

U.S. Department  
of Transportation

United States  
Coast Guard



# Memorandum

Subject: AVIATION MIND-SET QAT REPORT OF FINDINGS Date: 13 MAY 1993  
5000

From: TEAM LEADER, AVIATION MIND-SET QAT

Reply to: G-ODO  
Attn. of: CAPT PARKER  
7-2039

To: TEAM LEADER, AVIATION MANAGEMENT QAT  
Via: ADJUNCT MEMBER, AVIATION MANAGEMENT QAT


1. Enclosed is the report of the QAT on Aviation Mind-Set.
2. The QAT was chartered to perform the task of determining and evaluating the concept of Aviation Mind-Set and how it may affect the efficiency and effectiveness of Coast Guard Aviation. It is extremely difficult to quantify how, and to what extent, a group's mind-set affects organizational activity and interactions. In light of this, the QAT decided the best method to accomplish the task was through interviews. The interviews were conducted on a nonattribution basis to ensure candid and open comments on sensitive matters.
3. The QAT took a macro perspective in determining the scope of the Aviation Mind-Set problem. The key factors in selecting this approach were the time constraints for the deliverables set by the Flag QAT and the primary duties and scheduled TAD of our members. Although a micro perspective could be undertaken by another group, it is the QAT's opinion that the value added would not justify the effort.
4. The QAT found that the psychology of aviators is a very interesting and important factor in the overall issue. The group interviewed both a flight surgeon and an aviation psychologist, and although there is a wealth of information available on the subject, the QAT would have benefited more if an aviation psychologist had been a member.
5. We also noted two other significant items outside our charter's tasking:
  - a. During our deliberations we noted that the aviation organization has four senior leaders (G-OAV, G-EAE, CO ATC, and CO ARSC), none of whom have sole responsibility for the aviation "program". This appears unsatisfactory from either a leadership or management perspective. However, we deferred to the QAT examining the aviation organization to resolve this item.

## MIND-SET QAT REPORT OF FINDINGS

5000

b. From the survey it also appeared that the aviation community had lost focus with its customer base. We referred this to the aviation marketing NWG for their consideration.

6. In general, the QAT found that an Aviation Mind-Set problem does exist, however, the phenomena, in most cases, can be explained. The QAT feels that implementation of appropriate actions can overcome real and perceived mind-set concerns. The traits the organization actively develops in training its flight school candidates are the traits they currently possess as individuals. In reviewing this report, one should keep in mind a very simple yet profound phrase that reads: "We all carry the vices of our virtues."

*Very respectfully,*  
  
J. L. PARKER

## Methodology:

Our QAT met for four months discussing the mind-set question. We gathered information by interviewing all of the personnel from identified "aviation top management" positions, as well as some senior level CG leaders, including both active and retired Flag Officers. We also interviewed a Naval Aviation psychologist and a CG Flight Surgeon to gain insight into the aviation psyche. QAT members received direct field input by facilitating a workshop of aviation unit Commanding Officers during the Aviation CO's Workshop in March (Enclosure (08)). We read numerous reports, drafts, and letters pertaining to aviation's performance as viewed by customers and supervisors (see references, Enclosure (08)). Finally, we selected the pertinent mind-set-related questions from the field-wide Aviation Survey and incorporated their results in our analysis.

## Definition of mind-set:

A mental disposition or attitude that predetermines one's responses to and interpretations of situations.

## Discussion:

Beyond our preceding definition, it has been a perplexing problem to quantify a specific "aviation mind-set." Everyone perceives the situation differently, largely depending upon their experience or background. There are neither hard facts nor figures to grasp, only general opinions and perceptions. Gradually, the group came to the consensus that our ideas on the aviation mind-set/psyche could be best illustrated with a diagram. We developed a non-scientific "Mindset Model" (Enclosure 03) to illustrate our conclusions. The background scale indicates the range of human behavior and shows a normal societal distribution of pride with regards to character traits/personality styles. The model shows that too much of one personality trait (pride or self esteem in this case) will become a negative, unacceptable trait. The QAT believes that aviators, in general, have higher self esteem than the societal norm, and more than most CG specialties. A normal distribution of aviators drawn around the "aviator norm" then illustrates that a larger group of aviators will approach the negative aspects (arrogance, elitism) of self confidence. This placement of aviators, as a whole, towards the higher ranges of pride was also amply supported by the aviation psychologist and flight surgeon.

