THE COAST GUARD
AT WAR

LANDINGS IN FRANCE

PREPARED IN THE
HISTORICAL SECTION
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION
U. S. COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS
SEPTEMBER 1, 1946
It has been found, from past experience, that valuable material is sometimes received after a monograph has been carefully prepared in every detail and distributed. It is then too late to incorporate that new material into the story. This monograph is, therefore, submitted in first draft, for distribution to members of the Service in order that material still not at hand may be obtained from them or suggestions made by them as to what is still needed. Some parts are still in the form of notes, credit being indicated in the list of sources, as well as in the main part of the story in some cases. Readers are requested to send in their material and suggestions at this time so that they may be incorporated into the final draft.
"Tous les Francais, ou qu'ils soient, vont avoir à souffrir. Qu'ils se montrent dignes du grand passé de leur pays. Qu'ils deviennent fraternels, qu'ils se serrent autour de la patrie blessée, l'heure de la résurrection viendra." (All French people, wherever they are, are going to have to suffer. Let them show themselves worthy of the great past of their country. Let them become as brothers, let them gather closely about the wounded homeland, the hour of resurrection will come). The last words of the last speech of the last President of the Council of the Third Republic, announcing to all French persons that the catastrophe had been consummated, France had been forced to capitulate to the Germans. "....l'heure de la résurrection viendra."

"We summon you as comrades to the common fight against the invaders of France. The war has entered the phase of liberation."

Lieut. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces, addressing the French

".... If America and its Allies are to win the devastating war now raging over the surface of the entire globe, the ships that carry the food, the guns, the tanks, the planes, and the other implements of war to our fighting forces on battlefields beyond the seas must reach their destinations safely."

Vice Admiral Russel R. Waesche, Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard

".... Our fighting men at the front know, as we know, that this war must be won, not just for the sake of ourselves and our families, but for the sake of all the 2,000,000,000 people who make up the earth's population. If we stop before we win on this world-wide scale, we will only face another terrible Armageddon a few years hence. The free world of which we speak so glibly is no idealistic dream. It is the sworn goal of your government and of all nations which are allied with us. Never before in history has such a formidable collection of forces moved in concert for one ultimate purpose."

Rear Admiral Lloyd T. Chalker, Assistant Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard

"Enormous attacking armies -- for us, liberating armies -- are setting out from the ancient shores of England. This is the battle for France -- and it is France's battle.... Every son of France, no matter who he is or where he is, has one simple and sacred duty: to fight the enemy with every means in his power."

General Charles de Gaulle, Leader of the "Fighting French" Head of the Free French Provisional Government
FOREWORD

As the Allied troops moved into Normandy, German forces of occupation gave before the shock of wave upon wave of hard-hitting, superbly equipped troops, moving with precision timing across the choppy Channel. And behind the German lines, hidden in the heart of Nazi-occupied France, waited the French Underground, poised to strike.

They had been busy until D-Day. On Sunday, June 4, the Jura Underground, in the French Alps, received orders to sabotage a railway line. A few hours later, there were 42 breaks in the shortest railroad line between Germany and France. During the weeks immediately preceding Allies landings, the Breton and Normand Undergrounds were unusually active. Communications linking northern France with Paris were broken. Transportation of German troops and supplies were interrupted. Electric installations serving German defense systems along the Channel were destroyed.

But as invasion commenced, Underground activity was suspended. Held in check by Allied directives to prevent useless loss of life and premature German discovery of locations, the Underground waited for two long days. Then the signal flashed. By radio, by plane the word went throughout France: "Make every German feel insecure upon French soil."

The Germans were already insecure. Despite bloody reprisals, despite mass arrests and murders, despite deportations and torture, organized French Resistance had not only continued to resist, but had spread and grown. The very week of the Allied landings, the appearance of five new clandestine newspapers was announced, two of them slanted especially toward French sportmen.

Given the official "go ahead" from Allied headquarters, the Underground started work in earnest. Specialists in railway sabotage, they showed their versatility by cutting canals, blowing up transformers, engaging German troops in open battle. While Vichy alternately pleaded and threatened in a frantic effort to support the Germans, organized Resistance laid siege to Grenoble, moved on Toulouse, Limoges, Tarbes, Bellegarde. Swooping down from the mountains, the Maquis lit the fires of widespread rebellion in southeastern France. In Britain, the Underground attacked a body of German troops, killed 20, and captured their supplies.

Exact figures on the strength of the Underground armies of France are still unavailable. Reports from inside France indicate that some 100,000 are supplied with arms. Behind them are reserves of about a million more. Men, women, even children fight in this army, recently officially designated by the French Provisional Government as the French Forces of the Interior with full military rights and privileges.
Arms and equipment have been supplied by the Allies, and often, not too willingly, by the Germans. Resistance training has centered around commando tactics how to murder quietly by night, how to dynamite a tunnel efficiently, how to make explosives, how to sabotage machinery.

Most of the members of the French Underground are simple, everyday people, who, until now, had worked in secret; women distributing clandestine papers, acting as decoys for leading Germans to their deaths, children playing where they can overhear German conversations, carrying messages, men who worked as small tradesmen, tavern keepers, hundreds of "little people" who hated the invader, who wanted their traditional freedoms.

Their was a flexible, but well-disciplined movement. Careful planning accompanies every action, every move, even the routine work of printing the clandestine press. Every member of the Resistance knew the importance and value of teamwork and cooperation; the price of carelessness was death.

Typical of their careful planning and timing was the raid on Figeac, near Cahors in the south of France. Early one morning, trucks loaded with 400 members of the Underground drove in. They blew up the gates of the city with charges of dynamite, then loaded war materiel, which had been collected for German use, into their trucks and carried it away. Each of the 400 men had exact orders. Carried out with skilled precision, the entire operation took only four hours.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword ........................................................................................................ iii
Landings in Normandy .................................................................................. 1
Plans and Preparations — Code Name Overlord — Neptune ...................... 7
Operational Chain of Command .................................................................. 9
Pattern of Invasion ....................................................................................... 9
Merchant Marine Inspection ........................................................................ 11
Merchant Marine in the Invasion .................................................................. 13
The BAYFIELD APA-33 — Admiral Spencer's Account ............................... 15
First Hand Account of Lt. Comdr. Julius Mizel, USCG, Communications Officer ................................................................. 19
Normandy Invasion ..................................................................................... 23
Medical Officer's Account ........................................................................... 25
Official Action Report of the BAYFIELD — Utah Beach ............................. 29
"An Army of Beetles" .................................................................................. 39
The Invasion ................................................................................................ 53
An Account of the Invasion ......................................................................... 59
The SAMUEL CHASE .................................................................................. 63
Account of Emil A. Bachschmidt ................................................................. 67
Lt. (jg) James V. Forrestal's Commendation ................................................ 69
A Coast Guardsman on Normandy Beach .................................................... 71
Official Action Report of the USS SAMUEL CHASE on June 6, 1944 ....... 75
Official Account of the SAMUEL CHASE ................................................ 77
The JOSEPH T. DICKMAN .......................................................................... 79
Loading ......................................................................................................... 83
Tactical Procedure ....................................................................................... 83
Materiel ......................................................................................................... 83
General Comment ....................................................................................... 85
Coast Guard Rescue Flotilla No. One .......................................................... 85
Rescue Flotilla One — Fifty 83-footers ......................................................... 87
Rescue Patrol ............................................................................................... 91
Care of the Wounded ................................................................................ 95
Mine Laden "DUCK" is Sunk ...................................................................... 95
The Snafu No. 56 ....................................................................................... 97
Rescue Cutter 62 ....................................................................................... 99
An LST Sinks ............................................................................................ 105
One Hero's Experience ............................................................................. 107
Explosion Rocks Rescue Cutter on Way Back From France .................... 111
Coastline .................................................................................................... 113
First Hand Account of Lt. Comdr. Alexander Stewart, USCGR, Commander, Coast Guard Rescue Flotilla One ................................................................. 113
Coast Guard LCI(L) Flotilla ........................................................................ 137
Official Report of Captain Miles Imlay ........................................................ 137
The LCI (L) 319 ......................................................................................... 163
The LCI (L) 85 .......................................................................................... 171
Artificial Harbors - Code Named "Mulberry"
Officers Cited for Part in Creating Artificial Harbors
Capture of Cherbourg
Summary of Commander Walsh's Duties
Account of Commander Walsh
Courage is Keynote in Cherbourg
Southern France
Account of Lt. Comdr. Martin D. Berg
Official Action Report
Additional Action Report
The BAYFIELD
The SAMUEL CHASE
The JOSEPH T. DICKMAN
Report of Operations, 13-17 August, 1944, Invasion of Southern France
Coast Guard Ferried Assorted Nazis to United States

