

OUT

Comment

Let's Reform
The Military
Reformers*Pentagon Critics Can't Tell
A Laser From a Latrine Fan*

By Fred Reed

MANY AND GRAVE things are wrong with the American military, about which nothing will be done; these defects could easily lose us a big war. A major reason why we will do nothing to remedy them is that a few evangelical critics of the military, by focusing on defects which do not exist, have distracted attention from defects that do exist. Not to mince words, much of what prominent adversaries of the military write is absolute, verifiable nonsense—yet Washington takes it seriously. This is an inadequate approach to the management of a heavily armed world.

A few examples of the work of these people, who invariably call themselves Military Reformers:

Dina Rasor, archenemy of the M1 tank, head of the Project on Military Procurement, and so frequently on talk-shows as to seem part of their furniture, has over the years released all sorts of information purporting to show the manifold shortcomings of the M1. Rather less attention has been paid to the manifold shortcomings of Rasor, the unconscious assumption in much of Washington being that anything derogatory to the military must be true.

In 1985 she published a book, a risk which few Reformers should take. In the book ("The Pentagon Underground"), she tells of going with a congressional delegation to Fort Hood, Texas, in 1981 to see the M1. She tells of getting into the driver's seat, low in the front of the hull, and discovering—lo! The Army had designed the tank for midgets! There wasn't enough room for people of normal size. For example, her head bumped against the turret. Why, she gasped, one of our boys might be knocked out.

Ever vigilant, Rasor ferreted out another manifestation of the tanks excessive tininess. She is only 5'6" tall, she writes, yet "I later had a crew member close the hatch while I was in the driver's seat. In order to fit,



Was Castro

New Evidence Shows the

By Seymour M. Hersh

LOOK

ry and Opinion

*Returns to
F.A.*



ut of Control in 1962?

ets Weren't Calling All the Shots in the Cuban Missile Crisis

which became known only when the United States face-to-air missile in the crisis, and senior White
broke a Soviet code in 1964, is that it shows the House officials did not consider the possibility that
Cubans were more independent of Moscow in the 20s it had been a Cuban decision to shoot down the


possible. In particular, it suggests that Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev may not have had complete control of the SAM battery that shot down the U2. If so, the Cuban missile crisis 25 years ago was even more dangerous than the public has realized—with both superpowers making important strategic misjudgments.

The Kennedy administration's assessment of the U2 shootdown, one of the most emotional issues of the crisis, was shaped by its assumption that Khrushchev had direct control of all surface-to-air missile batteries in Cuba and had ordered the shootdown—perhaps to deliberately escalate the crisis. It was the first known use of a Soviet sur-

The U2 shootdown was a factor in President Kennedy's decision to send his brother Robert to see Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on the evening of Oct. 27, according to Robert Kennedy's posthumous memoir. The younger Kennedy carried a tough ultimatum: The Soviets should begin dismantling the missiles within 48 hours or the United States would strike. Khrushchev caved in overnight and agreed to an immediate withdrawal of the Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in return for a private American commitment to remove Jupiter missiles within five months from Turkey and Italy, as well as a public pledge not to invade Cuba.

See CRISIS, II2, Col. 1

nd White



DAN HUDIG FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

Panama's Noriega?

in, for reasons that elected civilian government. . . . The [U.S.] policy is to promote democracy."

ciga blames for his Noriega is bitter. He recalls the day his de Assistant Secre- mentor and predecessor, Gen. Omar Tor-Abrams, Sen. Jesse Vrijos, asked him to go to Cuba to gain the Ambassador to Pan- release of a U.S. serviceman who had been d his deputy, John captured during the 1961 Bay of Pigs inva- Abrams once asked sion. He accomplished the mission and not- civilian figurehead ed that "when the Americans need some- Why is Noriega de- thing, they picture it very nicely and say ral [who ruled] Gua- you're a hero, but when they don't need you ags?" anymore, they forget you."