Generally, our Mindset Model attempts to illustrate that aviators have a greater tendency towards the inappropriate levels of self confidence. Obviously, as in any group, a few individuals will also display these traits to the extreme. It is our collective opinion that a few individuals have created a disproportionate amount of the "superiority complex" perception

that other CG specialties see in aviation. Absent this skewed imbalance, there is normally a good natured, healthy rivalry between specialties.

However, we recognize that too much of this rivalry, if unchecked, can hinder, and in severe cases; prevent teamwork. Much of our effort, then, was directed towards identifying the causes of the superiority mind-set and developing recommendations to appropriately deal with these causes.

After lengthy discussions, we believe that the potential for developing an inappropriate mind-set stems from two general areas. We identified/categorized these areas as Individual Personality Traits and Organizational Career Paths/Policy. Aviators differ substantially from non-aviation personnel in these two areas, and these differences can foster an "Us-Against-Them" mind-set. We have split the areas apart for further discussion, as each area has several elements.

## I. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES (WHO is a pilot?)

### A. HUMAN FACTORS

#### WHAT makes up the person?

Common personality traits/qualities fostered in average aviators -- some natural attributes, some developed or encouraged through training. These traits were supported by our interview with the aviation psychologist.

1. Proud/Elite - developed early in flight training. Ultimate designation as an aviator is an extremely selective/discriminating/rigorous process. At each successive milestone flight students are reminded that they are the "Cream of the Crop."

2. Confident, high self-esteem - developed in flight school although present in "desired" aviator psychological profile. Aviators are trained to believe that they are the best trained, skilled, and equipped aviators on the planet - and are expected to overcome any threat/complete any task.

3. Independent, leading towards distrust of others - ingrained in flight school that pilots must depend on themselves. Your knowledge/skill might be the only factor that could save you on arduous missions or during critical aircraft emergencies.

4. Adventurous, risk takers - it is an inherent personality trait of aviators to want to try new, difficult tasks. However, indiscriminate risk taking is discouraged in flight training and exists only in Hollywood.

-Guardian



5. Assertive/Aggressive/Egocentric/Prefers Control - basic personality traits of aviators. Aviators want to take action now, and not delay. They prefer control as their confidence leads them to believe that they can do it best themselves.

6. Emotional Compartmentalization - a basic trait of aviators that is strongly encouraged in flight training. Certain in-flight tasks can be so critical that inattention or preoccupation could ultimately result in death. Aviators are adept at leaving personal worries behind so they can concentrate on the mission. This can result in aviators being perceived as cold, emotionally distant, or uninterested in the feelings of others.

7. Action/Results oriented - another personality trait of aviators. Inaction bothers aviators, and they are likely to take action sooner than most. They can be impatient while waiting for all available information to be gathered. While this trait could be viewed positively in urgent operational situations, it could be detrimental and frustrating when expected to submit completed staff work.

8. Very Competitive - a personality trait that is strongly encouraged and used as a motivating force in flight training. Competition is used in survival training, personal defense training, and for aircraft type/personnel assignments following flight school.

9. Stamina - flight training encourages physical fitness to combat periods of high stress endured by aviators during missions. Not only is fitness organizationally encouraged, but more stringent physical exam requirements exist for aviators.

10. Highly structured/checklist oriented - a personality trait regularly reinforced by job requirements. Aviators have a need for explicit, written guidelines/procedures in many areas of their job to insure standardization and reduce costly mishaps. This expectation is often carried over to other areas where written policy may not easily apply.