APPENDICES

Appendix A - USS JOSEPH T. DICKMAN - Chronological Account of Operations
Appendix B - Summary of Fifth Year of World War II
Appendix C - Coast Guard Vessels Which Participated in the Invasion & Bombardment of Coast of France, 6 - 25 June, 1944
Appendix D - Coast Guard Manned Ships Entitled to Operation and Engagement Stars
Appendix E - Operation Neptune
Appendix F - Premature Announcement of the Invasion
Sources
Symbols of U. S. Navy Ships
Designations of U. S. Naval Aircraft

- vi -
LANDINGS IN NORMANDY

After months of preparation, the long-awaited western front in Europe was opened on June 6, 1944, when an armada of 4,000 ships and thousands of smaller craft appeared off the coast of Normandy, and thousands of troops swarmed ashore under cover of the greatest sea and air bombardment in the history of war. American, British, and Canadian troops landed successfully at various places on the coast, from a point near Le Havre, at the mouth of the Seine, to the Cotentin Peninsula, where Cherbourg is located. Substantial beachheads were established. First came the airborne troops—four airborne infantry divisions and two paratroop divisions. The paratroops, British and American, jumped two hours before midnight on June 5, landing behind the German shore defenses. The tow planes came in slowly behind them, cutting loose the gliders that circled and crashed through the trees. Out of the gliders came the airborne infantry, artillery 37-mm antitank guns, jeeps, and anti-aircraft guns. The troops smashed German coastal gun positions and set up defenses around strategic bridges, villages, and road junctions.

Among the vessels that were to do the job were Coast Guard-manned transports, the Coast Guard LCI(L) Flotilla, and the Coast Guard Rescue Flotilla. The transports were the BAYFIELD (Captain, later Admiral, Lyndon Spencer, USCG); the SAMUEL CHASE (Captain Edward E. Fritsche, USCG); and the JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (Captain Richard Mauerman, USCG). The LCI(L) Flotilla, variously named Four, Ten, and other numbers, consisted of thirty-six landing craft, commanded by Captain Miles H. Imlay, USCG. The Coast Guard Rescue Flotilla, consisting of fifty 83-foot boats, was commanded by Lieutenant Commander Alexander V. Stewart, Jr., USCG.

Landing conditions on the once fashionable bathing resort beaches along the Bay of the Seine were ideal. Farther north, near Calais and Dunkirk, the shore was too shallow, and to the south, nearer Spain in the Bay of Biscay, it was too steep and rocky.

Furthermore, this section of Normandy was near the embarkation ports in southwest England and near the important communication lines and highways leading to Paris. And it was near the two best French ports on the Channel, Cherbourg and Le Havre, which the Allies had to get to supply an extended drive into the Continent. Denmark or the nearby German coast would have been the nearest landing points to Berlin. But to send troops there would have been to place them in a pocket completely ringed by German airfields. The strip of coast lying between the Rhine and the Seine would have been closest to England, but the Dieppe raid showed that German defenses were strongest at that point. This left Normandy, near to Paris, and containing the second and third largest ports in France, as the best landing place. Normandy was close enough for fighter planes...
REAR ADMIRAL LYNDON SPENCER, COMMANDING OFFICER USS BAYFIELD
coverage and provided natural advantages for the supplying of invasion forces. Seizure of the Normandy peninsula would at once provide ports for the shipment of heavy equipment and flat terrain for the establishment of airfields.

**MINESWEEPERS**

**PRECEDE**

**INVASION FLEET**

When dawn came, on June 6th, minesweepers edged their way carefully toward the shore, ahead of the invasion fleet. As the two hundred little British vessels led the way, over the horizon thundered the greatest umbrella of airpower ever assembled for invasion protection. More than 7,500 Allied planes went into action over the 50-mile stretch of Normandy coast during the first eight hours of combat. German shore batteries opened fire on the minesweepers but they kept on moving straight toward the shore, clearing a path for the landing craft that were already swinging around in wide circles at the rendezvous points farther back in the Channel.

**ALLIED WARSHIPS**

**OPEN FIRE**

A little after 5 a.m., on June 6th, the guns of the Allied warships opened on the enemy shore batteries and defense installations. Battle-ships, cruisers, and other types of warships participated. Seconds after the bombardment, our troops poured onto the beaches. Great fires and smoke arose from the coast. The Allied warships steamed close inshore and dueled with the shore batteries. Fire support for advancing troops was continued for miles inland, with naval gunfire liaison officers accompanying the troops to spot targets.

**LITTLE OPPOSITION MET BY FIRST LANDING WAVES**

"As far as could be ascertained, little opposition was experienced in the landing of the first waves of troops on the beach," reported Admiral Spencer, commanding officer of the BAYFIELD, the flagship of Rear Admiral Don P. Moon, USN, Commander Task Force "U". "Rockets, bombs, and naval bombardment had been effective to the extent that the opposition was minor and came from positions to the Southeast of the Utah beach. No underwater obstacles were encountered by the BAYFIELD's boats used in landing the BARNETT's troops."

**ENEMY COASTAL GUNS KEPT CONCEALED FROM OVERHEAD**

German pillboxes along the Normandy coast, all the way from Cherbourg to LeHavre, had to be destroyed before the mines that girdled the shore, the tank traps and the obstacles, the road blocks and booby traps could be cleared away. If the pillboxes could have maintained their fire, the invasion would have been a bloody fiasco. According to some authorities, a German machine gunner, crouching in his concrete pillbox, held 10,000 British and American lives in his hand. His twin guns could fire 1,000 shots in a minute; in ten minutes he could mow down an entire assault wave of infantry; he could sweep the
AN AMERICAN SOLDIER CRAWLS THROUGH A SLIT TRENCH CUT IN THE BLUFFS THAT PROTECTED THE FRENCH INVASION BEACHES
whole beach clear in the time it would take the infantry to work its way up from the shallows to the high-water mark. A decision had to be made whether to destroy the pillboxes by air or naval gunfire.

