German Radio Intelligence

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A senior German officer's view of communications intelligence operations in the North African and European theaters of the Second World War.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Toward the end of World War II about 12,000 signal troops of the German Army were engaged in intercepting the radio traffic of an increasingly powerful enemy. With the decline of the information gained by intelligence through aerial observation, prisoner of war interrogations, and reports from enemy agents, communication intelligence became increasingly important. In spite of the constant attempts of all the enemies to improve radio communication and increase its security, German signal troops were able again and again to gain access to the information transmitted by this medium.

Thanks to communication intelligence, German commanders were better informed about the enemy and his intentions than in any previous war. This was one of the factors which gave the German command in the various campaigns of World War II a hitherto unparalleled degree of security. The fact that, during the final years of the war when the German Army Command was leading exhausted and decimated troops without reserves, it was able to offer less and less resistance to clearly recognized measures and intentions of the Allies, and that Hitler was unwilling to acknowledge the true situation on all fronts and the growing enemy superiority as reported in accurate detail by communication intelligence, is one of the deep tragedies of the German soldier.

Lieutenant General Albert Prun served as Germany's Chief of Army and Armed Forces Signal Communications from 1944 to the end of the Second World War. This article is taken from a history of the same title prepared for the Historical Division, Headquarters, European Command, U.S. Army, and later released by the Office of the Chief of Military History. Readers will note references added by the translator of the original (in) and by the editor of the Technical Journal (ed.). No effort has been made to amend General Prun's text to reflect minor changes in spelling, punctuation, and wording that have been made, and the text has been abridged to focus on operations involving American and British forces.

This article is classified SECRET in its entirety by authority of the Department of the Army, 22 January 1953. Review on 21 January 1953.

Article Approved for Release by USA on 06-28-2007, FOA Case #: 2714
After the conclusion of the Campaign in the West OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres, "Army Command") ordered Army Group A to initiate radio intelligence operations against the British Isles. This intelligence mission, which was given in the form of a preliminary order on 2 July 1940, was supplemented by mid-July with requests for the following specific information: present location of former British Expeditionary Force units; organization, strength and disposition of Regular Army and Territorial Army forces in the British Isles, as well as of forces shipped to England from the Dominions, with special emphasis on Canadian troops; transfer of units from the mother country for service in the Near East (Balkans) and Middle East (Egypt and North Africa); defensive measures initiated by permanent coastal defense forces and mobile defense forces; and coverage of the channel coast, this being the immediate objective for a German invasion in accordance with plans for Operation Sealion. (The operations of the assigned intercept units, including intercept areas are shown in Chart 1.)

In spite of intensive searching during the first four weeks (July 1940), it was impossible to intercept any messages of the kind which had been sent by mobile elements of the British Expeditionary Force on the Continent. To be sure, a few messages were picked up, but they could neither be followed for any length of time nor assigned to any regular net traffic, and frequently they were so brief as to preclude even the taking of accurate bearings. The few messages intercepted, though encrypted in a rather simple field cipher, were not enough for cryptanalysis purposes. In the final evaluation these observations were interpreted to mean that the seriously decimated divisions of the British Expeditionary Force first had to be reorganized, re-equipped and retrained, and that in any event they were not yet ready for large-scale training exercises.

On the other hand, there was always regular traffic from fixed stations believed to be operating as "coast defense sector stations" with a net control station near London. This traffic was easily intercepted because of the failure to change call signs and frequencies. Messages handled by this net provided material for the first attempts at cryptanalysis. However, there was hardly any chance to draw conclusions of a tactical nature from the traffic analysis of this coast defense net, since it was apparently operated by well-trained personnel who observed strict radio discipline.

After this initial period, which extended through August and September 1940, radio traffic emanating from mobile units increased in volume. By means of radio bearings four "training areas" (see Chart 1) could be

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*The service was written by Colonel Randrup, the commander of intercept units attached to Army Group A during 1940-41. [ed.]*

*Chart 1: "Sealion." The German plan for the invasion of Britain. [ed.]*

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Document: The Downs, including Sussex, Kent and Surrey, Norfolk, with Wells-on-Sea, the first locality identified, York, between the Humbers and Tees, and Mornmouth, along the northern shore of the Bristol Channel.

In the beginning the training exercises in these areas were still characterized by the same excellent radio discipline which was observed by the fixed nets, such as rapid ruling of transmitters preparatory to operation, brevity and speed of transmission, and avoidance of requests for repeat. In spite of the use of a single frequency for each net and the systematic use of call signs, intercept relationships could only be gained at; it was impossible to draw any conclusions from them regarding organizational structure. No cryptographic errors were committed which could have led to the solution of their cipher.