11. "Special" or superior to others - unchecked traits in 1, 2, 3, 5, and 8 above can lead some individuals to develop a superiority complex. Rivalry between groups, however well intended, can also be interpreted as a "better-than-you" attitude. (It should be noted that the belief of being above regulations is not encouraged in aviation training since it is detrimental to standardization and mishap prevention.)

B. VOCATION-RELATED REQUIREMENTS      ◀      WHAT's their job?

Knowledge, skills, and abilities acquired during aviation training process, related to job requirements.

1. Intellectual Capacity - increasingly complicated aircraft and mission planning requires a broadened knowledge base. Emergency, and some normal procedures, must be memorized since there may not be sufficient time to check a reference before taking corrective action.
2. Mental/Emotional Stability - see 6 above.
3. Physical Motor Skills - keen hand/eye coordination.
4. Judgement/Risk Management - aviators are given great responsibility at a junior rank. They are also given the authority to refuse missions they view as too hazardous. Risk management and judgement are qualities that are specifically evaluated as aviators progress through their pilot designations.
5. Rapid Decision Making - operational scenarios requiring quick decisions and aircraft maneuvers requiring rapid reactions are routinely practiced in aviation training. Repetitive training processes foster rapid decision making.
6. Precision - attention to detail is mandatory throughout aviation training.
7. Standardization - aviation credits its overall accident rate reduction largely to standardization (everyone doing maintenance, missions and maneuvers identically, according to written procedures). This is heavily emphasized and routinely evaluated on an individual and unit basis.

C. AREAS UNDER CRITICISM      ◀      WHAT are areas of concern?

Attitudes and behaviors observed by others which are indicative of aviator mind-set-type problems which detract from organizational effectiveness at senior management levels.

1. Resisting Change - defensive reaction to feedback; nonresponsive and defensive reaction to feedback which can deter innovation.

2. Too Conservative - "hiding behind" rules/standards; particularly applies to safety guidelines such as fatigue limitations.
3. Inappropriate use of aircraft - particularly abusive when use is under the cover of training flights.
4. Closed, separate society - inadequate communication with other Coast Guard communities.
5. Inconsistent management of aviation resources - lack of doctrine/aviation users guide.
6. Enjoy special status/treatment - pay, equipment, expensive resources and safety privilege (see para. III.C.3).

## II. ORGANIZATIONAL CAREER PATHS/POLICY

In any organization, differences between groups can drive a wedge between the factions. CG aviators have many differences from other occupational fields. The following known, observed or perceived distinctions contribute toward setting aviators apart from others:

### A. MEASURABLE/TANGIBLE DIFFERENCES

1. Pay: Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP), and Hazardous Duty Incentive Pay (HDIP).
2. Aviation Life Support Equipment:
  - a. "Appealing" items: flight jackets, aviation-frame glasses, flight suits, flight boots, and survival knives.
  - b. Other items: knee boards, helmet bags, nomex underwear, winter flight gloves/jackets.
3. Expensive resources: High-tech aircraft, maintenance and rescue equipment, logistics and support systems.
4. Nonstandard financial procedures (apparent misperception. See para. III.A.3).

### B. INTANGIBLE DIFFERENCES

1. Public Attention: Aviation has been romanticized by the media and public.
2. Awards.

3. Mission: Heavy operational slant, preconditioned for SAR, and strict adherence to flight rules and regulations.

#### C. MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES

1. Career path.
2. Little opportunity to "cross pollinate" with other CG specialties.
3. "Union Rules."
4. Emphasis on safety and concept of safety privilege.
5. Separate Instructions/Manuals.
6. High level of required individual training.

### III. OPINIONS / EVALUATIONS / DATA ANALYSIS

#### A. TANGIBLE DIFFERENCES

1. Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) and Hazardous Duty Incentive Pay (HDIP). ACIP and HDIP are misunderstood and the perception of widespread intentional unauthorized HDIP payments adds to the problem. Lack of equivalent pay for performing what aviators and non-aviators view as equally hazardous duty further exacerbates this problem.