**DECISION IS MADE TO USE NAVAL GUNS**

The decision was made to use naval guns. Air bombardment would have been unsatisfactory for several reasons. First of all, the pillboxes and gun emplacements had been constructed to resist attack from the air. They were buried in hillsides and cliffs, for the most part, where they were safe from any but the largest bomb striking close at hand. Although Allied Intelligence work had been excellent, the position of the majority of pillboxes could not be determined. They were almost invisible. The gunner had ten feet of concrete over his head; the sides of the pillbox were sunk into the earth, with solid cliffs walling the gunner on three sides. He did not have to expose himself; he could crouch low and use a periscope. His coupled machine guns, looking out through a tiny slit, had been so situated that their fire could sweep the beach raking it from one end to the next. An aerial bombardment necessary to destroy all the pillboxes from Cherbourg to LeHavre would have had to be so intense that surprise would have been impossible. Surprise was vitally important, yet the gun emplacements would have to be destroyed before the assault boats reached the beaches. So the decision was made to use the naval guns of the fleet for the destruction of the enemy's coastal defenses. The success of naval gunfire at Salerno, when the army had succeeded in landing against powerful opposition and maintaining its position through many counterattacks, served as a precedent.

**ENEMY WAS KEPT DECEIVED**

While plans were worked out, the enemy was bewildered and deceived in various ways. A small naval force made a threatening appearance off the French shore of the Strait of Dover, leading the Germans to think that was the place where the real blow would be struck. The Germans were also deceived by an attack on their big guns in the neighborhood of LeHavre. Those guns had to be knocked out because they commanded waters in which the fleet was operating. But the operation served the further purpose of keeping the Germans in doubt until the last moment of the actual attack. There were many proofs that the Germans had been caught off their guard. One German non-commissioned officer of a coastal defense unit, brought in among the first prisoners, had actually been blown out of his bed by the opening shells of the bombardment. Three Germans destroyers dashed out of the mouth of the Seine, while the bombardment was at its height, to see what was happening. When they caught a single glance at the enormous fleet, they fled immediately for shelter.
ADMIRAL HAROLD STARK, COMMANDING ALL AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE GIVES FINAL INSTRUCTIONS TO THREE U.S. COAST GUARD OFFICERS DURING AN INSPECTION OF THE COAST GUARD MANNEI INFANTRY LANDING CRAFT FLOTILLA SHORTLY BEFORE THE INVASION OF THE FRENCH COAST
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

CODE NAME OVERLORD - NEPTUNE

In April, 1943, Prime Minister Churchill and his staff met in Washington with President Roosevelt and his military and naval leaders to shape the plans for finality. The code name for the invasion was OVERLORD, and its naval phase was solemnly dubbed NEPTUNE. A full-size war was being fought in the Mediterranean; the U-boats were swanking around the Atlantic; in the Pacific the Navy was battering down the bastions of Japan's defenses at grim cost. In Washington the planners worked in secret on the operation that was to dwarf all of these, and then moved on to Great Britain.

"Get to know your opposite number," was Admiral Stark's order of the day to his staff, and so thoroughly was this order carried out that the entire business of securing bases, facilities and supplies, as well as establishing joint operational procedure, went through swiftly and smoothly.

On July 15, 1943, COMINCH wrote to COMNAVEU outlining the additional duties and the means of handling them which would come to the command as the time for invasion drew near. The letter said, in part:

(2) As a first step in the build-up for operations and prior to the later appointment of a U. S. Naval Commander for future operations afloat, a new command is established, of Landing Craft and Bases, Europe. (Short title--LANCRABEU).

(6) It is expected that a Captain or Commander under Commander, Landing Craft and Bases, Europe, will act as officer-in-charge of each training establishment or base with a minimum of such other officers as required.

(8) It is contemplated that the Commander, Landing Craft and Bases, Europe (short title--COMLANCRABEU), will perform the following tasks:

(a) Command U. S. Naval Bases for landing craft in the United Kingdom, ...
(b) Provide for the reception and effective maintenance of U. S. landing craft in the United Kingdom.
(c) Establish facilities as required for use of landing craft during the training phase, mounting of any operation, and the follow-up.
(d) Act in liaison with British authorities in charge of British bases used by U. S. landing craft in the care and operation of such craft.

ABOARD A COAST GUARD MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT, THE DECKS ARE JAMMED WITH AMERICAN FIGHTING MEN
(e) Act as Commander, Amphibious Forces, Europe, until relieved.

(f) During combat operations it is not expected that Commander, Landing Craft and Bases, Europe will have a tactical command afloat. It is considered that the development of maximum efficiency of landing craft and bases will require the full employment of his time on the tasks involved.

OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND

In accordance with this letter Rear Admiral John Wilkes, USN, reported on September 1, 1943, to take up his duties as COMLANCRAEU and, in November, Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk, USN, who had been placed in operational command of all United States naval forces participating in the forthcoming operations as Commander Task Force 122, arrived in London. Shortly after that Rear Admiral John H. Hall, Jr., USN, arrived aboard the ANCON from the Mediterranean to act as Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force. This, then, was the operational chain of command as it was to function from that time on through Operation OVERLORD-NEPTUNE: Commander in Chief Allied Naval Expeditionary Force (Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, RN, naval hero of Dunkerque), Commander Task Force 122 (Rear Admiral Kirk, who had commanded our naval forces at Sicily), Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force (Rear Admiral Hall), and Commander Landing Craft and Bases Europe. Later, the lower echelons of Task Force 122 were expanded to provide for three further task forces; Task Force O, under Rear Admiral Hall, Task Force U, under Rear Admiral Don P. Moon, USN, and the Follow-Up Force under Commodore Campbell D. Edgar, USN.

PATTERN OF INVASION

TRANSPORT AREA

At the start of the invasion, the Transport Area was the point of reference and the point of focus of all activities. In the Transport Area the troopships anchored and lowered the amphibious craft, the LCVP's, which forthwith assembled off the quarters of the ships to be unloaded first, and circled about until called alongside the transport to take on troops. The circling was somewhat like the formation of airplanes leaving or approaching a carrier. Circling kept the small craft in order. The unloaded craft were summoned to the troopships by colored light signals; the troops scrambled down the cargo nets into the amphibious craft, which chugged off for the rendezvous circle nearby, each roundabout composed of boats that hit the beach in the same wave. The rendezvous circling was performed, usually, off the bows of the transports on the landward side.

CONTROL BOATS

Marking the inshore extreme of the Transport Area were the control vessels that guided the first four or five waves of small craft through the mineswept lanes to the beach. Five minutes before the

YANKEE SOLDIERS PILE OVER THE SIDE FROM A COAST GUARD ASSAULT TRANSPORT OFF THE FRENCH COAST AND INTO THE LANDING BARGES
final dash, a light gleamed from each control craft. When that light went out, the run for the beach began. The circles straightened out into columns. It was an orderly run. The control boats took the troop-and gun-laden craft in prearranged waves to an imaginary line known as the Line of Departure, from 1,500 yards to 4,000 yards off the beach target. From the Line of Departure, the small craft could see the beach and recognize from landmarks and detailed charts the spot at which they were to discharge their troops. The control boats remained on station on the Line of Departure, acting as close control of all boat traffic near the beach. In the Normandy invasion the Line of Departure was 3,000 yards off the beach, and the Transport Area was from 10 to 14 miles distant.

TRANSPORT AREA WAS HEART AND BRAIN OF INVASION

Until the Army signaled that the beach was securely held, the Transport Area remained the heart and brain, the nerve and arterial system, of the invasion. Through it passed all troops, cargo and craft that were to hit the beach, no matter when. To it and through it passed all messages, for the Naval Task Group Commander and the Commanding General, with their respective staffs, all were there.

