionage. Donovan’s OSS also encountered the administration’s reluctance to antagonize Moscow when OSS officers bought unidentified Soviet cryptographic documents from emigre Finnish cryptanalysts in late 1944. Secretary of State Edward P. Stettinius insisted that the papers be given back to the Russians, and Donovan promptly obeyed a White House order to return them to the Soviet Embassy.

The intrigues surrounding the development of the atomic bomb both symbolized and helped widen the growing breach between the Soviet Union and its Western allies in 1945. Washington and London jointly built the bomb but did nothing about their work to Moscow. Stalin’s clandestine sources, however, obtained detailed political, military, and diplomatic reports on his allies’ strategic planning and war aims. He knew of the bomb project long before the new President Truman finally divulged it to him in July 1945. The KGB effort against the Manhattan Project (codenamed ENORMOUS) represented a shift in collection emphasis. Moscow hitherto had regarded the United States primarily as a source of information useful in the war against Germany; now America became in Russian eyes a rival and even a threat to the Soviet Union itself. Soviet agents penetrated the Manhattan Project at several points. At the Los Alamos facility alone, at least four agents reported through couriers such as Lona Cohen to the Soviet consulate in New York, where a KGB sub-residency under a young engineer named Leonid R. Kvasnikov (covername ANTON) coordinated operations and dispatched intelligence to Moscow.

US perceptions of the Soviets began shifting after the war had been won. Two defections in autumn 1945 galvanized US counterintelligence. Igor Gouzenko, a GRU code clerk in the USSR’s Ottawa Embassy, revealed to Canadian authorities that the Soviets had indeed penetrated the Manhattan Project and other agencies. A few weeks later, Elizabeth Bentley gave the FBI details about spies in the State and Treasury Department, OSS, the Pentagon, and even the White House. Both Bentley’s and Gouzenko’s accounts dovetailed with the story that Time magazine editor and former GRU agent Whittaker Chambers had told FBI agents in 1942 and again, in detail, in May 1945. By mid-November, the White House knew the outlines of the defectors’ stories and had heard of their accusations against dozens of US Government employees, including high officials such as White House aide Lauchlin Currie, OSS executive assistant Duncan Lee, and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White.

A Canadian Government White Paper on the Gouzenko affair in July 1946 confirmed the gist of press speculation about Soviet wartime espionage and gave the Western public its first official account of the extent of the problem. This confirmation of the essential truth behind the rumors diminished public tolerance for Communism at home and abroad. Truman became convinced of the need for a government-wide tightening of security, but he had no intention of condoning
witch-hunts for allegedly disloyal Democratic officials or blanket accusations against federal workers and Roosevelt's New Deal. Little could be done, for the time being, against the individuals named by Gouzenko or Bentley—apart from corroborating their reports and limiting the suspects' access to sensitive information—until Western governments could gather evidence that would stand up in court.

Domestic politics, however, prompted the White House to act. Republicans campaigning in the 1946 Congressional elections accused Democrats of ignoring Communist infiltration and disloyalty; the charge helped the GOP regain control of Congress for the first time since 1931. Truman's response was motivated in part by his own political considerations. Hoping to deter free-ranging Congressional probes and harsh Republican-drafted loyalty legislation, he signed Executive Order 9835, which institutionalized the wartime loyalty regime. The executive order mandated loyalty boards in all federal agencies and defined employee disloyalty to include membership in groups judged subservive by the Attorney General. (39)

During this period, Bentley gave the FBI details that opened a hitherto unnoticed window on the networks run by "illegals"—Soviet citizens abroad under false identities who worked for the KGB or GRU in apparent isolation from official Soviet consular missions. Special Agents fanned out across the country to investigate Bentley's leads and to monitor persons whom she had named, and for about a year the FBI entertained hopes of "doubling" her against the KGB. (40)

The "Gregory" case—as the investigations prompted by Bentley were known inside the government—produced many leads but led to no espionage prosecutions. FBI agents could not use evidence gathered by wiretaps in court, and they were unable to catch suspected spies in the act of compromising official secrets. (41) Meanwhile, Soviet agents and intelligence officers almost certainly surmised the existence of a serious leak. They took precautions even before a federal grand jury, meeting in 1947, probed Bentley's allegations and called as witnesses dozens of individuals named in her testimony.

At roughly the same time, the renamed Army Security Agency (ASA—formerly the Signals Security Agency) developed evidence that would soon corroborate Bentley's testimony and the 1943 anonymous letter. After the war, the "Russian Section" at Arlington Hall expanded. Work on diplomatic messages benefited from additional technical personnel and new analysts—among them Samuel Chew, who had focused on Japan, and linguist Meredith Gardner, who had worked on both German and Japanese messages. Chew had considerable success at defining the underlying structure of the coded Russian texts. Gardner and his colleagues began analytically reconstructing the KGB codebooks. Late in 1946, Gardner broke the codebook's "spell table" for encoding English letters. With the solution of this spell table, ASA could read significant portions of messages that included English names and phrases. Gardner soon found himself reading a 1944 message listing prominent atomic scientists, including several with the Manhattan Project. (42)

Gardner henceforth made rapid progress, reading dozens of messages sent between Moscow and New York in 1944 and 1945. By May 1947 he had read one that implied the Soviets ran an asset with access to sensitive information from the War Department General Staff. (43) It became apparent to Gardner that he was reading KGB messages showing massive Soviet espionage in the United States.

Another problem soon arose—that of determining how and to whom to disseminate the extraordinary information Gardner was developing. ASA's reporting procedures did not seem appropriate because the decrypted messages could not even be paraphrased for Arlington Hall's regular intelligence customers without divulging their source. At this point, ASA knew nothing about the federal grand jury impaneled in Manhattan to probe the espionage and disloyalty charges leveled by Bentley and other defectors from Soviet intelligence, so no one in the US Government was aware that evidence against the Soviets was suddenly developing on two adjacent tracks. Gardner took matters into his own hands in the summer of 1947, drafting "Special Report #1," which went to a handful of senior ASA officials. One item in it about an unidentified Soviet asset would later prove fateful:

LIB?? (Lieb?) or possibly LIBERAL: was ANTENKO [later understood as ANTENNA] until 29 Sept. 1944. Occurs 6 times, 22 October—20 December 1944. Message of 27 November speaks of his wife ETHEL, 29 years old married (?) 5 years, "... ... husband's work and the role of METR(O) and NIL." [Spelling and punctuation in original] (44)

Cooperation Expands

Deputy G-2 Carter Clarke read Special Report #1 and in late August or early September 1948 asked FBI liaison officer S. Wesley Reynolds for a list of KGB and GRU covernames. Clarke's hint that ASA had broken a KGB code piqued the interest of the Bureau, which at that time was questioning former Soviet agents living in the United States concerning the allegations of Bentley and others and information gathered from surveillance of Soviet officials during the war. The Bureau quickly sent ASA a list of some 200 names, and, although few of them appeared in the translated messages, the long cooperation later known as the Venona program had begun. (45) This cooperative spirit between cryptanalysts and investigators endures to the present day.

Full inter-agency cooperation, however, was still several years away. President Truman, unhappy about the mass of
analysed reports that the departments daily sent to the White House, had insisted in 1945 on greater coordination of intelligence information. His new Central Intelligence Group was intended to solve this problem, but it started out slowly. American intelligence agencies on the whole did not do a good job of presenting counterintelligence analyses to the President and his aides. FBI Director Hoover, for instance, frequently sent to the Truman White House allegations of Communist plotting and Soviet espionage. It is not clear how much of this information actually reached the President, however, or how seriously it was regarded by White House aides.

Despite the Truman administration's sustained but piecemeal restructuring of the Intelligence Community, the division of labor in counter-intelligence functions remained much as it had been set early in World War II. The new National Security Council preserved the FBI’s and armed services’ monopoly of domestic counterintelligence in NSC-17/4 and 17/6 in 1949. (46) The agencies outside this monopoly were expected to provide information but were not invited to join operations involving domestic security. The new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the closest institutional successor to OSS and CIG and, consequently, the inheritor of OSS's dismal security reputation, saw little of the information Gardner and his colleagues were developing. CIA counterintelligence officers, however, now had wider access to signals intelligence than had their predecessors in X-2, and they briefly joined the Army and Navy in a Joint Counterintelligence Information Center (JCIC) to exploit current signals intelligence leads, using X-2's wartime employment of ULTRA as its model. (47) The JCIC received Special Report #1 at roughly the same time Colonel Clarke notified the FBI, but the Bureau never joined the JCIC or sought its assistance with the Soviet translations. When the JCIC inquired about additional Special Reports in early 1949, Clarke apparently instructed his subordinates not to provide anything. The early American effort to use the information from the Soviet messages thus remained understaffed and highly compartmented, and exploitation opportunities were almost certainly lost in consequence. For several years the major investigative burden remained with the FBI, which assigned the most important inter-agency liaison work to a single Special Agent, Robert Lamphere.

"I stood in the vestibule of the enemy's house, having entered by stealth," Lamphere recalled in his memoir of the investigations. (48) Lamphere began sharing liaison duty with Wesley Reynolds in the spring of 1948. That October he had a private meeting with Meredith Gardner and began full-time liaison on the project. It was Lamphere's tenacity that taught the FBI how to use the translations against Soviet espionage. Through him the Bureau received a steady flow of translations and re-translations, as well as Gardner's insights about the "tradecraft" of Soviet spying. Gardner and his colleagues, in return, received collateral evidence, identifications, and additional leads. (49) The process was essentially a slow comparison of evidence for and against various competing hypotheses, with the knowledge gained in many cases being greater than the sum of its parts.

By the time Lamphere began using the translated messages, the public controversy over "loyalty" and "red-baiting" had risen dramatically amid growing concern over US-Soviet tensions. New allegations that prominent American citizens had spied for the Soviets burst upon the public in July 1948, when Bentley spoke before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Her testimony recounted, among other things, Lauchlin Currie's alleged distress over US efforts to read wartime Soviet telegrams (this seems to have been the first public clue to the existence of ASA's effort). A few days later Whittaker Chambers charged that Roosevelt administration figures Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White were secret Communists. Heated denials by the accused and their supporters added to the drama and controversy as elections loomed that autumn. Republican Congressmen and activists hailed the testimony as the long-suppressed proof of Democratic inattention toward Communist subversion. Truman bitterly resented such charges and insisted that the Hiss affair in particular was a GOP "red herring." (50)

Truman's repeated denunciations of the charges against Hiss, White, and others—all of whom appear under covernames in decrypted messages translated before he left office in January 1953—suggest that Truman either was never briefed on the Venona program or did not grasp its significance. Although it seems odd that Truman might not have been told, no definitive evidence has emerged to show he was. In any event, Truman always insisted that Republicans had trumped up the loyalty issue and that wartime espionage had been insignificant and well contained by American authorities. (51)

In December 1948 the FBI identified a Soviet agent covernamed SIMA as Judith Coplon, a young Justice Department analyst recruited by the Soviets in 1944. (52) Coplon would become the first person arrested on the basis of a Venona lead. FBI agents detained her in March 1949 along with a KGB official under UN cover; her purse contained ostensibly sensitive documents (which the Bureau had routed through her office as bait). Director Hoover or (less likely) someone higher in the Truman administration forbade FBI officials testifying at her trial from introducing the translated messages as evidence. This protection of the cryptanalytic breakthrough forced prosecutors and government witnesses into elaborate circumlocutions; Special Agent Lamphere, for example, testified that suspicion had fallen on Coplon because of information from a reliable "confidential informant" that was not a wiretap. (53) Although both of Coplon's convictions would be overturned on appeal, subsequent prosecutions developed in the same manner, with the too-sensitive codebreaking secrets obscured behind mounds of corroborating evidence.

The Coplon case set the pattern for an intense series of investigations and prosecutions that followed over the next two years. Meredith Gardner and his colleagues (working from May 1949 under the auspices of AFSA, the new Armed Forces Security Agency) supplied covernames and translations to the FBI; Lamphere and other Special Agents tracked down the leads:

- **February 1949.** ASA observed that messages containing “Material G” were quoting British Foreign Office telegrams sent
to the British Embassy in Washington during the war. Not until March 1951, however, did American and British cryptanalysts conclude that “G,” “GOMMER,” and “GOMER” (the Russian transliteration of HOMER) had to be the same agent who had provided the cables to the KGB. By the beginning of May 1951, the list of possible suspects had narrowed to one name: Donald Maclean of the Foreign Office. Maclean, with compatriot Guy Burgess, soon fled to the Soviet Union.

- **September 1949.** The FBI determined that covernames REST and CHARLES, both denoting a scientist in the wartime Manhattan Project, referred to physicist Klaus Fuchs, author of a paper quoted in one message. British authorities interrogated Fuchs in late 1949. His information in turn led the FBI to courier Harry Gold, arrested in Philadelphia on 22 May. (54)

- **February 1950.** Lamphere suspected that a Soviet agent covernamed CALIBRE had to be an enlisted man posted at the Manhattan Project facility at Los Alamos during the war. Subsequent AFSA analysis, and additional information from Harry Gold, led to David Greenglass, who confessed to the FBI on 15 June 1950 and also implicated his brother-in-law, Julius Rosenberg.

- **Spring 1950.** Covername NICK had emerged in 1949 as one Amadeo Sabatini, who had fought in Spain together with KGB asset Morris Cohen. Sabatini apparently kept quiet about Cohen but did point the FBI toward a Jones Orin York (almost simultaneously identified as Venona covername NEEDLE). When questioned in April 1950, York alleged that a former case officer of his was an AFSA employee named William Weisband. AFSA suspended Weisband in May.

- **Late June 1950.** The FBI discovered that information in the messages about an agent who collected technological and scientific secrets, codenamed LIBERAL and ANTENNA, matched the known facts about New York engineer Julius Rosenberg. Two messages also implicated his wife, Ethel. Rosenberg had been questioned on the basis of David Greenglass’ information on 16 June and tailed ever since, but he was not arrested until a month later. (55)

- **Sometime in 1949-50.** Gardner translated a 1944 message that described the recruitment of Harvard physics student Theodore Alvin Hall. Soon afterward, the Bureau determined that the covername YOUNGSTER [MLAD], found in other messages, matched Hall. Special Agents questioned Hall in 1951, but he was never prosecuted (probably because a case could not have been made without revealing AFSA’s program).

Translated messages also corroborated various charges made by Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers. By June 1950 the Bureau determined that the covername ALES, mentioned in one KGB message, referred to former State Department aide Alger Hiss, then serving a sentence for perjury. (56) Around the same time, Lamphere told Gardner that the covername JURIST meant Harry Dexter White, a former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, who had died suddenly a few days after denying Whittaker Chambers’ August 1948 charge before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. (57) The translations also clarified another sensational spy case a few years later when the FBI identified the covername MARQUIS as Joseph Milton Bernstein, a GRU agent linked to the Institute of Pacific Relations and Amerasia magazine. (58)

**Double Dilemma**

The KGB had not been surprised by the wave of charges, arrests, and prosecutions. Intelligence officials in Moscow nonetheless faced much the same dilemma that confronted the FBI and AFSA. Both sides now had sources too important to risk. The Americans and their allies had to be careful in investigating certain suspects. The Soviets had to be equally wary in protecting their agents.

The Soviets apparently had monitored Arlington Hall’s “Russian Section” since at least 1945, when William Weisband joined the unit (see inset). Weisband’s earliest reports on the work on Soviet diplomatic systems were probably sketchy and might not have provided clear warning to Moscow about the exploitability of the KGB messages. By 1947, Weisband could have reported that KGB messages were being read, although by then virtually all of the exploitable messages had been transmitted and were in Arlington Hall’s possession. Where Weisband had sketched the outlines of the cryptanalytic success, British liaison officer Kim Philby received actual translations and analyses on a regular basis after he arrived for duty in Washington in autumn 1949. (59)

Timely warnings from Philby helped the KGB protect some of its agents and operations. Various accounts indicate that in
Who Was William Weisband?

In 1950 one Jones Orin York (covername NEEDLE) told the FBI that he had passed secrets to the KGB since the mid-1930s. A worker in the aircraft industry on the west coast, York said that his KGB handler during 1941-42 had been one Bill Weisband, who had helped him buy a camera for photographing documents.

York’s allegation was disturbing news, implying that the KGB had a mole in the sensitive Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). Born in Egypt in 1908 of Russian parents, Weisband emigrated to America in the 1920s and became a US citizen in 1938. He joined the US Army Signals Security Agency in 1942 and performed signals intelligence and communications security duties in North Africa and Italy, where he made some important friends before returning to Arlington Hall and joining its “Russian Section.” Although not a cryptanalyst, as a “linguist adviser” (he spoke fluent Russian) the gregarious and popular Weisband had access to all areas of Arlington Hall’s Soviet work. Meredith Gardner recalled that Weisband had watched him extract the list of Western atomic scientists from the December 1944 KGB message mentioned earlier.

Weisband always denied involvement in espionage, and the US Government never prosecuted him for it. While suspended from AFSA on suspicion of disloyalty, he skipped a federal grand jury hearing on Communist Party activity. As a result, in November 1950 Weisband was convicted of contempt and sentenced to a year in prison. He died suddenly of natural causes in 1967.

The Venona messages do not hold a definite reference to William Weisband. Nevertheless, three messages mention a “ZVENO” (the Russian word for “link”). The earliest and clearest reference suggests procedures for the KGB’s London residency to use in contacting ZVENO, who was awaiting a transfer to England. ZVENO, according to one message, had spent the last four weeks in an Italian-language course in Virginia and would leave for Britain by mid-July. NSA records show that Weisband spent that June honing his skills in a language (probably Italian) at Arlington Hall, shipped out on 17 July, and arrived in London by 29 July.

(a) Information that York provided in a later FBI interview can be seen in the Washington Field Office’s memorandum “William Wolf Weisband,” 27 November 1953, Document 34.

(b) New York 981 to Moscow, 26 June 1943; this was not fully translated until 1979.

The long spate of prosecutions and loyalty hearings coincided with, and helped heighten, the atmosphere of suspicion and accusations now known as McCarthyism. Republicans in Congress were echoing widespread sentiment when they criticized the Truman administration for its failure to prevent Communism from conquering Eastern Europe and China. "Softness" on Communism abroad was portrayed by Republicans as the corollary of laxness at home. Suspicions that the Roosevelt and Truman administrations had neglected internal security fed charges of a Democratic-led coverup of the wartime Amerasia affair, as well as Eisenhower administration Attorney General Herbert Brownell’s 1953 accusation that then President Truman had ignored FBI warnings about Harry Dexter White in 1946. Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy and allies exploited this confusion and rancor, blaming Communists in the State Department for “losing” China and accusing federal workers of disloyalty on flimsy pretexts.

The tacit decision to keep the translated messages secret carried a political and social price for the country. Debates over the extent of Soviet espionage in the United States were polarized in the dearth of reliable information then in the public domain. Anti-Communists suspected that some spies—perhaps including a few who were known to the US Government—remained at large. Those who criticized the government’s loyalty campaign as an overreaction, on the other hand, wondered if some defendants were being scapegoated; they seemed to sense that the public was not being told the whole truth about the investigations of such suspects as Julius Rosenberg and Judith Coplon. Given the dangerous international situation and what was known by the government at that time, however, continued secrecy was not illogical. With the Korean war raging and the prospect of war with the Soviet Union a real possibility, military and intelligence leaders almost certainly believed that any cryptologic edge that America gained over the Soviets was too valuable to concede—even if it was already known to Moscow.

Intensified political and legal pressure on the CPUSA coincided with shifts in Soviet intelligence tactics. Two pieces of legislation for a time gave the Justice Department broad powers against the Party. Between 1949 and 1957 the government, invoking the Alien Registration Act (better known as the Smith Act), won convictions of a dozen top CPUSA leaders for advocating the violent overthrow of the government. The following year, Congress overrode Truman’s veto and passed the Internal Security Act (often called the McCarran Act), which required Communist-affiliated organizations to register with the government and allowed emergency detention of potential spies and saboteurs.
These and other governmental actions sent the CPUSA partially underground in 1951. Party leaders took this step in an effort to protect essential cadres, but the move actually hastened the CPUSA’s decline. In addition, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 critique of Stalinism prompted demoralizing internal debates in the CPUSA and precipitated the departure of still more members.\(^{63}\) Soviet intelligence officers apparently received orders to steer clear of the closely monitored CPUSA, and they urged assets to avoid open contacts with Communist causes. By 1953 the FBI had concluded that the CPUSA was no longer a serious espionage threat, although the Bureau still regarded it as a potential recruiting ground for spies.\(^{64}\) Nonetheless, intensive surveillance of Soviet diplomats and nationals did not stop KGB and GRU officers, even those working under official cover, from meeting with assets, and from continuing to operate with some effectiveness in the United States.\(^{65}\)

### Venona in Later Years

Allied efforts to translate the wartime cables would continue for years to come (many translations would be first published in the 1960s and 1970s), but identifications of Soviet agents in America fell off in the 1950s. The CIA finally became an active partner in the Venona effort.\(^{66}\) After senior manager Frank Rowlett transferred to the CIA in 1952, selected analysts in the Agency’s Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Staffs used the translations as a reference point to check the memories of KGB and GRU officers who had defected after the death of Stalin. Defectors once again became the US Intelligence Community’s primary source of relatively current information on Soviet intelligence. American analysts sifted the defectors’ accounts and compared them with information supplied by Venona and various liaison services to catalogue Soviet intelligence officers worldwide.\(^{67}\) Venona thus became a touchstone for American counterintelligence.

Spy stories again dominated the headlines during 1957. In January the FBI wound up an operation it had run for almost a decade, hauling in Soviet asset Jack Soble and his associates on the basis of reports from double-agent Boris Morros—whom the Bureau had initially spotted in the company of Vassili Zarubin in April 1943.\(^{68}\) A timely defection in Paris soon led the FBI to an even bigger catch. In the spring of 1957 the KGB recalled from New York an unreliable illegal, Lt. Col. Reino Hayhanen, who feared punishment at home and sought sanctuary in the American Embassy in Paris. Hayhanen gave the FBI enough information to locate the Brooklyn studio of his superior, an artist whom he knew only as “Mark.” Special Agents spotted the elusive Mark when he returned to his studio one last time and found stolen documents and espionage gear in the artist’s hotel room. Arrested in June 1957, Mark gave his name as “Col. Rudolf Abel,” refusing to cooperate further. He was really William Henry Fisher, a senior KGB officer born in England who had entered the United States in 1948. Abel’s arrest marked the first time the government had caught a Soviet “illegal” working in America. Indeed, Abel may well have been Iskhak A. Akhmerov’s successor as illegal rezident in the United States.\(^{69}\)

The year 1957 ended with the FBI surveilling a pair of GRU illegals, Walter and Margarita Tairov, in New York. Although the Tairovs vanished and apparently fled the country in early 1958, the operation against GRU illegals was another first for American intelligence. The CIA had spotted one of the pair in Europe with help from its penetration of the GRU in East Germany, Lt. Col. Petr S. Popov. Timely liaison work enabled FBI Special Agents to amass scores of leads from surveillance of the duo.\(^{70}\) Unfortunately, the couple almost certainly spotted the surveillance, and their flight and subsequent report were among the factors that soon led to Popov’s arrest.

Venona had contributed to just one of these cases. Only a handful of American intelligence officials knew the truth behind the big spy cases of 1957: that US counterintelligence efforts against the Soviets, at least in the United States, had relied on volunteers since the Venona program peaked. This was not for want of trying. NSA had pored over the Soviet traffic and had kept its shrinking Venona team looking for additional leads. The FBI had penetrated the CPUSA and searched for illegals—but still did not catch Rudolf Abel for almost a decade. CIA divisions created clever but only marginally effective programs designed to establish coverage of Soviet installations abroad, to induce Soviet intelligence officers to defect (the REDCAP program), and to monitor the mail of Soviet illegals in America (HTLINGUAL). Despite all these efforts, the Intelligence Community’s most important counterintelligence leads in the late 1950s came from volunteers—both walk-ins like Hayhanen and KGB Maj. Peter S. Deriabin, as well as agents-in-place like Popov and Polish intelligence officer Michal Goleniewski.\(^{71}\) American counterintelligence was once again, as it had before Venona, left to rely on voluntary sources.

Venona, according to US policy at the time, could only be shared with a small, witting cadre of senior American intelligence officers. The tiny fraction of Soviet messages that were read convinced the CIA and FBI that Soviet espionage, at least in the 1940s, was aggressive, capable, and far-reaching—and that at least some wartime spies and agents of influence remained unidentified. Nothing that the West learned in subsequent years suggested that Soviet intelligence had grown any less capable or aggressive. Senior American intelligence officers also knew how poorly American intelligence had fared in its efforts to recruit agents to report on Soviet intelligence operations in the United States. Direct approaches to Soviet officers and illegals in the early Cold War usually failed, and by the 1960s American intelligence was relying on voluntary defectors such as Anatoli Golitsyn and Yuri Nosenko, and defectors-in-place such as Aleksii I. Kulak and Dmitri F. Polyakov, for relatively recent information about Soviet intelligence services. The leads they provided were often valuable but sometimes troubling for Western counterintelligence officers. Remembering how many clues to Soviet penetrations had accumulated in the files before Venona finally provided incontrovertible evidence of espionage against the West, molehunters in the CIA and FBI privately resolved to leave no defector’s tip uninvestigated.
Only a short step led from this conclusion to a new concern among some, particularly in the CIA, that the Soviets might try to stage such defections to feed misinformation to American and Western intelligence services. While this possibility is now considered to have been remote, it could not be resolved beyond all doubt at the time. It was impossible to prove the negative and rule out the possible existence of Soviet misinformation operations designed to distract Western services from the most damaging penetrations in their midst. Even so, American counterintelligence services would spend much of the 1960s doing all they could to prove that negative, and to minimize the possibility of deception.

The extreme secrecy of the Venona information tended to ensure that any precautions would be viewed skeptically by some of the very intelligence personnel they were designed to protect. Only a handful of American intelligence officers had access to the Venona secret, and those who did not have such access had no way, in many cases, to judge the reliability of the evidence gathered against alleged Soviet agents in the 1940s. As a result, even seasoned intelligence professionals viewed the spy cases and internal security debates of the 1940s and early 1950s as McCarthyite hysteria. This attitude probably influenced some in the Intelligence Community as a whole to underestimate the Soviet espionage threat.

Elizabeth Bentley died in Connecticut in December 1963, long before the end of the Cold War she had helped to start. She never knew about the Venona secret, or about the way in which her testimony (among that of others) assisted the program. Before she died, she had been denounced as a traitor, a liar, and a criminal by everyone from her old comrades to a former President of the United States. The controversy over her testimony was only a skirmish in the national debate over the true extent of Soviet espionage, and over the federal government’s attempts to balance competing requirements of civil liberties and internal security. The declassification of Venona augments and clarifies the evidence in the public domain, and consequently should move the debate from the politics and personalities of those who testified in public to the capabilities and actions of political leaders and intelligence officers—both American and Soviet—who worked in many cases behind the scenes.

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**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

**AFSA** Armed Forces Security Agency, 1949-52

**ASA** Army Security Agency (US Army), from 1945

**CIA** Central Intelligence Agency, from 1947

**CIG** Central Intelligence Group, 1946-47

**CPUSA** Communist Party of the United States

**DCI** Director of Central Intelligence, from 1946

**FBI** Federal Bureau of Investigation

**GRU** Chief Directorate for Intelligence, Red Army General Staff

**G-2** Military Intelligence Division (US Army)

**HCUA** House Committee on Un-American Activities, US Congress

**IIC** Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

**JCS** Joint Chiefs of Staff

**KGB** Committee for State Security, from 1954


**MID** Military Intelligence Division (see G-2)

**NIA** National Intelligence Authority, 1946-47

**NKGB** Peoples Commissariat for State Security, 1943-46

**NKVD** Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs, 1934-43

**NSA** National Security Agency, from 1952
Chronology

1939

10 January
Soviet intelligence defector Walter Krivitsky has the first of several debriefings at the Department of State.

26 June
President Roosevelt secretly gives the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Military Intelligence Division (MID), and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) exclusive responsibility for counterespionage.

23 August
Germany and USSR sign Non-Aggression Pact.

1 September
World War II begins as Germany invades Poland.

1940

21 May
President Roosevelt authorizes the FBI to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance of persons suspected of subversion or espionage; surveillance was to be limited insofar as possible to aliens.

5 June
FBI-MID-ONI "Delimitation Agreement" further specifies the division of labor in domestic intelligence work.

28 June
The Alien Registration Act (the “Smith Act”) criminalizes conspiracy to overthrow the government, requires resident aliens to register, report annually, and provide notice of address changes.

20 August
KGB agent Ramon Mercader assassinates Leon Trotsky in Mexico.

1941

10 February
Walter Krivitsky found dead of a gunshot wound in a Washington hotel; the police rule his death a suicide.

5 May

22 June
Germany invades Russia.

29 June
FBI arrests 29 German military intelligence agents, crippling Germany’s clandestine operations in the United States.

23 July
US Government allows Ovakimian to leave the country.

25 September
London KGB rezident Anatoli Gorski informs Moscow that his agent reports London has decided to build an atomic bomb.

7 December
Japanese aircraft attack Pearl Harbor; America enters the war.

25 December
Senior KGB officer Vassili M. Zarubin arrives in San Francisco on his way to succeed Ovakimian as New York rezident.

1942

20 March
MID’s Special Branch begins producing daily “Magic Summaries” analyzing foreign diplomatic messages for the White House and senior military commanders.

13 June
The Office of the Coordinator of Information becomes the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

30 June
Interagency agreement divides signals intelligence duties: Navy assigned to handle naval codebreaking; the US Army’s Signals Intelligence Service to handle diplomatic and military traffic; and the FBI works clandestine radio communications.

8 July
President Roosevelt bars all agencies except the FBI and the armed services from code-breaking activities. The services interpret this directive as authorization to deny signals intelligence to OSS.

1943

1 February
US Army’s renamed Signal Security Agency (SSA) formally begins work on Russian diplomatic traffic.

10 April
KGB New York rezident Vassili M. Zarubin meets CPUSA official Steve Nelson in Oakland and discusses espionage.

15 May
Communist International (Comintern) resolves to disband.

7 August
FBI receives an anonymous Russian letter naming Soviet intelligence officers in North America.

31 October
San Francisco KGB residency acknowledges the receipt of a new codebook.

1944

1 May
The KGB, apparently on short notice, changes the indicator system for its cables, leaving the one-time pad page numbers en clair.
SSA’s Cecil Phillips discovers the new KGB indicator, which is then used to detect “key” duplicated in Trade messages.

December
OSS purchases Soviet code and cipher material from Finnish sources; the Roosevelt administration orders the material returned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

15 December
The War Department transfers operational control of SSA from the Signal Corps to MID.

1945

12 April
President Roosevelt dies; Harry Truman sworn in as his successor.

27 April
A US Army Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM) team finds Russian code and cipher material in a German Foreign Office cryptanalytic center in a castle in Saxony-Anhalt.

8 May
Germany surrenders.

10 May
FBI conducts a lengthy debriefing of former Soviet agent Whittaker Chambers.

June
Earl Browder ousted as leader of the Communist Political Association, which reclaims its old name, the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA).

16 July
The Manhattan Project detonates the world’s first nuclear explosion, Trinity, in New Mexico; Soviet agents had warned Moscow in advance.

14 August
Japan capitulates.

5 September
Soviet GRU code clerk Lt. Igor Gouzenko defects in Ottawa.

6 September
The War Department authorizes merger of SSA with selected Signal Corps units to form the Army Security Agency (ASA), under MID.

12 September
US-UK signals intelligence Continuation Agreement extends wartime cooperation in this field.

20 September
President Truman dissolves OSS.

7 November
Elizabeth Bentley interviewed at length for the first time by FBI agents about her work for the KGB.

1946

22 January
Truman creates the Central Intelligence Group and the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

13 June
The State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board adds the FBI and renames itself the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCiB).

8 July
National Intelligence Authority Directive 5 secretly directs the DCI to conduct, as “services of common concern,” all foreign
intelligence and counterespionage.

10 July
CIG joins the new USCIB and gains access to signals intelligence.

15 July
A Canadian Royal commission releases its report on the Gouzenko affair to the public.

17 July
Attorney General Tom Clark urges Truman to renew and broaden Roosevelt’s 1940 authorization to conduct electronic surveillance on “persons suspected of subversive activities”; the President soon approves.

20 December
ASA’s Meredith Gardner translates part of a KGB message containing a list of atomic scientists.

1947

22 March
Executive Order 9835 tightens protections against subversive infiltration of the US Government, defining disloyalty as membership on a list of subversive organizations maintained by the Attorney General.

26 July
President Truman signs the National Security Act of 1947, creating the National Security Council (NSC) and transforming CIG into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Around 1 September
Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI’s liaison officer on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic.

12 December
NSCID-5 reiterates but qualifies DCI’s counterespionage authority to avoid precluding certain “agreed” FBI and military counterintelligence activities.

1948

1 July
NSCID-9 puts USCIB under the NSC and increases civilian control of signals intelligence.

20 July
General Secretary Eugene Dennis and 11 other CPUSA leaders arrested and indicted under the Smith Act of conspiring to advocate violent overthrow of the US Government.

31 July
Elizabeth Bentley testifies before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA), publicly accusing Harry Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie of being Soviet agents.

3 August
Whittaker Chambers names Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White as Communists in testimony before the HCUA.

19 October
Meredith Gardner and Robert Lamphere meet at Arlington Hall and formally inaugurate full-time FBI-ASA liaison on the Soviet messages.

17 November
Chambers produces the “Pumpkin Papers” to substantiate his new charge that Hiss and White spied for Moscow during the 1930s.

16 December
A federal grand jury indicts Alger Hiss for perjury.

December
FBI identifies covername SIMA as Justice Department analyst Judith Coplon.
1949

4 March
FBI arrests Coplon and Soviet UN employee Valentin A. Gubitchev in New York.

23 March
Truman approves NSC 17/4, which reconstitutes the secret Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to coordinate jurisdiction of FBI and military counterintelligence.

20 May
Defense Secretary Louis Johnson directs a quasi-merger of service signals intelligence in a new Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), subordinate to the JCS.

23 September
Truman announces that the Soviets have exploded an atomic bomb.

1 October
The People’s Republic of China is proclaimed in Beijing.

1950

21 January
Alger Hiss is convicted of perjury.

24 January
Klaus Fuchs confesses to espionage.

9 February
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, in a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, brandishes a list of Communists allegedly working in the State Department.

22 May
FBI arrests Harry Gold for espionage.

25 June
North Korean troops invade South Korea.

17 July
FBI arrests Julius Rosenberg.

24 August
AFSA assigns Soviet intercept material a restricted codeword (“Bride”) and special handling procedures.

23 September
Congress passes the Internal Security Act (the “McCarran Act”), which it would soon pass again over President Truman’s veto. The Act requires Communist-linked organizations to register and allows emergency detention of potentially dangerous persons.

1951

25 May
British Foreign Office officials Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess flee Great Britain to defect to the Soviet Union.

July
CPUSA announces that the Party will operate as a “cadre organization,” with many of its leaders underground.
1952

AFSA detects duplicate key pages in GRU messages.

4 November
Truman creates the National Security Agency (NSA) to supersede AFSA and further centralize control of signals intelligence under the Secretary of Defense and a reconstituted USCIB.

1953

NSA places the “POBJEDA” codebook—recovered in Germany in April 1945—against KGB messages from 1941 through 1943. More than half of the burned codebook proves useable.

5 March
Stalin dies.

6 April
KGB defector Alexander Orlov’s story appears in Life magazine; finally alerting the FBI to his residence in the United States.

19 June
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg executed after President Eisenhower again denies executive clemency.

27 July
Armistice signed in Korea.

6 November
Attorney General Herbert Brownell sparks controversy by claiming in a Chicago speech that former President Truman had appointed Harry Dexter White to head the International Monetary Fund despite FBI warnings that White was a Soviet agent.

1954

20 December
CIA’s Directorate of Plans creates the Counterintelligence Staff, with James J. Angleton as its chief.

1956

8 March
NSC approves the FBI’s proposed “Cointelpro” operation against the CPUSA.

4 June
The Department of State releases Soviet General Secretary Khrushchev’s secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, in which Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s crimes.

October
Soviet troops suppress a popular uprising in Hungary.

1957

25 January
FBI arrests Jack and Myra Soble for espionage on the basis of evidence provided by double agent Boris Morros.

4 May
KGB officer Reino Hayhanen, en route from the United States, defects at the US Embassy in Paris.
17 June
Supreme Court in *Yates v. US* rules the government had enforced the Smith Act too broadly by targeting protected speech instead of actual action to overthrow the political system; this ruling makes the Act almost useless for prosecuting Communists.

21 June
Federal authorities detain Hayhanen's superior, KGB illegal Col. Rudolf Abel, in New York.

15 November
Abel is sentenced to 30 years and conveyed to prison.

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**Part I: The American Response to Soviet Espionage**

**Archival Citations and a Note on the Documents**

The following 35 documents are reproduced in Part I. They represent an attempt to gather some of the more interesting, important, and revealing original documents available to American policymakers and intelligence officers during the period covered by this volume. It is hoped that these documents will provide researchers with ready access to some of the key decisions of the period, as well as give them a flavor of internal US Government discussions and concerns over Soviet espionage in America. Almost all of the documents are published here for the first time anywhere; although most of the documents were already declassified, 13 were declassified by NSA, FBI, and CIA specifically for this volume. In many cases the date of the declassification is marked on the document's first page.

**NOTE TO VIEWERS: The following pages were scanned as graphics.**

(Each graphic is approximately 50KB)
1. Loy W. Henderson, memorandum of conversation [with General Krivitsky], 15 March 1939.

Statement made by General Krivitsky, a former general of the Soviet Army, formerly on duty in the Military Intelligence Section of the Soviet General Staff (alias Samuel Ginsberg)

It will be recalled that General Krivitsky, who escaped from the Soviet Union at the time that the eight Red Army generals, including Marshal Tukhachevsky, were seized and executed, and whose civilian name is Samuel Ginsberg, came to this country with his wife on temporary visitors' visas in the latter part of 1938. In January 1939 he called at the Department and discussed at length certain aspects of Soviet developments with which he was particularly familiar. A memorandum prepared by Mr. Page setting forth some of the statements made by General Krivitsky is attached hereto. While the general was in the Department he told me frankly that he feared that agents of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs (the OGPU) might make some attack upon him or members of his family while they were in the United States. He said he was therefore living quietly and endeavoring not to attract attention to his actions.

General Krivitsky came in to see me today and during the course of a rather extended conversation made a number...
of statements, the substance of some of which are set forth below.

He has sold a series of four articles to the Saturday Evening Post and is writing a book which he hopes to have published in the not distant future.

On Tuesday evening, March 7, he entered a café near Forty-second and Broadway and took a table with a friend, a Mr. Shour, one of the editors of the Jewish Daily Forward, whom he had met while in Paris. While they were talking at this table four men entered the restaurant and seated themselves at an adjoining table. One of these men made obvious efforts to attract the General’s attention and the General recognized him as Sergel Bassoff, an agent of the GPU who had been connected with the American work of that organization for many years and whose record had become known to the General while the latter was engaged in intelligence work in Moscow. Bassoff was formerly a Soviet sailor; he joined the Soviet secret police in 1920; he came to the United States as a Soviet secret agent some time during the early twenties; since his arrival in the United States he has been an employee of the Soviet secret service; he has been naturalized as an American citizen; he has been invaluable as a GPU courier traveling between various European countries on an American passport; in June 1937 he was arrested in Holland while transporting funds but was released shortly thereafter
thereafter, apparently after having called upon the American Consul in Amsterdam for protection; after his release he proceeded to Moscow where he arrived in July 1937 and where he remained for some time.

Mr. Bassoff indicated by gestures that he desired to speak to the General and the General in a somewhat agitated frame of mind suggested to Mr. Shoup that they leave the cafe at once. Before they could get out, however, Mr. Bassoff stopped them and told the General that he desired to have a talk with him. When the General replied that he wished to have nothing whatever to do with Mr. Bassoff, the latter repeated his statement that it was necessary that they should have a talk. Mr. Shoup interrupted to suggest that all three of them go to the New York Times Annex, which was close by, where they could talk in private. The General then asked Mr. Bassoff if he intended to shoot him and Bassoff replied in the negative.

In the office of the New York Times Mr. Sheplin, a member of the editorial staff of that newspaper and a friend of Mr. Shoup, conducted them to a private room. Mr. Shoup withdrew to a distance so the conversation could be carried on without a third person overhearing. The General asked Bassoff who had sent him and Bassoff replied that the meeting had been accidental. The General said that
that he knew that Bassoff must be acting under orders since otherwise he would not dare to talk with a person in such bad standing with the Soviet authorities as himself. Bassoff replied that the General still had friends in Moscow and that many persons continued to have confidence in him. He said, "Of course, we have read all that you have written and we suppose you are writing more." The General then inquired regarding the fate of a number of his friends and was informed that all had been shot. He was also told that the brothers of his wife "had suffered greatly." The intonations and gestures accompanying this statement were apparently made in order to convey the impression that the actions of the General and his wife were responsible for this suffering.

The General asked Mr. Bassoff if the latter was not afraid to approach him in such a manner in the United States. Bassoff said, "I have no fear. I am perfectly safe here." The General then told Bassoff that the latter would not dare take his life. Bassoff made no threat but contented himself with stating that there was nothing particularly to fear; that the penalty for such an act would probably be only a couple of years in jail.

The General told Bassoff to leave at once and not to approach him again. Bassoff thereupon left the building, joined his three friends who had waited outside, and disappeared.
disappeared. The General had paid no particular attention to the three men accompanying Mr. Basoff but Mr. Shov told him later that they appeared to be of the gangster type.

The General told me that he believed that his life was in danger since the GPU organization in the United States was very strong and since he was certain that Basoff would not have approached him unless he had been ordered so to do by the highest Soviet authorities and unless it had been decided that some what may the General must not be permitted to continue writing his experiences and memoirs. He said that in 1935 a GPU agent had been killed in New York City by an automobile in suspicious circumstances. There were ways of bringing about his own death in such a manner as to make it appear to be accidental.

I asked the General if he desired police protection and he replied that he did not presume to make such a request; that he hoped eventually to be able to leave New York and live quietly in some more remote place; but that he could not do so until he had finished some of his writings and had obtained an extension of his permit to remain in the United States, which expired on March 31.

Since General Krivitsky has served for many years in the Military Intelligence Service and since the work of that service is closely connected with that of the GPU (The Commissariat for Internal Affairs), I asked him several
several questions regarding the organization of the GPU in the United States. He replied that there were two distinct branches of the GPU operating in this country. One branch was headed by someone in the Soviet Embassy, a person probably who had no diplomatic rank or perhaps a low diplomatic rank and who had little direct contact with the Ambassador or diplomatic members of his staff. Subordinate to this person were GPU centers in Amorg, Intourist, and the various Soviet consular offices.

The second GPU branch had no connection whatever with the first and like the first, reported directly to Moscow. The head of the second branch lived in New York and undoubtedly many of his agents were American citizens. Although there was some contact between the two branches of the GPU they worked independently.
Office of the Attorney General  
Washington, D.C.  

June 17, 1939

The President,
The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I desire to direct your attention to the importance of investigations involving espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage. For some time an informal committee composed of representatives of the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of War, the Department of Justice, the Post Office Department, and the Department of the Navy, has been acting as a clearing house for data or information concerning such matters. Such data or information was then transmitted to one of the investigative agencies for further action. The great majority of the investigations in this field have been conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the G-2 Section of the War Department, and the office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department.

Experience has shown that handling such matters through a committee such as is described above, is neither effective nor desirable. On the other hand, the three investigative agencies last mentioned have not only gathered a tremendous reservoir of information concerning foreign agencies operating in the United States, but have also perfected methods of investigation and have developed channels for the exchange of information, which are both efficient and so mobile and elastic as to permit prompt expansion in the event of an emergency.

As of course you are aware, the Department of Justice has developed in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation a highly skilled investigative force supported by the resources of an exceedingly efficient, well-equipped, and adequately manned technical laboratory and identification division. The latter contains identifying data relating to more than ten million persons, including a very large number of individuals of foreign extraction. As a result of an exchange of data between the Departments of Justice, War and Navy, comprehensive indices have been prepared.

With a view to organizing investigative activities in this field on a more efficient and effective basis, I recommend the abandonment of the interdepartmental committee above mentioned, and a concentration of investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters in the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the G-2 Section of the War Department, and the office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department.

The directors of these three agencies should in that event function as a committee for the purpose of coordinating the activities of their subordinates.

If the foregoing recommendations meet with your approval, I suggest that confidential instructions be issued by you to the heads of the Departments interested in accordance therewith.

A draft of a memorandum which you may possibly care to use for that purpose, is enclosed herewith for your consideration.

Respectfully,

Attorney General.

Enclosure
No. 2100
3. Franklin D. Roosevelt, to Secretary of State et al., 26 June 1939.

Hyde Park, N.Y.,
June 26, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE POSTMASTER GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters be conducted and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities.

No investigations should be conducted by any investigative agency of the Government into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counter-espionage, or sabotage, except by the three agencies mentioned above.

I shall be glad if you will instruct the heads of all other investigative agencies than the three named, to refer immediately to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any data, information, or material that may come to their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage, counter-espionage, or sabotage.

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

[Document image]

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been operating for a period of many months on the eastern seaboard a shortwave radio station which is utilized by the German Intelligence Service for transmission of reports of German Agents in the United States to Germany. The directors of the German Secret Service in Germany also communicate with this station furnishing instructions and requests for information to the operators of this station for transmission to German Agents in the United States. Needless to say, no one knows that this German communication system is actually controlled and operated in the United States by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who are considered both by German Intelligence Services in Germany and in the United States to be actual members of the German espionage ring. Through this station the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been able to develop voluminous information concerning the identity of German Agents in the United States, their movements, interests and program. All material furnished by German Agents through their complicated channels of communication to this station for transmission to Europe is cleared by State, War and Navy Department officials prior to the time that it is actually transmitted to Germany. Collaboratively, in the operation of this station the undercover Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have been utilized for the transmission of funds for salaries and expenses of German Agents operating in the United States, which has of course resulted in increasing the knowledge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation relative to this espionage group.

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have under constant observation and surveillance a number of known and suspected Agents of the German, Russian, French and Italian Secret Services. The FBI is able through its counter espionage efforts to maintain a careful check upon the channels of communication, the sources of information, the methods of finance and other data relative to these agents. Arrest is considered inadvisable except in extraordinary cases because counter espionage methods of observation and surveillance result in a constantly growing reservoir of information concerning not only known but also new agents of these governments.

(Continued)
Of course, when material is observed passing through the monitored channels which should not reach its European destination, such steps as are necessary are taken to prevent the ultimate delivery of this information.

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are assigned in undercover capacities to those plants engaged in the production of materials which are vital to the national defense and to those factories in which the War or Navy Departments have a particular interest. Thus, Bureau Agents work in munitions plants, shipyards, aircraft plants, engine factories and other industrial units whose products and production are vital to the national defense. Agents selected for these posts are men qualified in the skills of the trade in which they are engaged. Their identities as Special Agents of the FBI are of course unknown to their associates in the plants or even to the plant officials. Not only is vital information pertaining to the production of plants in which these men are engaged developed through these Agents, but they are able through their daily contacts to study and observe fellow employees who may be utilized as confidential informants for the FBI in these plants.

Undercover Agents, of course, never contact their fellow employees and disclose their identities but appropriate contacts are established through regional field offices with plant employees known to be dependable in order that arrangements may be perfected whereby these employees will keep the FBI informed of all matters of interest to the national defense. Indicative of the tremendous coverage established by this method, it is interesting to note that in one Ohio city the Federal Bureau of Investigation has 159 confidential informants in a single industrial unit, all of whom furnish to the FBI information deemed of interest to the production of the plant. None of these informants are known to each other and each believes that he is the Bureau's sole source of information within that organization. Extraordinary care is exercised at all times and situations of this kind to avoid the so-called "Labor Spying" industrial espionage or other matters which would interfere in any manner with employer-employee relationships.

Informants of this character are maintained in more than twelve hundred key industrial facilities. Among the plants in which Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are assigned in undercover capacities are the Carl L. Horden Company of New York, manufacturer of bomb sights, the Vought-Sikorsky Aviation Corporation, Stratford, Connecticut, the Newport News Shipbuilding Company of Newport News, Virginia, the New York Shipbuilding Company of Camden, New Jersey, the Federal Shipbuilding Company of Kearny, New Jersey, the Shipbuilding Division of the Bethlen Metal Company at San Francisco, California, the Bath Iron Works of Bath, Maine, and other plants.
Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are actually operating in undercover assignments for intelligence purposes in many foreign countries. Included in the posts of assignment where men are stationed as of the date of this memorandum is Shanghai, China, where investigation by Bureau personnel has been under way for several months in connection with the espionage operations of German Agents. Specially qualified and carefully selected Special Agents are assigned in various undercover capacities in Mexico, from whence they operate in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Salvador and British Honduras. Other Agents are operating in Cuba, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, Chile and other South American countries. Other Special Agents of the Bureau are on confidential missions in Moscow, Russia, Lisbon, Portugal, Berlin, Spain and Rome, Italy. A large detachment of Agents is stationed in the Hawaiian Islands to devote their entire time to general intelligence matters not only in the Hawaiian group but in other islands of the Pacific.

The office of the FBI at Juneau, Alaska, has been augmented in such a manner as to permit constant control of Bureau Agents in all settlements within the territory of Alaska. Particular care is exercised to constantly maintain appropriate channels of information with its sections of the Territory most adjacent to Siberia. At San Juan, Puerto Rico, the office of the FBI has been further enlarged and serves as the headquarters for a group of specially qualified Agents who from this point cover not only the American insular possessions in the Caribbean Sea but also make frequent visits to the insular possessions of other foreign governments.

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are presently undertaking under appropriate cover a detailed examination of the numerous islands and cays in the Caribbean Sea, with particular emphasis on the minute islands of the Antilles groups. This project contemplates frequent personal contact with inhabitants of all of these islands and periodical physical surveys of the islands to determine whether foreign powers may be concentrating fuel or other supplies in any remote spot.

Bureau Agents are conducting police training schools at the present time in Haiti and another Agent is assisting the Government of Columbia in the improvement of its policing facilities. Another Agent recently completed an assignment in Ecuador, which was designed to improve relations between the United States and Ecuador.
Arrangements have been perfected with the following companies to obtain through their facilities in Central and South America information concerning industrial, financial, political and propaganda manipulations and operations of foreign governments:

- Standard Oil Company of New Jersey
- Pan American Airways, New York City
- National City Bank, New York City
- United Fruit Company of Boston, Massachusetts
- E. R. Grace Company, New York City
- Montgomery Ward & Company, Chicago, Illinois
- Dan and Bradstreet, New York City
- The American Metal Company, Ltd., New York City
- Sterling Products, Inc., New York City
- (Importers of Bayer aspirin and related products)
- Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., New York City
- The American-Colombian Corporation, Washington, D. C.
- Stewart, Jones & Company, Inc., New York City
- American Express Company, New York City
- Smithsonian Institution, New York City
- E. A. Pierce & Company, New York City
- Pan American News Service, Washington, D. C.
- The Hemisphere Corporation, New York City
- Rockefeller Foundation, New York City.

All of these organizations have extensive interests and personnel in Central and South America and are in a position to obtain information of interest and value to the Government of the United States.

The employees of these companies who obtain this information do not know its purpose or the identity of the agency to which it is furnished.
A close and constant liaison is maintained by representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with operatives of the British Intelligence Service. These contacts are maintained not only in the continental United States but throughout the Western Hemisphere and a considerable volume of material is received daily from this source. Information so received is of course transmitted to interested governmental agencies.

Close liaison is maintained with the Canadian Intelligence Service, which it is to be noted operates independently of the British Intelligence Service. This agency has established over a period of many years excellent and dependable contacts in the Western Hemisphere. Officials of the FBI and officials of the Canadian Intelligence Service meet at least once a month in Ottawa, New York City or Washington for the purpose of exchanging data of interest to the national defense of Canada and the United States.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is collaborating with the Pan American Union and the State Department at the present time in perfecting plans for a conference of law enforcement officials and Intelligence Agents of the Western Hemisphere in order to establish a broader medium for the exchange of Intelligence information. Plans are also being perfected for the holding in the training facilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Washington, D. C., in January of a special session of the National Police Academy to be attended only by accredited representatives of the Central and South American countries. A comprehensive and extensive course in police methods, investigative procedure, Laboratory techniques and training methods will be afforded the representatives selected for this school. Invitations will be extended through the State Department to the Central and South American countries to have representatives attend this session of the National Police Academy. Not only will this school enable the FBI to increase its channels of information from Central and South America, but the school will undoubtedly contribute to a greater feeling of good will between the United States and its southern neighbor republics.

For the past year Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have been engaged in the conducting of surveys of plants upon the priority lists of the War and Navy Departments. These surveys are intended to determine the vulnerability of American industrial units to espionage, sabotage and other detrimental efforts of foreign Agents. The Special Agent personnel engaged upon this type of work have received extensive specialized training in all aspects of plant protection and industrial security. To date, complete surveys have been made of more than 350 plants and detailed recommendations made both to the plant management and the War and Navy

(Continued)
Departments as to the steps which should be taken to minimize the possibilities of espionage and sabotage of these plants.

Actually under survey at the present time are 243 plants, in which the War and Navy Departments are interested, and by November last, surveys will have been completed of more than 1,000 plants. Recommendations made to plant management pertain to vulnerable points, hazards, the selection and handling of personnel, the handling of confidential documents, the establishment of identification systems, the initiation or improvement of guard forces, the prevention of fires and other similar subjects pertinent to the protection of such facilities. A staff of more than 250 men is used in making these industrial surveys. Astounding evidence of the lack of comprehension of the potential danger to plants production on the part of plant management is disclosed in many of these surveys.

Collateral to the plant survey program, arrangements have been perfected whereby a special committee representing all of the insurance companies in the United States is cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the problem of industrial protection. Hundreds of carefully investigated and specially trained insurance company inspects make frequent detailed checks of key facilities to ensure that all recommended precautions against fire hazard and other interference with continuity of production may be maintained on an absolute minimum.

The Special Agent staff of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is undergoing extensive expansion but great care is exercised to ensure that the high standards of personnel selection and qualification are not lowered. The training center at Quantico, Virginia, is filled to maximum capacity and in addition, five Special Agent schools are operated in Washington at all times. Through the combined facilities thus available, eight training schools for newly appointed Special Agents are in operation at all times. In addition, upon completion of the training course in Washington, Special Agents when assigned to field duty are required to continue their training under the supervision of Special Agents in charge for a considerable period.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, because of its work in the field of law enforcement, has established and maintained for years friendly contacts with police officials throughout the
country. To insure a coordination of state, county and municipal law enforcement agencies with the Federal program for the national defense, there has been completed a series of conferences with police executives, these conferences being called by the Special Agents in Charge of each division of the Bureau. A nationwide coordinated plan of procedure under the supervision of the FBI with reference to national defense investigations has been worked out. In every section of the country Special Agents in Charge of the FBI field offices have called together groups of police officers, as a result of which there has been established in each community the machinery whereby thousands of police of local, county and state jurisdiction are available for use in the handling of these types of inquiries and investigations which the FBI believes can be referred to those agencies. This program gives the local officers a high degree of pride in the fact that they are cooperating in the national defense program and it likewise serves to assist the FBI in the handling of routine cases which the police are qualified to handle. The system is presently working in excellent manner and as the emergency becomes greater, the machinery so established will permit an even wider use of the services of local law enforcement agencies.

Closely aligned with the program of enlisting the active assistance of local departments has been the development of the FBI National Police Academy. This Academy, inaugurated in 1935, has trained selected officers from local, county and state police organizations in investigative methods and advanced crime detection. An effort has been made in the three months’ course of training afforded officers in this Academy, to qualify them as instructors in their own departments. Thus the FBI graduates of the Academy are in a position to make the FBI methods available in police departments having a total law enforcement personnel of 56,119.

Each year a retraining session of the National Police Academy is held. On October 6th there was completed the Fifth Annual Retraining Session of the former graduates of the Academy and considerably more than 300 of the graduates returned to Washing- ton for an intensive course of study and training in the handling of investigations pertinent to the national defense.

In view of the known practices on the part of certain groups of foreign representatives which extend beyond the scope of diplomatic usages, careful and constant observation is made of these groups in Washington and at other strategic and carefully selected places. This operation is productive of considerable
information of interest to the Federal Government concerning actual and proposed activities contrary to the best interests of the country. This type of work is, of course, done under guarded circumstances and in a most careful manner.

A constant monitoring is maintained of all movements and expenditures of foreign funds, their location, sources and distribution, with special emphasis of course upon those funds in which there is a direct or indirect interest on the part of the German, Italian, Russian, Japanese and French Governments.

Because of the FBI's friendly relationships over a period of many years with various banking establishments, excellent cooperation is received from financial institutions. This monitoring program of course produces much valuable information not only from the standpoint of detecting espionage, sabotage and similar activities for which the funds may be used, but also develops data and information of interest to the Treasury Department in reaching administrative decisions with reference to desirable legislation, etc.

The Bureau has prepared and maintains extensive suspect lists composed of data concerning several thousand individuals located in the United States and its territories whose nationalistic tendencies and activities are considered potentially harmful to the welfare of the United States. These records are maintained according to the nationality of the individuals involved, as well as geographically. In the event of greater emergency or the enactment of additional legislation when it might become necessary to take such individuals into custody or to intern them, the information maintained in these suspect lists, instantly available, sets forth the names, addresses, activities and source of information upon each individual in convenient form for necessary action. This list is of course being increased daily as the facts justify. Individual lists are maintained upon German groups and sympathizers, Communist groups and sympathizers, Fascist groups and sympathizers, Japanese and others.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation Technical Laboratory, which is the largest and best equipped of its kind in the world, has trained personnel constantly engaged in the handling of scientific studies and technical crime detection methods in the solution of espionage and sabotage cases by laboratory procedures.
The Intelligence operations of the FBI require the constant use of skilled experts in document identification, including the comparison of handwriting and typewriting, chemical, physical and other scientific analyses. This Laboratory has proved itself a most valuable adjunct to the investigation of national defense matters. Constant work is carried on in the solution of ciphers, in decoding ciphers, and in similar matters. Research is being continued by members of the Laboratory staff to enlarge the possibility of utilization of Laboratory technicians in internal security cases. Members of the technical staff who are authorities upon the subject of explosives have completed a lengthy series of experiments for the purpose of perfecting methods of handling bombs and infernal machines. Detailed instructions upon this subject are being prepared for dissemination throughout the United States. Included in the experiments conducted was a complete study of the efficiency and practicability of a freezing process which would render bombs ineffective and inoperative. Research has been conducted as to the possible use of portable X-ray equipment in the study of bombs at the points of their location. Experimentation has made possible the wider adoption of spectroscopy in cases involving espionage and sabotage. Extensive research is being conducted in the use of infrared light, ultraviolet light and black light for photographic purposes, particularly in the development of concealed and secret writings.

Radio stations are being operated at strategic points for the purpose of intercepting messages transmitted to European nations by small but powerful portable transmitters in the hands of foreign agents. An experimental radio station is being operated for the purpose of intercepting radio waves carrying impulses transmitted by specially designed teleprinter machines, which messages are not intelligible to receiving equipment designed to receive either regular code messages or voice messages.

Information concerning sabotage methods utilized throughout the world has been obtained and compiled in comprehensive form. In order that Bureau Agents will have first hand knowledge as to the potential means and methods which may be utilized in perpetrating sabotage. The staff of the Identification Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been doubled in the past year and the Identification Division operates on a twenty-four hour a day basis. Daily receipts of fingerprints have doubled in the past year, the daily average number of prints received at the present time approximating 12,000 per day. All of these prints are answered within a 24-hour period. Included in the
4. (Continued)

Fingerprints being searched at the present time are applicants for enlistment in the service of the Federal Government, current employees of the Post Office Department, and persons being engaged to work upon secret and confidential projects for the War and Navy Departments. Two thousand fingerprints are received each day from the Director of Alien Registration and after proper classification these prints are searched and filed as a permanent record of the alien's registration in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This material, of course, provides a valuable source of information relative to the identity, location and background of aliens. Included in the Federal Bureau of Investigation fingerprint collection at the present time are more than 16,000,000 prints. This constitutes the largest reservoir of information based on fingerprints in the world.