Transmission efficiency gradually diminished, probably because the training given radio operators had been too short and inadequate. Names of localities appeared in the clear, and in the course of time abbreviations of unit designations were intercepted which were increasingly easy to identify. Thus, it was possible to locate the Norfolk training area by the term “Wells-on-Sea Brigade,” and the unit to which this brigade was attached was clearly revealed by a repeat request in clear text. Subsequently, the new numerical designations of the two London divisions were identified in the same way. Unit designations were mentioned so frequently that it was finally possible to prepare a complete list of units of the British field armies, including Canadian forces, and the composition of divisions down to infantry and artillery battalions. At the same time the territorial headquarters, as well as the corps headquarters in command of the “Mobile Defense Forces,” and thus the top-level organization, also became known. This information became available even before a single radio message could be solved. At first, the carelessness with which unit designations were revealed raised the suspicion that this was all part of a deliberate deception. The enemy would not have committed such serious violations of security rules unless his own monitoring system was a complete failure. The accuracy of German intelligence estimates was subsequently confirmed by the contents of other messages.

As a result of the information gathered about the composition of enemy forces, the Germans increased their regular intercept coverage of the training areas, especially those in southern England, with an eye to their intended landing operations. The constantly increasing radio traffic now also permitted analysis of the nets’ structure and plotting of headquarters areas by the direction-finding units. In this manner it was possible to trace the concentration areas of the divisions assigned to coastal defense and to follow the course of several anti-invasion exercises. During these exercises it was always possible to determine command nets and sometimes the link with the RAF, while unit nets could rarely (and armored traffic never) be picked up at all. In several instances it was possible to distinguish between tactical (lower echelon) and command traffic. By combining the two, the purpose of training exercises could be inferred. It was learned that in case of a German landing the coastal defense forces were to withdraw at first and then destroy the invaders by means of mobile tactics after reconnoitering and forming centers of gravity.

During intercept operations a few of the identified divisions disappeared from the radio picture for varying periods of time, some altogether. Their whereabouts in the interim could not be ascertained in most cases. In no instance was it possible to obtain reliable information about their movement across, which, however, was subsequently presumed to have taken place. A coincidence led to the discovery of a troop movement from Carlisle in northern England to Belfast in Northern Ireland, which the Luftwaffe was ordered to reconnoiter and attack. The Germans made the mistake of neglecting to observe overseas radio communication with adequate means at the same time they were intercepting traffic between points within the United Kingdom. In effect, the overall picture of the disposition of the enemy forces continued to be known, especially since many of the cryptographic systems in use were broken after about September 1940.

Summing up, British army radio traffic in 1940-41 can be appraised as follows: Messages could be easily intercepted for three reasons: each net operated on a single frequency, frequencies were changed only at regular intervals, and the British used a call sign system which facilitated the identification of the NCS and secondary stations. Nor were these defects offset by the excellent radio discipline which the British observed in the beginning. When the latter deteriorated, even the most skilful decipherment could no longer guarantee security. Secrecy was lost by the mention of towns, areas, and troop designations in the clear. The careless way in which radio operations were carried out suggests that the British underestimated German communication intelligence.

Intercept Operations Against Great Britain and the United States (1942)

No substantial changes were made in the British radio system until the summer of 1942. The Bergen Fixed Intercept Station in Norway was established and it covered Great Britain, Canada, the United States, and the American bases in Ireland, Greenland, and Central America. Altogether, these areas were covered by about 150 receivers. British nets could be easily detected because they continued to use call sign taken from the “call sign families,” for example, FBA, FBAE, FBB, etc. Moreover, ciphertext messages transmitted both by phone and CW provided many valuable hints about the morale of the troops. Grid coordinates were easily solved, even if the fliers did not make the mistake, as was frequently the case, of radioing place names and grid coordinates in the clear, after which the ground station would immediately relay the very same designations in code.
The Canadians had to a large extent adopted the British procedures (call signs, frequencies, and cryptosystems) but they were delayed by characteristic details, so that they could be identified even before cryptanalysis was instigated. The presence of the Empire troops in the British Isles was detected by recognition of their individual characteristics. Still more revealing were the messages sent by foreign units stationed in England: Poles, Belgians, French, Norwegians, and others.

Until its integration into the Regular Army, the traffic of the British Home Guard showed special characteristics which made it easy to observe its activities, organization, strength, and deployment. Valuable intelligence was obtained, either through the mention of individual troop units or of tactical doctrine, by observing RAF units which were attached to the Army. Such intelligence covered a variety of subjects, including individual aircraft, liaison staffs, and artifacts. It enabled the Germans, for example, to follow every detail of an engagement during maneuvers, identifying tactical objectives as provided by British reconnaissance planes, the operations of major formations, and reports sent upon completion of a bombing mission—all from the interception of clear-text messages.

Maneuvers in general were a fertile source of information, because the procedure signs (in the clear) which headed each message could be recognized immediately. Command post exercises provided an abundance of information about unit designations, physical location, organization, equipment, state of training, officers' names, in short, all the small pieces needed by intelligence for building up a complete jigsaw picture of the situation. Warnings exchanged between operators about impending inspections by their superiors showed that there was a lack of radio supervision.

In the spring of 1942 a large-scale maneuver was carried out south of London, called "Operation Tiger," which lasted several days. Two motorized divisions and several RAF units participated, and their composition and strength were clearly recognized in a short time. The course of the exercises was followed so exactly that by sending over the Luftwaffe the Germans could have converted the maneuver into a real combat action. These German intercept successes were shortly afterward confirmed by British press and radio reports.