FIRE SUPPORT AREAS FLANKED THE TRANSPORT AREA

Flanking the Transport Area were the Fire Support Areas where the bombardment groups formed, to provide the landing forces with artillery support, to blast any probing artillery fire directed at the heart of the invasion; battleships, cruisers, destroyers for closer work, and rocket ships and gunboats to charge in with the first waves of the landing craft.

TRANSPORTS MOVE CLOSER IN AFTERTHE BEACHHEADS ARE SECURED

Later, with the beaches secured and the invasion forces in control far enough inland to eliminate enemy shore batteries, the transports moved closer in to shore to speed the movement of troops and supplies to the beach. When the Admiral in charge deemed that safety permitted, the Transport Area was expanded to a general anchorage.

MERCHANT MARINE INSPECTION

LIVES SAVED BY INSPECTION

One of the major functions of the Coast Guard was the inspection of merchant vessels and safety appliances thereon. The work of the Coast Guard Inspectors to ensure that merchant vessels carried adequate safety equipment, and that their crews attained greater proficiency in operation saved many lives. In home ports, lifeboat drills and safety instructions were given by the Coast Guard. Marine Inspectors, detailed to ports in the United States and abroad, examined merchant
officers for upgrading and administered discipline, in addition to carrying out the duties of inspection.

MERCHAND MARINE IN THE INVASION

CAPTAIN SHEPHEARD'S CITATION

In June, 1944, General Eisenhower asked for a high ranking officer, thoroughly familiar with merchant marine problems, and the Commandant recommended Captain Halbert C. Shepheard, (later Commodore), Chief of the Merchant Marine Inspection Division of the Coast Guard. Captain Shepheard left for England late in June to become a member of General Eisenhower's staff at a time when the invasion on the French coast was giving rise to many problems involving thousands of merchant ships and seamen. In response to a pledge of full support from the Merchant Marine, at the liberation invasion of France, General Eisenhower sent the following cable, dated June 28, 1944, to Captain Edward Macaulay, USN (Ret.), Deputy War Shipping Administrator: "In behalf of the men of my command, I thank the men of the Merchant Marine for their pledge of full cooperation in our common effort to destroy the forces of tyranny and darkness. The huge quantities of supplies that have been brought across the Atlantic are a testimonial to the job that has already been done."

The citation, accompanying Captain Shepheard's award of the Legion of Merit, gives an idea of the part played by the Merchant Marine Inspection Division of the Coast Guard. The citation reads: "For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the Government of the United States as Chief of the Merchant Marine Inspection Division, Office of Operations, United States Coast Guard, from March 1942, to June 1945. Skillfully administering a greatly expanded and vitally important Merchant Marine Inspection Service, Commodore Shepheard exercised strong influence toward the early adoption of specific safety measures for war-time shipping and for personnel engaged in that activity, effecting and enforcing stringent rules and regulations which were important factors in the successful operation of our Merchant Marine in hazardous waters during World War II. Rendering marked assistance to the Army and Navy commands in the European theater prior to D-Day, he advanced sound advice relative to the best utilization of enemy shipping for the occupation of hostile countries and took an outstanding part in the preliminary planning for a new international conference to be held in the near future concerning the entire matter of safety at sea. Uncompromising in his devotion to duty and tireless in his efforts, Commodore Shepheard, by his resourceful initiative and judgment, contributed essentially to the development of an efficient war-time United States Merchant Marine for the transportation of troops, war-time personnel and war cargoes to all fronts of the world on merchant and troop ships with a minimum loss of ships, passengers, operating personnel or cargoes, thereby serving the interests of his country to the best of his fine abilities throughout the most critical period in the history of the Nation."
ADIRAL SPENCER’S ACCOUNT

"We left New York on February 10, 1944, and went to Glasgow, Scotland, arriving there on the 22nd of February. It was Washington's Birthday, and a beautiful day. As we sailed up the Clyde, people said it was the most beautiful day in eighteen months. We made two runs to Scotland to bring troops to train in Southern England, remaining there until D-minus one-Day.

"While moving in convoy, large ships like transports, were 800 yards apart from the bow of one to the stern of the other. Usually the columns were 1,000 yards apart. Before we started, while we were in New York, the Commodore of the convoy informed us that he could tell if we were as much as ten yards out of position. He said he wouldn't hesitate to tell us. And he didn't! We had a bunch who had never run in a convoy before, including the Commanding Officer, and we had a lot to learn.

"Radio silence was observed. In emergencies, the TBS was used. It is a low-powered radio incapable of being heard by the enemy. There was a period just before dark every day when instructions for the night were given over the TBS. When we were all on the circuit, the Commodore of the convoy would give us instructions about what course and time changes would be made, and so forth. Flag hoists were used during the day for signaling any changes in information. At night, emergency communication was over the TBS. And instructions for the night, given just before dark, were also over the TBS. In convoy over the ocean, we used this low-powered radio.

"We had been selected as Flagship. We were considered as best qualified because, besides being an APA (Auxiliary, Personnel, Assault), we were also a Reserve AGC (Auxiliary General Command ship). Actually, we thought we had more radio installations than we did, but after we had been selected, we found we didn't have enough radio equipment. So we got more at a commercial dock yard in Falmouth, a nice little town by the way.

"At one time, on D-Day, we were operating 47 radio circuits at one time. That is, we were directing operations of the floating forces, the Army ground forces, and the Army air forces. We not only had aboard the Admiral in charge of the floating forces making the assault on Utah beach, but we also had the Senior Army Officer of the forces landing on Utah beach, and we had liaison officers for the Army Air forces. All were giving their instructions. We even had pigeons on board, in case the radio failed. There was one commanding officer who put some men and pigeons in the brig because
USS TIDE

A MINESWEEPER THAT PRECEDED THE INVASION ARMADA TO THE COAST OF NORMANDY DIES IN THE WATERS OFF FRANCE
they came aboard without his receiving an order for them. He was suspicious about the pigeons. He finally released the men but kept the pigeons in the brig. If they had messages of use to the enemy it might prove disastrous.

"As for the attitude of the fighting men, they took it as a job to be done and they were going to do it. I didn't see anybody crawling off into corners, but, on the other hand, neither was there any hilarity that morning, when the men climbed into the landing boats, lowered for the run to the enemy beaches. Many of these boys had been in the invasions of North Africa, Sicily, and Italy.

"The doctors did a wonderful job, but one patient didn't get much tender sympathy. Among the wounded brought aboard the BAYFIELD was a German woman sniper. She had rouge on when she came aboard and the next morning when she left she had rouge on. I don't know where she got it. We gave her medical care and then sent her on with the other wounded. Someone told me she said she had gotten several of our boys before we got her.

"That was one time I saw Dr. Braund incensed. Here was a woman who was a civilian, she was shooting at our boys. He wanted to know why he should have to give her any medical attention at all. 'What I ought to do,' said he, 'is to stand her up against a wall and shoot her.'

"As for the food situation, we had good food aboard the ship, so good that we hated to go ashore for meals. We had a six-months supply of meat, eggs, and other things. It was a shame to go ashore to eat. We gave all the troops a steak dinner at midnight before the landing--like a banquet, or a condemned man's last breakfast. How many of those men were lost I don't know. They had the biggest job of all, going from the barges into the enemy territory, facing the guns, capture, death, if they didn't win.

"In the 20 days we were on the Normandy coast, we were not attacked. I think the Germans didn't have the planes, gasoline, fuel, and so forth. The planes attacked at night but not during the day. By 1944 they had to economize in the use of their air forces.