United States is, in He says he has done other favors for the e Noriega's regime, United States. He claims that when the ama should not be American invasion force took off for Gre- should be run by an

See PANAMA, II2, Col. 1

MARY McGRORY

Reagan's Last Hope: Ortega

MANY Washingtonians woke up last Tuesday to the sound of a familiar sneer. Elliott Abrams, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, was on National Public Radio sounding a theme that has been peddled by the administration ever since it began its hapless contra venture five years ago. What we are facing is nothing less than the establishment of a "Soviet base in this hemisphere." It was as if the Arias peace plan had never seen the light of day.

Abrams has been absent from Capitol Hill since the Iran-contra hearings, when he admitted to lying to Congress about his part in getting big bucks to the contras. Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) refused to have him as a witness and House committees have followed suit.

But if he is out of the loop on the current peace initiative being pushed by House Speaker Jim Wright, Abrams is plainly in sync with his ultimate boss, President Reagan. The president's speech to the Organization of American States, which National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci had told Wright would be conciliatory, was the utterance of a man who chokes on the thought of leaving the Sandinistas in power.

Puzzled Hill people think that Carlucci was possibly speaking in

See McGrory, III, Col. 4.

Mary McGrory is a Washington Post columnist.

almost impossible driving position."

I had the same problem until I adjusted the seat.

At 5'11" I fit comfortably into the tank. Not only didn't Rasor know about the adjustable seat, she apparently wasn't interested. The book was published in 1985, and the trip made in 1981, allowing ample time to make a telephone call. Her whole book is full of such tales. Thus do we influence policy in Washington.

Ignorance of such august dimensions is customary among Reformers. When I first became a military col-

See REFORMERS, II4, Col. 1

Fred Reed writes "Soldiering," a nationally syndicated column on military affairs, and is a Washington editor of Harper's.

A in October 1962, a key Soviet surface-to-missile base on the island was attacked, apparently by Cuban troops, with at least 18 Sov casualties, according to newly available decod communications intercepts.

Less than 12 hours later, on the morning of Oct. 27, 1962, an American U2 spyplane crashed in the base. President Kennedy and his advisers, who did not know of the firefight at the Cuban base, assumed the Soviets had shot down the U2 with missile from that base.

The significance of the military skirmish in Cu

Seymour Hersh is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author of "The Target Is Destroyed"

The Second World War in Black

How Hollywood Lost the Battle for Racial Progress

By Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black

IN 1942, the United States found itself not only fighting a war on two fronts abroad, but trying to unify the population at home behind the war effort. One group—black Americans—presented a particular problem. Blacks still suffered under the burden of Jim Crow laws, which kept them segregated in large sections of the country, especially the South as well as the armed forces; they were effectively denied the right to vote in the South, and in the North they were confined to menial jobs and to living in squalid ghettos.

Polls taken by the government showed that blacks despised the Germans, not sur-

prising because of the Nazis' racial policies. At the same time, however, blacks showed a more ambivalent attitude toward the Japanese, who some tended to identify with as fellow people of color.


With racial tensions increasing, the government was anxious that nothing aggravate black hostility and undermine the war effort. Films were the most popular form of entertainment and the government, through its Office of War Information, had high hopes of getting Hollywood to portray blacks in a more favorable light than the film industry had ever done before.

There was clearly room for improvement. As Dalton Trumbo said, the movies made "tarts of the Negro's daughters, crapshooters of his sons, obsequious Uncle Toms of his fathers, superstitious and grotesque crones of his mothers, strutting peacocks of his successful men, psalm-singing mountebanks of his priests, and Barnum and Bailey side-shows of his religion."

OWI's Bureau of Motion Pictures regretfully concurred. In an analysis of the depic-

See HOLLYWOOD, II4, Col. 1

Clayton Koppes is chairman of the history department of Oberlin College. Gregory Black is chairman of the communications studies department of the University of Missouri, Kansas City. This article is adapted from "Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits & Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies."