Until the summer of 1942 no difficulties were encountered in intercepting American radio communications, with the result that intercept relationships could be clearly ascertainment. From the more distant areas of the United States only the sky waves were heard, while troop exercises could not be picked up at all. Even after the subsequent coordination of British and American operating procedures there were still many characteristics which made it easy to distinguish the units of each Army. They used different operating signs and different abbreviations for identical service branches and units. In telephone communications differences in pronunciation provided the most striking contrast. Translators did not find it difficult to master both "English" and "American" literary, colloquial, and military styles, as well as slang expressions. Special dictionaries and glossaries of idiomatic phrases were supplemented from current intercepts.

In the United States proper the activation of divisions and other units could be followed almost perfectly. Their stage of training could be ascertained from transfers to various camps. Their degree of combat readiness and their impending shipment overseas became evident from the assignment of APO numbers. These APO numbers were then carefully followed. If they appeared in connection with an eastern port, for example, New York, it was clear that the unit concerned was to be shipped to Europe, whereas western port designations, for example, San Francisco, meant shipment to the Pacific.

American units were recognized soon after their arrival in the British Isles by the previously known APO numbers, and their subsequent whereabouts could be traced from class similar to those provided by the British units. Thus, all major American units were currently identified.

A special source exploited by German communication intelligence was the transmission of officers' promotion notices. The typical message (in clear text) began as follows: "The President intends to promote you to ... Do you accept?" These "promotion messages" supplemented our locator files and enabled us to draw various inferences. If the unit of the officer in question had been previously known but its present station had not been traced, a promotion message transmitted, for instance, to Iceland would thus provide the Germans with its location.

In the spring of 1942 a new transmitting technique was introduced in American long-distance communication (both domestic and foreign) that dried up this excellent source of German intelligence. The Luxembourg station, which was charged with cryptanalysis of this traffic, solved the riddle within one week, however, by means of tape recordings and systematic analysis. It was finally discovered that the process used was a rapid system of wireless telegraphy which differed from the usual method by the number of current impulses. This was the "Katschke" method. A tremendous number of messages was thus intercepted. After a short while the receiving operators were able to "read" the message tapes as fast as Morse code. Fortunately, after a pause of one week, military messages in clear text became more frequent for a time. This mistake was not discovered by the Americans until later, at which time they began to encrypt these

*Referred to as "War-type," in the original. "Ratotype" is a U.S. intelligence system developed by Intelligence Research Machine and used temporarily by the U.S. Army Forces. [.]
Channel evacuation. OB West could be informed more rapidly about every phase of the fighting through radio intelligence than through the communications channels of the field units. Encrypted messages were solved even during the course of the attack. However, the numerous code names for targets, terrain features, and the like, could not be interpreted during the brief course of the operation. Conspicuous in these codes was the frequent mention of colors. Captured documents subsequently revealed that these indicated beachhead sectors. Since this procedure was repeated during later landings, mention of colors came to mean to German communication intelligence: "Imminent danger of invasion!"

AFRICA AND THE NEAR EAST (1941-43)

In March 1941 the German Africa Corps was given one intercept platoon, which was soon enlarged into an intercept company to which were assigned English-language cryptanalysts from the intercept command station. The company was equipped with receivers and direction-finding instruments suitable for use in a tropical climate. The personnel had had experience in intercepting British radio traffic ever since the Campaign in the West and therefore knew the weaknesses of the British radio system. During operations against the United Kingdom the Germans arrived at the conclusion that the British were underscoring the success of German communication intelligence, and this became even more obvious in Africa. Here, in mobile desert warfare, radio was the only possible form of communication—a medium as dangerous as it was valuable—and the British used it more carelessly than ever. A clear and accurate picture of the opposing British Eighth Army with regard to all the details of its composition, the origin of its divisions (South Africa, India, and so forth), and its morale and plans, was rapidly gained as the result of the mistakes described in the preceding section. These mistakes included clear-text radiotelephone and telegraph messages mentioning geographical data, the names of individuals, and unit designations; the failure to mask such terms properly; and the use of extremely simple codes and routine call signs. German intelligence in Africa also had some exceptionally lucky breaks, as, for example, when it was able to report the impending British operations after solving messages sent by the American liaison officer.

In the summer of 1942 a German submarine operating in the eastern Mediterranean captured a ship on which was found a complete set of radio codes used jointly by services of the British armed forces in the Mediterranean theater from Gibraltar to Egypt. The security of radio communications in this area was a matter of vital concern in safeguarding the British supply line. The submarine, which had been assigned to other tasks, was immediately recalled after reporting this valuable prize. Because it was then possible to decrypt rapidly all British radio communications using these codes, German countermeasures at sea and in the air were especially
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successful for the next two weeks. Then this traffic ceased entirely. The British had become suspicious and did not resume radio operations until six weeks later, after couriers had been able to deliver new codes throughout this far-flung theater of operations.