"'Omaha' beach had the underwater obstacles and barbed wire on beaches. It was by far the worse of the two beaches we were assigned to take. The minesweepers did a fine job, in the approach to the transport area--11 or 12 miles offshore. Not only had they swept the channels but they had marked them with lighted buoys. It was a remarkable job. Primarily there was one channel--the transport area where the transports were unloaded--but they branched off into several channels."
DURING INVASION MANEUVERS IN EUROPEAN COMBAT WATERS, COAST GUARD MANNEED LANDING CRAFT HIT THE BEACH WITH ROYAL BRITISH MARINES
"Care of the wounded had been carefully planned. They were picked up at once and taken to a first aid center. Then they were piled on an LCT and came to us, because there was no hospital ship in the area. We took them aboard one afternoon and sent them on the next day, as soon as a hospital ship arrived. That's what takes the glamor out of war—to see these boys go out in the morning, strong and healthy, and come back in the evening all shot to pieces.

"For months they practiced invasion runs. Everybody got fed up with the 'dry-runs.' They'd think it was the real thing and it was only another dry-run, a practice run. But when D-Day arrived they made the landings as scheduled. Everything worked smoothly under the combined command.

"We went to Italy later for the South France invasion of August 15. There was loss of life, but that position was not nearly so heavy as at Normandy. The Germans were not resisting with the same intensity and ferocity as before."

Admiral Spencer left the BAYFIELD on September 5, 1944, long after the invasion had been accomplished.

FIRST HAND ACCOUNT OF LIEUT. COMDR. JULIUS MIZEL, USCG, COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER

"The USS BAYFIELD (APA-33) in command of Rear Admiral (then Captain) Lyndon Spencer, USCG, was the flagship for task force "U," under the late Rear Admiral Don P. Moon, USN, task force commander. There were approximately 1,000 vessels of all descriptions, both American and British, in the force. Obviously, to adequately and expeditiously convey necessary orders and receive reports required quite an extensive communications system. The communications channels, required by the Naval forces, ground forces and air forces, not only included radio channels but included visual channels, comprising flashing light, flag hoist and pyrotechnics.

"Late in October, 1943, there gathered at Brooklyn, N. Y., a crew for the BAYFIELD of regulars and reserves. Most of us had never served with the Navy, had never seen or had transport experience. We saw the BAYFIELD, a transport 500 feet long, being converted. We of the Communications Department, accustomed to the peacetime communications installations, had to pitch in to study a modern naval installation, consisting of 19 transmitters, 21 receivers, a direction finder, and radar gear, all installed in three radio rooms and two radar rooms. We knew that the BAYFIELD had a dual job to perform: that of being an assault transport, landing troops where directed, and to act as a reserve Combined Operations Headquarters and Communications ship in the event that
A COAST GUARD MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT PUTS IN AT A BRITISH PORT
the flagship was a casualty. It was hard work. It was a job of organizing and training four sections within a department, the radio section, the C.L.C. section (this section included the radar gear), the signal section and ship's secretary section, which included handling of all cryptographic material. To this we must add the communication group of the Boat Division. The conversion was completed. We tested all equipment and started to learn all about multiple frequency operation. Off we sailed for training to Solomons, Md. There the amphibious training command was most helpful. There we had an opportunity of discussing our problems with those who experienced assault landings. There we really learned the problem we faced. It was there that we learned what radio silence meant. It was there we learned how much to depend on visual signalling, and we learned from the briefings held prior to practice assaults and the critiques held after the assaults really brought out the weaknesses. Corrective action was instituted, and the first thing you know we really thought we knew something. It was at these practice landings the Army brought their own signal troops with them and set up their own circuits aboard the ship. It was at these practice landings we learned what "radio intelligence" could do and what improper procedure and inadvertently spoken remarks could afford the enemy in the way of information. That was corrected. We learned how to get our breakfast at midnight and work all day. We learned that the working day started at midnight and ended at 10 p.m. and how to get along with one or two hours of sleep a day.

"Finally the training was completed. Back at an East Coast port we secured to a pier and loaded troops for the trip to Europe.

"It was most fortunate that in our convoy we had another Coast Guard named Navy transport, the DICKMAN, Captain R. J. Mauerman commanding and Lieut. Comdr. Rhonke, the Communications Officer. Mr. Rhonke was most helpful. He took us under his wing at the briefing prior to departure, carefully explained convoy procedure and promised if we both arrived in the same port overseas he would guide us through all the mysteries of British communications.

"We sailed. Except for the usual submarine alerts, the trip was uneventful. Fortunately, when the convoy was broken up overseas, we remained in company with the DICKMAN and upon arrival at a port in the British Isles, true to his word, the DICKMAN's communicator continued conveying the BAYFIELD's communicator. Then came some more practice assault landings and finally the BAYFIELD was visited by representatives of COMNAVEU and Admiral Moyn's staff. We were selected as flagship for the assault force. Then the work really started. Conferences. More conferences. The Army was there. The Air Force and Navy was there also. We thought we had enough radio equipment to handle anything but were told we didn't have half enough. We had to expand. It was necessary to install 30 additional receivers and 16 additional transmitters, making a total of 35
permanently installed transmitters and 51 permanently installed receivers. To this must be added the portable FM radio equipment that was used on both the flag and the ship’s bridge to maintain communications with assault craft and advanced Army detachment: That was the job lined up for the BAYFIELD.

"The BAYFIELD was ordered to a British port and to accomplish the conversion task, a crew of U. S. Navy personnel, consisting of Sea Bees and personnel from the Radio Material Office from an inland base, were dispatched. They started to work immediately. A new radio room was built, officers' heads were cleared and converted into transmitter rooms, diesel electric generating plants were installed on deck to provide emergency power in the event of combat casualties. All hands turned to. The work was done in less than a month. Upon departure of the installation and construction force the real job of making this comprehensive array of radio equipment work 51 circuits were set up according to plan. The only space available for antennae was the midship section between the signal mast and the main mast. Twenty-six of these circuits were on the two to four mc. band. On the first test we discovered that there was considerable interaction, key clicks, hash, and whatnot. We had to go to work. All equipment was gone over. Every bit of equipment had to be checked for bonding, grounding, and shielding. Various arrangements of equipment had to be made so as to give the widest separation range of frequencies to each piece of equipment. New receiving antennae were installed. Tests were made, until finally after weeks of hard labor we could run 51 circuits to the satisfaction of the Navy, Army and Air Forces. At a communication exercise held in England we were given the final O.K. by the several Services. In the meantime we had participated in the pre-invasion exercises.

NORMANDY INVASION

"On the night of June 4, 1944, we departed. Every man was on his toes. We knew where we were headed. We knew just where we would land our troops. Everybody was keyed up. We thought we would make the assault, land our forces, and return to the British Isles. We were wrong. We landed our troops and discovered that we were to stay there and become the floating Headquarters for the three Services. So for the 21 days that we laid off the Normandy Beachhead we did that job. During that time, surprisingly, we had very few breakdowns of equipment. The actual number of breakdowns was only eight, mostly minor, consisting of relay adjustments. The most surprising was the fact that through all the bombings we experienced the only equipment failure was a tube, jarred in one transmitter by near-misses of a stick of bombs. On D-plus 3-Day, the ship's force was requested to proceed ashore and assist the beach battalion in the installation of a radio station for the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Utah Beach. In compliance therewith,
WOUNDED IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF THE ALLIED LANDINGS IN FRANCE, THESE SOLDIERS ARE BEING HOISTED ABOARD A COAST GUARD MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT FOR TREATMENT.
a small party consisting of the ship's communication officer and several technicians went ashore, examined the situation, selected a concrete pillbox that had been used as a German telephone station for the beach defenses and installed a station capable of handling five circuits. This was done in a matter of few hours.