ACIP, HDIP and other special incentives found in the military pay system were created to attract needed personnel to otherwise unattractive specialties or to compete for personnel with skills marketable in the civilian economy. The two incentive pays found in the CG aviation community are necessary management tools, but as currently implemented are inflexible to market forces, and may not be justified due to current excesses in aviation enlisted ratings. As demonstrated by the recent HDIP audit, they are also subject to abuse.

ACIP's structure and eligibility standards are specified in legislation. Standard payments are made to all qualified pilots, regardless of whether they are currently involved in flight operations. Since ACIP cannot be adjusted in response to changes in the commercial aviation industry's demand for pilots, it has only a weak link to maintaining the desired aviation force structure. CG personnel managers don't have the flexibility to key their payment levels towards maintaining the necessary aviation force structure at minimal cost. Due to this inflexibility, ACIP is now viewed as a "right" rather than a career incentive. Legislation would be required to change this perception and provide flexibility.

ACIP and HDIP systems also need better controls, explicit direction, and simplification so that vague guidelines cannot be interpreted in numerous ways.



2. Aviation life support equipment. Aviation's undeniably risky past resulted in the development of special individual equipment to lessen aviator's injuries. Some of this equipment has been glamourized so it is perceived more as a symbol than as essential protective equipment. Substantiating this point, nomex underwear and other non-glamorous equipment are never mentioned as a problem between aviators and other communities. Obviously, wearing of specialized gear at inappropriate times by any community in violation of uniform regulations can lead to factional disharmony. This is viewed as a minor problem that could be handled at the local level.

3. Expensive resources and nonstandard financial procedures. Costly resources are inherent to the aviation program. This could become a more important barrier if shrinking budgets are not shared equally across all CG programs. The perception that aviation supply and/or maintenance personnel are not required to play by the same financial rules as other programs could be a serious problem. However, we could find no evidence to indicate that aviation does not operate under the same strict purchasing regulations as the rest of the CG.

4. In general, our QAT believes that these tangible differences are only a minor factor of the mind-set phenomena. These differences are much more likely to affect behavior at the field level, but could lead to problems at the targeted senior aviation leadership level later on.

#### B. INTANGIBLE DIFFERENCES

1. Public attention and awards. Generally, aviation conducts the more "glamorous," highly visible missions and is more often in the public eye since the press concentrates on dramatic cases. Often non-aviators see the aviator's greater opportunity for operational awards simply as aviators receiving more awards. Due to time constraints, our QAT did not research the frequency of awards of each community.

2. Mission: Operationally, aviators are predisposed towards SAR. There are humanitarian and legal aspects to consider, but this is seen as a particularly thorny issue. As one of the individuals we interviewed stated, "Nearly all customers are served with the caveat that the aircraft is SAR divertable." This most likely leads to the perception that any other mission is receiving "second class service." We must somehow overcome this perception, but must also realize that while all missions are equal, SAR is "more equal" than others.

#### C. MANAGEMENT BARRIERS

1. Career path. The CG's need to reap the most benefit from expensively-trained aviation personnel results in aviators being kept longer in their narrow specialty field. Typically, aviators remain as duty standers until making commander (aviation career

path statistics are included in Enclosure (04)). Success in this narrow specialty does not necessarily equate to success in the mainstream CG. Narrow focus, quick decision-making, a fierce competitiveness, and confidence in one's ability to perform well independently often guarantees success as an aviator. However, these skills alone do not guarantee success as a "teampayer" outside aviation. Since behavior patterns are formed early in a career, O-5 may be too late to attempt a fundamental change of managerial style and behavioral attitudes.

2. No "cross pollination." Fixed wing aviators have very few opportunities to associate with/work alongside other CG specialties; rotary wing pilots have a greater opportunity as many deploy with the surface fleet. However, this situation can be strained as a small aircrew tries to adapt to a much larger group aboard ship, often far from their home unit. Basic human nature does not help, as the smaller group normally bands together. The same result would probably occur if a small group of non-aviators worked at an aviation unit for an extended period. Limited contact greatly contributes to stereotyping and misperceptions by both groups. All specialties would benefit from more regular interaction.