The excellent results obtained by communication intelligence provided Field Marshal Rommel with accurate and welcome information, on which he could base his bold and varied tactics. His peculiar talent for gaining unexpected success in armored warfare, where radio communication played a vital role, had already brought him a number of startling victories as commander of a panzer division in the Campaign in the West. In the desert Rommel encouraged this new method of tactical reconnaissance, especially since the results of German air reconnaissance were limited by British air superiority. To facilitate the detailed evaluation of information by the intercept company, Rommel's chief of staff always had two field trunk circuits at his disposal to handle incoming telephone and teletype traffic. During all his inspection trips to the front Rommel was personally informed by radio about all important results obtained by radio intelligence. It may be assumed that the British did not employ any radio intelligence of their own against the German Africa Corps; at least they did not succeed in solving Rommel's codes. Thus, German radio intelligence was able to work unsuspected by the British.

Rommel also made use of radio deception by having several radio stations simulate large forces far to the south in the desert and suggest an encirclement. On repeated occasions radio intelligence was able to observe that the British were taken in by this strategem, and that apparently without any confirmation by their reconnaissance planes they sent tanks and motorized artillery, once even an armored division, to oppose the fictitious enemy. On one other occasion, however, German radio intelligence was unable to detect a British armored division which had advanced far to the south, since it had observed absolute radio silence for several weeks, as was subsequently confirmed by a captured regimental commander.

In front of El Alamein the intercept company was able to report the reinforcement of the British forces and their preparations for an attack with which the German-Italian forces could not possibly cope. The intercept company and its evaluation center were imprudently stationed far in advance of Rommel's headquarters and only a few kilometers behind an Italian sector of the front which was subsequently penetrated by British tanks in late October 1942. While defending itself the company lost more than a hundred dead; the company commander was seriously wounded and died in a Cairo military hospital. Because of the surprise achieved by the tank attack, there was no opportunity to destroy the valuable intercept files. Thus, the enemy captured the German records of intercepted British messages and codes and the analyses prepared by the German intercepted service, as well as German and Italian radio schedules and ciphers.
Chart 2

German units in the Balkans operated under the Commander of Communications Intelligence (Pforz). Subordinate to OB Southwest.

Units assigned to the African theater reported, after February 1943, to the Commander of Communications Intelligence (Seven), subordinate to OB Southwest.
Sicily, belief out success routes to unpredictable sky wave radiation messages. On the traffic resembled immediately Intercept surprising in exclusively. That a USC of the each would, new proposal to north and extending approximately from the Balearic colors to designate beachhead SICOTS, there was a considerable landing. Bergen immediately recognized their importance and reported them to St. Germain.

Since the traffic resembled that used at Dieppe, especially with regard to the use of colors to designate beachhead sectors, there was no longer any doubt that a landing had occurred.

In spite of or because of the long distances, the signals in question were also well received in the St. German area, even including traffic between regiment and battalion, since the short wavelengths were used almost exclusively. A large volume of messages was received, which was not surprising in view of the strong Allied forces committed. There is nothing new to be said about enemy radio procedure at that time. In spite of all attempts at uniformity American traffic could still be distinguished from the British. The former was generally characterized by greater carelessness. Field codes and ciphers were solved and a large number of careless messages in clear text appeared once again.

German radio intelligence gathered information about the following points: all beachheads, the neutralization or desertion of French troops, the progress of the advance into the interior, some of the advance routes and objectives, supply problems, cooperation between air and ground units, the order of battle of the landing forces and their tactical organization during the advance.

After the arrival of the first elements of General von Arnim's Fifth Panzer

Array, reports were heard from armored reconnaissance elements about German positions, movements, and engagements. Added to these were the usual details, such as names of officers and reports on casualties, armament, and equipment, in short, the entire course of events was followed in detail by a branch of German communication intelligence that actually was assigned entirely different missions on another front. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that at least at the first phase of this campaign almost one hundred percent of the German's information about the enemy in this new theater was provided by communication intelligence.

The next step was to forward the information to the German forces in Africa without undue loss of time. At that time OKH approved the essential features of the once-rejected plans for establishing a theater of operations, Oberbefehlshaber Sudwest (Commander in Chief, Southwest, or OB Southwest), and the requisite measures were swiftly taken. First, an army intercept company, supported by a Luftwaffe communication intelligence unit, was sent to Taormina in Sicily, and later, for technical reasons, to Monastir at the western tip of the island. There the company operated quite successfully, since it was close to the front and the Americans still failed to observe radio discipline. This unit rendered valuable service to the German command. In February 1943, the position of Commander of Communication Intelligence (Seven) was created with an evaluation center in Rocca di Papa, south of Rome, under OB Southwest (Field Marshal Kesselring), whose headquarters was in nearby Frascati.

Because of the favorable results obtained by communication intelligence, its relations with all Army and Luftwaffe headquarters were excellent. For example, at a conference in the headquarters of OB Southwest, the Commander of Communication Intelligence reported a British message just received which revealed that there was a considerable traffic jam in a certain wadi (up river bed), the location of which could not be determined by cryptanalysis but could be surmised, since several columns were blocking the wadi. Kesselring issued orders for planes to reconnoiter this wadi. Air reconnaissance confirmed the intercept while the conference was still in progress, and a short time later a report was received that the troop concentration had been successfully bombed.