"It was an endless task for the Communication Department. All hands worked hard. It was remarkable to see how, with so few experienced personnel, the success that was achieved was made possible. It was also remarkable to note how all hands reacted, working at their posts through the numerous calls of "all hands man your battle stations." The discipline was perfect. Every function carried on. Also remarkable was the fact that through all the bombings and strafings experienced we did not at any time, although fully trained and prepared, have to effect any battle casualties."

MEDICAL OFFICER'S ACCOUNT

"The BAYFIELD served as a hospital ship, having assigned to her one of the most brilliant surgeons of the U. S. Public Health Service, Dr. Ralph R. Braund. His letter, written aboard the transport, to his superior officer at the USPH, gives some idea of the splendid work done to save the lives of our fighting men. Wounded brought aboard totalled 312 one day. Doctor Braund and assistants worked sixty hours at a stretch.

USS BAYFIELD
Fleet Post Office, N. Y.
July 8, 1944

Dear Dr. Ossenfort,

"... We had quite an exciting time during the invasion. Part of which I can tell you -- other parts will have to wait. We had known for three or four days that the big show was due to go on. Unfortunately the weather delayed us a day so we were cooped up for an additional twenty-four hours. Having nothing for the boys to do I manufactured work--that is, I had them check and recheck all dressing stations, first aid equipment, supplies, etc. Everyone was glad when orders came to sail. Needless to say, we had little sleep that night. When we awakened the next morning it was an inspiring as well as comforting sight to see so many ships. Before we could see the beach the battlewagons, cruisers, destroyers, etc., had started their incessant pounding of the beach. This continued through the day and night. It was like two old-fashioned fourth of July celebrations wrapped up in one. Though I had been through a few air raids we did not look forward to that first night with any pleasure. Jerry did not disappoint
us. In the twenty days we remained off the beach, he was over seventeen nights. The last three were quiet. However, we were lucky. We had one alongside that was close enough to start pipes leaking and crack several porcelain lavatories. The boys in the sick bay thought the next one would be "it." I bet my chief ten dollars to one we wouldn't get hit. That sort of broke the tension. I had a good bet because if we had I might not have been available for him to collect. But all in all it wasn't bad as far as we personally were concerned. Other ships unfortunately did not fare so well.

"The evening of the first day (June 6) we began to get our first casualties and a rather grim lot they were. Most of them had been wounded between 7 and 8 a.m. and we got them aboard between 6 p.m. and midnight. My boys really did a marvelous job. I felt amply repaid for the hours of instructions and drills we had had. Though none of my corpsmen had any experience they could have not been better. Many a chap is alive today because of their efforts. And here let me give credit to those thousands upon thousands of people who have given their pint of blood that some soldier might live. It was remarkable to see those boys come back after 500 to 2,000 cc of plasma had been given to them. Many were in such extreme shock that you had to cut down to find a vein. I got rather good at hitting femoral veins during those three weeks. Often the casualty load became so heavy my force could not handle it, and then everyone in the ship's crew that could be spared from his other duties turned to. In only a few instances was it necessary to give blood; though if time had permitted we probably would have given more. The crew was our source of donors and a very willing source they were. One day I called over the loud speaker for two donors and in less than five minutes I had 88 boys come to my office. Makes you proud you're an American to see such a spirit.

"As I said before, we stayed off the coast from the 6th to the 26th acting as hospital ship for those casualties brought from the beach and from ships sunk in the area. The number we had aboard at one time varied as we sent them back to England when they could be moved. Our high was 312 on one day. For sixty hours in one stretch the boys were on duty. I drank so much coffee that I was having extra systoles every 4th or 5th beat.

"However, as the Army got their facilities set up ashore our load became lighter and I was able to get on French soil two different afternoons. All you need to do is to know where you want to go and crawl on any vehicle going your way. I rode everything moving except planes. I also regretted that I didn't take my French teacher a little more seriously 20 years ago.....

"I feel my boys did a stupendous and marvelous job. I've
been told some citation or award has been recommended. They really earned it I'm sure. We lost only 1½ of those brought aboard alive, which if I could give you the total number you'd agree was quite good...."

**OFFICIAL ACTION REPORT OF THE BAYFIELD**

**UTAH BEACH**

**Movement** - On D-1 Day, the BAYFIELD was under way at 0930 and sortied from Plymouth Harbor at 0943. The trip to the Transport Area was without difficulty and as planned, due allowance for wind and current being made in keeping station and in navigation. All hands went to General Quarters at 2230, and this condition was maintained until necessary to debark troops on D-Day. Gunfire, anti-aircraft fire, and bomb bursts were observed in the distance as the convoy approached the Far Shore, but the convoy was not molested by the enemy. The movement proceeded without incident.

**Debarkation** - The ship was anchored in the Transport Area in its assigned position at 0230 on D-Day, and all boats were lowered away at 0305.

Twelve of the BAYFIELD's LCV(P)'s were dispatched to the BARNETT for use in unloading her troops; the remainder were held in assembly circles to be used by other vessels in the vicinity as required. Conditions for the loading and operation of these boats were not favorable--there was a considerable sea, whitecaps, and high wind which hampered their movement. The BAYFIELD had 19 LCV(P)'s (36 feet long), 2 LCM's (50 feet long), and 2 LCPL's. The latter had a deck-house for leaders. These craft were guide-posts (36 feet long). Troops debarked from the BAYFIELD were sent ashore in land-based LCM's, which were due to arrive at 0330. The first of these did not come alongside until 0525, and work was immediately commenced to unload into them. In spite of the fact that these craft were almost a full two hours behind schedule in reaching the ship, the waves of which they were a part arrived on the beach five, ten and fifteen minutes late respectively. The remainder of the troops and vehicles were loaded in LCT 526 at 0950.

**Assault** - As far as can be ascertained, little opposition was experienced in the landing of the first waves of troops on the beach. Rockets, bombs, and naval bombardment had been effective to the extent that the opposition was minor and came from positions to the Southeast of the Utah beach. No underwater obstacles were encountered by the BAYFIELD's boats used in land-in the BARNETT's troops.

LCM's involved in the landing of troops from the BAYFIELD proceeded to the beach in later waves. There was no opposition
A COAST GUARD ASSAULT TRANSPORT WHICH LANDED AMERICAN SOLDIERS IS PRESSED INTO ACTION TO REMOVE THE WOUNDED AMERICANS FROM THE BEACHES
to these waves up to about a mile from the beach, when considerable fire was encountered. This was in the nature of cross-fire between an LCTG and shore batteries, and on several occasions the boats narrowly escaped being hit. The LCM's stood the rough sea conditions better than the LCV(P)'s, although all personnel embarked in them were thoroughly wet. Sea was rough to within about 3,000 yards of the beach. The surf was reported at the time to be about one foot high.

Casualties (Personnel) - Jessie G. Patton, Seaman Second Class, USCGR, was injured by shell fragments while on the beach. He was a member of an LCM crew whose boat got stranded while landing equipment on D-Day.

Ensign Mason C. Daly, USCGR, was injured by fragmentation of an enemy shell while landing cargo on the beach. He was in charge of an LCM which was assisting in the unloading of an LCI anchored offshore.

