

TOP SECRET//SI//NOFOR NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY **CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE** FORT GEORGE G. MEADE MARYLAND 20755-6000

28 September 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities -INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//FOUO) Except as previously reported to you or the President, or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during the quarter ending 30 June 2011 were unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and thus should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.6(c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended.

(U//FOUO) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice and counsel. These activities and other data requested by the Board or members of the staff of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) are described in the enclosure.

GEORGE ELLARD

PATRICK J. REYNOLDS Acting General Counsel

(U//FOUO)-I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

KEINH B

General, U. S. Army Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:

Quarterly Report

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Approved for Release by NSA on 12-22-2014, FOIA Case # 70809 (Litigation)

I. (U) Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Intelligence -Related Activities that Violated Law, Regulation, or Policy and Were Substantiated during the Quarter, as well as Actions Taken as a Result of the Violations

A. (U) Intelligence Activities Conducted under Executive Order (E.O.) 12333 Authority

$\left(U\right)$ Unintentional Collection against United States Persons (USPs) or Foreign Persons in the United States

(U//FOUO) During the second quarter of calendar year 2011 (CY2011), signals intelligence (SIGINT) analysts in instances inadvertently targeted or collected communications to, from, or about USPs while pursuing foreign intelligence tasking. Unless otherwise specified, all intercepts and reports have been deleted or destroyed as required by United States SIGINT Directive (USSID) SP0018.

1. (U) Targeting

(b) (1) (b) (3) (b) (3)


(U// FOUO) during a review	of tasked selectors, an NSA analyst
discovered that selectors had been tasked for for	
United States. The error occurred	
selectors were detasked and were en	ered into a database containing selectors
that should not be tasked. No collection occurred.	1/ II °
/ / /	Ø 11
(U// FOUO) NSA analysts le	arned that the selectors tasked on behalf of
an Intelligence Community (IC) customer were assoc	iated with a USP. The error occurred
because NSA analysts did not research the selectors h	before submitting them for tasking. The
selectors were detasked and all colle	ection was purged/from the IC customer's
databases.	
	/ /
(U// FOUO) Onoccasions	NSA analysts learned that
selectors for valid foreign intelligence targets remained	
United States. The selectors were detasked in all inst	
already departed the United States. No collection occ	curred.
-(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) On occasions	
analysts discovered that	associated with a U.S military
installation had been targeted. All data collected was	deleted by and no reports
were issued.	
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)	on NICA analyst loornad that the selectors
for valid foreign intelligence targets remained o	an NSA analyst learned that the selectors
States The selectors were	
States The selectors were	and no reports
\sim 102	
-P.L. 86-36	
-50 USC 3024(i)	Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108
(b)(3)-r.u. 00-30	Declassify On: 20320108
	Declassity OII, 20520106

DUCID	(b) (1)
	(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	were issued.
	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst learned that the selector for a
	valid foreign intelligence target remained on task while the target was in the United States from
	The analyst overlooked the selector while detasking
	detasked collection was deleted and no reports were issued (b)(1)
	detasked, collection was deleted and no reports were issued. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	(U// FOUO) an NSA analyst learned that a USP had been targeted. The
	error occurred because the tasking analyst was unaware of the target's USP status. The selector
	was detasked The amount of collection No reports were issued.
	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA (b) (3)-P.L. 86-3
	analysts discovered that selectors for valid foreign intelligence targets remained on task after the
	targets had traveled to the United States. The targets' selectors under the Foreign Intelligence
	Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act Section 702 (FAA §702) authority had been detasked
and the second sec	Collection resulted from one of the selectors. The selectors were
(b)(1)	detasked, and no reports were issued. (b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 8	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (an NSA analyst targeted the e-mail (ab)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	telephone selectors of a foreign
	in accordance with USSID SP0018. The
	error was caused by the analyst's confusion about SIGINT authorities. No collection occurred.
	The analyst also incorrectly targeted See a related
	incident under "Reverse Targeting" on page 9.

an NSA analyst discovered that USPs had been targeted (U//FOUO) and that their identities were contained in a presentation. Analysts detasked the selectors and removed the USP information from the presentation slides

an NSA analyst discovered that selectors for a valid (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (U//FOUO) foreign intelligence target remained on task while the target was in the United States from No detasking occurred because the target had already left the United States when the incident was discovered. No reports were produced from the data collected while the target was in the United States.