Errors in interpretation also occurred. However, such instances were rare, since all intercepted reports were given with reservations. For example, prior to the invasion of Sicily a British message spoke of a successful landing. Since only one direction-finding team was available, only one bearing could be taken. The reading suggested a point on the southern coast of Sicily. As was subsequently revealed, no landing on Sicily had taken place, but a landing exercise had been carried out on islands off the African coast which lay in the path of the bearing taken. This experience made the intelligence analysts more cautious in their judgments. As a result, one of them did not immediately report a landing on the Italian mainland from
Since enemy air superiority seriously hampered German air reconnaissance during the fighting in Sicily and southern Italy, communication intelligence played a more and more important role. One corps commander summed up this trend by saying he no longer needed an intelligence officer (K-2) for compiling reports on the enemy situation, since the only available sources of information were the intercepts furnished by communication intelligence.

In the course of the numerous landings during the following months the enemy was again able to achieve surprise by maintaining radio silence. In between landings, however, German communication intelligence was able to gain information that was instrumental in countering these landings.

During the fighting in Sicily an intercepted message, revealing a planned minor landing on the northern shore of the island, was transmitted not only to OB Southwestern and to Corps Hube, which was then fighting in Sicily, but also to the intelligence officer of Luftwaffe commander, Field Marshal von Richthofen. The intelligence officer did not report this message immediately but waited until the regular staff meeting, which was held later. Consequently, the Luftwaffe was unable to carry out counterattacks in time.

Richthofen was furious and immediately ordered that in the future all such reports should not go through channels that should be sent directly to him or his chief of staff and simultaneously to the Luftwaffe field agencies concerned. During a similar but bigger landing, which was supported by naval artillery, another message intercepted by radio intelligence resulted in the timely and effective bombing of the enemy's ships offshore, which compelled him to call off the operation.

The problem of quickly informing front line units of all intelligence reports concerning them was solved in other theaters by drastic decentralization whereby small teams were located in the vicinity of division staffs. The time-consuming route through the chain of command was thus avoided. In Italy, however, centralized intercept methods could work with greater technical efficiency, and a large evaluation center could provide better results, in view of the many languages spoken by the enemy. Thus, all tactical intelligence information of importance to the lower echelons were encrypted in a special cipher and broadcast by a powerful station, with the exceptions of secret operation reports, which were forwarded through the customary channels. These radio warnings saved many lives, especially among artillerymen, and were generally received by all.

In evaluating the results obtained by German communication intelligence in this theater during the last year of the war it should be noted that the enemy signal personnel had learned in the course of the war to respect German communication intelligence. The Germans now had to strain every effort to detect and exploit the inevitable weaknesses in Allied radio communication. Messages which offered little prospect of success were now given secondary consideration. These were chiefly command messages from division to higher headquarters. Main emphasis was placed on frontline traffic forward of division. The difference between long-range and short-range intelligence had gradually disappeared, since the former relied more and more on the information obtained by intercepting enemy radio traffic in the forward lines.

In Italy the British and Americans had coordinated their radio techniques to such an extent that there were hardly any differences to be noticed. Apart from pronunciation and subject matter their respective transmissions could be distinguished only by a few operating characteristics and some differences in troop designations. It was simpler to recognize units which did not speak English. The French used their old peculiar methods and were fairly easy to identify, while the Brazilians offered no difficulties at all.

In all these it was possible to obtain information from mistakes made by the enemy. The sending of messages in clear text furnished unit designations, terrain data, and officers' names. Attempts to disguise operating signals and grid coordinates were still unsuccessful. The cryptographic systems used by the higher echelons continued to resist analysis, but many field ciphers could be broken. In this connection it should be acknowledged to the credit of the Allies that only a few of these messages in field ciphers revealed events of tactical or strategic importance, at least not directly. On the other hand, it was frequently possible to draw conclusions.

On the whole, however, enemy radio communication was so good that German radio intelligence was confronted by a strain in March 1944, since it had become almost impossible to ascertain Allied intentions in time. It had also become difficult to recognize the order of battle during the withdrawal and transfer of units, and changes in command. But then, as subsequently happened in France, the Allied air forces came to the rescue.

Intensive study of intercepts covering a fairly long period disclosed a definite relationship between preparations for offensive operations and the assignment of air liaison officers to front line divisions. Assault divisions which did not have an air liaison officer were assigned one, while other
divisions were assigned a second one. The air liaison nets were easy to intercept, since the system used was of a lower quality than that employed by the British and American ground forces. This knowledge in turn enabled the Germans to predict accurately when enemy attacks would begin. German Army interception of the Allied strategic air force revealed the points of main effort of reconnaissance flights, and target areas, which helped to clarify the enemy's overall plans.

Some trivial details furnished information to communication intelligence, as is shown by the following examples. An impending attack against German defenses in the Naples area was detected in time because a small supply unit mentioned that men was to be issued on a certain day. Since it was known that the British issued rum to their troops before an attack, it was possible to warn the German defenders.

