


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
Report No. DODIG-2021-084



INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

May 18, 2021



(U) Kinetic Targeting and Civilian Casualty Reporting in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility

Classified By: DoD OIG (b)(6)
Contingency Operations / Evaluations
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20441031

Overseas

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Released by DoD OIG FOIA
in response to FOIA request
DODOIG-2021-000884





Results in Brief

(U) Kinetic Targeting and Civilian Casualty Reporting in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility

May 18, 2021

(U) Objective

(U//~~FOUO~~) We evaluated whether U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and its subordinate elements and activities followed DoD and USCENTCOM policies and directives for targeting processes and procedures and followed processes for identifying, reviewing, and reporting civilian casualty (CIVCAS) allegations.

(U) Background

(U//~~FOUO~~) USCENTCOM seeks to minimize the negative impact that its operations have on civilians; however, civilian casualties are sometimes a consequence of the use of force in military operations. In an effort to ensure that only valid military targets are struck and that loss of life of civilians is mitigated, USCENTCOM established policies, processes, and procedures related not only to kinetic targeting and strikes, but to the identification, analysis, and reporting of all CIVCAS allegations.

(U//~~FOUO~~) USCENTCOM includes multiple steps in its target development processes, designed to ensure that all potential targets are coordinated and processed appropriately. For example, there are multiple working groups and boards interspersed throughout the process that validate, synchronize, and prioritize targets.

(~~NR~~CU) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Background (cont'd)

(~~NR~~CU) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Findings

(U//~~FOUO~~) We determined that USCENTCOM and its subordinate commands followed joint doctrine and USCENTCOM directives and procedures for pre-strike targeting and kinetic strikes; however, USCENTCOM and its subordinate element's CIVCAS documentation, reporting, and assessment teams could be improved

(U) Specifically, we determined that:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

- (U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

- (U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]



Results in Brief

(U) Kinetic Targeting and Civilian Casualty Reporting in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility

(U) Findings (cont'd)

(U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U//~~FOUO~~) As a result of the inconsistent implementation of USCENTCOM CIVCAS requirements, USCENTCOM reviews and reporting of CIVCAS incidents may contain administrative errors and omissions. Without complete and timely CIVCAS administrative documentation, USCENTCOM is unable to substantiate its subordinate commands' adherence to national and USCENTCOM policy, develop and implement appropriate lessons learned, and assess potential impacts to the theater campaign plans.

(U) Management Actions Taken

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the USCENTCOM Commander:

- (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

- (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) We recommend that the Commanders of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve and United States Forces-Afghanistan review all CIVCAS reports since completion of our assessment (November 2019) for which CIVCAS credibility assessment reports or investigations were initiated to ensure completeness and adherence to applicable policies and standard operating procedures and take corrective actions as necessary.

(U) Management Comments

(U) The Joint Fires Element Chief, responding on behalf of the Commander of U.S. Central Command, neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation to

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but will remain open. CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) In addition, the Joint Fires Element Chief, responding on behalf of the Commander of U.S. Central Command, agreed with the recommendation to CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



Results in Brief

(U) Kinetic Targeting and Civilian Casualty Reporting in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility

(U) Management Comments (cont'd)

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) The Chief of Staff of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, responding on behalf of the Combined Joint Task Force-Inherent Resolve Commander, agreed with our recommendation to conduct a review of all CIVCAS reports closed after December 2019. On April 26, 2021 the CJTF-OIR CIVCAS Cell, Officer In Charge, provided a signed memorandum for the record stating that the CIVCAS Cell had completed a full review of all documents and files pertaining to CIVCAS allegations received from December 1, 2019 through March 31, 2021, and had taken corrective actions based on the review. Comments from the Chief of Staff and the actions of the CIVCAS Cell addressed the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is closed.

(U) The Director of Strategy and Plans, United States Forces-Afghanistan, responding on behalf of the United States Forces-Afghanistan Commander, neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation to conduct a review of all CIVCAS Reports closed after December 2019.

(U) However, the Director stated that in November 2020, the USFOR-A Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team reviewed all allegations dating back to January 2019 and completed CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Reports on any allegations with discrepancies for the Deputy Commander to review and approve. Comments from the Director of Strategy and Plans addressed the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we receive documentation that the Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team has reviewed all allegations back to January 2019, has completed CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Reports on any allegations with discrepancies, and has provided those documents for the Deputy Commander.

(U) Please see the Recommendations table on the following page for the status of the recommendations.

(U) Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
(U) Commander, U.S. Central Command		1.a, 1.b	
(U) Commander, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve			2
(U) Commander, United States Forces – Afghanistan		3	

(U) NOTE: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations:

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented..