Why Is Elliott Abrams Picking on

By Lally Weymouth

PANAMA CITY—Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, who has ruled Panama since 1983, is complaining that the Americans have set about destabilizing his country in an effort to get rid of him.

Noriega is sitting in the back of his helicopter, called "the Super Puma," with a drink in his hand and a pretty female soldier at his side. He's a short man with a pockmarked complexion, derided by his enemies as "pineapple face."

Lally Weymouth writes regularly about foreign affairs for The Washington Post.

"We are going to make a list of those the U.S. betrayed," says the Panamanian general. "The shah of Iran, Gen. Alvarez of Honduras—they kidnapped Alvarez and now he's a teacher in a small military school." He adds Ferdinand Marcos to the list and says that he—Noriega—is the next target of the United States.

"You can erase me," Noriega says. "But there are another two guys behind me. Ten years ago, I wasn't here."

Noriega is no angel. He's a military strongman and he's been accused of corruption, brutality and consorting with Cuba's Fidel Castro. But Noriega has a point. The United States does seem to be

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
fact, trying to de

Abrams says thi

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which, but the military control of the point, although... no side at the time." In the television about the fire- rations intercepts. In scores of books and missile crisis have he extent of Khrush-

eminent batteries there, including... emplacements that had fired on the two low-flying American reconnaissance planes on the morning of the 27th. In Ellsberg's view, Khrushchev understood what Kennedy did not—that he, and perhaps even Fidel Castro, could not stop the firing of the anti-aircraft batteries. "Bobby had no reason to believe that the threat on reconnaissance [to Dobrynin] had



RANGES BY DAVE COOK—THE WASHINGTON POST; PHOTO OF SOVIET MISSILES LEAVING CUBA BY ASSOCIATED PRESS

AM sites in Cuba, and ly suggested that the been ordered behind ssident military men recent weeks that a independent corroborq the firefight at Danes, his crisis-communicat- undertaken for W. Walt department counselor, ss to America's most tell as to members of also had been deeply sis in 1962, working Cuban air strikes. ewed by Ellsberg in Kennedy, who told of eg with Dobrynin on after the U2 shoot- p came after the re- ter in which he de- missiles be pulled out, ment, as part of a set- are that his remarks ily classified internal Ellsberg of his ultima- ultimatum would not until Kennedy's mem- ten Days," was pub- te, the Soviets were- tes would attack the by Tuesday morning. Some evidence with- (the sites were being s already had learned or a full-scale invasion y set for early Tues- ndence emerged sug- ultimatum may have Rusk, who was sec-

any special significance," Ellsberg recalled. "He didn't think it was that important. He had no reason to believe that Khrushchev was going to be so reckless as to shoot anything else down. It didn't occur to him that he was talking to the wrong nation—and that Khrushchev did not control the Cubans."

That fact also didn't occur to Ellsberg—until he was informed on April 14, 1964, about a month after his meeting with Kennedy, of the new intelligence finding.

"Once I learned about the firefight at Los Angeles," Ellsberg recalled, "I said, 'Jesus Christ.' Khrushchev didn't have control and that's why he backed off right away"—within 12 hours instead of taking the next 48 hours and attempting to improve his bargaining position. Khrushchev knew that the United States would send more reconnaissance flights at first light the next morning and he also knew, Ellsberg theorized, that he could not guarantee that the Cubans manning the anti-aircraft guns—and perhaps the SAM site at Los Angeles—would not shoot down another aircraft and precipitate an immediate American response.

Castro, in an interview with journalist Tad Szulc published last year, acknowledged that on Oct. 27 he had given his anti-aircraft forces blanket authority to shoot at low-flying American reconnaissance planes. Only "the inexperience of our artillerymen," he said, led them to miss that day. "I am absolutely certain that if the low-level flights had been resumed [on Oct. 28], we would have shot down one, two, or three of the planes," Castro said. "I don't know whether this would have started nuclear war."

The risks were greater than anyone in Washington realized.