3. Safety, the concept of privilege, and "union rules." Aviation has developed a safety program that is much more pervasive than in other specialties. Its elements of standardization, privileged treatment of accident information, open, honest reporting and investigation of mishaps, strict procedures, crew fatigue requirements, and required recurrent training have greatly reduced aviation's accident rate. Most of these guidelines have been derived from accident investigations. In fact, despite its success in reducing accidents, the heavy emphasis on aviation safety has resulted not only in the perception that flying is no longer dangerous, but that safety per se is more important than productivity. In the past, the use of safety privilege (nonattributorial investigations to be used ONLY for accident prevention) was primarily limited to aviation. Although other communities have started to use the concept of privilege, it has not yet been institutionalized outside of aviation. Consequently, in contrast to the surface ops community, the frequent use of the safety privilege is interpreted as aviation's reluctance to identify and punish.

"Union rules" were also developed in response to accidents. In particular, the aviation crew fatigue limits (popularly known as "bag rules") are a major barrier between sailors and aviators. Simply using the phrase "in the bag" (meaning that further flight activities are prohibited as crew fatigue limits have been reached) is usually sufficient to irritate non-aviators. Abuses of flight time limits occur in both directions. Non-aviators most often see the situation where aviators decline missions due to flight or crew mission time limits. Aviators sometimes experience situations where they are directed to land just short of crew mission/flight time limits so that they can be launched

again. Both scenarios are contrary to the spirit of the crew fatigue guidelines. Everyone would benefit from re-emphasis of the wording of the first page of the Air Operations Manual, COMDTINST M3710.1B, which states:

"...No provision of this manual relieves personnel of their duty to use sound judgement or to take such emergency actions as the situation demands....[the "union rules"] ARE TO BE USED AS GUIDES [emphasis added] and carried out with sound professional judgement... Successful operations require the exercise of good judgement and common sense at all levels of command... mission demands may require on-scene deviation from prescribed instructions or procedures when, in the judgement of the pilot in command, such deviation is necessary for safety or the saving of life. Such deviation must not be taken lightly and must be tempered by maturity and a complete understanding of the aircraft, mission, and crew."

4. Separate Instructions/Manuals. The Air Operations Manual and Shipboard/Helo Operations Manual set policy. Each individual aircraft-type manual establishes procedures and operating limitations. In CG Regulations, shipboard operations/procedures and shore facilities are covered while aviation is scarcely mentioned. In this instance, the omission of the aviation specialty from CG Regulations accentuates the split between aviators and non-aviators.

5. Individual operational training. Aviators receive annual recertification in aircraft standard operating procedures. They are required to complete a specific minimum number of flight maneuvers every semiannual period. These individual training requirements are quite different from the general unit training requirements in other specialties. The need for and extent of training required by aviators is generally unknown outside of aviation, and therefore the importance aviators place on training is often underestimated.

#### D. LEADERSHIP'S RISK ADVERSE ASSESSMENT

The QAT could find no conclusive evidence to support our charter's statement that aviation top leadership is risk adverse. This personality trait is also not generally ascribed to aviators in the field.

#### E. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA

The Aviation Marketing Natural Working Group, in cooperation with the Aviation Planning QAT, conducted a Coast Guard-wide survey of issues relating to CG Aviation's customer-supplier relationships. A total of 406 responses analyzed were well distributed geographically, organizationally, programmatically,

by job title and by rank. The analysis addressed them as a composite, and across three dimensions: rank (enlisted, junior and senior officers (0-5+)), organizational level (field, operational commanders (i.e. area/district staffs), headquarters), and occupational area as indicated by billet code (general administration, marine safety, engineering, aviation, surface operations).

Selected survey questions are pertinent to this review of the "Aviation Mindset." These findings include:

Communications: A strong consensus of all respondents felt that communications barriers exist between aviation and non-aviation communities.