Extensive investigations are being conducted upon the basis of complaints received from officials and citizens relative to violations of espionage and sabotage laws, as well as other statutes designed to maintain the internal security of the nation. Indicative of the volume of this work receiving attention, it may be noted that on a single day 2,000 complaints of this kind were received.

The Bureau has established a special unit to handle cases involving violations of the Selective Service Act of 1940. Based upon a comprehensive study of records available from the World War I period, the Bureau estimates that enforcement of the Selective Service Act will require the services of 1,000 field agents. Based upon World War I figures, the Bureau estimated that in the course of the registration and conscription of 10,000,000 males between the ages of 21 and 35, there will be violations of the law on the part of approximately 800,000 persons. On the basis of the average number of cases cleared per agent per month, it would require a staff of approximately 8,000 agents to handle this volume of work. Since, however, the present Selective Service program will be extended over a period of five years, Bureau estimates provide for the use of 2,000 men upon this type of work. A comprehensive program has been outlined which contemplates not only close personal license with the 8,000 draft boards throughout the country, but also a systematic check to locate persons failing to register, persons failing to report to draft boards when called, to investigate cases of conscientious objectors and all other possible violations under the statute.

Close relationship is maintained with the State, War, Navy and Treasury Departments, as well as other departments and agencies participating in the national defense program. The heads of the
various governmental departments are informed promptly of any information obtained which relates to the operations of those departments.

Weekly meetings are held with representatives of Military and Naval Intelligence, the Treasury and State Departments for the purpose of exchanging information of current interest, outlining future programs and otherwise coordinating the work in the Intelligence field.

In a most discreet and careful manner, constant check is being made of those Consular representatives whose conduct is reported to be detrimental to the United States. Their movements, contacts and financial transactions are the subject of constant observation and study.
5. (Continued)

O-8 Report
I.G. No. 3100

OGPU.

The Cheka lasted until March 1, 1922, when its name was changed to the GPU - Gосударственный Политический Управление (The State Political Administration) with little or no changes in function. Gradually, each republic organized its own GPU and on November 22, 1923, the republic GPUs were united into the Государственный Политический Управление (The Unified State Political Administration) (OGPU).

OGPU.

The purpose of the OGPU was to unite all the revolutionary forces of all the republics to "combat the political and economic counter-revolutionary movements, espionage and banditry". The chief of the OGPU was appointed by the Presidium of the then Central Committee of the U.S.S.R. and had a vote in the committee.

The head of the OGPU at that time was also a member of the Supreme Court; and the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. was responsible for the legality of all acts of the OGPU. It was simply another CHEKA with broader powers. These powers grew to such proportions that it became, for a while, the most powerful and feared government agency. It had so much power that its activities were actually curtailed in 1925 when it was incorporated into the N.K.V.D.

N.K.V.D.

At the time of the Civil War all of the republics organized their own republic commissariats of internal affairs. These commissariats controlled the militias, criminal investigations and prisons. But in 1920 these republic N.K.V.D.'s were liquidated and the term was not used again until 1934 when the N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R. was formed as an All-Union Commissariat. It was responsible for the following:

1. Preservation of revolutionary order and state security.
2. Protection of public property.
3. Registration of civil acts, and vital statistics.
4. Protection of the border.

The following administrations were organized and subordinated to it:

1. State security.
3. Border and internal protection.
4. Fire protection.
5. Corrective labor camps and settlements.
6. Department of civil acts.
7. Administrative economic administration.

From M. A. Moscow Report No. 1905 Date: April 14, 1941

3855 44
Although the N.E.V.D. was made an All-Union Commissariat, it again formed the N.E.V.D. in all the republics, except the U.S.S.R., which republic became directly under the All-Union N.E.V.D. The same administrations listed above were organized in all the subordinate administrative divisions down to and including the city or district and village.

At the same time, the N.E.V.D. collegium within the Supreme Court was abolished, and certain cases were referred to the court having jurisdiction. Cases of treason and espionage were referred to the Military collegium of the Supreme Court or to the military tribunal having jurisdiction. Cases coming within the functions of the State Security Administration were all referred to the Supreme Court.

To take over all other court functions of the abolished N.E.V.D. collegium, there was formed the Special Advisory Council within the All-Union Commissariat. It consisted of five members and was actually a court in itself. This step gave the N.E.V.D. even more power for it permitted it to try its own cases.

In November, 1925, the N.E.V.D. took over the surveying and cartography administration of the U.S.S.R. with all of the technical agencies to carry out its functions. This latter was taken over in 1926 when it became an All-Union Administration under the Soviet of Peoples Commissars (SOVIAMIN).

In October, 1925, the administration of highways was brought into the N.E.V.D., where it remains today.

When the new constitution was ratified in November, 1926, the N.E.V.D. became a Union-republic Commissariat and has remained as such to the present time. In February, 1941, the State Security Administration was removed from the N.E.V.D. and formed into a new comissariat.

Today the N.E.V.D. is organized into six administrations:

1. Militia.
2. Border and internal protection.
3. Fire protection.
4. Corrective labor camps and settlements.
5. Registration of civil acts, vital statistics and preservation of state papers.
6. Construction and maintenance of highways.

Each republic, autonomous republic, territory, autonomous territory, city or district and village has an agency of some kind for each one of the above named administrations. Theoretically, each one of these subordinate N.E.V.D. Commissariats controls its own six administrations under the next higher N.E.V.D., but there is no doubt that in practice each administration works in close harmony and directly under the administration of the next superior N.E.V.D. administration.

Although it has not been so stated, it may be that since there are seven (?!) vice commissars, each administration and the chief inspector is under one of these vice commissars. The chief inspector is responsible to the commissioner only and functions as
the Chief Inspector of the Commissariat. The attached chart shows the organization of the N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R. as it is today.

**ADMINISTRATION.**

Since a few of the administrations have little or no military value they are discussed briefly below.

**Fire Protection Administration.**

This administration confines its activities to cities and towns. Each city has its fire department, theoretically subordinate to the city Soviet but with probably a greater responsibility to the fire administration of the oblast Soviet above it. Funds for the city departments come from city budgets and therefore only the fire administration headquarters of the U.S.S.R. and the sixteen (16) republics are financed by the national budget.

In rural communities all fire administrations are voluntary; and since the Soviet Union is 97% rural, it means that 97% of the personnel in the fire administration forces are unpaid volunteers. In addition, all factories and mills also have their own volunteer fire brigades. Hence, the city personnel in the city fire departments is relatively small. The estimated number of fire administration personnel is 60,000 for the entire country, exclusive of volunteers.

**Civil Acts & Vital Statistics Administration.**

This administration is purely civil in character. It is also charged with the preservation of state papers, and the personnel for this administration is trained in the N.K.V.D. Institute mentioned above. Except for the headquarters of this administration, which are established in the U.S.S.R., republics, territories, oblasts and cities, the routine duties of this administration as they apply to small towns, villages and rural areas, are performed by the militia. National funds are used to maintain only the headquarters of the administrations of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics. The personnel is estimated at 22,000.

**Highway Administration.**

This administration is responsible for the construction and maintenance of the All-Union, the Republic, the regional, and the territorial highways. The responsibility for the district and village roads lies with the respective Soviets. The personnel in this administration is made up principally of technicians. The labor for highway projects comes from the corrective labor camps. When an important highway must be built it is not infrequent that an appeal (with rather stiff persuasion) is sent out to the Komsomol, trade unions, Kolkhozak and the Party, to donate services to a highway project. This administration is maintained entirely by the national budget. Its personnel is estimated at 6,000.

From M. A. Moscow Report No. 1903 Date: April 14, 1941

3855 46

Page 4
5. (Continued)

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See the following reports for other administrations:

- **Militia**
  - Report No. 1906 — 2037-2100/71
- **Border Guards & Internal Troops**
  - 2037-1532/2
- **Corrective Labor Camps and Gulags**
  - 1906 — 2037-1532/17

**REMARKS**

The personnel strength of the N.E.V.O. of the U.S.S.R. is estimated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Militia (excluding)</td>
<td>375,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Guards</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise Guards</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Border Guards</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Interior Troops</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Convoy Troops</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Fire Personnel</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Civil Aide Administration</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Highway Administration</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control over this commissariat is actually centralized in the Soviet of Peoples Commissars, where orders are carried out by the Commissar of the N.E.V.O. of the U.S.S.R. In some of the subordinate organs in this central control, the responsibility of maintenance and financing is forced upon agencies other than the U.S.S.R. Although the Soviets disallow forced labor in this country, the organization of this commissariat is interesting to note. In it are the means to apprehend (militia), try and sentence (advisory council) and imprison offenders (corrective labor). Any governmental organization that has a certain need for labor simply calls upon the N.E.V.O. to supply it. If the amount of labor is insufficient to supply the need, it is relatively an easy matter to institute a reign of terror on any present and fill up labor colonies to meet requirements. There is little doubt that during the purges of the past, one eye was kept on the labor needs of governmental projects.

The N.E.V.O., including the State Security, has protected the present regime but has also prevented the development of the country. In close supervision over the people, its program, its raids and arrests, has instilled fear to such an extent that initiative in all phases of national economy has disappeared. The Individual is too concerned with the problem of simply living that he is

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From H. A. Moscow Report No. 1903 Date: April 14, 1943

3655 47

Page 5
5. (Continued)

G-3 Report

i.d. No. 3100

reluctant to attempt any changes or improvements for fear of a mistake - and a mistake means prison. The N.K.V.D. has every individual under observation from birth to death. It registers the birth, assigns quarters, controls internal, as well as external, passports, it prevents or permits travel within the country, its secret agents are everywhere; its actions are swift. An individual simply disappears in the middle of the night and no one ever sees or hears of him again. The N.K.V.D. is used as the check and balance weapon by the government - whenever a group in the government gets too popular, or too powerful, or when Stalin needs scapegoats to cover government mistakes he unleashes his N.K.V.D. The N.K.V.D. and the State Security are the most powerful weapons in the hands of the government. The Soviet Union is in itself a prison and the N.K.V.D. and State Security are its keepers.

Joseph A. Michale,
Major, Cavalry,
Ass't. Military Attached.

1 enclosure:
Chart.

Page 6
6. Hoover to Watson, 18 February 1942.

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

February 18, 1942

PERSONAL AND

Major General Edwin M. Watson
Secretary to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

By dear General Watson:

As of possible interest to the President and to you,
I am transmitting herewith copy of a revised delimitation
agreement executed by General Lee, Admiral Wilkinson and
myself on February 9, 1942. It will be observed that this
agreement outlines the respective responsibilities of
Military and Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation under various conditions.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11650, Sec. 3(3)(2)
Justice Dept. letter, 9-21-42
By JSR, SLH, Date JUN 22 1975

Attachment

By special messenger
February 9, 1942

SUBJECT: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division

The Agreement for Coordination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division.

I. The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the President's Memorandum of June 28, 1939, as augmented by his directive of September 6, 1939, the Delimitation Agreement of June 5, 1940, and the supplemental interpretation and agreements thereunder. It is now agreed that responsibility for investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, counter-espionage, subversion and sabotage, (hereinafter referred to as "these categories") will be delimited as indicated hereafter. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to provide a pool of all information received in that field but it does not imply the reporting agency alone is interested in or will work alone in that field. Close cooperation between the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized necessity.

II. FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigation of cases in the categories involving civilians in the United States and its territories with the exception of the Republic of Panama, the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, American Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake and Midway Islands, the Philippine Islands and the Territory of Alaska other than that specifically described in Paragraph III.
2. Investigation of all cases directed from foreign countries on those occasions and in those situations in which the State, War or Navy Departments specifically request investigations of designated group or set of circumstances.

3. The coordination of civilian organizations furnishing information regarding subversive movements.

4. Jointly with ONI, the coverage of Japanese activities in these categories. ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as heretofore and FBI will continue to expand its operations in this field.

5. Keep MID and ONI advised of important developments, such as:
   
   (a) Developments affecting plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts.

   (b) Cases of actual and strongly presumptive espionage and sabotage, including the names of individuals definitely known to be connected with subversive activities.

   (c) Developments affecting vital utilities.

   (d) Developments affecting critical points of transportation and communication systems. (for c and d above, no protective coverage is contemplated)

6. Ascertaining the location, leadership, strength and organization of all civilian groups designated to combat Fifth Column Activities (overt acts of all sorts in groups of armed forces of enemies); and transmitting to MID, ONI and State Department information concerning these organizations and any information received concerning their possession of arms.
7. Keeping ONI and MID informed of any other important developments.

III. MID will be responsible for:

1. Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the military establishment including civilian employ, military reserve and military control.

2. The investigation of cases in these categories involving civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, the Philippine Islands and the Alaskan Peninsula and islands adjacent including Kodiak Island, the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands and that part of the Alaskan Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay northwest to the town of old Iliamna and thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to Kvichak Bay.

3. Informing FBI and ONI of any other important developments.
IV. ONI will be responsible for:
1. Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories
   in the Naval establishment, including civilians under Naval
   employ or control, and all civilians in Guam, American Samoa,
   Palmyra, Johnston, Wake, and Midway Islands.
2. Jointly with FBI, the coverage of Japanese activities in the
   categories enumerated in Paragraph I.

   ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as hereerto-
   fore, and FBI will continue to expand its operations in this field.
3. Informing FBI and MID of any important developments.

V. The ultimate test of cooperation and coordination of the
   Intelligence agencies is the manner in which they function under conditions
   of national emergency or actual warfare. There should be no doubt as to
   the identity of the agency or official who is primarily responsible for
   carrying on intelligence operations under the broad conditions for
   which the governing principles are listed hereinafter.

   PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW

VI. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has been declared
    by the President, the Military Commander assumes responsibility for Intel-
    ligence coverage. He has authority to coordinate intelligence activities
    of the participating agencies, within the limits of their available
    personnel and facilities by the assignment of missions, the designation
of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration or discipline of the subscribing agencies to which he does not belong, nor to issue instructions to such agencies beyond those necessary for the purposes stated above.

VII. Personnel of the subscribing agencies will still send reports to and be under the continued supervision of their respective headquarters. The subscribing agencies will render such aid and assistance to the Military Commander and his designated representatives as are possible and practicable. All pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or desirable to him shall be furnished by the most expeditious means and methods possible consistent with requisite security. The headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be advised of all information and data appropriately identified as having been furnished to the Military Commander.

VIII. It is assumed that the Military Commander will not hesitate to call upon any governmental agency outside the three subscribing agencies to this agreement for any assistance, cooperation, or activity.

PREADVANCE OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY INTEREST, NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW.

IX. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential theatres of operation. When a Military Commander of such a potential theatre is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the area. In order that the Military Commander may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:
6. (Continued)

-0-

1. Agents of the FBI, of ONI, and of MID will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs II, III, and IV.

2. In addition thereto the Military Commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other two intelligence services will insure that the Military Commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other services.

3. The Military Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he may desire and they may be able to furnish.
I. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the
coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any
additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. When
the Commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it is
recognized that his service is authorized to augment the coverage.
Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under the
cognizance of the other subscribing agency, the Military Commander
should obtain the necessary authority from the War Department.

II. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have
placed the initiative in the hands of the Military Commander, whenever
either of the other two services feel that such a survey to determine
adequacy of coverage should be undertaken, it should be so recommended
through the director of each service.

III. The above provisions contemplate that the War Department will be
the agency administering martial law. When appropriate, the same
principles will govern the Navy Department.

**PERIODS OF NORMAL CONDITIONS**

III. Under these conditions, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division will
operate in accord with the provisions of paragraphs II, III and IV.

IV. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of changing
conditions to modify or amend this delimitation agreement. Such
amendments or modifications when agreed upon by the heads of the
6. (Continued)

subscribing agencies shall be issued in the form of a revised delimitation agreement and not as separate instructions.

[Signatures and titles]

Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department

Director, Office of Naval Intelligence

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

(Continued)
From: Tokyo (NOTNS)
To: Berlin and Helsinki
October 6, 1942

REvised translation
Circular #906 (Seven parts complete)

To Col. Hayashi and Major Hirose.

We have commenced the study of Russian diplomatic and commercial codes, and have obtained the following results. For our information let us know how you are getting along.

1. Extent of interception.

Mostly from Moscow and the Foreign Office in Kuibyshev. Also from the embassies and consulates in Japan and Manchoukuo. Very little material aside from this.

2. Diplomatic.

Subtracting the first group of the text from the third group, the first and second digits give the additive page, the third digit is the same as the second; the fourth and fifth digits give the vertical and horizontal coordinates; the fifth digit is always even; the code seems to be a 4 figure one.

The additive table is 58 pages each of 58 groups. This type is used in all messages centering in Kuibyshev and about ***** of those around Moscow.

C.I. #896 (Japanese) Page 1

ARMY

SECRET
(2) Special form 1(a).

Subtracting the first group of the text from the second group from the end, the first and second digits give the number of groups in the text of the message; the third, fourth, and fifth digits are all either 4 or 6.

In subtracting the first group of the text from the third group from the end, the first, second, third, and fourth digits are very often all the same. This is believed to be the number of the additive table. (The fifth digit is believed to give the consecutively ascending additive page for each message.)

The additive table is 15 pages each of 70 groups. This type is used for about half the messages centering in Moscow and between the representatives in Vladivostok and Tokyo.

(3) Special form 1(b).

Only the difference between the second group from the end and the first group of the text mentioned in the previous paragraph.

This type is used between Tokyo, Vladivostok, Seoul, Hakodate, and Dairen. Between Seoul and Vladivostok (they also) subtract the fourth group of the text from the third group from the end, and the seventh group from the end from the fourth group from the end.

(4) Special form 2(a).

The difference between the second and third groups from the end is a series of 2's and 8's. Moreover the sum of the digits in the third

C. 1. #895 (Japanese) Page 2.

ARMY 44
7. (Continued)

SECRET

The additive table is 40 pages each of 50 groups.

This form is used from Tokyo -- HASHI -- to (LAGOSA ?) and from -- HASHI to Manchuria.

(5) Special form 2(b).

The second group from the end is a multiple of 10. Aside from this it is the same as the preceding paragraph.

This form is used for messages going in the opposite direction as the previous paragraph.

3. Commercial.

The first and second digits of the first group of the text give the vertical and horizontal coordinates. The third digit gives the length of the message. (Up to 85 groups is 1; and increases 1 for each 50 groups thereafter.) The fourth and fifth digits give the additive page.

The additive table is 50 pages each of 50 groups.

a - Kana spelling.

C I. #896

| (Japanese) Inter. | 10/6/42 (12) |
| Trans. | 1/29/43 |
| Retrans. | 2/6/43 (E-d) |

ARMY

Page 3.

The present memorandum records all quickly available information concerning Russian codes which have been transmitted in the Japanese Military Attache (JMA) system of enciphered code.

The transmissions seem all to have taken place from Europe (Berlin, Stockholm, Helsinki, Hungary) to Tokyo (once to Manchuria). The earliest found is dated July 1, 1941; the most recent, December 26, 1942. All but one (number 8 below), which does not seem to be an ordinary code, were enciphered by the C additive-book, no matter what the date or the cipher-alphabet used (1, 2, 3).

Cipher text. The text seems to suffer from more than the usual transmission garbles. It is possible that haste and indifference have produced many of the deviations from intelligible Russian and numerals that are found.

Materials used. Circumstances caused the preparation of the memorandum to be hasty. The various message-parts had already been recorded on cards by originating station, station addressed, date, serial number, additive-book page, and the first and last words of the code involved. Unfortunately, the corresponding terminal numbers had not been recorded. Additional information has been sought principally by inspection of the first and last available parts of each message.

It has been impossible in the time spent to correct many garbles and other inaccuracies in the Russian words or to check the work of the compiler of the cards, although some errors of both sorts have been detected and amended in passing.

Types of codes. Each code is classed, when this could be easily done, as one- or two-part and as four- or five-digit.

Treatment of the Russian (Cyrillic) alphabet. The earliest transmissions (1-3) used the code-values for the letters of the Russian alphabet provided in the basic code of the JMA system. These are properly quadrilateral groups introduced by NC; thus, N1A2Z3 = Russian A. (See 9.) On some occasions, N0 is used only at the beginning and the end of a Russian word, and is to be read before each intervening letter-pair. (See 5.) In the longer code-book messages here treated, N0 never appears, but is to be read before each applicable letter-pair. (See 1, 2, 3, and compare 8.)

It seems reasonable to assume that the abandonment of this method was caused by the great time, effort, and expense it entails. In all later transmissions sent (beginning with 4), the Russian letters were incorporated as individual-letter (IL) spellings into the message in transliteration, the 26 letters of the Roman alphabet being substituted for the 31 of the Russian (the hard sign being omitted). This change in method reduces the length of words by half. The table of transliteration is given below. Note that the use of С, V, Ю, (for У), X, and Про (for С) agrees with the use of the corresponding Norse
letters when applied to Russian. The use of the other letters
agree both with the Norse and with the usual Slavonic transliteration of the Cyrillic letters (cf. Х — [Serbian X = Croatian Ћ],
Г, Ы), except for Ъ (taken away from М, which becomes Z, and assigned to Ч). The special Norse letters for У, Ю, and А have been re-
placed by Ы, У, and A respectively, so that, finally, the follow-
ing pairs of letters are represented each by the same letter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cyrillic</th>
<th>Transl. in English</th>
<th>Transl. used in English</th>
<th>Cyrillic</th>
<th>Transl. in English</th>
<th>Transl. used in English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>А</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>П</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Б</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>В</td>
<td>С</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>С</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>В</td>
<td>В</td>
<td>Г</td>
<td>Т</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>У</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Г</td>
<td>Г</td>
<td>Д</td>
<td>У</td>
<td>У</td>
<td>П</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Д</td>
<td>Ы</td>
<td>Е</td>
<td>Ф</td>
<td>Ф</td>
<td>Ы</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Е</td>
<td>Ы</td>
<td>З</td>
<td>Х</td>
<td>Х</td>
<td>ТС</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ж</td>
<td>Ж</td>
<td>И</td>
<td>Ж</td>
<td>Ж</td>
<td>Ш</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>И</td>
<td>И</td>
<td>К</td>
<td>Ъ</td>
<td>Ъ</td>
<td>ШК</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>І</td>
<td>І</td>
<td>Л</td>
<td>Ы</td>
<td>Ы</td>
<td>Ъ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ІІ</td>
<td>ІІ</td>
<td>М</td>
<td>Э</td>
<td>Э</td>
<td>Ъ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ІІІ</td>
<td>ІІІ</td>
<td>Н</td>
<td>Ы</td>
<td>Ы</td>
<td>Ъ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ІІІІ</td>
<td>ІІІІ</td>
<td>О</td>
<td>У</td>
<td>У</td>
<td>Ъ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>П</td>
<td>П</td>
<td>П</td>
<td>А</td>
<td>А</td>
<td>TA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Transliterated YE when it does not follow a consonant.
b At first the usual Slavonic Ы was used for Ъ. But since
in systems for use in English-speaking countries Ю, ХА, and on
occasion YE are used for Ю, Н, and С, it was thought better, in
order to avoid some one’s misunderstanding a form like
"VUERIVAT" (for "VUEIRIVAT"), to employ Ъ, a symbol widely used
by linguists and lexicographers to express the sound of Ъ.
Hoover to Harry Hopkins, 7 May 1943.

Through a highly confidential and reliable source it has been determined that on April 10, 1943, a Russian who is an agent of the Communist International paid a sum of money to Steve Nelson, National Committeeman of the Communist Party, USA, at the latter's home in Oakland, California.

The money was reportedly paid to Nelson for the purpose of placing Communist Party members and Comintern agents in industries engaged in secret war production for the United States Government so that information could be obtained for transmittal to the Soviet Union.

The Russian agent of the Communist International has been identified as Vassili Zubilin, Third Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR. New York City is his headquarters.

Both Nelson and Zubilin will meet in the near future with other leaders of the Communist International (Comintern) apparatus active in the United States.

It has likewise been determined through a highly confidential and completely reliable source that the National Headquarters of the Communist Party, USA and, particularly, Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA are aware of and have approved of the assignment which has been given to Nelson by the Communist International.

Steve Nelson has used the following aliases: Steve Joseph Nelson, Stephan Wesaroch, Steve J. Wesaroch, Joseph Fleischinger and "Bago." It is reported that he was born in Yugoslavia in 1903. His true name is unknown. According to a biographical sketch of Nelson which appeared in the Daily Worker for November 10, 1937 (when the Daily Worker was admittedly the official organ of the Communist Party), Nelson joined the Communist Party, USA in January, 1923. He claims
9. (Continued)

- 2 -

to have been naturalized under the name, Stephan Measrosh, at Detroit, Michigan on November 20, 1928.

According to Nelson's own statements he performed espionage work for the Soviet Government in 1931 and 1932. In 1935 he was vice president of the Workers Alliance in Pennsylvania and was a subdistrict organizer of the Communist Party in Pennsylvania at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Nelson went to Spain as a political commissier of the International Brigades and rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel. He returned from Spain in the latter part of 1937 and became active in the affairs of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and the American League for Peace and Democracy. Since 1938 he has been a national figure in the Communist Party, USA and is now a member of the National Committee, a high policy-forming body of the Communist Party, USA.

Steps are being taken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to identify all members of the Communist International (Continuums) apparatus with which Steve Nelson and Vassili Zabulin are connected, as well as the agents of that apparatus in various war industries.

Because of the relationship demonstrated in this investigation between the Communist Party, USA, the Communist International and the Soviet Government, I thought the President and you would be interested in these data.

These matters are being brought to your attention at this time for your confidential information inasmuch as the investigation is continuing.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
10. Anonymous letter to Hoover, undated [received 7 August 1943], National Security Agency Venona Collection, 54-001, box D046 [Russian original with English translation].
10. (Continued)

SATO, a agent for the Purchasing Commission in BUFFALO.

LENOV, a agent for the Purchasing Commission in the ports of NEW YORK and FLUSHING. SUBLILIN is assistant for naval intelligence. Not a lot of agents in these ports. The materials are very valuable and dangerous to the U.S.... as they are all being sold on by SUBLILIN through his wife to the Germans.

SUBLILIN, the 3rd Secretary of the USSR Legation in Canada, Z.'s assistant for Canada.

LENOV - secretary of the USSR Embassy in Mexico, Z.'s assistant for Mexico.

DOROCH - attaché of the USSR Embassy here, Z.'s assistant for WASHINGTON. A person who occupies a most special position, ranks next after SUBLILIN in the NKVD, is a 2nd secretary in the USSR Embassy here - MIRONOV, his real name is KLIMOV (SUBLILIN is a general in the NKVD, MIRONOV - a colonel). Both into each other over their positions. In the NKVD line they directed the occupation of Poland. SUBLILIN interrogated and shot Poles in NOZERNO, MIRONOV in BERNBERG. All the Poles who were saved knew these butchers by sight. 10,000 Poles shot near NOZERNO was the work of both of them. If you prove to MIRONOV that Z. is working for the Germans and Japanese, he will immediately shoot him without a trial, as he too holds a very high post in the NKVD. He has some high level agent in the office of the White House.

Postmarked: WASHINGTON, D.C., 2. a.m., 7th August 1943.
10. (Continued)  

Г-н ГУЛУР,

Несмотря на то, что нынешняя обстановка побудила нас сообщить Вам о деятельности, мы напомним Вам о сновом факте: в ГФР (ныне ГДР), слушается странным образом освобождённого правительством, но в известности, нам всем ясно, что он избегает вести настороженную работу с теми, кто находится в нашей стране. В связи с этим, мы хотим подчеркнуть, что любой контакт с ним, будь то в Москве, Вашему представителю или в каком-либо другом городе, будет воспринят как недопустимая провокация.

Другая важная деталь: у нас есть свидетельства о том, что он активно занимался пропагандой за освобождение Западной Германии. Эти действия, как мы полагаем, могли привести к серьезным последствиям для государственных интересов.

Важно отметить, что он является заместителем руководителя комитета по вопросам освобождения ГДР. Его активность в этой области не может быть недооценена.

В заключение, мы хотим подчеркнуть, что любые попытки контактов с ним могут быть восприняты как опасные и вредные.

(Continued)
В НКВД, 2 секретаря посольства СССР здесь — Миронов, его заместитель Зубков, генерал НКВД, Миронов — помощник НКВД. Оба друг друга называют по кличке. Но в НКВД руководят секретарями полиции. Зубков охотник, судя по рассказам полицейских, в Новосибирске, Иркутске, в Отрубовне. Все обвиняєсь полицаи знает своих НКВД. 10000 расстреляны людей под Могилевом деля руки обоих. Роди Миронову, дескать, что 5. рапортует на виновного в колониях, то он неизменно расстреливает его без суда, т. е. имеет такой самозваный вост в НКВД, имеет даже то крупного агента в офисе Вашего Дома.

рассекречено. Washington, 3. xx. 2. am. 7th August 1943.

54

KARIN

February 26, 1944

The American Embassy
Mexico, D.F.

[Signature]

Dear Sir:

Please refer to your cable of February 25, 1944, advising that Jacob Ostapenko, who has been identified as one of the writers of the secret writings emanating from Mexico in this case, met an unidentified individual at a restaurant and conferred with him on the night of February 23, 1944, for forty minutes. This unidentified individual then went to the Russian Embassy and the next day this same individual appeared at the airport in Mexico City in company with Alexei Frolov. Frolov, Russian diplomatic courier who went to Mexico from the United States by plane on January 30, 1944, and was returning to the United States. The unidentified individual then went to the Geneva Hotel, and it was determined that one Paul Klarin was registered at the hotel from 7 East 62nd Street, New York City (the 62 was obtained from a garble and this could be 61), nationality-Russian, registered at the Hotel Geneva since November 23, 1943.

Your office stated that it was believed this individual was identical with Pavel F. Klarin, a Vice Consul of the Russian Consulate-General in New York City, and a suspected Russian agent who had left the United States for Mexico in November 1943, but has not been located. You were advised by Bureau cable dated February 24, 1944 that the Russian Consulate General in New York City is located at 7 East 62nd Street, and were requested to effect a discreet surveillance of Klarin and to forward a picture taken of him and Frolov at the Mexican airport.

Attached for your use are three photographs of Klarin together with his signature. You should advise the Bureau as soon as possible whether Klarin is identical with the unidentified individual mentioned above.

For your information and the information of the offices receiving copies of this letter, the following is set forth. This should be maintained in a strictly confidential manner. You are aware numerous secret writings letters in this case were intercepted up until 1 November 1943, at which time it appears that the subject became apprehensive of the security of their method of communication. They indicated that couriers were to be used in the future for their communications, and we know that an attempt was actually made to use Mr. Anna Collins, New York City, as a courier.
It now appears from the information furnished by your office relative to Epstein's meeting with the unidentified individual believed to be Klarin, that the subjects are using either Russian diplomatic pouch or the Russian diplomatic pouch or both. This consideration should be borne in mind by all offices investigating this case.

The following is background information regarding Klarin as published to the State Department when Klarin became attached to the Russian Consulate General in New York. His full name is Pavel Panteleevitch Klarin, born August 15, 1903, Iasi, former Kharov, Gubenov, Russia. He graduated from high school in Iasi in 1920, and from the economic faculty of the Don State University in 1928. He was employed as a field economist for "chosen" in various parts of the Soviet Union from 1925 to 1931. From 1931 to 1935 he was the economist of the All Ukrainian Union of Cooperatives. From 1935 to 1937 he was economist of the All Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce; from 1937 to April 1939, senior economist of the People's Commissar of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. From April to June 1939, he headed the Agriculture Section of the Soviet pavilion of the New York World's Fair, and then served as administrator assistant to the Commissioner General of the U.S.S.R. at the Fair. On February 17, 1940, he became Vice Consul of the Consulate General, located at 7 East 41st Street, New York City. He listed his American address as 11 East 41st Street, New York City. He stated that he came to the United States on April 6, 1939, aboard the L. D. Green Mary that he is the father of two children, Kladya, 16 years old in January 1941, and Mada, 9 years old in January 1940.

There is a copy of a letter from the Immigration and Naturalization Service to the State Department dated March 9, 1940, indicating that Klarin was admitted to the United States at the port of New York on April 4, 1939, temporarily for business, destined to the Antony Trading Corporation, and was to leave the United States within thirty days after the close of the New York World's Fair. He requested an extension of five months to complete work as an employee of the Soviet Commission in the New York World's Fair, but this request was denied on January 30, 1940, since the World's Fair was not to re-open in 1940. A request was then submitted by the Consul General in New York for a change in Klarin's status from a temporary visitor to that of a government official, he having been appointed Vice Consul of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in New York and his appointment accepted by the United States Government and certified by the Secretary on April 4, 1940.

Surveillance conducted by the New York Field Division have established that Klarin has been in considerable contact with Vasilii Nikolaevich Sobilin, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., and undoubtedly the head of the Soviet intelligence activities in the United States at the present time. It has been found that Sobilin and Klarin have met a number
of times in the early hours of the morning, sometimes at 3:00 and 4:00 A.M.

Zublin was born January 22, 1900, in Moscow, Russia. He claims to have been graduated from the Pushkin Institute of Literature and to have subsequently held several positions in the People's Commissariat for Finance of the U.S.S.R., which is known as Barkunin. In 1941 he was appointed attaché of the Soviet Embassy in China. In 1942 he was appointed Third Secretary of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in Washington, D.C., and he is at the present time the Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy.

For your strictly confidential information, it has been determined that Zublin paid a sum of money to a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party in April 1943, for the purpose of defraying expenses of Communist Party members engaged in espionage activities of the Soviet Union and for Communist Party couriers.

According to information received, Zublin holds the rank of general in the KGB and is engaged in the movement of Soviet agents into and out of the United States. He reportedly organizes secret radio stations, prepares counterfeit documents, and obtains industrial and military information for transmittal to the Soviet Union.

For your guidance in the investigation of Soviet agents in Latin America, the following information is furnished to show the type of information Soviet agents in the United States, both those who are members of the Communist Party, USA, and those who are Soviet citizens, are attempting to obtain.

1. Formulas and blueprints for all inventions, discoveries and innovations of a military significance.
2. Formulas and blueprints for all inventions, discoveries, and innovations of an industrial significance.
3. Information regarding the means of communication between individuals in this country and persons in occupied European countries who do not wish to have their nations anxious of the Soviet Union at the close of this war.
4. Information regarding the number of students and the curricula of the schools operated by the United States Army for administrative officers who are to be sent to territories freed from Axis occupation.

Zublin's closest assistant in the Soviet Consulate General in New York was Nevel F. Klimin, now in Mexico. It is reported that in Mexico Zublin's assistant was Leon Krasny, First Secretary of the Russian Embassy at Mexico City. It should be noted that
Leon Tarasov was accompanying Alexei Prochorov at the time Prochorov departed from Mexico City by plane on February 22, 1944.

All of the above information is extremely confidential and must be so maintained by all of the offices receiving copies of this letter. It is furnished to aid in the investigation of this case, which is of increasing importance to the Bureau. It is requested that all offices submit investigative reports of investigations to date within the very near future, and that all offices conduct all necessary investigation promptly and thoroughly.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Codes

You will recall our conversation on the Soviet codes. I have informed General Donovan that he should send through General Deane in Moscow to General Petin, the Soviet General with whom Donovan deals on all matters connected with the exchange of information in his field, a message informing the Soviet Government that in dealing with other matters one of our agencies had run across certain material which purported to be related to Russian messages sent in code. He was also asked to explain that we had taken advantage of the opportunity to prevent this material from falling into the hands of the enemy and that we would immediately make it available to the Soviet Government if they so desired.

I feel sure that this will take care of the matter, as the Soviet Government will be informed and will see that we are fully disposed to cooperate with them and not retain any material which they themselves might desire to have.

Edward P. Stettinius, Jr., Memorandum for the President, “Soviet Codes,” 27 December 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, President’s Secretary’s Files (Subject File), “Russia—1944,” box 49.
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police have advised that they have obtained positive information through a former employee of the Soviet Military Attache at Ottawa, Canada, that the Soviets have an extensive espionage network in Canada. The Soviets have made the obtaining of complete information regarding the atomic bomb the Number One project of Soviet espionage and these data must be obtained before the end of this year. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police report that there is considerable loose talk in the Office of the Soviet Military Attache in Ottawa regarding the "next war" which the Soviet Union will have with the Anglo-American nations.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police received from the same source information that an assistant to an Assistant Secretary of State under Mr. Stettinius was a paid Soviet spy. This man's name, or nickname, is unknown at the present time but further inquiry is being made by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in an effort to obtain further identifying data. No information regarding this situation is being furnished to the State Department in the absence of further identifying data.

With regard to the atomic bomb project, Dr. Allan May, a British scientist assigned to the McGill University Laboratory in Canada, has been identified as a paid Soviet spy of long standing. Dr. May spent some time during September, 1944, at the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago, working on the separation process for uranium and is well informed as to the methods of setting up uranium piles or lattices.
13. (Continued)

With assurances of my highest esteem and best regards,

[Signature]

[Handwritten note:]

May 4 or 5 is reported to have continued the searches in Oceana with a small quantity of U233 which is one of the isotopes of uranium and this operation was from directly to ioaco.
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

Date: September 24, 1945

To: Mr. Frederick B. Lyon  
Chief  
Division of Foreign Activity Coordination  
State Department  
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SOVIET SPIONAGE ACTIVITY

Reference is made to my memorandum of September 18, 1945. Additional information has been obtained by a Bureau representative from Igor Gouzenko as follows:

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Gouzenko stated that all intelligence activities outside the Soviet Union and inside the Soviet Union are coordinated by S. M. Malenkov, a member of the Bureau of the All Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a member of the Central Committee of the same organization and the man who is mentioned by many Soviet officials as Stalin's successor. Malenkov, according to Gouzenko, is actually the head of all intelligence activity, and Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, the NVD and the political apparatus are all ultimately responsible to him.

There are numerous jurisdictional clashes, particularly between the Military and Naval Intelligence organizations and the NVD. All such matters are referred to Malenkov.

Malenkov is the actual head of the political apparatus in foreign countries and all communications, reports, etc., enter, from the Political Secretary in any Embassy are sent directly to Malenkov and not to Bolotov or any person in the Peoples Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

Likewise, no communication from the Military or Naval Attaché in any Embassy would go to Bolotov. Such communications go to the Chief of Espionage for the area covering the particular Embassy.

In the same way, the Embassy Secretary who represents the NVD does not send any correspondence to the Peoples Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. According to Gouzenko, the only person in the Embassy who would be corresponding with the Peoples Commissariat of Foreign Affairs would be the Ambassador himself, who in every instance is only a front, and possibly one or two men close to the Ambassador who are called "innocents."
Gusenko stressed that the ambassador was advised in general terms of political and economic matters which the Political Secretary, the MVD representative and the Military or Naval Attaché received and which they felt would possibly be of interest to the ambassador. The ambassador, however, is not consulted or advised with regard to the primary functions of these intelligence organizations.

According to Gusenko, he has heard discussions in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa indicating that the present system of superintending the activities of the Communist Party of a particular country through the Political Secretary in the Embassy is much more efficient and much more effective than the old cumbersome Communist setup. Under the present organization, the directives issued by Kalakov through the Embassies to the Parties throughout the world are much more direct and there is less possibility of misinterpretation.

The man in the Embassy in Canada who handles political matters is Gouzarov, the Third Secretary, who has his own cryptographer, one Potemkin, who also acts as a door guard at the Embassy.

The aforementioned system is known to Gusenko to be in operation in the United States, Canada and Mexico and possibly in the other Western Hemisphere countries. It is also in effect in Great Britain, to his personal knowledge. He believes that this system is likewise in effect in all other countries in the world where the Soviets have diplomatic establishments, although there are variations for those countries occupied by the Red Army.

Gusenko states that in the Western Hemisphere and in Great Britain no reports are ever made to Moscow directly by individual espionage agents, whether they refer to military, industrial or political espionage. All such reports clear through the embassies and are transmitted by the Embassies.

NOTICE PERIODIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS OF GOVERNMENT

Gusenko stated that from conversations which he had heard in the Embassy and from traffic which he had read, it appeared the Soviets were intending to plant new Soviet espionage agents in the diplomatic establishments already in the United States and Canada, as well as in those diplomatic establishments which are yet to be set up in the United States. These espionage agents are to be sent from Eastern, Central and Balkan European countries. These would number between 50 to 100% of the employees below the rank of ambassador and would actually be Soviet trained military intelligence, MVD or Comintern men.

Gusenko pointed out that Lieutenant Kalakov had told him that one of his, Kalakov's, best friends is an officer in the MVD. This MVD officer is
the code clerk for the Lublin-Polish Embassy in Moscow. Kulakov’s friend reports his NKVD uniform to work and it is apparently a standing joke in Moscow that the NKVD operates the Polish code room.

According to Gumansko, another NKVD man who is a close friend of Lieutenant Kulakov in Marshal Tito’s personal cipher clerk in Yugoslavia, Gumansko states that this cipher clerk is almost worked to death because Tito sends messages to Moscow asking for instructions and advice on the most minor matters.

Gumansko stated that Soviet Intelligence had good coverage at the present time in the Czech Embassies and he knows from reading dispatches that the Military Attache who is being assigned to the Czech Legation in Ottawa is a Soviet espionage agent. This individual had expected to be appointed Adjunct to the Chief of the Czech General Staff, but the Soviets decided that he should go to Canada in the immediate future as Military Attache, considering this to be an equally important post.

Gumansko stated that in Washington, D. C. the Czech Military Attache is a Soviet spy named Hess. It seems that Colonel Zabotin, the Soviet Military Attache in Ottawa, made a trip to Washington shortly after his arrival in Ottawa and sent a cable to Moscow telling them that he had met Hess, who seemed to be sympathetic and that Zabotin felt that he could be developed. Moscow immediately cabled back that Zabotin should stay away from Hess because he was already being operated as a spy by General Sarcev, Soviet Military Attache in Washington, D. C.

INTERNATIONAL PLANS OF THE SOVIETS

Gumansko was asked what the attitude of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa was towards the San Francisco Conference and the other conferences in which the United States, Great Britain and Russia played leading roles.

He stated that in the Embassy the meetings of the All-Union Communist Party are secret, while the meetings of the Provisional Union discussed such matters. They were likewise discussed in the meetings of the Komsomol (Young Communist League), which is known in the Embassy as the “Sports League,” and there was also considerable loose talk in the Embassy itself. From these incidents, Gumansko understood that many of the Soviets considered all such conferences as merely “talk fest” which served only to conceal from the Anglo-American powers and from the rest of the world the actual plans of the Soviets. Anything of a material nature which could be gained by the Soviets through such conferences was, of course, all to the good and would not have to be gained by force of arms.
He stated that he had been told that the Soviet Union's budget for war, which would include intelligence activities, appropriations for the Red Army and Red Navy and for war production, would be greater during the coming year, which was ostensibly a year of peace, than it had been last year during a year of actual warfare.

He further stated that he had been informed that the Soviet Union was not converting its factories to consumer goods production, such as the United States and Canada had announced these countries were doing, but, on the other hand, the Soviets were increasing their war potential by setting up additional plants devoted solely to war production in Siberia. He stated that he was informed that the Soviets would continue to increase their industrial production for war and would obtain consumer goods from factories in the satellite states of Eastern Europe and through purchases in the Western Hemisphere.

Gusenko stated that the Soviets before the use of the atomic bomb were confident that within ten years their military potential would enable them to conquer the world. Since the atomic bomb has been used by the United States, they have set their calendar ahead and have instructed all espionage agents to make the obtaining of the complete construction plans of the bomb itself the No. 1 espionage project. They have issued instructions that this information should be obtained by the end of this year, 1945. Gusenko stated that the last message received at the Embassy from Moscow before he left on September 5, 1945, was stressing the necessity for obtaining the atomic bomb before the end of this year.

He was asked whether this meant the Soviets had set their calendar up the full ten years. He stated he did not know, but that he was merely telling what he knew.

Gusenko stated that all responsible Soviet officials know that the Soviet Union is aiming toward beating the United States and Great Britain in the new war, which will permit the Sovietization of the entire world.

THE PERSONALITY OF BUJING AGENT IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Gusenko was questioned carefully regarding the possible identity of the individual in the Department of State under Stalin who is a Soviet spy. Gusenko stated he did not know the man's name but that he had been told that an assistant to Stalin was a Soviet spy. This information came to him in the following manner:

After the arrival of Bukovsky in Ottawa in the Summer of 1945, Bukovsky and Gusenko got into a discussion on the agencies of the Canadian organization as compared to the United States organization. Gusenko was bearing in mind the
diverge opinions held by the Soviet inspectors with regard to the American organization in 1944. Kulakov informed Ouzenko that although the Canadian organization was closely knit and well operated and most productive, that there were, of course, more agents in the United States and that he had learned in Moscow that an Assistant of Stettinius, then the United States Secretary of State, was a Soviet spy. Ouzenko pointed out that this information could necessarily have come to Kulakov’s attention prior to May 17, 1944, because that he did not ask for the name of this individual because Kulakov would have suspected his motives, since it involved an individual who was not being run by Colonel Sobchak.

Ouzenko pointed out that the Soviets were frantic to obtain the secrets of the atomic bomb and that an incident had been reported in the press recently which appeared to him to have been inspired by a Soviet agent. This Soviet agent might not necessarily be the same one to whom Kulakov referred, but on the other hand, it had all the earmarks of the technique used by Soviet agents in London by Stettinius that the atomic bomb should be turned over to the Security Council of the United Nations. Ouzenko suggested that if the Bureau could determine who suggested to Stettinius that this statement be made, the Bureau might be able to identify a Soviet agent, if not the Assistant to Stettinius referred to by Kulakov.
Dear General Vaughan:

As a result of the Bureau's investigative operations, information has been recently developed from a highly confidential source indicating that a number of persons employed by the Government of the United States have been furnishing data and information to persons outside the Federal Government, who are in turn transmitting this information to espionage agents of the Soviet Government. At the present time it is impossible to determine exactly how many of these people had actual knowledge of the disposition being made of the information they were transmitting. The investigation, however, at this point has indicated that the persons named hereinafter were actually the source from which information passing through the Soviet espionage system was being obtained, and I am continuing vigorous investigation for the purpose of establishing the degree and nature of the complicity of these people in this espionage ring.

The Bureau's information at this time indicates that the following persons were participants in this operation or were utilized by principals in this ring for the purpose of obtaining data in which the Soviet is interested:

Dr. Gregory Silvermaster, a long time employee of the Department of Agriculture.

Harry Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury.

George Silverman, formerly employed by the Railroad Retirement Board, and now reportedly in the War Department.

Laughlin Currie, former Administrative Assistant to the late President Roosevelt.
Victor Perlow, formerly with the War Production Board and the Foreign Economic Administration.

Donald Wheeler, formerly with the Office of Strategic Services.

Major Duncan Lee, Office of Strategic Services.

Julius Joseph, Office of Strategic Services.

Helen Tenney, Office of Strategic Services.

Maurice Halperin, Office of Strategic Services.

Charles Kramer, formerly associated with Senator Kilgore.

Captain William Ludwig Ullman, United States Army Air Corps.

Lieutenant Colonel John H. Reynolds of the United States Army, a former contact of Gaik Ovakimian, former head of the Soviet Secret Intelligence (KGB) in New York, is also apparently involved in the Soviet espionage activities stemming from Washington, D.C.

In addition to the foregoing group in the Government, it appears at this time that Mary Price, formerly Secretary to Walter Lippmann, the newspaper columnist and presently publicity manager of the United Office and Professional Workers of America, CIO, is also associated with the foregoing group.

The Government documents were furnished to Gregory Silvermaster, who thereafter photographed them and turned over the undeveloped, but exposed film to a contact of the Soviets.
in either Washington, D. C. or New York City. In the past, it is reported, the contact man made trips to Washington, D. C.
one every two weeks and would pick up on such occasions an average of forty rolls of 35-millimeter film.

Investigation of this matter is being pushed vigorously, but I thought that the President and you would be interested in having the foregoing preliminary data immediately.

With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards,

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

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16. Hoover to Vaughan, 1 February 1946 [Attachment not included].

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

February 1, 1946

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Brigadier General Harry D. Vaughan
Military Aide to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Vaughan:

As of interest to the President and you, I am attaching a detailed memorandum hereto concerning Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the United States Treasury Department.

As you are aware, the name of Harry Dexter White has been sent to Congress by the President for confirmation of his appointment as one of the two United States delegates to the International Monetary Fund under the Bretton Woods agreement. In view of this fact, the interest expressed by the President and you in matters of this nature, and the seriousness of the charges against White in the attached, I have made every effort in preparing this memorandum to cover all possible ramifications. As will be observed, information has come to the attention of this Bureau charging White as being a valuable adjunct to an underground Soviet espionage organization operating in Washington, D. C. Material which came into his possession as a result of his official capacity allegedly was made available through intermediaries to Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, his wife, Helen White Silvermaster, and William Ludwig Ulmann. Both Silvermaster and Ulmann are employees of the United States Treasury Department, reportedly directly under the supervision of White.

The information and documents originating in the Treasury Department were either passed on in substance or photographed by Ulmann in a well-equipped laboratory in the basement of the Silvermaster home. Following this step, the material was taken to New York City by courier and made available to Jacob M. Golos, until the time of his death on November 27, 1945. Golos, a known Soviet agent, delivered this material to an individual tentatively identified as Gall Ovakianian. Ovakianian you will recall was arrested some years ago as an unregistered agent of the Soviet Government and subsequently, by special arrangements with the Department of State, was permitted to return to the U.S.S.R.

After the departure of Gall Ovakianian, Golos delivered his material to an individual who has been tentatively identified as Dr. Abraham Benedict Weinstein. Subsequent to the death of Golos, the carrier handling material received from the Silvermasters and Ulmann delivered it through an unidentified
individual to Anatole Raisovich Gromov, who until December 7, 1945, was assigned as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., when he returned to the U.S.S.R. Gromov had previously been under suspicion as the successor to Vasili Zubilin, reported head of the MVD in North America, who returned to Moscow in the late summer of 1944. This whole network has been under intensive investigation since November, 1945, and it is the results of these efforts that I am now able to make available to you.

I also feel that it is incumbent upon me at this time to bring to your attention an additional factor which has originated with sources available to this Bureau in Canada. It is reported that the British and Canadian delegates on the International Monetary Fund may possibly nominate and support White for the post of President of the International Bank, or as Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund. The conclusion is expressed that assuming this backing is forthcoming and the United States acquiesce, if not concurrence, resulting, White's nomination to this highly important post would be assured. It is further commented by my Canadian source that if White is placed in either of these positions, he would have the power to influence to a great degree deliberations on all international financial arrangements.

This source, which is apparently aware of at least some of the charges incorporated in the attached memorandum against White, commented that the loyalty of White must be assured, particularly in view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. has not ratified the Bretton Woods agreement. Fear was expressed that facts might come to light in the future throwing some sinister accusations at White and thereby jeopardize the successful operation of these important international financial institutions.

I thought you would be particularly interested in the above comments, which originated with sources high-placed in the Canadian Government, on the subject at hand.

With expressions of my highest esteem,

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Attachment

October 21, 1946

17. (Continued)

UNDERGROUND SOVIET ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION (NSOO)
IN AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

PREDICATION

BACKGROUND OF CURRENT PRESENTATION

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth certain charges against officials and employees of the Federal Government. These charges will be dealt with in detail and information arising from other sources and investigation will be coordinated in an effort to give an over-all view of the situation concerning underground Soviet espionage activities in the United States Government at the present time.

A time element exists in making a factual approach to the material set forth. Although the majority of the basic charges against the individuals mentioned herein concern activities dating back several years, these charges must be viewed from the fact that they only became available in November of 1942. Consequently the reader must consider the difficulty of actually proving these activities by investigation at this late date. The facts are strong in many instances and circumstantial in others primarily because of the disparity in time between the date of the activities and the actual report of these activities to the authorities. A determined effort has been made to produce as much actual and circumstantial evidence as possible, either to prove or disprove the basic charges. At the outset it is considered proper to make a statement concerning the source of the basic charges which will be outline hereinafter. This source who became available and cooperative in November, 1942, for protective purposes in view of continued assistance being received thereafter, is being given the cover name of Gregory. All material originating with Gregory will be so designated and will be set forth as nearly as possible in the very words used by Gregory in reporting the material submitted.

BACKGROUND OF GREGORY

Gregory is an individual of American origin and descent, and was educated in both American and foreign educational institutions. Gregory possesses far above the average of academic learning. As far as political affiliations are concerned Gregory first came in contact indirectly with the Communist Party while attending one of the leading educational institutions of New York City. Gregory's first activity was as a speaker for the American
League Against War and Fascism in late 1924 or early 1925. The American League Against War and Fascism was succeeded by the American League for Peace and Democracy, both of which have been reported from numerous sources to be generally accepted as Communist front organizations. From contacts made while appearing as a speaker for the American League Against War and Fascism, Gregory was introduced to and became a member of the Communist Party in 1925 in New York City. Following this affiliation Gregory held numerous temporary positions having no relationship to Communist Party activities but at the same time in an extra-parliamentary manner participated in many of the activities of the party and its fringe groups. As an example, Gregory, during the summer of 1926, served as an assistant at the Antory Camp in Niagara, New York, a summer camp for the children of Soviet nationals, attended by children ranging in age from 5 to 10. In June of 1928 through an employment bureau of the educational institution attended by Gregory, contact was made with the Italian Library of Information, an adjunct of the Italian Propaganda Ministry situated at 556 Madison Avenue, New York City. Gregory there came in contact with information which was thought of interest to the Communist Party. In a then sincere effort to assist the Communist Party, Gregory approached Ferrari, a former member of the Communist Party of Italy, a former student of the Lenin School, Moscow, USSR, and an individual who since his arrival in the United States in 1928 has been active in the National Administration of the Communist Party. Gregory remained with the Italian Library of Information until March, 1929. In the meanwhile Ferrari had introduced Gregory to an individual originally known only as "Tim." "Tim" was later identified by Gregory as Jacob N. Solos of World Tourist, Inc. After the introduction to Solos, Gregory information to him rather than to Ferrari. The activities of Solos will be set forth in detail hereinafter.

In September, 1928, at the instigation of Solos, Gregory secured a position as secretary to Bernard R. Haldo, the president and owner of Checkers Syndicate which published and distributed the "Checkers". Solos explained to Gregory that Haldo was suspected of being affiliated in some way with the Communist Party and the Communist Party was seeking information concerning his activities. Haldo between September, 1929 and February, 1940, in fact, was successful in securing considerable information regarding proving what the Communist Party desired were forthcoming. In April, 1941, the United States Service and Shipping Corporation, 215-5th Avenue, New York City, was organized, and Gregory became an official of this organization. This company was established with many belonging to the Communist Party - USA, or to the Soviet Union, made available by Earl Browder, then National Chairman, of the Communist Party. According to Gregory, Browder made available $15,000 and Browder for this position, submitted another $5,000 to augment the capital. While Browder in this connection were funds of the party, Gregory's superior in the Social Intelligence Service described the funds as "Russian Funds." The United States Service and Shipping Corporation, Gregory states, is a cover firm for Soviet espionage, in the same category with World Tourist, Inc., with which Solos
was associated up to the time of his death on November 27, 1943. The ostensible business purpose of United States Service and Shipping Corporation is to engage in the shipping of parcels and merchandise to Soviet Russia.

**Synopsis of Gregory's Courier Activities**

As outlined above, Gregory's first contact with the Soviet Intelligence Service was with an individual known only as "Tina" who, in view of definite identification at a later date will hereinafter be referred to as Jacob M. Golos, Secretary of World Tourist, Inc. World Tourist, Inc., was a New York corporation chartered on June 10, 1927. It is interesting to note that Golos pleaded guilty to an indictment along with Ward Tourist, Inc., charging failure to register as agents of the Soviet Government in March, 1940. He received a fine of $500 and a jail sentence of four months to one year which was later changed to probation.

After the passage of an initial probationary period, when Gregory was supplying Golos with material secured from the Italian library of information, Golos began to use Gregory as a courier for the collection of information from various individuals in Washington, D.C., and New York City, or had sources therein. During early activities as a courier, Gregory became definitely aware of the connection of Golos with the Soviet Intelligence Service, namely the A.N.S. as distinguished from the Red Army Intelligence. Regular service as a courier began during the summer of 1941 when Gregory came in contact with a parallel of Soviet espionage headed by Nathan Silvermaster, who had held several positions in the United States Government in past years and is now Chief of the Division of Economic Analysis of the War Assets Administration. Silvermaster and his wife, Helen White Silvermaster, according to Gregory, were in turn in contact with many other individuals in the United States Government from whom they secured material and made it available to Golos. This material was delivered to Gregory in the form of written reports, actual documents, exposed but undeveloped film and verbally requiring its recording in shorthand which Gregory later transcribed. Gregory was eventually placed in contact with another parallel of Soviet espionage, headed by Victor Perlo, who was formerly employed with the War Production Board and later by the Foreign Economic Administration. Gregory met Perlo with others at the apartment of John Abe in New York City who was then and is now General Counsel for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, Inc. Abe is married to Jessica Smith, the President of the N.E.T., Communist and pro-Soviet propaganda organ. 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certain material was delivered to one "Jean" who has not been further identified to date. "Jean" was introduced to Gregory by Solos and after having made several contacts he introduced Gregory to an individual known only as "Margaret," Gregory's meeting with Margaret occurred in the latter part of 1941 or the early part of 1942. Subsequent to the introduction Gregory met Margaret five or six times over a period of approximately four months. Margaret did not receive material collected by Gregory but merely arranged for contacts between Solos and "Charlie" who Gregory never saw but is convinced was Solos' superior, to whom the material which Solos received was delivered. Just prior to the death of Solos he instructed Gregory to meet Margaret who would make an introduction to a new person who was to receive the material obtained from the Silvermaster group. This contact was made and Margaret introduced Gregory to an individual known only as "Katherine." Material from the Silvermaster group was only delivered to "Katherine" on one or two occasions when these arrangements were apparently upset by the death of Solos. Taking stock for the moment, the only individual who has been definitely identified in this "Jean," "Margaret" and "Katherine" series of contacts is "Margaret," who is Olga Borisovna Pravina, a former employee of Antony Trading Corporation, a Soviet purchasing agency. Her husband, Vladimir Seregin Pravina, was the head of Tab News Agency, the official news organ of Russia, in New York City. They both returned to Russia in March, 1946.

Immediately following the death of Solos, "Katherine" introduced Gregory to "Bill" who has not been further identified. "Bill" received all of the material collected by Gregory from November, 1943, until September, 1944. In October, 1944, "Bill" turned the operation of Gregory as a courier over to an individual known only as "Jack." Cooperation with Jack continued until December, 1944, when Gregory was removed from duties as a courier for this espionage group. However, during the period of service with "Jack" he introduced Gregory to an individual known only as "Ali." Through ordinary investigative procedures it was learned that "Ali" contacted Gregory in November, 1945. As a result of this contact he was identified as Anatoli Gromov, then first secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. Gromov had been under suspicion for a considerable period as a successor to Vasili Zhikilo, reported head of the NKFD in North America until the late summer of 1945 when he returned to Moscow, USSR, following the inspection of espionage facilities of the Soviet Government in North America by representatives of the NKFD and the Red Army Intelligence. Gromov departed from the United States for Moscow, USSR, on December 7, 1946. It is suspected that his position has been assumed by Peder Alexeyevich Gerasim, an official of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C.

Gregory is unable to state specifically to whom Solos, "Bill," "Jean," or "Ali" (Gromov) delivered the material which was collected for them. However, Gregory does state that during the period of associations with Solos he selected those items of a political, economic or social intelligence character and made them available to Karl Brandt.
17. (Continued)

then National Chairman of the Communist Party. Browder, in no instance kept this information for delivery to a third person since he did not wish significant to note, however, that Gregory is definite in stating that Browder was cognizant of the activities of Solos and his use of Gregory as a courier. It is Gregory's opinion that Solos violated his directives in making information available to Browder. This presumably was done on whom Gregory never personally observed. He has tentatively identified as Dr. Abraham Benedict Teppstein, a practicing dentist at 20 East 53rd Street, in contact with several of the individuals prominent in this case and dealt with in full detail hereinafter in addition to other individuals known to be Soviet agents.