Other Cuban missile crisis scholars, most notably Ambassador Raymond L. Garthoff,

mander of Soviet forces in Cuba. Thant quoted the officer, according to Stevenson, as explaining that all of the anti-aircraft weaponry and SAM sites on Cuba are "manned by Cubans. It was a Cuban colonel that shot down our plane."

Statsenko's statement to Thant suggested, as Ellsberg understood, that the Cubans were manning the SAM sites as of Oct. 30, three days after the only known firing of a SA-2 SAM missile had taken place. Since it was highly improbable that the Soviets would turn over control of the SAM sites to the Cubans after the U2 had been shot down and after Khrushchev had agreed to no longer attack American reconnaissance aircraft, Statsenko's comment seemed to mean that the Soviets had permitted the Cubans to operate the SAM sites at least since the 27th, even if a Soviet officer was on the scene and nominally in charge.

The second telephone message to Rusk discovered by Ellsberg came from George Ball, the undersecretary of state, who reported Nov. 1 on a conversation he had with Thant's military adviser, Indian Gen. Indarjit Rikhye. Rikhye described a conversation with Fidel Castro in which the Cuban premier was quoted, as relayed by Ball, as saying that "Castro talked as though he had all the anti-aircraft and he did boast that it was the Cubans who had shot down Maj. Anderson. Rikhye himself is not at all persuaded," Ball told Rusk on the telephone, "that this was just only boastfulness on his [Castro's] part."

Rusk and other members of the ExComm thus had been provided with evidence within days of the shootdown from both the Cubans and the Soviets in Cuba that the U2 probably had not been attacked on orders from Khrushchev. But the senior officials could not see the significance of the information because everyone in the government assumed that the spy plane had been shot down by a Soviet SA-2 missile in the control of the Soviet forces on the ground—and thus by Khrushchev.

Castro himself has since provided varying accounts of who was in control, telling a Washington Post reporter during an interview in 1985, for example, that Soviet troops had been manning the SA-2 missiles when the U2 was shot down. "I did not have the honor of shooting down the spy plane," Castro said.

The strong assumption of Soviet control inside Cuba made it inevitable that the information provided by Thant and his military adviser also would be overlooked throughout the intelligence community, although senior American intelligence officials, in interviews in recent weeks, acknowledged that the United States government had no hard information as of Nov. 1, 1962, as to how Maj. Anderson's aircraft had been destroyed.

George Ball, in a telephone interview from his office in Princeton, N.J., confirmed that he had held a conversation with Rikhye. Told of the intelligence suggesting that Khrushchev had not controlled the U2 shootdown, Ball said he had not been told of the 1964 intercepts but acknowledged that he "was not surprised." Throughout the crisis, he said, the ExComm was constantly making assumptions about Soviet behavior: "We were making guesses and we were just plain wrong—and we were tapping what we thought was the best possible intelligence."

In the Soviet Union,

Word of the U2 shootdown came into the morning on Oct. 27, just moments after the White House learned that Khrushchev had toughened his demands for a settlement of the crisis by insisting in a letter to Kennedy that any withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba be publicly linked to the withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey. In a note received by the White House the evening before, Khrushchev had offered to withdraw the missiles from Cuba without any such linkage.

The ExComm transcript shows that President Kennedy expressed concern that the U2 shootdown might be "an escalation" on the part of Khrushchev, according to those who have read the transcript. There also were reports that Cuban-run antiaircraft batteries had opened fire on two low-flying American reconnaissance aircraft, without causing serious damage, and there were questions in the ExComm, according to the minutes, about the extent of Khrushchev's control over the antiaircraft units.

The slain U2 pilot, as many in the ExComm knew, was Air Force Maj. Rudolph Anderson Jr., whose flight two weeks before had been the first to bring back photographic evidence of the Soviet missile installations.

The first challenge to American assumptions about the U2 shootdown came about 18 months later, in early 1964, when analysts at the National Security Agency succeeded in breaking a Soviet code. The Soviet code system, known to some in the American intelligence community as "Silver," had been in widespread usage by Soviet forces stationed in Cuba in 1962.