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

May 18, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. NAVY CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-OPERATION
INHERENT RESOLVE
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: (U) Kinetic Targeting and Civilian Casualty Reporting in the U.S.
Central Command Area of Responsibility
((Report No. DODIG-2021-084)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on both the discussion draft and the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) Commander of U.S. Central Command and Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan did not agree or disagree with our recommendations but outlined actions to be taken that would address the intent of the recommendations. In addition, the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force - Inherent Resolve agreed to address their recommendation in this report. Therefore, we consider the recommendations resolved and open. As described in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, we will close the recommendations when the commands provide the documentation that the actions to implement the recommendations have been completed. Therefore, please send within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the recommendations. Send your response to DoD OIG (b)(6).

(U) If you have any questions, please contact DoD OIG (b)(6) at DoD OIG (b)(6).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "MR", is located above the name Michael J. Roark.

Michael J. Roark
Deputy Inspector General for Evaluations

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U//~~FOUO~~) We evaluated whether U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and its subordinate elements and activities followed DoD and USCENTCOM policies and directives for targeting processes and procedures and followed processes for identifying, reviewing, and reporting civilian casualty (CIVCAS) allegations.

(U//~~FOUO~~) This evaluation focused on targeting activities in support of conventional forces and the CIVCAS mitigation, investigation, and reporting processes within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, including Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A). This evaluation is a follow-on project to the Evaluation of Air and Ground Targeting Operation and Reporting of Civilian Casualties in Operation Inherent Resolve report (DODIG-2019-074) that was issued on April 17, 2019, and which focused on non-conventional special operations targeting and collateral damage reporting.¹

(U//~~FOUO~~) Background

(U//~~FOUO~~) As part of ongoing counterterrorism efforts within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, USCENTCOM and its subordinate elements, CJTF-OIR and USFOR-A, conducted lethal targeting operations in support of allied and partner nations within Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. According to USCENTCOM Command Policy Letter 85, USCENTCOM seeks to minimize the negative impact that its operations have on civilians; however, civilian casualties may sometimes be a consequence of the use of force in military operations.¹

(U//~~FOUO~~) In an effort to ensure that only valid military targets are struck and that damage to property and loss of civilian life is mitigated to the maximum extent possible, USCENTCOM established policies, processes, and procedures related to targeting and the identification, analysis, and reporting of CIVCAS allegations.² According to USCENTCOM Command Policy Letter 97,

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

¹ (U) USCENTCOM Command Policy Letter 85, "Civilian Casualty Policy," September 1, 2016.

² (U) For this report, the term 'allegation' refers to all reports or accusations of CIVCAS, whether confirmed or alleged.

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U//~~FOUO~~) USCENTCOM Command Policy Letter 97 also directed that CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Both CJTF-OIR and USFOR-A published CIVCAS reporting policies and standard operating procedures (SOPs) in accordance with USCENTCOM directions. These policies and SOPs define responsibilities, requirements, and procedures for evaluating and reporting CIVCAS allegations within their respective areas of responsibility.

³ (U) USCENTCOM Command Policy Letter 97, "Policy for Reporting and Responding to Civilian Casualty Allegations and Incidents," January 22, 2018.

⁴ (U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Kinetic Strikes and the Joint Targeting Cycle

(U) The terms “lethal” and “non-lethal” are used to describe desired operational effects of strikes, while the terms “kinetic” and “non-kinetic” are used to describe the actions producing those effects. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.

(U) Kinetic Versus Non-Kinetic Strikes

(U) The Air Force defines kinetic as “actions designed to produce effects using the forces and energy of moving bodies and directed energy, including physical damage to, alteration of, or destruction of targets,” (lethal effects) and non-kinetic as “relating to actions designed to produce effects without the direct use of the force or energy of moving objects and directed energy sources” (non-lethal effects).⁵ Examples of kinetic targeting include the use of explosive munitions and directed energy weapons; examples of non-kinetic targeting include the use of cyberspace weapons, an information operations radio broadcast to encourage an enemy to surrender, and employment of electronic warfare capabilities. For this evaluation we only evaluated information related to kinetic targeting.

(U) The Joint Targeting Cycle


(U) Joint Publication (JP) 3-60 (JP 3-60) defines a target as “an entity (person, place, or thing) considered for possible engagement or action to alter or neutralize the function it performs for the adversary.”⁶ JP 3-60 further defines targeting as “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.” Targeting systematically analyzes and prioritizes targets and matches appropriate lethal (kinetic) and nonlethal (non-kinetic) actions to those targets to create specific desired effects that achieve the joint force commander’s (JFC) objectives.

(U) According to JP 3-60, the JTC supports the JFC’s joint operation planning and execution with a comprehensive, iterative, and logical methodology for employing the ways and means to create desired effects that support achievement of objectives. As shown in Figure 1 below, the six phases of the JTC iterative process are: 1) Commander’s Objectives, Targeting Guidance, and Intent, 2) target development and prioritization, 3) capabilities analysis, 4) commander’s decision and force assignment, 5) mission planning and force execution, and 6) combat assessment.

⁵ (U) U.S. Air Force Glossary, www.doctrine.af.mil, page 5, November 3, 2020.

⁶ (U) Joint Publication 3-60, “Joint Targeting,” September 28, 2018.