It is significant to observe that while working with Solos and his predecessors, Gregory had specific instructions to have no associations whatsoever with the Communist Party or any of its fringe groups. Gregory's true name had never figured prominently in any of the activities of the Party or its fringe groups until the advent of the current inquiries. It was through the United States Service and Shipping Corporation, New York City, mentioned hereinafter, and he assisted Gregory from time to time with grants of money plus all traveling and incidental expenses.

As will be seen hereinafter, through the groups previously mentioned as headed by Silvermaster and Browder, as well as various miscellaneous individuals, it is apparent that the Soviet Intelligence Service was successful in securing material from the Department of State, Office of Strategic Services, the Treasury Department, the War Department, the Department of Justice, the Foreign Economic Administration and numerous other agencies of the Federal Government. In numerous instances the documents themselves were made available from these agencies for copying verification or for photographing in the basement of the Silvermaster home where investigation has determined a newly equipped photographic laboratory was located.

As pointed out hereinafter, investigation in this case has only extended over the period November 8, 1945, to the present time. Consequently it has not been possible to show that each and every one of the individuals mentioned by Gregory is interrelated in their activity. The normal practice of espionage would not permit contacts between each and every individual during that period. However, it will be observed numerous contacts between the subjects of instant inquiry have transpired and in some instances under very suspicious circumstances. A studied attempt has been made to establish the basic truth or validity of Gregory's information and certain observations are apropos in this connection. Gregory has mentioned over 1,000 names and in no instance has investigation indicated that a non-existent person was mentioned.
Only in those instances where only a first name was given and no identifying data was available was it even possible to identify the person to whom Gregory was referring. In addition, the methods by which the passage of information was affected are ones which by experience have been tried, tested and used by all effective intelligence services, including particularly the Soviet. It is also significant that Gregory, by actual observation, has identified Olga Borisovna Pavlova of Antioch as "Marjorie" and Anatoli Borisovich Grigorov of the Soviet Embassy as "Al." Gregory has reported with a high degree of accuracy situations of the United States Government policy which were only known within the Government itself as examples of material which was passed through Gregory to Gallo and his associates for use of the Soviet Government. Also reported by Gregory was the existence of a photographic laboratory in the basement of the Silvermaster house during the time Gregory was acting as a courier. This laboratory was used for the reproduction of documents brought to the Silvermaster house by various contact persons of that particular espionage group. Investigation determined that such a photographic laboratory sufficiently well equipped for the copying of documents was located in the basement of the Silvermaster house. In a few instances has Gregory reported information which could not either directly or substantially be verified. A high degree of accuracy has prevailed throughout the revelations made by Gregory. In conclusion, it should be carefully borne in mind that in no instance has the information furnished by Gregory proved false, unfounded, or materially inaccurate despite intensive and searching investigation thereof.

Set out hereunder is a summary of the information submitted by Gregory, gathered from other sources and established by investigation concerning the persons identified to date in this espionage group, the Soviet system of espionage, the espionage agents comprising the Silvermaster and Forlo groups and the miscellaneous personalities serving the Soviet espionage system independent of association with any organized group as far as is known.
METHOD OF OPERATION OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE SYSTEM

As a result of the revelations made by Gregory, considerable information concerning the modus operandi of the present Soviet underground espionage organization was obtained. Although these methods are related as pertaining to espionage activities of the USSR, it should be noted they differ little from the method used by any country engaged in effective secret intelligence. As an example, their clandestine activities are cloaked with cover companies such as World Tourist, Inc., and the United States Service and Shipping Corporation in this instance. Pertinent material from numerous sources is collected by the use of couriers and cover addresses. Intermediaries of a primary, secondary and tertiary character are apparent. There is a certain but not necessarily significant absence of advanced technical methods, either in the transmission of communications or the gathering of information itself. The only technical device apparent in the operations of these espionage parallels was the use of the copying camera.

Soviet espionage has one clear cut advantage over that practiced by any other country, within the borders of the United States. This advantage centers in the existence of an open and active Communist Party whose members are available for recruitment for any phase of activity desired. As will be seen hereinafter, in almost every instance Soviet espionage agents, particularly sub-agents, are recruited from among individuals closely associated with the Communist Party, or at least strongly pro-Communist and pro-Soviet, who in the main are native born Americans or individuals not native born but sufficiently familiar with the American way of life to avoid detection. Even the Germans with the large German minority in the United States were not so advantageously placed nor does the fanaticism of the most ardent National Socialist exceed that of the militant members of the Communist Party selected for cooperation directly with the USSR.

Briefly, Soviet intelligence is broken into three branches, namely Military-Naval, Political and General. The first, namely Military-Naval, is handled by Red Army Intelligence. The gathering of political and general information is left in the main to the NKVD, now the MGB, or Ministry of State Security, with which this case deals.

Gregory has described what is referred to as the "pale" method of establishing a ring of individuals for the gathering of information. The term "pale" in reality is the designation of the individual at the apex of the organization which is a self-contained unit. For example, six individuals would be active in the obtaining of information for the Russians. No one of these six individuals would know the identity of the other five. Such individuals would have a courier whose identity he did not know and/or a mail drop by which he would dispose of the material which he gathered. None of the six individuals in this self-contained unit would know the identity of their...
17. (Continued)

...courier or the identity of the person collecting the material from the mail drop. The next step up the ladder would be an individual responsible for receiving the information from three couriers and/or mail drops. He would correlate this material and in turn would have a courier and/or mail drop to which he delivered the edited information. The other three in the unit would operate similarly. The two individuals each handling three sources of information in turn would not know the identity of their courier or the person collecting their edited material from a mail drop if this was used. In this manner a single individual unknown to anyone else in the group would eventually come in the possession of all the information obtained by the original six sources. This individual or "pole" at the apex of the triangle usually knows all the original sources of information, couriers, mail drops and editors in the unit.

According to Gregory, the individual designated the "pole" would normally be a Russian who in turn would pass the information on to the proper authorities for transmission to Moscow by diplomatic coded cable or diplomatic pouch. It will be seen, this system has as its purpose the security of the espionage organization. Any one member of the group with the exception of the "pole" who becomes compromised will be able to directly compromise the remainder of the unit... This in intelligence parlance is generally known as the double cutout system. It is possible to vary it, however, by extensions to a triple or quadruple cutout system with little difficulty.

As will be seen hereinafter, the KGB was interested in securing all types of information including economic, political, social, industrial, technical and military. Instructions were often given to the courier to relate to the Silvermaster or Perlo group directing them to attempt to secure information on specific matters. Requests for specific material, however, were comparatively limited, resulting in the conclusion that this particular parallel of Soviet espionage was operating more or less as a sponge accepting any type of material that might become available from any source that could be recruited. To gain the full benefit of this type of operation, it is absolutely necessary that effective correlation be made on a higher level. It is obvious, however, that Gregory's handiwork was well schooled in the operation of a secret intelligence service. In this regard some of the cautions expressed to Gregory to avoid detection or compromise are of interest.

Gregory was issued repeated warnings to take every precaution possible to detect a surveillance. This included a tour of New York City in order that a prior knowledge would be available of the location of drug stores with two exits, rest rooms with two exits, movie theaters and other establishments that could be entered and left quickly thusing a surveillance.
Gregory never departed from any premises at the same time with any individual with whom contact was made for Soviet intelligence. Further, with respect to surveillances the instructions were issued to observe automobiles, and their occupants. When on foot, crossing and recrossing the street was recommended and walking the opposite direction on one-way streets when an automobile surveillance was suspected. All contacts were made very cautiously and multiple appointments were the order of the day. For example a rendezvous would be set for 4:00, 6:00 and 8:00 o'clock on a certain day and the contact ultimately consummated at any one of these three times.

Precautionary measures were taken concerning the maintenance of incriminating material on the premises of the courier and other units in the system. Methods were described whereby subsequent detection of the existence of the premises clandestinely by outsiders could be determined. All incriminating material following its use was to be burned or flushed down the toilet. Couriers traveled with no marks of identification in their persons or on their clothing. Meeting places in general were such public establishments as restaurants and theaters. Hotels, private homes and bars were avoided. When bulky material was transported it was left in a locker in a rail car or bus terminal and the key delivered to the individual who was ultimately to receive it. Special cautions were given to all participants in this group to avoid discussing anything pertinent over the telephone.

Another interesting factor is the manner in which finances were handled. Couriers and persons serving in other capacities requiring reimbursement did not receive a regular salary but did receive payment for traveling expenses and other incidentals. At least until the fall of 1943 the whole service was operated on a very frugal basis. At least during the preponderant period reimbursement for traveling and incidental expenses had to be supported in detail by receipts or sales slips. It is estimated by Gregory that Dolos received between $2,000 and $3,000 every two months for the operation of his particular parallel. Then considering that he only paid traveling expenses and incidentals, it is quite obvious that he was operating on a parallel with the one with which Gregory is familiar.

Money in some instances came to Dolos through Gregory who received it from unidentified individuals believed to have been officially connected with the Soviet Consulate in New York City. Denominations of money were never in larger amounts than $20 and Gregory's own expenses did not exceed $100 per month. After the death of Dolos, finances seemed to be more readily available and requirements concerning receipts and sales slips were somewhat relaxed. Delays in payments were infrequent and one of Dolos' successors commented to Gregory that money was no object as long as it was being used for a worthwhile purpose.

It is interesting to note that one of the duties exercised by Gregory was to buy Christmas presents for the individuals supplying information, as well as for the members of their family each year. These presents, for
which Gregory received reimbursement, bore a direct relationship to the usefulness the particular individual had demonstrated to the Russians, and some were of a substantial value, costing approximately $500. With the exception of one instance, Gregory did not pay for any of the information gathered from Colom's contacts. In this instance payment was made on a regular basis to an individual temporarily in financial straits. While Gregory was dealing with someone other than Colom, substantial sums of money were received personally as remuneration for services rendered. This may be attributable, at least in some instances, to the fact that Gregory was dealing directly with the Russians rather than with an intermediary such as Colom.

As can be seen from the above methods and instructions and handling of finances, the Soviets are not in any sense of the word novices at conducting secret intelligence. The nodus operandi, however, is not novel or different from that of any other country where diplomatic relations exist. It is obvious that all of the information gathered eventually filters into the Soviet Embassy or one of its Consulates where it in turn can be forwarded to Moscow by coded cable or diplomatic bag. It is logical to assume that other parallels of Soviet espionage are in operation whereby material can be forwarded to Moscow outside the above indicated methods of transmission. The present methods of filtering this material through diplomatic establishment if the most efficient during the existence of diplomatic relations and the other systems, although they may be dormant now, still only be used as an alternate means of communication in the event of the breaking of these relations.

The Soviet organization mentioned by Gregory based upon the "pole" principal was stated to have been the type of organization being put into effect by the Soviets at the time Gregory ceased active handling of the groups discussed in detail in this memorandum. During this period the Gregory was active as a courier and intermediary the personnel of the Silvermaster group, the Perko group and the miscellaneous group in Washington, informal basis, channelling the material to Gregory through the leaders of the groups and occasionally holding group meetings. The gradual elimination of part of the Soviet design to place espionage activities in the departments of the United States Government on a more businesslike basis under direct Soviet control.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

June 10, 1947

Subject: Walter Krivitsky

At about 9:30, Monday morning, February 10, 1941, Thelma Jackson, a Negro chambermaid, found sprawled on the bed of his fifth floor room at the Hotel Bellevue, 15 E Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., the body of Walter G. Krivitsky, his death caused by the contact discharge of a .38 caliber bullet into his right temple, approximately six hours previously.

Walter Krivitsky was born Samuel Ginsberg, June 28, 1899, to middle class peasants in the Russian Ukraine near the Polish border. From 1919 to 1927, Krivitsky served in Military Intelligence of the Soviet Army. In 1923 he was sent to organize the nucleus of a Communist army in Germany in preparation for a revolution in Germany. In May 1926, he was called to Moscow by the Soviet War Industries Institute. In 1928, he was sent abroad as Chief of Soviet Military Intelligence for Western Europe, which job he held until November 1937. In the 1937 purge, many of Krivitsky’s fellow generals were liquidated. In December, Krivitsky himself was ordered back to Moscow but refused to return. In the course of his 18 years in the Soviet Military Intelligence, Krivitsky was twice decorated for espionage work.

In March 1933, at Paris, Krivitsky gave an interview to a Russian emigré paper on the death of Maxim Gorky. Krivitsky, in this interview, published by Russian emigré paper Les Dernieres Nouvelles on March 4, 1933, said that Gorky may have been killed on Stalin’s orders if he did not die from natural causes, since Gorky had been refused permission by Stalin to attend the International Convention of Anti-Fascist Authors at Paris recently, and had been under close surveillance. Krivitsky stated he himself had a price on his head and had decided to remain abroad “to rehabilitate those of thousands of so-called spies.” On April 28, 1939, the Daily News-Register published one of a series of articles by Krivitsky exposing Soviet espionage activities. In this article, Krivitsky predicted the Soviet-German pact which was concluded in August 1939. Krivitsky’s articles, following closely the Moscow trials, were an important factor in the decision of many to leave the Communist Party camp. During 1939, Ignace Reis, an associate and friend of Krivitsky’s 

Charles Runyon [Department of State], Memorandum for the File, “Walter Krivitsky,” 10 June 1947, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 59 (Department of State).
in the Soviet Secret Service, was machine-gunned at Lausanne. It is believed, by Hans Buerk, OGPU political assassin who operated in cooperation with a woman agent, Gertrude Stiefschbach.

In November 1939, Krivitsky entered the United States on a temporary passport, using his original name, Samuel Ginsberg. On July 1, 1939, he was ordered to report to Ellis Island because his temporary visa had expired. He was given a hearing July 8 and his visa was extended to December 21. At about this time, he escorted his family safely to Canada, using the name of Thomas. At this time, Krivitsky's attorney, Louis Waldman, intimated that the Communists were maneuvering through the Labor Department to have Krivitsky deported in order that they might get their hands on him.

On October 11, Krivitsky testified before the Dies Committee as follows:

1. Soviet Intelligence uses the Communist Party here and the real head of the American Communist Party is Stalin.

2. Soviet Intelligence chiefs in the United States have been: Military: Boris Byock since 1936; Alfred Fildes, 1929-1933; Felix Wolfe, 1924-1929. OGPU: Boris Shpak, 1936-1937; Valentine Merkin, 1933-1934; Alexander karin, 1926-1928.

3. The Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union are 90% subjugated by the Soviet Union.

4. OGPU supervised Military Intelligence and the Embassies after 1935 and 1936 when Stalin came to distrust the military.

5. Soviet agents are restricted to the jobs of recruiting and directing United States Party members who do the actual work of espionage.

On October 17, 1939, Representative Dickstein of New York charged that Krivitsky was "nothing but a phony" and "was induced to testify to protect the publishers of his magazine articles from libel suit.

On November 9, 1939, Soviet Ambassador Gumanovsky, returning to the United States on the Rex, was asked if he had read any of Krivitsky's magazine articles naming Gumanovsky as a former OGPU agent. Gumanovsky appeared annoyed and replied that he had never heard of General Krivitsky and was never in the OGPU.

On December 20
On December 30, 1939, Kravitsky's departure, three or four days previously from the United States for a secret destination, was revealed by the immigration authorities. The story subsequently delivered was that he went to Great Britain where he engaged in extensive fifth column activities and to Paris where he collaborated with Paul Wohl, later of 175 Lexington Avenue, New York City, on various articles.

It appears that by March of 1940, Kravitsky was back in the United States, since it is stated in that month he told a story of meeting three men coming toward him on a New York street. One of these he recognized as the CPU agent, Sergei Basoff, alias Jim.

It appears that Kravitsky, except for his articles and Dies Committee appearance, lived a retiring life and expressed to his friends a fatalistic belief that he would eventually be assassinated by Stalin. Among these friends were Boris Shev, his translator, Ismael Don Levine, Louis Nalman, New York attorney, and Suzanne Lefollette, described by the newspapers as a New York editor.

At some point during his residence in the United States, Kravitsky negotiated with Albert Goldman of Chicago, Trotsky's attorney, with a view to helping solve Trotsky's murder.

In the period before his death, Kravitsky told friends and associates that his assassination had become urgent because of his knowledge of identity and methods of many Party agents entering the Western Hemisphere. At an unspecified date, Paul Wohl, then in New York, wrote a note to Suzanne Lefollette asking her to warn Kravitsky that Hans Brusse was in New York. Wohl, with whom Kravitsky had had a dispute about money, was the only one among his friends and associates to assert that Kravitsky had contemplated suicide. He was not, however, on close speaking terms with Kravitsky after their quarrel and stated that Kravitsky avoided him.

On Wednesday, February 5, according to his wife, Tanya Kravitsky, Kravitsky left her and his son, Alexander, seven years old, to whom he was particularly devoted, in New York in order to find a refuge in Virginia for himself and his family and in order to see Martin Dies, to whose committee he had already given much information on Soviet espionage.

Mrs. Kravitsky
Mrs. Krivitsky stated that he did not take a pistol with him. According to Louis Waldman, one of the purposes of Krivitsky's visit to Washington was to push through his naturalization, which, among other things, would enable him to purchase a pistol in New York, something that, as an alien, he could not do. At this time, his friends stated Krivitsky had sufficient money earned from his writings to carry his for several years. It has also been asserted that he had voluminous notes and stacks of documents although the newspaper stories did not indicate their disposition.

According to Eitel Wolf Dobert, a former German Army officer, who has been described by the newspapers as a former political associate of his and who lived at Charlottesville, Virginia, Krivitsky arrived at Dobert's house in Charlottesville on Thursday, February 6. While there, he bought a pistol from Charles Henshaw, the clerk at the local hardware store, who later identified the gun found beside Krivitsky's body as the same gun which he had sold to Krivitsky. In buying the gun, Krivitsky had used the name of Walter Parer of Barboursville, Virginia. With the gun, he bought fifty mushroom bullets. Henshaw's statement was later taken by Detective Horace E. Negaufa and Lieutenant George E. Bargell of the Washington Police Department. The newspaper's story attributes a statement that Krivitsky set up until 3 Sunday morning, writing the three suicide notes which were later found in his room at the hotel, to Dobert. The notes found were on stationery having the printed address, Charlottesville, Virginia. It does not, however, appear whether Dobert did or could have identified the notes as actually material written by Krivitsky Saturday night and early Sunday morning. On Sunday, February 9, Mrs. Dobert drove Krivitsky to the Hotel Bellovas in Washington where he registered at 6 p.m. as Walter Parer, a name which, according to Waldman, Krivitsky was taking steps to adopt as his legal name in the United States. Hotel employees did not recall that Krivitsky left his room after 6 p.m. Sunday. The occupants of the other rooms on the fifth floor stated that they had heard no shot. Thelma Jackson, the chambermaid, said that she passed the door several times on Monday morning and knocked each time until she finally used her pass key to get in. The body was found sprawled on the bed—its does not appear with the face up or the face down. Krivitsky's shoes were off and near his bed. His socks were still on his feet and he was otherwise dressed. Near Krivitsky's right hand, but with fingerprints obliterated by
blood from the wound, was the .38 caliber pistol purchased at Charlottesville, Virginia. There were only two openings to the room, the door, which was latched from the inside, and the window, which was either closed or locked—the story varies—which opened out on the sheer side of the building with no fire escape and no ledge. It is not stated whether the fifth is the top floor of the Bellevue. There was no sign of a struggle in the room which was ten feet square. The pistol was discharged close to Krivitsky’s right temple and the contemporary comment was that it was not in his hand for assailants would most likely have placed it.

The body was identified by J. B. Matthews of the Dies Committee who stated that Krivitsky had once told him: If they ever try to prove I took my own life, don’t believe it. The case was handled by Bernard Thompson, Chief of the Detective Force of the Washington Police, and Detective Sergeant D. Guest who originally came to the scene.

Three notes were found in Krivitsky’s room, one in English addressed to Waldman requesting that he help his family, adding as a postscript that he went to Virginia because he could get a gun there and asking Waldman to help his friends there who did not, he stated, know why he got the gun. A second in Russian was addressed to his wife and son and pitched in an emotional tone. He stated that it was very difficult. but it is impossible. you will understand that I have to go. . . . I think my sins are big. . . . F.S. On the farm of Dobertov I wrote this yesterday but I did not have any strength in New York. I did not have any business in Washington. I went to see Dobertov because that is the only place I could get the firearms. A third in German was addressed to Suzanne LaFollette asking her to help his wife and son. The Washington Police compared the notes with samples of Krivitsky’s handwriting and decided that they were authentic. Waldman initially denied their authenticity and the last news on this subject is that Waldman had procured photostatic copies which he and Krivitsky’s friends had examined and in which he found discrepancies with Krivitsky’s other writings. Waldman stated, however, that it was possible that the discrepancies were purely normal variations and that he proposed to have a professional examination made in New York.

Waldman and Krivitsky’s friends called for a Federal investigation but the FBI refused to assume jurisdiction. Although Waldman and Krivitsky’s friends sought to hold up issuance
issuance of a certificate of suicide, the certificate was
finally issued although the coroner agreed that he would
impanel a jury in case further evidence 'cropped up'.
Representative Rankin told the newspapers that the gun was
in the wrong place for the death to have been a suicide.
Mrs. Krivitsky felt sure that the Soviet had forced her
husband to write the notes with the threat of assassinating
her and his boy. She said that Krivitsky was especially
devoted to Alexander. She stated that the note to her did
not sound like her husband. Krivitsky's body was taken to
New York and cremated February 18. On February 29, Repre-
sentative Parnell Thomas said the Dies Committee should
investigate because certain evidence led him to believe
that the body found in the hotel was not Krivitsky's.
Previously, over the weekend of Sunday, February 16, the
offices of the New Leader in New York were raided. The
safe was cracked but nothing was taken. Money left in the
office was not removed, but the files were strewn about
the office. It was suggested that the OGPU had been search-
ing for Krivitsky's unpublished works.
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COVENANCES IN DIPLOMATIC TRAFFIC

1. Limitations of the report.

Any report made at this time on the contents of traffic encrypted by the system must necessarily be fragmentary and subject to correction in detail. In the messages that are in any degree readable, there are large gaps in solution of the cipher key (additive), and in the code book only about 15 per cent of the equivalences are identified, some only tentatively. Both these deficiencies are constantly being ameliorated, with the result that such reports as this will be updated very rapidly until a much higher degree of recovery has been reached.

2. Collateral information.

The collateral information given about the covenances is both scanty and tentative, for reasons implied in paragraph 1. The most reliable data related to the covenances and the date and place of origin of the messages containing them. Since most of the readable traffic originated in New York, it will be necessary to indicate the origin only in the case of Washington, Trinity, and Stockholm messages. All the messages used are directed to Moscow.

3. Use of covenances.

It is known from the Report of the Royal Commission in Canada appointed under order in Council P. G. B. of February 5, 1946 (report dated June 27, 1946) that covenances of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics engaged in conspiratorial activities are accustomed, for reasons of security, to refer to persons that are facilitating these activities by covenances, and in particular that this is done in encrypted messages sent between diplomatic installations and Moscow.

4. Covenances in

The traffic encrypted by the system contains many covenances, which are definitely proved to be such by two circumstances, (1) that many of them are so designated in messages (given as a supplement hereto) that describe themselves as dealing with changes in covenances (KIEVEN) and (2) that many of them are contained in the formula: "A (henceforth B)"., in which A is evidently the real name of the old covenane and B the (new) covenance.

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(Continued)
The classic example for the "Kosoroth" formula is in a message of 23 August 1941 from Novocherkassk to Moscow, which starts with "C1-4". The next sentence contains the term "covanonna" (Kosoroth "C1"). The term "covanonna" can be found in the name of a person known to have been with the Soviet Purchasing Commission. After giving his name in full, the originator of the message gave his covanonna and immediately proceeded to use it. (EH is not known outside this message, the rest of which is not yet readable; see section 15.) In this case, where perhaps the need for security was not great, the covanonna seems to be the name of the initial letter of "KOSOROTH". This circumstance may not, however, lead us to employ the term "covanonna" for initials used for the sake of brevity, the expansion of which is always evident from other messages in the message concerned. (Covenanons themselves can be ambiguous.)

5. Reliability of "Readings".

In the following it must be borne in mind that some of the covanonnas are expressed by single code groups not yet found in other contexts and others contain groups not yet found in other contexts. When any form has been assumed for the equivalent of such a group, it is here generally followed by a question mark. The forms assumed are based (1) on calculations made possible by the fact that they see a one-part code and that complete one-part codes of the same length are available (this process of comparison and calculation has yielded many values that were later verified) and (2) on the analogy of verified covanonnas. As mentioned below, the covanonna fall in part into "families".

6. Families of covanonnas.

It has become evident that many of the covanonnas can be put into categories on the basis of some similarity between them. In the Report of the Royal Commission we find the following families: COCK, BACON, BACON, BACLEY (all members of the Group "Bacon"; cf. p. 769). We find a Prometheus that seems to belong to a "mythology" family, examples of which in traffic are Jupiter and Mars. In New York message 735 appended below, we find Erie immediately followed by Euros (in fact, Erie gave the clue for the identification of Euros). There is a family of ancient Egyptian cities: Carthage, Tyre, and Sidon.

The arrangement of the material from this point will be based on such categories. First, covanonnas apparently for persons will be listed: Addresses, signatures, specifically Russian Christian names, Christian names not specifically Russian, relationships and conditions of age, station and calling, mythological names, names of animals, names of plants, and miscellaneous. Then covanonna apparently for places and institutions will be listed: Ancient


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places, geographical features, and miscellaneous. Names occurring only in
the special coverage messages are sometimes not listed except in the text of
of these messages themselves (see supplement).

7. Addresses.

The addresses and signatures seem to be covernames. The constant address
of Canberra and Stockholm messages and the address of by far the greater part
of the New York messages is expressed by a group falling in the book just before
the group for YIL and five places after the group for YIL, (via). All
probability favor the name VIENON (as an address, it is to be read in the
devise case: VIENON, to Victor). The only other occurrence of the group is
in the spelling VIENONI (in which, unfortunately, it can be secured only by
assuming a one-digit garble) in the expression of Victoria and New South Wales.

New York messages show at least three other addresses: 8 ONION (to the
Second Division of Department) and SEMINUS (to Simon or Simon), both confirmed
from other ways, and a group falling two places after VENON, hence perhaps
VENON (Peter) or VIENON or the like.

The frequency of VIENON in the latest index is 64 for Canberra, 4 for
Stockholm, and for New York 86. New York Four times follows this by 8
ONION (with a separating dash or period), Canberra 5 times with a period
between and once without--once Canberra has simply VIENON 8. New York also
has VIENON, SEMINUS twice, VENON, NORTHON once, and once VENON OR
SEMINUS: (1 and (1)) (to Victor from the Consul:i(1)et(1)). Canberra
has one VIENON SEMINUS.

SEMINUS occurs 22 times as an address from New York (twice after VIENON),
once from Canberra (after VENON). All occurrences are after 19 July 1944.

8 ONION occurs 22 times, 11 of these after VIENON (with or without
separating period or dash). One Canberra message begins "To Victor. In reply
to your telegram No. 6803. 8 ONION(1)"

VIENON, or whatever it is, in an address at least 7 times, all from
New York, from May to August 1944. (The group occurs in 4 other messages,
twice preceded by VIENON, "Curato"; once in a Canberra message. Note
that in all indications of frequency, unless otherwise stated, anti-garble
repetitions have been eliminated.)

NORTHON occurs once in the phrase VIENON, NORTHON(1)ON from
New York, 17 August 1944.

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8. SIGNATURES.

The content of the signature is a group that has been tentatively tagged "INF" (Beethoven), only one case of a Washington signature (?) is known, a group presumably in the range of VAE to VAE. It could be something like VAE or even VAE (Beethoven).

No Stockholm signatures are known.

The most frequent New York signature is RAY, with an overall frequency of 166, only a handful of which occurrences are not signatures. Occasionally, to distinguish his own remarks from a document he is transmitting, MAY will use the expression "PRINCIPAL: MAY" (Ray's note), thus confirming that MAY is a signature and that the value of the signature group is RAY (for MAY is a different group and certainly maps "of ray" in issues).

Another signature, in about the range for ANTON (Anthony), occurs 16 times (New York). Since 12 December 1944 the form is "VAR" (1) and "VAR" (1) and "VAR" (1). All occurrences are from October 1944 to January 1945. The name also occurs in the text 5 times (New York, May-December 1944). In a message of 23 August 1944, ANTON (1) is associated with ARGENT (1) and AKEN, apparently in connection with southwestern factories and plants.

A signature in the right range for RORIS occurs at least twice as a New York signature, on 23 October and 21 December 1944.

ARGENT (1) (Argent): There are 9 candidates for this value. One occurs 5 September 1944 and 12 January 1945; the other occurs 17 times, 26 May 1944 - 13 January 1945. The second one is associated with ANDER (1) and AKEN (see section 5).

AKEN (Aiken): occurs 5 times, 9 May - 14 December 1944.

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(Continued)
19. (Continued)

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5. **Specifically Russian Christian names.**

Some common names that are Russian Christian names have already been mentioned in sections 7 and 8. Others are as follows:

- **ABEYIO** (Alexei); in 5 New York messages, 16 June-22 December 1944.
- **VITALIO** (Vitalis); occurs in 3 messages, 5 August, 21 August, 21 December 1944. Also occurs in a real name (see ABEYIO in section 4.)
- **YAKOV** (Jacob); was GORN before September 1944.
- **ARKIM** (Arkaim); occurs 8 times in 8 messages (all with a GORN address), 16 June-23 Dec. 1944. See section 8.

16. **Christian names not specifically Russian.**

Although many Soviet citizens have Christian names virtually identical with names found in other languages than Russian, it is safe to set up a category that would include vaguely international forms together with definitely non-Russian forms. In connection with one of these names, the following quotation from *My Story* by Louis Francis Halema, former managing editor of the Daily Worker, (McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York and London: 1947) pp. 129-130, is given for whatever reference value it may have.

The so-called "Dutch" or German, comrade—though his accent was indeterminate to my untrained ear—was the first of a long line of persons with foreign accents and foreign origins who passed through the governing apparatus of the Communist party of the U.S.A. To me, and to all of any well-educated American, has any complaint about full participation of the foreign born in American life; our own ancestors came from afar to make up this land of the free. But the right of those who are agents of a foreign power to cross our borders under aliases and order American citizens about, is another matter. Yet, to my surprise, this was what I found in the building at Thirty-five East Twelfth Street when I entered it and began to work there.

These men of many names and no names bore aliases like Edwards, **carefully chosen placas of Christian names** such as Roberts, Richards, Stevens, Michaels, John and, occasionally, something more distinctive taken from England or the Middle East. The same one of these gentlemen to impress himself upon me was "Weber," then acting in a vital secretariat capacity in the party. That is, he was one of the chief factors in the national setup. Still in the stage of plesantrieus upon such matters, I had kindly referred to him as "the Cheese Cut Commissioner" because of his perpetual mechanical smile. It was not unpleasant but unreal. Like the Edwards, he had made friends under the name of Edwards; see pp. 135 and 137 and his testimony in District Court, Washington, on 20 July 1947.

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celebrated fellow, his name kept vanishing. Shortly after my labor
situation began, he suddenly converted himself into "Conrad Peters" and
then into "Conrad Stove" and then, after a long time, back to
"Conrado Sohrario". It kept me busy trying to keep up with these trans-
formations.

Before the publication of Badiane's book, certain groups had tentatively
been identified as equivalent to RICHARD, ROBERT, and the like. That such
names occur in the code book has been amply verified, e.g. by the message of
5 December 1944, listing nuclear physicists and mathematicians. To serve an
example in daily cologne, some of these names would have to take on an S.

The group that seems to stand out for ROBERT (it follows next after E)
occur 32 times. The group for RICHARD (appears beyond RT) occurs 6 times
(plus once in RICHARD PALMER). Both are restricted to New York messages.
RICHARD is the new covername given in September 1944 to someone whose
previous (cover) name seems to have begun with R (see margin 746 appended
below). A ROBERT occurs from 4 June 1944 on through 21 January 1945
or course not necessarily one single individual throughout.

It is significant that ROBERT was always "transmitting" written matter
to the originating(s) of the messages: the formula "Robert has transmitted"
occur five times in the index.

Another individual of particular interest is one whose name would seem
to begin with ME (or, by the more usual transliteration, MEO). This may be
MENHE (Mary), though there is almost certainly another and more usual
spelling of "Mary" in the book, GEMI or GEMII. MENHE figures in
arrangements for a rendezvous in front of a Mexico City movie house (R. T.
message of 16 June 1944); in other messages he is located in MENHEA
(the country, covariance for MEXICO). In a message of 16 August 1944 there
seems to be talk of calling him back to TELL (Texas, covariance for New York).
He occurs 21 times, from 26 May-16 August 1944. The other group, GEMII,
occur in message 756 (below) and perhaps in a message of 1 June 1944
involving the securing of a MEXICAN (Mexico) visa.

Other such names are:

AL 'or EL' (Alt): occurs 1 October in phrase "AL' or EL'" (both
tries to render English Alt)

EIX (内部控制): was EIX or EIX before October 1944; occurs in five
messages, 23 October -26 December 1944.

DOMAL'D (Donald): became PILOT September 1944; this second name
appears in section 11 below.

DURIEAN (Duran): occurs in message of 26 May 1944.

ELAR (Earl): was EIX or EIX before October 1944; occurs once
26 December 1944.

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CHERI (Henry): was killed before October 1944. See the last paragraph above.

HERON (John): was KGB before October 1944; occurs once 14 December 1944, with AGENT.

JESSE: was CHEEROTTI (Black) before October 1944.

CHARL'S (Charles): was something else until October 1944.

SHIFT: was something else until October 1944.

Eyb: Canberra, twice 1 September 1944. Seems to have furnished information on the Australian Security Service. Same name twice from New York, 25 July and 12 August 1944.

ELOD (Claude): Canberra, April-October 1944. KGB is Canberra's regular purveyor of information; he occurs 13 times in the formula "KGB has communicated".


(CHARL'S HENRI (Charles Henri): in N.Y. message 14 June 1944, this is the name HENRI? Is to give as a password at the rendezvous.)

ROE: in two messages, 23 October 1944 and 4 January, 1945.

ROE (Core): 29 December 1944.

CIA: a Washington female agent; name changed to something else in October 1944. Occurs in 2 messages, 1 May and 16 August 1944, both dealing with EDWAR (that is, probably KANHCHOK). It is planned to make these messages the subject of a separate report. In the former CIA is described as seeking more detailed information on the EDWAR affair. In the latter she has something to do with the suggestion that (does not think that?) EDWAR is staying at 259 West 97th Street.

HIT: mentioned 16 August 1944 in the phrase "the first two parts (of) the business of HIT". (The message also mentions EDWAR, issue of LA VIZ/Mexico City Communist organ/ for 7 June, HIT.)

11. Relationships and Conditions of Age, Station and Calling;

OTCHM (stepfather): in 3 messages, 17 May - 27 December 1944.

SWAT (matchmaker: Son- or Daughter-In-law's Father): 29 Aug. and 6 Dec. 1944.

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ENCODED (or translated): occurs 3 times in 1 message. 9 May - 14 August 1944.

BAKOS (Bakos): apparently a high American diplomatic official. Occurs 5 times in 3 messages, 9 May, 7 September, 14 December 1947; in messages of 7 September, in connection with postwar treatment of Germany.

ATAMU (German): occurs 4 times in 3 messages, 17 May, 7 June, 6 October, 1944.

FILOU (Pilots): was DESI'D before September 1944.

12. Mythological Names:

JUPITER (Jupiter): became OSLOM (Eagle) in October 1944.
SKEES (Bones): in 4 messages, 4 May - 22 July 1944.
NEHA (Hose): 4 July 1944; commented on concerning Secret Funds Division, American Biglow, all of 98,955,988 Portuguese escudos, Northern European Division of Secret Intelligence Branch, etc.

KEO (Koko): became DEI in October 1944; occurs 15 times, 2 May 22 October, 1944.
GONN (Gummi): became BARON in September 1944. Occurs 3 times, 16 May, 16 June, 23 July.

13. Names of animals:

TITAAN (Beans): 19 August 1944, (a KINAR or Krawchenko message).
ORIOLO (Eagle): van NORTHERN until October 1944. Occurs 5 times, 1944.
LUNI (Lun Bar): in 4 messages, 3 May - 17 August 1944.
GUS (Gus): changed to something else October 1944.

KINAR (Kina etc.): probably covers name for Victor Krasnogorikh.

KRAVCHENKO. For a complete development of this idea, a separate report would be necessary. Occurs in 8 messages to TAP partly read. 6 between 3 and 23 May, 1944, 2 on 19 August, 1944; KINAR is the object of intense interest, including attempts to locate him (28 May, "is living with KRAVCHENKO in the state of Connecticut etc.").

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**TULIP** (Tulip): 15 August 1944; (a Kovan or Krevolko message) changed to something beginning with KX in Sept. 1944.

15. Miscellaneous.

**LIBER** (Liber) or possibly **LIBERAL**: was AESTERAD until Sept. 1944. Occurs 5 times; 26 October - 26 December 1944. Message of 27 November speaks of his wife KRON, 20 years old, married (1) 5 years, "...husband's work and the role of KRON(0) and NIL".

**ANR** (Anor): was EB---3---st (Annette?) before October 1944; occurs once 26 December 1944 with BERN.

**MORE** (like many other spellings in the code book, this might have an alternative reading, perhaps **MORE**; as **MORE** it means "water" and as **MORE** it is a nickname, applied for example to the Paris subway system); was ESTERAD until September 1944. Occurs 27 Nov. 1944 (something about Lib's wife Edna: knowing about her husband's work and the role of KRON(0) and NIL; notice in message 756 below how KRON(0) and NIL come together). Seems to occur 3 December 1944 in phrase "KRON(0) and LKRON (Kaplan)". Note on page 73 of the Report of the Royal Commission: "Metro.....the Embassy of the U.S.A.".

**GART** occurs 26 May 1944 in phrase "OF GART and EARL"; message mentions FFR (French Franchise de l'Indre) or possibly a name ending in FFR (Fried).

In 1945, GART was used in Canada as the surname ofColonel Nikolay Zabolot, Soviet Military Attaché in Ottawa and head of military intelligence work in Canada (see Report of the Royal Commission).

**EM (0)**: occurs twice in 2 messages, 15 August 1944.

**EM** (0): 33 November 1944 in message 23 August 1944. He was a member of the Soviet Purchasing Commission, having entered the U.S. in December 1943. He was still here in September 1945. This name may be EM, or may be the same EM listed 23 November 1944 (see below).

**KABUKI** (Kabuki?): Occurs 4 times in 2 messages, 24 July and 1 August 1944.

**GI** (GI): occurs 23 October and 6 December 1944.

**PA** (PA): occurs 13 December 1944.

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List of 26 November 1944: In a message of that date the following names occur, apparently as operating from New York: KESO (Circle, or the name KESO), KIR--I-- (was R-1-OLIV until October 1944), MIA, --I--, TIE--I-- (this word may not be a name) --HALIGAR (Peirce), TIL (Jan), ERE.........

16. **Covenans apparently for places and institutions:**

Ancient places (also rivers, etc.):

- KIR (Tyre): covenan for New York.
- SICIL (Sicily): covenan for London.
- MARAVICH (Carthage): covenan for Washington.
- RIL (Riel): was something beginning with MI (MIB, MM) until September 1944; linked with MIRI, which see.

17. **Geographical features:**

- U.S.I.S. (Island): covenan for Great Britain; changed October 1944, to something beginning with RE (or ME).
- U.S.I.S. (the Country /i.e., rural districts/): covenan for Mexico.
- U.S.I.S. (Fellow Countrymen): Covename for some nationality, possibly U.S.

18. **Miscellaneous:**

- KARK (the Bank): probably covenan for the U.S. State Department, occurs 24 times, (once in the plural from Canberra, probably in the literal sense).

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In its present state the traffic tends to arouse curiosity more than it does to satisfy it. This unsatisfactory state of affairs makes it imperative that this report be supplemented at intervals. It is proposed that such supplements not be complete revisions of this report, but rather be of such a nature that they would be filed with it and used in conjunction with it. When enough material has been accumulated, a new report will be made.

This report incorporates the previous brief tentative report of 29 June 1947.

A final reminder of the extremely provisional nature of all assumptions made in this report is desirable. Future supplements will not fail to specify those that have become untenable.
nature somewhere "in Central Europe". Before returning to the U.S. in 1933, NELSON is known to have been, for a brief period, in Shanghai, China, and he has stated that while in Shanghai he was closely associated with Arthur Iaien, alias Harry BECKER, who was active in the Communist apparatus for many years and was dispatched to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1937 under supporting cover from Trepkov for the purpose of guiding the abortive Communist revolution in Brazil the following year. It will also be recalled that KENNEDY, who was known in Rio as BECKER went insane while being interrogated by the Brazilian police. Upon his return to the States about 1933, NELSON became increasingly active in Communist revolutionary work in the trade union field and was particularly active in the industrial areas of Detroit, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Cleveland.

5. Shortly after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War NELSON went to Spain where he became a political commissar of the International Brigades, specifically attached to the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and eventually attaining the rank of Lt. Colonel. Upon his return from Spain, subsequent to the collapse of the Spanish Republic, NELSON was immediately made a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA by co-option. It is amusing to note that the procedure adopted in NELSON's case in placing him upon the National Committee was an exact parallel of the procedure used to give Stalin his first post on the Central Committee of the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party of Russia. Shortly thereafter, NELSON was transferred to the Alameda County section of the Party. The exact intelligence significance of NELSON's service in Spain has never fully been revealed, although it has been reported that he served as an "ENVOY agent" during this period. During the period between his return to the U.S. and late 1942, when he is known to have been re-activated as an intelligence agent, his exact intelligence participation also is not known, although there are indications that during this period he may have carried out certain domestic assignments.

6. On April 20, 1943, it was ascertained through technical coverage of his residence in Berkeley, California that NELSON was in carefully veiled but detailed conversation with an individual, then unidentified, who spoke Russian, accent. This conversation which lasted for several hours, revealed without question that NELSON was an important figure in a Soviet net engaged in operational espionage, in the maintenance of Illegal Communist seaman courier routes and in least to some extent in the clandestine forwarding of propaganda through illegal means to the Far East, and that the then unidentified visitor was NELSON's Soviet superior. The conversation opened with the unknown visitor coming ten bills or bundles of currency and its significance was almost immediately tabbed by the following exchange:

NELSON: "Jesus, you count money like a banker."

Unknown man: "Well, you know I need to do it in Minsk."

Through this conversation it was revealed that NELSON had been recruited shortly before January 1, 1940 by a "man from Moscow" and that this recruitment had been with the knowledge of "the old man", which was an obvious reference to Karl Bowers.
20. (Continued)

then General Secretary and undisputed head of the CPUSA. Both NELSON and his unknown visitor referred to in this network as the Communist Apparatus and as the "Apparat". It is interesting to note that this conversation took place only a month prior to the formal dissolution of the Communist International and that NELSON, later the NKVD, and now the SB, during the conversation, references were made to one "Happ" and to one "George". It was indicated that "Happ" was responsible for West Coast clandestine courier routes and that George was responsible for liaison with BRANDON for all Apparat matters. "Happ" was subsequently identified as Horace MANFORD, an old time Communist waterfront figure, and "George" was subsequently identified as Jake ROCHBERG, who was then acting as BRANDON's bodyguard and was accompanying NELSON on his various Party trips throughout the U.S. ROCHBERG was an active Communist Party member. NELSON complained bitterly to his visitor about the ineffectiveness of both MANFORD and ROCHBERG and it is interesting to note that a few days afterward both of them were detained and disciplined, MANFORD being transferred from San Francisco to Los Angeles where he was given a minor Party post and ROCHBERG being transferred from New York to Detroit merely as a Party member.

7. During the conversation frequent mention was made of an individual referred to as "Ali" who was described as located in or near New York and as head of the Apparat although obviously Ali also was under the direction and control of NELSON's unidentified visitor. Ali was subsequently identified as Ralph NOONAN, a supposedly minor editorial writer for the now defunct New Masses, a leading weekly organ of the Communist Party for many years. It is interesting to note that while NOONAN maintained an office at the New Masses, his name did not appear on the magazine's masthead and that he was extremely successful in concealing his movements and contacts and in selling his true significance.

8. Also discussed as a possible recruit, during this conversation, was a woman, later identified as Louise Rosenberg BRANDEN, a wealthy California woman and former wife of Michael BRANDEN, also Bruce BRANDEN, well known Party propagandist for many years and a frequent contributor to New Masses before his "rejection" as a result of the BRANDEN-VOTER split in the CPUSA. It is noted that BRANDEN, as Bruce BRANDEN, was partially responsible for the final recruitment of two of the agents active in the GRODIN case, having referred them two to NELSON who, in turn, arranged their recruitment with Jake ROCHBERG. At the time of this conversation, in 1943, Louise Rosenberg BRANDEN was the mistress of Joseph Koroticky BRANDEN at that time and until the summer of 1944 Soviet Vice Consul in San Francisco, who was identified through independent investigation as an FBIS official active in the running of operational nets on the West Coast. BRANDEN was mentioned in reference to the conversation between NELSON and his visitor, and reference was made also to William BRANDEN, California State Secretary of the CPUSA, it being indicated by NELSON that Sonnenberg was reluctant to take the chance involved in making Party members available for "special work" (a stock Party term for Soviet Intelligence assignments). A number of other individuals, cryptically referred to in this conversation,
have never been definitely identified.

9. Almost immediately thereafter the unidentified man conversing with NELSON was positively identified as Vasili Mikhailovich ZUBILIN, then Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and shortly thereafter promoted to the position of Second Secretary. Through other cases and collateral information, it was ascertained that ZUBILIN was a Major General of State Security that his real name is V. ZUBILIN (apparently no relation to Georgi N. ZUBILIN, Soviet ambassador to Canada during the time of the extensive operation of M.G. NIKOLAI KASOKIN, Soviet Military attaché and US! head in Canada from the summer of 1943 until December 15, 1945).

10. Through investigation it was established that during 1943 and 1944 Ralph BOMAN ("R.B.") was in frequent correspondence with Steve NELSON, concerning matters pertaining to this intelligence parallel, through a complicated series of Party and Party affiliated individuals serving as mail drops. During this time also Steve NELSON is known to have been in possession of a complete formula for the preparation of a secret ink adaptable for clandestine secret writing of espionage communications, and he was in possession also of certain ingredients for the preparation of this ink. While no secret writing communications were actually intercepted by this case, it should be noted that it was established that Herosova, BAPROWSKI (in 1945) was in possession of a formula for secret ink exactly the same as the one possessed by NELSON.

11. The next major development in this case was the receipt in August, 1943 of an anonymous letter, postmarked at Washington, D.C. on August 7, 1943, mailed from a small box in the proximity of the Soviet embassy, and addressed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This letter was written on a Russian typewriter in obviously military style, and, as will be noted below, could only have been written by an individual closely acquainted with and undoubtedly deeply implicated in Soviet espionage operations within the U.S. This anonymous letter stated that the Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Vasili M. ZUBILIN, was actually the head of the Foreign Department (given in Russian as ZAO) of the NKVD (meaning obviously OGPU, NKVD) for North America, having jurisdiction over not only the U.S. but Canada and Mexico as well. The letter stated that ZUBILIN was running a large network of agents, that his real name was V. ZUBILIN and that he was in Poland at least shortly after the Soviet occupation in 1939 where he was responsible for the massacre of several thousands of Poles. The letter also described him as a Major General of NKVD and listed in detail a number of Soviet officials in North America who, according to the letter, were serving as his assistants in Soviet espionage operations. The other persons named in the letter are listed below, together with a summary of the allegations in the anonymous letter, plus the substantiating information concerning them developed through independent investigation and other sources.

a. Elisabetha Zrubekab (illegible) According to the letter ZUBILIN's wife, Elisabetha, personally was operating a network composed of a large number of agents serving in agencies of the U.S. Government. It has been established independently that
Elisabetta ZUBILIN was active, at least as early as 1937, as a Soviet agent of importance under the cover name "Helena".

b. Boris Michael WIEBES, a Hollywood film director of Russian extraction. It has been established independently and in fact WIEBES has admitted serving as a Soviet agent under ZUBILIN and other individuals with the primary mission of establishing a cover film or films for Soviet espionage operations in the U.S. and Latin America. One of the allegations in the anonymous letter, and the only allegation which is considered untrue or inaccurate, was an allegation to the effect that the ZUBILINs were actually betraying the Soviet Union, were passing "false information" back to the Soviet Union, but were passing valid intelligence data to the Germans and Japanese through NIKIFOR. Intensive investigation failed to substantiate this allegation in the anonymous letter, although, without exception, where possible, all of the other allegations have been independently substantiated. The possible explanation for this rather startling statement is discussed below in connection with the evaluation of this letter and the writer thereof.

c. Grigori Markovich KORFEVS, described in the letter as Soviet Vice Consul in San Francisco and an important assistant to ZUBILIN. Through independent sources it is known that KORFEVS, until his departure for the Soviet Union in the summer of 1944, was active in operational Soviet espionage principally in the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas, it being noted that at least one of his sub-agents was controlled. KORFEVS, during this period, used among other aliases, the alias of KOMAG or VON HAHN. His intelligence contacts were clandestinely made with maximum secrecy precautions and a predilection for the use of public places not readily accessible to physical or other observation. Access to certain personal papers in KORFEVS' possession reflected that he maintained a tremendously large number of contacts on the West Coast and that he underrated himself for other extensive intelligence operations which were never completely identified. It is interesting to note that when KORFEVS departed from San Francisco in the summer of 1944 he was replaced as Vice Consul by Grigory ROMANOV, who also was identified as taking over KORFEVS' intelligence operations and contacts, as well as his overt duties as Soviet Vice Consul. However, KORFEVS did not use exactly the same approach as was frequently used by KORFEVS; it being noted that KORFEVS consistently claimed to be assigned to the Consulate in San Francisco as a representative of VOS and stated on numerous occasions that prior to coming to the U.S. he had been an official of VOS in Moscow.

d. Andrei Yaroslavitch SCHOVCHENKO, described in the letter as a subordinate of ZUBILIN's, active in technical espionage. For a period of several years until late January 1946 SCHOVCHENKO was an engineer with both the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission and the Army Trading Corporation. Inasmuch as two of SCHOVCHENKO's sub-agents were controlled, it is known that the allegations regarding him in the anonymous letter were without question true. It is interesting to note that SCHOVCHENKO's primary interest, at least as exhibited through his two controlled sub-agents, was in the procurement of technical documents from critical industrial facilities, including the Bell Aircraft Corporation in Buffalo. He is known to have
expressed a particular interest in jet propulsion, rocket motors, and related matters, and upon at least two occasions he furnished his sub-agents with Leica cameras for photographing documents.

20. (Continued)

e. Leonid A. TASHKOV. More commonly known as Lev TASHKOV, he was first an important official of the newly opened Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and was described in the letter as SULLIN’s chief subordinate in Mexico. TASHKOV later became either first or second secretary of the Soviet Legation, later Embassy, in Mexico and was independently identified as deeply involved in operational Soviet espionage. It is interesting to note that TASHKOV was at least in a large part responsible for the Mexican end of the Altacker case, a Soviet espionage case involving numerous secret writing messages which were never completely deciphered between the U.S. and Latin America. This case involved, among other things, efforts to procure the release of disposal of provocateur Konrad Rosenthal, also Frank JAZZOR, the convicted assassin of Rev. David O. HUNTLEY (home, TASHKOV). Shortly after the receipt of the anonymous letter TASHKOV departed Mexico for the Soviet Union and his functions, at least in the Altacker case, were taken over by another Soviet intelligence official, possibly Pavel MIKHAILOV, referred to in greater detail below, and later by Grigori LEPANOV, referred to above.

2. Pavel MIKHAILOV. At the time the anonymous letter was received MIKHAILOV, also known as Pavel MIKHAILOV and Pavel A. MIKHAILOV, was Vice Consul assigned to the Consulate General, USSR, in New York City. The letter described him as an assistant to SULLIN, responsible for the operation of an extensive espionage net in the New York area. These allegations were substantiated by independent investigation. There appears no question but that MIKHAILOV, during the period he spent in New York before proceeding to Mexico as an official of the Legation there in 1943 or 1944, was responsible for the New York ramifications of the Altacker case. He has been identified almost without doubt as the writer of the Southbound secret writing letters in these operations.

e. Ivan R. MIKHAILOV. According to the anonymous letter this individual was a colonel of the KGB and SULLIN’S personal assistant and secretary in the Embassy. The letter stated that he also operated an espionage network which included ‘an important agent in the White House.’ MIKHAILOV’S Embassy position and his close association with SULLIN were verified; however, independent investigation failed to substantiate the allegations concerning his espionage operations.

b. Sergei D. LEHMAN. LEHMAN, an engineer with the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission also was listed in the letter as an assistant to SULLIN and as a Soviet intelligence official actually operating agents. However, LEHMAN departed from the U.S. for Vancouver, Canada, about the time of the receipt of the anonymous letter, and consequently it was impossible to substantiate the allegations of his espionage activities in the U.S. The Canadian authorities were not able to establish definitely his participation in Soviet espionage in Canada, although they did report that his activities were highly suspect and that he
20. (Continued)

assumed to himself on frequent occasions diplomatic precautions which were not in accordance with protocol or with his position as interpreted by the Canadian Department of External Affairs.

2. V.T. CAVAZZOLI. This individual was described in the letter as Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, and, under the direction of DUBININ, responsible for MVD operations in that country. It will be recalled that these allegations were completely substantiated in September 1953 by Innokentiy Ivanovich DUBININ, Red Army Intelligence code clerk who defected in Canada.

3. Samuel SEMENOV. SEMENOV was named in the letter as a Soviet Intelligence official and engineer representing the Soviet Government in the U.S. It was impossible to substantiate the allegations concerning SEMENOV.

k. Vassili (2) BALOV. BALOV, also a Soviet engineer in the United States, was named by the writer of the anonymous letter as another assistant to DUBININ in his espionage operations. In his case, likewise, it was not possible to substantiate this allegation through independent investigation.

12. In connection with the anonymous letter, the pertinent contents of which are set out above, a number of observations appear of importance. Intensive efforts to identify the writer of this communication and/or the Russian language typewriter on which it was written proved completely fruitless, which was and is most unfortunate, since the writer of this letter obviously possessed both authentic and detailed knowledge of Soviet Intelligence operations in the U.S., at least as of 1943. The independent substantiation of so many of the allegations made in the letter, as reflected above, leaves absolutely no doubt as to its basic authenticity. Only one portion of the letter appears open to definite question, i.e., the allegation that Vassili Mikhailovich DUBININ and Klishepa Ivanovna DUBININ were betraying the Soviet Union, passing "disinformation" to their superiors and transmitting valid intelligence data to German and Japanese authorities through Boris NURKO.

As noted above, intensive efforts to substantiate this part of the letter were made without result, and in addition it was not possible to establish the existence of any channel whereby NURKO or the DUBININS, through either intermediaries could have passed intelligence information during 1943 to Germany or Japan. Set out below is a possible explanation of the inclination in this letter of these apparently false allegations, which explanation may have some validity, at least insofar as the accusation for including these statements existed in the mind of the writer of the letter.

13. From the language of the letter and the apparent important intelligence position of the writer thereof, it is believed that the writer was unable to take any personal action against DUBININ and his associates, either because of a hostage situation or because the writer felt that he could not safely complain, except anonymously, to U. S. authorities. Remembering that at the time of receipt of the

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20. (Continued)

letter the Soviet Union and the U. S. were in the position of at least quasi-alliance, it is believed probable that these allegations were included by the writer of the letter for the purpose of forcing the U. S. authorities to take action on the theory that perhaps no action would be taken against the diplomatic and official representatives of the Soviet Union mentioned in the letter unless some betrayal to the common enemy was alleged.

14. The possible motivation for the rest of the letter is more difficult to speculate upon. It is believed, however, that the letter was written by an officer, either of the Red Army Intelligence or of State Security, sufficiently highly placed to have a detailed knowledge of DUBLIN's network. It is interesting to note that the letter gave personal characteristics and personal comments concerning each of the individuals mentioned, reflecting with little question that the writer was personally acquainted with the individuals he named. It is, of course, possible that the motivation for this letter stemmed from the writer's past participation in or knowledge of the NKGB purge of Red Army Intelligence in the middle and late 1930's.

15. In the summer of 1941 there began a general exodus of Soviet officials named in the anonymous letter and closely connected with DUBLIN. The last of the individuals named in the letter to depart from the U. S. was SOROKHINDI, who did not finally depart until January 10, 1946. PAYNOV, it will be recalled, departed from Canada for the Soviet Union early in 1945 after the defection of Igor GORODKO SUSANNOV. It will also be recalled that this exodus was a direct result of the inspection conducted in the spring and summer of 1941 by NKGB and GSHN facilities in the U. S. by two Soviet Intelligence Inspectors, who, according to SUSANNOV, represented both the Red Army Intelligence and NKGB, and traveled under the guise of diplomatic couriers using the names MIKHAIL KHARJEY and SERGEY KOSSARYEY. It is recalled further that KOSSARYEY, who presumably was an NKGB inspector, has never been identified, but that SUSANNOV identified KHARJEY as a Colonel KETZRENTCH, Deputy Director of the North American section of the Red Army Intelligence in Moscow.

16. DUBLIN, himself, departed from the port of New York City for the Soviet Union on August 28, 1946, and at about the same time MIKHAIL KAMINSKII, and several of the other individuals named also departed.

17. DUBLIN's successor in the NKGB apparatus in the U. S. is believed to have been ANATOLI VOROBIEV. GORDEEV, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., from the summer of 1941 until December 7, 1945, when he departed from the port of New York City ostensibly for the Soviet Union. It will be recalled that GORDEEV was identified as the Soviet agent ART, who was GORDEEV'S superior in the GORDEEV case. Shortly after his departure from the U. S., it was ascertained that GORDEEV was assigned as Counselor to the Soviet Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, from where he departed, at least clandestinely, late in 1946. His present whereabouts are unknown and have been unknown since that time. It is interesting to note that investigation of GORDEEV'S contacts and activities did not
20. (Continued)

Reflect his active personal participation in many of the operations DUSHNITSKI is known to have directed, although it is entirely possible that such implication may have existed inasmuch as GRISHIN's full significance was not realised nor his full identity as "AI" ascertained until November 1943, approximately a month before he departed from the U. S.

19. In connection with this case further, it is interesting to note that in addition to his contacts with DUSHNITSKI, Steve NELSON was also in contact, at least in the spring of 1943, with what appeared to be a separate and distinct Soviet intelligence operation headed by Peter TAVKOV. At that time Secretary of the Soviet consulate in San Francisco, California, NELSON was, during the early months of 1941, made clandestine notes with TAVKOV and, in addition, was responsible for putting TAVKOV in touch with a number of Communist and pro-Communist professors directly or indirectly connected with the radiation laboratory at the University of California. It will be recalled that this laboratory was one of the key installations of the HDM project. It is also known that during the early months of 1943 NELSON made attempts to procure information concerning this project from a Party contact employed therein. While it has never definitely been established, the speculation has been advanced that Peter TAVKOV was a C.I. official, whereas it will be recalled that DUSHNITSKI and his assistants were officials of the N.K.G. It is interesting to note that the approaches used by TAVKOV in his efforts to recruit agents to secure information concerning the HDM project very closely paralleled approaches known to have been made by former Alexandrovitch AMAR, a highly important Soviet espionage agent definitely identified as working for the Army intelligence, who was intermittently active in the U. S. from 1939 to 1944. AMAR was last active in the U. S. from 1939, when he entered the country on a fraudulent Canadian passport, until he disappeared in New York City late in January, 1946. TAVKOV departed from the U. S. shortly after his series of contacts with NELSON, and his present whereabouts are not known. The full scope of TAVKOV's activities and operations was never definitely ascertained.

19. In 1945 Steve NELSON was made a member of the National Board of the National Committee of the CPAUSA, which required, under Party rules, his moving to the vicinity of New York. In the fall of 1945 NELSON proceeded to New York where he became a full-time official at Party Headquarters, 5 East 11th Street, assuming, in addition to his membership on the National Board, the position of Director of Foreign Nationality Group work for the Party. Since that time NELSON has made a number of highly suspicious contacts, but there has been little definite indication of operational espionage on his part. However, he has been in frequent contact with individuals highly suspect as Soviet espionage agents, including a number of visiting Polish and Yugoslav officials whose intelligence significance is open to little question. In addition he has continued his interest in Communist scanned courier routes.