Casualties (Material) - During the landing of the assault waves, three LCV(P)'s which had been assigned to the BARNETT swamped on discharging their troops and had to be left on the beach. Their crews returned to the ship in other boats. According to reports made by coxswains, their craft were heavily loaded, and they were compelled to run at high speeds in order to reach the rendezvous area on time. As a result, they took on water beyond the capacity of the pumps and grounded twenty to thirty yards farther off the beach than other boats in the wave. When the ramps were lowered, the boats filled with water, engines were inundated, and the crews had no choice other than to abandon their boats. Troops waded ashore without mishap, although they started out chest-deep in the water. The boats were later recovered at low tide, returned to the ship, and put in operational order.

Later in the day, one of the BAYFIELD's LCM's while landing a small tracked vehicle (M-29) on the beach, got stranded there and suffered damage. The man ashore with the vehicle did not know how to operate it, and by the time someone was found who could get it out of the boat the tide had gone out so that the LCM could not be backed off. The crew of this boat proceeded up the beach and took refuge in a foxhole after the shelling had become intense and one of the men (Patton) had been wounded by shrapnel or shell fragments.

Upon returning to their boat when the tide came in, they found that it was rendered useless; shell bursts had put about forty holes in the hull and had broken the ramp cables so that the ramp could not be raised. The ramp was later temporarily repaired by the Beach Party, and the boat was brought back to the ship. The ship's maintenance crew replaced cables for the ramp, welded holes, and generally overhauled the craft to place it back in first-class operating condition.

General - Following the departure of other transports, the
OFFICERS ON THE BRIDGE OF A COAST GUARD MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT WATCH THE PARADE OF SHIPS MOVING EASTWARD ACROSS THE ATLANTIC.
BAYFIELD shifted anchorage to a position closer to the beach. Position was also changed on D plus 1, D plus 4, and D plus 9-Days, progressively closer to the beach. Although primarily functioning as a Flagship, the BAYFIELD also served as a Service Force.

In the BAYFIELD's capacity as Headquarters Ship for the Commander Force "U," it was assumed by most of the vessels in the area and by organizations on the beach that she was prepared to act as supply ship, hospital ship, information center, oiler, accommodation ship, as well as to perform any other miscellaneous functions that might arise.

The ship's crew was called upon to extend itself far beyond their ordinary duties for the protracted period during which the BAYFIELD was retained on the Far Shore. In order to meet the demands for dispatch boats, work boats, and smoke boats, it was necessary to put boat crews on a watch-and-watch basis,—twelve hours on duty and twelve off.

Boat maintenance men repaired and salvaged not only those craft belonging to the ship, but also many others. No one was refused assistance, especially prior to the time that adequate repair facilities were set up ashore and on repair vessels in the Area. After such facilities were established, there was still a stream of boats which could not be handled by the repair facilities' capacities and which were routed to the BAYFIELD. The carpenter's crew had repaired, replaced parts, and patched 30 boats, 9 of which were craft of other vessels and/or activities.

Major engine overhaul jobs (requiring from three hours to a full day) were done on 20 boats, only eight of which were the BAYFIELD's. Much other boat maintenance work was done—such as changing or straightening screws, minor repairs, lifting boats to free wheels from rope or other foreign matter, etc.

Prior to the arrival of the accommodation ship, and afterwards when conditions warranted, survivors were brought aboard, given medical attention when necessary, fed, and accommodated. Evacuees from the beach, principally Glider Pilots, were taken aboard temporarily during the early stages of the operation, and were routed back to the United Kingdom.

The efforts of the medical staff, headed by three doctors and one dentist of the United States Public Health Service and augmented by one Navy Medical Officer attached to the Staff, were nothing short of heroic. On D plus 11-Day, a total of 419 casualties had been brought aboard and cared for, the treatment involved ranging from appendectomies and amputations to the dressing of gunshot and shrapnel wounds. 307 of these casualties were brought aboard in one night. They were distributed throughout the
AS A COAST GUARD MANNED LST MOVES INTO THE COAST OF FRANCE
ARMY "DUCKS" STREAK THROUGH THE CHANNEL IN WATERBUG FASHION TO MEET THE FREIGHT CAR–LADEN TANK LANDING SHIP
ship, in Junior Officers' Quarters, Troop Officers' Quarters, Troop Quarters, and Mess deck, in addition to the Sick Bay. Approximately 75 of these were wounded Prisoners of War. All were removed to other vessels for evacuation the following morning, but in the meantime, each man had been examined and had received the necessary care.

With the exception of one night, enemy air activity required General Quarters at least once during each period of darkness up to D plus 10 Day. The ship was attacked by bombers twice, on one of which occasions, D plus 9 Day, a low-flying plane established a near miss that caused some minor damage in the engine room. This damage was repaired by the ship's crew. During the period from D plus 10 up to the time of the BAYFIELD's departure from the Far Shore (D plus 19), although bombing and anti-aircraft fire were observed in the distance on beaches and inland, no activity was experienced over the anchorage.

On D plus 13, when LST-523 struck a mine and sank, the BAYFIELD was again called upon to act as rescue, emergency, and hospital ship. All available boats were dispatched to the scene of the explosion, and subsequently 49 casualties, 75 survivors, and 2 dead were brought aboard. Survivors and casualties were cared for, quartered and outfitted. All these men were kept aboard until D plus 17, due to weather conditions.

From the afternoon of D plus 13 to the morning of D plus 16, heavy weather curtailed activities to a point where they were virtually at a standstill. The BAYFIELD found it necessary to send boats already in the water into the beach where they could have the protection of the breakwater, since they could not be hoisted aboard due to swells and waves. During the period it was necessary to drop both anchors. The gangway was secured since there was no small-boat traffic.

On D plus 19, the BAYFIELD departed for the United Kingdom escorted from the Assault Area by minesweepers, and across the Channel by a destroyer screen.

The Legion of Merit was awarded to Rear Admiral Lyndon Spencer, USCG, for his outstanding part in the successful invasion of Normandy. The citation accompanying the decoration reads: "For exceptionally meritorious service as Commanding Officer, USS BAYFIELD, the Flagship of Rear Admiral Don P. Moon, U. S. Navy, Commander Task Force "U."

"This U. S. Naval Assault Force successfully landed the VII Corps, U. S. Army on the Cherbourg Peninsula of France against well prepared defenses and strong opposition during the period June 6-24, 1944. As Commanding Officer of the Force, Captain Spencer rendered every conceivable aid to his Commander and the Force, a great deal of which was beyond that to be normally expected.
WAVING AMERICAN, FRENCH, AND BRITISH FLAGS, FRENCH PATRIOTS, MANY OF THEM IN COSTUME, PARADE THROUGH PARIS IN VICTORIOUS CELEBRATION OF THEIR LIBERATION
"The invaluable support rendered by the USS BAYFIELD was a direct result of the exceptional leadership, ability, and devotion to duty displayed by Captain Spencer at all times."

In gratitude, the French Government, headed at that time by General Charles de Gaulle, the remarkable leader of the Resistance Forces, awarded Admiral Spencer the French Croix de Guerre. The citation is here given in the original language.

CAMPAGNES pour la LIBERATION de la FRANCE
(Juin - Decembre 1944)

DECISION No. 539

Le General De Gaulle,

President du Government Provisoire de la
Republique Francaise

CITE a l'ORDRE_________CU CORPS D'ARMEE:

__________________________
Captain Lyndon SPENCER, U. S. Coast Guard

__________________________
"Four services exceptionnels de Guerre rendus au
"cours des operations de liberation de la France."