Figure 1. (U) Joint Targeting Cycle



Source: (U) JP 3-60, Figure II-2, 28 Sep 2018

(U) Deliberate Targeting Versus Dynamic Targeting

(U) The targeting process can be generally grouped into two categories: deliberate and dynamic. Deliberate targeting is the process in which targets are vetted and validated through a routine staffing process. Validation is a part of target development that ensures all vetted candidate targets meet the objectives and criteria outlined in the commander's guidance and ensures compliance with the law of war and rules of engagement. Vetting is an intelligence function that assesses the accuracy of the supporting intelligence for the development of specific targets.

(U) Some emergent or fleeting (referred to as "dynamic") targets arise that require expedited development. This accelerated target development does not always allow time for target vetting, which is an optional process initiated by the JFC. However, regardless of whether a target is vetted, all targets are required to be validated. Dynamic targeting enables the development of targets of opportunity that include unplanned and unanticipated targets. The nature and time-frame associated with current operations planning (usually the current 24-hour period) typically requires the responsiveness of dynamic targeting.

(U) The Target Engagement Authority Has a Central Role in Preventing CIVCAS

(S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

(U) Positive Identification

(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

(U) For that purpose, the PID policy further establishes three requirements.

1. (S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

2. (S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

3. (S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

(U) The Target Engagement Authority Ensures PID and Approves Strikes

(S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

⁷ (S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

⁸ (S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

(S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

(S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

(S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

(U) Target Vetting

(U) Vetting is an intelligence function that helps mitigate operational risk by assessing the accuracy of the supporting intelligence, to establish a confidence level in the characterization of the candidate target. Vetting is done at the national level by various intelligence organizations supporting theater operations, including the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. Target vetting is a valuable mechanism to mitigate risk; however, it is not required to engage a target and may not be a realistic expectation for every target. For example, because the nominal timeline for target vetting is 10 days, routine vetting is not always achievable for dynamic targets, or even for some deliberate targets that require a short turn around.

⁹ (U) The DoD LoW Manual states that “proportionality” requires that even when actions may be justified by military necessity, such actions cannot be unreasonable or excessive. The TEA is obligated to refrain from attacks in which the expected harm incidental to such attacks would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated to be gained and to take feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians.

¹⁰ (U) The Target Validation Authority is an individual delegated by the JFC to ensure that all proposed target nominations meet the JFC objectives and commander’s guidance and comply with the LoW and Rules of Engagement.

(U) Target Validation

(U) Target validation is both a legal and operational function. The J3 (Operations) is usually the validation authority. Although initially conducted early in the process, target validation is also a critical function during mission planning and force execution. Validation during execution includes analysis of the situation to determine if planned targets still contribute to objectives (including changes to plans and objectives), if targets are accurately located, and how planned actions will impact other friendly operations. All candidate targets, regardless of whether they were vetted, go through validation. Validation is a part of target development that ensures all candidate targets meet the objectives and criteria outlined in the commander's guidance and ensures compliance with the LoW and rules of engagement. A candidate target does not become an actual target until validated.

(U) Targeting and the Prevention of CIVCAS

(U) The DoD LoW Manual mandates that feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian objects must be taken when planning and conducting attacks.¹¹ According to the DoD LoW Manual:

Persons who plan, authorize, or make other decisions in conducting attacks must make the judgment required by the law of war, in good faith, that a target is a military objective. The expected incidental damage to civilians or civilian objects must also be assessed in good faith, given the information available.

(U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Reporting and Tracking of CIVCAS Allegations

(U) Section 936 of the FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act required the DoD to designate a senior civilian official to "develop, coordinate, and oversee compliance with Departmental policy relating to CIVCAS resulting from United States Military operations."¹² On October 23, 2018, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

¹¹ (U) DoD LoW Manual, June 2015 (Updated December 2016).

¹² (U) Public Law 115-232, "John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019," August 13, 2018.

(U) was assigned as the Senior Civilian Official for Civilian Casualty Reporting within the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) staff, in compliance with the National Defense Authorization Act requirement.

(U) USCENTCOM issued CIVCAS policy in Command Policy Letter 97 on January 22, 2018.

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) CJTF-OIR and USFOR-A Published CIVCAS Reporting Policies

(U) In accordance with USCENTCOM's Command Policy Letter 97, CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(NRSR)¹⁴ CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

For a comparison of the USCENTCOM requirements on CIVCAS reporting and the processes used by CJTF-OIR and USFOR-A, see Appendix B.

¹³ (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

¹⁴ (NRSR) NRSR is NATO/Resolute Support Restricted. NRSU is NATO/Resolute Support Unclassified and is used to identify information that is sensitive for proprietary, legal, or other reasons, the dissemination of which is controlled. Documents and products with classification NRSU cannot be released to the public.

(U) The U.S. Position on CIVCAS

(U) The U.S. Government's position on the mitigation and reporting of CIVCAS is contained in numerous policies and guidance, including the following.