As the NSA analysts began decoding some of the many messages sent during the crisis, they learned that there had been a major firefight on the night of Oct. 26 at Los Angeles, a SAM site near a naval base at Banes, on Cuba's northeastern coast—which was the site of the next morning's U2 crash.

The Soviet commander at the Banes base was overheard saying that there had been an attack at the adjacent SAM base. He subsequently reported that he was advancing with troops and that three soldiers were killed and 15 others were wounded. The commander, identified by the NSA as an officer named Mal'tsev, also issued a call for surgeons. Seven physicians were sent to the scene that night.

Other NSA intercepts showed that Mal'tsev, whose "advance" was apparently a counterattack against Cuban troops seeking to storm the SAM base, was ordered to make a full report in person the next morning, Oct. 27, to Col. Gen. of Aviation Victor Davidkov, apparently the senior Soviet commander at the time in Cuba.

The intercepts, which made clear that Soviet soldiers had been "shot and wounded," did not specifically name the attacking forces as Cuban, although NSA analysts quickly reached the obvious conclusion that the fighting was between Soviets and Cubans. The intercepts suggested that the attack had ended by the morning of Oct. 27, but the NSA analysts were unable to preclude the possibility that the SAM

also, it could have been Russians fighting Cubans. However, an American professor said in an interview last week that during a research trip to Cuba several years ago, he had been told that the Cubans indeed had taken over a Soviet military base by force during the Cuban missile crisis.

None of this information was available to the ExComm on the morning of Oct. 27. Nonetheless,

is not known, Ellsberg said that the Soviets had lost a site is known to this point one knew that on the U.S.

Ellsberg did not mention in the interview that his information came from communist sources. In addition, only a few of the academic studies on the crisis raised any doubts as to the



MAP OF MISSILE

less, the intelligence official said, he found it disturbing that the senior members of the ExComm acted without full knowledge in assuming that Khrushchev was responsible for the shootdown: "I don't think you'll ever know who pulled the trigger."

The highly classified communications intelligence, with its implication that policy-makers had made a serious miscalculation during the missile crisis 18 months earlier, was kept under tight wraps inside the National Security Agency. Conversations in recent weeks with former members of the ExComm, including McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security adviser, indicated that none of the key Kennedy administration actors in the missile crisis had been briefed on the new material in 1964.

The report of the firefight at Banes apparently did not surface again until 1979, when William B. Bader, an assistant deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, initiated an exhaustive study of Soviet forces in Cuba. The Carter administration was then in the embarrassing position of having called public attention to the so-called Soviet "brigade" in Cuba only to learn that it had been in place since the resolution of the missile crisis, which hinged in part on a pledge by the Kennedy administration not to invade the island.

Bader, in a recent interview, recalled asking the intelligence community in 1979 for all of its files on Soviet forces in Cuba. The documents included a bonus: the electronic intelligence about the battle at Banes. "What I saw was a summary talking about a firefight inside Cuba," he said. "It did have date and time groups but the significance of it didn't occur to me at the time." His focus then was to unravel the 1962 and 1970 agreements that permitted the Soviets to keep troops inside Cuba: "I saw that material in context of the brigade issue."

chev's control over the S the few doubters invariably the U2 had Khrushchev's back by d inside the Soviet Union.

Ellsberg, informed in a reporter had obtained information for his account of told more of the story. I tions study, which was u Rostow, then the State I gave him enormous acc closely held secrets as v the ExComm. Ellsberg involved in the missile c with a group planning the

Among those interviewed early 1964 was Robert his extraordinary meeti the evening of Oct. 27, down. That meeting als cept of Khrushchev's l manded that the Jupiter with an official announce tlement.

Kennedy, obviously as were meant only for a hi government study, told tum to Dobrynin. That become publicly known oir of the crisis, "Thir lished in 1969. In esser told that the United St missile sites inside Cuba Oct. 30, unless there wa in the next 48 hours tha dismantled. Soviet offici that American planning I was underway, with D-I day morning.