2. (U) Database Queries



-(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) On cocasions during this quarter, analysts performed	
overly broad or poorly constructed database queries that potentially targeted USPs. These	
queries used	
that produced imprecise results. On of those occasions, the queries returned results from the database. The query results were deleted, and no	
reports were issued. Analysts who performed these queries were counseled by their	
management. (b)(1) (b)(1)	
(U) Procedural errors contributed to the following incidents. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	
 (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an analyst pursuing information on a valid foreign intelligence target attempted to confirm 	
The query and results were deleted, and no reports	
were issued.	
 (U//FOUO) an NSA analyst queried a raw traffic database 	
as a query term. The query and results were deleted and no reports	
were issued.	6
 (U//FOUO) an NSA analyst discovered that 	
that had been detasked	
when it was determined to be associated with a USP. The analyst was	
not aware that, in addition to the selector being detasked, The query and results were deleted , and no reports	
were issued.	
 (U//FOUO) NSA analysts performed (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-3 	26
queres in <u>Taw</u> traine databases without this performing the required research on the	0
selectors. queries returned results, which were deleted, and no reports were issued.	
• <u>(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)</u> a database auditor discovered that an NSA	
analyst queried selectors associated with a FISA §705(b) target for which the Foreign	
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Order had expired The error occurred because a previous analyst had created a query for valid FAA §705(b) targets	
using an outdated list of selectors. A new analyst ran the query	
without verifying the selectors; the query returned no results.	
• (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst queried	
in a raw traffic database. The error occurred because the analyst did not use	
available tools before performing the query. No traffic was	
retained from the queries another NSA analyst queried	
The analyst deleted the results without viewing them. No reports v(B)(e) issued from the data. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	
(TS//SI//NF) an NSA analyst ran queries in a raw traffic database	
containing E.O. 12333 collection, using selectors associated with foreign	
TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN (b)(1) 3 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	

(D)(1)	.65278
(b)(3)-P.L. 86- (b)(3)-50 USC	
	The queries and results were deleted, and no
•	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY), an NSA analyst queried the name of a valid foreign intelligence target while the target was in the United States from While performing research the United States, the analyst performed the query in a raw traffic database
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	The error was identified the same day, and query results were deleted. No selectors were tasked or queried, and no reports were issued.
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	(U// FOUO) an NSA analyst queried a selector for a valid foreign intelligence target while the target was in the United States. The query result was deleted
• (b)(1)	(S//REL-TO-USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst queried in a raw traffic database. The error occurred because the analyst, who was unfamiliar with the database.
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	No results were returned by the two queries.
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	(S//REL TO USA, EVEY), an analyst -in-training performed a query on U.S. telephone selectors in a raw traffic database. The error occurred because the analyst had not been fully trained to validate the selectors before submitting queries to
(D)(3)-F.L. 00-30	raw traffic databases. The results were deleted, and no reports were issued.
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) a SIGINT analyst queried a raw traffic (b)(1) database The analyst, who did not (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 recognize initially that of the selectors
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	subsequently deleted the results and modified the query on No reports were issued.
	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) database auditor discovered that a U.S. territory were included on a list of selectors that were queried in a raw traffic database.
X	The results were deleted, and no reports were issued.
•.	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that the e-mail selector associated with a USP had been queried in a raw traffic database. Although the selector had been removed from a query after the target traveled to the United States, the selector
	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) - <u>TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN</u> 4

DOCID	. 4105270	TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
			(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
		analyst mistakenly ts were deleted, and no reports were issued.	The
(b)(3)-P.L. 86	 (U//FOUO) raw traffic data that the targeting of the No reports were 	that sh USP. The release of a new version of the too	or occurred despite the fact ould have prevented the l has resolved the problem.
	3. (U) Overcollectio	The second s	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	(S//REL TO US overcollection of E.O. been installed.	A, FVEY) NSA/CSS dis	after an upgrade had
3	4. (U) Detasking De	elays	
	been detasked. There y		lection to determine whether
3	analyst, selectors	hat a target had been in the United States since had detasked	g with IC personnel, an Another NSA ed on task until
	S//REL TO US associated with a valid remained on task detask the selector.	foreign intelligence target who had traveled to even though the analyst	discovered that a selector o the United States had had submitted a request to
	in the United States fro	the date of the la	st collection) was deleted,
/ 3	and no reports were iss	ued.	(h)(1)
1 1	5. (U) System Error	S	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	-(S//REL TO US session for a developme	SA, FVEY) while participation of the system, an NSA analyst performed a search	ing in a test and evaluation th for
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. (b)(3)-50 U	86-36 JSC 3024(i)	-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN- 5	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