- Aviators held this opinion most strongly followed by the marine safety community with the remaining operating programs least likely to see barriers.
- Headquarters was more likely to see communications barriers than the field or operational commanders.
- The responses to a complementary question assert that there was inadequate dialogue between aviation and non-aviation communities, with aviation and marine safety communities being the strongest holders of this sentiment.
- Overall, customers are neutral regarding whether CG aviation understands all of their needs, with marine safety disagreeing most. On the other hand, aviators tend to believe that their own unit understands its customers' needs.
- Overall, respondents tend to believe that their units understand the capabilities of CG aviation. HQ and field units were stronger on this issue than operational commanders. The surface operations community agrees most strongly and marine safety was neutral.

#### Coast Guard Mission Support:

- Overall, the survey respondents tended to agree that a gap exists between operational needs/requirements and CG aviation resources/flight hours. This opinion was most strongly held by the marine safety community and by operational commanders.
- But, by a slightly wider margin, they also believe that adequate aviation resources/flight hours are available for own unit/program to use, and that aviation support is available when it is needed. The marine safety community was neutral on this issue.



- The apparent disagreement concerning the presence of a gap between needs and resources and the general availability of aviation resources when needed may be an issue of balance. The respondents tended to believe that operational tasking of aviation resources/services is not balanced across program areas. The marine safety community held this opinion most strongly but the aviation community also tended to agree with this assertion. Senior officers were more inclined to see an imbalance than more junior personnel.
- A belief that aviation has not identified all of its customers is held most strongly by Headquarters and the marine safety community, and less strongly by field units and the surface ops communities. Of significance, only 1/3 of all aviation respondents believed that they had identified all of their customers.

#### Management:

The respondents tended to believe that mission priorities for CG aviation are clearly established. Field units, enlisted personnel, and junior officers (who probably receive more specific tasking) believe this more strongly than other groups.

They tend to agree that HQ guidance to OPCON/field on the use of CG aviation facilities is clear. Aviation and surface communities agree most strongly while marine safety disagrees.

Overall, they tend to agree that operational missions for CG aviation are well coordinated. Aviation and surface communities agree with this assertion more strongly than the marine safety/environmental protection community.

The survey provides no data regarding the aviation communities attitudes or the quality of their leadership, but a December 1991 Master's Thesis prepared by LCDR R. J. Morrison while at the Naval Postgraduate School analyzed 457 responses to a survey of duty-standing aviators (O-1 to O-5).

When queried on the extent that they thought of themselves as a Coast Guard aviator or a Coast Guard officer, 12.9% considered themselves as "mostly aviator" and 21.9% considered themselves more aviator than officer. The distribution of responses was not substantially affected by rank.

36.8% of the responders strongly agreed with the statement that they would rather fly their entire career than have one

or more rotational tours out of the cockpit. 65.7% at least agreed with this statement.

76.1% of them were at least generally satisfied with the kind of work they do (18.6% strongly), and 83.8% at least agreed with the assertion that they were satisfied with their career (37.2% strongly).

When the general desire of aviation officers to remain in the cockpit and avoid rotational tours is combined with an assignment policy that has to maximize the time pilots remain at aviation commands (a career pattern which is agreeable to pilots) there is a strong tendency toward a "stovepiped" community.

Generally regarding all the above, it may be concluded that "although the large majority of Coast Guard aviation officers considered that their status as Coast Guard officers was at least equally as important as their position as aviator, there is a small but significant group who strongly hold the opposing view"... (and who thereby may likely have misplaced priorities).

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

o COMMUNICATION - In the opinion of the QAT, communication, or in this case the lack of communication, between the aviation community and the rest of the Coast Guard has created an atmosphere of distrust and false perceptions. For whatever reason, aviation is viewed by some as too "stovepiped." Without communication, it is quite easy to understand why the aviation community is perceived by some as a "closed, separate society which enjoys special treatment and conducts itself as a cut above the rest of the Coast Guard." Open, honest dialogue fosters cooperation and promotes synergy among communities.