(Six weeks ago, now gesting that Kennedy's been partly a bluff. Dea

Picking on Noriega

PANAMA, From H1

ada, Vice President George Bush called and asked him to tell Castro to stay away. (Bush denies this through a spokesman.) "Bush is my friend," says Noriega. "I hope he becomes president."

In blaming the Americans for all his problems, Noriega has downplayed the widespread and genuine opposition to his regime. But it cannot be denied that the United States is playing an active role in undermining him. For example, one senior State Department official wondered out loud recently: "Why is it so hard to get rid of Noriega and Pinochet, when it was so easy with Haiti and Marcos?"

Noriega clearly feels that he's being cornered by the Americans. Last month, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution cutting off military and economic aid within 45 days unless the military (meaning Noriega and his forces) ceased to dominate the politics of Panama. Meanwhile, Panama's economy is crumbling. As a result of the political instability, capital is being withdrawn and credit isn't available.

The situation appeared to be reaching a stalemate in the past month, and moderates were hopeful that a compromise could be arranged. But instead of showing the hoped-for signs of moderation, Noriega lashed out this week. He had Delvalle make a hardline speech warning that the government would crack down on future opposition demonstrations. And after the speech, the police went out and picked up eight U.S. servicemen,

who were held overnight along with many Panamanian opposition members.

"This is only a sample of what could happen," says an anxious former U.S. official. "Noriega is bad, but he keeps the lid on. Don't corner him. He will fight and he holds the trump. We've got a catastrophe in Nicaragua. Do we need another one in Panama of our own making?"

Noriega made his name as the head of the Panamanian military intelligence service. In this capacity, he established close intelligence links with the Israelis. (His right hand man is reputedly a former Mossad agent named Mike Herari, and one U.S. official told me that Israel wants to see Noriega stay in power because of the information he provides.) Noriega also developed a long-term relationship with the Cubans.

A Machiavellian character, Noriega managed to play left against right and stay on top in Panama. If he gave communists key positions in his government and made Panama a rest-and-recreation site for some of the world's leading terrorists, he also managed to make it safe for the thousands of U.S. soldiers that are stationed there.

Four months ago everything changed, when Col. Roberto Diaz Herrera broke the code of silence that the Panamanian defense forces had always maintained about Noriega and themselves. Herrera alleged publicly what had long been rumored: that Noriega had ordered the murder of his political opponent, Hugo Spadafora, back in 1985, that he had participated in a plot to assassinate Torrijos and that the election of 1984 had

been rigged. Noriega's charges are "total sick man."

But in response, crowds took to the waving white flag. Noriega's ouster as Businessmen who politics joined with the so-called "Civil organized and sustained in Panama since rule 19 years ago."

Sitting at the table in his plush office in his military facility, Noriega explains how created the present responsible, he charged.

"Helms has always the canal to Panama. Helms has devoted Panamanian interests."

Helms did indeed long before it became one of his senior staff. And the senate very active in pre-resolution, which is iminous vote.

As for why At in Panama, "Elliott didn't to save himself from was referring to the contra affair. Noriega told by many American on Panama is himself with the Congress."

The State Dept. that by attacking making its eagerness

Was Cuba Out of Control?

CRISIS, From H1

That Saturday, Oct. 27, was described by Harvard professor Graham T. Allison in his classic 1971 study, "Essence of Decision," as "the blackest and most frustrating day of the crisis." New details will emerge soon when a 25th-anniversary conference at Harvard University releases a previously classified transcript of the Oct. 27 meetings of President Kennedy's missile-crisis management group known as the Executive Committee, or "ExComm."