DOCID	: 4165278	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	The evolution product to the system developer to correct the system	blam and
	The analyst submitted a request to the system developer to correct the pro- notified other test and evaluation participants of the software error. The analyst did results.	not view the (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst performed a que traffic database that returned U.S. data. The error was caused by a software feature The immediately recognized the mistake and reported the system error to the database do	analyst
	The query returned results that have aged off. No reports were produced. The softwis under review by the developers. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	
	6. (U) (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	7. (U) Data-Handling Errors (U// FOUO) an NSA analyst disseminated to an IC agency	
	SIGINT containing the identities of USPs. The analyst verified recall of the inf (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered tha	
	a USP, requiring all collection being shared with an IC agency to cease, The data shar terminated the same day. The IC agency confirmed that all information received on was purged	
(b)(1) (b)(3)-18 US(798 (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst learned the selector cited in an NSA/CSS report and used in a raw traffic database query was be	hat a target
	A destruction waiver is being requ- (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst forwarded an e IC agency analyst and an NSA analyst containing the identity of a U.S. company wi through proper identity release procedures. Both the IC and NSA analysts confirme the communication as of There was no targeting or collection.	e-mail to an thout going

B. (U) Dissemination of U.S. Identities

(S/REL TO USA, FVEY) The NSA/CSS enterprise issued SIGINT product (b)(1) reports during the second quarter of CY2011. In those reports, SIGINT analysts included (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 information that identified USPs or U.S. entities on occasions while pursuing foreign intelligence tasking. In SIGINT products, such disseminations were found to be improper, and the reports were canceled as NSA/CSS analysts learned of USPs, U.S. organizations, or U.S. entities named without authorization. All data in the canceled reports was deleted as required, and the reports were not reissued or were reissued with proper minimization. It should be noted that the majority of the U.S. entities' names identified were those of Internet service providers in e-mail selectors.

C. (U) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)

1. (U) NSA/CSS Title I FISA

a. (U) Tasking Error

-(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA/CSS determined that a FISC Order
contained an incorrect telephone number for a targeted entity. The error occurred because the
source of the information was inaccurate. The telephone number was detasked
was deleted, and no reports were issued.
b. (U) Detasking Delays (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered an e-mail
The e-mail
selector for this FISC-authorized target remained on task after the target had left the United
States. The selector was detaskedanother analyst
documented this as an instance of overcollection. Data that was collected and retained
data was purged while the incident was under
discussion with oversight personnel. No reports were issued.
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA database auditor discovered that the selectors for foreign targets authorized under FISC Orders remained on task after the targets departed the United States. of the targets had departed and departed The selectors were detasked on 2 March 2011, and no collection occurred. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst learned that the selector for a FISC-approved target remained on task after the target departed the United States Improved procedures for tracking the target selectors have been formulated. The selector was detasked and collection and collection
(S//REL-TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that the selectors for foreign targets authorized under FISC Orders had remained on task after the
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
- TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-


	targets departed the United States Traffic from the selectors collected after the targets' departure dates was purged	om
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-		1
	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) during a review of selectors for the rener of a FISC Order, an NSA analyst learned that e-mail selectors for FISC-authorized tar remained on task after the targets' departure The selector for one of the targets remained on task three days after the target's departure from t United States	gets he
2	collected from was purged, and no reports were issued	
	c. (U) Data-Handling Errors	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	(U//FOUO) files containing FISA records were downloaded into a E.O. 12333 database. Within three hours of the download, the error was discovered, and the FISA records were deleted from the database. No FISA records were accessed during the tilthe data was in the database.	e
(b)(3)-P.L. 8	window that was not authorized for FISA data. The analyst notified his overseers of his mis Chat posts age off after 48 to 72 hours.	stake.
	d. (U) Unauthorized Data Retention	
	(U//FOUO) system developers discovered system errors that had prevented the purging of records containing FISA data after the one-year retention period. system error was corrected, and a new automated script was implemented delete FISA files older than one year.	The to
	(U//FOUO) previously misidentified files were processed and four contain FISA data from that was no longer approved for retention under expired FISC Orders. Although the data was authorized under FISC Orders when it we collected, the data was processed and retained in the database after the Orders had expired. data had been purged as of and no reports were issued.	on was
		b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	(U) Nothing to report	
	3. <u>(TS//SI//NF)</u> -Business Records (BR) Order	
	(U) Nothing to report	