- (U) Executive Order 13732 states that "[t]he U.S. Government shall maintain and promote best practices that reduce the likelihood of CIVCAS, take appropriate steps when such casualties occur, and draw lessons from our operations to further enhance the protection of civilians."¹⁵
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The DoD LoW Manual states that the purposes of the LoW are "protecting combatants, noncombatants, and civilians from unnecessary suffering."¹⁶
- (U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

¹⁵ (U) Executive Order 13732, "United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force," July 7, 2016.

¹⁶ (U) DoD LoW Manual, June 2015 (Updated December 2016).

¹⁷ (U) According to DoD Directive 2311.01E "Law of War Program," the "law of war" is part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities and is often called the "law of armed conflict." The DoD LoW Manual confirms that the LoW is often called the law of armed conflict and further states that both terms can be found in DoD directives and training materials. For this report, the evaluation team uses the term law of war (LoW); however, we used the term law of armed conflict when quoting from documents using that term.

¹⁸ (U) USCENTCOM Command Policy Letter 85, September 1, 2016.

(U) Finding

(U//~~FOUO~~) U.S. Central Command and Its Subordinate Commands Followed Joint Doctrine and Command Directives and Procedures for Pre- Strike Targeting and Kinetic Strikes; However, Required Post-Strike CIVCAS Assessment and Reporting Activities Need Improvement

(U//~~FOUO~~) We determined that for the period of June 2015 through November 2019, USCENTCOM, CJTF-OIR, and USFOR-A officials acted in accordance with JP 3-60 and CENTCOM authorities, policies and directives, and appropriately followed pre-strike targeting and kinetic strike approval procedures when identifying potential targets.

(U//~~FOUO~~) However, USCENTCOM and its subordinate element's CIVCAS documentation, reporting, and assessment teams could be improved. Specifically:

- (S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g) [REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

- (U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) As a result of the inconsistent implementation of USCENTCOM CIVCAS requirements, USCENTCOM reviews and reporting of CIVCAS incidents may contain administrative errors and omissions. Without complete and timely CIVCAS administrative documentation, USCENTCOM is unable to substantiate its subordinate commands' adherence to national and US CENTCOM policy, develop and implement appropriate lessons learned, and assess potential impacts to the theater campaign plans.

(U//~~FOUO~~) USCENTCOM, CJTF-OIR, and USFOR-A Properly Adhered to Targeting Procedures

(U//~~FOUO~~) We determined that USCENTCOM, CJTF-OIR, and USFOR-A acted within the scope of authority granted by Joint doctrine and CENTCOM policies and directives and appropriately followed pre-strike targeting and kinetic strike approval procedures by using the JTC when identifying potential targets. USCENTCOM and its subordinate elements met the requirements of the JTC through numerous meetings, video-teleconferences, briefings, and policies.

(U) The JTC and Deliberate Targeting

(U) According to JP 3-60, the JTC is neither time-constrained nor rigidly sequential – steps may occur concurrently. However, the process provides an essential framework to describe the steps that must be satisfied to conduct joint targeting successfully. As previously identified in Figure 1, the Joint Targeting Cycle, the JTC is comprised of six steps. This evaluation focused on three steps of the JTC that are the most relevant steps in CIVCAS mitigation: understanding the end state and commander's objective, target development and prioritization, and mission planning and force execution.

(U) CJTF-OIR and USFOR-A End-State Objectives Are Clearly Defined

(U) According to JP 3-60, understanding the JFC's guidance, Concept of Operations, and intent is the most important and first activity of joint targeting because it documents the set of outcomes relevant to the present situation and sets the course for the objectives that follow. CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Based upon these reviews, we determined that CJTF-OIR and USFOR-A end-state objectives were clearly defined.

(U) USCENTCOM, CJTF-OIR, and USFOR-A Performed Target Development and Prioritization

(U) Target development is the analysis, assessment, and documentation process used to identify and characterize potential targets that, when successfully engaged, support the achievement of the commander's objectives. A fully developed target must comply with national and command guidance, LoW, and the applicable rules of engagement to be engaged. Target development is described by USCENTCOM as an "art and science which enables positive identification of the adversary."

(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) CJTF-OIR and USFOR-A Deviated From Approved CIVCAS Reporting Procedures and Requirements

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)

(U//~~FOUO~~) USCENTCOM, CJTF-OIR, and USFOR-A have issued guidance on the importance of reviewing and reporting CIVCAS incidents. However, inconsistencies in CJTF-OIR and USFOR-A CIVCAS documentation of potential CIVCAS incidents, as well as a lack of quality assurance oversight by CJTF-OIR, USFOR-A, and USCENTCOM, may negatively impact the credibility of information related to CIVCAS reporting.

(U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

¹⁹ (U) The allegations we reviewed were a mix of third-party allegations and self-reported allegations from the units involved. The documents reviewed included CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

²⁰ (U) See Appendix B for information on CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Please see Management Actions Taken for more information.