20. At the time of NELSON's move to New York, at least the form in which this Soviet espionage parallel existed in the spring of 1943 appears to have materially changed and its present form is unknown.
21. Through the investigation of the OKHAP case, in addition to the large number of individuals identified as major participants, many others were involved as strongly suspect Soviet agents. Very briefly, there are set out below the identities of a number of these individuals.

Max and Grace GRANICH. These two individuals, husband and wife, who have long been active in Communist and Communist Front circles in the New York area were identified as mail droppers used in the operation of this parallel by NELSON and BEGEMAN. Both of them have been active in the past in the Far East and have maintained an intense interest in Far Eastern affairs. In 1947 they moved to a farm in New England and are known to have expressed to associates a desire to return to China at some time in the future. During 1943 and 1944 the GRANICH's were receiving mail from Madame Sun Tat Sen containing conspiratorial messages and signed by her with the cover name "CHAT.

It is noted that one of these letters to the GRANICH's mentioned the return of the U.S. of John S. SERVICE; State Department official implicated in the illegal disclosure of classified documents in connection with the Philip Jacob JAFFE case and strongly suspect, in that connection, of working for Soviet Intelligence. Madame Sun Tat Sen's letter mentioned SERVICE as a "valuable individual" who "thinks as we do."

In the summer of 1945 three Chinese Communist delegates to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco visited Max and Grace GRANICH in New York and were almost immediately escorted by Grace GRANICH to an apartment in lower Manhattan, subsequently identified as occupied by Abe TIEFEO, a concert pianist, born in Canada under the name of Abraham NETZER. TIEFEO became of extreme interest in February 1946, when he was contacted by Sam CARR (real name Schmi ROSS). It will be recalled that CARR was one of the principal recruiting agents in the GOE espionage ring operated in Canada by Colonel Maksai JANOV in the summer of 1943 until the fall of 1945. At the time he contacted TIEFEO in February, CARR was enroute back to Canada from Havana, Cuba, where as a temporary delegate of the Canadian Communist Party of Canada he had attended a National Congress of the Cuban Communist Party. Subsequent investigation reflected that TIEFEO and CARR have been close associates and there appears little question that TIEFEO was involved in the disappearance in Canada of Sam CARR in April 1946. It was never possible to ascertain the exact significance of the visit to TIEFEO's apartment by the three important Chinese Communists attending the UNGC.

Alexander BITTENMAK, (real name Arthur BITTENMAKER). BITTENMAK was drawn into the OKHAP case through his close and frequent contacts with the principal figures therein and it was strongly indicated by the investigation that he was at least indirectly connected with the activities of this net. BITTENMAK, who was born in Russia, and whose deportation was requested very recently by the Department of Justice, has long been an important national functionary of the CPUSA. He has interested himself particularly in Party organization and propaganda among the Jewish minority elements and he is considered by many Party leaders to be the
20. (Continued)

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foremost Marxist, Leninist, Stalinist dialectician in the Party. The exact extent
of BITTENBERG's intelligence activities has never definitely been ascertained.

Alexander "BCHNBERG," BCHNBERG, a member of the National Committee of
the Party, is the director of International Publishers, most important of the Com-
munist Party publishing firms. BCHNBERG figured in the JINSAF investigation
through his intimate association with many of the other subjects thereof. Collat-
erally, it was ascertained that he was in close contact with a number of other
strongly suspect Soviet agents, not implicated, as far as is known in this case,
but definitely implicated in other Soviet espionage operations. Of particular in-
terest in this regard is TCHANBERG's association with Joseph NADAR-MARION,
alias Joe MESSING, alias Joe B, alias Joe BERNSTEIN, alias Joe SUDARKIS,
Messing, a minor Party figure for many years, has been closely connected with a number of
individuals who have figured in the JINSAF case; involving, it will be recalled,
the operation of extensive Soviet espionage parallels centered in agencies of the
U.S. Government. In addition, BERNSTEIN appears identical with an individual known
to have been described by Philip Jacob JANKIS--as an important Soviet espionage agent.
There is good reason to believe, on the basis of certain correspondence between
subjects in the GREGORY case referring to BERNSTEIN, that at least for several years
during World War II BERNSTEIN may have been operating a Soviet espionage parallel
in Washington, D.C., identical with the so-called Third Parallel referred to by
GREGORY about which GREGORY knew practically nothing.
21. George M. Elsey, Memorandum for Mr. [Clark M.] Clifford, 16 August 1948.

Memorandum for Mr. Clifford:

The following represents the consensus of opinion at our meeting this morning with the Attorney General and Mr. Peyton Ford:

(1) The President should not at this time make a statement regarding "spies" along the lines proposed by Mr. Spingarn.

(2) Attention will be given by Justice to the possibility and desirability of referring the question of Soviet espionage in the Federal Government to a bi-partisan commission, such as the Hoover Commission.

(3) Justice should make every effort to ascertain if Whittaker Chambers is guilty of perjury.

(4) Investigation of Chambers' knowledge in the United States.

(b) The Attorney General will furnish the White House with a description of the data Miss Bentley claims to have obtained for Soviet agents during the war, and the White House should endeavor to determine how much of this information was freely available to the Soviet Government through routine official liaison between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The purpose of this would be to make it clear that Miss Bentley was not successful in transmitting secret material to the Russians that they did not already have.

(5) The White House should ascertain the facts concerning the retention of Mr. Kemington in OSM, his transfer to the Council of Economic Advisers and his subsequent transfer to the Department of Commerce.

GEORGE M. ELSEY
22. [Harry S. Truman] to the Attorney General, 16 December 1948.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 16, 1948

Memorandum for: Attorney General

From: The President

I wonder if we could not get a statement of facts from the FBI about the meddling of the House Un-American Activities Committee and how they dried up sources of information which would have been accessible in the prosecution of spies and communists.

Their meddling efforts were in fact a "red herring" to detract attention not only from the shortcomings of the 80th Congress but also contributed to the escape of certain communists who should have been indicted.

I'll appreciate it if you will look into this a little bit and we will talk it over at the Cabinet meeting tomorrow.

[Signature]

[Office of the Attorney General]

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Memorandum to the Director

On February 28, 1941, Mr. Adolf Berle of the Department of State requested a meeting from the Bureau to discuss his regarding Chambers. On March 1, 1941, Mr. Roosevelt advised Mr. Berle's secretary that it was his understanding that Mr. Geronimo and Mr. Foxworth of the Bureau had an appointment with Mr. Berle. (10-09508-12)

At this time there was a nationalistic tendency card filed in the Bureau indices which indicated that Whittaker Chambers was alleged to be a Communist and formerly a member of the JCA, also former staff editor of the "Daily Worker" and contributing editor of "New Masses."

On March 5, 1941, Mr. Foxworth in a memorandum to you made reference to his conversation with you that day concerning Whittaker Chambers. Reference was made to the aforementioned nationalistic tendency card and Foxworth stated, "We are not conducting any investigation and I have accordingly informed Mr. Berle." (10-09508-13)

On March 10, 1941, Mr. Berle telephonically advised Mr. Foxworth that he was advised that the Russian agencies were looking for Whittaker Chambers. This matter was not followed up and the memorandum concerning it was merely filed. (10-09508-122) (This is the memorandum which was referred to in the memorandum to you from Assistant Director L. B. Nichols dated September 1, 1942, which prompted the memorandum to all Assistant Directors bringing to the attention of supervisory personnel the significance of initiating communications.) (10-09508-22) (ATTACHED)

Information was received on April 28, 1941, from Confidential Informant Victor Fleis, then assistant editor of "New Leader" newspaper, that Whittaker Chambers, a former member of the Communist Party, was then a motion picture reviewer for "Time," "Life" and "Fortune" magazines and was at that time (1941) strongly anti-Communist. (10-09740-9)

On May 9, 1941, the New York Office reported an interview with Mr. Ludwig Lere on May 8, 1941, pursuant to the Bureau instructions of November 13, 1940. Lere declined to furnish the name of the unknown former GPU agent and stated that he had been advised that this man's case had been discussed with the Director of the FBI some six or seven months previously by an intermediary who had suggested that the former GPU agent wanted some sort of immunity guaranteed before exposing himself and that the Director had stated that no such agreement could be entered into. Lere also alleged that this former GPU agent had delivered to the President of the United States through a trusted friend who had the necessary

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Memorandum to the Director

[Paragraph containing a list of persons in the Government who were Communists or pro-Soviet, indicating nothing had been done about it. (100-25628-4)]

The New York Office was advised on May 16, 1941, that you had no recollection of ever having been approached by any intermediary who discussed some type of immunity guarantee which could be given to an agent of the GPU if he were willing to expose himself. The New York Office was instructed to obtain from Ludwig Lore the identity of the former GPU agent. (100-25628-6)

On August 3, 1941, the New York Office advised that Ludwig Lore had identified the individual to whom he had referred as Whittaker Chambers, an associate editor of "Time" magazine. (100-25628-9)

On August 16, 1941, Assistant Director E. J. Connally in New York was instructed to institute a detailed investigation regarding Chambers to determine his character, background, activities and affiliations in a highly discreet and tactful manner. At the completion of the investigation the feasibility of openly interviewing Chambers would be considered. (100-25628-6)

During the conduct of this investigation Mr. Will Allen of the "Washington Daily News" contacted Assistant Director L. E. Nichols during October 1941 and advised that Ludwig Lore, a former Communist in New York City, knew an individual familiar with GPU activities whom Allen subsequently contacted. Allen obtained from this person the names of three alleged GPU agents - Iraan Holaday, Helen Holaday and Sophia Slepenko. Investigation was immediately instituted by the Bureau on the three individuals named. (100-25628-13)

Allen was again interviewed by a representative of the Washington Field Office on November 28, 1941, but stated that he could not under any circumstances divulge the identity of his informant in New York City. Allen was again interviewed by Assistant Director Nichols on January 25, 1942, at which time he stated that his informant's initials were W.C. (obviously Whittaker Chambers) (100-25628-19)

On February 25, 1942, the New York Office advised that Ludwig Lore did not introduce Allen to Chambers, but Lore claimed that Allen had been introduced to Chambers by Isaac Don Levine. (100-25628-20)
Memorandum to the Director

The logical leads in the investigation into the background of Whittaker Chambers having been completed, the New York Office advised the Bureau on March 4, 1942, that an effort would be made to interview Chambers. In this regard a follow-up letter was sent to New York on April 30, 1942. (100-29528-21)

It will be noted that there was an investigatory delay from August 18, 1941 until March 4, 1942, in conducting the necessary investigation into the background and activities of Chambers for the purpose of laying the proper predicate for an interview. The field was followed by the Bureau on this matter in October, November and December, 1941, and in January, 1942, as new information was received or investigative suggestions made. (100-29528-5, 15, 15, 10, 17, 15, 19)

It is possible that this investigatory delinquency was a reflection of the general investigative delinquency in the field during the period immediately prior to and subsequent to Pearl Harbor.

Chambers was interviewed by Special Agent John R. Baul, and E. J. Greenland, Jr. of the New York Office on May 13, 1942, the results being transmitted to the Bureau by letter on May 14, 1942. Chambers advised that he had given all of the information which was in his possession to Mr. A. A. Berle of the State Department in Washington, D. C., in September, 1939, and before discussing any of the matters with the Agent put through a long distance call to Mr. Berle at the latter's home.

Chambers advised Berle in the presence of the Agent that there were present in his office two FBI Agents who wished to secure the information that he, Chambers, had given to Berle and asked if this would be all right. Apparently Berle was in accord for Chambers thanked him and thereafter supplied considerable information which he indicated had been furnished previously to Mr. Berle in September, 1939. (100-29528-22)

During the course of this interview Chambers denied that he was directly connected with the CPUSA and stated that he was in the underground movement of the Communist Party, USA as a kind of "muscle officer" to guide recruits in the Party's policy. He denied that he had ever been to the USSR. (In this regard the investigation conducted by the Bureau prior to the interview failed to disclose any indications of travel by Chambers to or residence in the USSR as originally alleged by Ludwig Lore, who you will recall died shortly after the conclusion of this investigation, and no was not available to recheck allegations made by him concerning Chambers.) (100-29528-22)
23. (Continued)

Memorandum to the Director

As will be seen from the foregoing, the first knowledge the Bureau had that Chambers had been interviewed by Adolf Berle on September 2, 1939, in Washington, D.C., came to us as a result of our interview with Chambers May 13, 1942. You will recall in connection with this matter SAC Carson was brought up from Miami to interview Berle on September 3, 1948, regarding the latter's testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee in order to clarify the ambiguities in Berle's testimony and to cause a correction in the inference left by Berle's testimony that he had advised the FBI in 1939 of Chambers' allegations. Mr. Berle advised SAC Carson that his recollection being refreshed, he could state that he does not recall or have any record of any prior conversation with the FBI prior to March, 1941, concerning Chambers and that he does not recall having furnished to the FBI in 1941 any information concerning Chambers' interview with him. Mr. Berle advised SAC Carson on September 3, 1948, that in 1939 (and by inference in 1941 as well) he did not feel free to divulge the content of Chambers' conversation to the FBI at that time as Chambers had indicated that he did not do so desire and had further indicated that he would not back up the story and also did not desire the information furnished to the FBI, particularly if the source was to be revealed. (100-05284-50)

The Bureau may have been delinquent in not contacting Mr. Berle immediately upon the conclusion of the Chambers interview regarding the data which Chambers had furnished the Bureau and to Berle, in order to make sure that it was the same. However, Chambers when interviewed on May 13, 1942, had indicated that what he was furnishing to the Bureau at that time was the substance of what he had given to Mr. Berle in September, 1939.

An analysis of the Bureau's action with regard to individuals mentioned by Chambers in the 1942 interview shows that 21 persons were already subjects of Bureau investigations, as well as two organizations, namely, American Trending Corporation and Rome River Agency. On five other persons, investigations were instituted on the basis of Chambers' allegations. These persons were: storms; Harry Gurt, with aliases; Paul Reising; Reising; and Bolen, who were not mentioned by Chambers in his interview. The individuals, Harry Dossen and Margaret Dossen, became the subject of investigation at a later date on the basis of information developed through other sources, data furnished by Chambers in each instance already appearing in the Bureau files. With regard to Dowman, it was noted that he was established to be identical with the person mentioned by Chambers as Rudolph Baken but Chambers was never able to identify Dowman's photograph as Baken.

Regarding those individuals mentioned by Chambers, concerning whom no investigative action was undertaken, Mrs. Lilian Land and Marko Land were
Memorandum to the Director

(Continued)

...dead and the Bureau files contained considerable information regarding Hare. Gertrude Scolich, a German Communist involved in the murder of Ignacy Solecki in Switzerland, was not indicated to be in the United States. Isaiah Miller was not alleged to be either a Communist or an espionage agent. The circumstances regarding the disappearance of Juliet Fauriel were generally known to the Bureau and Chambers' suspicions contributed nothing to the picture at that time. Chambers mentioned one Frawh who "was obtained from the underground movement of the Party" and, according to Chambers, became a co-editor of a State Department publication. He has subsequently been identified as Richard Powell Frawh, a State Department employee and a Loyalty investigation has been conducted concerning him. Chambers mentioned an unnamed individual "connected" with the Communist underground who was in the Trade Agreement Section of the State Department. This person has been identified as Henry Julian Wallis, who was formerly employed by the State Department and who was recently interviewed in connection with the most current allegations of Chambers. As to the latter two individuals, Chambers' statements with regard to them were less positive than as to other persons and he did not state in unequivocal language that they were Party members at the time he left the movement in 1938, as he did in the cases of many of the individuals discussed.

It should be noted that subsequent to the Chambers interview on May 13, 1948, Bureau files on numerous individuals were reviewed, certain investigations were opened, and efforts were made to identify persons named by Chambers, the principal one of which was his superior "Peter." In a report dated December 1, 1948, in the Chambers file, the New York Office identified "Peter," the reputed head of the underground movement of the Communist Party, as J. Peters, author of "The Communist Party, A Manual of Organization." (100-45584-69)

Whittaker Chambers meanwhile had been bedridden with acute pericarditis from November, 1948 until March 5, 1949, when agents of this Bureau were able to interview him for a period of five minutes. At this time Chambers identified a photograph of Alexander Stevens, with alias, as "Peter" his superior in the Communist Party underground. (100-184235-67)

Thereafter, the desirability of determining whether the information furnished to Mr. Berle was identical with that furnished to the Bureau by Chambers became apparent and subsequent to Mr. Berle's recovery from an illness which had afflicted him in May, 1943 (24-1-3259-38) the Liaison Section of the Bureau obtained Mr. Berle's notes of the 1933 interview, which were very...
Memorandum to the Director

sketchy and disjointed in June, 1943. Copies of these notes were placed in the Whittaker Chambers file. (100-25689-27)

The Bureau was probably delinquent in not pressing Mr. Berle in June, 1943, for any independent recollection which he might have had to explain or clarify the ambiguities in his notes, although it is probable that Mr. Berle not having reduced these notes to a memorandum would have been unable to contribute materially to the matters under investigation after a lapse of almost four years since the date of his interview with Chambers.

DELINQUENCIES NOTED

1. The Bureau did not press Mr. Berle for information which he might have had concerning Whittaker Chambers at the time he made his inquiry in March, 1941, concerning the Bureau's possible interest in Chambers. The files do not indicate a definite explanation, but if one exists it might be that the Bureau did not feel that it was desirable to press the Assistant Secretary of State for information which he did not see fit to volunteer concerning a subject which had been raised by him.

2. There was an investigative delinquency in the period required for investigation of the background and activities of Whittaker Chambers from August 15, 1941 to March 4, 1942. An explanation, if one exists, might be the general investigative delinquency in the field immediately prior to and subsequent to Pearl Harbor.

3. The Bureau was probably delinquent in not contacting Mr. Berle immediately upon the conclusion of our interview with Whittaker Chambers on May 15, 1942, to determine the substance of the information which had been furnished by Chambers to Berle in 1939. The Bureau waited until June, 1943 to obtain Berle's notes concerning the interview. The only possible explanation for this delinquency was that Chambers' telephone conversation with Berle and his interview with the Agent indicated that he was furnishing the Bureau in May, 1942, the substance of what he had given to Berle in 1939.

4. The Bureau was probably delinquent in not pressing Mr. Berle in June, 1943, at the time his notes were obtained, for any independent recollection which he might have had of the 1939 conversation in addition to the
23. (Continued)

Memorandum to the Director

notes. The Bureau files do not indicate what if anything Mr. Hoile said at the time the notes were obtained by the Bureau, but it is doubtful that he would have been able to contribute materially to a clarification of the notes in 1943 after a lapse of almost four years from the date of his original inter-

view with Chambers.

Attachment

Of course, hindsight is better than foresight but we should learn from this incident and have any occurrence of similar situations.

- 8 -
2. Oplos has pleaded innocent and in the event we deport Gubitseh she will claim it was done to prevent her from having his testimony in defense.

3. The jury would be adversely affected by the prosecution of this young woman alone. The absence of Gubitseh would, of course, be known to the jury and prosecution against Oplos would be charged.

4. The deportation of Gubitseh would undoubtedly cause many to think and say that the Department of Justice never had an espionage case against him and never intended to prosecute the case to its conclusion.

5. The public reaction to immediate deportation before trial would, in my opinion, be extremely unfavorable. If Gubitseh were deported the result would be that an American citizen would remain to face possible conviction and imprisonment with the alien Russian being excused from even the embarrassment of a public trial.

I cannot, of course, substitute my opinion for that of the State Department in matters of foreign relations. I only wish to express my view of the problem presented.

The Secretary of State has asked that I advise him of the decision in this matter by Friday morning. I have furnished him a copy of this memorandum.

Another alternative exists, i.e., to prosecute Gubitseh and then permit his deportation to Russia. In this event I am advised by the Secretary of State that this decision could not be made known until the conclusion of the prosecution. However, it might be possible to inform the Russian Government that Gubitseh will have to remain in this country for the trial but that the consideration of his ultimate deportation after trial would remain open.

It is my considered recommendation that I be authorized to proceed with the trial of Gubitseh without delay, reserving until a later time the question of deportation.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Attorney General.

[Signature]

FLORA DON WOVSCHIN, with alias

In connection with the investigation to identify Zora, the person who recruited Judith Coplon and Marion Davis Berdecio in the Fall of 1944 as Soviet espionage agents, an identification has been made which indicates that Zora is identical with Flora Don Wovschin.

Miss Wovschin was born February 20, 1923, at New York City. Her mother, Miss Maria Wicher, and her stepfather, Enos Regnet Wicher, presently reside at 229 East 79th Street, New York City. He is a professor at Columbia University. Mrs. Maria Wicher was born in Russia and became a citizen of the United States in 1922. Flora Don Wovschin’s father, Dr. William A. Wovschin (deceased), was born in Russia and became a citizen of the United States in 1914.

Miss Wovschin attended the University of Wisconsin, Columbia University, and received her degree at Barnard College. While at Barnard she was active in the American Students Union and was possibly a member of the American Youth for Democracy. She was acquainted with both Judith Coplon and Marion Davis Berdecio while at Barnard. She was employed by OWI from September 9, 1943, to February 20, 1945, when she transferred to the State Department. She stayed at the State Department until September 20, 1945, when she resigned. Her mother and stepfather reportedly were very active in the Communist movement when they resided in the State of Wisconsin.

We have recently received information to the effect that Flora Don Wovschin went to Russia several years ago after renouncing her American citizenship, and in Russia she married a Soviet engineer. It is reported that she is unhappy at the present time and would like to return to the United States.

On 9 May 1949, in the course of investigations, a report reached the Central Office of a noticeable change in political views.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At the 36th Meeting, the National Security Council, including the Secretary of the Treasury and a representative of the Attorney General for this matter, agreed, subject to a dissent by the Secretary of the Army, to recommend that you approve the enclosed draft directive on coordination of internal security (NSC 17/1).

The reasons for the dissent by the Secretary of the Army are stated in the enclosed memorandum dated March 21, 1949.

/S/ Sidney W. Souers
Executive Secretary

APPROVED:

/S/ Harry S. Truman
HARRY S. TRUMAN

Date: March 23, 1949

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A REPORT
TO THE
PRESIDENT
BY THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on
INTERNAL SECURITY

March 22, 1940
WASHINGTON

Confidential
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ON

INTERNAL SECURITY

References:
A. NSC 17/3

At its 36th Meeting, the National Security Council considered the references and agreed, subject to a dissent by the Secretary of the Army, to recommend to the President that he approve the proposed directive enclosed herewith. The reasons for the dissent by the Secretary of the Army are stated in the Reference memo dated March 21, 1949.

Subject to the approval by the President of the above recommendations, the National Security Council also directed the NSC representative on Internal Security to arrange for the prompt study of the points outlined by the Secretary of the Army in the reference memo dated March 21, 1949, and to submit for Council consideration such recommendations with respect thereto as are deemed appropriate.

SIDNEY W. SOUBERS
Executive Secretary

Distribution:
The President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, National Security Resources Board

CONFIDENTIAL

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March 22, 1949

DRAFT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

1. There is hereby established under the National Security Council, pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 of the National Security Act, the following arrangements for the purpose of effecting more adequate and coordinated internal security.

2. The following two permanent committees, together with such secretariat as may be required, shall be responsible for coordinating internal security.

   a. The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (ICIC) is responsible for the coordination of the investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. It consists of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice; Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; Director of the Intelligence Division, Department of the Army; and the Director of the Office of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force.

   b. The Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) is hereby created and shall be

NSC 174/4

CONFIDENTIAL
responsible for coordinating all phases of the internal security field other than the functions outlined in paragraph 2-a above. It shall be composed of representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice and the National Military Establishment.

3. Both Committees shall invite non-member agency representatives as ad hoc members thereof when matters involving their responsibilities are under consideration.

4. In accordance with arrangements to be determined in each case, there shall be transferred to the IIC and the ICIS for incorporation as subcommittees or for the absorption of their functions such existing committees as are operating in their respective fields of responsibility. The two committees shall also establish such new subcommittees as will assist them in carrying out their responsibilities.

5. The IIC and the ICIS will, whenever appropriate, hold joint meetings or establish joint subcommittees.

6. The National Security Council shall designate a representative who, under the direction of the Executive Secretary of the NSC, shall:

a. Assist and advise the NSC in coordinating the activities of the IIC and the ICIS;

b. Assist and advise the IIC and the ICIS in carrying out their respective responsibilities and in collaborating on problems of common interest;

c. Submit to the IIC or the ICIS questions which, in his opinion, require their consideration.

(Continued)
26. (Continued)

g. As representative of the NSC, participate as an observer and advisor in all meetings of the IIC and the ICIS;

h. Submit for consideration by the NSC problems which cannot be resolved by either the IIC or the ICIS or by the two committees acting together, outlining any divergent solutions which have been proposed and his own recommendations;

i. Report to the National Security Council from time to time, at least quarterly, on progress being made for the provision of adequate internal security;

j. Have no powers of instruction, direction or supervision over either the IIC or the ICIS.

7. The IIC and the ICIS shall prepare and submit for consideration and approval by the National Security Council proposed charters for the IIC and the ICIS respectively. The Department of Justice representative shall serve as the Chairman of the ICIS for this purpose. The Executive Secretary of the National Security Council shall assist the IIC and the ICIS in coordinating the preparation of the proposed charters. These charters shall define, in accordance with the foregoing, the respective functions and responsibilities of the committees and shall provide for their chairmanship and staff.

On June 15, 1944, Rest furnished to a representative of Soviet Intelligence (M.O.S.), Part III of a document now identified as KEN-12. This document dated June 6, 1944 is on file with the Atomic Energy Commission and is entitled “Fluctuations and the Efficiency of a Diffusion Plant,” and Part III specifically refers to “The Effect of Fluctuations in the Flow of 93.” The designation KEN stands for documents prepared by British scientists who were in New York City working on Atomic Energy research. The author of this document is K. Fuchs, who is actually Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, who is usually known as Karl Fuchs. He is a top ranking British Atomic scientist.

Information available concerning Rest indicated that he was a British scientist, inasmuch as he had also furnished to the Soviet Intelligence information concerning British participation in the Atomic Energy development. It was also indicated that he had a sister in the United States. There are indications that Rest was actually the author of the document.

Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs also known as Karl Fuchs, was born December 29, 1913, at Breslau, Germany. His father, Emil Fuchs was born May 13, 1874, and was a professor in Germany. Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs entered the United Kingdom in 1932, and from 1942 to 1943, was a medical physicist at the University of Birmingham, England. In November 1943, he was designated by the British Government to come to the United States as a part of the British Atomic Energy Commission. He arrived at New York City on December 3, 1943, and went to Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, New Mexico in August 1944. While in the United States, Fuchs worked with a group of British scientists in the period of March to June 1944, on the development of diffusional operational processes working particularly with the Kellex Corporation, which was working under the Manhattan
Engineering District. Fuchs left for England from Montreal, Canada on June 28, 1946.

In November 1947, Fuchs was back in the United States and visited the Chicago Operations Office of the Atomic Energy Commission. At that time, he attended discussions regarding unclassified and declassified aspects of neutron spectroscopy. He also participated in declassification conferences which were being held between the United States, Great Britain and Canada. Fuchs is presently the senior research worker at the Atomic Energy Commission project at Harwell, England.

Fuchs has a sister, Bristol Fuchs Heineim, who prior to January 1941, resided at 55 Carter Road, Watertown, Massachusetts. From approximately 1941, until about 1945, she resided with her husband, Robert Hock Heineim at 141 Lakeview Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts. They presently reside at 94 Lakeview Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Robert Hock Heineim has been reliably reported as a member of the Communist Party, United States of America in 1947.

The address book of Israel Halperin implicated in the Canadian Espionage network contained the following: "Klaus Fuchs, Ass. to J. Born, Ris Orme Lane, University of Edinburgh, Scotland Camp (possibly camp) N. Camp L., Internment Operations - Bristol Heineim, 55 Carter Road, Watertown." The phrase Camp L. is encircled.

In addition to the foregoing a captured German document prepared presumably by German Counter Intelligence and which relates to Communist Party members in Germany contains the following:

"Klaus Fuchs, student of philosophy, December 29, 1911, Russelheim, BSRA-IV2, Gestapo Field Office Kiel.

"Gerhard Fuchs, October 30, 1909, Russelheim, student BSRA-IV2, Gestapo Field Office Kiel."

It is to be noted that Gerhard Fuchs is the brother of Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs.

"In connection with best, who furnished the document BSRA-12 and who
is thought to be Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, it is also known that Sest's sister was a contact of Gus (Gosse), who has presumably a scientific background. You will recall, Gus contemplated preparing a work on the production method with respect to the thermal diffusion of gases.

You will also recall, Gus, who has not been identified was also a contact of Abraham Brothman, a Consulting Engineer in New York City, who furnished espionage information to Elizabeth Bentley in 1946.

It is thought that Gus may possibly be identical with Arthur Phineas Weber, who is presently an employee of the Keller Corporation which is engaged in work under the Atomic Energy Commission. Weber was born March 30, 1920, in Brooklyn, New York and is a chemical engineer. From 1941 to 1942, he worked with Brothman at the Hendrick Manufacturing Company. From June 1942 to July 1944, he worked with Brothman in the Chemurgy Design Corporation, and according to some information during a part of this period he was also working for the Keller Corporation. Weber lists employment with Keller Corporation as a chemical engineer from July 1944 to March 29, 1946, and again from April 8, 1946, to the present. It should be noted that the Keller Corporation was closely working in 1945 with the British Scientist group which included Fuchs.

HELLIG

With respect to Mr. Heilig, the Heilig mentioned is believed to be Theodore Heilig, who was born August 6, 1897 in Jersey City, New Jersey and resides at 138 West Walnut Street, Long Beach, New York. He is married and his wife's name is Lee Heilig. In November 1942, Heilig formed the Tedlee Chemical Corporation. This corporation received Government contracts for the filling of methyl bromide ampoules. In July 1943, Heilig formed the Tedlee Chemical Corporation which received Government contracts for the filling of aerosol containers with insecticide. The prime contractor was the Bridgeport Brass Company.

In October 1943, Abraham Brothman and Arthur P. Weber became associated with the Tedlee Chemical Corporation doing work for Heilig under a contractual agreement to work on an automatic machine to fill aerosol cans. In an interview Brothman claims that in April 1944, Heilig offered to ask for a draft deferment for Weber if Brothman would sign over to Heilig the automatic filling machine. Brothman refused to do this and broke up with Heilig.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee
FROM: The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
SUBJECT: Failure of JAEIC to Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value.

1. It is the opinion of the JAEIC that considerable counter espionage information is and has been available in the files of the FBI and elsewhere which would have been and probably still is of considerable value to the JAEIC in making its estimates of the status of the U.S.S.R. atomic energy program. Some of this information has become available through the investigations conducted by the House Committee on U.S.-American Activities and the Canadian Royal Commission. However, essentially all information that has become available is of a peripheral nature, incomplete, and of relatively little value because of the length of time which has elapsed since the incidents occurred. The Nuclear Energy Division of OST made a request for specific information to the Director of the FBI on 21 September 1949, and while some information was furnished in answer to this request, it was only of slight value.

2. More specifically, if the JAEIC had known of the implications of the Pechace case in June 1949 at the time when the July estimate was being written, the estimate of the time by which the Soviet could have obtained their first bomb would have been appreciably advanced, as no allowance was made in making that estimate for successful espionage on details of bomb design and construction. Of course, the JAEIC does not know how long Pechace has been under investigation, but the fact still remains that the JAEIC was not informed until after the man's arrest.

3. If the pattern set forth above is followed, it seems obvious that much counter espionage information will not be made available. The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of the investigations of a Congressional Committee or the arrest of the offender in isolated instances. This is very unsatisfactory from the standpoint of time, as the information is so old by the time we get it that it is of little value.

4. The JAEIC desires to point out to the SEC this possibly large area of information which is being denied us. Furthermore, in view of the paucity of information from other sources, the elimination of this deficiency is urgently necessary if the JAEIC is to perform its duties adequately.

SECRET

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29. W. K.

5. The JABIE recommends that this situation be brought to the attention of the JAG as soon as possible in order that remedial action on a high level may be instituted.

[Signature]

W. K. RUSSEN
Chairman, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers
Special Consultant to the President
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C.

To: Admiral Souers

May 24, 1950

Subject: Harry Gold

Dear Admiral:

I believe the President and you will no doubt be interested in the information concerning Harry Gold who has been identified as the individual who received atomic information from Dr. K. Julius Klaus Fuchs in the United States for transmission to the Soviet Union.

Harry Gold was born December 12, 1910, in Switzerland. In 1914 he came to the United States with his parents, Sam and Celli Golodnitsky, both of whom were born in Russia. At the time of their naturalization as United States citizens their name was changed to Gold. Harry Gold claims citizenship by derivation through his parents. His mother is deceased. Harry Gold resides with his father and his brother, Joseph Gold, at 3823 Kindred Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

 Shortly after arriving in the United States the Gold family moved to Philadelphia, where, in 1929, Harry Gold began employment by the Pennsylvania Sugar Company in their laboratories. He continued his employment with this company until about February, 1944, at which time he became employed with A. Brotchman Associates, Consulting Engineers, New York City. He left this firm in June, 1944. He presently is employed at the Philadelphia General Hospital and is a Civil Service employee of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the hospital he is engaged in the laboratory doing research in connection with serious cardiac cases.

Gold received his education attending night school at the Drexel Institute, the University of Pennsylvania, and Columbia University. In 1938 he obtained leave of absence from the Pennsylvania Sugar Company to attend Xavier University, Cinnati, Ohio, where he received a Bachelor of Science degree summa cum laude in 1940.

Gold first came to the attention of this Bureau in connection with the activities of Abraham Brothman, concerning whom Elizabeth T. Bentley furnished information. In a signed statement dated November 30, 1945, Bentley advised that in about May, 1940, she was introduced to Brothman, whose photograph she identified, by Jacob Golos, her Soviet espionage superior.

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She stated that Golos told her that Brothman would furnish her with certain blueprints. Following that she met with Brothman about ten times in the summer of 1940 until the fall of that year, and obtained blueprints from him for Golos. She said that in the fall of 1940 Golos claimed to have become disgusted with Brothman and told her he was turning Brothman over to someone else.

As a result of this information an investigation of Brothman was conducted, which resulted in an interview of Brothman on May 29, 1947. At first Brothman denied recognizing the same or photograph of Golos. Upon being shown a photograph of Bentley, which he identified as a person whom he knew as "Gelen," he then admitted that he did recognize the photograph of Golos.

Brothman related that same time in 1938 or 1939 Golos had come to his office at 116 East 53rd Street, New York City, and advised Brothman that he had contracts with the Russian Government, by reason of which he was in a position to obtain contracts from that government for Brothman if Brothman would turn over to him blueprints of certain products on which Brothman was working at the time. Brothman advised that the blueprints in question were his own property. He said Golos visited his office on several occasions thereafter until Golos introduced him to "Gelen," Golos advised that "Gelen" would thereafter obtain the blueprints. "Gelen" visited Brothman's office over a dozen times during 1938, 1939, and 1940. Some time in 1940 she stopped coming and another individual named Harry Gold appeared at Brothman's office and said that he represented Golos. Thereafter Gold visited Brothman's office on a number of occasions during 1940 and early 1941, and obtained blueprints from Brothman. He said the last time Gold picked up the blueprints, according to the best of his recollection, was late in 1941 or early 1942. He was emphatic in stating that Gold was the last individual to pick up any blueprints or material for Golos. He stated that Harry Gold was, at the time of the interview, namely May 29, 1947, employed by him as a chemist in his laboratory at Elmhurst, Long Island. A signed statement to this effect was obtained from Brothman.

Upon receiving the information about Gold from Brothman, Gold was interviewed the same day at A. Brothman Associates Laboratory, 8505-37th Avenue, Elmhurst, Long Island. Gold related in substance that he had met Jacob Golos in October, 1940, at a meeting of the American Chemical Society at the Franklin Institute, Philadelphia. At this time Golos propositioned Gold, saying that he had connections with individuals in a foreign country, not needing the country, and also had connections with Abraham Brothman in
New York who was turning over certain blueprints. Golos told Gold that he required the services of a chemist to go to New York City, obtain the blueprints from Brothman, and then evaluate them on a chemical basis.

Gold stated that about two weeks after this, in November, 1940, he contacted Brothman in New York City and introduced himself as a representative of Golos. For the next six months he made visits to New York City on the average of every three weeks to obtain blueprints from Brothman. He said that during this period he received four or five telephone calls from Golos, who always stated that they would have to get together very soon, but that actually this never happened. He said the last telephone call from Golos was in May, 1941, after which time he had no further word from Golos. He denied that he ever had seen Golos except on the occasion when he met him in October, 1940. Gold claimed that after his second or third trip to New York City Brothman became friendly and exhibited an interest in Gold’s career as a chemist. He said that ever since that time Brothman had been interested in having Gold join Brothman’s organization, but that it was not until February, 1946, that he could see his way clear to accept such employment, which he did at that time. Gold denied any financial agreement with Golos, and claimed he never received a cent from Golos. He insisted that he stood the expenses for the trips to New York City on the first two occasions, after which Brothman became friendly and furnished him a five-dollar bill to cover expenses. A signed statement to this effect was obtained from Gold.

On July 22 and 31, 1947, Abraham Brothman and Harry Gold, respectively, were called before the federal grand jury, Southern District of New York. Both testified in substance before this Grand Jury to the effect that they had furnished an interview. The investigation of the Grand Jury concerning the charges of Elizabeth T. Bentley culminated in the finding of a “no bill.”

After extensive and intensive investigation which developed information indicating that Harry Gold was very probably the United States contact of Joel Julius Klaus Fuchs, he was interviewed at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and on May 22, 1950, he furnished a signed statement admitting espionage activity. He admitted that he began the procurement of industrial information for the Soviet Union in the fall of 1938 and continued this activity until 1945, except for the period from 1938 to 1940 while he attended Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio.
Gold advised that very early in 1944 his then superior made arrangements for him to meet Dr. Klaus Fuchs in New York City. This first meeting occurred on a Saturday afternoon in February or March, 1944, on the East Side of Manhattan, from where they took a cab uptown to a restaurant around Third Avenue in the 50's, possibly Manny Wolf's Restaurant. Following the dinner they walked about and completed arrangements for further meetings. Gold recalled the arrangements for actual recognition to be that he was to carry a pair of gloves in one hand, plus a green-covered book, while Fuchs was to carry a baseball. He introduced himself as "Raymond" and Fuchs introduced himself as Klaus Fuchs. He said that Fuchs never used the name "Raymond" because he knew it was fictitious.

At this first meeting no written information was passed, but Fuchs revealed that he was with the British Mission working with the Manhattan Engineer Project. He told Gold that the British Mission was working on the separation of isotopes, and Gold believes there was at least implied an eventual utilization of the energy produced by nuclear fission in the form of a weapon. Following this, Gold had about four meetings with Fuchs in the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Queens. During at least two of these meetings Fuchs furnished written information to Gold, which the latter delivered it to his superior, "John." He said that he had taken a brief glance at the material on one occasion and found it to consist of a number of folded sheets of paper containing mathematical equations which seemed to concern mathematical derivations.

Gold further advised that he lost contact with Fuchs when Fuchs failed to keep a meeting in August, 1944. He stated that "John" obtained the information whereby he was once more enabled to contact Fuchs. "John" gave Gold the address of Mrs. Kleinman in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the sister of Fuchs. As a result of this, he met Fuchs at the Kleinman residence shortly after Christmas Day, 1944, or early in 1945. At that time Fuchs told him that he was at Los Alamos, New Mexico, a short distance from Santa Fe. Fuchs also gave him written information at the time and the two made an arrangement to meet in June of that year in Santa Fe. Gold stated that on this occasion he had been given a sum of approximately fifteen thousand dollars in cash and a book of watches to offer Fuchs in a very diplomatic manner so as not to offend him. He said that Fuchs "turned it down cold." Gold returned to New York with the money and information which he delivered to "John."
Gold has further advised that he met Fuchs in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in June, 1949, and again in September, 1949. On both of these occasions Fuchs furnished him with written information. He said that during the September, 1945, meeting Fuchs told him that he had been present at the initial large-scale trial of nuclear fission at Alamogordo, New Mexico. He also stated that Fuchs told him at the time that he probably would return to England soon, but that by paying a call to Fuchs' sister he could ascertain just when. Gold said he made one or two attempts to see Fuchs again at the home of his sister, but was not successful. After the possible second attempt, which was either in late January or early February, 1946, Gold missed a scheduled appointment with his superior, "John," and has not seen or heard from him since.

In connection with the current interview of Fuchs in London by representatives of this Bureau, still and movie photographs of Gold were surreptitiously obtained for display to Fuchs. Previously, Fuchs and Robert and Erstel Nelmesen had failed to recognize a photograph of Gold. On May 30, 1950, Fuchs was shown the new still photographs of Gold and he did not identify them, though he stated he could not reject them.

On May 22, 1950, Fuchs viewed three repeat viewings of the moving pictures of Gold, after which he stated that Gold was very likely his contact in the United States. It is most interesting to note that this information was received by cable at 11:30 AM, while Gold had first admitted his espionage activity to the interviewing agents in Philadelphia at approximately 10:45 AM the same day.

On May 25, 1950, a complaint was filed before a United States Commissioner for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York, charging Harry Gold and "John" Doe with conspiracy to commit espionage on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in violation of Section 32, Title 50, United States Code. A warrant was issued and Gold was thereupon taken before United States District Judge James P. McNerny at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for arraignment. Judge McNerny gave Gold the complaint to read and he admitted that he was the Harry Gold named in the complaint. A preliminary hearing was set for June 12, 1950, and bail was set at one hundred thousand dollars, in default of which Gold was remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.
Further information of interest to the President and you will be furnished as it develops.

With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards,

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

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June 27, 1950

STUDY OF CODE NAMES IN MGB COMMUNICATIONS

Reference is made to the memorandum dated June 23, 1950, bearing the above caption.

Since the referenced memorandum was prepared it has been determined that one JULIUS ROTHENBERG is probably identical with the individual described as ANTENNA and NERINA in that memorandum. It is also believed now that DAVID GREENBLATT is identical with the individual described as BAIKIN, and that RUTH PRINZ GREENBLATT is identical with the individual known under the code name QSA.

From the information available to date it is believed that ANATOL İNKHOVICH YAKOVLEV is identical with the individual described under the code name ALEXEI in the referenced memorandum.

More complete details concerning these individuals will be furnished to you at a later date.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington 25, D.C.

July 19, 1950

Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison
Naval Aide to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Admiral:

I thought the President and you would be interested in the attached memorandum which sets forth information concerning Julius Rosenberg, who was arrested on July 17, 1950, for conspiring to violate the Espionage Statute.

As further pertinent information regarding this matter is received you will be advised.

This information has been made available to Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Special Consultant to the President, and Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council.

With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure

[Signature]

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Hoover to Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison, 18 July 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI—R," box 169.
ARREST

Julius Rosenberg was arrested by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the evening of July 17, 1950, in New York City. On arraignment before Federal Judge John F. X. McChesney, he was charged with espionage conspiracy in violation of Section 74, Title 50, United States Code.

BACKGROUND

Julius Rosenberg was born May 12, 1918, in New York City, the son of Harry and Sophie Rosenberg, both born in Poland. He graduated from the College of the City of New York in February, 1939, receiving a B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering. He also claims to have attended courses at the Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute and at the Guggenheim Aeronautical School, New York University. He married Ethel Guggenheim on June 13, 1939, and has two sons, Michael Allen, age 7, and Robert Harry, age 3. His wife, Ethel, is the sister of David Greenglass who was arrested on June 12, 1950, for conspiring with Harry Gold and Anatoli A. Yakovlev in violation of Section 74, Title 50, United States Code.

Julius Rosenberg was employed by the War Department, Signal Supply Office, New York General Depot, Brooklyn, New York, beginning on September 1, 1940, as a Junior Engineer, Radar. On October 11, 1941, he was transferred to the Signal Corps, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was promoted to Assistant Engineer, Inspection, on January 1, 1942, and on January 15, 1942, was transferred to the Newark Signal Corps Inspection District of the Philadelphia Signal Corps Procurement District, Newark, New Jersey. He was again transferred on October 1, 1942, to the Newark Signal Corps Inspection Zone, Newark, New Jersey, and on February 16, 1943, was promoted to Associate Engineer, Inspection. As of February 9, 1945, he was suspended indefinitely pending a decision by the Secretary of War on the recommendation of his commanding officer for removal by the demands of national security on the basis of information indicating Communist Party membership. His employment by the Signal Corps was terminated as of March 26, 1945. Prior to the
above employment, Rosenberg worked for various firms in the New York City area and for his father-in-law, Barnett Greenglass. He has reported that he worked for Barnett Greenglass from 1936 to 1956 as a part-time draftsman, machinist and junior engineer. Subsequent to his release from the Signal Corps Rosenberg has principally engaged in his own businesses under the trade names of the G and R Engineering Company and the Pitt Machine Products, Inc., 970 East Houston Street, New York City. He was also employed for some months in 1945 by the Emerson Radio and Phonograph Company, New York City. At the time of his arrest Rosenberg was residing at 10 Monroe Street, New York City.

ESPIONAGE

David Greenglass has stated that in 1944 his wife, Ethel, at the request of Julius Rosenberg, traveled to Albuquerque, New Mexico, where he, David, was then residing in connection with his employment at Los Alamos. Further, and also at Rosenberg's request, she asked David Greenglass to provide information concerning the atomic bomb. This, David Greenglass said, he agreed to do. Subsequently, in January, 1945, Greenglass, while on furlough in New York City, contacted Julius Rosenberg. On that occasion Rosenberg described to Greenglass the "naval type" bomb which was Greenglass later learned, used at Hiroshima. Greenglass stated that he provided Rosenberg, during this meeting, with the names of personnel at Los Alamos who he, David, believed were ideologically suited for recruitment to furnish information to the Russians.

In June, 1945, David Greenglass was contacted by Harry Gold in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Gold identified himself by his possession of a half of a Jello box top, the connecting piece of which was in Greenglass' possession. David Greenglass has stated that the box top originally came from Julius Rosenberg, and the latter cut it in half, gave one half to either him, David, or his wife Ruth, and retained the other half. Rosenberg told him that the person who would contact him for information would present the other half of the cover, which Gold did. Greenglass said he provided Gold with information concerning the Los Alamos project, the names of individuals working there, and a sketch of a high explosive lens mold, or something of that type.
In the Fall of 1945 Greenglass was in New York City on furlough, at which time he saw Julius Rosenberg. On this occasion he provided Rosenberg with considerable technical data concerning the construction of an atom bomb. He also believes that he gave Rosenberg some sketches having to do with a part of the bomb. Greenglass does not recall if Rosenberg looked at this information, nor does he know what disposition Rosenberg made of it. During this meeting Rosenberg requested Greenglass to remain at Los Alamos following his discharge from the Army, but Greenglass stated he refused.

David Greenglass was discharged from the Army on February 28, 1946, and from that time until September, 1949, was associated with Rosenberg in the G and R Engineering Company, and the Pitt Machine Products, Inc. Greenglass said that when Klaus Fuchs was arrested in England, Rosenberg told him, Greenglass, to leave the country but he refused. On the arrest of Harry Gold, Rosenberg pointed out to Greenglass that Gold was the person who contacted him in Albuquerque. Rosenberg told Greenglass that he must get out of the country. To this end he gave Greenglass five hundred dollars, which sum Greenglass said was not enough. Later, on May 28, 1946, Rosenberg gave Greenglass four thousand dollars in twenty-dollar bills. He told Greenglass to leave the country, taking his wife and children with him. He also provided Greenglass with certain instructions as to how he should travel. Rosenberg indicated to Greenglass that more important people than he, Greenglass, had already left the United States, and he, Rosenberg, intended leaving. Greenglass said that he indicated to Rosenberg that he would leave, but actually he and his wife planned to go to the mountains in New York State until Rosenberg left, and then return to New York City. Greenglass assumed that Rosenberg had been unable to effect his departure from the United States due to his being under surveillance by the FBI.

Ruth Greenglass has stated that Julius Rosenberg, prior to requesting her to approach her husband, David, for information, pointed out to her that he, Julius, and his wife Ethel, had discontinued their open affiliations with the Communist Party. Julius also told her that he always wanted to do more than merely be a Communist Party member, and that he had searched for two years to contact the "Russian underground" in order to do the work for which he felt he was "slated."
1. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

A. Captured German Documents

The information presented in this paper is based solely on a study of relevant documents issued by the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) in their TICOM documents folder (IP) series. The great majority of these documents are translations from the German of material pertaining to signals communications which the Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM) was able to salvage as cryptologic targets in Germany and German-occupied territories on the continent of Europe were overrun by the advancing Western Allies in 1944-1945. In addition to the discoveries of important Axis cryptologic caches, the interrogations of Axis cryptologic experts and the treatises written by some of them in the postwar era concerning their wartime activities have added to the amount of valuable documentary material.

B. Personnel of Former German Cryptologic Experts

1. Importance of These Men

Of the treatises written in the postwar era, those written by the following cryptologic experts were found to be the most useful sources of information on Russian Cryptology:

- Alex Dettmann, former chief of the Russian Section of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the German Army High Command (OKH/35 M1).
- Kurt Friedrichshagen, a linguist and cryptanalyst with the German Army Signal Intelligence Regiment (KOWA 01).
- Adolf Pascho, the last head of the German Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section (Frem 5).
- Wilhelm Paumer, former chief cryptanalyst of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command German Armed Forces (OEE/CHI).
- Wilhelm Fliege, formerly chief evaluator and the officially designated historian of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command German Armed Forces (OEE/CHI).

These men were key figures in the various German Signal Intelligence Agencies and there is no question but that they can speak with authority on the subject.

2. Reliability of Their Evidence

A general agreement regarding the details of many Russian systems is evident in these treatises. Only in a few instances any discrepancies be found. The information on the whole seems to be authentic, and there is little reason to question the sincerity of these men. While these sources of information are often not as
III. ORGANIZATION OF CRYPTOLOGY IN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

A. The Vagueness of the Apparatus and the Consequent Need for a Communications System

Before presenting the few details that are known concerning the organization of cryptology in the NKVD (People's Commissioner for Internal Affairs) it might be well to stress the importance of this organization in the political, military, and economic life of the Soviet Union.

The basic task of the NKVD was to assure the continuation of the political structure of the USSR. To carry out the necessary measures the NKVD had at its disposal various types of troops of its own - NKVD troops - which were assigned and employed according to need by the Central Office in Moscow (GPU NKVD, Central Administration of NKVD Troops).

From an evaluation of the results of traffic analysis and cryptanalysis on Russian traffic the Germans were able to establish the following categories of NKVD troops:

Troops of the Interior - The "Political Section NKVD" has an extensive network of agents to note any trend hostile to the Soviets. The actual combating of any such movements is by contingents of these "Troops of the Interior." When there was no occupation of foreign territory during the war, the number of political sections increased materially with consequently a very great increase in the number of contingents of "Troops of the Interior" NKVD.

Escort Troops - The sending away of politically unreliable elements, surveillance, and control of concentration camps as well as the setting up of penal camps and penal battalions fell in the province of the "Escort Troops" NKVD.

Frontier Troops - Because of the special political structure of the USSR, it was necessary to provide for sealing the country heretofore from the outside world. This is the function of the "Frontier Troops" NKVD. Corresponding to their task, these troops have aircraft available and along the water boundaries, appropriate warships. Before the war these troops were deployed along the actual frontiers but with the outbreak of hostilities regiments of "Frontier Troops" NKVD were deployed some 30 to 60 kilometers beyond the combat units of NKVD (Bnd Worker and Peasant Army) to form an unbroken, very mobile, and deeply deployed security zone. NKVD frontier troops controlled the employment of these regiments; these staffs were located in the immediate vicinity of the forward staffs of the Army but received their orders from NKVD headquarters in Moscow. The task of this security zone was to prevent desertion and infiltration of enemy agents by sealing the sector of the front from the rear area; by controlling the movement of the population for political reasons; by return of population for new construction of defensive installations, airfields, and plants of value to the military economy by guarding supplies, and by collecting and transporting prisoners to the rear.

Railway Troops - The entire economy of the Soviet Union, in particular the military economy and transportation system are under very sharp control and thus under the influence of the NKVD. Whereas before the war this control could be exercised through the local organs of the NKVD, after the outbreak of hostilities it became necessary to take over also the protection...
of the railroads along with their control and for this purpose especially trained troop contingents, "Railway Troops" HEVD were formed. They guarded transports, depots, bridges, junction points, and important as well as threatened stretches of railroad track.

**Operating Troops** - In various phases of the war they had to appear for very daring and reliable units at danger points in the line or at points of concentration. Such elite troops were formed by the HEVD and assigned to divisions of the NKVD armies as "Operating Troops" HEVD.

In addition to the major tasks already outlined the HEVD was charged with the carrying out of the following supplemental tasks: (1) The political training of the NKVD by means of political units, political couriers, etc. (2) The training of a number of military specialists, such as sharpshooter units; selection and training of all replacements for medium and high-grade officers in the NKVD, and all technical signal personnel including those engaged in cryptographic work. (3) The conduct of training schools for dogs and carrier pigeons. (4) The combating of espionage, sabotage and the activity of enemy agents. This work was done by the SEKHE (Secretre Bezi Sprava), an agency under the control of the NKG (Peoples Commissariat for the Security of the State). (5) Direction of the activities of partisans and the training of agents for work behind the German front. (6) Mobilization and drafting of recruits for the NKVD. (7) Recruiting workers from among the people of occupied areas into labor battalions. (8) Integration of armies and units of foreign nationality into the framework of the NKVD.

With such a powerful organization having tentacles which reach into the furthest recesses of the political, military and economic life of the Soviet Union, it is obvious that the HEVD must also have possessed a far-flung communications complex and cryptographic systems of its own.

**B. The Centralization of the Production of Cryptographic Systems**

It is said that the Central Office for the cryptographic service of the HEVD orgnas was located within the GSSHEVD (Central Administration of HEVD Troops) in Moscow. Organization and functioning of this section in the field of cryptography are not known. In contrast to the cryptographic systems of the Army and Air Forces, no cryptographic systems of the HEVD were ever captured by the Germans while they were still in use. At various points on the front these codes did fall into the hands of German troops, but either they were then no longer in use or they represented reserve systems which, due to their capture, were not put into use. Consequently there was never the urgent need which brought about the decentralization already noted in the case of NKBA cryptography but instead the HEVD cryptographic Central office in Moscow was able to retain the method of centralization for the production, issue and recall of cryptographic material throughout the entire war. For this reason the Section of GSSHEVD corresponding to the 88 Section of the General Staff of the HEVD in Moscow was not obliged to make any radical change in the further development of cryptographic systems but allowed them to remain substantially unchanged. From the time the Germans began systematic observation down to the day of capitulation. Therefore in spite of the great number of different HEVD organs there was only a very limited number of HEVD cryptographic systems in use and it was also true that these were valid for a relatively long time, often more than two years. Consequently there was the chance...
for the German cryptanalysts to do extensive work on great amounts of heterogeneous material and to accomplish more with far less personnel against ENIGE cryptographic systems than was the case with AGA systems.

All internal radio circuits of the USSR were not only monitored and controlled by the NKVD but in many cases were directed by it and in all probability the SBU NKVD was also responsible in large measure for the loss of any cryptographic material which might be used for encipherment of such internal radio traffic. The Germans, of necessity gave some attention to the interception and decryption of this traffic. Among other things, special units were devoted to the reception of the Soviet traffic passed on many of these circuits by high-speed transmitters. It is reported that of the entire traffic monitored at great expense by the Germans, at best only 10% was useful for economic leaders while military-political matters constituted barely 1%. From this traffic German evaluation results very almost exclusively in the economic field.

C. The Decentralization of Production of Cryptographic Systems for use of Agents

The NKVD also had an important share in the preparation and issue of cryptographic materials for partisan organizations and for the agents and espionage service. In view of the initial multiplicity of partisan groups which operated independently and of the often very extensive employment of agents and spies in the enemy's rear, it was necessary to provide for current replacement of cryptographic systems, in which connection it was of primary importance that these should be convenient, simple to use, and yet secure. This responsibility could not be met by a single central unit, however large; therefore the individual partisan units, which for the most part were located in the immediate vicinity of army front staffs, were assigned the task of producing and distributing such cryptographic systems, although all of them were subject to the guidance and control of the NKVD. Although the systems used in partisan, scout, and agent traffic, from the simplest to the most difficult, included some which were neither theoretically or practically capable of solution, it can be stated with good reason that in many respects such latitude was afforded the individual imagination and discretion. A more, similar to that in the AGA systems of the USSR, did not exist. The structure and use of cryptographic means had to be adapted here to the monetary needs of agents who often worked alone.

D. The High Sense of Responsibility of Personal Handling Cryptographic Material

Considering the vastness of the NKVD apparatus and its consequent use of a complex communications system, one unique characteristic was noted by the Germans during the war. This is the high degree of training and the sense of responsibility of NKVD personnel which prevented any cryptographic systems of the NKVD which were skill in use from falling into the hands of the Germans during the entire period of the war. This is indeed amazing since the Germans proved conclusively and again throughout the course of the war that the complete destruction of all secret documents of a nation is a practical impossibility. According to the German account of their experiences in the Balkan Campaign, the Greek and Yugoslav Governments had obviously issued orders for the destruction of all secret documents, yet the records of captured material was so enormous that it had to be shipped in barges up the Danube to Vienna and from there to Berlin in freight
carried and nearly two years elapsed before a systematic evaluation of these documents was finally concluded by the Central Evaluation Section in Berlin. But during the German advance into Russia, up to the siege of Stalingrad in 1942, the operational area of the Frontaufklärung (military intelligence) in the operational area comprised upwards of 3 million sq. kilometers of Russian soil and although many, many documents had been abandoned by the Russians in the battle and contrary to orders, over 1,000 comprising only the most important ones having then been registered at Wall 1111 (the German center for tactical counterintelligence on the Eastern Front), still no live cryptographic material of the NKVD was found at this time or even during the entire period of the war. In this connection it might be mentioned that our own TSOVN effort against the Germans which saw the first exploitation team dispatched in April 1945 was able to salvage approximately 8,000 separate German documents with a weight of about 5 tons and this does not include materials captured in the heat of battle and passed to military intelligence for immediate processing.

E. Lack of German Knowledge Regarding a Russian Organization for Cryptanalysis

Not a thing is known about the possible activities of an agency of the NKVD in the field of cryptanalysis. The subject has already been touched on above in the discussion of a similar function being exercised by the 8th Section of the General Staff of the RKKA. The conclusion is that the NKVD is active, whether in absolute control or merely maintaining its customary surveillance in a more subtle way, it matters little.
IV. ORGANIZATION OF CYTPTOLOGY IN OTHER AGENCIES:

A. The External Communications

In the organization of cryptology in the Soviet agencies so far mentioned we have been concerned for the most part with strictly internal communications. When we come to an examination of the external communications of the USSR, at least three agencies are mentioned by the Germans as using cryptographic materials during this period. In the diplomatic field we have the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs; in the commercial field the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Trade; and in the communist-international field the Comintern as it was called at that time.

B. The Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs

No mention is found in those sources regarding the authority for the compilation, issue and recall of the cryptographic materials used by the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. But in view of what has already been intimated with respect to the activities of the NKVD it seems probable that here too they exercise some sort of control. The use by this Commissariat of the one-time additive pad for re-encipherment of its code is exactly the means employed by the NKVD for the re-encipherment of its operational 5-figure chiffrecoads.

C. The Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Trade

The Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Trade also uses an additive pad system for re-encipherment of its communications. In fact each Commissariat has its own code book and the pad system is generally used for the re-encipherment of the external communications passing to or from the head offices in Moscow.

D. The Comintern-International

Only in the cryptographic systems of the Comintern for its signal communications with the Comintern parties in foreign countries is there an exception in the use of the additive pad, as such, -- here the most essential parts, the keys for the encipherment, are not outwardly to be recognised as cryptographic materials, the necessary digit sequences being derived from a book kept by means of a mnemonic key. This development corresponds to the increasing use by the NKVD of similar systems in their own organizations and in point of fact one of the functions of the Comintern is espionage, political, economic or military according to opportunity. While little is known regarding the chain-of-command for issue and usage of cryptographic materials in the foreign services of the USSR, the logical surmise is that the NKVD through some of its many organs exercised its usual surveillance.