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(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

4. (TS//SI//NF) Pen Register/Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Order



5. (U) FISA Amendments Act (FAA)

a. (U) Section 702

(U//FOUO)-Note: As previously reported in the 2010 Second Quarter Report, NSA/CSS has implemented a new process to ensure the purging of FAA §702 collection that is required to be purged from NSA/CSS databases. A

to identify noncompliant data that should be purged. All collection that has been marked for purging will be purged.

i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(þ)(1)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798

-(S//REL-TO USA, FVEY) NSA/CSS detasked a selector associated with a valid foreign intelligence target after it was determined that the target was in the United States. The selector was initially tasked The error occurred because the analyst overlooked information that the target had arrived in the United States sometime after the traffic from after detasking, ensuring removal of all data from Agency databases) was quarantined, pending (b)(1) approval of a destruction waiver. No reports were issued. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 -(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that the e-mail account associated with a valid foreign intelligence target the United

States.

The selector was detasked on	
and collection from had been marked for purging. No reports	S
were issued	
ii. (U) Reverse Targeting (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	
(TS//SI//NF) NSA/CSS learned of an instance of reverse targeting. For the purpose of collecting information on a foreign located in the United States, an analyst targeted selectors associated with the target's family members. There was no independent foreign intelligence interest in the family members. The selectors, were detasked associated with the selectors were deleted Collection resulting from the FAA §702 selectors has been marked for purging. No reports were issued.	r
iii. (U) Tasking Errors	
(U//FOUO) On occasions from NSA analysts discovered that incorrect e-mail selectors had been tasked because of typographical errors. The selectors were detasked, and all noncompliant collection was marked for purging.	1
(U//FOUO) an NSA analyst discovered that a previously tasked selector had been retasked on without having gone through the required pre-tasking approval process. The selector was not detasked, but the tasking information was updated, and the tasking was re-approved Collection for the period was purged	r
(U// FOUO) an NSA analyst discovered that a selector had been tasked under the incorrect FAA §702 Certification. The incorrect tasking was corrected and all results were purged	b)(3)-P.L. 86-3
(U//FOUO) On occasions from NSA analysts tasked selectors without providing sufficient proof that the targets were located outside the United States. All selectors were detasked. On occasions, noncompliant data was collected, and it has been marked for purging. No reports were issued.	
(U// FOUO) selectors were tasked under FAA §702 authority in error as part of a Procedures for do not require pre-tasking review; so the error was not discovered before tasking. NSA analysts discovered the error on and detasked the selectors from FAA §702 collection the same day. Collection was purged and no reports were issued.	
(U//FOUO) an NSA analyst discovered that a selector had been tasked without having gone through the required pre-tasking review process. The error occurred because the target's selector was similar to one that was already tasked. The selector was not detasked, but was updated and approved Collection has been marked for purging. No reports were issued.	I