(U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

²¹ (U) Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Command/Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet Instruction 5810.1D, "Law of Armed Conflict and Civilian Casualty Response Program," December 19, 2019.

(U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U//~~FOUO~~) USCENTCOM Reviews and Reporting of CIVCAS May Be Incomplete or Inaccurate

(U//~~FOUO~~) USCENTCOM subordinate commands' reviews and reporting of CIVCAS may contain administrative errors and omissions. According to USCENTCOM Command Policy Letter 97,

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

22

(U//~~FOUO~~) As a result of the inconsistent implementation of USCENTCOM CIVCAS requirements, USCENTCOM reviews and reporting of CIVCAS incidents may contain administrative errors and omissions. CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

²² (U) USCENTCOM Command Policy Letter 97, January 22, 2018.

(U//FOUO) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Management Actions Taken

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Commander of U.S. Central Command:

a. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) U.S. Central Command Comments

(U) The Joint Fires Element Chief, responding on behalf of the Commander of U.S. Central Command, neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation, but stated that CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Our Response

(U) The Joint Fires Element Chief's response addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we receive documentation that CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

b. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) U.S. Central Command Comments

(U) The Joint Fires Element Chief, responding on behalf of the Commander of U.S. Central Command, agreed with the recommendation and stated that CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Our Response

(U) The Joint Fires Element Chief's response addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve review all civilian casualty reports from December 2019 to the present for which civilian casualty credibility assessment reports or investigations were initiated to ensure completeness and adherence to applicable policies and standard operating procedures and take corrective actions as necessary.

(U) Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve Comments

(U) The Combined Joint Task Force-Inherent Resolve Chief of Staff, responding on behalf of the CJTF-OIR Commander, agreed with our recommendation and stated that CJTF-OIR will conduct a review of all CIVCAS Reports and Investigations closed after December 2019, and that the quality assurance and quality control procedures will be completed by the CJTF-OIR CIVCAS Cell within a month. When complete, the CIVCAS Cell will notify leadership and stakeholders of the results, report any errors or violations of policies, and note any remediation efforts.

(U) In addition, the Chief of Staff requested that we change the recommendation to read "We recommend that the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve appoint a General/Flag level officer to review all CIVCAS reports."

(U) Finally, on April 26, 2021 the CJTF-OIR CIVCAS Cell Officer In-Charge provided a signed memorandum for the record stating that the CIVCAS Cell had completed a full review of all documents and files pertaining to CIVCAS allegations received from December 1, 2019, through March 31, 2021. The Officer In-Charge stated that

(U) CIVCAS Cell personnel found one allegation that contained an administrative error which was corrected. In addition, the CIVCAS Cell reorganized the CIVCAS archival system to avoid future missteps and mitigate administrative errors.

(U) Our Response

(U) The Chief of Staff's comments and CIVCAS Cell actions addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is closed.

(U) We acknowledge the Chief of Staff's request that we revise the recommendation to require that CJTF-OIR appoint a General/Flag-level officer to review all CIVCAS reports, as this would provide higher level accountability to the process. However, the wording of the recommendation will remain the same because any action by a CJTF-OIR staff officer taken on behalf of the commander meets the intent of this recommendation.

(U) Recommendation 3

(U) We recommend that the Commander of United States Forces-Afghanistan review all civilian casualty reports December 2019 to the present for which civilian casualty credibility assessment report or investigation were initiated to ensure completeness and adherence to applicable policies and standard operating procedures and take corrective actions as necessary.

(U) Commander of United States Forces-Afghanistan Comments

(U) The United States Forces-Afghanistan Director of Strategy and Plans, responding on behalf of the Commander, neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation. However, the Director stated that starting in November 2020, the USFOR-A Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team has reviewed all allegations dating back to January 2019 and completed CCARs on any allegations with discrepancies for the Deputy Commander to review and approve.

(U) In addition, the Director of Strategy and Plans requested that we change our recommendation to read "We recommend that the Commander of the United States Forces-Afghanistan (or a designated General/Flag officer) review all civilian casualty reports..."

(U) Our Response

(U) The USFOR-A Director of Strategy and Plans' comments meet the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we receive documentation that the Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team has reviewed all allegations back to January 2019, has completed CCARs on any allegations with discrepancies, has taken corrective action, and has provided those documents for the Deputy Commander.

(U) We acknowledge the Director's request that we revise the recommendation to require that the USFOR-A Commander or designated General/Flag officer review all CIVCAS reports as this provides higher level accountability to the process. However, the wording of the recommendation will remain the same because any action by a USFOR-A staff officer taken on behalf of the Commander meets the intent of this recommendation.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from February 6, 2019, through March 19, 2021, in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that we meet project objectives and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The evaluation focused on deliberate and dynamic kinetic targeting activities in support of conventional forces, and the CIVCAS mitigation, investigation, and reporting processes within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, including CJTF OIR and USFOR-A. We reviewed Executive Orders; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), DoD, and Joint Staff policies and orders; and Combatant Command and agency directives, instructions, and policies. We analyzed the criteria provided in those publications against a historic sampling of strike data, including target development and collateral damage mitigation actions. This included target identification, prosecution, and after action activities and post-strike processes related to the collateral damage and CIVCAS assessments, as well as identifying deviations from prescribed criteria and any additional outcome of those deviations.