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RAPIDAGE ACTIVITIES

On October 6, 1953, JONES ORIN YORK was interviewed by SA WILLIAM L. BYNE, JR. and SA FRANCIS D. COOLEY, at which time he submitted the following signed statement:

"Burbank California
October 6, 1953

1, JONES ORIN YORK, make the following voluntary statement to WILLIAM L. BYNE, JR. and FRANCIS D. COOLEY, who are known to me to be Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I know I do not have to make any statement, have the right to consult an attorney before making a statement, and that my statement may be used against me in a court of law.

I was born August 5, 1913, at Bushnell, Illinois, and attended school at Western Illinois Normal School until 1910. After spending approximately one year in Hagen, Nebraska, with my parents I came to Berkeley, California, arriving on December 11, 1911. I worked as a clerk, telephone switchboard installer, and for two automobile agencies. Since 1910 I have been interested in the aviation field; I learned to fly an airplane in 1919 and since that time I have been employed in occupations relating to the aircraft industry. I am presently self-employed as an aircraft engineer, consultant and fabricator of special aircraft apparatus at 2030 North Main Street, Burbank, California.

In 1929 I was employed as an aeronautical engineer at Douglas Aircraft Corporation, El Segundo Division; at that time I met a group of Russians who were touring aircraft plants in the Los Angeles area as representatives of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission. One of these Russians was STANISLAV SHINOVSKY. He was identified to me as a technical representative from the Central Hydro-Aerodynamics Institute of Moscow, USSR.

STANISLAV SHINOVSKY indicated interest in an airplane engine I was designing and gave me $200.00 as evidence of his interest in my work, with the idea that eventually I might develop something that the Russians would actually purchase. Later, in 1935 or 1936, SHINOVSKY asked me to furnish him information from Douglas Aircraft Corporation, El Segundo Division, which I did and he furnished me various sums of money.

About the first part of 1938 SHINOVSKY introduced me to a man using the name of 'BROOKS' and I continued furnishing information and receiving money from him until January, 1938, when 'BROOKS' arranged to put me in contact with a man named 'WERNER.' I continued to furnish material to 'WERNER' and receive money from him until about January, 1939. At that time I lost contact with 'WERNER' but in about February, 1960, he recontacted me and I agreed to continue to furnish information to the Soviets. 'WERNER' told me that a new contact had been arranged for me, and it was agreed that my new contact to identify himself would inquire regarding a violin which I owned. Also, 'WERNER' took a picture of SIDNEY TEMPLE, tore it in half, and said my new contact, upon contacting me, would present the half which 'WERNER' was retaining in order to identify himself.

[Signature]

WFO 121-12/310

DECLASSIFIED: 30/4 MAY 1974

[Stamp]
The next individual who contacted me and to whom I furnished information was known to me as 'BILL' and I understood his last name was KELLERBERG. I cannot recall when 'BILL' first contacted me, but I believe it was about two weeks after I moved into 1404 North Harper Avenue, Los Angeles, California. I don't know when I moved into that address, but do recall that I obtained a telephone very shortly after I rented the premises. 'BILL' came to my Harper Avenue address and produced the half of the picture of ELISEAN TEMPLE that had been previously retained by HUMPHREY. 'BILL' also told me he was supposed to tell me the birthdays of my mother, but I said this was unnecessary as I was satisfied he was my new contact.

At this first meeting 'BILL' asked if I could obtain information, and I said that I could, but advised him that I needed a camera. 'BILL' said that he would furnish me money for this purpose. 'BILL' gave me about $250.00 to purchase a camera. I believe at our second meeting, which occurred about a month after he first contacted me. I purchased a Contax No. 3 camera with an 85 mm Sonnar lens at 'The Dark Room,' a camera shop, located on Wilshire Boulevard, about two blocks west of La Brea Avenue, in Los Angeles for about $250.00, paying a substantial down payment and the balance in monthly installments. I used this camera to photograph information on airplanes being produced at Northrop Aircraft Company, Hawthorne, California. In particular I remember photographing specifications of the P-61 airplane, also known as the 'Black Widow,' and delivering the film I had taken to 'BILL.'

I also recall that 'BILL' gave me a list of material in which the Russians were interested. When he gave me this list, 'BILL' said that there was some hesitancy about furnishing me this list as it might reflect that the Russians lacked information on those subjects. I don't recall the items on the list, but it was very broad and included many matters on which I had no information and was unable to obtain information.

I met with 'BILL' about ten times over a period of about one year and I believe that during this time he paid me approximately $1,500.00. During these contacts, I turned over to 'BILL' airplane specifications, the details of which I cannot now recall. I am not certain that these documents were all classified as confidential data but am sure some of them were so classified. I never gave 'BILL' any actual documents but when I gave him the film I would prepare a summary of the information in the film contained and any suggestions I had concerning the information. During the course of our meetings, 'BILL' came to my home three or four times, and I recall on one occasion, I showed 'BILL' a copy of a poem I had written entitled 'The Vandal's Scorn,' which dealt with the German attack on Russia. 'BILL' stated he liked this poem very much and asked if he could make a copy of it. I agreed and the next time he came to my home he typed out a copy on my typewriter and indicated that his superior would like the theme of this poem, and that he would forward it to him.

I recall meeting 'BILL' on one occasion at the Florentine Gardens in Hollywood, and on another occasion at a bar near the corner of Wilshire Boulevard and Fairfax Avenue in Los Angeles. At one of my meetings with 'BILL' I recall
34. (Continued)

WFO 121-12210.

What he drank two scotch and soda and I noticed that he was making some marks on the edge of a newspaper. "BILL" explained that these marks were in Arabic and indicated the time of our next meeting. He said that anyone could take this newspaper and they would not know what these marks signified. "BILL" also told me how to say some simple greeting phrases in Arabic such as 'Salaam Aleikum,' meaning 'Peace Unto You,' and the reply, 'Aleikum Salaam.'

In the early part of our contacts I received a telephone call from "BILL." The operator said the call was from Pendleton, and I presume she meant Pendleton, Oregon. "BILL" said he would not be able to keep a scheduled meeting, and would contact me when he returned to Los Angeles.

In the latter part of 1942 I met "BILL" near the Garden of Allah on Sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles, and he told me he would no longer contact me, that my next contact might possibly be a woman, and that the new contact would inquire about my violin. It was arranged that I would meet my new contact at a statue in Westlake Park in Los Angeles on a date I cannot now recall.

During my meetings with "BILL" no one else was ever present, and I never met any person with whom he was associated. I did ask "BILL" about SHOWNSKY and from what "BILL" told me I gained the impression he was personally acquainted with SHOWNSKY. I remember that "BILL" told me SHOWNSKY "was fine," and that he was "not in this country." I remember that "BILL" was very much concerned over the suffering of the Russian people because of the war and mentioned the sacrifices being made by the Russians.

I subsequently met my new contact whose name I cannot recall in accordance with instructions I had received from "BILL" and continued furnishing information to this new contact until the latter part of 1943, when he told me the information he had been receiving from me was unsatisfactory and then did not appear for a scheduled meeting. I have had no further contact with Soviet representatives since that time.

After the last contact with "BILL" in the latter part of 1942, I did not see him again until August, 1950. At that time I was at the Federal Building, Los Angeles, having just testified before a Federal Grand Jury. I was standing on the front steps of the Federal Building and I observed "BILL" walking along the sidewalk about 75 yards away. With me at this time were Special Agents THOMAS F. REYNARD and FRANCIS D. COOLEY and I pointed "BILL" out to them.

I have read the foregoing statement consisting six and one-quarter pages and it is the truth.

w/o JONES URBAN YORK

W/ FRANCIS D. COOLEY Special Agent, FBI Los Angeles 10/6/53
W/ WILLIAM L. BYRNES, Special Agent, FBI, Los Angeles, Calif. 10-6-53.
On August 10, 1950, AGENT GEORGE B. GOOLAY and THOMAS H. BRANT of the Los Angeles Office were standing on the steps of the Federal Building in Los Angeles, California, with JONES ORIN YORK. At that time, YORK pointed out the subject, who was then about seventy-five yards away, as the individual he knew as WILLIAM BAUMAN and to whom he furnished information for transmission to the Soviets.

It is noted that YORK placed the date he first met the subject as approximately one month prior to the time he purchased a Contax Camera at "The Dark Room," a camera shop located on Wilshire Boulevard about two blocks west of La Brea Avenue in Los Angeles.

HENRIK HENSSMANN, owner of "The Dark Room," 2070 Wilshire Boulevard, advised that his records reflected that J. O. YORK, 1301 1/2 North Harper Avenue, Los Angeles, telephone number, Gladstone 8-48, purchased a Contax Camera, number 4567, at a Sonnar 50mm lens on October 15, 1941, for $35.70. The down payment of $17.70 was made at the time of purchase, and payments of $50.00 each were made on January 1, 1942, and March 9, 1942. The lens number on this camera was 1886065 and the body number was 3-50839. The records further reflect that on January 25, 1942, YORK purchased lens, Zeiss lens number 1060110, for $144.90.

With regard to the estimate by YORK that he believes subject first contacted him about two months after he moved into 1301 1/2 North Harper Avenue in Los Angeles, California, it is observed that the application records for the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company for the years 1941 and 1942 have been destroyed; however, telephone directories for those years reflected that J. O. YORK was listed as residing at 1301 1/2 North Harper Avenue, telephone - Gladstone 8-48, in directories dated from September, 1941, until June, 1942.

KEISMAN was interviewed by Washington Field Office agents on May 7, 1950, and May 13, 1950, and by Los Angeles agents on August 10, 1950. When interviewed, KEISMAN denied being implicated in Soviet espionage. He said that, to the best of his knowledge, he had never been acquainted with anyone in the Communist Party and he knew that any documents or material from AFSA nor had he ever advised any unauthorized person that AFSA was being carried on at AFSA. Subject declined to furnish a signed statement denying that he had been involved in espionage activities.

On July 1, 1953, a photograph of JONES ORIN YORK was exhibited to KEISMAN and he stated he recognized the photograph as being that of YORK, an individual whom he was acquainted, but he declined to answer any further questions concerning JONES ORIN YORK.

On July 1, 1953, KEISMAN also said he would not admit nor deny he had ever been involved in Soviet espionage activities.

Mrs. PATRICIA BAUMAN, formerly 1950 Marengo Avenue, South Pasadena, California, was interviewed by Los Angeles agents on May 12 and 13, 1950. Mrs. BAUMAN has recently been remarried and is now known as Mrs. JOHNETT F. CALLIOPE.
35. Hoover to Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, USA, 23 May 1960 [Table of Contents and Appendixes not included].

JON EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

May 23, 1960

PERSONAL ATTENTION
VIA LIAISON

Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, USA
White House Staff Secretary
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear General:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a document entitled, "Exposé of Soviet Espionage, May 1960," which we prepared in the FBI and copies of which have been furnished to the Vice President, the Attorney General, Under Secretary of State Dillon, and Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The material contained in this document is unclassified and was prepared for use by the State Department in case it desired to use any portion of it before the United Nations or for public release.

I thought that you might desire to have a copy of this in the event there is any portion which you consider should be called to the President's attention.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Enclosure
Exposé of
SOVIET ESPIONAGE
May 1960

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR
SOVIET-BLOC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. INTRODUCTION:

Recent Soviet propaganda has denounced the United States for aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union in terms designed to convince the world that the USSR would not stoop to espionage. In discussing this subject and the reception which President Eisenhower might expect on his visit to Russia, Premier Khrushchev was quoted in the newspapers on May 11, 1957, as wondering what would have been the reaction of the American people if the Russians had sent a plane over the United States on the eve of his visit to this country.

The facts are that at the very time Premier Khrushchev was advancing to the podium to speak before the United Nations General Assembly on September 18, 1959, two Soviet espionage agents were cautiously surveying a street corner in Springfield, Massachusetts, in preparation for a clandestine meeting with an American whom they were attempting to subvert. At the very time that Khrushchev was declaring that a means must be found to stop mankind from backsliding into an abyss of war, Vadim A. Kiril'uk, Soviet employee of the United Nations, was attempting to induce an American to furnish information regarding United States cryptographic machines and to secure employment in a vital United States Government agency where he could obtain classified information for the Russians. While this meeting was taking place Kiril'uk and the American were under observation by Leonid A. Kovalen, another Soviet employee of the United Nations who was conducting a countersurveillance. Unknown to the Russians, however, this meeting was also being observed by Special Agents of the FBI who obtained photographs of the Russians.

Not only did these Russians stoop to spying, but they callously abused their status as guests of this country to spy in the most reprehensible manner -- subversion of an American on American soil.

Although FBI Agents observed this meeting and photographed the Russians, no publicity was given to this incident in view of the negotiations which were then in progress. This incident, as contrasted with the recent handling of the plane incident by the Russians, gives ample testimony as to which country is acting in good faith in trying to maintain world peace.

And this is not an isolated incident -- nor has the target always been so limited. The facts are that Soviet agents for three decades have engaged in extensive espionage against this country, and through the years have procured a volume of information which would stagger the imagination. This information includes literally dozens of aerial photographs of major
U.S. cities and vital areas which have given the Russians the product of aerial reconnaissance just as surely as if Soviet planes had been sent over this country.

2. ACQUISITION OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS:

In a free country such things as aerial photographs are available to the public and can be purchased commercially. The Soviets have been fully aware of this and throughout the years have taken full advantage of this free information, collecting aerial photographs of many areas of the United States.

For example, during October, 1953, two Soviet officials visited Minneapolis where they purchased fifteen aerial photographs of Minneapolis and St. Paul. In October and November, 1953, two Soviets traveled in Missouri and Texas and obtained aerial maps of Dallas, Tulsa, Fort Worth and the surrounding areas covering a Naval air station, an Army airfield, and an Air Force Base. In April, 1954, a Soviet official purchased aerial photographs of five Long Island communities. Also, in April, 1954, a Soviet official purchased three aerial photographs of Boston, Massachusetts, and Newport, Rhode Island, areas. In May, 1954, three Soviets traveled to California where they ordered from a Los Angeles photography shop $80 worth of aerial photographs covering the Los Angeles area.

However, they have not been content with acquisition of publicly available data. For example, on May 3, 1954, Leonid E. Plinev, an assistant Soviet air attaché stationed in Washington, who had previously traveled extensively throughout the United States and had obtained commercially available aerial photographs of various areas of this country, requested a Washington, D. C., photographer to rent an airplane to take photographs of New York City which were not commercially available. He specified the scale to be used and the altitude from which the photographs were to be taken. He offered $700 for this activity. Obviously the photographs which he requested would depict vital port areas, industrial facilities, and military installations in the New York area.

For this brazen abuse of his diplomatic privileges Plinev was declared persona non grata on May 29, 1954, and departed from this country on June 6, 1954.

But this did not stop the Soviets. They continued their systematic program of collecting aerial photographs of major cities and vital areas of the United States. On January 19, 1955, the State Department sent a note to the Soviet Ambassador placing restrictions on the acquisition of certain types of data.

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by Soviet citizens in the United States. These restrictions were comparable to restrictions on American citizens in Russia and in part prohibited Soviet citizens from obtaining aerial photographs except where they "appear in or are appendices to newspapers, periodicals, technical journals, atlases and books commercially available to the general public."

Soviet reaction to the restrictions was typical of their philosophy. They began circumventing the restrictions by subverting Americans to purchase aerial photographs for them. One month after the restrictions became effective, Nikolai I. Trufinov, a Soviet official in Mexico, began negotiations for a resident of the west coast of the United States, to obtain aerial photographs of 45 major United States cities. Nineteen of these cities are located near Strategic Air Command bases. The remaining 26 are all strategic cities in or near which are located air bases, naval bases, research or training stations, atomic energy installations, or important industrial facilities.

During April, 1959, Vladimir D. Loginov, a Soviet employee of the United Nations used the same scheme to obtain an aerial map of New York City. At 10 p.m. on April 26, 1959, Loginov secretly met an individual in a darkened parking lot at the railroad station in Scarsdale, New York, where this map was delivered to Loginov. Months later on November 12, 1959, this same parking lot was again utilized by the Soviets to obtain aerial photographs of Chicago, Illinois. On this occasion, the photographs were turned over to Etrill D. Doronkin, another Soviet employee of the United Nations. In this same operation, the Soviets attempted to obtain aerial photographs of Portland, Oregon, Seattle, Washington; and San Diego and San Francisco, California.

Circumvention of the restrictions also took the form of trickery and deceit. For example, on July 17, 1959, Viktor V. Fenin, assistant Soviet military attaché and Anatoli G. Vasiliev, an employee of the Soviet Military Attaché in Washington, D. C., obtained an aerial photograph of the Chicago Air Force Base in Montana from the local Chamber of Commerce by posing as tourists without identifying themselves as Soviet officials. On July 26, 1959, they obtained an aerial photograph of Thermopolis, Wyoming, by bullying the clerk at the Chamber of Commerce in an arrogant and insistent manner, again posing as tourists. They were given the photograph in spite of the fact that such a photograph is not normally given to tourists.

Soviet activities did not stop there. At the present time, a Washington, D. C., photographer is under the instructions...
of Petr V. Eshov, third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, to 
take flying lessons at Soviet expense. Eshov has indicated 
that the Soviets will purchase a plane for the photographer's 
use after he obtains his pilot's license. That aerial recon-
naissance is the Soviet objective, is amply proven by the fact 
that this photographer has been requested to obtain aerial 
photographs of the East Coast from Boston, Massachusetts, to 
Jacksonville, Florida. He has already been sent on reconna-
sissance trips throughout the southern states under Soviet instructions 
to photograph military installations with telephoto lenses. The 
information obtained on one of these reconnaissance trips including 
photographs of United States military bases was to be delivered 
on September 17, 1959, to Vladimir Glinsky, an assistant Soviet 
naval attaché who originally recruited the photographer. At 
7 a.m. on that date, however, Glinsky contacted the photographer 
by telephone and cancelled the appointment, explaining, "my 
boss is here." Premier Khrushchev on that morning was winding 
up his first visit to Washington on his tour of the United States. 
These photographs were subsequently delivered on October 2, 1959.

It is apparent from the examples cited that the Soviet 
Union reaps the benefits of aerial reconnaissance of the United 
States just as surely as if planes were sent over this country.

II. RECRUITMENT OF AMERICANS:

The acquisition of aerial photographs is only one 
phase of Soviet Bloc intelligence activity in the United States. 

The manner in which it has been done illustrates two basic 
Soviet intelligence concepts: namely, to exploit the weaknesses 
of Americans whenever possible and to take full advantage of all 
the freedoms of our democratic society.

Following these concepts, the Soviets through the use 
of such devices as entrapment, blackmail, threats, and promises 
have exploited human frailty. The record is replete with 
examples of such exploitation of Americans throughout the years 
following the Russian Revolution in 1917. For example, 
Nicholas Dobenberg, a naturalized American, first became 
associated with the communist movement about 1920. In 1928 he 
was recruited into Soviet espionage activities with the approval 
of the Communist Party. He was recruited by one Alfred Tilton, 
who was an illegal agent of Soviet Military Intelligence, posing 
as a Canadian citizen and in possession of a Canadian passport. 
One of the early assignments given to Dobenberg was the sounding 
out of other Americans for later recruitment by Tilton. 
Dobenberg, after pleading guilty to violations of the passport 
laws, served a term in prison in 1940 and thereafter prior to 
his death cooperated with United States Government agencies.
Simon Rosenberg, another naturalized American of Polish background, during 1931 was sent to Russia by his employer. While there, he met representatives of a Soviet intelligence agency and under threat of reprisals to be taken against his sister who was then living in Russia, he agreed to work in behalf of the Russians upon his return to the United States. His principal assignment in this country was to obtain technical and industrial information. Rosenberg, who is now deceased, also cooperated with agencies of the Government, prior to his death, as have many other Americans who have been involved in Soviet intelligence activity.

Another example is the case of Hafis Salich, a naturalized American employed by the Office of Naval Intelligence in California who met Mikhail N. Gorin through a mutual acquaintance in 1939. Gorin was then the Pacific Coast manager of Intourist. By advancing Salich money, Gorin ultimately persuaded him to furnish Office of Naval Intelligence reports for which Gorin paid $2,000. Gorin and Salich were found guilty of espionage in 1939 and Salich was sentenced to four years imprisonment, which he served. Gorin appealed his conviction and sentence of six years to the Supreme Court of the United States which unanimously upheld the conviction in 1941; however, the trial judge suspended execution of the sentence and placed him on probation provided he would pay a $10,000 fine and leave the United States, never to return.

The decade of 1950 - 1960 has been no exception. It began with the trial and conviction of Valentin Subitchev, a Soviet employee of the United Nations who had obtained information from Judith Coplen, an employee of the Department of Justice. This conviction was soon followed by convictions of several Soviet agents in the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg network in 1951; by the sentencing of Otto Verber and Kurt Ponger in 1953 after they pleaded guilty to espionage; by the guilty pleas of espionage by Jack and Myra Sobel and Jacob Albin in 1957 and later in the same year the conviction of Colonel Rudolf Abel, a Soviet illegal agent in this country.

These prosecutions, although they clearly establish the nature of Soviet espionage activities against this country, involve only a part of the Soviet-bloc espionage attack which has included numerous Soviet attempts to penetrate United States Government agencies. For example, the prosecution of Judith Coplen, an employee of the Department of Justice in early 1950 was followed in October, 1950, by a Soviet assignment to Boris Morra, an American motion picture producer who was cooperating with the FBI, to revive his acquaintance with a member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission; to obtain compromising
information concerning this individual and to carefully explore the possibility of placing a secretary in his office who could furnish information to the Russians. Morroe previously in 1948 had been given the assignment to attempt to obtain information which could be used by the Russians in an effort to compromise United States General Clay in Germany.

Another example occurred during 1954 when Soviet intelligence officers in Germany approached an American Army officer stationed in Germany who was soon to be retired. They propositioned him to work for the Soviets after his return to the United States and set up a schedule for meetings in New York City. Pursuant to the arrangements, Makim O. Martynov, counselor of the Soviet Representation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, carried out a series of clandestine meetings in New York with a person whom he believed to be the Army officer. As a result of his indiscreet abuse of his status, Martynov was declared persona non grata on February 21, 1955.

Another example is that of Vsevolod A. Zatrouk, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy who was declared persona non grata on May 31, 1959, for attempting to subvert a State Department employee to obtain information from State Department files.

A more recent example has been previously cited involving the attempt by Vasili Kirilyuk, an employee of the United Nations, to penetrate a vital Government agency by instructing an American to obtain employment in that agency.

Soviet attempts to recruit Americans during this period have not been confined to attempts to infiltrate Government agencies. For example, in February, 1954, Igor A. Amosov, assistant Soviet naval attaché, was declared persona non grata for attempting to obtain information concerning radar and United States naval vessels from a businessman who had commercial dealings with the Russians and who was in a position to obtain such data.

In June, 1956, Ivan A. Babichkov, an assistant Soviet military attaché was declared persona non grata for attempting to obtain data regarding radar, guided missiles, jet fuels and atomic submarines from an American businessman who during World War II had extensive contacts with the Russians on both private and United States Government business. The Soviets attempted to exploit his World War II friendship.

In August, 1956, Viktor I. Petrov, a Soviet translator at the United Nations, was released from his employment for recruiting an employee of an American aviation company to obtain classified data regarding United States aircraft.
This activity has continued throughout the decade into 1960, as illustrated by the case previously cited where a Washington, D. C., photographer has been utilized for the purpose of photographing military installations.

4. THE INTELLIGENCE ROLE OF THE SOVIET-BLOC OFFICIALS

Only a few of the many examples of abuse of their diplomatic privileges by Soviet-bloc officials in the United States have been mentioned. In the more flagrant cases, the United States Government has asked the offending officials to leave this country. During the decade, 1950 - 1960, 19 Soviet officials have been asked to leave. Many more have been engaged in intelligence activities throughout the years.

The Soviet Union has maintained a large staff of officials in this country since its first recognition in 1933. These officials have been assigned to Soviet embassies, consulates, trade delegations, news media, the United Nations, and the American CIA Corporation. It is from these installations that the primary intelligence activities are directed against the United States. A former Soviet intelligence officer who defected from the Soviets has estimated that from 70% to 90% of the Soviet officials in the United States have some type of intelligence assignment. Other defectors have confirmed that a high percent of the officials are intelligence agents. As of May 1, 1960, there were 329 Soviet officials stationed in this country. They were accompanied by 455 dependents, many of whom are also potential intelligence agents.

Nor is this the full strength of Soviet-bloc intelligence. As of May 1, 1960, there were 272 satellite officials stationed in the United States accompanied by 425 dependents. This almost doubles the potential of Soviet intelligence services. The satellite intelligence services have been developed according to the Soviet pattern, their personnel selected or approved by the Soviets and they are trained and guided by Soviet policies and procedures. Recent defectors from satellite intelligence services have advised that the Soviets have access to all data obtained by the satellites and, in fact, maintain an advisor system at headquarters level to make certain that the satellites operate consistent with Soviet interests.

This coordination is not limited to headquarters levels. Beginning in November, 1955, the Soviet and satellite military, naval and air attaches stationed in the United States began a series of monthly meetings under the guidance of the Soviet military attaché. During this
Initial meeting the satellite representatives were given specific target assignments for the collection of information desired by the Soviets and arrangements were made for the over-all correlation of their activities.

5. INDUSTRIAL SPYING AND CIRCUMVENTION OF REGULATIONS:

This large group of Soviet-bloc officials stationed in the United States has systematically over the years developed a most important part of the modern intelligence machine which was referred to by one Soviet official as the best industrial spying system in the world. Volumes could be written as to the techniques used and the ways and means developed by the Soviet bloc to obtain information regarding the industrial potential of the United States often with the use of subterfuge and deceit as well as deliberate circumvention of Customs regulations.

The following examples illustrate this activity:

In 1924 the Amorg Trading Corporation was organized in New York for the purpose of acting as an importer and exporter on the North American continent for official trusts of the Soviet Union. Amorg continued to operate during World War II, although in 1942 the Soviet Government created the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C., to purchase war material. This Purchasing Commission was dissolved after the end of World War II, and its activities absorbed by Amorg. Since its organization, Amorg Trading Corporation has been staffed primarily by representatives of the Soviet Government who have official status. Former employees of Amorg have advised that it was standard practice for Soviets attached to Amorg to request permission for Soviet officials to visit industrial facilities throughout the country on the promise of orders to be forthcoming if the products were found satisfactory. In many instances the officials of the companies would later be advised by Amorg that Moscow would have to approve the order. In instances where a contract was given to a particular company, Amorg consistently demanded blueprints of the particular product and other data to which it was not
entitled by normal business practices. Amtorg officials also consistently insisted on a clause in the contract which would give Soviet inspectors the privilege of inspecting all of the merchandise before it was shipped to Russia.

Another device utilized by Amtorg officials was to gain the confidence of some employee in a plant which had a contract with the Russian Government and, through this employee, obtain blueprints which were copied in the Amtorg office and the copies forwarded to Russia. Amtorg officials would also advertise for employees who, when they appeared for an interview at the Amtorg office, would be instructed to bring proof of their ability in the form of blueprints of former projects. When the applicants for employment later showed up with the blueprints, the blueprints would be photographed and the photographs forwarded to Russia.

Amtorg has also followed a practice of preparing detailed catalogues concerning American industry. Congressman Mondt on January 90, 1947, described one of these catalogues as "a manual for bombing America." It was pointed out that the book contained detailed information including many photographs and maps of vital areas of the United States. In this connection Amtorg Trading Corporation during the 1940's prepared a monthly magazine called "American Engineering and Industry" and an annual guide called "Catalogue of American Engineering and Industry." This latter publication in 1946 was described as a three-volume, 5,000-page document.

In August, 1956, Milos Prochaska, a Czechoslovakian official assigned to the Commercial Office at the Czech Embassy, furnished to an American the specifications for the components of 2 steel mills to be purchased in the United States for the Czechs. He outlined a plan whereby the American would act as an exculsive agent to purchase these mills ostensibly for a private concern in a Western country. He would obtain estimates and if the estimates were approved, the Czechs would furnish the name of the purchasing company, a power of attorney and the necessary bank credit. Thereafter, the mills would be shipped to the Czech agent in the Western country and then transshipped to Czechoslovakia.

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6. **EXPLORATION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION**

It is no secret that one of the results of the freedom of our democratic society is the availability of voluminous information to members of the public merely for the asking. Some of the cases previously cited clearly indicate that the Soviet-bloc intelligence services are aware of this fact and have taken full advantage of this democratic freedom; however, it remains for former Soviet-bloc intelligence officers to testify as to its real significance and importance to the Soviet-bloc intelligence services. One defector has stated that the ease with which information is obtained in this country has resulted in a reduction of the hazardous and time-consuming clandestine operations which would otherwise be necessary. Another has estimated that the Soviet Military Attaché's office in the United States is able to legally obtain 95% of the material useful for its intelligence objectives. He stated that, in fact, 80% of an intelligence agent's time in any other country in the world would normally be consumed clandestinely obtaining information which is readily available in the United States through Government agencies or commercial publishing houses. He pointed out that Polish military intelligence obtains more technical data in the United States than from all the other countries in the world combined.

Although such information is collected in a number of ways, the following techniques in addition to those previously mentioned have been most productive.

One of the most useful techniques is attendance of conventions of American organizations by Soviet-bloc officials. During the year preceding Khrushchev's visit to this country, Soviet officials alone attended approximately 30 conventions covering various fields of endeavor including aeronautics, electronics, plastics development, education and others. Typical were the activities of 2 Soviets who attended the Western Electric convention held in Los Angeles during August, 1959. As usual, at the inception, they began to collect voluminous literature. When the volume became unmanageable one Soviet left the material at a check stand and resumed his collection activities. It was estimated that the literature picked up by these Soviets at this one convention weighed approximately 250 pounds.

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Another technique utilized in correspondence with chambers of commerce and industrial facilities throughout the United States through which voluminous information regarding transportation systems, major industries, etc., is obtained. In many instances useful maps of the areas are also secured.

Still another technique is the subscription to American publications and collection and review of United States Government documents. For example, during June, 1959, it was ascertained that the personnel of the Soviet Military, Naval and Air Attaché Offices subscribed to 44 newspapers and 58 magazines of a technical, scientific, military and general news nature. It is apparent that the Soviets have a definite program of subscribing to newspapers published at or in the vicinity of vital United States military bases.

Purchases from the United States Government have long been a productive source for Soviet-bloc intelligence. For example, on December 29, 1944, the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C., ordered copies of 5,610 patents. On the same date the New York office of this Commission purchased two copies of 18,000 patents. On January 1, 1945, the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington again ordered copies of 9,342 different patents. On January 12, 1945, copies of 41,610 patents were ordered. The next order was for 41,610. The acquisition of copies of patents has been continued throughout the years as illustrated by the fact that in early 1959 Anatoli G. Vasiiev, an employee of the Office of the Soviet Military Attaché, requested an American to instruct him in the use of the "Search Room" of the United States Patent Office so that he could locate patents in which he was interested.

The Soviets have, of course, not restricted themselves to the acquisition of patents. For example, on March 10, 1954, an Assistant Soviet Air Attaché purchased "The Pilot's Handbook" for the East and West Coasts of the United States from the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey of the Department of Commerce. On March 12, 1954, a chauffeur of the Soviet Air Attaché purchased "The Pilot's Handbook" for Canada and Alaska. Six days later an Assistant Soviet Attaché ordered "The Pilot's Handbook" for the Far East and Europe. These handbooks contained
diagrams of all of the principal airfields and the approaches used in landing planes.


This collection activity has continued unabated up to the present time. Literally thousands of similar documents are obtained in this country every year by Soviet-bloc officials assigned in this country and through registered agents such as the Four Continent Book Corporation and the Pass News Agency.

A statement of a satellite defector illustrates the value to the Soviet-bloc of United States Government publications. He stated that on one occasion, Polish military intelligence obtained an 18-volume edition prepared by the United States Army Engineers regarding United States port facilities. It was purchased from the Government Printing Office at nominal cost, but its estimated value to the Polish military intelligence was placed at $50,000.

Not content with the large volume of publicly available material, Soviet-bloc officials have resorted to deceit. For example, on November 5, 1956, Ion Dubesteanu, an assistant military attache of the Romanian Legation in Washington, D. C., was declared persona non grata for activity beyond the scope of his official duties. Using a false name and identity, Dubesteanu had corresponded with U. S. military installations soliciting material and had rented post office boxes at North Beach, Maryland, under assumed names to which such material was to be sent.

Reconnaissance trips by Soviet-bloc officials have been a most productive source of intelligence. The officials have been observed to carefully prepare for such trips by reviewing publications collected in this country, doing research at the Library of Congress, et cetera. Exclusive of trips from Washington, D. C., to New York City, officials of the Soviet Military Office alone took 10 trips
to various areas of the country in 1958 and 1959. They visited 26 states in 1958 and 30 in 1959. They covered most of the strategic areas of the country and covered some areas as many as four times. During these trips they followed a definite pattern of visiting chambers of commerce, driving around the perimeter of industrial facilities and wherever possible visiting military, naval and air installations in the areas visited. They collected all available literature and maps relating to industrial facilities, transportation systems, power plants, dams, chemical factories, oil fields, and wherever possible took photographs in addition to making extensive notes.

7. PROPAGANDA AND PERSONAL APPEARANCES

Exploitation of our freedoms has also taken the form of propaganda. Just content with the distribution of over 20,000 copies of the illustrated monthly magazine, "URSS," which is in reciprocity for distribution of a similar American magazine in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Embassy has a carefully planned program of distributing press releases. As of February, 1960, the Press Department of the Soviet Embassy was distributing press releases to almost 7,000 individuals and institutions in the United States, including newspaper editors, business leaders, radio stations, public libraries, television stations, teachers, labor leaders, scientists, and leaders in trade and commerce.

In addition, since January 1, 1959, 30 different officials attached to the Soviet Embassy have made, or were scheduled to make, 74 public appearances (not including additional invitations for appearances by the Soviet Ambassador) before various groups in this country. Nineteen other Soviets attached to the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, employed by the United Nations Secretariat or assigned to Intourist, made, or were scheduled to make, 39 public appearances during the same period.

These public appearances normally involved speeches or participation in forums on the part of the Soviet officials and were made before various types of groups, including high school, college, and university groups, parent-teacher associations, advertising and civic clubs, fraternities, professional associations or clubs, religious and cultural groups, travel clubs and community centers. Some of these were television appearances. It is apparent that the Soviets are taking every opportunity to spread the gospel of communism by exploitation of the intense desire of Americans to learn more about the Soviet Union.

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6. USE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Attention is called to the fact that many of the incidents and cases previously cited involved Soviet employees of the United Nations. They are guests of the United States and are supposedly dedicated to the cause of international peace but they are, in fact, carefully selected envoys of the international communist conspiracy, trained in trickery and deceit and dedicated to the concept of fully exploiting the freedom of the countries they seek to destroy. It is too much to expect that they would not prostitute the United Nations.

2. "ILLEGAL" OPERATIONS

Although Soviet-bloc intelligence services have made extensive use of their officials stationed in foreign countries for espionage purposes throughout the years, they have, in addition, operated a parallel clandestine espionage system known as the "illegal" system. As previously noted, "illegal" Soviet agents were dispatched to the United States as early as the 1920's. Such "illegal" agents have no ostensible connection with the Soviet-bloc official establishments in the United States, but operate clandestinely, usually under false identities, making full use of secret communications channels and other clandestine techniques of operation. Their dual function is to bolster the espionage activities of the Soviet-bloc officials and to be prepared to take over all espionage operations in the event of war or other emergency which would cause a break in diplomatic relations.

It is apparent that during the decade 1950-1960 the Soviets have placed increasing emphasis on "illegal" operations. One former intelligence officer of the Soviet Ministry of State Security has advised that a special directorate was created in 1947 for the purpose of handling "illegal" agents. Another former intelligence officer, Reino Hayhanen, has stated that he was told, while in Moscow in 1952, that plans were being made to change over Soviet contacts from "legal" to "illegal" operations. Another former officer of the Soviet Ministry of State Security has advised that as early as June, 1952, an order was sent to intelligence agents in all western countries to prepare "illegal" organizations which could function without interruption under any conditions.

That this policy was followed with respect to the United States is illustrated by the fact that in August, 1955, a female Soviet agent attempted to enter the United States from
Canada at Detroit using an authentic copy of a birth certificate previously issued to an American. Detected by the United States border screening process, she was refused entry. Less than a year later, Rudolf J. Abel, a colonel in the Soviet Committee of State Security, was arrested in New York City where he was posing as an American photographer under the name Emil B. Goldfarb. Abel had entered the United States in 1948 using a passport issued to a naturalized American in 1947 to visit relatives behind the Iron Curtain and who never returned to this country. Abel was subsequently convicted of espionage and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, which sentence he is now serving.

It is interesting to note that in October, 1952, the Soviets sent Reino Hayhanen to the United States to act as Abel’s assistant. Hayhanen, prior to leaving Russia, had been given instructions by Mikhail N. Swirin, a Soviet intelligence officer. After his arrival in this country, Swirin, who had become First Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, met with Hayhanen and subsequently, during the period 1952-1953, Hayhanen operated under his supervision. It was not until 1954 that Swirin gave instructions for Hayhanen to contact Abel and to act as Abel’s assistant.

The case involving Abel and Hayhanen is a striking example of Soviet use of "illegal" agents against the United States. In dispatching such agents to this country, we can be certain that the Soviet-bloc intelligence services will, as they have with their representatives who are dispatched to this country as diplomats, take full advantage of the freedoms of this country which are guaranteed by our Constitution.

10. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE

The United States has not been the only target of the Soviet-bloc intelligence organizations. Many other countries of the world have felt the barbs of the Soviet espionage attack. The disclosures of the Royal Commission in Canada which followed the 1945 defection of Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet code clerk, revealed a Soviet espionage apparatus which on a broad scale had recruited and subverted Canadian citizens while seeking to infiltrate the Canadian Government and drain off its secrets. The admissions of Klaus Fuchs in 1950 that he betrayed the free world when, as a member of the British Atomic Energy Team, he passed atomic secrets to the Russians clearly indicate the Soviet designs on information in possession of the British Government. The flight of the British scientist Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo in 1950 and the British diplomat only

- 15 -

(Continued)
Burgess and Donald MacLean in 1951 behind the Iron Curtain add additional proof. The report of the Royal Commission of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1955 following the defection of Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, Soviet espionage agents assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Australia, disclosed an extensive Soviet espionage apparatus directed against Australia. Many similar examples could be cited to illustrate that Soviet espionage is international in character and the expulsion of two Soviet officials from Switzerland during the past month clearly indicates that Soviet espionage is currently international in character.

Practically every one of the cases cited above, although based in other countries, had ramifications in the United States. For example, information furnished to the Russians by Dr. Allan Mann May, who was uncovered by the Russians, had been obtained when May visited a laboratory in Chicago in 1944. Klaus Fuchs worked on atomic energy in the United States from early 1944 through September, 1945, and supplied information to the Russians while in this country. The British diplomat Burgess and MacLean had been stationed in the United States prior to their disappearance behind the Iron Curtain. In spite of the use of third countries by the Soviet Union to commit espionage against the United States, Premier Khrushchev has made strong threats of reprisal against his neighboring countries which he assumes have been used as bases for United States aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union.

11. AIMS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

The world-wide espionage networks of the Soviet Union are an essential and integral part of the over-all communist plan to completely dominate the world. However, to understand the significance of the intelligence activity, it is necessary to examine the basic aims and principles of communism.

The highly authoritative "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)" summarized the teachings of Marx and Engels on the question of force and violence. It stressed that Marx and Engels taught the impossibility of establishing a communist state by peaceful means, emphasizing that this could be achieved only through a proletariat revolution through which a dictatorship could be established and all resistance crushed. V. I. Lenin gave practical application to the teachings of Marx and Engels. Through the application of such principles the Bolsheviks seized power.
in Russia in 1917 and under Lenin's guidance, established a dictatorship through which all resistance was systematically crushed. The success of the movement led Lenin to reiterate in later years that "the substitution of the proletarian state for the bourgeois state is impossible without a violent revolution."

Joseph Stalin followed the Marxist-Leninist principles. The Communist Party in the United States, since it was organized in September, 1919, and throughout the years of Stalin's rule in Russia, was unalterably bound to Moscow. In the earlier years, Party leaders openly, boastfully and defiantly proclaimed their allegiance to and support of Soviet objectives. The nature of the Communist Party, USA, was exposed in 1969 and its leaders convicted in a court of law where the evidence laid out before the jury constituted irrefutable proof that the Communist Party, USA, advocated the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by force and violence. The policies and activities of the Communist Party, USA, have not changed to date. The current leaders of the Communist Party, like their predecessors, unwaveringly follow the lead of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Time and again, Soviet Premier Khrushchev has claimed that the Soviet Union does not and will not interfere in the affairs of other nations. Yet, in practically every country in the world to date the Soviet Union has established fifth columns in the form of Communist parties which are under the complete domination and control of the Soviets and are sworn to uphold and aid the Soviet dream for world conquest. Through the directives it furnishes to these subversive forces, the Soviet Union clearly interferes with the political, social, and economic affairs of other nations on a continuing basis in the relentless drive toward world domination.

Today, the rallying cry of world communism is "peaceful coexistence." However, on May 5, 1956, Premier Khrushchev, addressing the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, paid tribute to V. I. Lenin and stated "The Soviet people are proud to know that the cause of our great leader and teacher lives and triumphs and that Lenin's dreams are being translated into reality by hundreds and millions of people—builders of socialism and communism—and that Lenin's cause is winning all upright men on earth." Referring to the triumph of the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, Khrushchev went on to reaffirm "Marxist-Leninist ideas" as the guide to the ultimate triumph of world communism.
Part II: Selected Venona Messages

A Note on the Translations and List of Messages

The release of Venona translations involved careful consideration of the privacy interests of individuals mentioned, referenced, or identified in these documents. In very few cases, names have not been released because doing so would
constitute an invasion of privacy.

In some of the Venona translations, the analytic footnotes indicated that the person referred to by covername had not been identified. Another—usually later—message may have footnoted that same covername with an identification. For example, in some early message translations, the covernames MER and ALBERT were footnoted as unidentified, but analysts subsequently determined (as footnoted in later translations of other messages) that the person in question was Iskhak A. Akhmerov, the KGB’s chief illegal officer in the United States. Unfortunately for readers, the KGB occasionally reused covernames; consequently, a single covername can designate two different persons. Even so, readers often can determine from context or geographic location which person is being referred to.

Finally, the Venona messages are replete with specialized Soviet intelligence terminology. The following are definitions of some of the more common terms and phrases.

The Russian word klichka (sobriquet or nickname) appears in the Venona translations as “covername.” There are hundreds of covernames in the translations, including many seen in the messages included in this volume, such as ALBERT, LIBERAL, and ALES. Covernames designated Soviet officers, active or retired assets, valued contacts, and sometimes even prominent figures (such as CAPTAIN for President Roosevelt) and were periodically changed. Assets and contacts, however, rarely knew their covernames, which were to be used primarily in cable traffic. To complicate matters further, a Soviet intelligence officer like illegal rezident Iskhak Akhmerov typically had a covername (MER, and later ALBERT), aliases he used in his cover identity (William Grienke and Michael Green, among others), and “street names” he used in the company of assets and contacts (“Bill”).

Fellow countrymen were members of the local Communist Party.

An illegal was a KGB or GRU officer, often a Soviet citizen, working abroad under alias with neither diplomatic cover nor visible connections to legal Soviet establishments. An individual illegal’s cover story was his or her legend. Iskhak Akhmerov was the KGB’s principal illegal in the United States before 1946 and thus was regarded as the illegal rezident. He apparently was succeeded in this role by Rudolf Abel. Several KGB and GRU illegals were shown in Venona messages to be operating in the United States, Mexico, and other countries. Although some Soviet illegals later used radios for direct clandestine communication with Moscow, illegals in the United States during World War II generally transmitted and received messages through Soviet diplomatic missions.

A leader (or group leader) was a KGB officer or an experienced local agent who handled and supervised a network or subnetwork of assets. Such an officer might have either worked for an official Soviet entity or operated as an illegal. Venona messages showed that such agents as Jacob Golos and Sergei Kurnakov, while not themselves KGB officers, were nonetheless given significant responsibilities for certain networks. In many cases where the KGB gained control of older Comintern or GRU networks, the existing leader was left in charge for months or even years.

A line was a grouping of KGB officers by operational tasks. Some of these entities seen in Venona communications were the Second Line (which focused on ethnic groups of interest to Moscow, such as Ukrainians or Latvians); the Fifth Line (responsible for the security of the Soviet merchant fleet and its personnel); the White Line (concerned with White Russian emigres); and the Economic Line (a scientific and technical sub-residency, headed by Leonid Kvasnikov, in the New York consulate).

The KGB and the GRU referred to one another as the neighbors. In KGB parlance, Near Neighbors meant the GRU-Naval auxiliary, while the GRU proper was referred to as Far Neighbors.

Probationers was the cover term for KGB agents. The term—which apparently fell out of usage after the 1940s—was sometimes applied to KGB officers who were temporarily not attached to a diplomatic mission and hence were being run as agents.

To put on ice (sometimes rendered in cold storage) meant to suspend use of an agent.

The rezident was the KGB chief at a particular location; his station was called a residency (rezidentura). The New York residency supported a sub-residency, under Leonid R. Kvasnikov, to collect scientific and technological secrets.

A worker (sometimes referred to as a cadre) was the KGB’s usual term for its own officers working in a diplomatic or official Soviet establishment such as the TASS press agency or the Amtorg trading company.

Access to the Venona Translations

All the Venona translations—roughly 2,900 KGB, GRU, and GRU-Naval messages—are being released to the public. Paper copies have been sent to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, and to various federal repositories (typically at large state universities). The National Cryptologic Museum, adjacent to NSA headquarters at Ft. George G. Meade, Maryland, also has a complete set of the translations. Each release of the Venona translations in
1995 and 1996 was accompanied by an original explanatory monograph authored by Robert Louis Benson, co-editor of this volume. The translations and monographs can also be found on the Internet’s World Wide Web, NSA’s Homepage, at http://www.nsa.gov:8080. This conference volume can be found on the World Wide Web, CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence Homepage.

NOTE TO VIEWERS: The following pages were scanned as graphics.

Translations included: (t) (Each graphic is approximately 50KB)
1. Moscow [Comintern] 117, 121 to the US, 21 and 23 March 1936.

FROM: MOS
TO: U.S.
NO: 117
DATE: 21 March 1936

Urge you speed up departure of (1 group) students for radio school. Furthermore urge that party choose 5 comrades especially reliable and tested, with good American passports for chief work. Furthermore urge you choose 5 young comrades well tested and especially wished for by party knowing well photography and with good American passports. Please reply immediately.

FROM: MOS
TO: U.S.
NO: 123
DATE: 23 March 1936

In addition to previous communication please inform us on following:
1. What short term courses for radio operators are there in your country, and of what duration are they.
2. Are there private courses, under whose control are they, are people who finish these courses registered somewhere or take over (1 group) engagements.
3. What are conditions for admission and what fees asked for.
2. London [GRU] to Moscow, 10 August 1941.

2. FUCHS AND PROBABLY REFERENCES TO ATOMIC ENERGY PROJECT

From: LONDON
To: DIRECTOR

1. RABCH'S MEETING

On 9th August RABCH[a] had a meeting with [C6 a former acquaintance],
Doctor FUCHS [FUCHS] [a], who [t group unidentified] [b] that
[1] groups unrecovered
[4] groups unrecovered

[5] in three months [3X time] and then all the material [A] will be sent
to CANADA for industrial production [e] [G. [t group unidentified] [f]
the fact that in GERMANY, in LEIPZIG [LEIPZIG] [g]
[6] groups unrecovered

[7] for FEISERBERG [FEISERBERG] [14]
[8] groups unrecovered

1225 tons of dynamite.

[Report when opportunity occurs] [OKLAB OKABER], [h]

Notes [a] The following is an alternative reading:
"... had a meeting with [C6 a former acquaintance] or
Doctor Fuchs who ..."
On technical grounds there is nothing to choose between these
two versions. Without collateral it is impossible to say
which is the correct one.

[b] It appears from the two previous occurrences of this group
that the general sense is "said".

[f]
2. (Continued)

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[a] Inserted by the translator. The case ending indicates that the preposition "in" must precede "BIRMINGHAM".

[b] It is almost certain that this means "papers", "documents", etc.

[c] This is a literal translation. The sense is probably: "... will be sent to CANADA so that industrial methods may be used."

It is known from collateral that laboratory facilities were found to be inadequate and that the decision was taken to use industrial plant.

[d] There is some evidence that the value of this group is: "draws attention to"

[e] The structure of the sentence suggests that LEIPZIG should be an adjective and that the passage should read: "... in the LEIPZIG..."

However the adjectival ending has been tried without success.

[f] This is an elliptical expression which is exceedingly hard to interpret without the full context.

"OKAZION", or more correctly "S OKAZION", is equivalent to the French "a l'occasion". To send a report or letter "S OKAZION" means to send it when the opportunity arises.

"JOGLAS OKAZION" thus suggests that a report was to be sent when an opportunity for sending one arose. If so, the report was presumably to be sent in writing. (BEING! could have signalled a report at any time and need not have waited for a suitable opportunity.)

Comments: [i] BARCH: Simon Davidevich KEDROV.

[ii] FUCHS moved to BIRMINGHAM on 27th May 1941 and took up his research duties on the following day.

[iii] HEISENBERG: Professor Werner HEISENBERG, who was Professor of Theoretical Physics at LEIPZIG University 1927-1941.

[iv] BEIG: Lt.Col. I.A. SKURYDIN.

NEW YORK 854 to MOSCOW, 16 June 1942.

VENONA

TOP SECRET

Ref. No. (of 16/6/1942)

Issue:

Copy No. 204

VENONA

PROFESSIONAL RECRUITMENT OF SPECIAL AGENTS

INCLUDING "OZOR/26" AND "OZOR/76" (1942)

From: NEW YORK

To: MOSCOW

No. 854

To VENONA [1]

Reference No. 2359.[a]

The signing up of "OZOR/26"[11] was delayed because of his prolonged absence and the necessity for checking additional information. He arrived today and we shall report results.

[1 group uncovered] "TENSE[11]", we are cultivating the American

Jane Postel[14] with a view to signing her on. She is about 30 years old and

works in "BARBER" as a translator of Poland. POSTEL is a "BARBER/TRANSLATOR".[7]

[26 groups uncovered]

[65 .....JK] was given [1 group uncovered].

Her writing was carried out by us. She is a "BARBER/TRANSLATOR". She is

described as a "BARBER/TRANSLATOR". [1 group uncovered], indicated person.

[115] has also been reported as favourably by [1 group uncovered] who

is a friend.

We intend to sign her on with a view to making use of her connections and

[2 groups uncovered] [55] [1 group uncovered] [96] [group uncovered]. Our American our tasks

No. 204

[111] [Note and deletion overleaf]

Distribution

M: 11, 8, 10

E: 21, 16, 17

S: 2, 3, 26

D: 1, 16, 16

203
3. (Continued)

Note: [a] Not available.

Comments:


[li] LISA : Unidentified cover-name. First occurrence in this line.

[v] FOSCA : Later given the cover-name 'GIANS'. Employed by Netherlands Study Unit, later by MI5, then by MI6.

[iii]黃志明 : Member of the Communist Party.

[vii] TANG : The full name cannot be found. It is however a fairly short name since TANG is preceded by a single group probably of one or two syllables.

[viii] Pan : Unidentified cover-name. First known occurrence.

[iv] MARKOV : Vasiliy MARKOV, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.
4. Moscow 424 to New York, 1 July 1942.

More recruiting proposals

[Document content]

presentation of documents, three references and the completion of a detailed questionnaire including such questions as the names and addresses of previous employers, places of residence, particulars of parents, relations, etc., after which all the papers go to the F.B.I. (Counter-
intelligence) for checking. It is impossible at present for the BELGIAN GOVERNMENT to get work in these establishments.

[Part II]

2. The basic document which gives proof of American citizenship is the birth certificate. The birth certificate does not, as a rule, serve as an
everyday means of identification. The ordinary, everyday documents are the
driver's licence, the draft registration card (for men) and various
passes and identity papers issued by establishments, businesses, companies
and firms. The HOSPITALS of the opinion that birth certificates were formerly issued by the churches. Now they are issued by hospitals.
Archives of birth records are carefully preserved by the Americans and
making a copy of a birth certificate does not cause the F.B.I. any great
difficulty. The driver's licence [2 groups unrecoverable] [85 such] adult
and bus cards and the address of the holder are recorded on it, it also serves
as an ordinary, everyday means of identification. Licences are issued by
the railroad department of the City Police (Traffic Department). To obtain
then one has to fill up a short questionnaire giving basic biographical
details and present a licence from another state or pass a written examination
on the traffic regulations of the city in question and a driving test. An
American needs no other paper. The HOSPITALS are promised to draw up a birth
certificate and the other way that, in view of the postponement of his
appointment to GEMINI, the opportunity in this respect has come to an end.

[13 groups unrecoverable]

posting to GEMINI for this purpose. In his opinion it is possible in the
last resort to forge a birth certificate at home or simply to do without
papers at all.

[Part III]

[59 groups unrecoverable]

The prospects of a new system of documentation being instituted in the USA
are uncertain. The F.B.I. insists on registration and on taking[f]

[59 groups unrecoverable]

about 20 million persons have been fingerprinted. These are mainly
aliens (all aliens are fingerprinted), merchant seamen and crews of ships
calling here, servicemen, employees and workers in defense plants and
government establishments. The issue of fingerprint identifications to
(2 groups unrecoverable) is becoming popular, a number of
people and their fingerprints taken in order to get places into the ports.
5. The landing of an illegal immigrant on our ships requires careful organization. The "VENONA" operation keeps a careful eye on our ships and people. During the period from September to December 1942 there were two cases of attempts to inspect two ships for a second time. The following cases are known:

(a) During the inspection of a ship, the passengers and crew were checked a second time on a trivial pretext.

(b) There was a personal search of members of a crew going into the city "in order to recover smuggled letters[1]." [2 groups uncovered] to search

[4 groups uncovered]

[Part V]

Contrary to the previous arrangements, the Americans only admit the crews of our ships into the city if they show their passports. They are presumed to be seamen who have been admitted for this purpose. They are issued to each sailor arriving in the US for the first time after his fingerprints have been taken. The information on the pass is checked on departure from the port and on return. The number of check points varies. Cross of ships

[45 groups uncovered]

in principle remains as before. All officers brought here which are being taken away[2], packages and letters are inspected.

4. In clothing and appearance, our seamen inшив[2] uniform] on ships are clearly distinguishable from the local seamen. This is because of their uniforms, their berets (American seamen wear hats), their handling and their attitude. They do not take any trouble over their hair or their make-up. Suits or overcoats of wisteria quality differ little from the American ones.

[Part VI]

5. The possible landing ports are SAN FRANCISCO and PORTLAND. Up to 15 of our ships arrive in PORTLAND each month. 6 to 7 arrive in SAN FRANCISCO.

SAN FRANCISCO
Advisories:

(a) A large city in which it is easy to disappear.

[Continued overhead]
5. (Continued)

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(b) Easier to get a hotel room or a [furnished] room if necessary.

(c) Easier to buy a train ticket.

(d) Less danger of the AUSTRALIAN BOARD’s meeting.

[6 groups unsecured]

[Formal]

Advantages:

(a) DEWIS [DEWIS] can be relied on. His work is such that he sees personally to the ships and is in the port practically all the time.

(b) If necessary DEWIS can avail himself of the help of our other people there.

Disadvantages:

(a) The city is small. It would be harder to disappear in it. It is necessary to [2 groups unsecured] on the day of landing.

(b) It is harder to get a hotel room and practically impossible to take a [furnished] room. Our people have been watched and are well known. It would be more difficult to pass the time until the departure of the train.

(c) DEWIS is overloaded with his own work.

[Formal VII]

6. Sleeper tickets on long distance trains may be bought at the ticket office two or three days in advance. Reservations are required when making a reservation. Two or three trains a day leave for BERKELEY. The trip takes three or four days and one must change in CHICAGO. The Northern route through MINNEAPOLIS should be avoided.

[66 groups unsecured]

The press reports that the checking of cars is in force along the west coast, especially around LOS ANGELES and to the south. To combat desertion, the military police check the papers of enlisted men in trains at PORTLAND and SAN FRANCISCO. Civilians are not liable to have their papers checked. Carriages on long-distance trains consist of common sleepers and separate compartments — there are compartments for one person (compartments) and for two or three persons (compartments) and special classes compartments (drawing room). In this instance a compartment would be the most suitable. One boards the train 30 to 45 minutes in advance. One can eat in the restaurant car or order in the compartment.

[Continued secured]

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5. (Continued)
5. (Continued)

7. Summary

The F.M.L. keeps a strict check on all the numbers and series of banknotes. By exquisitely is also subject to checking through the bank. Every received in the hands by our citizens who come here.

[15 groups uncovered]

series.

End of part one[1].

No. 765-752 [File No. 91][vi]

Notes:

[a] The Russian word МАТЕРИАЛ is often used in the name of “documents” or “documentary material.” In this context it appears to mean “information.”

[b] МАНЕВР is generally means the transfer of troops or goods from one place to another. In conspiratorial language it means the dispatch of an agent to a given country.

[c] КОЛШЛАЙФ is very difficult to translate out of context. It can mean “company,” “firm,” “establishment,” “household.”

[d] Literally “the designations and addresses of previous service.”

[e] Or “КУНТУЗ”.

[f] There is technical evidence that the word after “taking” is “fingerprints”.

[g] I.e. “an illegal agent”.

[h] This can either be interpreted as “troops and letters” or “troops AND letters” i.e. “snagged letters”.

[i] Literally “all objects being transported, being carried away...”. This presumably means “all objects brought here by ship and taken out of the dock area”.

[j] Inserted by translator.

[k] I.e. part one of the material on the dispatch and legalization of the AUSTRALIAN DOYAN. There is an indication that part two will be sent later.

[Continued overleaf]
5. (Continued)

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Comments:
[1] [Map No. 42] Possibly Capt. (1st Rank) A.N. VORONOV.

[11] AUSTRALIAN WOMAN: Probably Frances Takil'ovna WITKIN (exact spelling not verified) who is probably identical with Mrs. Margot POSTEROS.

[166] TAJIK: An unidentified cover-name. Also mentioned in cables passed between 14/6/1943 and 9/6/1943; the latest message was No. 597 of 9/6/1943 (3/059/1943).

[175] GUERRA: Members of a non-soviet counter-espionage agency.

[304] BAEKLEN: An unidentified cover-name. Also mentioned in WASHINGTON's (Blue-Red) of 15/6/1943 and 19/9 of 9/6/1943.

[36] [Map No. 31] Probably Capt. (1st Rank) L.A. BORNIKOV.

[35] INTERROGATION: Soviet Intelligence Organization after being head of GOR. Named RONALD.
From: WASHINGTON
To: MOSCOW
Rec: 846, 846-846
18 April 1943

[Part 1]
To [Name no. 45][11].

[5 groups unrecoverable] the following about the RAYVER[THREE][11] and their methods of work with the personnel [5 groups unrecoverable].

   [7 groups unrecoverable].
   In a drunken condition he spoke indiscreetly
   [11 groups unrecoverable].
   I assume during the period 1938-41.
   [11 groups unrecoverable],
   evacuated to
   [10 groups unrecoverable]
   [55 groups unrecoverable]

ENGLISH
[9 groups unrecoverable]

a) ENGLISH
   [1 groups unrecoverable]
   Concerning this one of the interpreters who has been assigned to us [Liaison OFFICER[11]] spoke indiscreetly [2 groups unrecoverable] refused to fulfill this
   [89 groups unrecoverable].
   d) I switched RAYVER[11] telephone over to my switchboard for
   monitoring.
   e) At a reception at RAYVER[11]'s place in a conversation with Captain
   his drunk and that our people behave "like snakes in the
   grass".