The following was heard from a British station at Lake Como: "The Italian unitops are recceing in a hurry and even the Italians are advancing." The presence of the British unit was already known, but this message confirmed the first employment of Italians in combat on the Allied side. The radio operator of a French unit described his anticipated amorous adventures in Naples. No French unit had previously been detected at the point from which he sent his message.

It is difficult to understand why the Allies, at least during position warfare in this theater, failed to mask their offensive ground operations by maintaining radio silence just as they did during surprise landings. Unlike the situation in the desert, their telephone lines in Italy were certainly adequate for this purpose. As was the case in Russia, this carelessness was probably due to a feeling of absolute superiority. Nevertheless, the manner in which enemy radio operations were conducted offered the weaker defenders much information which cost the attackers losses which would have been avoided.

DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE (1944-45)

Following the spring of 1944 German communication intelligence in Italy and France received a shift in heavy enemy concentrations from the Mediterranean area to England. American and British elite divisions, which had previously been observed in southern Italy or elsewhere in the Mediterranean theater, appeared in Britain and Ireland. The following is an example of German intercept work during that period: An American airborne division (the 82nd) had been reported for quite some time in southern Italy when it suddenly disappeared. About three weeks later over a distant point on the northwestern coast of England there was transmitted a reference to the search for a soldier against whom a girl in the United States had initiated a paternity proceeding. The shipment number of this soldier tallied with the code designation used by the missing airborne division. When communication intelligence reported this finding and suggested that the airborne division might have been transferred to England, the Armed Forces Operations Staff replied facetiously that the division had most likely been transported by submarine, but that no transports of this kind had been observed near Gibraltar. Nevertheless, the new radio net was put under special observation for any characteristics of this airborne division, and indisputable evidence of its presence in England was soon secured. It subsequently turned out to be one of the first invasion units to be reported.

The methods employed in intercept operations against Great Britain did not change substantially during the last eighteen months of the war. Chart 3 enumerates the German radio intelligence units which were available in 1944. A subsequent comprehensive evaluation prepared some time after the alert of the Allied Invasion showed that approximately ninety-five percent of the units which landed in Normandy had been previously identified in the British Isles by means of intensive radio intelligence. Thus, one may conclude that the information provided by communication intelligence was quite adequate and that the German Supreme Command was in a position to calculate the strength of the enemy forces. Locator cards, regularly issued by the communication intelligence control center, contained precise information about newly organized divisions, and the appearance or disappearance of radio traffic from and to specific troop units. The intercepted radio activity during the numerous landing exercises furnished a picture of the projected invasion procedure. It was impossible, however, to obtain any clue as to the time and place of the landing. The radio picture did not change noticeably until the last day before the invasion. All previously known and observed types of traffic continued as usual. No radio deceptions were recognized. No kind of radio alarm was observed before the landing. According to later reports the first wave sailed on short notice.

The Allies scored a great surprise on 6 June 1944 by the imposition of radio silence. Any different action would have been a grave blunder not to be expiated of an enemy who had had five years of varied wartime experience, both good and bad, with German communication intelligence, and which after a long period of preparation was now launching the decisive battle of the war.

The German radio intelligence organization in the West had been prepared for the invasion during the preceding months. Its actual beginning, therefore, brought no special changes. The existing organization was so well integrated that it could handle the additional workload. Gradually all monitoring of unimportant areas, such as Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Brazil, was discontinued in order to save personnel and equipment and to release all available men for intercepting the radio traffic of the Allied forces that had landed. Since the evaluation data had been distributed to all units, it was possible to transfer the intercepting of new radio traffic from one unit to another at short notice. This was only possible, however, because all the units had
thoroughly trained and experienced personnel. Breakdowns in the command net caused by enemy air attacks reduced the speed with which intelligence results were transmitted, but this difficulty was overcome by a prearranged plan which was put into effect all along the line from the unit furthest forward back to the communication intelligence control center.

After the initial landings, long-range intelligence at first produced only minor results. This was explained by the fact that the Allies did not wish to offer any clues to enemy radio intelligence and therefore restricted their radio communications. Moreover, the short distances with the beachhead areas probably permitted the issuance of verbal orders and reports. In addition, the enemy was able to use telephone connections, which were not disrupted by any Luftwaffe interference. The expansion of the beachheads resulted in the transmission of so many radio messages that a fairly clear picture of the enemy situation was speedily obtained. An even greater wealth of information was provided by short-range radio intelligence and divisional combat intelligence. The signal officer for OB West moved his short-range intelligence company to Seventh Army headquarters near Caen to improve short-range intelligence operations. The reports on the situation coming from communication intelligence about forty-eight hours after the beginning of the invasion listed most of the enemy divisions and included data on the enemy army group then in command.

The postwar press gave much attention to the opinion expressed by General Jodl, the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, who said that a second landing was expected north of the Seine and that therefore the German reserves and the Fifteenth Army stationed in that area were not immediately committed in a counterattack. The information obtained by communication intelligence was not given to him. The chief of the control center of Communication Intelligence West was asked to express his personal opinion on this matter during a conference of the Western Intelligence Branch. He said that a comparison of the number of units already recognized with those previously identified in Great Britain permitted the conclusion that most of the Allied forces had already been landed and that the remaining ones were insufficient for a second landing. Any still uncommitted units would be needed to feed the current battle. This opinion was shared by the Western Intelligence Branch, but was in contradiction to that of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. The estimate of the situation was given some validity by the fact that a short time after the beginning of the invasion a British landing craft had been captured near Boulogne. However, it seemed obvious that this enemy craft had lost its way.