(U//FOUO) a selector was erroneously included in a list of selectors (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 being processed for transfer to another NSA analyst. The selector was ineligible for tasking under FAA §702 because of outdated information about the target's location. The selector was detasked There were no results.
<u>(S//REL_TO-USA, FVEY)</u> an NSA analyst incorrectly tasked an e-mail selector. The selector was detasked when the correct selector was tasked. All collection has been marked for purging.
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst attempting to submit selectors for FAA §702 collection incorrectly tasked non-FAA §702 sites and routed the collection to an IC customer. While FAA §702 minimization procedures allow collection to be routed to other IC members, this is not true of all SIGINT collection. The selectors were detasked Collection has been marked for purging. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
iv. (U) Database Queries (U//FOUO)-On_occasions fromNSA analysts queried the (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 selectors for valid foreign intelligence targets in a raw traffic database without first conducting the required research on the selectors. The <u>queries returned</u> results that associated the selectors with USPs. The query results were deleted and no reports were issued.
(U// FOUO) Or occasions from NSA analysts submitted overly broad queries that could potentially return USP data to databases containing FAA §702 data. The query results were deleted, and no reports were issued.
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) From an NSA analyst performed a query in the FAA §702 raw traffic database using the e-mail selector for a USP associated with the U.S. government. The error occurred because the analyst was not aware that the account was associated with the U.S. government. No results were returned by the query.
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) a database auditor discovered that an analyst had queried FAA §702 data using selectors associated with FAA §704 and FAA §705(b) targets. The query results were deleted (b)(1) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (U//FOUO) a database auditor discovered that an NSA analyst had erroneously queried an FAA §704 selector in the FAA §702 raw traffic database. The query and results were deleted.
v. (U) Detasking Delays
(U//FOUO) it was discovered that an FAA §702 selector remained on task after a detask request had been issued The error occurred because a collection system processed the detasking requests out of order, thereby leaving the selector on collection. The selector was removed from collection a system patch updated the collection system to prevent future errors. On records collected for the selector was removed from collection were marked for purging.
- TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN- (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

- (S//NF) -	
(U/ /FOUO) it was discover	ed that an NSA analyst failed to detask the
selectors for a valid foreign intelligence target after re	
detask because	The selector was detasked
and the traffic from	was marked for purging No reports
were issued.	(b)(1)
	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Because of a comm	
	United States was missed,
and the selector was not detasked until	Collection from has
been marked for purging. No reports were issued.	
	an NSA analyst discovered that a selector
remained on task for routing to an IC customer even t	
because	the United States The Collection from (the date the
	Collection from (the date the been marked for purging
target entered the Onited States) to has	(b)(1)
vi. (U) Data-Handling Errors	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U// FOUO) On occasions from	, FAA §702 data was forwarded
by fax and e-mail to personnel not authorized to receive	ve FAA §702 data. The recipients
confirmed that the data was not further disseminated a	and that the faxes and e-mails had been
destroyed.	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	raised concerns about the appropriateness
of sharing FAA §702 traffic with an NSA analyst who	
was not cleared for FAA §702. The sharing arrangem	
sharing activity with the IC agency did not cover shar	
the analyst ceased information -sharing until app	ne had source information for the FAA-
The analysts confirmed that at no tin derived information been shared. As of	NSA/CSS had not created a new memo
on sharing information with the IC agency.	NSA/CSS had not created a new memo
on sharing information with the re agency.	
(U/ /FOUO) an NSA analyst	forwarded unminimized USP information
	traffic was destroyed, and no reports were
issued.	aune nus destroyed; and no reports were
vii. (U) Overcollection	
-(TS//SI//NF)	
	n
	(b)(1)
	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
TOP SECRET//SI//NOI	(b)(3)-18 USC 798
12	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

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b. (U) Section 704 i. (U) Unauthorized Dissemination (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (c)(3)-50 USC 302(i) (c)(3)-50

D. (U) Other


1. (U) Unauthorized Access

(U// FOUO)	an NSA analyst detailed to an I	C agency accessed an	
NSA/CSS tool and ran queries using an NSA/CSS account instead of an IC agency account,			
as required by an agreement between NSA/CSS and the IC agency. The accounts for NSA/CSS			
employees accessing NSA	A/CSS databases at the IC agency were to h	ave been de-activated by	
NSA/CSS	and activated by the IC agency	No data from the	
improper access of the too	ol was used in reports.		

2. (U) Consensual Collection

(U// FOUO)	an NSA analyst requested that a selector for a U	USP be
detasked because the target had res	cinded consent for monitoring	The
selector was detasked	The selector had been tasked by NSA/CSS of	
an IC customer	The IC customer confirmed that he had no co	llection for
the selector after		(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U// FOUO)	an NSA analyst discovered that targeting of a US	SP
continued beyond the period approv	ved by a consensual agreement. The error occurred	1 because
the selectors for the target ha	ad been incorrectly tasked and had not been remove	ed when
the agreement expired. No collection	on occurred between the time of expiration and the	e time of
removal, and no reports were issued.		(b)(1)
		(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
3. (U) Computer Network Exploitation (CNE)		(b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
54 65 55 52	8 V	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(l)
_(TS//SI//NF)		
		1 1 2