(U//~~FOUO~~) To obtain information on targeting and CIVCAS policies, authorities, processes, and standards, we reviewed documents and interviewed personnel at the following locations.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence and Security)
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Joint Staff (J2X)
- (U//~~FOUO~~) USCENTCOM, Tampa, Florida
- (U//~~FOUO~~) U.S Air Force Central Command, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina
- (U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(3)

- (U//~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM (b)(3) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) CJTF-OIR, Kuwait
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Combined Air Operation Center, Qatar
- (U//~~FOUO~~) USFOR-A, Afghanistan
- (U//~~FOUO~~) NAVCENT, Bahrain
- (U//~~FOUO~~) U.S. Embassy, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia²³

(U//~~FOUO~~) We reviewed CIVCAS reporting from CJTF-OIR and USFOR-A to determine whether the procedures were followed. We conducted the initial reviews through requests for information submitted to the commands and followed up with site visits to the respective CIVCAS assessment teams and cells in theater. During the site visits, we reviewed CIVCAS investigations and reports. CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data for this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued one classified report discussing targeting operations and CIVCAS.

²³ (S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(c),(g) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Report No. DODIG-2019-074, "(U) Evaluation of Air and Ground Targeting Operations and Reporting of Civilian Casualties in Operation Inherent Resolve," April 18, 2019

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(c),(g)




(U) Appendix B


(U) Comparison of USCENTCOM Requirements and Processes Used by CJTF-OIR and USFOR-A

(U) Figure 2. USCENTCOM, CJTF-OIR, and USFOR-A CIVCAS Policy/SOP Requirements Comparison

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)



(NRSR) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a),(b),(c),(g)



²⁴ NATO/RESOLUTE SUPPORT RESTRICTED (NRSR) is used for documents generated by RS staff on RS Secret workstations. Examples of information and material for which unauthorized disclosure would be disadvantageous to the interests of NATO and RS include standard orders, SOPs, and activities inside the HQ RS compound. See Footnote 8 for NRSU information.

(U) Management Comments

(U) U.S. Central Command



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UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

02 April 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 4800
MARK CENTER DRIVE, ALEXANDRIA, VA 22350

SUBJECT: (U) Response to DODIGD2019-DISP A2-0051.000 "Evaluation of U.S. Central
Command (USCENTCOM) Kinetic Targeting Processes and Reporting Procedures"

Ref(s): (a) 2019 Annual CIVCAS 1057 Report (U)
(b) CJTF-OIR CIVCAS Monthly LOG February 2021 (U)
(c) USFOR-A CIVCAS Monthly Review February 2021 (NATO/RS SECRET//REL
USA, NATO, RSMA)

I. (U) USCENTCOM CCJ3 was tasked to provide a formal response to DoDIG Discussion
Draft recommendations 1.a and 1.b. A technical review of the DISCUSSION DRAFT was
also requested. The specific questions are italicized, and our answers are detailed in the
following discussion.

a. (U) **Page i, Findings:** This section mentions that *some administrative errors in
CIVCAS documentations were found due to lack of quality assurance reviews.*

b. (U) **USCENTCOM RESPONSE:** CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[REDACTED]

c. (U) **Page 17 Recommendation to USCENTCOM (1.a):** CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[REDACTED]

d. (U) **USCENTCOM RESPONSE:** CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[REDACTED]

Classified by: CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6) USCENTCOM CCJ3-JFE
Derived from: USCENTCOM CCR 380-14 (14 May 19)
Declassify on: 20460402

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(U) U.S. Central Command (cont'd)

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CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

e. (U) Page 17 Recommendation to USCENTCOM (1.b): CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

f. (U) USCENTCOM RESPONSE: CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

2. (U) My point of contact is CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6) who can be reached at CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6) or by electronic mail at CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6)

CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6)

Chief Joint Fires Element

Attachment(s):

TAB A: 2019 Annual CIVCAS 1057 Report (U)

TAB B: CJTF-OIR CIVCAS Monthly LOG February 2021 (U)

TAB C: USFOR-A CIVCAS Monthly Review February 2021 (NATO/RS SECRET//REL USA, NATO, RSMA)

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(U) Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve



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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE - OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO AE 09306

CJ-IR

13 Mar 21

MEMORANDUM FOR Inspector General, United States Central Command (CENTCOM)

SUBJECT: Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) Responses to USCENCOM Tasker USCC2106179255: DODIG D2019-DISPA2-0051 000 Discussion Draft "Evaluation of USCENCOM Kinetic Targeting Processes and Reporting Procedures" Technical Review.

1. Reference CENTCOM Tasker USCC2106179255: DODIG D2019-DISPA2-0051 000 Discussion Draft "Evaluation of USCENCOM Kinetic Targeting Processes and Reporting Procedures" Technical Review, due 16 Mar 2021.