The ExComm transcript will show that Kennedy was more willing than many of his advisers to compromise over withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey than previously thought. Kennedy wondered on Oct. 27 how he could justify risking a nuclear war over the details of withdrawing missiles from Turkey that his own advisers considered obsolete. The minutes also show that ExComm members, in their discussions that day, all assumed that Khrushchev had authorized the U2 shootdown as a show of force designed to buttress his bargaining strategy—or had

site at Los Angeles may not have been fully under Soviet control when the U2 was shot down.

Other evidence supported the analysts' assumption. By early 1964, according to a former official who was at the top of an intelligence agency at the time, there was clear evidence that the Cuban military—and thus Fidel Castro—had been in direct control of the many anti-aircraft batteries scattered throughout the island at the height of the crisis. The official recalled that his agency eventually concluded that the SA2 SAM sites had been "manned by a mixed crew of Cubans and Russians" as of Oct. 27. Furthermore, he said, there was no available evidence linking Khrushchev to an order to shoot down Maj. Anderson's U2.

"We'll never know whether it was shot down by Cubans or Russians," the official added. "I doubt even if Castro knows."

Cuban accounts of the crisis are contradictory, and it remains unclear why Cubans would have attacked the Los Angeles SAM site. An American who recently visited Havana said that a senior Cuban official had told him that he had no knowledge of such a firefight in Oc-

Bader, who is a think tank called Sizized much later the intelligence report. question," he said, especially of an exodus in the system? The community at the Why didn't they appen of it?"

One government the strategic significance 1964 was Daniel F from the Rand Corp. sified study for the crisis communication site crisis. Ellsberg) en years later as the top-secret Pentagon close his special knowledge until April 1986, WGBH, the Boston for a documentary to be aired in 1989.

According to interview, the geles site had on Oct. 26, apparent Soviet counterattack "Precisely whose when the U2 was at

ga says that all these false, the product of a to Herrera's charges, streets of Panama City, erchiefs and calling for the end of military rule. id never been involved in teachers and lawyers in a Crusade," the first or- ed opposition movement a imposition of military of a long mahogany ta- at a joint U.S.-Panama- called Fort Amador, No- e believes the Americans crisis. The man most es is Sen. Helms. op- posed the transfer of a," says Noriega, "and is political life to fighting start opposing Noriega i fashionable to do so, as llers readily affirmed to s staff has indeed been oting the latest Senate sed by an almost unan- ms is promoting change briega had this to say: ly has his own strategy his own problems." He rans role in the Iran- claims that he has been ans that Abrams' posi- means of ingratiating res. ment may have hoped inpopular Noriega and for democratization as

clear in regard to Panama as it is in Nicaragua, the administration would attract liberal support for the contras. But there is another reason for the American enthusiasm to get rid of Noriega. Looking toward the year 2000, when the United States would turn over the canal to Panama, American officials want to plan for a stable government, friendly to U.S. interests. Back in 1977 when President Carter signed the Panama Canal treaty, U.S. strategic planners had not counted on a Sandinista presence in Nicaragua. As instability has increased in the region during the last few years, the State Department and the NSC staff have concluded that anything would be better in Panama than Noriega. The Pentagon and CIA aren't so enthusiastic about the campaign against the Panamanian leader, partly because they aren't sure what would come next. The best solution to the present crisis is probably negotiations between Noriega and the opposition. Noriega claims he is willing to negotiate with anyone without preconditions, but members of the Crusade say they will not negotiate with him until he announces a retirement date—which he will not do. Noriega struck a conciliatory tone in the interview, saying, about the opposition: "We have to gain their trust that they can have a fair chance in competing for the government." As for the next election, which is scheduled for 1989, he said he would agree to having computers count the votes and to representation of the opposition on the electoral tribunal—which is not now the case. But many Panamanians would regard an election with Noriega still at the helm as a waste of time. After all, many believe he fixed the returns of the last election and then later kicked out the appointed winner, Nicky Barletta. Asked whether he would be willing