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6. (Continued)

f) In a personal letter the Chief of the Shipbuilding, who is in contact with us on shipbuilding matters, said that he could not give us rest. This was discovered when VENONA put some civilian questions to the Department of the Navy (KURSK, KURSK, KURSK).

g) Under [redacted] of KURSK, DONALD [redacted], one of the acceptance officers at the plant, has been taken off the work.

2. [redacted] of the Intelligence Service.[BAKTHETA].

a) Interpreters: Lieutenant KIHKHI [redacted] who came from USSR in 1957; Lieutenant PIROTONI who is the son of a SARENO merchant, emigrated in 1926; (2 groups unrecovered) was the only worker free

[25 groups unrecovered]

readily[redacted], old sailors (over 50 years of age) no doubt dressed [in] civilian clothes, sailers or intelligence men dressed as sailors who speak Russian, a unit of whom were specially assigned to France, military intelligence men of the American navy, particularly [redacted] (24 Palace), clerks (1 group unrecovered) [50 at the base and others].

[Part III] Organization and method of work:

1. Secret surveillance by counter-espionage agents, for example at the tailor's where our people order uniforms, several cases of shadowing etc. have been noticed.

2. Special surveillance in key bases.

3. Throwing light on the functions of Deputy Commanders and their real role (Deputies for Political Affairs).formats).

4. Discovering the attitude of the enlisted men towards the command, towards drink and women.

5. Finding out how Comrade STALIN is regarded and attempting to discredit him in the eyes of Red Fleet sailors.

6. Bringing to light dissatisfaction among Red Fleet sailors, boasting about their own standard of living, and attempting to win their confidence.

7. Attempting to get them drunk and to corrupt them by using women.

8. The suggestion made to Red Seamen BURGMAN [redacted]

[14 groups unrecovered]
carton paper

[11 groups unrecovered]
the BRTTHH.

10. Finding out the geographical
6. (Continued)

Top Secret

[XX]

Part IV

I have given instructions to [REDACTED] on two groups unrecovered with NATIVES and the MATTES

[30 groups unrecovered]

with the NATIVES by well-wishers

[35 groups unrecovered]

[45 groups unrecoverable]

not to give a vital [redacted] for permanent work with [redacted]. When the opportunity occurs this material should be used for preserving the NATIVES with this bill. Discipline in the unit is good and many NATIVES are favorable contacts. The list of the two Red Seamen [redacted] and [redacted] who were sent back in a drowsy condition details by letter. [redacted] gave [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] instructions on two groups unrecovered a search locally and to brief [REDACTED] people.

3. A report about [REDACTED] should be sent to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs ([REDACTED]) 14 days against sending the press of the next week to the media. The press is ready to receive the material. (1 group unrecovered) [redacted] material to [REDACTED].

REX 207, 208, 209

[REDACTED]

Notes:
[a] The actual name is not clear.
[b] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED].
[c] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED].
[d] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED].
[e] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED].
[f] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED].
[g] Inserted by translator.

Command:
[1] [REDACTED] [redacted] Capt. (2nd rank) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. (1) [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted].
[2] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted].
[3] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted].
[4] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted].
[5] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted].
[6] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted].
[7] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted].
[8] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted].
[9] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted].
[10] [REDACTED] [redacted] [REDACTED] [redacted].

PREVIOUSLY AN ERROR FOR THE NAME FRANK FLACKS WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO THE STAFF OF GEN. KRIS [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED].

6. (Continued)
6. (Continued)

Comments (cont'd.):
[iii] KRTNI: Probably Capt. Nikolaj Alekseevich SERYGIN, Assistant Naval Attaché, WASHINGTON.
[xiv] JNK: Lt. Georgij Stepanovich PASEKO, Secretary to the Soviet Naval Attaché, WASHINGTON.
[v] STEPAOV: Vice-Adm. I.A. STEPAOV, Acting Chief of Naval Staff.
[xvi] No date. 91: Probably Capt. (lst Rank) I. A. KO-BEBOV, Soviet Naval Attaché in WASHINGTON.

1 March 1971

"Koch"[i] reports that at the "Captain"[ii]--"Boar"[iv] conference [i] group gathered
[16 groups unrecovered]

known, "Ibba"[v] has no
[69 groups unrecoverable]
information from Istanbul [8 groups unrecovered]
[IA known to the Romanian ambassador but in the situation after]
[53 groups unrecovered]
thousand dollars in support of an underground [6A diversion and]
espionage group in France.

In the middle of June Koch is going [2 groups unrecovered] noon
 to CHINCHI to acquaint himself there with the work of the "Ibba"
group. With him will go an American army colonel [1 group unidentified] at
CHINCHI [3 groups unrecovered] espionage group. It is considered necessary to establish [6 groups unrecovered] with
them, we will arrange a password.

We discussed with Koch the question of his removing documents
 for photographing. Koch said that in some cases he (IA agrees) to
do this, but as a rule he considers it inexpedient. He promised to
think [6 groups unrecovered]

\[\text{[i] VICTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. PIVIN.  
[iii] CAPTAIN: Franklin Delano ROOSEVELT.  
[iv] BOAR: Winston Leonard Spencer CHURCHILL.  
[vi] MAKSIM: Vasili Mikhailovich TURILIN.}\]

5 May 1943

8. New York 777-781 to Moscow, 26 May 1943. MI School
8. (Continued)

The students of the photographic section are recruited from among alumni and upon finishing at the school they return to flying units. Students of the other sections

[22 groups unrecovered]

in divisions, corps etc. [3 groups unrecovered] groups

[35 groups unrecovered]

solders [11 groups unrecovered] soldier first class

[56 groups unrecoverable]

lecturers know little about the Red Army and

[67 groups unrecovered]

[Part III]

[16 groups unrecovered]

in May 2 officers and 11 enlisted men [9 groups unrecovered] the Russian section. In the first year study was conducted only on the English language, gave

[18 groups unrecoverable]

and third classes of the air sector were [21 groups unrecovered] KISLIFSIV [1v], former [16 teachers], has been living in the USA since

[18 groups unrecoverable]

and was included in the regular teaching staff. In [7 groups unrecovered] sector.

In the Russian section 3 members graduated:

1. Yudin GOMISOV [1v] — age 26 years,

[19 groups unrecovered]

2. Sergej GLASILINH [1v],

[18 groups unrecoverable]


[18 groups unrecoverable].

Before joining the school he was

[22 groups unrecoverable].

He has a good command of the Russian language. 1e graduated with honor.

[6 groups unrecoverable].

[Part IV]

5. Lieutenant [2 groups unrecovered] KOSOV [11], [10 groups unrecoverable].
8. (Continued)

[566. Lieutenant] BAKHNER[xii], 38 - 39 years old, a Polish Jew.
Pro-Soviet feelings.

7. [Ukrainian] GUDASNY[x], 41 years old. [3 groups uncovered]
evacuated from Chino.

[15 groups uncovered]

8. [1 group uncovered] GUDASNY[X], 41 years old. Emigrated
from China where his parents resided. [5 groups uncovered]. Left to
the right [1 group uncovered].

9. [1 group uncovered] GURISH[xii], 31 years old, evacuated from
China.

10. [15 groups uncovered] a Jew from VARSOV. [6 groups unre-
covered]. He lived in FRANCE where he was a correspondent [2 groups un-
covered]. Jewish newspaper. Pro-Soviet feelings[xii].

11. Aleksandr ORLEK[UADNY][xiv], 31 - 32 years old, a Jew. He
has a [1 group unidentified] business in NEW YORK.

12. Guya LERF[xv], 24 - 25 years old, a Jew from Poland. The
Russian language [3 groups uncovered] in the army at the beginning of
the year. Before joining the school [5 groups uncovered].

[Part V]

[5 groups uncovered]

1. Michal CHIFOLD[xvi] [1 group uncovered] school. 31 - 33 years
old, [4 groups uncovered] Jew. He lives in TIBER[xvii] at the address
3071 Sedgwick Avenue Bronx.

[18 groups uncovered]

96[xvii]. He is a teacher at the school. He is drawn in exclusively during
examinations. Pro-Soviet feelings.

[55 groups uncovered]

[55 groups uncovered]

LEGINSKY[xviii] thus graduated in the French section.

The director of the Russian section is Lieutenant ZANGER[xix]

[39 groups uncovered]

In the hospital attached to the school, complement and description of
the students. SLAVA was warned about appropriate secrecy and caution.
For the time being we are carrying out work with him through [4 groups
uncovered]

No. 427

VENONA
8. (Continued)

[Top Secret]

Ref. No: [redacted] (of 15/40/1943)
Issued: 22/5/1943
Copy Iss: [redacted]

MR/SS/57

FROM: "TOP SECRET" OR "CAPITAL" TEXT (750)

From: NEW YORK
To:Moscow
Date: 26 May 43

[Part 1]

[Two-part message complete]

To: VENUSA

For processing [unclassified] "CAPITAL" TEXT [11], [2 groups uncovered], [or group friend Gertrude FRANZ, wife of the well-known wealthy stockbroker [15 groups uncovered], and associates]. On this line contact is being maintained with her by [redacted] [15 groups uncovered], the official representative of the NRODZ and the Russian student committee [15 groups uncovered]. "Estate" [15 groups uncovered] displays great interest in life in the USSR and Soviet Russia [15 groups uncovered], and the letter circumstances for bringing "Hitler" [15 groups uncovered] into close touch with her with a view to [119 groups uncovered or uncovered], or scientific worker.

Distribution [continued overleaf]

New York 786-7 to Moscow, 26 May 1943. Mrs. Roosevelt
9. (Continued)

[Part II]

[Group uncovered]

"CAPLIN' [group uncovered][a]."

[71 groups uncovered]

for further processing.

No. 832

[Made[vl]]

Note: [a] This unidentified group is not simply an inflection added to CAPLIN. It is possible that it is added to form an oblique case of the word KAPLINA. - "Kaprin's wife" which might have been adopted to replace the term "wife of CAPLIN" which is used at the opening of the message.

Comments: [i] VINOGR : Lt. Gen. F. H. PURIN.

[iii] CAPLIN : Franklin Delano ROOSEVELT.

[iii] SEKIREN : Possibly the Aleksei A. SEKIREN who by 1930 was 1st Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

[i] SOCIETA: People's Senator for Foreign Affairs.

[v] VISHNO : Kirovets Yar'evo Zhdanov.


"19" reports on discussions with "KAPITAN", "KARNOV" and "SAGNETTE" on the Second Front (1943)

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No: 812
29 May 1943

"19" reports that "KAPITAN" and "KARNOV" during conversations in the "GOVERN" (SCHAMA) [perhaps "Gouvernement"], invited "19" to join them and "SAGNETTE" to fully hold "KAPITAN".

[20 groups uncovered]

Second Front against GERMANY this year. KAPITAN considers that, if a Second Front should prove to be unsuccessful, this will (2 groups uncovered) harm to Russian interests and (2 groups uncovered). He considers it more advantageous and effective to weaken GERMANY by bombing and to use this time for "(2) groups uncovered" political crisis so that there may be no doubt that a Second Front next year will prove successful."

[24 groups uncovered]

"19" thinks that "KAPITAN" is not informing "SAGNETTE" of important military decisions and that therefore "SAGNETTE" may not have exact knowledge of [1 group uncovered] with the opening of a Second Front against GERMANY and the postponement from this year to next year. "19" says that "SAGNETTE" personally is an ardent supporter of a Second Front at this time and considers postponement [Continued overseas]
10. (Continued)

[Text not legible due to redactions]

[Signatures and notations]

[Text not legible due to redactions]

226

10. (Continued)

From: NEW YORK
To: Moscow
No.: 887
5 June 1943

To VENONA.

1. "IZDA"[iv] reports that according to information of a [CS branch] of the "IGM"[iv] (2) groups unrecovered

In ITALY: Also Italian workers are returning from GERMANY.

2. "ZOR"[v] reports that the "IZDA" has received from its [CS branch] in SICILY[iv] two confidential reports on 3 groups unrecovered. One of them from 30 April says that GERMANY is inclined to side with the Allies but "AFA"[v] takes a more moderate position proposing to give [to MIELOUKOVSKI] and the URBANS to the USSR and eastern FRANCE to POLAND

(2) groups unrecovered

Notes and the chances for

(16) groups unrecovered

"IZDA" from

[34 groups unrecoverable]

PLATO[1] [2]-[vii]

[13 groups unrecovered]

Diplomatic relations of (a) the USSR

No. 408

1943[viii]

Notes:

[a] Could alternatively be "via, by" etc. The purpose of this is uncertain.

Comments:


[IV] "IZDA" i.e. "AFA" or "MONITOR". Maurice MARCHUK, who became head of the Latin American Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS.


[I] IZDA: i.e. IZDA: Israel C. LAM in the Far Eastern Section of OSS.

[v] ZOR: LONDR.

[vi] ZOR: i.e. "MOA", Winston CHURCHILL.

[vii] PLATO[1]: Possibly a reference to Marcel PILGRIM, of this time a member of the Swiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs.

[viii] LONDR: Israel M. HALEN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.

31 October 1943

227

TOP SECRET

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
Ref: 927 - 928
16 June 1943

[Part I]

To the Director:

1. NEW YORK [GRU] has established friendly relations with T.A. MIESSEN, [in future "MIESSEN"] who has recently left BNN [11]; he is now working in the Institute of Pacific Relations and in the editorial office of MIESSEN’s periodical. MIESSEN evidently is well informed and has [30 agents] in government institutions.

2. ANSERH passed to MIESSEN, so that as his colleague in the editorial office he might get acquainted with them, copies of four documents:

(a) his own report for BNN with his views on working out a plan for shipments of American troops to China;

(b) a report by the Chinese embassy in WASHINGTON to the government in China about the situation and means of trade between the Japanese in the occupied territories and Chinese industrialists in free China [30 territory [30]];

(c) a brief BNN report of April 1943 on a general evaluation of the forces of the allies on the Soviet-German front and the prospects of the German summer offensive;

(d) a report by the American consul in VIENNA on the economic and political situation in the VIENNA area.

The reports are in translated form. We will pass on valuable points [10 by telegraph].

3. A check on ANSERH’s personal connections will be undertaken on the spot. At the same time make use of the Centre’s opportunities for checking.

[Part II]

Concerning NOEL [GRU] [111];

(a) No transactions were arranged. A few days ago NOEL [GRU] [11] met BNN [30]. The latter [30] groups uncovered.

[30 groups uncovered]

[13 groups uncovered]

To ask NOEL [30] to replace JACK is useless since he considers him the best of the possible candidates.

(b) NOEL and JACK have put forward one person to set up a group of sources in KREMILIN. COX and [30] groups uncovered to use this person on pay by the month (100 American dollars). My instructions to him were: "having received JACK’s propoae, to give his views on the use and pay of the person for forwarding to the Centre. Now COX is asking the Centre to [30] agree to the use and pay of the [30] person for three months to check his [30] possibilities. This person is a former member of one of the [30] committees of the KREMILIN, a woman, named A. GURIN. I think payment for three months should be

1.
allowed, at the same time insisting on his being directed personally by OSS [(6 groups uncovered)].
6. BENSKE[(vii)] has been detained by the school for several days to continue his training. He will return about the 31st June[(c)].
7. Reference your No. 940(b) [a]. The instruction to cease [US correspondence] with the [US city] [(3 groups uncovered)] [(5 groups uncovered)] only on 29th Apr has been put into effect [this was permitted by you in May 1949, telegram No. 9466 (41)]. As soon as possible with [2 groups uncovered] in their name.
8. The ship's departure is being held up until 30th June. MOLER[(a)] will be put on board on 31st or 2nd June.

Sd. 158
MOLOVER[(Molotov)[a]]

T.N.: [a] See New York to Moscow #69 of 24 June 1949, paragraph 1, which corrects this statement.
[b] Inserted by the translator. The "his" in the Russian is to be explained by the fact that the verb used for "person" - GLEBOVSK - is masculine.
[c] A date between 10th and 22nd June.
[a] Not available.

Comments:
[1] MARGEL: Joseph Molotov MARRIN.
[x] MOL: Unidentified, probably a city. (possibly NYC)
[viii] BENSKE: Thomas BENSKE.
[a] MOL: Unidentified.
[a] MOLER: Pavel P. KIRILLOV, GHI Resident in NEW YORK.

15 April 1948

TOP SECRET TRINE VENONA

230

FROM: NEW YORK
TO: MOSCOW
Rq. 938

17 June 1943

To the Director.

1. I am transmitting the main points of a report of HRA(4) (compiled in April) reviewing the evaluation of the American and British Intelligence Services of the forces in the Soviet-German Front in 1943 (the report was given by INTELSER[ALIE][1] from AMERIR[ACUS][11]).

1. The main conclusion in the [OF report]

[Or groups unrecognizable]

2. The evaluation of the British Intelligence Service:

The ground and air forces of the USSR considerably exceed the German. The USSR's production of tanks and aircraft exceeds by far the German. The economic and possibly the military potential of the USSR have not reached their peak, but the German is on the decline. On the Front by March there were 158 Soviet divisions, German (in the equivalent) 100-110, not considering Romania and others. Aircraft correspondingly 4,000-4,500 and 1,500.

3. [The evaluation][a] of the American [Intelligence Service][a]:

"It is inadequately defined: all the German losses on the front will be replaced by summer by [9 1 June of this year] 30-60 new divisions will be formed and trained. The aim of the German in 1943 is as before - the destruction of the Red Army in offensive operations."

4. The RNW's own conclusions:

a) British Intelligence grossly exaggerates the Russian forces and underestimates the German forces, but the Americans do the opposite.

b) A full-scale offensive by the Germans is beyond the limits of their possibilities. At the same time the economy of the USSR is so strained that the armed forces cannot be, from the point of view of ability to conduct operations, at the 1942 level for more than a year.

c) In the summer the Russians will have considerable superiority on the ground and undisputed mastery in the air.

d) The superiority of the Germans is in transport both in the rear and along the front for regrouping.

v) If by the summer Germany can replace all her losses and there will be no risk in weakening her garrison in Europe, she can launch an offensive on a scale almost equal to that of 1942. The German General probably would not consider advantageous a transition to defense on all fronts. Their main task is to [9 therefore] be the destruction of the armed strength of the USSR.

TOP SECRET TRINE VENONA

231
2) The ability of the Russian to withstand for a long time the impact

[? groups unskewable]

Notes: [a] Inserted by translator.

Comments:
[111] ARNOLD: Thomas Arthur ARNOLD.

15 April 1968

TOP-SECRET-TRINE-VENONA

232
New York 1132-3 to Moscow, 13 July 1943.

VENONA

TOP SECRET

From: New York
To: Moscow
Nos: 1132, 1133
13th July 1943

We are planning to use Vladimir Alexandrovich POGOR (formerly "PLATONIVICH") born in Leningrad no earlier than 1927. Until 1935 he lived in Germany. From 1925 to 1941 he lived in France. In October 1935 he was called into the French army as an officer-candidate because of [C5] bismarck/Kerzner/1931 of military aviation] and in August 1941 was demobilized. In the [GROUNDBREAKER] [1921] since May 1941. [3 groups unrecovered]

[Part 1]

(Continued overleaf)
14. (Continued)

**VENONA**

Top-Secret

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

PART II

A secretary at "GANDA" (2 groups unrecovered) [O] has a sister - Veneda (O) (I) and is being redeployed by OC [I] in connection with "PLAN 94".

[Redacted] [54 groups unrecovered]

There is a file director.

[Redacted] [57 groups unrecovered]

I. He is characterized by "KUNDEN" [I] and other [7 groups unrecovered]

[Redacted] [of 27/3/1957]

[Redacted]

234

14. (Continued)
VENONA

TOP-SECRET

by GENROG

[33 groups unrecoverable]

but in the interests of our business we will withdraw.

Please check FLAT and retain his use as a proficient [STAGER] and a source of leads [NAYONKE].

[11 groups unrecoverable]

No. 652

Footnotes:
[111] Inserted by translator.
[15] ...: The preceding gap is the right length for this to be the end of "SHERIDAN PARANOID".
[1511] GENROG : An "GROUP" unidentified covering, also occurs in NEW YORK 396, 583 of 8th June 1943 and 853 of 16th June, 1944; 7th possibly (see no.) in 1932 of 21st November 1943.
[1511] Klinger : Ellen POGH, also Halee NASH-POGER, wife of Vladimir Alexandrovitch POGH.

VENONA

TOP-SECRET

(22/2/1947)
14. (Continued)

VENONA
TOP SECRET

4.


[xii] KALISTAT : i.e. "KALISTRATUS"; Aleksandr
Zenonovich Yekhine, clerk in the
Soviet Consulate, NEW YORK (1941-1946).

[xiii] LUKA : Pavel Klaren, Soviet Vice-Consul in
NEW YORK.

VENONA
TOP SECRET

236

14. (Continued)

TOP SECRET TRINE VENONA

FROM: NEW YORK
TO: MOSCOW
No. 1325

11 August 1943

To the Director.

[69 groups unrecoverable]

Forehead [a], house 14 and postman SANNEMANN, hung on the [a] of the Lincoln Brigade.[b] There held the post of aide-de-camp to the commander of the 13th division, then staff officer in the Republic Army as [CS Interpreter] in the line [a group unrecoverable] at [CS advisors]. Returned to the U.S.A. in [CS November] 1943. Up to 1 August 1943 worked in various explosives factories, last post assistant director of the T.B.T. Factory in WILKESBARRE, Pennsylvania. Has now accepted an invitation to the post of CS production safety [b] CS inspector] attached to the Explosives Division (permitted) of the War Department (the division is in CHELSEA). PHELPS[c] evidently has already had a conversation with him as he has passed on material received from him on the production of an explosive called pentolite (a mixture of TNT and penta-erythritol-tetra-nitrate) which is used for shells, bombs, and torpedoes. He will issue instructions. The question of the means of liaison [CS can] be decided later. [ii]

2. KRONM[ill] just did not turn up for the first meeting.

3. HAMIDEZSI[manic] [iv] [a group unrecoverable] a two weeks' vacation.

No. 212

MD......[iv][v]

T.N.: [a] These are street names. The first word of the first name is not recoverable.

[b] SANNEMANN: This can also mean "security".

[c] The remaining letters of the signature are unrecoverable.

Commands:

[i] FIELD: Not identified.

[ii] The information contained in this paragraph relates to Daniel Abraham DAFNY.

[iii] KRONM: Not identified.

[iv] HAMIDEZSI: Joseph Mark BERKSTEIN.

[v] Almost certainly NOV '43 - Pavel P. NEZHOLOV, OSN Resident in NEW YORK.

TOP SECRET TRINE VENONA

15 April 1966

237

New York [GRU] 1325 to Moscow, 11 August 1943. GRU espionage

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BRIDE

TOP-SECRET

S/L

Ref. No.: 3/REP/9139 (at 10/6/1959)
Issd: 13/7/1960
Copy No.: 20 (ff)

BRIDE

TO: WASHINGTON

From: MOSCOW

No. 1969

To: [Name No. 12][1]


Since 26th July he has been working at the R.O.C. Laboratory, ZIMMER, BALTIC. It has a staff of 20 engineers. They are developing two projects by contract with the Army Signal Corps. These are to be ready by October - November 1963. Both projects are basically for the improvement of radar and its use in radio navigation for blind bombing (but is now a high altitude and a giant [2 groups uncovered]) without visual bearings and without optical sights. It is subject to be fitted on V-1995 Transporter. GEMBE has been entrusted with drawing up instructions and a manual for the use of this apparatus. There is an opportunity of collaborating with other engineers. In an expletive note CARTER mentioned the advantages of the new system over the British: it is not subject to Interference and has greater accuracy.

CARTER mentions his contacts with four engineers who are working on important RAF establishments. For checking purposes he has told the MESSINGCR, [NAME] [12] about the last three of them. All are Germans.

Philip [REDacted], aged 26, mechanical engineer, lives at 26/56, is Russian (party member). At present working in a military establishment (we will let you have the case later).

[Continued overseas]

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16. (Continued)

[Handwritten text with redacted content]

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240

16. (Continued)

DRUG

TOP SECRET

From: Washington
To: Moscow
Date: 14 Aug. 43

The "KIROV" arriving in BAY BRIDGES on 13th August. [9] The formalities with the crew and being on 14th August and aboard those I will report later.

SALLY [241] is feeling all right. On 15th August she [9] will come under the control of [1] was unconditionally.

Note: [a] Very probably a mistake.
[241] Name No. 31: Unidentified.

Distribution

Washington [Naval-GRU] 1983 to Moscow, 14 August 1943. SALLY
18. Moscow 142 (Circular), 12 September 1943.

TO: CANBERRA
From: MOSCOW
No: 142[a]

12 September 1943

TOP-SECRET VENONA

Taipeh

1. A change in circumstances — and in particular the dissolution of the "BIG HOUSE (BOE)" ([1]) — necessitates a change in the method used by the workers of our residents to keep in touch with the leaders of the local FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN ([HENCHMAN]([ii]) organizations on intelligence matters.

2. Our workers, by continuing to meet the leaders of the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN, are exposing themselves to danger and are giving cause ([1] group unidentified) ([2] local authorities to suspect that the "BIG HOUSE" is still in existence.

3. We propose:

a) That personal contact with leaders of the local FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN organizations should cease and that FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN material should not be accepted for forwarding to the "BIG HOUSE."

b) That meetings of our workers may take place only with special reliable undercover [SANDSPRING/ VIEW] contacts of the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN ([3] organizations, who are not suspected by the [1] group unidentified) ([2] local authorities, exclusively about specific aspects of our intelligence work (acquiring [1] group unidentified) contacts, leads [STAGING], rechecking of those who are being cultivated, etc.). For each meeting it is necessary to obtain our consent.

[1] group unidentified
[2] group missing

representative of the Soviet Union.

No. 4048 VICTOR([iii])

Notes: [a] This message is known to have been sent also to NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO and OTAYA.

[2] The unidentified group is the same in both cases.

Com BASE:

[1] "BIG HOUSE": The COMINTERN.


17 August 1971

TOP-SECRET VENONA

243
19. San Francisco 441 to Moscow, 31 October 1943.

TOP-SECRET DINAR VENONA

From: SAN FRANCISCO
To: MOSCOW
No.: 441 31 October 1943

I confirm receipt of Code "075-B" [1] copy No. 27.
Code "POBEDA" [11] will be destroyed [2 groups unidentified]
after [36 such] code has been received in TTR [TTR][111].
282 CHARON [CHARON][iv]

Comments:
[1] KOD "075-B": The code designated [ ]and [ ]
under different system of pub-page
identification. The "P" stands for
BROVZINOT (Security), that is, "for
use by the NGRB."
[11] KOD "POBEDA": The code designated[ ] "POBEDA"
means "Victory."
[iv] CHARON: Grigori KHRJETE
20. Moscow 232-3 to all Residents, 2 December 1943.

TOP SECRET

Moscow

DATE: 16 August 1971

VYENA

Message

From: PETROV
To: All Residents

No: 232-3

2 December 1943

[Part I] Circular(s).

Once again we direct your attention to the insufficient secrecy in the work of the leaders and operational workers of the residency. Some operational workers are being initiated into affairs of the residency which have no relation to the work which they are carrying out. Of course this is the result of talkativeness and the unavoidable question of paper trail which are maintained among our workers. It is necessary to all [6 groups uncovered] but each individual operational worker should know on the general work of the residency only what is necessary in order to carry out the work on his own assignment. In the premises of the embassy, legation, consulate (in the offices and work rooms of the residents) and in the private apartments, probably fitted with special [1 group unidentified], discussions are held conducted on operational questions. There have been cases of setting up in the work room a conference of all the workers of the residency for a collective discussion of instructions of the (US center). It is categorically forbidden during instruction and generally in discussion, particularly within the premises, to use the real names of workers and operators [STARKER], names of cities and countries, officials and other objectives. All this should be encoded.

[Part II] [1 group uncovered] considering the cases cited above it is recommended instead of conversations aloud to exchange notes, which immediately after such a "secret conversation" [1 group unidentified] are destroyed. Our workers must not at work and in private life [4 groups uncovered] from other [1 group unidentified] apparatus and [1 group uncovered] that it will inevitably lead to disclosure. [1 group uncovered] other [1 group unidentified] discussion is prohibited about [4 groups uncovered].

[5 groups uncovered]

Violation of rules of secrecy we will take strict measures. [1 group unidentified] providing the necessary secrecy in our work to a considerable extent depends upon the leaders and the residency themselves. The residents should not share with their subordinates communications which they are not supposed to know for the work.

No. 477

Notes: (a) This message is known to have been sent also to MEXICO, MEXICO CITY, OTTAWA, SAN FRANCISCO and NEW YORK.

Comment: (1) PETROV: Unidentified Moscow signature.
San Francisco 510 to Moscow, 7 December 1943. Olga Khlopkova
22. Mexico City 158 to Moscow, 23 December 1943.

VENONA
TOP SECRET

USER
Ref. No.: JNRF/72942
Issued: 19/3/77
Copy No.: 301

LUKA'S CONTACTS; PLANS FOR SURGICAL OPERATION, ASK ANN HENRY (1943)

From: MEXICO CITY
To: MOSCOW
No.: 328
23 December 1943
To: PIRKEV[11],

Contact has been established by LUKA[11]. The SURGICAL OPERATION[111] is planned by the SOVIET[111] to take place in four days' time. At this stage (1 group unrecovered) by other means[11] is impossible. Without delay transfer 10,000 in "VAF/-"[11] notes[11] for urgent requirements. Telegraph your (1 group unrecovered). [2 groups unrecovered].

No. 38
[Continued overleaf]

VENONA
TOP SECRET

251

Mexico City 158 to Moscow, 23 December 1943. Assault to free Mercader
22. (Continued)

Footnotes: [i] FERKOV: LavrentiI Pavlovich BERIA.

[ii] LUNA: Pavel Panteleevich KAZENKO, 2nd Secretary, Soviet Embassy, MEXICO CITY, from 23 November 1943 to 24 May 1944; served previously and subsequently in the USA.

[iii] SURGICAL OPERATION: coverwords associated with the coverword "ESPADAN", i.e. "prison". They appear to denote a release from prison and those affecting it: relating here to the attempt to secure the release of VENONA's shabakad (cfr. MEXICO CITY's Nov. 35 of 15 January 1944 (unpublished) and 193, 194 of 18 March 1944 (5/08/77/20)).

[iiv] or "with other funds [SHERSIVAJ]."

[v] KAPITAN's money: Presumably U.S. dollars; "KAPITAN", i.e. "CAPTAIN", is President Franklin Delano ROOSEVELT's covername on the NEW YORK scene - first occurrence on this line.

[vii] TAFOV: Lev Aleksandrovič TARKOV.
23. San Francisco 31 to Moscow, 17 January 1944.

TOPO SECRET

Ref. No.: 3/339/3137
Issued: 20/11/1940
Copy No.: 2

1. "BUTCHER" contacts and the dissemination of "AL/WM".

2. Robert Custer link with "JULLI" (?). (1944)

From: SAN FRANCISCO
To: MOSCOW

17 Jan. 44

"BUTCHER" reports [1 group uncovered] that the chemist
Leo LEVINE[111] (in future "AL/WM") will start giving us help.
[30 groups uncovered]

BUTCHER in [5 groups uncovered] through BUTCHER - AL/WM.

IMMY BUTCHER's contacts there are also some interesting targets in the
aviation plants [1 - group uncovered]: Los Angeles.

No. 16.

ONION/STRAW[111]

Since a direct cipher link has been set up with "JULLI" [iv] she sends
[1 group uncovered] since the secret expanded in telegraphic communications. I
gave JULLI [3 groups uncovered] the sum of 125 dollars.

No. 15

Comments:
[1] BUTCHER : [redacted]
[111] ONION/STRAW : [redacted]
[iv] JULLI : [redacted]

Distribution

253

On 5th February a meeting took place between "GUSH"[xvii] and "FUCHS'[xv]. Beforehand GUSH was given a detailed briefing by Mr. HESS. He received him pleasantly but was rather cautious at first. The group uncovered the disguised defence itself that HESS was aware of whom he was working with. [xvi] arrived in the CUNY[c뉴.eps] in September as a member of the ISLAMIC[ISLAMIC][xv] mission on ENGLISH[NENGER][xvii]. According to him the work on ENGLISH in the CUNY is being carried out under the direct control of the CUNY's army represented by General SUMMERS[SUMMERS][xvii] and SMITH[SMITH]: at the head of the group of ISLAMIC[ISLAMIC][xvii] is a Labour Member of Parliament, Ben SMITH[xvii].

[Continued overleaf]
The whole operation amounts to the working out of the process for the separation of isotopes of 
ENHIOUS. The work is proceeding in two directions:
the electron method developed by LASSINSHEHIVASHIK.

[79 groups unrecovered.]

Separation of isotopes by the combined method, using the diffusion method for preliminary and the electron method for final separation. The work
[86 groups unrecovered.]

3rd February, we shall report the results.

No. 92

APPENDIX

Footnotes:
[1] VENUS: Mt. Etna, F.P. FITIN.
[111] ORS: Ie. "ORS"; Harry GOLD.
[112] REIN/:
[1] LASSINSHEHIVASHIK.

ENHIOUS:
b) Uranium.

[111] General SCHENVEL: Gen. General George Barks SCHENVEL,
[112] REIN/:
War Department.
[113] VENUS: Henry Lewis SCHENVEL, Secretary of War.
[114] VENUS: On 31 March 1943, Minister Resident in
[115] VENUS: WASHINGTON for supply from 1943.
[116] VENUS: Professor Ernst Oskar LASSINSHEHIVASHIK.
[117] VENUS: Leonid Konstantinovich XVASHIK.
25. San Francisco 65 to Moscow, 10 February 1944.

San Francisco 65 to Moscow, 10 February 1944. Kuznetsova deserts
To all residents [REDacted].

From 1 May[,] instead of the method of setting up the indicator group [WHITEOUT: DATA OMITTED] in effect at the present time, for the determination [REDacted: identification] of the re-enciphering table [REDacted: DATA OMITTED] enter [REDacted: write (down)] in clear [REDacted: ECM] at the beginning of the cipher text the first group of the table (the first indicator group) with which the last of the pad [REDacted: EF MGERBOK] on the occasion[4] begins. The recipherment itself begins with the second group of the table. At the end of the cipher text, likewise in clear, the group following upon the last used group of the name [REDacted: ECM] (the second indicator group). If the recipherment ends with the last group of a table, enter the first group of the following table.

[REDacted: groups on a depth of 1, 2, groups omitted]

[REDacted: sent to Havana, México, New York, Ottawa, San Francisco (no others found).

[REDacted: units of USIS agent systems abroad.

[REDacted: table or additive key [REDacted], each such table being on one leaf [REDacted] of a pad [REDacted], whose table [REDacted] and leaf [REDacted] (often referred to in ECM as "page", since each leaf is printed on only one side) are up to a certain point interchangeable. (The table is what is written or printed on the leaf.) It is called "reciphering" because it is used in a partial deciphering process (the first leaf being encoded with the code book).]

That is: now this will be the first indicator group.

That is: the last sheet to be used on the respective occasion (?).

[REDacted: key.

TOP SECRET ACORN

TOP SECRET ACORN

259

26. Moscow [unnumbered], 25 April 1944. Keypad indicator change
27. New York 588 to Moscow, 29 April 1944.

TOP SECRET

UNSK

Ref. No.: 3/985/1510 (f/1/1946)

Issued: 16/10/1948

Copy No.: 1

27th SESSION

1. KNOX, FRUS, ROSES, VD, PRIBINCHER, MAKIN, MT and MES
2. KRAMER, YERLO, SHIN, GLASS, FISHERMAN ETC. GROUP OF VENLO

From: NEW YORK

To: MOSCOW

No.: 588

29th April 1944

On 27th April UNITE[1] reported as follows:

"After STUX[2](iii) death, ROSES[3](iii)

[15 groups unrecovered]

on ROSES's instructions, SVUK

[5 groups unrecovered].

FRE[4](iv) used to meet R.(v) before meeting me. In future if R. permits my meeting with FRE [4 groups unrecovered] R.[vi] even SVUK used not to meet P.[vii] once often than once in six months."

Possibly we are making this up and exaggerating. At least [3 groups unrecovered] enthusiastic control of [a] the FRUS.TURK[7] and express[8] an unreasonable [REVOLUTION] fear [of that] so will contact them direct. It is essential that either MACIN[9](vii) or I should see R. and come to an agreement that the Malin group and UNITE[10]

[15 groups unrecovered]

I recommended [5 groups unrecovered]

[15 groups unrecovered]

[Continued overseas]

DISTRIBUTION:

VENDURA

TOP SECRET

VENLO

261

New York 588 to Moscow, 29 April 1944. Perlo group
27. (Continued)

UNIDENTA talked with ANU and PHILO. They told her that this group was neglected and that nobody was interested in them. KRABA is the leader of the group. All are good responsible people in CANTNER[687806][(46)].

[20 groups uncovered]

AMT and PHILO

[29 groups uncovered]

NEIGHBOURS[687806][(58)]. For more than a year UNIDENT and I tried to get in touch with PHILO and ANU. For some reason or other Rubin did not come to the meeting and has just decided to put U.[687806] in touch with the whole group. If we work with this group it will be necessary to remove her and the group uncovered. Recently I met PHILO by chance in REBWA's[(66)] flat.

For your information: I have never met Rubin.

[7 groups uncovered]

No. 372

[687806][687806]

Notes:
[a] Literally "full monopoly over".
[b] Or "express". The group represents either 3rd person singular or 3rd plural.
[c] If it is assumed that a conjunction or punctuation has been omitted after "others", the passage could be interpreted as: "...in the group there are 7 or 8 million counternists".

Comments:
[i] BITHAN: i.e., "CLEVER GIRL"; Elizabeth BENTLEY.
[ii] ZONE: i.e., "ZONE"; Jacob GOSS, who died in November 1945.
[iii] KRAKA: i.e., "KRAKA"; Karl BAUER.
[iv] VIL: Cyrillic transliteration of English word "VIL"; Nathan GREGORY HEINEMAN.

3/SEP/119

TOP-SECRET

262

27. (Continued)
28. New York 598-9 to Moscow, 2 May 1944.

[Document text redacted]

265

New York 598-9 to Moscow, 2 May 1944. CPUSA political analysis
elections 85% of the Polish vote was given to the Democratic party, in comparison to the general figure of 65%. The British undoubtedly will support ROOSEVELT.

[7 groups unrecoverable]

will not waver. The Italian Social-Democrats together with former Fascists in every way possible are trying to turn the Italian-Americans against ROOSEVELT. An overwhelming majority of the deputies are for ROOSEVELT, even members of the mass organizations which are officially being led by supporters of MIRELLO. This majority will come out for ROOSEVELT. Various reactionary union groups [7 groups unrecoverable] ROOSEVELT, but they cannot attract to their side even all of those who follow them in [6 groups unrecoverable].

6. If the elections were to take place at the present time ROOSEVELT would probably receive an insignificant majority of the popular vote, but he would lose the election since the votes in his favor are strongly concentrated in the South, where the major share of votes is held by the majority of the voters in the South. For the last two months ROOSEVELT has been slowly gaining strength, but not with such speed as

[7 groups unrecoverable]

only a favorable course of the war and some bold efforts of ROOSEVELT toward a more clear-cut definition of his policy before the war could assure his re-election.

7. According to our speculations a second front will be launched during the next few weeks. A further delay would actually assure the accession to power of the Republicans.

8. As far as we have been able to learn, the financial and business circles completely share hopes for a quick [8 groups away]. The sharp fluctuations of the "New York Times" undoubtedly reflect the sentiments of some of the groups of these circles, but in our opinion not of the most decisive groups.

No. 510

KAZIV

Notes: [a] "non-commital" given in italics spell.

Comments:

[1] MIRELLO: i.e. "MELINO," Carl BRUGGER.


266

28. (Continued)
New York 601 to Moscow, 2 May 1944.

TOP-SECRET VENONA

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No: 601
2 May 1944

1. The commentator of station WMCA[1] Norman JAY, henceforth "ROTELJ[11]", has twice sent DEDEHIA[11] the text of his talks, which are consistently in a tone extremely friendly to us. We consider it advisable to profit by this circumstance and to invite BOMETJ [CN to a restaurant] and get acquainted in the line of cover [LINEYÀ PRIKRETTIA][x]. Telegraph what you think about ROTELJ.

2. LEONDJI[iv] and ALESEJI[v] can hand over the "NEIGHBOR[vi] SOESEJI" [vi] affairs to STEPAVI[vi]. Advise when LEONDJI is to leave for home and whether he can occupy himself with our line before his departure. LEONDJI [3 groups unrecovered]. Are we to turn that case over to STEPAV?

3. At a meeting in the PLANT[SAYO][viii] GRIN[ix] [vii handed KALISTRAVI[x] a letter in which[,] in the name of the editor of "NEW MARSE", Joe MOORE[BOSS], he asks for financial assistance to be given to the magazine, which is in a bad way. For the present [vii] [1 group unrecovered] the reason for no strange a step on GRIN's part or his appealing to KALISTRAVI in particular[.] Telegraph your opinion and instructions.

No. 320

MAJ[xi]

Note: [x] LINEYÀ PRIKRETTIA: That is to say that the meeting would be arranged with a member of the state security organization in his official capacity as a member of the Consulate-General.

Comments:
[1] Station WMCA is a NEW YORK, N.Y., broadcasting station.
[11] ROTELJ: i.e. PENNY, Norman JAY.
[11] DEDEHIA: i.e. GRANDPAPA, Evgenij Dmitrievich KISELEV, Soviet Consul-General at NEW YORK.
[x] LEONDJI: Alexej Nikolaevich PRIBOROV.
[v] ALESEJI: Anatoliy Antonovich YAKOVLEV.
[vi] SOESEJI: Member of another Soviet intelligence organization
[vii] STEPAVI: Possibly Pavel Ivanovich PESOSIN.
[viii] SAYO: The Soviet Consulate-General at NEW YORK, N.Y.
[ix] GRIN: If not a cover-name this may possibly refer to Abner GREEN, of the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born.
[x] KALISTRAVI: i.e. KOLISTRAVI, Aleksandr Ivanovich FOMIN.
[xi] MAJ: i.e. MAT, Pavel Ivanovich PESOSIN.

TOP-SECRET
16 March 1973

VENONA
New York 618 to Moscow, 4 May 1944.

Dear [REDACTED],

Ref. No.: 3/196/2/95
Instead: [REDACTED]
Copy No.: 36

ASSURANCE

ASSURANCE OF SIRLICH'S BUSINESS DEALINGS, ASSOCIATES JOSEPH WOLKOFF AND RUP, FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS (1944)

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No.: 618

4 May 1944

Your No. [REDACTED].

1. The money which [REDACTED] will receive will not be put into circulation by his personally. For the 5,000 he will get a loan from Joseph WOLKOFF [REDACTED], proprietor of the "KUHBO" [REDACTED], whose business provided SIRLICH with cover for six years. About two years ago the cover fell through because S. [REDACTED] does not own the firm and the KUHBO [REDACTED] required by law the registration of all stockholders, with an indication of their position in the firm. S. has very good personal relations with WOLKOFF and the latter will undoubtedly give him a cheque for the required sum. S. will deposit the cheque received for the necessary sum in his account in the bank and than after this will [REDACTED] the money from the bank. If it is insufficient, S. may be given some aid by a relative of his wife's who has a watch business.

[Continued on next page]
30. (Continued)

2. S. is organizing a firm(s) of his own, with the money available he is buying manufactured goods in the shape of watches and crocodile-skin articles: S5P[vii] is resisting him in this. Thus the money will be in goods. During the last two months S. has been making a detailed study of the market for watches and crocodile-skin articles and has ascertained that these things are much in vogue and in great demand. Therefore he is sure that in the next three months [if goods are unavailable] will be able to sell them: thus he will not only get back the money invested but will also make a profit of at least four thousand. He will repay his debt of 550P out of the money he saves and will carry on the business without anybody's aid. We repeat, the whole business has been worked out so that S. should be the full owner of the firm and he is not inviting any partners into this [if word]. In these conditions we can always organize any kind of business or transfer the firm to other hands. The business in its present form is safe and there should be no delay in organizing it since the watches will be arriving in the country [S5P[vii]] in the near future and must be bought up at once.

We await a reply as soon as possible.

No. 335

May

Footnotes:

[i] STRANG/Ab. i.e. "INFORMER"; Joseph KATZ.

[iii] Joseph WILSON: Joseph WILSON, as working partner, and Joseph KATZ (Footnote [i]), as owner and financier, operated the MEZOURI Dental Laboratory, VENOM, CONNOR, from 1935 to 1945. In 1944 WILSON was the sole proprietor.


[v] Firm: The "TEMPER Import Company", NEW YORK CITY, was formed by Joseph KATZ (Footnote [i]) in 1944 to import leather goods from South AMERICA. From 1 June 1944 KATZ employed his brother-in-law, Martin RYAN, previously a sales agent for watches. From May 1945 RYAN and other Communists owned and ran the firm.
30. (Continued)

Postnotes
Continued: [vi] DR.: Unidentified covername. Also occurs in RENEX's
Nos. 4730 of 26 July 1944 (2/86/755.2) and 1294

[vii] COUNTRY: The U.S.A.
[viii] RAF: i.e. "RAF": Stepan Zakharovich APRENTIN.
31. New York 625 to Moscow, 5 May 1944.

VENONA

Top Secret

From: New York
To: Moscow

New: 625

[Address line recovered]

In call (MONdragon) No. 2 we informed you that cover had been fixed up for
AKRAM[1]. We [1 groups unrecovered] directly to set up the cafeteria. For this
we gave him the authorized advance of 2,000. AKRAM's partner in the cafeteria,
a certain AFFER[2][1], had several relatives in the business and
AKRAM came to suspect that AFFER was stealing [of valuable] business from him.
[85 to improve control] and to expand the business, he decided to run the
cafeteria himself.

[41 groups unrecovered]

AFFER

[79 groups unrecovered]

DISTRIBUTION: [Continued overleaf]

3/30/1944 (of 12/5/1943)

Top Secret

Venona

273
31. (Continued)
New York 628 to Moscow, 5 May 1944. Recruitment of Al Sarant

32. New York 628 to Moscow, 5 May 1944.

VENONA

TOP-SECRET

Ref. No.:

Issued:

Copy No.:

ALFRED SARANT, A LEAD OF ANTENNA'S: PROPOSED RECRUITMENT, DETAILS (1944)

From: NEW YORK

To: MOSCOW

Rec. No.: 628

5 May 1944

Please carry out a check and mention the recruitment of Alfred SARANT[1], a lead of ANTENNA'S[11]. He is 35 years old, a Greek, an American citizen and lives in NEW YORK[111]. He completed the engineering course at Cooper Union in 1928. He worked for two years in the Signal Corps Laboratory and then was discharged for post union activity. He has been working for two years at Western Electric.

[56 groups unreadable]


No. 394

RAT[11]

5 May

Footnotes:

[1] Alfred SARANT: Alfred Sarantakis SARANT. Later probably other covername "SARANT/PARTAN" (ie "SOEY"/"SOEY/P" or "SARAN/P"") or covername "SARAN/P" (ie "SOEY/P").


[111] YN: NEW YORK CITY.


[111] RAT: Ie "RAT", Stepan Bamburovich APRETO.

VENONA

TOP-SECRET
33. New York 640 to Moscow, 6 May 1944.

New York 640 to Moscow, 6 May 1944. Infiltration of an organization
34. New York 655 to Moscow, 9 May 1944.

**BRIDE**

**TOP-SECRET**

From: New York
To: Moscow
No.: 655
9 May 1944

To the 8th Department,

P.L. [censored] advises:

1. According to the information of P.E., on 20/21 April, the BELGIAN [censored] gave up the plan of invading the Balkans, preferring to attack the Soviet [censored] group uncovered, and after that rapidly occupy Greece and Yugoslavia.

2. The BANK [censored] is inclined to approve the USSR's intention to remove industrial equipment from Germany to replace what was destroyed. The BANK considers it possible to exact reparations from Germany for 10 years. Only after this does it think it possible to allow Germany to begin the reconstruction of her own industry.

3. The [censored] in conversations with various highly placed representatives of the [censored] is indicating that Finland is unable to pay [censored] group uncovered, the USSR 120 million dollars in reparations.

4. The master of the COUNTRY HOUSE [censored] to a telegram to the BANK on 15th April advised that the Soviet Government does not want to participate financially in the talks about a loan. He considers [censored]...

[Continued overleaf]
34. (Continued)

[Page 280]

...more in the interest of the country [STRAW],[viii] to conclude an agreement about a loan now than to wait for the end of the war.

5. [K. ROB] [ix] has decided to present to [CAPTAIN] [x] a plan for a post-war trade agreement with us.

[? groups unrecoverable]

Comments: [i] FEL: possibly Nathan Gregory SELWYNETZ.
[ii] STRAW: the British.
[iii] ROB: the U.S. State Department.
[vii] STRAW: the U.S.,
[x] CAPTAIN: Franklin D. ROOSEVELT.
35. New York 687 to Moscow, 13 May 1944.

TOP-SECRET TRINE YENON

From: New York
To: Moscow
No: 687

13 May 1944

On HELGRAM[1][ii] instructions GOOD GIRL[1][iii] contacted through ANT[1][ii] a new group [65 in CASHAGA][1][iv] the group recently.

[5 groups unrecoverable]

GOOD GIRL's[1][v] impression: They are reliable FELLOW-COMMUNISTS[1][vi] politically high, they want the help of information. They said that they had never been arrested and no one had taken any interest in their potentialities.

[29 groups unrecoverable]

We will go to VEN[1][ix] every two weeks in turn.

FUNK [x] and [x] know FAL[1][xi]. We shall let you have identifying particulars later.

No. 373

MAYOR[1][xii]

Comments:

[1ii] ANT: Presumably a mistake for John Ant. See also NEW YORK to MOSCOW No. 540 of 29 April 1944. (2/19/44).
[1iv] CASHAGA: Washington, D.C.
[1x] TOY: Unidentified.
[1xii] UNIDENTIFIED: Possibly Charles Emer.

25 July, 1944

TOP-SECRET TRINE YENON

281

New York 687 to Moscow, 13 May 1944. Perlo group, again
36. New York 696-7 to Moscow, 16 May 1944.

[Part I] To the 8th Department.

In a conversation with SERGEJ[ti] IMPERIALIST[ll] said:

1. The General Staff of the COUNTRY[STRANA][ii] has no doubt of the success of the invasion of Europe. Last week CARRIAGE[KABO-GE][iv] assured EISENHOWER that there were sufficient trained reserves in the COUNTRY to ensure the reinforcement of the units taking part in the invasion. The EISEN[FW][iv] have stopped objecting to the invasion. LEN'¥[v] deputy (henceforth "ZAPLAN[vi]") told IMPERIALIST that KARA[N][vii] had agreed with the invasion plan proposed by the TOWNSEND [GUSOCHANE][ix]. In KARA[N]'s words KARA[N] told him: "For a long time I could not agree to an operation of this kind. However, now despite [3 groups unrecovered]

[42 groups unrecovered]

is sure that a break will ensue very soon. Concerning Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary the BAN[K][a] supposes that they will break with Germany only after the development of decisive operations on the Western and Eastern Fronts.

Only in passing did IMPERIALIST touch upon European questions, saying that it was desirable to have a solution of the Soviet-Polish problem before the invasion: "In return for a change in the Polish Cabinet, MOSCOW ought to renounce L'VOW.'

I. [xi] continues to consider the question of the participation of the USSR in the war against Japan a stumbling block in Soviet-American relations. The master of the DACHA[xii] told him that discussion of this question by the press was contrary to the interests of the COUNTRY. IMPERIALIST agrees with him but does not conceal that our future intentions in this matter are considered in responsible circles in the COUNTRY to be a deciding factor in the policy of the COUNTRY.

[Part II] According to IMPERIALIST's report the Americans by the end of 1944, hope to seize the Philippines, Formosa, Singapore and

[189 groups unrecovered]

[19 groups unrecovered]

No. 376

16 May

YEMO[!]A
Comments:

[i] SURJÉ: Vladimir Sergeevich Pravdin.


[iii] STRANA: The U.S.A.

[iv] TARASOV: Washington, D.C.

[v] GROSFITITSEVO: The British

[vi] LOW: i.e. Ben Habib, Cordell Hull.


[x] BANK: The U.S. State Department

[xi] I: i.e. IMPERIALIST.

[xii] DAČA: i.e. The COUNTRY HOUSE, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

[xiii] HAJ: i.e. HAY, Stepan Afifyan.

16 April 1974
New York 732 to Moscow, 20 May 1944.

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No: 732  20 May 1944

Data from "GOMEN"[1] about the "JET [POBEDA]", assembly 19 A of the WESTINGHOUSE firm. The assembly includes:

- [9 groups unrecovered]
- Increase in speed. It consists of a compressor-integral combustion chamber-turbine. The exhaust nozzle with the cross-section regulated by a central cone. Data of the assembly:
  - Weight dry - 960 pounds.
  - Full length - 100 inches.
  - Diameter of the installation - 19 inches.
  - Diameter of the compressor - 16 inches.
  - Compression ratio of the compressor - 2.75/1, number of stages of the compressor - 6.
  - Single-stage turbine.
  - Temperature of the gas in the turbine: 00 Fahrenheit, maximum [3 groups unrecovered]

- Nozzle: [67 groups unrecoverable]

- Works only when starting. The normal power of the thrust which is created by the assembly is equal to [3 groups unrecovered]

BRIDE

TOP-SECRET

From: MOSCOW
To: MEXICO CITY
No: 334
30 May 44

To REICH.[1]

Pursuant of the deposit in the "Kredite" business we demand a principal
[29 groups uncovered]
from the bank of blacklists is registered by the appropriate departments[REICH],
it is desirable in order to avoid complications that TOSCO should pay the
deposit from his own.[26 groups] of a. I am well aware that
[10 groups uncovered]
sent on from here. The Germans will not give a transit visa to MOSCOW if
it is not approved in TOSCO or [17 groups] for this the Mexican Embassy in
MEXICO must get the passport on instructions from the
CONSULAR[12]. We shall communicate with you after a reply about the above
possibilities has been received from MEXICO[12].

Krs. 2334
MEXICO[84]

Distribution

[Notes and Comments oversee]

287

BRIDE

TOP-SECRET
38. (Continued)
New York 786 to Moscow, 1 June 1944. Try to bribe Niles in White House
39. (Continued)

- 2 -

[Text continues from previous page]

[Notes and comments]

[Further text continues]

5/18/37/359

290

39. (Continued)
40. New York 824 to Moscow, 7 June 1944.

TOP SECRET COPY

New York-Moscow
1944
No. 824 (7 June)

To Victor (VIN);

Your no. S260:

1. I conversed with Chemist (KHER) about the MINKA [2]; according to his account the MINKA is associated with the reception of baby MINKA [2]. Relative to the dumping boat we are awaiting a released by Chemist. There have been no other cases (neg榄tive). I shall get together before long [with] R, and EIA separately?......From these details I shall telegraph the results.

According to Chemist's account right now AURIA [4] and GREGORI [5] are living together with civil students they made the acquaintance of on the steamer. Chemist here me to raise the question again of his wife's coming to Moscow as the MINKA is supposed to stay here at least a year more. For the time being the MINKA is waiting permission to send telegrams and parcels to [those] facilities by designated [6] addresses, in order that your people may intercept them and deliver them to the addressers. Telegrams.

2. By post I am sending a memorandum [or: report] [in] which I shall adopt the following conventions:

a. the Mink [MINKA];

MINKA, establisment [WEINK],

MINKA, editorial staff [out; office] [WEINK],

M. the husband [WEINK],

M. the neighbor [WEINK],

M. covers [WEINK],

TOP SECRET COPY

291
TOP SECRET - COPE

40. (Continued)

7 P.M.

Previously unread: the text. This translation, while justifiable (see below), is misleading, for it tends to suggest that the message was necessarily composed of just two people. Actually, the quantitative references may be no stronger than that of a toy, "The Men of Three" or "Thick Hair." A translation of the definition of ZHITIA in the Chulbea Almanac follows: English words for the various meanings are added in brackets:

ZHITIA

41. New York 847B-848 to Moscow, 15 June 1944.

New York 847B-848 to Moscow, 15 June 1944. Walter Lippman, again
not to recognize any such agreement. According to IMPELLETS's account
DUPLIN[.] LEE[.] [xxiv] and [xxv] his deputy [xxvii] are not in agreement with
DUPLIN and consider that their policy with the CENTRAL and the island
[xxvi] have already practically lost the confidence of the French while
nevertheless our prestige there is growing. [xxviii] affirms that the BSSG
[xxix] as well as military circles and the Navy, are in favor of
recognizing B. [xxvii]. Naval circles [xxviii] are not desiring the
annexation of BSSG or other bases but want a military alliance which will
offer the CENTRAL their use. They also have in mind bases in the Pacific.

2. According to [xxvii], the LEAGUE [xxvi] - contrary to its previous
intentions - is not at present supporting the annexation of BSSG although
it still regards the need of BSSG to BSSG as essential. The
question of the use of BSSG base in the RUNE and
[xxviii] would have paid and red they.

1. As regards the question [xxiv] as well as circles in the LEAGUE
think, according to [xxvii], that the BSSG should yield on the LEAGUE question in
return for a change in the composition of the BSSG Cabinet. I, in a conference with the
following observation: "The BSSG cannot remove to this subject the present one while
considering the case of the BSSG or other bases but want a military alliance which will
offer the CENTRAL their use. They also have in mind bases in the Pacific.

4. I, says that Will Street considers the forthcoming country conference to be
pointless. It is stated in financial circles that the currency of Europe occupied countries cannot be stabilized at present as the prospects for their economy in the future are not known; consequently stabilization
should be limited to the dollar-shilling bloc and the BSSG should not be
included in the conference as the risks are stable.

5. Considering European questions to be of secondary importance, I, constantly
advocated, as in previous discussions, that it was essential for the BSSG to
take part in the future in the destruction of BSSG in order to secure firm
friendship relations with the CENTRAL. As regards PULFIN, I, stated that the
breaking off of diplomatic relations would depend on the breaking off by the
BSSG of relations with BSSG. However in a conversation with PULFIN [xxvii],
BSSG affirmed that CHANVRE had finally rejected the proposal by BSSG BSSG
and BSSG [xxvii] to BSSG on the ground that this would be
inexpedient before the elections.

6. I, is well acquainted with BSSG [xxviii] one of PULFIN [xxvii]
[xxvii] group of official advisers. In [xxvii] stated that the position of PULFIN on the question of posture [xxvii] should be set out and
included I, statement in a speech of PULFIN in BSSG.

No. 453

1/09/124

TOP SECRET
41. (Continued)
New York 850 to Moscow, 15 June 1944. Report from Klaus Fuchs
42. (Continued)

T.N.: [a] This is a periods group possibly representing a government, or alternatively as group (the possibility being "finally") with "so" or "it" being understood immediately following.
[b] Only the latter part of the word has been recovered, but "diffusion" is probable from the context.

Comments: [1] VICTOR: probably Lt.-General F.W. FITZER.
[111] R.: 1st. GENY.
[1111] OTTO: Great Britain.
[11111] EINSTEIN: the Manhattan Engineer District.
[11x] KLAUS: WASHINGTON, D.C.
[12] KL: NOB resident in NEW YORK.

V.S. No.: 69-60 (Revision)
43. New York 1053 to Moscow, 26 July 1944.

To VIKTOR.[I]

In July ANTENNA.[II] was sent by the firm for ten days to work in CAMBRIDGE [KAMBRIDGE][III]. There he visited his school friend MAX ELITCHER,[A] who works in the Bureau of Standards as [B] of over five-inch caliber. He has access to extremely valuable materials on guns.

Five years ago MAX ELITCHER [MAKI E.] graduated from the Electro-Technical Department of the City College of NEW YORK. He has a Master of Science degree. Since finishing college he has been working at the Bureau of Standards. He is a Fellow COUNCILMAN [KONYULNAY][IV]. He entered the FELLOW COUNCILMAN's organization [KOMMUNALIST] after finishing his studies.

By ANTENNA he is characterized as a loyal, reliable, level-headed and able man. Married, his wife is a FELLOW COUNCILMAN [KOMMUNAL]. She is a psychologist by profession, she works at the War Department.

MAX ELITCHER is an excellent amateur photographer and has all the necessary equipment for taking photographs.