2. CJTF-OIR's technical review CRM is found in Enclosure 2.

3. The point of contact for this memo is CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6) at DSN: CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6) or CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6)

CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6)

Deputy Chief of Staff

Encl

1. D2019 DISPA 0051 Discussion Draft
2. D2019 DISPA 0051 Discussion Draft CRM CJTF-OIR

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(U) Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (Enclosure 2)

#	Org/Reviewer	Page	Para	Line	Type (C/S/A)	Comment	Disposition (A/R/N)
1	OIR CIVCAS/ CENT CCIS (D/3), OIR6	17	3	9-14	S	<p>Concur with comment on Recommendation 2</p> <p>Request updating recommendation 2 to read as follows: (U) We recommend that the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation INHERENT RESOLVE appoint a General Flag level officer to review all CIVCAS reports since completion of our assessment (November 2019) for which CIVCAS credibility assessment reports or investigations were initiated to ensure completeness and adherence to applicable policies and standard operating procedures and take corrective actions as necessary.</p> <p>Reasoning: Every closed assessment from December 2019 has been previously reviewed and approved by a general court martial convening authority or someone he or she has delegated CIVCAS approval authority to. This is normally the Chief of Staff, Deputy Commander or Assistant Commanding General. For CJTF-OIR, the Chief of Staff has been and remains the approval and closure authority.</p> <p>Assuch, CJTF-OIR will conduct a review of all Civilian Casualty Assessment Reports and Investigations closed after December, 2019. This QAQC will be completed by the CJTF-OIR CIVCAS Cell within a month. Upon completion the Cell will notify leadership & stakeholders, report errors/adherence to policies, and remediation.</p>	

(U) Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve – Memorandum for Record



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE – OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO AE 09306

IRSJ

14 April 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION OF KINETIC TARGETING AND CIVCAS
REPORTING REVIEW IN US CENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

1. (U) **GENERAL.** The Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) called for a review of CJTF-OIR Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) assessments that were completed since December 2019. The review was to find any administrative errors or omissions in CIVCAS reports and to refine archiving and quality control procedures

a. (U) **Purpose.** Ensure assessments were conducted to standard, in particular checking whether CIVCAS allegations were properly reviewed by closure and approval authorities and whether they were archived sensibly.

b. (U) **Scope.** A full review of documents and files pertaining to allegations sent to CCAR from 01 December 2019 through 31 March 2021. The focus was on administrative, procedural, and clerical errors in archived documents.

c. (U) **Findings.** After a review of all pertinent files, one allegation was found to be missing a digital signed copy of the closure report. A signed copy was obtained from document storage and uploaded to the proper database location. No other errors were found during the review. The CIVCAS office archival system was reorganized as to avoid future missteps and mitigate administrative errors in the future. Additionally, the current CIVCAS Cell finds that marked improvements in quality control and data management were made since the Cell was first established in 2016.

2. (U) The point of contact for this memorandum is CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6)

CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6)

(U) United States Forces – Afghanistan

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A J5

15 March 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350

SUBJECT: Response to DODIG D2019-DISPA2-0051.000 "Evaluation of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Kinetic Targeting Processes and Reporting Procedures"

1. (U) AAG was responsible for reviewing and providing a response on the DODIG Discussion Draft. The specific questions are italicized, and our answers are detailed in the following discussion.

2. (U) *Conduct a technical review of the attached DISCUSSION DRAFT and provide comments as necessary to correct inaccuracies or issues. If there are reasons identified that would cause a non-concurrence with the report's recommendation directed to USFOR-A, please include those in your response.*

- a. (U) **Page 19, Recommendation to USFOR-A (3):** The DISPA report reads, "*We recommend that the Commander of United States Forces-Afghanistan review all civilian casualty reports December 2019 to the present for which civilian casualty credibility assessment report or investigation were initiated to ensure completeness and adherence to applicable policies and standard operating procedures and take corrective actions as necessary.*"

(U) **USFOR-A RESPONSE:** USFOR-A and Resolute Support SOPs call for the Deputy Commander, USFOR-A to serve as the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for CIVCAS assessments. In this capacity, the Deputy Commander reviews each allegation of civilian casualties, the subsequent CCAR, and any investigations that stem from them. Starting in November 2020, the CCMT reviewed all allegations back to January 2019 and completed CCARs on any allegations with discrepancies for Deputy Commander review and approval.

The Commander of USFOR-A/Resolute Support maintains oversight of civilian casualty allegations through the use of CCIR, and directly reviews all investigation findings and initial reflections. The Deputy Commander of Resolute Support maintains direct correspondence with the ICRC and UNAMA to further reinforce this effort.

The practice outlined above provides sufficient command and senior leader oversight of the civilian casualty reporting and investigation process. Given this, USFOR-A recommends the following adjustment to the DODIG recommendation above: "*We recommend that the Commander of United States Forces-Afghanistan (or a*

(U) United States Forces – Afghanistan (cont'd)

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designated general/flag officer) review all civilian casualty reports..."