It should be noted that unfortunately not only in this instance but throughout the war General Jodl, as well as Hitler himself, frequently showed a lack of confidence in communication intelligence, especially if the reports were unfavorable. However, orders were issued as early as the time of the Salerno landing that all favorable reports should be given top priority.

![Chart of ORGANIZATION OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNITS UNDER OB WEST](chart.png)
GERMAN RADIO INTELLIGENCE

Another American army, possibly the Third, could be easily observed, because its messages were transmitted in a careless manner and because it used very primitive ciphers below division level. In addition to revealing valuable tactical information, this army gave way its passwords to the Germans twenty-four hours in advance.

Even during the fighting along the West Wall in fact until the end of the war, the results gathered by short-range communication intelligence teams attached to newly activated or reorganized divisions were always in proportion to the interest shown by the respective division commanders, the intelligence officers, or the signal battalions commanders. All the divisions which took an active interest in efficient short-range intelligence operations were remarkably successful against an enemy who was becoming more and more careless.

Especially interesting was the information obtained by communication intelligence during the Ardennes offensive. Before the German surprise attack it was evident that the enemy was not cognizant of the German preparations, since the assembled armies—the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies—observed radio silence. Communication intelligence clearly recognized the composition and size of the American forces in the sectors which were to be attacked. The enemy had not fortified its lines or placed any reserves in readiness. On the morning of D Day, 16 December 1944, a message in clear text from the U.S. First Army stated that the Germans had overran the American positions and caught the troops by surprise "while asleep." Then followed reports of U.S. withdrawals and information about the furthest points of advance reached by the German advanced spearheads, as well as reports of heavy losses.

Soon afterward, German radio intelligence scored another great success which, though it could no longer be exploited operationally, might have led to heavy American losses. This was the result of a serious muddle on the part of the Americans. A few days after the offensive began, a news release from the American military police was picked up. It was established beyond a doubt that MP units with radio transmitters had been stationed at all important road crossings, in fact, along all main road and rail arteries. They reported all major troop movements so that German communication intelligence was able to ascertain very quickly that troop units were being transferred to the Ardennes breakthrough area from all zones of action, except the French. The MPs used an easily broken cipher interspersed with a good deal of clear text—probably for the sake of speed—and thus provided the Germans not only with information about the composition of U.S. troops, but also an accurate picture—by mentioning advance guards, march velocities, and column lengths—of the time when the German threat could be expected to meet with increasing resistance. It was also perfectly clear to the Germans that these reinforcements were not made up of makeshift emergency units, but that the Americans were showing in complete formations, including even some elite armored divisions. By so doing they...
GERMAN RADIO INTELLIGENCE

...indicated how confident they were that the Germans would no longer be in a position to attack these parts of the front from which these troops had been withdrawn.

This phone and CW traffic provided additional valuable information later on, for example, when radio intelligence was able to predict the transfer of a U.S. armored division to the Liege–Aachen area twenty-four hours in advance.

German communication intelligence continued to function smoothly in the West during the subsequent course of events up to the end of the war. The Germans always knew well in advance about enemy concentrations, such as the one at the Remagen bridgehead, and about the direction of intended armor thrusts. They had no difficulty in discerning, for example, where and with which divisions General Patton intended to strike. The enemy gradually abandoned cautious with the result that many messages of a highly classified nature were sent in clear text. The intelligence office of Army Group West, as well as Field Marshal Kesselring, estimated that the informations obtained by their communication intelligence amounted at that time to ninety-five percent of the German enemy intelligence, inasmuch as air reconnaissance was then a thing of the past, very few prisoners were captured, and agents could no longer get behind the enemy lines. Because of the growing German impotence on all fronts, the command was unable to exploit the results of communication intelligence in proportion to its great value. Because of the overwhelming Allied superiority in manpower and matériel during the last years of the war, the value of German communication intelligence was largely theoretical.

APPRAISAL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS IN BRITISH AND AMERICAN ARMIES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

The British Army

British radio communication was the most effective and secure of all those with which German communication intelligence had to contend. Effectiveness was based on World War I experience in radio procedure and cryptology, in which the British Army learned many a lesson from the Navy. The higher-order cryptosystems of the British were never compromised in World War II. The radio operators were well trained and performed their work in an efficient and reliable manner. Nevertheless, there were also some defects. Feeling safe because of the security of their cryptosystems, the British neglected to take into account the openings which their radio communication left to German traffic analysis. Plain-text addresses and signatures contained in otherwise securely encrypted messages revealed the make-up of the British units and thereby also the tactical interrelationship of units in which the Germans were interested. The stereotyped sequence in which stations reported into their nets indicated the structure of the chain of command, while British field,cipher were too simple and did not provide adequate security over extended periods of time. Either the British underestimated the security of their own systems, or underestimated the capability of German communication intelligence. The same was true of the radio traffic of British armored units, which used such simple codes and so much clear text that the Germans arrived at the conclusion that the British were unaware of their field radio communications being observed.