to step down before the election, he was evasive, claiming that this would lead to the destruction of the armed forces and ensuing anarchy. In reply to a question, he said he would run for president. Noriega has other problems. According to news accounts, two federal investigations in Florida are looking into possible drug violations by Noriega, an allegation he denies. And he's angered conservatives in the United States by flirting with Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega. Asked why he was dealing with Ortega if he was worried about the left, Noriega replied that he had to talk with everyone and then asked: "Why does Reagan embrace Gorbachev?" So what should the United States do about Noriega? It could actively encourage negotiations between the two sides—and not just stand by and wait for a disaster to occur. It could, for example, send a special U.S. emissary to cut a deal with Noriega to get him out by 1989. These steps have been discussed but not yet implemented. The danger for the United States of a continuing stalemate is that as the situation gets worse, Noriega will play his only card—and unleash the Cuban-backed leftist elements he has kept under control until now. State Department officials, although concerned by the radicalization of Nicaragua and Cory Aquino's problems in the Philippines, argue that Panama will be different, that it does not have an active insurgency like the Philippines and that it will not face a threat from the left because it has such a strong middle class. But as they move to destabilize Noriega's regime, how can American officials be sure they aren't providing an opening for the left? In any event, if the United States decides to oust Noriega, it should do so quickly and decisively—by finding a viable alternative and backing him all the way.

a vice president of a International, only real- ificance of the 1964 his raises an important w is raw intelligence— iversity—used or abused didn't the intelligence t make the connection? date the significant bur- cial who did understand ce of the intercepts in erg, then a consultant work on a highly clas- inson administration of during the Cuban mis- id burst into fame sev- in who made public the pers. But he didn't dis- dge of the missile crisis he was interviewed by blic television station, he Cuban missile crisis ranscript of Ellsberg's called that the Los An- en under ground attack y Cubans, with a fierce per was on the button" down the next morning

retary of state at the time, disclosed that Kennedy had told him to contact United Nations Secretary General U Thant and have him propose a compromise if the tough talk didn't work and Khrushchev didn't back down.) Ellsberg recalled that he asked Kennedy: "So they had 48 hours to decide and if no dismantling is under way, then we'll hit the missile sites and follow up with an invasion." Bobby interjected, "Unless they hit another reconnaissance plane and in that case, we will hit all the SAM sites immediately and probably the missile sites as well." More reconnaissance flights were scheduled for the next morning. Kennedy was specific, Ellsberg said, in recalling that he had told Dobrynin he had 48 hours to act. In "Thirteen Days," Kennedy described his tough conversation with Dobrynin this way: The shooting down of the U2 was "a most serious turn of events," he quoted himself as telling the Soviet ambassador. "Because of the deception of the Soviet Union, our photographic reconnaissance planes would have to continue to fly over Cuba, and if the Cubans or Soviets shot at these planes, then we would have to shoot back. This would inevitably lead to further incidents and to escalation of the conflict, the implications of which were very grave indeed." Kennedy was assuming that Khrushchev had control not only over the SAM sites in Cuba but also over the many an-

confirmed in recent interviews that the private record shows that Robert Kennedy did warn Dobrynin about reconnaissance flights in their Oct. 27 meeting. Garthoff, who wrote many key memoranda during the crisis as a young State Department officer, reports new details about the extent of Soviet-Cuban estrangement in his new book on the missile crisis, which will be published later this month. After Khrushchev's backdown, he writes, "Cuban troops took up positions around the four Soviet missile bases on Oct. 28 and remained there for three days . . . This fact was not immediately known." As his research continued, Ellsberg said, he found further evidence of Khrushchev's lack of control, ignored at the time, in Rusk's as-yet-unpublished telephone records. Ellsberg was provided with full access to all of the secretary of state's telephone logs and memoranda and uncovered two extraordinary telephone calls in which Thant reported on his visit to Cuba in late October, just after Khrushchev had agreed to dismantle the nuclear missiles. The first telephone message, dated Oct. 31, was from Adlai Stevenson, the American ambassador to the United Nations, who relayed Thant's account of a meeting on Oct. 30 in Havana with the Soviet ambassador and a young brigadier general, identified as Igor