- b. (U) Page 20, Appendix B: the Appendix as written describes the USFOR-A CIVCAS SOP as of 19 February 2019. Specifically, this Appendix describes the CCARB investigation process, which USFOR-A no longer uses.

(U) **USFOR-A RESPONSE:** RS HQ updated this SOP in October 2019. The new SOP replaced the CCARB process with a CCAR process. Instead of a board, an assessment officer collects all relevant information and comes to an assessment of the credibility of each allegation. Following legal review of the recommended assessment, the CCAR is forwarded to the OPR for review and approval.

- c. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) **USFOR-A RESPONSE:** CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

3. (U) The point of contact for this document is CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6) at CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6)

[REDACTED]

CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6)

[REDACTED]

United States Forces - Afghanistan

Encl: D2019_DISPA_0051 DISCUSSION DRAFT - 3-1-2021

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCAR	CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report
CCMT	Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team
CIVCAS	Civilian Casualty
CJTF-OIR	Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JP	Joint Publication
JTC	Joint Targeting Cycle
JTF	Joint Task Force
LoW	Law of War
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCENT	U.S. Navy Central Command
OIR	Operation Inherent Resolve
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
PID	Positive Identification
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
TEA	Target Engagement Authority
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USFOR-A	U.S. Forces-Afghanistan

(U) Sources of Classified Information

1. (U) **Source 1:** (U) USCENTOM "Positive Identification Policy,"
(December 2018) (SECRET//REL USA, FVEY)
Declassification Date: December 2043
Date of Source: December 14 2018
2. (U) **Source 2:** (U) CJTF-OIR Joint Targeting Board
(December 2018) (SECRET//REL USA, FVEY, FRA)
Declassification Date: December 2043
Date of Source: December 2018
3. (U) **Source 3:** (U) USCENTOM CJTF-OIR CG O&I Update
(March 2019) (SECRET//REL USA, FVEY)
Declassification Date: March 2044
Date of Source: March 2019
4. (U) **Source 4:** (U) USCENTOM CJTF-OIR O&I JOC-I Update
(January 2019) (SECRET//REL USA, MESF)
Declassification Date: January 2044
Date of Source: January 2019
5. (U) **Source 5:** (U) USCENTOM OPORD to Defeat ISIS OPORD 26 MOD 2
(June 2018) (SECRET//REL USA, MESF)
Declassification Date: June 2043
Date of Source: June 2018
6. (U) **Source 6:** (U) USCENTOM OPORD 25 Operation Freedom's Sentinel
(December 2014) (SECRET//REL USA, FVEY)
Declassification Date: December 2039
Date of Source: December 2014
7. (U) **Source 7:** (U) USCENTOM Joint Fires Annex to OPORD 26
(August 2017) (SECRET//REL USA, FVEY)
Declassification Date: December 2042
Date of Source: August 2017
8. (U) **Source 8:** (U) USCENTOM CJTF-OIR OPORD 17-08-0002 FRAGO 61
(November 2018) (SECRET//REL USA, FVEY, FRA)
Declassification Date: November 2043
Date of Source: November 2018
9. (U) **Source 9:** (U) USCENTOM USFOR-A FRAGO 18-333 MOD 2 (Targeting Process)
(July 2018) (SECRET//REL USA, FVEY)
Declassification Date: July 2043
Date of Source: July 2018

10. (U) **Source 10:** (U) USCENTOM J3 Night Orders for 19 Nov 18
(November 2018) (SECRET//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)
Declassification Date: November 2043
Date of Source: November 2018
11. (U) **Source 11:** (U) USCENTOM CJTF-OIR OPORD 17-08-0002 FRAGO 71
(January 2019) (SECRET//REL USA, FVEY, FRA)
Declassification Date: January 2044
Date of Source: January 2019
12. (U) **Source 12:** (U) USCENTOM CJTF-OIR OPORD 17-08-0002 FRAGO 73
(December 2018) (SECRET//REL USA, FVEY)
Declassification Date: December 2043
Date of Source: December 14 2043
13. (U) **Source 13:** (U) Joint Staff CIVCAS Strategy Review Implementation Plan
(July 2018) (SECRET//NOFORN)
Declassification Date: July 2043
Date of Source: July 2018
14. (U) **Source 14:** (U) USCENTOM Campaign Plan 1000-18 Annex A
(October 2019) (SECRET)
Declassification Date: October 2044
Date of Source: October 2019
15. (U) **Source 15:** (U) USCENTOM Campaign Plan OIR Defeat ISIL/DAESH
(October 2015) (SECRET//REL USA, FVEY)
Declassification Date: October 2040
Date of Source: October 2015
16. (U) **Source 16:** (U) USCENTOM OPLAN 1710-18 Freedom's Sentinel
(March 2018) (SECRET//REL USA, FVEY)
Declassification Date: March 2043
Date of Source: March 2018

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

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