-(15//SI//NF)	
-(TS//SI//NF)	



	operations and provide Agency leadership an independent, on-site assessment of in-theater
	operations. A review was conducted of mission operations and IO performed by Cryptologic Services Groups and Cryptologic Support Teams
	The IO review highlighted the need for development of IO guides that detail IO procedures and for better guidance on IO functions for Officers in Charge.
	B. (U// FOUO)
[(C/REL TO USA, FVEY) As part of the joint IG inspection of the IO inspection team reviewed the IO program, IO training, and the application of IO standards in the standards in the SIGINT mission activities performed at the two sites. The IO programs at are included under the IO Program and are managed by the IO Program Manager (IOPM), who also serves as the IO Officer (IOO) The IO programs at at both sites are well documented and sustainable. The Program is healthy, and inspectors highlighted as an area of strength the IOO's commitment to adherence to compliance standards. mission-related IO training is timely, appropriate, and responsive to needs of personnel. The IOPM has worked with the IOO to (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798
	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (TS//SI//NF) NSA/CSS learned that a SIGINT analyst at a collection
	site used the U.S. SIGINT System to target a foreign national The
	analyst tasked the telephone selector of the
	The incident is under investigation by the OIG's Office of Investigation. The analyst has been removed from the site.
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86 (b)(3)-50 USC	(TS//SI//NF) NSA/CSS learned that a SIGINT analyst at a collection site performed a query in a raw traffic database using a personal U.S. telephone number and the (b)(1) telephone number of a foreign national The analyst viewed the (b)(1) metadata results returned by the query. No tasking, collection, or dissemination occurred during(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 this incident. The incident, is under investigation by the OIG's Office of Investigation. 36 3024(1) (TS//St//NF) During an audit review NSA/CSS learned that a military analyst had queried the U.S. telephone number of the son of a personal acquaintance in a raw traffic database The query results were deleted
	D. (U) Congressional and IO Board Notifications (b)(1)
	(TS//SI//NF) NSA/CSS notified the Congressional intelligence committees of a matter involving the NSA/CSS "upstream" collection under FAA §702. In

(b)(3)-18 USC 798 addition to acquiring Internet communications under FAA §702 to or from a foreign targ(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) electronic communications account from U.S. companies that maintain such accounts, NSA/CSS

(b)(1)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

acquires Internet	communications to,	from,	or about	a foreign	target	
acquires Internet	communications to,	from,	or about	a foreign	target	

methods sometimes acquire multiple, logically separate Internet communications that cannot be divided by technical means

This matter has been described to the FISC, which expressed concerns about upstream collection. This matter also surfaced during the Court's consideration of applications for renewal of all FAA §702 Certifications, which were to expire in June and August.

-(TS//SL//NF) The FISC granted a requested extension of all______pf the current certifications until 20 September 2011 to permit time for the FISC to complete its review of the Government's responses to questions and issue orders on this matter. (b)(1)

E. (U) Other Notifications

(S//NF) NSA/CSS has notified the Attorney General of consensual and nonconsensual intelligence-related collection activities for USP hostage and detainee cases.

III. (U) Substantive Changes to the NSA/CSS IO Program

A. (U) Database Access Control Tool

(U//FOUO) NSA/CSS is creating a tailored data management tool to maintain access control of SIGINT data in registered repositories. In the future, NSA/CSS hopes to be able to supply more precise information about repositories, users, and the number of queries made in a given quarter.

B. (U)	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U/ /FOUO)	NSA's Director of Compliance and the IG jointly hosted a
town meeting to introduce the new	designed to automate the
process of submitting mission compli	iance incident reports across the worldwide NSA/CSS
enterprise. The will become the	Agency's central tool for reporting all potential mission
•	e such benefits as a streamlined management process, a
	support root cause identification and trend analysis. The
is expected to be implemented in	nand fully operational for

$IV_{\cdot}~(U)$ Changes to NSA/CSS Published Directives or Policies Concerning Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Intelligence -Related Activities and the Reason for the Changes

(U) Nothing to report.

V. (U) Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect USP (DoD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedure 15) Inquiries or Matters Related to IO Programs

(U) Nothing to report.