1. Publish Aviation Doctrine/Users Guide. Form a Natural Working Group to publish the capabilities of Coast Guard aircraft; circumstances under which a particular aviation resource is best utilized; guidance on who has operational control of aircraft; how to obtain/request use of aviation resources; how missions are prioritized, and; who has the authority to schedule missions, etc. "Union Rules" were another very intangible point of contention. Non-aviators felt that aviation leadership used the rules to their personal advantage and often to the detriment of others. This document would assist the customers of aviation in learning more about how and why the aviation community performs its missions.

2. Recommendations of the Aviation Flight Pay Audit Team. Publish the final implementation plan/action directed by the Commandant. Be specific in explaining entitlement criteria and differences between Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) and Hazardous Duty Incentive Pay (HDIP).

o ATTITUDES - Attitude, particularly the "negative" or "elitist" attitude of a few aviators is an intangible that was very difficult to quantify. However, our QAT discovered that an attitude/action of one group, no matter how small the group, most definitely shapes the long term attitudes and perceptions of other groups. The QAT felt that in order to become a fully integrated service (aviation with the rest of the service) a culture shift was required on everyone's part. Paradigms must be changed where cultural stagnation exists.

1. Invite a carefully chosen senior representative from the aviation community to provide a presentation during afloat prospective commanding officers (PCO's) and prospective executive officers (PXO's) training. This should include an in depth presentation on COMDTINST M3710.1B; Chapter 2 of COMDTINST M3710.1B is very explicit in providing guidance concerning aviation capabilities and "union rules". "The standards are not intended to unduly restrict operational commanders when urgent operations are required; exceptions may be made by cognizant commanders as authorized in this section (section 2). The



standards cannot cover every situation that will arise; the command must determine the best course to follow in accomplishing certain urgent missions. However, conformance with the "spirit" of these standards is necessary if chronic and acute fatigue is to be reduced."

Provisions should be made to provide a similar presentation at PCO/PXO ashore training.

2. Consideration should be given to having all afloat PCO's and PXO's travel to ATC Mobile for more intense familiarization with the capabilities and limitations of the aviation community. This was done successfully for many years in the past.

3. Area and district commanders develop an aggressive exchange program between aviators and other communities.

There needs to be a reaffirmation that all CG aviators are: Coast Guard Officers FIRST - aviators SECOND. **BS.....**

1. Air Station Commanding Officers should maintain regular discussions and visits with all Commanding Officers (cutter, Group, MSO, etc.) within their AOR's.

o MANAGEMENT - Many aviators have a restricted career path and are not exposed to other programs. Post graduate training of aviators is limited. "Cross pollination" of specialties should be encouraged.

1. G-PO should investigate the ideal career path development for aviators. Emphasis should be on the whole Coast Guard officer who specializes in aviation.

2. G-P should review the initial training given to our Direct Commissioned Aviators (DCA's). A high percentage of duty standing, operationally deployed aviators are DCA's. The QAT felt that this particular set of aviators may not be sufficiently indoctrinated in seagoing customs, tradition, etiquette, and professional training (beyond specialized aviation training).

3. At every opportunity, encourage Flag oversight (particularly at the district level) of aviation units.

o LEADERSHIP - The QAT found that there are concerns that aviators were not held to the same disciplinary standards as individuals or at the command level. For example: if a ship runs aground not only would those in direct control of the ship's movements be held accountable but also the Commanding Officer; and their careers are in immediate jeopardy. If an aircraft commander damages or destroys an aircraft, with very few



exceptions, no administrative or legal action is pursued against either the personnel directly involved or the unit commanding officer (and if action is taken, the results are not published). Further, there needs to be a reaffirmation of the Commandant's policy regarding personal accountability. Deployed aviators have always been and remain fully accountable to the commanding officer of the vessel. In instances of improper behavior, it is the duty of those commanding officer to document that behavior on an Officer Evaluation Report or other appropriate means.

1. G-L determine how best to ensure aviation legal board results are consistent/comparable to the action taken by other communities. Publish aviation legal board results.