Please check ELITCHER and communicate your consent to his clearance [OFORGANIZE].

No. 554

26 July

Notes: [A] Given in Roman alphabet.
[B] Inserted by translator.

Comments:

[I] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. F. M. PETIN.
[II] ANTENNA: Julius KATZERINO.
[III] KAMBRIDGE: WASHINGTON, D. C.
[IV] KONYULNAY: Member of the Communist Party.
New York 1043 to Moscow, 25 July 1944.

44. New York 1043 to Moscow, 25 July 1944. FBI attempt to enter Consulate
represented the KOMIT[v].

BOKIS[v] has no special instructions on the circumstances in which he is to destroy the cipher without reference to anyone and when it is permissible to use weapons. Please give some guidance.

No. 561.

In view of his having enciphered and sent off a telegram in the last 10 minutes before he left the point he was at and to his having destroyed the originals GRIM[v] requests that its receipt be confirmed. The telegram was in three parts.

No. 563.

We have received letter number 4 addressed to GRIM[vii]. Please explain [3 groups uncovered] and whether to send it at the first opportunity or should we obtain from GRIM[vii] the immediate despatch of a courier.

No. 566

T.N. [a] Inserted by the translator.

Comments: [i] VINIT: Lt-General P.M. FIVIN.

[iii] SHIKH: Konstantin Alekseevich GAVRILOV, clerk at the Soviet Consulate-General in NEW YORK.

[iii] ZAVUH: the Soviet Consulate-General in NEW YORK.

[iv] DROSA: Evgenij Dmitrievich GLASNY, Soviet Consul-General in NEW YORK.

[v] KHAYA: the P.S.I.

[vii] BOKIS: the MGB cipher clerk in NEW YORK, possibly Aleksandr Pavlovich ZAPFONIN.

[vii] GRIM: probably Nikolaj Alekseevich GLASNY.

[viii] SVM: not identified.

[ix] NAL: probably Stepan Zakharovich KREHAN.

U.S. No.: 39-20,14 (Revision)

2/WBP/746

304

44. (Continued)
45. New York 1065 to Moscow, 28 July 1944.

BRIDE

TOP-SECRET

Ref No. 5/36/792

Issued: 5/3/1954

Copy No. 415

REFERENCES TO THE WORK OF "MAYOR"

Item 2

REISSUE

From: NEW YORK

To: MOSCOW

No. 1065

28 July 1944

To VINTIK[1]

[Your no.][a] 1026. Some weeks ago GOOD GIRL [prenom] [nom] told MAYOR [prenom] [nom] that MAIDEN [prenom] [nom] had apparently decided that MR must be withdrawn completely from our work in order to employ her fully in FELLOW-COUNTRYMAN [prenom] [nom] work. In MAYOR's opinion MR's nerves have been badly shaken and her health is poor, which renders her unsuitable for our work.

In MAYOR's opinion it is possible to get F. [prenom] [nom] to change his opinion about the advisability of this decision which MAYOR suspects was made under pressure from GOOD GIRL, [prenom] [nom] for some reason dislikes MR. MAYOR has informed [prenom] [nom] that if MR is really ill she will need rather to be withdrawn for a rest, but afterwards be used on liaison [prenom] [nom] a non-combatant, apartment etc. She has been working for a long time and has acquired considerable experience. MAYOR proposes that she should not be employed on active FELLOW-COUNTRYMAN [prenom] [nom] work. Telegram your opinion.

No. 596

[Continued overleaf]

Distribution

3/36/792

[2 Pages]

TOP-SECRET

BRIDE

305

New York 1065 to Moscow, 28 July 1944. Browder, Bentley, Mary Price
45. (Continued)

Please advise whether information on the country's [STRANO][ix] car production and car effort should be brought to the notice of the head neighbour [BORED][x] of course without indicating the source. You are aware of the danger of people possibly being sent to check our sources. Moreover, the lack of exchange of information with the Neighbour here does not contribute, in my view, to our friendly relations; nevertheless, I have not as yet established relations with him.

No. 597

T.N.: [a] Inserted by translator.

Comments: [i] VICTOR: probably Lt.-General P.R. PITTIN.
[ii] UNOFFICIAL: Elizabeyt BENTLEY.
[iii] UN: unidentified.
[iv] BULYOV: Zdenk BROUK.
[v] DIR: possibly Mary Yelena PRICE.
[vi] ZNOSGOMNNO: i.e. Communist Party.
[vii] R.: i.e. BULYOV.
[viii] V.: i.e. UNOFFICIAL.
[ix] STRANO: the U.S....
[x] BORODE: a member of the Soviet military intelligence organisation.
[xi] FAD: Pavel Ivanovich PEDOSIMOV.

S/N/1F/752

306

45. (Continued)
New York 1076 to Moscow, 29 July 1944.

VENONA
TOP-SECRET

Ref. No.: 4677/112 (of 3/4/46)
Issued: 2/8/47
Copy No.: 3/1

DECODED


From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No.: 2976 29 July 1944

To VENON[11],

Herewith the personal report:

1. AMER[14] controlled several probationers (MELIND[15]) of the Second Unit[11]. He ran these probationers on his own until after KIMBER[16] had left for home. He did not display any particular initiative.

(20 groups uncovered).

He has a poor knowledge of the language, he barely [group uncovered] the minimum. His mere cover (messenger-pilot) actually stopped him. In the conditions obtaining here, from doing so (VENONA[12]) the interceptors, with a different cover he could have acted with greater initiative and more effectively. Perhaps he is experiencing a feeling of disinfection since, according to what he says, he has not been able to show his worth for many years because of his cover and [2 groups uncovered] he stops opening doors on an equal footing with others who are capable of nothing else.

(Continued overleaf)

VENONA
TOP-SECRET

307
2. LEXN(?), before NAGS(?), was given access to three CICs and a number of proboscises of the Second Line. Not having operational experience, he was not able to run proboscises in accordance with the requirements. He is qualified in the "L" technique and successfully carried out a number of special tasks connected with contacts with defectives and dispatching people. He has carried out missions consisting of checking and observing workers. He was used for tailing immediately after NAGS’s arrival. He acquired experience in external surveillance (MINISTRY NAKHIMOV). He has virtually no knowledge of the language and has not studied it.

[17 groups recovered]

2. LEXN (?), before NAGS (?), was given access to three CICs and a number of proboscises of the Second Line. Not having operational experience, he was not able to run proboscises in accordance with the requirements. He is qualified in the "L" technique and successfully carried out a number of special tasks connected with contacts with defectives and dispatching people. He has carried out missions consisting of checking and observing workers. He was used for tailing immediately after NAGS’s arrival. He acquired experience in external surveillance (MINISTRY NAKHIMOV). He has virtually no knowledge of the language and has not studied it.

[17 groups recovered]

"L" technically he [2 groups unrecoverable] did not try to improve himself, was off-hand and even rude, conducted [2 groups unrecoverable] "independently". He was mentionly frank with his wife about matters concerning our work, which

[23 groups unrecoverable]
47. New York 1088-90 to Moscow, 30 July 1944.

TOP-SECRET-DINAR VENONA

OPSSUN (VSP)

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No: 1088-9090
Dated: 30 July 1944

[Part I] To SHEREN[1].

[8 groups unrecovered]

[8 groups unrecovered] VITALI's concern, displayed in the opinion

[12 groups unrecovered]

seven months. During this stay and work on the ship REDINA in
July of this year V.[iv] [8 groups recovered] from the captain of the
ship an illegal payment, [5 groups unrecovered] were not for the
duration of his stay [3 groups with friends in Canada] [4 groups
unrecovered] on shore. Unconcealed affairs with women have
created around V. an atmosphere of gossip and have undermined
his authority in the local apparatus and the agent network
[AGENTURA] connected with it. On his side this has caused
irritability, rudeness and strained relations with those around
him. All this has led to exceptional slackness in operational
work:

a) Contact with the ship agent network [AGENTURA] was
not established on all vessels. The guarding of the ships
and investigating of obvious cases of sabotage were not
carried out. V. did not know how many ships and which were in
port or were expected in PORTLAND or SEATTLE. The reports for
the agent network for the most part came in haphazardly.

[Part II]

b) V. did not control the work of the group leaders [3 groups
unrecovered] the liaison was not established with the ship
agent network.

c) We did not take steps to investigate the sabotage on the
ship KONILAS.

d) [7 groups unrecovered] did not take steps to ascertain the
circumstances of sabotage on the ship OBESSA.

e) The serious fact of the loss of the ship IL'ICIO he did not
relate [8 groups although this affair came to the knowledge of the
Center].

f) Contact with

[15 groups unrecovered]

port of VANCOUVER [2 groups unrecovered] the ship P. VINOGRADOV.

TOP-SECRET-DINAR VENONA

309

New York 1088-90 to Moscow, 30 July 1944. Problems with seamen
The resulting position of Y. is not serious; according to all information his absent-mindedness regarding cover and his desire to leave PORTLAND for home or [10 groups unrecoverable] to recall from PORTLAND, although [15 groups unrecoverable] to replace [him] which could be [3 groups unrecoverable] work on the West Coast. In our opinion a suitable candidate is Victor Vasilyevich S. Since Y.'s conduct is a result of both of the prolonged absence of his family and the [3 groups unrecoverable].

(16 groups unrecoverable)

Russian agent network on shore and on Soviet ships. For the time being I have taken the following steps:

[Part III] At numerous meetings with Y. the way to fulfill the tasks set by you has been switched out. At the same time steps have been taken to release V. as much as possible from work connected with his cover by using as a roof [VKHNO] YUNKER who is his superior. The latter considers essential the control or reorganization of the method of work along the whole coast in our interests and the isolation of himself in our work with Y.

2. [11 groups unrecoverable]

IGOR'[v], VLADIMIR'[v], VOLODK, ALEKSEJ'[vii] and the probationers [STANISLAV] DICHNOV[vii] and ANTON [YAKOV][ix].

3. A preliminary investigation into the circumstances of the timing of the ship IL/ICh has been completed.

In LOS ANGELES I met PEER[x] whom I instructed on the reorganization of the work in BABYLON [VAVILON][xi] where he is finally going to the post of deputy ship repair engineer on the West Coast. On this day of the meeting PEER had no agent network in his charge. [3 groups unrecoverable]

No. 606

MAX[NAL][xii], AKIN[xi]

Indicate the shortcomings in my telegram.

DOKL[xiv]

Comments: [i] SEMEN: Unidentified cover-name.
[ii] VITALLY: Pavel Ivanovich KREIDOROV.
[iii] VOLODK: Probably Aleksandr Pavlovich BOVNEK.
[iiv] V. i.e. VITALLY.
[v] IGOR': Unidentified cover-name.
[vi] VLADIMIR': Nikolai Grigor'evich KREIN.
[vii] ALEKSEJ': Unidentified cover-name.
[viii] DICHTNOV: Unidentified cover-name.
[ix] ANTON: Unidentified cover-name.
[x] PEER: Aleksandr Petrovich DICHNOV.
47. (Continued)

[xi] BABYLON: San Francisco.
[xii] MAY: Stepan ARUSYAN.
[xiii] AKIN: Seraj Grigor'evich ISEK'YANU.
48. New York 1102-3 to Moscow, 2 August 1944.

BRIDE

TOP-SECRET

DATE: 2 August 1944

Ref. No.: 8/112/747 (of 27/8/1944)

Insert: 3/12/1951

Copy No.: 209

DECLASSIFIED

A QUESTION OF VISA FOR "THE FAIR" (1944)

From: NEW YORK

To: MOSCOW

No. 1102, 1103.

[Two-part message complete]

[Part 1] To VINTO,[1] and others, to be passed on the following:

"Sir, [name omitted] has asked [us][a] to pass on the following:

"The Fair [name omitted][2]

"[name omitted] is sending simultaneously a telegram relating to [name omitted] [name omitted]. [name omitted] [name omitted] that will [name omitted]. [name omitted][3]

[Note: group names redacted]

Filled in what was known to him, indicating that in general this was not important because when the Fair applied to the Embassy in [country][4] [name omitted], they would bring all the necessary information. We consider this information [redacted][5] and, most importantly, we also consider that the message about visas for the [name omitted] [name omitted][6] and [name omitted] [name omitted][7] should be made by the Fair from "[name omitted]" because it is known here that we do not allow foreigners into [country] on such business. It is necessary on the basis of [name omitted] to "call" on the [name omitted] [name omitted] to the Embassy of the [country] for vacation. [name omitted] with the request that they be sent to the Embassy of the [country][8] [name omitted] in [country][9]

DISTRIBUTION: [Continued overleaf]

3/12/47 (re-issuing)

BRIDE

TOP-SECRET

313

New York 1102-3 to Moscow, 2 August 1944. Fisher case
48. (Continued)

The letter will obviously ask the RASZ affiliates to say why they need to come to SOVA or to give all necessary particulars[6].

[5 groups uncovered]

Embassy of the COUNCIL in EKONOM immediately to telegraph variations[1 group uncovered].

Should complications arise the RASZ are to telegraph MIHON and you are to see that

... can be taken and fresh pressure brought to bear. According to MIHON's information there should be no complications.

4. For your information we advise you of the business of getting a visa for the COUNCIL was [5 groups uncovered]. To begin with MISHA[MISHA] refused to intervene in the case, explaining that he had only recently returned from one perhaps and recommended approaching Congressman MISHA[MISHA]. The latter did not [5 groups uncovered] but it was only that MIHON intervened. The affair was held up because of the party Congress and was actually settled in the last six weeks. All documents, telegrams and[1 group uncovered] money orders, the payment of the deposit was refused by MIHON to be controlled by the DENOM[DENOM]. The latter [5 groups uncovered] insisted and there is every chance of success[8].

[7 groups uncovered]

[8 groups uncovered]

[9 groups uncovered]

[10 groups uncovered]

[11 groups uncovered]

[12 groups uncovered]

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New York 1105-10 to Moscow, 2/3 August 1944.

VENONA TOP SECRET

[Redacted]

Ref. No: 3098/73 (of 3/6/45)
Issued: 36/5/1945
Copy No: 204

VENONA SERIES

INTELLIGENCE USER REPORTS "V."


e.g. "US V. FOR A CONFERENCE"

16.25/45

To: MOSCOW

Ref: 16/25-45

2/3 August 1944

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Of the Army [20 SENT]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Of the Allied [4 SENT]

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49. (Continued)
49. (Continued)
50. New York 1119-21 to Moscow, 4/5 August 1944.

BRIDE

TOP-SECRET

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY. NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE.

USER

Ref No: 3/319/2742

Issued: 8/10/1952

Copy No: Na

KOL'TSOV'S ACCOUNT OF A CONVERSATION WITH "JURIST".

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No.: 1119-21

[Three-part message complete]

[Part I] To VICTOR.

KOL'TSOV[1] advised, "The last group, I arrived in Yerevan [Tir] [11], Yerevan, and passed [some text]
and put in a conversation with "JURIST" [VHINS][1][r] on 6th July at his apartment. To my questions
JURIST replied as follows:

"1. [3 groups unrecovered] without attempting
   (3) groups unrecovered]
   [3 groups unrecovered]
   [3 groups unrecovered]
   [3 groups unrecovered] and so on, definitive decisions were not
   arrived at [3 groups possibly]"
   [3 groups unrecovered] extremely risky.

[Continued overleaf]
50. (Continued)

(b) [10 groups unrecovered]

5 to 10 years

[88 groups unrecovered]

formity of nations'. On the technique of control over Germany while reparations are
being paid there is for the time being no
definite opinion. JURIST thinks that a
definite amount of reparations should be
set in cased that this amount should be
subsequently reviewed and reduced if Germany
fulfills her obligations; if she does not,
Germany should be reoccupied.

[12 groups unrecovered]

JURIST's opinion the latter

[13 groups unrecovered]

with 【税金】 or 【特例】.

[Part II]

(a) The trade policy of the country 【税金】
[1 group unrecovered] which will be put into
effect by means of bilateral agreements with
individual states covering 5-3 years. There
will be no one set of conditions or removal
of tariff barriers.

(b) Loans. In the sphere the only concrete
thing that is being done is the preparation
of a credit for us of 10 million.

[13 groups unrecovered]

.......

The credit will be repaid by the
export of our raw materials to the C. S. R.
[3 groups unrecovered] caused by 【税金】
not being able to get conversations on this
business with 【特例】.

2. 【税金】 is being delayed for an indefinite period by
the talk place after the elections. On 26th instant
both are leaving for 【税金】 where
8 groups unrecovered] suppose that the
【税金】 will, if group unrecovered] wish to have the 【税金】 payments. The fact
[1 group unrecovered] is that the 【税金】's dollar balances have

[continues on next page]
[50 groups uncovered]
[25% use of amphibians]

4. The occurrence of the oil conferences
[5 groups uncovered, 51 groups uncovered]

[Part III]

5. The role
[56 groups uncovered]

there will be achieved a compromise agreement to exclude from the Polish Government the most hostile elements [5 groups uncovered] Committee of Liberation [51] the country
[51 groups uncovered]

[35 MIKOŁAJ DZIESIUK]

7. Finland has met the sympathy of the public in the country, therefore the restoration of the 10th Frontier will not arouse objections from the country.

8. As regards the Baltic Countries [PRELIMINARY] the country thinks that they are safe, but the restoration of the pre-war situation will not arouse any protest in the country.

9. JURISDICT is convinced that CAPTAIN will win the elections if [5 groups uncovered] not [5 groups uncovered] severe military dissatisfaction. JURISDICT's nomination is calculated to ensure the votes of the conservative wing of the party.

10. Concerns the technique of further work with us [56 JURISDICT] [5 groups uncovered] ready for any self-sacrifice; [5 groups uncovered] he himself does not think about his personal security, but a compromise [PRZYWIČ] would lead to a political scandal and [5 groups uncovered] of all supporters of the new course, [51 groups uncovered] therefore he would be very cautious. He agreed neither as to [5 groups uncovered] his work with us. [51 groups uncovered] that he should remain. JURISDICT was not suitable for this situation.

[continued on next page]
for a permanent meeting place[,] all his 
friends are fairly ample. Meetings could be 
held at their houses [or if arranged so] that 
one meeting would be on each every 1-2 months. 
He proposes occasional conversations lasting up 
to half an hour while driving to his apartment.

JUBIN has fixed the next meeting for the 
17th-19th August and arranged appropriate 
conditions for it. He returns to CANTERBURY 
[CARPENTER] about the 17th of August.

I leave for NEW YORK on the 9th of August 
and from there to SPERRY on the 12th of 
August. 

Telegraph the date of receipt of this 
telegram.

No. 62
M.Y. [n/a][xiii]

T.M.: [a] Or "had".
[b] Inserted by translator.
[c] RÔVËS NÄIS in the Russian. If correct it 
might be a way of transmitting "No Deal".
Comments: [i] Box 5/93/756 for another reference to 
ROD-TAYO.
[ii] NEW YORK, N.Y.
[iii] MASLIM: Vasiliy Mikhailovich ZUBILIN.
[iv] YODEST: Harry Dexter WHITE.
[v] ZEBNET: usually a cover-name for Lands-Less 
in this traffic.
[vii] XAFITON: Franklin Delano ROOSEVELT.
[ix] XNINX: MOSCOW.
[x] XIDON: LONDON.
[xi] XIFROV: Great Britain.
[xii] XLINGO: WASHINGTON, D.C.
[xiii] XVI: Pavel Ivanovich FEODOROV.
50. (Continued)

On Page 3 amend the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 5 to read:

"As regards the timings of further work with us, JULIET said that he was [6 weeks] for any self-assessment(s) he himself did not think about his personal security, but any compromise would lead to a political scandal and [6 weeks] of all supporters of the new course(s), therefore he would have to be very cautious. He asked whether he should [5 weeks] supervise his work with us. I [5 weeks] replied] that he should refrain. JULIET has no suitable apartment for a permanent meeting place(s) all his friends are family people. Meetings could be held at their houses in such a way that one meeting involved in each week. He proposes infrequent conversations lasting up to half an hour while driving in his automobile."
51. New York 1203 to Moscow, 23 August 1944.

To VICTOR,

To organise technical point "U" in TΩR [973][1] we have been compelled to set up 2 independent enterprises, as OBJEKT [OBJEKT][1] covers only a small part of the technical process of the manufacture of dies [BOILDE]. The basic part [4] never appeared [SOLNEN]. According to our data SΧΟΟΝΩ [BOILDE] in a devoted and reliable person. Please authorise the use of S. M. B. [S.] in the "U" line. We consider it essential to expand OBJEKT's enterprises by organizing a study [SΧΟΟΝΩ] workshop and transferring it to another part of the city. Suitable premises for this purpose have been selected. For the organisation of the two enterprises and for technical equipment 2500 dollars comprising 1500 for S. M. B. are required. Telegraph permission.

No. 675. [Continued overleaf]

Distribution

325.

New York 1203 to Moscow, 23 August 1944. Document forgery
- 8 -

8/295/12/65

I am awaiting an answer to No. 650(b).
MAY [MAJ][II]

T.N.: [v] GEBRIT: an inhabitant of GESSA.
[3] This is the second of two messages transmitted under external serial number 163 of 15 May 1965, in which AW asked for more information to assist in finding out about the group GRO/INN [8/295/12/65].

Comments: [1] TIR: NEW YORK, N.Y.
[III] I.e. GEBRIT.

W.B. No.: XV-66:3

326
New York 1251 to Moscow, 2 September 1944.

In accordance with our telegram no. 463[a] we are advising you of the new cover-names: Kavalerist - Ben[i]; Evroso - Armbr[i]; Klemm - Li[i]; Abram - Czpek[v]; Tulip - Batl[v]; Aida - Elz[vii], Tykoloy - [Cv Blos[viii], Tele - Sers[x]; Antenna - Leperek[x]; Grom - Tokey[i]; Eass - Mester[xii]; VD... - Met[xi]; Fugel - zip[i]; Osselet - Rust[v]; All those cover-names were selected [Cv by you] with a view to economy of means. Among the new cover-names introduced by you there are dissonant ones which we propose to replace as follows: Stella - Breltes[vx]; Sonal: B - Floy[vii]; Lewis - Richard[viii]; Floorb - Iea[x]; Shavus - Envtz[xi]; L group unrecognized - Zona[xii], Mangan - Karte[xi]; and on - shus[xiii]. All these cover-names are economical from the point of view of encoding. Please confirm. Continuation will follow later[b].

N: 790

W: 790

Notes: [a] NEW YORK's no. 744 of 25 May 1944. However, no. 744 has nothing to do with the subject of this message so must be an incorrect reference.
[b] See NEW YORK's no 1403 of 5 October 1944.

Comments:
- [ii] Kavalerist - Ben: i.e. Czapekman - Bink, Sergey Miko-
- [iii] Evroso - Armbr: i.e. Armbr - Aida, unidentified.
- [vi] Tulip - Batl: i.e. Tulip - Kante, Mark Srommke.
- [viii] Tykoloy - Blos: i.e. Osselet - Blos, unidentified. Blos
- [ix] is repeated as OE. There is no other occurrence of elsh
- [x] Vs - Sers: i.e. Rell - Sers. RELE has been tentative;
- [xi] ly identified as Mutation Sorell. However, the only other reference to Sorell is in NEW YORK's no. 59 of 11
- [xii] January 1845 and would not appear to refer to Sorell.
- [xiv] Grom - Tokey: i.e. Grom - Tokey, William Perl (origin-
- [xv] ally Mettesfeld).
Comments (cont'd.)
[xii] SHOT - MESR: i.e. SCOUT - MESRE, probably either Joel Mazer or Alfred Sargent.
[xiv] VOZEL - PERS: i.e. VOZEL - PERSIAN, unidentified.
[xv] KORESIT - ROUT: i.e. KORESIT - GROWTH, unidentified.
[xvi] STRESS - KINFA: Unidentified.
[xvii] DONALD - PILOT: i.e. DONALD - PILOT, William Ludwig
[xviii] ZOER - RICHARD: i.e. LAWYER - RICHARD, Harry Dexter White.
[xix] DOUGLAS - IRE: i.e. DOUGLAS - E, Joseph Fats.
[xx] SHREW - KIWA: i.e. SHERWOOD - PRINCE, Lawrence Zorob.
[xxi] ...Z - ZOO: i.e. ZOOG, unidentified.
[xxii] RICARDO - AZT: i.e. RICKER - BERG, unidentified.
[xxiii] SEND'RG - BEAR: i.e. SEND OR - BERG, unidentified.
[xxiv] MAI: i.e. MAI, Stephan Arens.

20 May 1975

328
New York 1271-4 to Moscow, 7 September 1944.

53. New York 1271-4 to Moscow, 7 September 1944. HOMER, again
53. (Continued)

53:

53. (Continued)
53. (Continued)

VENONA

TOP SECRET

[Redacted]

1. Should GERMANY be divided into separate states?
2. Should GERMANY be divided into separate states?
3. Should GERMANY be divided into separate states?
4. Should the USSR be internationalized?

No. 79
6 September

TOP SECRET

VENONA

331

53. (Continued)
53. (Continued)
New York 1313 to Moscow, 13 September 1944.

TOP SECRET

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No.: 1313

13 Sept 1944

To VICTOR[1].

Your number 4247[a]. SERGEJ[11] has three times attempted to effect liaison with PANKAK [BLZ][11] in CANTARAS [KARANS][14] in the line of event[v] [8 but] each time PANKAK declined on the grounds of being busy with trips. THE [KAR][14] has carefully attempted to sound him, but I. [S.][v] did not react. P. occupies a very prominent position in the journalistic world and has vast connections. To determine precisely his relations to us we will commission ROSH [AX0][11] to make a check.

No.735.

Your number 8336[a], NICK [BLZ][11] has been summoned to THE [TRO][11] and a meeting has been arranged

[60 groups unrecoverable]

character [KARANTIESTA] given to ROSH[a] by JUK[a]. However, BASIS [BAS][11] said that he did not intend to embark on a [of [RAS][11]] business as there was no need. In time he and ROSH will get big commissions for the deal in CHILE. BASIS said that ROSH was behaving rather [of despasitively] with the companies who were interested in personal representation in Chile [and] if it had not been for BASIS's insistence they would have broken off business relations with ROSH. BASIS says that ROSH is not seen to get an appointment in Chile, preferring to remain in the country [KARAS][11]. In our work with ROSH allowances should be made for the difficulties which are encountered in carrying through affairs begun by others and without having required in good time exhaustive character [KARHANTIESTA] of probationers.

No.739

MAY [BAS][11]

T.N.:
[a] Not available.
[b] Or "is being".
[c] Or "is conspiring".
[d] A group with some such meaning as "to set up" appears to have been omitted at this point.

Comments:
[v] i.e., in SERGEJ's capacity as TASS representative

TOP SECRET

333
[vi] B.: i.e. BLIN.
[vii] BEND: possibly Bernard SCHUSTER (Communist Party name CHESTER).
[viii] BEND: Ando SABATINI. Compare 5/NNP/T166, in which
- on 6 Sept 1944 MAJ said: "In DOUGLAS's opinion
- he should not continue to work in the West"  
- (apparently referring to BEND). SABATINI is known
to have acted as "go-between" on behalf of Grigori
KREEZSTEIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO.
[ix] TKN: NEW YORK, N.Y.
[x] ROB: Robert Owen MINKER.
[xi] ERE: Joseph KATZ.
[xii] BAS: Michael BURD (originally WEISSBURG).
[xiii] SUANA: The United States of America.
[xiv] MAJ: Pavel Ivanovich PEDOSINOV.
New York 1314 to Moscow, 14 September 1944. William Perl, again
56. New York 1325-6 to Moscow, 15 September 1944.

TOP SECRET

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No. 1325,1326

15 September 1944

To VERTEN[1].

According to advice of [Redacted] (red) has been compiled by the Security Division of [Redacted].

The list contains 8 surmises of persons who are supplying information to the Russians. One of them sounds like [Redacted].

The list is divided into two categories: 1. Open

FELLOW COUNTRYMEN [Redacted] [Redacted] (among them "[Redacted]"

2. Sympathizers, left-wing liberals etc. (among them "[Redacted]"

[Redacted]. [Redacted] is trying to get the list [Redacted].

PILOT[11] [Redacted] (groups unrecovered) plan dated 22 August for the transfer of the COUNTRY's [Redacted] air force from Europe

[Redacted] groups unrecovered]

groups of B-34s: 10 will be sent to China-Burma-India,

[18 groups unrecovered]

groups of B-25s: [6 groups unrecovered]

[3 groups of B-17s: 11 [5 groups unrecovered]

4 to the northern sector of the Pacific with a reserve of 100 percent, 6 to the southwestern part with a reserve of 100 percent

[39 groups unrecoverable]

A-26, 1 to the southwestern sector of the Pacific, 3 are remaining in Europe.

4. 3 groups of B-25s: 1 to the northern sector of the Pacific, 2 to the central.

5. 3 groups of P-40s: [1 group unrecovered: 2 to the COUNTRY

1 group unrecovered: 1 to the central sector of the Pacific.

6. 1 group [8 groups unrecovered]

7. 23 groups of P-47s: the crew of 6 groups to the COUNTRY

as strategic reserves, the material part is remaining in Europe as a reserve, 7 to the central sector of the Pacific, 10 are remaining in Europe.

8. 17 groups of P-51s: 4 to the COUNTRY, 2 to China India Burma with a reserve of 100 percent, 13 to the central sector of the Pacific.

9. 6 groups of P-52s: 1 to the COUNTRY, 2 to China India Burma with a reserve of 50 percent, 3 to the central Pacific.

TOP SECRET

337
56. (Continued)

TOP SECRET DAUNT DRUG

10. 17 groups of military transports C-47s: 3 to the country,
    1 to China, India, Burma with a reserve of 25 percent, 10 1/2 to
    the central Pacific, 2 1/2 in Europe.
11. [5 groups unrecovered]
    3 to the central Pacific, 4 in Europe.
    [42 groups unrecovered]
except the A-26 and
    [32 groups unrecoverable]
and 391 medium bombers 326, 373 and 396, Yu: fighters 19
    185, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200;
    transports 813, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108.
    No.741

T.N. [a] The list is transmitted in New York's No.1354 of
    22 September 1948.
Comments:
   [111] EOKI: Donald WHEELER
   [111] EOKI: Maurice NALPHIN
   [111] PILOTE: William Ludwig VILMANN
   [1111] COUNTRY: U.S.A.
   [11x] WAI: Stepan ARSHYAN

338
57. Moscow 954 to New York, 20 September 1944.

Moscow 954 to New York, 20 September 1944. "Reds" list
58. New York 1340 to Moscow, 21 September 1944.

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No: L340

21 September 1944

TO VENONA[1].

Lately the development of new people [has been in progress]. LIBERAL[2] recommended the wife of his wife's brother, RUTH GREENGLASS, with a safe flat in view. She is 21 years old, a TOMONEAN [TOMONEAN][3], a GYMNAST [GYMNAST][4] since 1942. She lives on STANTON [STANTON] street. LIBERAL and his wife recommend her as an intelligent and clever girl.

[15 groups unrecoverable]

[C3 Ruth] learned that her husband[v] was called up by the army but he was not sent to the front. He is a mechanical engineer and is now working at the ENORMOUS[5][vi] plant in SANTA FE, New Mexico.

[45 groups unrecoverable]

detain VIGOR[vii] who is working in a plant on ENORMOUS. He is a FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN][vii]. Yesterday he learned that they had dismissed him from his work. His active work in progressive organisations in the past was the cause of his dismissal.

In the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN line LIBERAL is in touch with CHESTER[ix]. They meet once a month for the payment of dues. CHESTER is interested in whether we are satisfied with the collaboration and whether there are not any misunderstandings. He does not inquire about specific items of work [NORREL][x].

As much as CHESTER knows about the role of LIBERAL's group we beg consent to ask C. through LIBERAL about leads from among people who are working on ENORMOUS and in other technical fields.

Your no. 4255[x]. On making further inquiries and checking on LARIN[x] we received from the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN through BHO[x] a character sketch which says that they do not entirely worth for him. They base this statement on the fact that in the Federation LARIN does not carry out all the orders received from the leadership. He is stubborn and self-willed. On the strength of this we have decided to refrain from approaching LARIN and intend to find another candidate in FAKT [FAKTE][x].

No 751
20 September

MAJ[xii]

341

New York 1340 to Moscow, 21 September 1944. Ruth Greenglass
58. (Continued)

Notes: [a] Not available.
Comments:

[11x] FIZHEL-MUTRA: Probably a Member of the Young Communist League.
[1y] i.e. David GREBLIN.
[1v1] VOLONG: Member of the Communist Party.
[1v11] ENGLAND: Member of the Communist Party.
[1x] CHESTER: Communist Party name of Bernard SCHUSTER.
[x] LUTES: Unidentified.
[x] ECHO: i.e. ECHO, Bernard SCHUSTER.
[x1] PARKY: Federation of Architects, Chemists, Engineers and Technicians. See also NEW YORK's message no. 911 of 27 June 1944.
[xii1] MAJ: i.e. MAV, Stepan ARSEYAN.

28 April 1975
59. New York 1388-9 to Moscow, 1 October 1944.

BRIDE

TOP-SECRET

[Redacted]

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Your telegram no. 492919. Answer:

ALBERG[1] has told me that his original proposal about the division [PRIVYCE] holds good and that in the near future he will send us a [CI special] note [on this subject]. In order to investigate the new situation by you, ALBERG has to think out a number of details which will take him some time yet.

[Note 1] On the question of the necessity of splitting ROBERTS[2] group into smaller units ALBERG gave the following answer:

[Note 2] [Redacted] [Note 3] [Note 4] and SOV[5]'s attempt to obtain answers to a number of questions of an international.

[Continued overhead]

Distribution

3/772/796

3 Pages
character produced an unfavourable impression on ROBERT. ROBERT was surprised at our decision to have Pressure to the aid of a special man for raising with [a group] questions on which ROBERT [is] important as leader of the group. In his own words, is saying, desirably, "No, I've decided to see (1) members of a group." [5 groups unrecovered]

In other words, this is step of ours [are] taken as a mark of insufficient confidence in his business abilities. It is true to have expressed regret as having received threats [intimato] [5 groups unrecovered]. In ROBERT's opinion also that ROBERT is jealous about [unrecovered]

[15 groups unrecovered]

not to agree to our measures calculated to "move" ROBERT. ALBERT is convinced that an attempt to "move" members of the group, however, will be refused [a group unrecovered]. Intending to ROBERT.

I [he] said that in that case [5 groups] should in the meantime have a chat with ROBERT about the possibility of breaking up the group into 3 or 3 sub-groups for greater secrecy and more effective protection of the work, leaving the overall direction in ROBERT's hands.

[Part II]

ALBERT [who] wanted to that for the time being the question can only be put in this form and that we will discuss it with ROBERT then occasion offers. At the same time he observed that his relations with ROBERT were very good and that the latter would connect to a meeting between ALBERT [dissipates] and any member of the group. Possible [in 31] ROBERT's meddlesome not to "reflect" anyone [10] BOUND'S [58%]? [full] education is making tragic fall.

3. Your points 3, 4, 5, and 7 I have passed on to ALBERT in detail.

5. ALBERT promised to write specially on your point 4. For the time being he told me the following:

ROBERT is not restricting himself to releasing material from the probations [unrecovered], but is giving them orders in coordination with ALBERT. The instruction not to impersonalize (7) the group's interest will be borne in mind (it is already being carried out)

PILOT [52] is bringing ROBERT's site (he is not married himself) into the processing [unrecovered] of materials.

This is not only in the know about her husband's work, but actively helps him in the processing.

There is no information about the KLINT [are] contact being finished. ROBERT is no longer interested in a favourable outcome than we are and is trying to keep

[continued overleaf]
BRIDE

59. (Continued)
59. (Continued)

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No: 1396

1 October 1967

REMARKS

Material about the conspirators (KLEINER) and the COMPETITORS
(HERBERT[1], [2] of the ISLAND[3], [4]). As it turns out, have to
be obtained through LSA[5] and so I am passing this task on to
VAR[6].

Notes: [a] This is the last paragraph of a long two-part message
on an entirely different subject. The message is addressed
to VENQ[7] and signed by NA[8].

Comments:
[1] KLEINER: members of a non-secret Intelligence Organization.
[4] VAR: ANDERSON Borjas's CBO[9], DC resident in WASHINGTON.

11 March 1970

VENQ[7]
NEW YORK 1410 to Moscow, 6 October 1944.

VENONA

TOP-SECRET

55

Ref. No. : 3/187/793 (of 4/7/53)
Issued 23.7.53
Copy No. : 5/6

RELATE

1. LENDO. PAYMENT TO ATOMAN FOR PUBLICATION OF BOOK
2. PROBLEM OF UNCHALLENGED ASSOCIATES: ENSO, DZ, ETA, NYLNDJ

(1944)

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No.: 1414
6 October 1944

To VENDO[

In LENDO's[11] time ATOMAN[11] was promised 1,000 dollars to pay for the publication of a book in Polish. 500 has been paid. ATOMAN is demanding the remaining 500. Do you sanction payment?

Sg. 807

Recently ENSO[10] has failed to carry out most of our tasks, pleading the unwillingness of the FELLOWCOMGRIA [ENS0][10] to co-operate. ENSO has been described to you as a worker occupying a responsible position in the FELLOWCOMGRIA organisation. In an interview with [22] he[11] quite a different picture came to light. ENSO is working with [33] in the question of our selecting another writer who occupies a more responsible

Cont'd overleaf
position to carry out our tasks, leaving L.[iv] the role of go-between.
He says that, because of the nature of his position among the
FELLOWSHIP, he cannot
[29 groups unrecognizable]
the selection of a replacement for KIT[vii], the search for a safe house,
the selection of candidates for planting in the COMA[viii] etc remains
undecided for the reasons indicated above. It recommends us to arrange
with MAJ[v] for a responsible worker to be assigned to us, one who
is capable of carrying out the necessary measures without seeking permission
from the authorities each time. If we do not do this, he will continue to
be unable, as he says, to cope with our tasks.

MAJ[v]
6 October

Footnotes:
[i] VENONA: Lt General P.H. Fitch.
[iii] ADAM: Boleslaw Remanski,
[iv] BOND/v: is "HEIR"; Bernard Scheider.
[vii] KIT: is "KIT" formerly "VENONA".
[viii] COMA: "CONFIDENTIAL" and "CRKLS".
[ix] MAJ: Joseph Rusk.
[x] MAJ: Only occurrence; presumably an
unidentified character.
[xxi] RELAD: is "HEIRMAN"; Earl Srope.
[xxii] MAJ: is "MAJ"; Stepan Baharovitch Apelvyn.
New York 1433-5 to Moscow, 10 October 1944. I. F. Stone, again

[Three-part message complete]

[Part I]

[99 groups unencerable]

[32 groups unencipherable]

\[14\]

SEEDK[14] has brought in IDE [?][11][11] but is not able to direct his work systematically as he does his too rarely. Among SEEDK's acquaintances are persons of great interest from a point of view. They are well informed and, although they do not say all they knew, nevertheless they provide useful comments on the foreign policy of the country. [RIDDLE][11][11]. More than SEEDK is studying Joseph RUND[11] and I. STONE[11] the, however, for the time being is avoiding SEEDK. Among his[11] other senior targets SEEDK has no opportunity for the [DEVELOPMENT] of CRITIC [KITTEN] for obtaining leads INDIA[11][11] is no good for anything else [11][11][11].

[Part II]

Decisive results in the business of signing up valuable people can be obtained in only two ways, first by transferring SEEDK to COUNTER [KIPPER][11] and secondly by making use of the FELLOW CONTINUER [RIDDLE][14].

[Continued overleaf]
At the present [SENRBY] is trying to get the Editorial Office [RURAL/'s] transferred to CARTHOUSE. [Enq. Enq.] [Y]  

The KMD [vii] for the acquisition of a cooperative apartment and so on. Without the help of the afternoon conditions, we are completely powerless.

Nay's [Mull][ix] opinion:

1. In this note [SENRBY] has put in a nutshell his whole conception of the reasons why he has made no real advance and [his][ix] approach to the first few months. His view that without CARTHOUSE and KMD/ND [RURAL] in CARTHOUSE we are doomed to vegetate in isolation. It is not true that everything is possible to do in CARTHOUSE and it is doubly unfair that without KMD/ND we are "powerless." I consider that in either case we shall have to have recourse to the help of the evening on CARTHOUSE, but they ought not to be the one and only base especially if you take into account the fact that in the event of KMD/ND being absent this source may dry up.

2. [SENRBY] will not want to be in the office [RURAL/nd] itself any more than how, excepting in cases when a great deal of material requiring urgent appraisal piles up.

3. [SENRBY] ought to organise the work of the Editorial Office so as to have more time for developing existing connections and standing up one case. He should not worry the whole Editorial Office on his own shoulders; then he could go to CARTHOUSE more, which is undoubtedly important.


The signing up of [SENRBY] is obviously not only impossible but unrealisable however, it is desirable to use him without signing him up.

[SENRBY] helps me to decide operational questions connected with information working and working on workers [RURAL/nd] and probationers [SENRBY] on current tasks. Questions on work with probationers [Y] groups unanswerable [i]D [Yi cover] the best for our [OJ system]. I hope that we will not have to engage in the "theoretical" education of [SENRBY] after all these years.

Telegraph your opinion and possible suggestions.

Pa. 6/11
19th October
NAY

"[Rural and Currents unanswerable]"

[SENRBY/ThKL]
BRIDE

TOP-SECRET

- 3 -

6/13/73

T.N. [3] Inserted by the translator.
[4] "in a nutshell" is given in English in the original.
[5] i.e., questions for which a knowledge of the possible sources (both institutions and persons) would be helpful.
[6] The last digit of the last of those groups is the same as the last digit of the group for "his".

[111] STAN: the U.S.A.
[11v] Zaidor Feinstein STONE.
[1v] KEREN: WASHINGTON.
[1vi] SERNIKOV: members of the Communist Party in this case of the U.S.A.
[1viii] kHAL: the KGB.
[1x] MAZ: Pavel Ivanovich PRIDIMOV.

351
New York 1437 to Moscow, 10 October 1944.

To the 6th Department.

2. [Redacted] reports that a telegram from SANS of 10 September has arrived in the SANS[1] in [Redacted] to discuss the introduction of TITO's strict regulations (presumably) on movements and activities of the military missions of the [Redacted] [Redacted] and the [Redacted] [Redacted]. In the telegram it is stated that the [Redacted] are opposed by the partisans and the evacuation of wounded. The telegrams conclude that the personnel of the introduction of strict measures is TITO's intention to control the areas under the present control due to exercises over the whole country.

By: [Redacted]

Notes:

A. Inserted by translator.

Complaints:

1) [Redacted]: i.e., "SANS" or "SANS".

2) [Redacted]: U.S. State Department.

3) [Redacted]: U.S.A.

4) [Redacted]: GREAT BRITAIN.

4 November 1944

[Redacted]

New York 1437 to Moscow, 10 October 1944. Maurice Halperin
New York 1442 to Moscow, 11 October 1944. Disputes at KGB residency
63. (Continued)

TOP-SECRET

63. (Continued)

be signs. As for people, NLT is utterly without the knack of dealing with them, frequently showing himself positively abrupt and inclined to say and do rashly, finding time to chat with them. Sometimes our operational visitors who went in the same establishments with him could not get an answer to a genuine question from him for several days at a time. Our permanent staff [REDACTED], noting NLT's impotence and remoteness from the details of everyday work, do not consider him an authoritative leader [REDACTED], which has an effect on working discipline.

Part II

Although since the receipt of your instructions I have formally known about [REDACTED] work of the OFFICE [REDACTED], in fact it turns out quite differently. [REDACTED] opportunities for removing assistance to NO [REDACTED] and as a result of inexperience and failure to understand that his appointment as leader does not signify recognition of his capabilities, but means that he has been given an opportunity to demonstrate his capabilities in this post, my cooperation cannot make a marked improvement in the position. The appointment of Master of the OFFICE [REDACTED] of a worker without experience of work abroad is an experienced apparently necessitated by the absence of a qualified candidate.

In my opinion you must decide whether to send here some other experienced leader, NLT will need to work under the supervision of such a permanent staff worker [REDACTED]. Written instructions from you to NLT cannot make up for lack of experience and know how. A worker who has no experience of work abroad cannot cope with the work of directing the whole office.

No. 880

17th October

Comments: [1] VICTOR: IA, Gen. P.M. FITZ.
[31] OFFICE: NOB Office in the Consulate-General in NEW YORK.
[111] BA: Stavka Rezervuomu AGENCIA, Soviet Visa Council in NEW YORK.
[21] VADIM: Anatoliy Borisovitch CHMOY, 1st Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, WASHINGTON.
[24] UKR: NEW YORK.
[81] SERGEI: Vladimir Sergyevich BAYOVO, Editor of the U.S.S.R. News Agency in NEW YORK.

356
64. New York 1469 to Moscow, 17 October 1944.

TOP SECRET

Reissue (T1306)

FROM: NEW YORK
TO: MOSCOW
No: 1469

17 October 1944

TO VIKTOR[1].

Today we received from ROBERT[2] 36 undeveloped films including the following materials:

1. Reviews by the Ministry of Economic Warfare on the Far East according to information of the economic COMPTETITION[KOR]

2. A review by the Ministry of Economic Warfare on the economic situation of GERMANY.


4. A review by the Ministry of Economic Warfare about [22 groups unrecoverable] negotiations of the COUNTRY[SYRAN] and the ISLAND[OSTROG] about DECKER.

5. A report of the Embassy of the COUNTRY in SYRAN about [1 group unrecoverable] GREECE.


7. Negotiations on DECKER with FRANCE.

8. [8 groups unrecoverable] about the situation in ITALY.

9. A report of the Embassy of the COUNTRY in MADRID about German assets in Spain.

10. The economic scale of defense.

11. A memorandum [5 groups unrecoverable] for KAPITAN on the question of DECKER for [1 group unrecoverable].


13. A memorandum of the executive committee on [19 groups unrecoverable].
16. [5 groups unrecovered] International cartels.

17. Instructions on the dissolution of the National Socialist Parties of GERMANY and affiliated organizations.

18. The situation on economic control of

[10 groups unrecovered]

20. A general review [4 groups unrecovered] crises of the COUNTRY.

The materials are recent.

[15 groups unrecovered]

at once the undeveloped films.

No. 835

MAJ[x]

Comments:

[4] RAPPORT: i.e. CAPTAIN, Franklin D. ROOSEVELT.
[8] SIDON: SOHO.
[x] MAJ: i.e. MAJ, Stepan APREYAN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.

7 December 1971
65. New York 1506 to Moscow, 23 October 1944.

TOP SECRET TRINE YENONA

From: New York
To: Moscow
No.: 1506

23 October 1944

To VENONA:

SUNOB[1] to CARTAME[1] has made the acquaintance of PARCAE[1]/F[1].
SUNOB[1] had several times tried to [5a contact] has personally met and also
through ID[2] [1] had the impression been created that PARCAE was avoiding
it. As the first conversation SUNOB[1] told his that he had very much
decided to make his acquaintance since he greatly valued his work as a correspondent
and was interested in flattery.

[5a groups unrecovered]

PARCAE to give us information. F[1] said that he had noticed our attempts
to [5a contact] has, particularly the attempts of the last of the TISE
[7/24/44] [1] but he had reached negatively fearing the consequences.
At the same time he implied that he decided at repudiation had been made
with insufficient caution and by people who were insufficiently responsible.
To SUNKA[1]'s reply that naturally he did not want to subject him to unpleasant
complications, PARCAE gave him to understand that he was not refusing his aid
but [5a one should] consider that he had three children and did not want to
attract the attention of the AIVIVA[1]. To SUNKA[1]'s question how he considered
it advisable to maintain liaison F[1], replied that he would be glad to meet but he
rarely visited [5a ZIUZ][1] where he usually spent

[5a groups unrecovered]

His fear is primarily explained by his unwillingness to spoil his career.
Internally he is well secured[1]. He earns as much as 1000 dollars a month but,
in some cases would not be worse that having a supplementary income. For the establish-
ment of business contact with him we are assisting us [1 group unrecovered]
reciprocally. For the work is needed a qualified [5a groups unrecovered] CARTAME.
Telegraph your opinion.

No. 943

23 October

[16] PARCAE: Iatove F. STONE.
[17] ID[1]: Samuel FINEUR.
[18] F[1]: I. E. PARCAE.

TOP SECRET TRINE YENONA

359

New York 1506 to Moscow, 23 October 1944. I. F. Stone might help
66. Moscow 374 to San Francisco, 7 November 1944.

BRIDE

TOP-SECRET

Ref. No. 3/507/508
Insert: 3/507/508
Copy No. 205

NOTIFICATION OF AN ORDER (1944)

From: MOSCOW

To: SAN FRANCISCO

No. 574

7 Nov. 44

The Government has awarded you the Order of the Red Star. On behalf of us all and of the President I hereby congratulate you on this high award and wish you the best of success in your work for the good of our country.

No. 5615

VEB065


Distribution

3/507/508

TOP-SECRET

BRIDE

361
New York 1585 to Moscow, 12 November 1944.

Theodore Hall recruited
68. New York 1600 to Moscow, 14 November 1944.

TO: VIKTOR

LIBERAL[II] has safely carried through the contracting of "El'Tus"[III]. El'Tus is a good gal of NEU's[IV]. We propose to pair them off and get them to photograph their own materials having given a camera for this purpose. El'Tus is a good photographer, has a large darkroom [camera] and all the equipment but he does not have 5 Leicas. LIBERAL will receive the films from NEU for passing on. Direction of the probationers will be continued through LIBERAL. This will ease the load on him. Details about the contracting are in letter no. 8.

OSA[V] has agreed to cooperate with us in drawing in SNEL's [VI] henceforth "GALES" -- see your no. 1298[II] with a view to ENORMOUS [ENORMOUS][VII]. On summons from KALIBER she is leaving on 25 November for the Camp 2 area [VIII]. KALIBER will have a week's leave. Before OSA's departure LIBERAL will carry out two briefing meetings.

Anton[IX]

24 November 1944

Notes: [ja] Not available.
Comments:

[V] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITZEN.
[II] LIBERAL: JULIAN ROSENBERG.
[III] EL'TUS: I.E. HUGHES, probably Joel BABB or Alfred SARANT.
[IV] NEU: I.E. NUTER, probably either Joel BABB or Alfred SARANT.
[V] OSA: Ruth GREENGGLASS.
[VI] SNEIL/KALIBER: I.E. RUMBLEE/STICK, David GREENGGLASS.
[VIII] Camp 2: LOST ALAMOS Laboratory, New Mexico.
[IX] Anton: Leonid Romanovich EVANSIKOV.

1 May 1975

365
69. Moscow 379 to San Francisco, 16 November 1944.

According to a plan approved by General Pershing on October 15th, a special sub-residency (RECEIVING) for the Fifth Line is being established within the framework of your residency. It will not be subject to the authority [16 groups uncovered].

Right to give independent decisions [1 group unrecoverable] concerning questions relating to the operation of the sub-residency and to have direct communication with the GHQ.

10 [5 groups uncovered] of the sub-residency in accordance with instructions of the GHQ, directing the work of the sub-resident and taking the necessary steps for the successful completion of the mission.

Los Angeles. The following changes among the personnel staff versus [RECOVERED] of the sub-residency have been approved:

1. "RAPID" [2 groups uncovered] in the transmission from VANCOUVER, is appointed [to be] in charge of the work in the part of SAN FRANCISCO.

2. "THUNDER" [3 groups uncovered] in the transmission from VANCOUVER, is appointed [to be] in charge of the work in the part of VANCOUVER.

Distribution [continued on next page]
69. (Continued)
69. (Continued)
New York 1613 to Moscow, 18 November 1944.

TO: MOSCOW

From: NEW YORK

In mid-October A.I. BERN[i] tried to get in touch with NTA[i][ii]. The latter's wife stated that NTA[i] had left for the PROVOSK civi] and would return after Christmas. At one time NTA[i] was compelled to resign because of the dismissal of LOM[i]'s former deputy on the grounds of organizational and political disagreement.

As a result of the election, LOM[i]'s dismissal and the appointment of ICH[i] in his place are not ruled out. Inasmuch as NTA[i] is familiar with ICH[i] (i.e., group uncovered) he could count on a leading post in the BUR[i].

(Continued overleaf)
70. (Continued)

About five months ago, having proposed to ALBEE[1] the suspension of meetings with KNYA[2], you promised to give, subsequently, instructions on how ALBEE would explain the break to KNYA[3]. ALBEE considers that a complicated explanation is not necessary as KNYA[4] knows of ALBEE's chronic ill-health and himself recommended the latter to go away to the CORUNDA[5][vi] or to ARIZONA for a few months

[24 groups unreadable]

use:

1. If LOR[1][ii] gets an interesting post it goes without saying that KNYA[3]'s must 'get in on it' by using his friendship.

2. If not, then we can try notwithstanding to use KNYA[3]'s proximity to LOR[1][ii] to fix him up in a suitable establishment, still extracting, via KNYA[3], interesting information which will ABCD in any case some LOR[1][ii]'s way, or to send him to GBCD[iv] or to some other place in the PROVINCE[iv][v] using the cover of a 'free' (according to ALBEE the PROVINCE[iv][v][vi]) experience of KNYA[3] allows him to count as any other appointment, and there to use him as the head of a private office (instead of, or with, LOR[1][ii]).

If you agree I shall brief ALBEE in this spirit.

We consider that KNYA[3] should be turned over to LOR[1][ii][vii] only after ALBEE has acquainted his prospects.

Rg. 987
5th November

[1][vi] VICTOR: Lt. Gen. P.N. FITZ.

[1][i] ALBEE: i.e. 'ALBERT': probably Zachary Abraham ARMSTRONG.

[2][i] KNYA: i.e. 'PRINCE': possibly Lawrence DONAHUE.

[3] PROVINCE: PROVINCIAL.

[4] LOR: i.e. 'HERMANUS': Cordell HULL.

[5] CORUNDA[vi]: i.e. 'CHANNEL-POOL': Harry I. Ward WALLACE.


[7] CORUNDA[vi]: MEXICO.

3/SEP/71956

TOP-SECRET
VENONA

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

5/3/95/2/1996

Comments
(Cont'd):
[14] N2: Probably OFF.
[21] VADIM: Anatoliy Bubnovich BROWN, First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in WASHINGTON.
[221] MAY: i.e. "MAY"; Stepan Zakhroshi APRESTON.

3/11/95/2/1996

VENONA

TOP SECRET

373

70. (Continued)
71. New York 1634 to Moscow, 20 November 1944.

Dear

Ref. No.: 5/WH/754

Issued: 02.1/1944

Copy No.: No.

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR "RICHARD"

From: NEW YORK

To: MOSCOW

No.: 1634

20 Nov. 1944

To VICTOR,[1]

According to advice from ROBERT,[1] RICHARD's[11] wife has complained recently about [5 financial]

[6 groups unrecoverable]

in particular with business [BIKES] since this would relieve them of heavy expenses.

ROBERT told RICHARD's wife, who knows about her husband's participation with us, that we would willingly have helped them and that in view of all the circumstances would not allow them to leave [CAMPAIGN][KAPPEN][9]. ROBERT thinks that RICHARD would have refused a regular payment but might accept gifts as a mark of our gratitude for

[7 groups unrecoverable]

daughter's expenses which may come to up to two thousand a year.

[Continued overleaf]

Distribution

0/WH/754

[2 pages]

BRIDE

375
While sharing ALBRET's opinion about the necessity for assistance we draw your attention to the fact that RICHARD has taken the offer of assistance favourably. Please do not delay your answer.

No. 932
23rd November

MAJ [illegible]

Documents: [i] VICTOR: possibly Lieut.-General Pavel M. FITIN.
   [ii] ROBERT: Nathan Gregory SILVERMOOT.
   [iii] RICHARD: possibly Harry Dexter WHITE.
   [iv] KARLSEN: WASHINGTON, D.C.
   [v] PILOT: William Ludwig SELMAN.
   [vi] MAJ: Pavel Ivanovich PESOSHOV.

W.S. No.: XY-70.5
71. (Continued)

USER

Ref No: Amendment to: 8/889/729 (of 22/1/1953)

Issue: 20/1/1954

Copy No: 2

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No.: 1654

20 November 1954

AMENDMENT

In line 3 of the last paragraph, on page 1, please amend the sentence to read "ROBERT, PILOT(v) and P. . . . . against attempting to offer RICHEL assistance."
72. New York 1635 to Moscow, 21 November 1944.

New York 1635 to Moscow, 21 November 1944. Reward for Silvermaster
72. (Continued)

1. ABSENT asks for word to be passed to you that [Redacted] and he [Redacted] (20 groups unrecognizable).

2. ROBERT is sincerely overjoyed and profoundly satisfied with the reward [given his [Redacted] (Sr. in accordance with your instructions), as he says his work for us is the one good thing he has done in his life. He emphasized that he did not take this only as a [Redacted] honour, but also as an honour to his group. He wants to see the reward and the books.

3. [Redacted] is very uneasy about the fate of her relations [and] [Redacted] again asks none of their whereabouts.

No. 976
21st November

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Comments: [1] Lt.-Gen. P.K. FITZ
[1a] Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.
[1b] Registrar-General Patrick J. KEENE, appointed U.S. Ambassador to Canada in December 1934.
[1c] U.S. Department of State.
[5] Helen (Witt) SILVERMASTER, wife of ROBERT.
73. New York 1657 to Moscow, 27 November 1944.

New York 1657 to Moscow, 27 November 1944. Ethel Rosenberg
New York 1699 to Moscow, 2 December 1944. Listing atomic scientists
74. (Continued)

[Page 3]

74. (Continued)
75. New York 1715 to Moscow, 5 December 1944.

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No: 1715

5 December 1944

To VIKTOR[1].

Expedite consent to the joint filming of their materials by both METR[1i] and KU/YUS[1ii] (see our letter no. 8). LIBERAL[iv] has on hand eight people plus the filming of materials. The state of LIBERAL's health is nothing splendid. We are afraid of putting LIBERAL out of action with overwork.

No. 943.

Your no. 5673[a]. DIX[v] is directly in touch with FLOKS's [vi] husband and not with FLOKS herself. The intention of sending the husband to see RAMSEY (RAMSA)[vii] is explained by [v] the possibility of avoiding a superfluous stage for transmitting instructions.

No. 944

ANTON[viii]

Your no. 5598[a]. The sending of passengers on Liberty ships from NEW YORK[39] to Soviet Northern ports has become exceptionally difficult. They can only be sent to England to await there a ship headed for the Soviet North.

No. 945

4 December

Notes: [a] Not available.

Comments:

[1i] METR: i.e. MEYER, probably either Alfred BARK or Joel BARK.
[1ii] KU/YUS: i.e. BUCHER, probably either Joel BARK or Alfred BARK.
[iv] LIBERAL: Julius ROSENBERG.
[v] DIX: i.e. DICK, Bernard SCHWEITZER.
[vii] FLOKS: i.e. FULOX, probably See NEW YORK's Nov. 618 4 May 1944 and 1203 5 July 1944.
[viii] RAMSA: Possibly

[1] ANTON:Leonid MARCHINOV.
[39] TIR: NEW YORK CITY.

[X] NAZ: i.e. MAY, Stepan APRESDAN.

1 May 1975
New York 1749-50 to Moscow, 13 December 1944. Rosenberg ring
76. (Continued)

[Image of the page]

VENONA

TOP SECRET

3. "BLAP"(xix)

[55 groups unrecoverable]

[DIAZ II] Further [416 groups unrecoverable]

Both are YELLOMOUNTAIN(YELMOUNT)(xix). Both are helping us and both made LIBERAL and ADMIRAL (5 groups unrecoverable). KX7(B)(xix) handed over 17 authentic drawings relating to the AGN(AGN) (special dispatch No.6 to E.) as can be trusted. The transfer of DS7 alone to BS2(xix) is in no way out of the situation. It will be necessary to get OVER in touch with ISLANDER(ISLANDER) in order to bring material for photography into the FLAP(FLAP) (xix). I cannot carry material in and out of the FLAP in the evening. It is best to bring all together, putting the latter in touch with ISLANDER or OVER and separating both from LIBERAL.

In TENSE(S)E(xix)

[44 groups unrecoverable]

round the clock. There are no major contradictions between letters 5 and 9 about LIBERAL. They complement each other. LIBERAL's shortcomings do not mean that he will be completely useless for photography. He is gradually getting used to photography.