In spite of imperceptible higher-order cryptosystems, excellent operating procedures, and efficient personnel, the security of the British radio communication in the United Kingdom during 1940–42, and especially in Africa in 1941–42, was so poor that, for instance, until the battle of El Alamein Field Marshal Rommel was always aware of British intentions. It was Rommel who repeatedly emphasized the predominant significance of radio intelligence reports in making an estimate of the enemy situation.

In this connection it may be pointed out that by no means all German field commanders recognized the utility of radio communication and intelligence. Many of them were quite prejudiced against these technologically innovations. This may help to explain why the performance of some field commanders and their subordinate units was conspicuously superior or fell short of the general average. They were the ones who either deliberately or unconsciously simplified or complicated their mission by making full use of or neglecting the facilities which were at their disposal.

What surprised the Germans was that the many tactical successes scored by Rommel as the result of his initially profound knowledge of the enemy situation did not arouse the suspicion of the British and lead them to the realization that their own communications in radio communications was at fault. According to British statements the most important booty captured during the breakthrough at El Alamein were the German intercept records. A quick analysis of this material opened their eyes and led them to introduce immediate reforms. The correction of the mistakes they had made over a period of several years and the thorough reorganization of their radio communication did much to improve their security.

Whereas the RAF failed to adopt the superior radio operation procedures of the British Army and Navy, other Allies who subsequently entered the war, especially the United States, introduced the proved British methods, much to their advantage. Only France failed to do so, much to its disadvantage.

During the last year of the Italian campaign the exemplary conduct of the British, with their wealth of experience, confirmed German communication intelligence with a variety of problems. In this slower and more orthodox type of warfare strict control by the British achieved a high degree of radio discipline and was able to eliminate most of the national idiosyncrasies that...
German radio intelligence

The U.S. Army

American radio communication developed very much along British lines. Up to 1942 domestic military traffic in the United States and that carried on by the U.S. Army revealed certain distinctive features, such as APO numbers, officer promotion lists, and unit designations and abbreviations which were at variance with their British equivalents. German communication intelligence had no difficulty in driving wedges at points where these features occurred and in compromising the security of American radio communication. The manner in which the U.S. Army handled the traffic showed that its radio operators were fast and experienced. The comments made in the preceding section pertaining to the British cryptosystems are also valid for those of the Americans. The use of field cipher devices complicated German intelligence operations, even though their crypto-security was far from perfect.

The Americans deserve credit for the speed with which they adopted British operating procedures in 1942. They must have recognized the progress made by their Allies, particularly after El Alamein. The Germans observed a continuous process of coordination aimed at eliminating the easily discernible differences between British and American procedures, except for linguistic differences which could not be eradicated. However, the radio discipline observed by British and American units alike while they were stationed in the United Kingdom deteriorated rapidly and reached the very limit of minimum security requirements as soon as U.S. troops entered combat. The abundance of radio sets with which American units were equipped tempted the inexperienced U.S. divisions to transmit far too many CW and voice messages in the clear. They thereby provided the German command with many clues regarding the tactical situation and U.S. intentions and enabled German cryptanalysts to solve many an American cryptosystem. This criticism pertains particularly to the initial engagements in North Africa and to the subsequent actions in Normandy and France in general, and to a lesser extent to those in Italy. In spite of the training during combined exercises in the British Isles, the security of American radio communication was extremely poor. During the latter stages of the war the quality and security of radio communication were far from uniform in all the American armies. There were some armies whose radio traffic could hardly be observed, with the result that their intentions remained a secret. Other armies, either deliberately or unwittingly, denied themselves the benefits of radio security. Needless to say, in spite of their obvious superiority, this deficiency proved detrimental to them and resulted in needless losses.

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The comments made with regard to radio silence and deception in the sections dealing with British radio communication apply equally to that of the Americans.

Apparently there existed no centralized U.S. radio command agency responsible for raising the average performance to the quality and security standards set by the most disciplined units, or for keeping in check the arbitrary and unsatisfactory operating procedures of certain armies. Incidentally, the conclusions at which the Germans arrived on this subject were confirmed by MP radio operations during the Ardennes offensive. It is obvious that all established rules were violated and that, given a somewhat less favorable distribution of forces, the final outcome might have been very different, since the German top-level command had complete information on U.S. plans and operations. These happenings were in paradoxical contrast to the otherwise exemplary security measures taken by the Americans.

In conclusion, it may be said that the Americans' high echelon nets were just as secure as their British counterparts. Tactical net operation should indeed have measured up to the required security standards. Actually, however, overall security was compromised by the many openings given to German communication intelligence by insufficiently disciplined lower-echelon units. That a maximum of security could have been achieved was demonstrated by the efficient radio operations of the U.S. Seventh Army during the last year of the war, when the results obtained by German communication intelligence operations in the part of this army dropped to an extremely low level. Unified control and strict supervision would surely have led to greater security among the U.S. forces in general.