2. Reemphasize command relationships and accountability of deployed aviation detachments.

Enclosures:

1. Aviation Mindset QAT Charter
2. Aviation Mindset QAT Problem Statement
3. Aviation Mindset Model
4. Aviation Officer Career Path
5. Aviation Psychologist Summary
6. Psychology and Psychopathology of Flight, excerpts from U.S. Naval flight Surgeon's Manual
7. Aviation Mindset Workshop Results from Aviation CO's Workshop
8. References of Selected Letters/Reports

U.S. Department  
of Transportation  
**United States  
Coast Guard**



Commandant  
United States Coast Guard

023

Washington, D.C. 20593-0001  
Staff Symbol: G-OAV  
Phone: (202) 267-0952

5000

12 DEC 1994

From: Commandant  
To: Distribution

Subj: AVIATION MIND-SET QAT REPORT OF FINDINGS

1. The enclosed report is the product of the Aviation Management QAT on "mind-set". It is being distributed to senior management, and aviators O-5 and above.

2. I consider this report as a tool to assist us in understanding ourselves and our relationships, with the goal of improving Aviation's already exceptional reputation for customer service.

*Respectfully,*

**N. T. SAUNDERS**  
Chief, Office of Law Enforcement and  
Defense Operations

Encl: (1) Aviation Mind-set QAT Report of Findings

Dist: All Flags  
CGLANTAREA (Ao)  
CGPACAREA (Ao)  
All CG Districts (o/osr)  
All Aviation (O-6/O-5)

G-CRC  
17 MAY 1993

From: Adjunct Member, Aviation Management QAT  
To : Team Leader, Aviation Management QAT

Subj: AVIATION MIND-SET QAT REPORT OF FINDINGS

1. Forwarded, recommending briefings of the findings and recommendations to the full Aviation Management QAT and follow-on briefing to the Commandant (G-CV, G-CCS....if desired).


2. While I now recognize my oversight in not proposing an aviation psychologist or flight surgeon as a member of the QAT, I feel the members of the QAT did an excellent job in addressing an ill-defined, wide-ranging, amorphous subject in a highly professional, straight forward manner. While formed as a QAT, because the subject being addressed was anything but a "process," I believe the team acted more appropriately as a study group.

3. After reviewing the findings of the subject report, I think there is little question but what a "problem" does exist between the aviation and non-aviation communities of the Coast Guard. I believe a minor part of that problem results from cases of mismanaged pride and lack of sensitivity on the part of members of the aviation community. This problem must be addressed on an individual and community-wide basis by the individuals within the community and their leadership, both within as well as outside the community. The bigger problem, however, and one that should be relatively easy to manage, is a lack of understanding and appreciation by members of the various communities within the Coast Guard for the needs, capabilities, and taskings of the individuals in communities other than their own. This derives from a basic lack of communication and familiarity between and among members of the various communities. While due consideration must be given to the efficient management and utilization of the specialty trained personnel in the Service, I fully support the tenor of the recommendations of the QAT. Adherence to uniform standards across all communities wherever possible, coupled with an understanding and appreciation of the diverse demands unique to the various communities, is essential to integrating all players into a fully effective and efficient Coast Guard team.

4. The keys to achieving a cohesive organization are in improving communications, insuring cross community orientation, and productive focusing of personal and community pride. The Aviators can provide a valuable service for all Coast Guard programs; they must recognize that and work to identify and appreciate the needs of their customers. Conversely, their customers must learn what aviation can provide in support of their programs and how to obtain these services. Ongoing and



reciprocal dialogue, followed by successful mission demonstration, will naturally result in developing not only mutual respect, but concomitantly, an appreciation by non-aviators for the unique facets of Coast Guard aviation. To this end, I fully support formal development and aggressive pursuit of programs that drive meaningful cross community interactions from both sides of the isle. In addition, following acceptance by the Commandant, I recommend that each Coast Guard aviator, O-5 and above, receive a copy of this package.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, featuring a large, stylized initial 'B' followed by a series of connected loops and a horizontal line extending to the right.

Copy:--Members of Aviation Management QAT (w/enclosure)  
Members of Aviation Mind-Set QAT (w/o enclosure)