No. 857171

[Signature unrecoverable]

Footnotes:

[1] Part II only of this message was also published earlier, as M222/198, Item 9.


[5] ALRI: Harry GOLD.

76. (Continued)

VENONA

TOP-SECRET

3/30/47

[xxiv] Camp 1: Not identified; probably an atomic energy site (cf references to "Camp-2" and "usgoe" in a
HM 703c's No. 1205 of 12 November 1944 and
799 of 3 July 1940 (31/30/2156), 235).

[xxv] OSA: is "GAUSE"; both GREENLASS.

[xxvi] KALLEN: is "KALLEN"; David GREENLASS.

[xxvii] LEIBEL: Julius ROSENBERG.

[xxviii] NEAR: is "NEAR"; Theodore Alvin HALL.


[xxx] NEY: is "NEYY"; Alfred Spanos (NEYY), who
was employed at the BELL Telephone Laboratories
(cf Footnote [xxiv]), NY NEW YORK CITY, from
October 1942 to September 1944.

[xxxi] ANP: 7: a high-resolution airborne radar
developed by the MASSACHUSETTS Institute of
Technology and built by BELL Telephone (cf
Footnote [xxix]) in the 1940s.

[xxi] SVZ: is "SVZI"; possibly Aleksey Aleksandreich
Dav.

[xxii] LAVLJAT: is "LAVLJAT"; Aleksey Samoivich ROMAN.


[xxiv] MEN: is "MEN"; Jews BASH.

[xxv] TTT: NY NEW YORK CITY.
77. New York 1751-3 to Moscow, 13 December 1944.

[Document content]
77. (Continued)

- 2 -

[1] REIOD: Italian Embassy CHIEF-LINE.

[11] The main body of the telegram consists of page 1 of this document containing a verbal summary of the rest of the document.

[111] This commentary is in the form of a letter from the Foreign Office dated 21 July 1940 to C.I.O.S.P. on the above draft of the 31DECE. This letter was as follows: An extract of this letter was transmitted on 25 Dec 1940 in Rey 1234,5678 [Armsfield internal No. 507]

[1111] [Re: 11.21.

V.J. Not X2.56.2

5/27/430
New York 1773 to Moscow, 16 December 1944.

VENONA

Reissue(71304)

FROM: NEW YORK
TO: MOSCOW
No: 1773

16 December 1944

TO VENONA [I].

OSA [I] has returned from a trip to see KALIBER [III]. KALIBER expressed his readiness to help in throwing light on the work being carried on at Camp-2 [IV] and stated that he had already given thought to this question earlier. KALIBER said that the authorities of the Camp were openly taking all precautionary measures to prevent information about ENORMOUS [V] falling into Russian hands. This is causing serious discontent among the progressive [VI] workers.

[II GROUP UNRECOVERABLE]

The middle of January KALIBER will be in TYRE [VII]. LIBERAL [VIII], referring to his ignorance of the problem, expressed the wish that our men should meet KALIBER and interrogate him personally. He assents that KALIBER would be very glad of such a meeting. Do you consider such a meeting advisable? If not, I shall be obliged to draw up a questionnaire and pass it to LIBERAL. Report whether you have any questions of priority interest to us.

KALIBER also reports: OFFENHEIM [VIII] from California and KISTIANSKII [IX] (MAD [XI]) report mentioned the latter) are at present working at the Camp. The latter is doing research on the thermodynamic process. Advise whether you have information on these two professors.

No. 967
15 December

ANTON [XI]

COMMENTS:

[II] OSA: i.e. VREB, Balth. GREENGLASS.
[III] KALIBER: i.e. CALLYRE, David GREENGLASS.
[IV] Camp-2: Probably LOS ALAMOS.
[VII] VENONA: NEW YORK CITY.
[VIII] LIBERAL: Julius ROSSBURG.
[VII] OPFFENHEIM: Presumably Dr. J. Robert OFFENHEIM, Director of the LOS ALAMOS Laboratory.
[IX] KISTIANSKII: Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, Chief of the Explosives Division at the LOS ALAMOS Laboratory.
[X] MEAD: I.e. YOUNG, Theodore, A. KALI.
[XI] ANTON: Ischi Romblovich TAMKIN.

TOP SECRET

26 May 1975

VENONA

393
VENONA

TOP-SECRET

UNRED

Ref. No.: 

Issued: 16/6/1946

Copy No.: 24

1. DESCRIPTION OF AMO’S COVER AND PLAN TO SET UP LABORATORY
2. KON
3. LUNA’S MOVE TO TREN’S TOWN, LIKELY TO GO THERE AND PUT THEM IN CONTACT

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No.: 1997

20 December 1944

To VENONA[5],


We have been discussing his cover with AMO[111]. AMO’s note about his setting up a laboratory was sent in postal despatch No. 6 of 20 October. As the subject on which to work AMO chose “Problems of Practical Application Under Production Conditions of the Process of Thermal Diffusion of German”. In his note AMO envisages concluding agreements with firms. At first he said that 25 years should be required to study the possibility of organizing a laboratory and he did not, as yet, adequately worked out the difficulties of concluding agreements with interested firms – on the conclusion of agreements with which he is counting heavily. I suggested to him that he should study the possibilities in greater detail. The picture will not become clearer before the end of January. AMO intends to open the laboratory in his own town.

[Continued overleaf]
A detailed report on VENONA's office was sent by postal dispatch No. 9. Let us know whether we should repeat this by telegraph.

No. 993

LINGA[v] and his wife have left for TEHOV's[vii] town. At the end of December, LINGA[vii] will go there and will put LINGA in touch with TEHOV. Before taking this move, LINGA and his wife visited the town and took an apartment, the address of which we reported in letter No. 9. LINGA sold his house and spent part of the money on the move. We gave him a once for all payment of $200. I consider that

[26 groups uncovered]

Footnotes:

[i] VENTOR: Lt. General Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN.

[iii] Not available. Also referred to in NEW YORK's No. 799 of 13 December 1944.

[iv] ABBR.: Formerly covered as "UGI", i.e. "UGDR"; Harry GOLD, resident in PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA.

[v] ABBR.: Formerly covered as "UGK"; unidentified covered; also appear in NEW YORK's No. 799 of 4 January 1944.

[vi] LINGA: Michael SITZMANN (wife Ann, née HANSEL); moved from NEW YORK State to CLEVELAND, OHIO.

[vii] TEHOV: Formerly covered as "UGE", i.e. "UGKO"; William FERG (formerly SITZMANN).
80. New York 12-3, 15-6 to Moscow, 4 January 1945. ALBERT reports

[Document content here]

New York 12-3, 15-6 to Moscow, 4 January 1945. ALBERT reports
80. (Continued)

It is possible that ALBERT thought we wanted to take away some of his people counting on getting better results and concluded from this that we were not altogether satisfied with his achievements. In ALBERT's opinion he succeeded in convincing ROBERT that our sole aim was organizational security. It must be said that on the basis of our workers' information ROBERT has been inclined to be critical and dubious of our ability to deal with the problems [STADJ]. Especially indicative from this point of view is the incident with NEW TECH.\[56 groups unnumbered.\]

...[65 groups unnumbered.\]

ALBERT [ALBERT][\[49] is our worker; if ALBERT proposed this ROBERT would undoubtedly reject it. Therefore ALBERT is trying to convince him of the necessity of setting up a small group whose technical work could be concentrated outside ROBERT's apartment. ROBERT retaining the general direction of it.\[52 groups unnumbered.\]

[Part II]

It has been decided to train ANDER [ANDER][\[49] and EMMET [EMMET][\[49] for the processing of small scale in their own apartment. The couple [ANDER][\[49] are conscientious, capable and fairly well disciplined. Notwithstanding, however, their devotion to the FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN [EMMET][\[49] and personally to ROBERT, the latter has from time to time complained of their services. Thus a few weeks ago EMME[\[49] told ANDER in ROBERT's and SIS[\[49] presence that the couple were trying to get themselves free of us. ALBERT does not regard this seriously but he no longer doubts that it costs ROBERT great pains to keep the couple and the otheriphertexts [STADJ] in check and to get good work out of them. Being their leader in the FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN line ROBERT has the opportunity to give them orders.\[55 groups unnumbered.\]

In ALBERT's opinion our workers would hardly manage to work with the same success under the FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN flag. He may possibly set up direct liaison with ANDER, ALBERT and the rest, but it is doubtful whether we could secure from them the same results as ROBERT, who, constantly dealing with them, has many advantages over us. The whole group [ET. of ROBERT's]

[56 groups unnumbered.\]

[Part III]

ROBERT resisted very stoutly when ALBERT suggested that before ALBERT's name somebody else tried to part him and SIS. That he did not believe in our orthodox methods and so on. As he said, it would not be hard to separate SIS from him, but he

[52 groups unnumbered.\]

[55 groups unnumbered.\]

[57 groups unnumbered.\]

[58 groups unnumbered.\]

[59 groups unnumbered.\]

[Continued overleaf]
family of western [OCCUPY.[ALL]], in ALBERT's opinion, for PILOT's successful work we are in large measure indebted to ROBERT and [NAME], who treat PILOT very solicitously, and in the near future we shall gain nothing at the cost of separating PILOT from ROBERT. ALBERT is trying to prevent a joint business [BRIDE] like a farm or an aeroplane and has advised ROBERT to let PILOT work out this project himself if the latter is sure of success saying that in case of need we should render PILOT some financial support. In ALBERT's opinion the project is unrealizable and later they will drop it.

ROBERT is displeased by our interference in his personal affairs, which is what he considers the farm to be. In his words, all these years he and the others have worked at high pressure and they want to acquire a farm rather for relaxation than as a cover. For a long time PILOT and [NAME] have been drawing up all kinds of plans relative to the farm.

[Part IV]
In PILOT's opinion the farm will be a good pretext for his absence(f) in CASTRIZE ([BRIDE],[ALL]) in case of dismissal, for having been dismissed he could hardly remain in CASTRIZE even temporarily, without legal(s) income. Seeing how much they were carried away by the idea ALBERT did not consider it wise to insist [29 groups uncovered] on the leadership of this new group which will have to be left to ROBERT.

That has been expounded does not mean that the mutual relations of ALBERT with ROBERT are strained or that ROBERT does not want to obey us. ROBERT estimates ALBERT highly and would not [29 groups uncovered] any request or order if ALBERT insisted. ALBERT does not doubt that ROBERT would introduce him to any of his people if ALBERT requested, for organizationally ROBERT has become very close to us.

ALBERT emphasizes the soundness and timeliness of the order and the gift to ROBERT, who is pleased at our high estimation of him)\(^\text{[6]}\).

Note by the Office [KOFFUL]. In the same letter ALBERT advocates short biographical note on [NAME] and [NAME] which we shall send by post.

Ex. 6
1 January
KLY [N.J][\text{on}]

[\text{T.M. and Customs overleaf}]

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80. (Continued)
This sentence contains a similar anacolount, in the original. Presumably some part of the subordinate clause has been omitted.

SUPRUDI means "couple" in the sense of a married couple.

Presumably an error for "presence".

I.e., overt.

Inserted by the translator.

Cements:

[VINCENT]: probably Lt.-General F.N. PETIN.

[NENT]: not identified.

[ROBERT]: Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.

[KLAU]: the F.B.I.

[KOL'TOW]: not identified.

[FLECH]: not identified.

[SHO FP]: possibly Bells [originally Bela ?] Sells.

[SHERI]: possibly Sonia Steinman SELL.

[Z IBER]: members of the Communist Party.

[BRAU]: Helen "Bette" SILVERMASTER.

[B]: not identified.

[FLOR]: possibly William Ludwig MILLER.

[ORC]: Americans.

[KROLL]: WASHINGTON, D.C.

[FR]: N.Y. resident in NEW YORK.

U.S. No.: NV-1, 06 (Revision)

TOP SECRET-DIRAR

RELEASE (TOP SECRET and 21) 1.03

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No: 18-19

a January 1945

[Part I] To VEPRON[1].

Ref: Further to No. 2[a], Here is the gist of the enclosure to
LOUIS' [2] memoranda:

1. In "Memoranda on Conversations" LOUIS sets out the reactions
to PROST[2] of various persons with whom he and PROST came in
contact. Opinions agree that PROST is not running the business
compétentement; that he is making many empty promises, that he is not
listening to advice and that he over-estimates his capabilities.

2. In "Summary Report" LOUIS reports about the various stages in
the development of the company and PROST's mistakes which were
connected with them. He considers it necessary to reorganize
the company by setting up the following departments (in order of
importance):

1. Production;
2. Selection of music to publish, of the artists and
gramophone recordings;
3. Promotion;
4. Distribution.

Except for PROST, LOUIS considers that none of the present personnel
is adequate to deal with the tasks which confront each of these
departments. In his opinion PROST should concentrate his attention
on the problems of the second department; LOUIS himself, not
knowing the technology of production, undertakes to head distribution.
For promoting the products ability of high order is required.
At present the company is failing to deal with the problem of
production and this means that business is at a standstill. We feel that it
is necessary to appoint a specialist who could surround himself with experienced sound recorders, chemists and machine
experts and who would know the market.

[Part II] He and 2 qualified workers could solve the personnel problem.

[63 groups unrecoverable]

Chronological Report for 1944 LOUIS describes the activities of
the company.

correspondence [unrecoverable] on company business.

No. 12

TOP SECRET-DIRAR 4.03

401

New York 18-9 to Moscow, 4 January 1945. Boris Morros
81. (Continued)

ALBERT[*]

is urgently asking for a CONTAX camera for his own use.[vi] It is extremely difficult to get one here. Please telegraph TOLDO[vii] at once.

No.13

ANTON[x]

Your No.555[c]. EST no a distinct test used by the army of the country [SINBAK][viii]. Say our letter No.1 of 1944, the paragraph about URALNE FLIGHT [ARNON][ix].

No.14

ANTON[x]

Your No.555[c]. You agreed to the use of ARMED[x] in the second line. In order to decide the question of whether to use ARMED as a group leader in this flow of REK[xix] or not, please permit NATAF[xii] to have a chat with ARMED for the purpose of verification. In, A.P. 6, A.C.

No.15

4 January

Notes: [a] Not available [b] Not available [c] Not available

Comments:


[vi] LOUZ: Alfred L. STERN.

[vii] TOLDO: Boris KOHNO.

[x] NATAF: Stepan Zaburovich APRESTOV.

[xi] ALBERT: Probably Izakov Archilovich APOSTELOV.

[xi] REK: Bella LEV.

[xii] DROZD: Lev A. TURANSKY.

[viii] SIBRAX: U.S.A.

[xii] ARMED: Unidentified cover-name.

[x] ANTON: Leonid Romanovich KVASNIKOV.

[xi] ARMED: Unidentified.

[xv] REK: Sergey Nikolayvich KURKaubov.

[xii] NATAF: Stepan Nikolayvich SHUBEENKO.
New York 27 to Moscow, 8 January 1945.

8 January 1945

TO VIKTOR,[1]

SERGEI's[2] conversation with SIMA[3] took place on [8 & 4 January]. SIMA gives the impression of being a serious person who is politically well developed and there is no doubt of her sincere desire to help us. She had no doubts about why she is working for and said that the nature of the materials in which we are interested pointed to the fact that it was our country which was in question. She was very satisfied that she was dealing with us and said that she deeply appreciated the confidence shown in her and understood the importance of our work.

SIMA's transfer to a new job was made at the insistence of her [64 superiors] [64 groups unknowable] generalizing materials from all departments [OTL]. SIMA will probably start work on 15 February.

On the basis of this preliminary information there is reason to assume that in her new job SIMA will be able to carry out very important work for us in throwing light on the activities of the KGB[4]. The fruitfulness of her work will to a considerable extent depend upon our ability to organise correct and constant directions. It should be remembered that SIMA from an operational point of view is quite undeveloped and she will need time to learn conspiracy and to correctly gain an understanding of the questions which interest us.

A final decision on the question of direction and liaison can be taken [8 only] after she has moved to CARPATH[5]. When it will be ascertained [8 specifically] what her new job consists of.

No. 423

8 January

[2] SERGEI: Vladimir Sergewich PRAVDA.
[3] SIMA: Judith COPLOM.
[6] KGB: Moscow, A. P.

29 January 1945

New York 27 to Moscow, 8 January 1945. Judith Coplon
83. Moscow 14 to New York, 4 January 1945.

BRIDE
TOP-SECRET

TO BE NOTED UNDER LOCK AND KEY.
NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE.

OSHER: Ref No: 8/339/1259
Issued: 20/12/1940
Copy No: 1

1. ADDRESS FOR "POTOK"'S" CORRESPONDENCE
   WITH HIS WIFE.
2. MENTION OF LIASION WITH NUTUS.
3. FINANCES FOR "GROWTH"'S ENTERPRISE.
4. INSTRUCTIONS TO "MONEY" THAT HE MUST DO
   WITH REFERENCE TO "THE FELLOW-COMRADE"'s
   ORGANISATION AS WELL AS TO THE WEB.

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No. 1
6 Jan 1945

To VICTOR[1].

POTOK received telegram from his wife not from
the address indicated by you in letter No. 2 but 3 Lumetstreet
Noset[1][11] [1] the KUOVELLE apartment. Advise what sort
of an address POTOK ought to use.

No. 7
ANTON

[Continued overleaf]

BRIDE
TOP-SECRET

8/OSR/1259
[3 Pages]
Your number 625[10]. I am bearing in mind your reminder about the lines of conduct in respect of the leadership of the fellow countryman’s organisation (RENMINBI[11] and KGB[12] to pass on to NELSON (AMERICAN:P) [11] certain materials (in particular concerning the Chinese (Chinese: FELLOW COUNTRYMAN (RENMINBI)[11]) and it is hard for him to go back on his word, please permit by way of exception the passing on of these materials to NELSON through VASIN or BUNO [BUNO][12], at the same time warning ALBERT that this is the last time. ALBERT emphasized that SAME’ attitude to this question was very jealous and he gave him to understand that he would not hand certain materials over to you without a guarantee that they would be handed over to M. [M.12] too and, should we refuse, he might try to establish liaison with M. over our heads.

4th January

MAY [MAY][12]


Comments: [1] VICTOR: possibly Pavel Mikhajlovich PYTIIN, lieutenant-general, head of the foreign intelligence branch of the KGB.
[11] 9 Rumetskij Most, MOSCOW, is the address of several organisations, including the TORSO BANK, which would presumably have correspondences with ARSTRO.

(continued overleaf)
BRIDE

TOP-SECRET

83. (Continued)
New York 79 to Moscow, 18 January 1945. KGB in Treasury
84. (Continued)

Footnotes:
[14] RICHARD: Harry Daster WITZ.
[19] NOBLE: Probably Harold GLASER.
[17] DANN: Pavel Yudovich FEDOROV.
[18] MARK: Henry MONSTERS, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.
[19] Made confusion is due to the fact that the proposed promotion, which later took place, was from "assistant to the secretary of the treasury" to "assistant secretary of the treasury." There was probably no slip of the pen, but the second position to pass correctly by using the Russian words for "assistant" and "director" respectively.
[111] SEMYACHIREI (adjective) and SEMYAKI (noun) refer to members of the communist party of the country in question. Here, therefore, they mean "members of the communist party" (attributive) and "members of the American communist party" respectively.
[14] ALBERT: Izakhan Abdulovich KORASOV, alias W. GREENE.
[16] TINA: Sonia Gold, see STEINMAN, employed in the Treasury Department from 24 August 1943 to 31 August 1947.
If she was in fact GLASER's secretary at the time of this message, the statement here is a strong confirmation of the identifications of NOBLE and INNES; if she was not, it strongly suggests that one or both identifications are incorrect.

29 September 1976

VENONA

410

84. (Continued)
New York 82 to Moscow, 18 January 1945. GRU asks KGB aid
86. Moscow 200 to New York, 6 March 1945.

VENONA

TOP SECRET

Ref. No.: 3/888/72286

Date: 17/5/46

Copy No.: 86

Receives for sources, excluding LEBEL and NIL, gifts or payments for prostitutes

1945

[66 groups unrecovered]

decision was made about awarding the sources as a bonus the following sums to

[84] - 841 dollars - [646]

[28 groups unrecovered]

either the purchase of valuable gifts for the prostitutes (STAGED) or payment to them of money on the basis of well thought out cover-stories.

[28 groups unrecovered]

No. 1396

VERNON[144]

Footnotes:

[41] NIL: In either "(silver) NIL" or a name eg "PLUNK/HALEY".

[66] "US..." unidentified covername. "US..."


[144] VERNON: In General Pavel. Mikhailovitch PETIN.

VENONA

TOP SECRET

3/888/72286

[1 page]

413
87. Moscow 284 and 286 to New York, 28 March 1945.

From: MOSCOW
To: NEW YORK
No: 284, 286
28 March 1945

[Part I] With Post No. 1 we received "ZORA"s"[i] reports in which there are the following facts which deserve serious attention:

1. In the report of 2 February 1945 in 2 pages, she, describing the situation concerning the change of working location, names institutions of the "COUNTRY"[STRANA][ii] by the code designations adopted by us in our telegraphic and written correspondence "CLUB"[KLUJ][iii], "BANK"[KIV], "CABARET"[KABARE][iv].

2. In the reports of 1 and 3 February "ZORA" several times mentions the words "BANK", "CABARET", "HOUSE"DOM][v], "CLUB". It is not a question about communications which have been [2 groups unrecovered] in the OFFICE[KONTORA][vi] in which you filled in the prearranged designations, but about [1 group unrecovered] written personally by ZORA nos. 8, 10, 11, 112.

3. In the report of [1 group unrecovered] January 1945 "ZORA" in detail sets forth the following story: "SIMA"[vii] chief, WOOLRORHH[VUL'YORH][viii] from the Military Department of the "CLUB" entrusted "ZORA" with finding out in her [31 groups unrecovered] was such an informer. "ZORA" gave

[19 groups unrecovered]

John DUNNING[DAUNING][ix] [3 groups unrecovered]. To DUNNING's question, whether [if she] was interested in this information [1 group unrecovered] the "BANK" ZORA answered that another institution, whose name she had been forbidden to disclose, was interested in the information and that this other institution would get in touch with him. A member of the Military Department of "SIMA"s" institution Aleksander SACKS[xi] (Alexander SAKS) in a conversation with ZORA [13 groups unrecovered] about the proposal by him declined. SACKS gave ZORA the task of trying to get in the "RADIO STATION"[RADO STIONO][xii] materials about Swiss-German
financial operations [C1 and]

[38 groups unrecoverable]

[Part II]  To "ZORA's" question to SACKS and WOOLMOUTH, why they are not receiving natural from the "RADIO STATION" through an official representative, [2 groups unrecoverable] institutions of the "COUNTRY" including the "BANCI", WOOLMOUTH is trying to [C1 seek out] [3 groups unrecoverable] the CLUB. WOOLMOUTH told "ZORA" that in the ZIBA[xiii]. BANK, RADIO STATION, PARTY[REPUTATION] [xiv] [4 groups unrecoverable] many people who

[17 groups unrecoverable]

by the next post answer:
1. Why [1 group unrecoverable] ZORA.
2. Were these reports read [1 group unrecoverable] by the liaison man.
3. Did "MAJ"[xv] and "GEREK"[xvi] see these reports.
4. Who told "ZORA" [3 groups unrecoverable] and then told "[1 group unrecoverable]"

[13 groups unrecoverable]

to WOOLMOUTH and SACKS.
5. Why did ZORA begin to take

[33 groups unrecoverable]

steps taken to curtail ZORA's dangerous activities.

Without waiting for instructions from us after you reply to the questions which have been raised, immediately and in detail enlighten our liaison man about the serious mistakes he has com-
mittled in the work with "ZORA". As an ultimatum warn ZORA that if she does not carry out our instructions and if she undertakes steps without our consent, we shall immediately terminate all relations with her. Forbid ZORA to recruit all her acquaintances one after the other. Take all steps to see that ZORA's activities do not lead to serious political complications with the "COUNTRY". This example clearly illustrates not only the falling off in the resi-
dency's work of controlling and educating probationers, but also the lack of understanding by our operational workers of the most elementary rules in our work.

No. 1893

[Signature unrecoverable]
87. (Continued)

Comments:

[i] DONA: Flora Don MOUSCHIN.
[ii] EYHAMA: U.S.A.
[iii] EUK: Probably the Department of Justice.
[vi] SOM: Probably refers to the central NSF organization inbug.
[vii] KOMPA: Local NSF organ or residency.
[viii] SIBIA: Judith CUPM.

(a) WULVORT: This is the transliterated form of the name WOLKOVICH. However, it is probably an error for WOLFORT. Robert Martin WOLFORT was at this time Chief of the Economic Warfare Section, Department of Justice, NEW YORK CITY.

[9] DUNNING: Not further identified.
[xi] SACKS: Alexander SACKS also worked in the Economic Warfare Section of the Department of Justice.
[xii] ENTRA: Office of War Information.
[xiv] REFUR: Foreign Economic Administration.
[xv] NL: I.O. MAI, Stopan APRESAN.
[xvi] SEND: Vladimir PRAVDA.

31 January 1974

MINONA

87. (Continued)
VENONA

TOP-SECRET

WASHINGTON

Ref. No.: 3/99/71727

Issued: 3/16/1945

Copy No.: 214

MATERIAL FROM "W" (1943)

From: WASHINGTON

To: MOSCOW

Nos. 1793

29 March 45

To the 6th Department,

MATERIAL FROM "W" (1943).

I am transmitting telegram No. 2536 of 16th March, 1945 from the MOSCOW (Moscow) to the WASHINGTON (Washington).

Sent to WASHINGTON as telegram No. 2535 of 16th March and repeated to MOSCOW.

Secret

MOSCOW telegram Nos. 635 and 636.

1. The remainder of the text (160 groups) has been largely recovered. It is a Russian translation of the telegram referred to above, which was sent by Your Eminence (the Foreign Secretary) to Lord Halifax (British Ambassador in WASHINGTON).

[2 groups unrecoverable][a] [1 group unrecoverable][a]

Note: [a] The WASHINGTON MSG officer's signature and reference number are unrecoverable.


[111] POOL : British Embassy in WASHINGTON.

Distribution:

WASHINGTON

3/16/1945

TOP-SECRET

VENONA

419

Washington 1793 to Moscow, 29 March 1945. HOMER, again
TOP SECRET-DINAR VENOVA

88. (Continued)

From: WASHINGTON
To: MOSCOW
No: 1793 29 March 1941

To the 8th Department.


*Sent to WASHINGTON under No. 2535 of 16 March and repeated to MOSCOW.

SECRET.

Reference telegrams from MOSCOW Nos. 823 and 824.

1. These telegrams arrived simultaneously with the President's message to the Prime Minister (No. 718). The message states that the President is still not inclined to support us in putting to the Russians all those questions, on which we consider it important to reach an agreement with them at this stage. From the Prime Minister's answer, transmitted in telegram No. 912, you can see that he is urging the President to reconsider his position in the light of the proposals now submitted by Sir A. Clare KERR, after consultation with Mr. HARRIMAN.

2. As soon as possible please see Mr. STEWART and after that, if you can, the President and show them [2 groups unrecoverable] to MOSCOW, suggested by Sir A. Clare KERR and supplemented by my telegram 80-2537. You should take part in the decision of these affairs. Use all arguments at your disposal to induce them to make a concerted effort with us on the basis of this draft. We are convinced that only on such a basis will it be possible to establish a foundation for the Commission's work. We believe that if we and the Americans together take a firm position, the Russians very likely will give way on some of the points.

3. If you do not succeed in persuading the President to accept Sir A. Clare KERR's draft as it stands, in my opinion you can induce him to send Mr. HARRIMAN

[20 groups unrecoverable]

put forth by us. (From the Prime Minister's message you will see that the point on which we cannot give way is the question of a truce). If this were done, I should be ready to instruct Sir A. Clare KERR immediately to consult with Mr. HARRIMAN in making a communication of similar lines. We fully realize the urgency of this question.
88. (Continued)

TOP SECRET BINAR VENONA

4.

[10 groups unrecovered]
specific points, which
[35 groups unrecoverable]

Comments:
[i] OR: i.e., HOMER [OCOH]. Donald MacLean.

20 July 1965

TOP SECRET BINAR VENONA

421
TOP-SECRET-TRINE-VENONA

From: WASHINGTON
To: SHERWOOD
No: 1793
28 March 1945

Attachment

In paragraph 3 of the NSA version of the translation of this message the "if groups unrecognizable" should contain the following:

"Instructions covering at least the more important points"

Paragraph 4 should read:

"4. My immediately following telegram contains arguments on specific points which you should use with Mr. SENTINUS and the President in addition to those contained in the Prime Minister's message no. 312."
Further to our telegram No. 38(A). As a result of "[X A. e.][a]  
chat with "ALEX"[a] the following has been ascertained:

1. ALES has been working with the NEGRONI[111][111] continuously since 1937.

2. For some years past he has been the leader of a small group of the NEGRONI's, probably [EXCISED], for the most part consisting of his relations.

3. The group and ALES himself work on obtaining military information only. Materials on the "BANK"[iv] allegedly interest the NEGRONI very little and he does not produce them regularly.

4. All the last few years ALES has been working with "POL"[v] who also meets other members of the group occasionally.

5. Recently ALES and his whole group were awarded Soviet decorations.

6. After the ThIRA Conference, when he had gone on to MOSCOW, a Soviet officer in a very responsible position (ALES knew to understand that it was G CARDINAL) allegedly got in touch with ALES and at the behest of the Military NEGRONI passed on to him their gratitudes and so on.

No. 433

VADIM[vi]

8 August 1969

Notes: [a] Not available.

Comments:

[A] "A." seems the most likely name here although "A.4" has not been confirmed elsewhere in the VENONA traffic.

[B] ALEX: Probably ALEX SHERN.

[111] NEGRONI: Members of another Soviet intelligence organization, here probably the CAP.

[iv] BANK: the U.S. State Department.

[v] POL.: i.e. "POL.," unidentified cover-name.

[vi] VADIM: Anatoly Borisovich GRISHIN, KGB resident in WASHINGTON.
90. Moscow 298 to NY, 31 March 1945.

TOP SECRET

From: MOSCON
To: NEW YORK
Ref. No.: J/MP/12090
Issued: 3/16/1945
Copy No.: 1

SUBJECT

EVALUATION OF MATERIAL ON ENORMOZ: FROM CNNL'S OF PUNITOLAR AND FROM NALD (1945)

From: MOSCON
To: NEW YORK
No.: 298
31 March 1945

ANNEX [1]

We are sending herewith an evaluation on ENORMOZ [4]. Referenced are materials from "CNNL's" [11] about the PUNITOLAR [6]:

a) 5/46 [v]

[31 groups unrecovered]
gaskets [BAL/WIL]

b) 5/60 - [46 groups unrecovered] - contains an interesting method of calculation, which will be used during the design.
c) 5/62 - technical data on the PUNITOLAR and

[12 groups unrecovered]
d) 7/82, paragraph 3 - about the degree of separation of the membranes [vi] - offers substantial interest.

e) 7/84, paragraph 1 - about the tests on the membranes and information about the layout of the plant - is of interest. What is needed is [7 groups unrecovered] plan of the plant.
f) 7/82 and 82 - on the theory of the [Ns stability] of the PUNITOLAR - together with "CNNL's" materials on this question received earlier they form a full and valuable piece of information.

1) NALD's [vii] report on work [46 groups unrecovered]. [1 group unrecovered], great interest.

To: 1972
VEYRON [vii]

Distribution: [continued]

3/16/1945

425

90.
90. (Continued)

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TOP SECRET

VENONA

2/SEP/32090

Postnotes:

1) ANTON : Leonid Serapovich KUZMIN
2) HERMANN : The Manhattan Project (Development of the Atomic Bomb).
3) CHARLIE : Dr. Klaus FRIED.
4) PARTICULAR: First occurrence. Probably a reference to a diffusion plant X-5 at CLARKSON, Tennessee.
5) A dispatch reference. The first number is probably the month or postal dispatch number and the second a running serial from the beginning of the year.
6) MEKANE : also referred to as "m关键是" in some books.
7) HEAD : Theodore M. HALL
8) VEKOR : Lt. General Pavel NikoIjevich FilIN

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TOP SECRET

VENONA

CLASSIFIED BY PROJECT 1188

DECLASSIFIED ON: [Date]

426

90. (Continued)
91. Moscow 337 to New York, 8 April 1945.

According to information we have received from [Redacted] the Commissars of the "OLD [Redacted]" and the "NEW [Redacted]" have worked out joint measures for strengthening our [Redacted].

Transmission of information by telegraph. Give tasks [Redacted] [Redacted].

[Redacted] and people devoted to us. In the work with [Redacted] group it is essential to adhere to the following:

1. [Redacted] or [Redacted] should not be more than 3 times a week.
2. [Redacted]
3. [Redacted] should be conveyed to [Redacted] only on film and in small batches.
4. [Redacted] are to be occupied by [Redacted] for the purpose of taking them in sending the trip to [Redacted] for [Redacted].

[Continued overleaf]
5. in regards the work with the probationers in this followsthe same principles. Organize the work of your
[60 groups uncovered]
VENONA

TOP SECRET

New York 776 to Moscow, 25 May 1945.

Ref. No. 3/868/776 (at 21/3/1945)
Issued: 21/3/1945
Copy No: 2,004

TRANSFER

TRANSFER OF PROFESSIONALS FROM "TREND" TO "VENONA" AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSFER OF "VENONA" FROM "TREND" TO "KIALI" (1945)

From: NEW YORK
To: KIALI

No. 776
23 May 45

To KIALI,

Your No. 3396(1).

On 25th May "VEENUS [SIBERI]"(11) will complete the transfer to "VENONA"(14) of the professionals dealing with "POLGAR" (12)(14)[15] and "BAI" (15)(16)(17)(18).

On 1st June in accordance with the understanding with "KIALI"(19)(20), "VENONA" will be handed over by KIALI(8) to KIALI in TIBER(8).

No. 603
25 May 1945

SIBERI(12)

Notes: (1) No. 3396 not available.

Comments: (1) VENONA: Lt. Gen. P. L. BENED.
(14) VENONA: Robert Owen BENED.
(15) SIBERI: Robert SIBERI.
(16) POLGAR: Tovarnikov.
(17) KIALI: Possibly Jews.

[Continued overleaf]
(Continued)
North Washington Boulevard in the city of ALLENDE, State of \textbf{VENONA}. Formerly he lived for a long, while in the city of \textbf{VENONA} as an artist's colony organized by the \textbf{VENONA} administration during the depression. He took an active part in the collection of funds.

[5 groups uncovered]

...[dead] be left here for children. In 1940 he worked in the Police Section of the Department of Justice where he was given the job of editing speeches for \textbf{VENONA} and other similar agencies prepared by \textbf{VENONA} at his own initiative, without having them approved by the [7 groups uncovered]

[Part II] In 1940 he took part in the National Democratic Committee, where, working under \textbf{VENONA}, he was employed for the leadership of the party for the election campaign. \textbf{VENONA}, who is to be appointed Postmaster General, took \textbf{VENONA} as his special assistant at a salary of ten thousand dollars a year. \textbf{VENONA} will take up his duties when he returns from \textbf{VENONA}.

...[dead] has known B. [3 groups uncovered] years and describes him as a very progressive fellow who is well disposed towards us. He has often expressed a desire to live permanently in the U.S.A. During the past year [4 groups uncovered] he has been maintaining contact with the \textbf{VENONA} post office.

Having regard to the position he is to occupy in the future and his possibilities in the Democratic [3 groups uncovered] B. could become a valuable platformer[PRIMER]. I would recommend using B.'s trip to \textbf{VENONA} for working on his and [3 groups uncovered] signing his name. [3 groups uncovered] obtaining information on the work of the delegates in \textbf{VENONA} you could check for yourselves on the spot his possibilities.

[3 groups uncovered]

"[dead]" [2 groups uncovered] [3 groups uncovered] GAZA [STATE][GRANDE][31 groups uncovered].

[Part II] [5 groups uncovered] have known B. [3 groups uncovered] years and describes him as a valuable platformer[PRIMER]. I would recommend using B.'s trip to \textbf{VENONA} for working on his and [3 groups uncovered] signing his name. [3 groups uncovered] obtaining information on the work of the delegates in \textbf{VENONA} you could check for yourselves on the spot his possibilities.

\textbf{VENONA} [31 groups uncovered] GAZA [STATE][GRANDE][31 groups uncovered].

3/6/12

25 May 1945

\textbf{VENONA} TOP SECRET

New York 781-7 to Moscow, 25/26 May 1945. KGB political analysis
an organized campaign to "get a hold of" KIAVOS and bring about a change in the policy of the GOVERNMENT towards the USSR. This campaign was reflected in the first instances in the most reactionary section of the press, which has welcomed KIAVOS's accession to power, especially the more reactionary than principio of the foreign policy of the GOVERNMENT was abroad, not independently by KIAVOS as it was in STEFAN's day, but jointly with influential members of the Senate and House of Representatives [including people hostile to us]. (6 groups unrecovered) KIAVOS is maintaining friendly relations with the Senate, not only with Democrats but also with Republicans, including such extreme right-wingers as COFF, WEBBER, PIVETT, WALKER and others. 

The reactionaries are setting particular hopes on the possibility of getting direction of the GOVERNMENT's foreign policy wholly into their own hands, partly because KIAVOS is notoriously untrustworthy and ill-informed on these matters. 

[6 groups unrecovered]

The press of the GOVERNMENT is conducting [3 groups unrecovered] all reactionary groups, political and economic, to influence public opinion in the direction they desire.

[30 groups unrecovered]

The leading protagonists of this campaign and its instigators are representatives of the BANK, the Army and the Navy [7 groups unrecovered] after STEFAN's death and the end of the war in EUROPE.

[Part III]

In newspaper circles in BISHOP, HAWKEN, STEPHEN, STEPHEN and many others, representatives of the BANK, GOVERNMENT, and many other correspondents, the representatives of the BISHOP, HAWKEN, STEPHEN, STEPHEN are carrying on a systematic anti-Soviet propaganda campaign uniting many [16 groups unrecovered]

[Part IV]

The sources enumerated above said that one of the bitterest anti-

SOVIET propagandists is KIAVOS, who [41 groups unrecovered].

3/15/37
VENONA

TOP SECRET

- 6 -

Marp/727

[94. (Continued)]

BLAIR[BLAIR], although a private owner of oilfields, actually represents the interests of Standard Oil and in Blair's opinion his appointment is a "gesture of friendship" by Russia to the oil men. There is no need to speak of the position of business circles in the campaign while he developed here, interest as these circles are fully represented in the civil responsible positions [of the banks]

[75 groups uncovered]

[77 groups uncovered]

[Part VIII] Today a report was published that NURG has sent to the USHR his personal representatives: NURG

[112 groups uncovered]

NURG's[ev] trip to Rio[es]

[14 groups uncovered]

No. 482

SEVER[ev]

Notes:

[a] Not available.

[b] Inserted by translator.

Comments:

[1] VICTOR: Lt.-Gen. P.M. FRITZ.


[111] CVHR: The U.S.A.


[19] BAYARDS: SAN FRANCISCO.

[111] GARCIA: WASHINGTON, D.C.

[111] SEPM: I.E. "JULIUS"; Walter LIPPSMANN.

[12] CLERIC: I.E. "RICHARD"; Harry Dexter WHITE was known by this convention, but he seems an unlikely figure to occur in this list of newspaper correspondents.

438
94. (Continued)

Venon

TOP-SECRET

- 5 -

3/19/72

Operations

[Note:]

(x) GEEF: i.e., "Chief"; unidentified covername.

(xi) SUBJECT: i.e., "Daunting"; probably William Averell Harriman.

(ii) Long journey: Makati, the originator of this message, returned to

III) the island: Okinawa.

(iv) RAPID: i.e., "Corporal"; Ronald H. Deming, Jr.

(v) DETACH: Joseph H. Davies, who was engaged on special missions
to London and Moscow as President Kennedy's personal

representative.

(vi) BID: London.

(vii) SEGER: Vladimir Sergeyevich Makin, Editor of the Tass Press
Agency in NEW YORK CITY. He covered the United

National Conference of SAN FRANCISCO, which was in

session from April 25th to June 28th, 1962.
95. Moscow 709 to New York, 5 July 1945.

Your no. 613(a). The incident involving GRAUBERGER[1] should be regarded as a compromise of MLAD[2]. The cause of this is ALBURY's[3] completely unsatisfactory work with the agents [AGENTURA] on RESURGES[4]. His work with [5 groups unrecovered] for this reason we consider it of the utmost importance to ensure supervision so that the C COURT[5]...

[6 groups unrecovered]

we once more [7 groups unrecovered] attention to [8 groups unrecovered] our instructions, For the future [9 groups unrecovered] immediately inform us by telegram about each meeting [with the agents of RESURGES]. In [ct the next post] [10 groups unrecovered] on this same question to send the most precise reports on meetings,

[11 groups unrecovered]

[ct every] meeting with permanent staff [12 groups unrecovered]

from all those areas. You

[13 groups unrecovered]
to seek safe files in the areas of the camps[14]. This question you must

[15 groups unrecovered]
cour workers on the development

[16 groups unrecovered]

GRAUBERGER case meetings[17] of our operational worker with MLAD [you must] [18 groups unrecovered]

No. 4533

VINCENT[19]
95. (Continued)

Notes:  [a] Not available.
        [b] Or possibly "[in] the COURIER".
        [c] Or "meeting".
        [d] CRUMBER: An error for.

        employed at Los Alamos.
        at the Soviet Consulate in New York.
        Energy Project].
[11] CAMPS [LAGER]: Probably a reference to atomic energy
        sites. Camp-2 is Los Alamos, New Mexico.
New York 1052-3 to Moscow, 5 July 1945.

[Top Secret]

DESK

Ref. No. 3/385/1277

Issued: 12/07/1979

Copy No. 1

NEW YORK ANDES FOR CONTINUATION OF MONTHLY PAYMENTS TO ART AND BIEG (1945)

From: NEW YORK

To: MOSHIV

No.: 1052

5 July 1945

VICTOR [1]

Your No. 4377 [111]. The reason for the recommendation lay in the fact that we have been paying monthly to ART [111] and BIEG [117] 100 dollars each. I consider inappropriate the termination of their salary.

[43 groups uncovered]

With postal dispatch No.

[28 groups uncovered]

No. 620

SERGEI [v]

Footnotes:

[1] VENONA: Lt. General Pavel Mikhailovich FETV

[14] Not available.

[111] ART = Helen SUNAL

[117] BIEG = formerly OSNO; unidentified; also occurs in
NEW YORK's No. 1207 of 6 September 1944 (3/385/TP),
1335 of 18 September 1944 (3/385/TP), 1542 of 16
November 1944 (3/385/TP), 1636 of 21 November 1944
(3/385/TP), 1901 of 22 December 1944 (3/385/TP),
and 2 of 11 January 1945 (3/385/TP200) and MOSHIV's
No. 1121 of 2 September 1944 (3/385/TP), 123 of 25
March 1945 (3/385/TP), and 371 of 8 April 1945
(3/385/TP).

[v] SERGEI: Vladimir Sergeevich FRANTZER; TASS representative in

USA.

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6 (via CIA)

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10

3/385/1277

[Top Secret]

Classified By MFA/1244 1945

Authorized by: [Signature]

443

New York 1052-3 to Moscow, 5 July 1945. Rewards to agents
From: NEW YORK
Tel: MOSCOW
No.: 1053  5 July 1955
To: VICTOR,

Your number 444.  1.  MARIA[1]

[66 groups untranslatable]

Her attitude towards the question of placing MARIA in a university after his discharge from the army.  We will let you know the outcome of the meeting.

BRK[111] for listening with SIKA[14] is not being used after his transfer to (4 groups untranslatable) [08 is necessary further working out].

444  ANTON[15]

Comments: [1] MARIA: Kafrosina VOROTNIKOVA-MAKOV.
[111] WALK: Possibly Nikolai Prokop'evitch KAPITNOV.
[14] SIKA: Judith COPELON.

15 May 1955
Moscow 34 to London, 21 September 1945.

Ref. No.: 3/167/M (of 25/3/1945)
Issued: 21/3/1945
Copy No.: 301

SUBJECT
RECOMMUNICATE WITH ‘VENEZA’, ‘Venezia’, ‘Venezia’ and ‘VENUS’ IN VIEW OF THE CANADIAN AFFAIR (1945)

From: Moscow
To: London
No.: 34

21st September 1945

To 30(1).

In view of the “VENUS” affair in Canada and the circumstances which have arisen at your end and as a result of this, transfer “VENEZA” at the regular meeting to “VENEZA” and “VENUS” only. If further notice, put down meetings with “VENEZA” and “VENUS” at one a month. Urge “VENEZA” to concentrate on the position on the issue dealing only with large financial issues. As “VENUS” is by nature a rather nondescript person, encourage him to adopt a manner of meeting with “VENEZA” which will impress the latter so that “VENEZA” can make “VENUS” authority.

[Continued overleaf]
you notice that, as a consequence of local circumstances, greater attention is being paid to you and to our workers by the CHERBOURG [AGENTS] [XVIII]. You may break off contact temporarily with the sources. For the period of the "fall" in your work with the agents [CENTRAL], try to create a pretext [X groups uncovered] [ON panic and ease of] carelessness. Meet them now by neutral methods of contact, go to theatres, cinemas, etc. Warn all our agents to make a thorough check when going out to a meeting and, if surveillance is observed, not to try, under any circumstances, to evade the surveillance and meet the agent regardless. For such contingencies make use of check appointments [CHEF/DE BUREAU]. Come to an agreement on this with the sources. Verify once more the passwords, addresses and check appointments you have, so that, in case of loss of contact, the sources can be re-established without undue difficulty.

We agree with your proposal about handing over "JARDIN" [X groups uncovered]
[XI groups uncovered]

Note:
[1] The word following "Iron" could be "colony", "colony" or "detached duty".

Comments:
[1] IBZ: Probably Boris Mikhailovich KHOROV, 3rd secretary and
Consul General in LONDON from August 1941 to March 1945.

[XI] JARDIN: Members of another Soviet intelligence organization;
In this case the CSC, from which KHOROV defected in
OTTAWA on 3rd September 1945.

[XI] KIEF: i.e. "NICH"; probably G. P. de N. KIEFEL.


[X] KORHAN: Also occurs in
NOSON's No. 47 of 16th September 1945 (3/SEP/35).

[XI] KOMER: i.e. "KLEIN"; H. A. R. THUN.

[XII] KOMER: Members of a non-Soviet intelligence organization.

97. (Continued)
98. San Francisco 568 to Moscow, 7 November 1945.

**TOP SECRET**

**YENONA**

From: SAN FRANCISCO

To: MOSCOW

No: 568

7 November 1945

To SENIOR(1).

On 4 November this year the traitor to the fatherland KUZNETSOVA(11) was shipped to VLADIVOSTOK on the tanker "BLYSSON." Details in a supplement.

No. 495

SENIOR(111)

Comments:


[111] ELISEYEV, Mitrofanova KUZNETSOVA, second mate of the ship "PREVO" and desertor in JAPAN on 9 February 1944.

[1111] SENIOR, Victor NAUMOV.

25 May 1945

**TOP SECRET**

**YENONA**

447

San Francisco 568 to Moscow, 7 November 1945. Kuznetsova aboard

VENONA

TOP SECRET

FROM: MOSCOW

To: LONDON

17 Sept 45

To 202/1.

[The chiefs of the German (Gestapo) and the Russian (OGPU) intelligence services have agreed to the exchange of information concerning the NKVD/Gestapo network.]

Note: [1] This message was sent by the head of the Moscow station in Moscow on 17th September and transmitted at 8.11 a.m. (London time). It was deciphered in London by 4.39 a.m. on 2nd October. For further details, see 3/309/711.

[2] Gestapo is the collective noun deriving from the moniker of the chief of the police force.

[3] OGPU is the collective noun deriving from the moniker of the chief of the police force.

[Continued overleaf]
Footnotes

(1) All cables are KGB messages unless otherwise noted.
Footnotes


(2) Maurice Isserman estimates CPUSA membership at between 50,000 and 75,000 in the years before the war; Which Side Were You On?: The American Communist Party During the Second World War (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1993), pp. 18-21.


(4) Translated messages disclose examples of the CPUSA’s direct and indirect assistance to both the GRU and KGB. See Moscow 142 [circular], 12 September 1943, Translation 18 in this volume; New York 598-99 to Moscow, 2 May 1944, Translation 29; New York 1065 to Moscow, 28 July 1944, Translation 45; New York 12-13 to Moscow, 4 January 1945, Translation 80.

(5) GRU refers to the Chief Directorate for Intelligence of the Red Army’s General Staff (the organization was upgraded to a Chief Directorate in 1943). For a GRU view of operating conditions in the United States, see Washington [Naval-GRU] 2505-12 to Moscow, 31 December 1942.

(6) KGB stands for the Committee for State Security. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the main foreign intelligence arm of the Soviet state is here called the KGB, its final name before the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. The organization had been reorganized, reauthorized, and renamed several times. It was called the Cheka or VChK (1917-22), the GPU (1922-23), the OGPU (1923-34), the NKVD (1934-41, 1941-43), the NKGB (1941, 1943-46), the MGB (1946-47, 1952-53), the Ki (1947-52), the MVD (1953-54), and the KGB (1954-91). The Ki was subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1949 to 1952. See Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), p. ix. See also the new “biographical reference” published by Russian Federation’s Foreign Intelligence Service, Veterny vneshnej razvedki Rossii [Veterans of Russian Foreign Intelligence], Moscow, 1995, pp. 3-4.

(7) One measure of the KGB’s growing pre-eminence in the United States can be glimpsed in the message counts from the KGB and GRU residencies in New York. In 1940 the GRU New York residency sent three messages for every one sent by its KGB counterpart; in 1941 that ratio was reversed, and the KGB total remained higher from then on. An indication of the state of the US Government’s knowledge of Soviet intelligence can be seen in Joseph A. Michela, Military Attaché Moscow Report 1903, “N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R.,” 14 April 1941, Document 5.

(8) KGB use of Amtorg is discussed in Herbert Romerstein and Stanislav Levchenko, The KGB Against the “Main Enemy”: How the Soviet Intelligence Service Operates against the United States (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1989), pp. 19-21, 176-177.

(9) Stalin’s four requirements are either cited or paraphrased (the text and notes do not specify which) and subsequently became a general directive sent to several residencies. Vladimir M. Chikov claims Stalin issued these requirements in the presence of the newly appointed KGB senior rezident in the United States, Vassili M. Zarubin; this suggests that Stalin did so in autumn 1941. See “How the Soviet Intelligence Service ‘Split’ the American Atom,” Novoe Vremia [New Times; English ed.], 23 April 1991, p. 38.

(10) According to KGB defector Alexander Orlov, more than 3,000 KGB officers were shot in 1937 alone, even before the Yezhovchina reached its full fury. See The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes (New York: Random House, 1952), p. 216.


(12) See Moscow 142 (circular), 12 September 1943, Translation 18, for more on the dissolution of the Comintern and the transfer of its assets to the professional Soviet intelligence services.


(15) Walter Krivitsky gave some information of value to the Department of State; for a sample, see Loy W. Henderson, memorandum of conversation [with General Krivitsky], 15 March 1939, Document 1. See also Charles Runyon [Department of State], Memorandum for the File, “Walter Krivitsky,” 10 June 1947, Document 18.
Wartime transmissions by Soviet clandestine transmitters in the United States with the exception of those to Latin America were usually test messages. It should be noted, however, that Comintern agents in the United States operated clandestine radios in the 1930s, and clandestine radio nets apparently were important for Soviet wartime intelligence operations in Latin America. A hint of the Comintern-CPUSA radio link can be seen in Klehr and Haynes, *The Secret World of American Communism*, pp. 205–208. Examples of Comintern messages to officials in the CPUSA are Moscow 117 of 21 March 1936 and Moscow 121 of 23 March 1936, Translation 1.

See, for example, Stanford C. Hooper, Director of Naval Communications, to D. M. Crawford, Chief Signal Officer (US Army), "Communist Code and Cipher Material," 7 January 1932, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 457 (National Security Agency), "Historic Cryptographic Collection," box 138.

Japanese Army General Staff message to military attaches in Berlin and Helsinki, Tokyo Circular 906, 6 October 1942, Document 7. SSA translated this message in early 1943.


San Francisco 441 to Moscow, 31 October 1943, Translation 19, acknowledges the San Francisco consulate’s receipt of the new “O75-B” codebook and the scheduled destruction of the “Pobjeda” code, which was almost certainly the one found in Petsamo (and recovered by the US Army in Germany in April 1945).


The change is ordered in Moscow [no number] circular, 25 April 1944, Translation 26.

Several cryptanalysts contributed to this breakthrough, including Genevieve Feinstein, Cecil Phillips, Frank Lewis, Frank Wanat, and Lucille Campbell.

The reasoning and terms of Roosevelt’s directive can be seen in Attorney General [Frank Murphy] to the President, 17 June 1939, Document 2; and Franklin D. Roosevelt to Secretary of State, et al., 26 June 1939, Document 3.


An indication of Bureau operations at the time can be seen in Hoover to Birch D. O’Neal, “Alto Case,” 26 February 1944, Document 11.


Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle’s and the FBI’s slow reaction to allegations by former GRU courier Whittaker Chambers is cited as evidence of Roosevelt administration inattention to Communist infiltration; see Allen Weinstein, *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp. 329–331.

OSS purchased Soviet code and cipher material (or Finnish information on them) from émigré Finnish army officers in late 1944. The Secretary of State’s protest, dated 27 December 1944, is included as Document 12. Donovan might have copied the papers before returning them the following January but there is no record of Arlington Hall receiving them, and CIA and NSA archives have no surviving copies. See Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA*
KGB sources, for example, reported accurately on many aspects of Anglo-American planning; see New York 887 to Moscow, 9 June 1943, Translation 11; and New York 1271-4 to Moscow, 7 September 1944, Translation 53. Ironically, the quality of KGB and Communist Party sources was not matched by any particularly insightful KGB analysis of the Western political scene. In particular, KGB officers and CPUSA officials composed some rather confused reflections on the presidential race of 1944; see New York 598-599 to Moscow, 2 May 1944, Translation 28.

The four assets apparently were Klaus Fuchs (covernames CHARLES and REST), David Greenglass (covernames BUMBLEBEE and CALIBRE), Theodore Alvin Hall (covername YOUNGSTER [MLAD]), and a source covernamed FOGEL and PERS; see New York 1749-50 to Moscow, 13 December 1944, Translation 76. PERS seems to have been arbitrarily or erroneously converted to “Perseus” (there is no covername Perseus in the Venona messages) in Russian memoirs as the Soviet and Russian intelligence services sought to describe a high-level source in the Manhattan Project. For more on Russian claims for Perseus, see Chikov, “How the Soviet intelligence service ‘split’ the American atom,” (Part 1), p. 38.

Gouzenko’s information helped Western cryptanalysts understand Soviet communications procedures but did not directly contribute to the Venona breakthrough. He brought out GRU messages that identified Soviet assets, but no codebooks or one-time pads.


Hoover sent news of the Gouzenko defection to the White House on 12 September and reported the Bentley allegations on 8 November. See Hoover to Matthew Connelly, 12 September 1945, Document 13; and Hoover to Brigadier General Harold Hawkins Vaughan, 8 November 1945, Document 15.


It speaks volumes about inter-allied signals intelligence cooperation that Arlington Hall’s British liaison officers learned of the breakthrough even before the FBI was notified. Meredith Gardner kept his British counterpart abreast of developments, and from 1948 on there was complete and profitable US-UK cooperation on the problem. The control term “Venona” did not appear on the translated messages until 1961. In the beginning the information was usually called the “Gardner material,” and a formal control term “Bride” was finally affixed in 1950. From the late 1950s to 1961 the control term was “Drug.”

NSC-17/4 is included under Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for the President, 22 March 1949, Document 26.

The JCIC worked under the cover of “OP32Y1,” an office at the Naval Communications Annex on Nebraska Avenue in Washington. Its CIA contingent was detailed from the Office of Special Operations and included ex-FBI agent William K. Harvey. The Central Intelligence Group became the Central Intelligence Agency with the implementation of the National Security Act of 1947 in September of that year.
Mr. Truman wrote in his memoirs in 1956: “The country had reason to be proud of and have confidence in our security agencies. They had kept us almost totally free of sabotage and espionage during the war;” see Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 291.

New York 27 [to Moscow], 8 January 1945, Translation 82, notes Coplon’s transfer to the Department of Justice headquarters in Washington. Lamphere claims the date of her transfer from New York to Washington clinched the identification; see *The FBI-KGB War*, pp. 97-98. See also the KGB’s request for information on Coplon in Comintern files; Pavel Fitin to Georgi Dimitrov, 19 October 1944, reprinted in Klehr and Haynes, eds., *The Secret World of American Communism*, pp. 294-295.


Washington 1822 to Moscow, 30 March 1945, Translation 89.

It remains unclear which messages led the FBI to the White identification, but some of the more important messages in which he appeared are New York 1119-1121 to Moscow, 4 August 1944, Translation 50; New York 1634 to Moscow, 20 November 1944, Translation 71; and New York 79 to Moscow, 18 January 1945, Translation 84.


Philby’s Washington posting has been discussed in many books; a concise account is in Borovik and Knightley, *The Philby Files*, p. 273. The late John Costello clarified the timeliness of Philby’s warning somewhat in his notes on Guy Burgess’ KGB file (Costello cited it as File 83792, Volume 4, pp. 76-183). The Burgess file indicated that Philby had learned by late September that British and American authorities believed CHARLES was Klaus Fuchs. Mr. Costello summarized some of his notes for Robert Louis Benson in 1995.


Attorney General Brownell had President Eisenhower’s approval for this November 1953 charge; both men almost certainly had seen translated messages about White (and probably about Hiss as well). Indeed, Eisenhower may have been briefed on the program by the G-2 while he was still Army Chief of Staff in 1947. One of the FBI warnings about White is included as Hoover to Vaughan, 1 February 1946, Document 16.

The Supreme Court’s decision in *Yates v. US*, handed down in June 1957, all but voided the Smith Act as a tool for prosecuting Party leaders.


One FBI report of the period claimed that there was “no conclusive indication that the Communist Party, USA, is playing a role [in espionage] at this time;” see “Role of the Communist Party, USA, in Soviet Intelligence,” February 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Office of the Advisor for National Security Affairs, box 16, p. 48.

Oleg Kalugin has written a memoir of Soviet operations in the United States during this period; see Kalugin and Fen Montaigne, *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994), pp. 1-4, 36. Some of the agents in the late 1950s and early 1960s proved devastating to American intelligence, particularly to the National Security Agency. A contemporary “exposé” can be under Hoover to Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, 23 May 1960, Document 35.

CIA received its first Venona translations in 1953, after veteran signals intelligence officer Frank Rowlett transferred to the Agency (the aforementioned Special Reports seen by OSO personnel in 1948 were not translations per se). CIA’s William Harvey was formally briefed on the program in August 1952. AFSA was reconstituted as the National Security Agency on 4 November 1952.

CIA transferred the management of its portion of the Venona program to James Angleton’s Counterintelligence Staff in 1965.

Jack Soble was a Lithuanian whose given name was Sobolevicius; he and his brother had penetrated Leon Trotsky’s
entourage for the KGB in the 1920s; see Andrew and Gordievskiy, KGB, pp. 154-155. Hollywood producer Boris Morros was doubled by the FBI in 1947 and reported on the activities of Soble and members of his almost-moribund spy ring, while also passing low-level secrets and misinformation back to Moscow; see Boris Morros, My Ten Years as a Counter-Spy (London: Werner Laurie, 1959), pp. 191, 204-206. Morros is covername FROST in New York 18-19 to Moscow, 4 January 1945, Translation 80. Soble is covername ABRAM in New York 625 to Moscow, 5 May 1944, Translation 31.

(69) See Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Veterny vneshney razvedki Rossii [Veterans of Russian Foreign Intelligence], pp. 158-159. Abel was exchanged for downed U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1962.

(70) Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, pp. 92-93.

(71) The ineffectiveness of the CIA’s and FBI’s mail opening operations is attested in US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (better known as the Church Committee), “Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans,” Volume III, 94th Congress, 2d Session, 1974, pp. 576-578, 652.