Cette Citation comporte l'attribution de la Croix de

Guerre avec________Etoile de Vermeil

PARIS, le________20 Mars 1945

Le General d'Armée JUIN
Chef d'Etat-Major General de la
Defense Nationale,

A. JUIN

Signe: de GAULLE

(FRENCH SEAL)
"AN ARMY OF BEETLES"

Ira Wolford, correspondent aboard the BAYFIELD, reported that like an army of beetles crawling over the waves, the great armada off the coast of France was so huge that no man could see it all.

"We started out here like an army of beetles crawling slowly, lumping, tilting ourselves over the waves that were as evenly spaced and inevitable as ruts in a road. We were an enormous armada, probably the largest ever assembled for any invasion; certainly the most powerful. There is a crushing force here spread out so hugely no man traveling with it can see any but a small part of it. Whatever part of it he looks at, it looks the same.

"This army of beetles at the core is composed of big slab-sided, broad-bottomed transports and a motley fleet of landing craft with their shockingly unshipshape, grab-bag shapes, looking like something that had crawled off the drawing boards of another planet rather than out of the shipyards of this one. Then, running along the outer edge, making a festive glitter, there are sleek powerful shapes of Allied warships.

"The army of beetles spread out its feelers ahead and behind and huddled under its shells. There were many uncertainties when we lifted anchor Monday morning and stood out past the submarine nets. We expected losses. Our kind of world was beginning its ultimate thrust at Hitler. Hitler, fighting for his life, could be expected to make his ultimate answer.

"Minesweepers went first. They went out saucily, kicking up a giggle of white water with their heels. They looked like ragged little boys who run on ahead in American towns to herald the coming of a parade. But their task was desperate. They had to stand up within gunshot of the enemy coast and clear the roadstead of mines.

"Next to leave were the slower landing craft, then the transports, and finally the fastest ships of all—the warships. This armada was put together by an involved system of one part overtaking another. It was done finally by midnight of June 5. Then for the longest day so far in the lifetimes of all concerned, the armada dragged its great length slowly across the eyes of the Luftwaffe.

"The Luftwaffe did not blink. Hour succeeded hour and the Channel, only recently the most ferociously contested strip of water in the world, stirred only to a patient
THE CHANNEL WATERS ARE BLACK WITH SHIPPING AS REINFORCEMENTS AND SUPPLIES ARE FUNNELED A SHORE FOR THE CONQUEST OF THE CHERBOURG PENINSULA
lumping and tilting of vessels over the whole length of its spine. Afternoon succeeded morning. Evening succeeded afternoon, and the question asked was, 'Where is the Luftwaffe?' An Admiral and two Generals on board asked that question, and Colonels and naval Captains, Lieutenants and even Ensigns also asked it.

"'You can say this,' the Admiral in charge of this landing force told me, 'if the Luftwaffe had force they'd be hitting us. They don't have force to nip us in the butt because our air power has taken it away from them. That's one thing that is definitely proved now.'

"As night settled on the Channel, the armada, its timing perfect to a minute, stood off the coast of the Cherbourg Peninsula. R.A.F. bombers were thumping moderately at first at the earth there. Our first view of France was that reflected by the anti-aircraft shells lighting up the night above it, and we saw a plane burning as it fell to earth and then a flicker as of a marsh fire twitching and leaping across the earth's surface where the bombs hit. That was about midnight. A little past one o'clock this morning, paratroopers began to land, their planes showered by whole buckets of blazing shells and golf-ball flak. One plane went down, then another, and a third and a fourth in plain sight of this ship while men stood silently in the darkness, their faces grim and their hearts sick.

"Immediately on the heels of the paratroop landing came a sight that until this morning had been witnessed from the ground only by the Germans -- a full-fledged R.A.F. night bombing. Target markers came first. They dropped fantastic chandeliers, flares that hung in the air eight minutes by my somewhat watered-down watch and threw light bright enough to recognize places over more than 200 square miles of space. Pale blue balls of light clung in patches to the earth and it was on these that the R.A.F. bombs were dropped. The German fire kept answering. The German's back might have been broken, but as a wounded beast he could still claw dangerously.

"I counted two R.A.F. planes shot down over the target. It was an agonizing spectacle. In both cases the fire of them could be seen high in the air at first, then falling, then pulling erect and struggling through the clouds while we wondered if the men inside were trying to fight the fire or bail out. The burning coffins rolled through clouds that seemed to be grappling to smother them, and then they plummeted straight to earth, blowing up with an explosion that stood up straight into the sky.

"Dawn was as pink as a freshly bathed baby. Our warships steamed up through it and stood up to within a few miles of
ARMY TROOPS LINE UP ON THE DECK OF A COAST GUARD ASSAULT TRANSPORT STEAMING ACROSS THE ENGLISH CHANNEL TO REINFORCE THE LIBERATION BEACHHEAD IN NORMANDY
the beach. At point-blank range our battleships and cruisers opened up their guns against the Germans. Where those shells hit, nothing lived.

"This ship (the BAYFIELD) stood off 8 miles behind the bombarding force, with the wind blowing the sound of the guns toward shore. But the sound came rumbling nevertheless against the wind and pressed so loudly against our ears that it felt like a weight there. And the shudder of the guns came across the sea, too, and made this whole ship shudder hard enough to tingle the feet of men standing on it.

"Then the warships let up a moment to allow the Ninth Air Force to come in and contribute its heft, to the ploughing that was turning the beach into a victory garden.

"'Hear this! Hear this!' said our ship's loudspeaker. 'Stand by, all troops! Stand by, all troops!'

"In the holds the soldiers who had been awaiting this call all night somberly shouldered their heavy packs, in some cases weighing more than 100 pounds, and made their way up the ladders that shook to the blows of the distant bombs, and then across decks that tingled to the shudder of distant guns as our warships took up where the bombers left off.

"An inferno was brewing up on the beach; smoke was clotting up from it, and blinding white and orange blasts of explosions flickered hotly at the base of the smoke.

"Our men's faces were white in the pink dawn. They climbed swiftly down the cargo nets to the small boats on the sea. The hope of a whole devilished world for an end to Hitler this year rested on their shoulders. They turned their white, sweating faces toward the inferno on the beach as small boats carried them toward it.

"This is the end of a day that began for me more than 30 hours ago. I spent it touring our beachhead, starting from far out in the Bay of the Seine, going ashore up towards the front and back again, to the currently sinister sea. That is where I am writing this. There ought to be a special name for such a day as today—perhaps "triphibious" would do. It has been a day of fighting by land, air, and water.

"I was aboard an LCT boat which was moving both American and German wounded from this murderous beach. The Germans aboard lay silently slumped side by side with silent Americans. On our way off the beach a German bomber swooped in so close I could feel the heat strike my face like a flurry of fists.
PACKED WITH YANKEE FIGHTING MEN AND VEHICLES, AN LST (LANDING CRAFT, TANK) MAKES READY TO CAST LOOSE FROM A COAST GUARD ASSAULT TRANSPORT AND DASH FOR THE FRENCH COAST.
"I had seen the first of its stick of bombs drop into churned, dust-colored water at the end of the beach. Then I had thrown myself against the iron deck and had seen nothing more except the iridescent oil smear, bright as a peacock tail, in which my face had landed. But at the moment which I remember clearest in all days, all moments, I was standing trying to make out what damage had been done by the raiders.

"Very few of the men aboard stirred. Most of them were immersed in the apathy that seizes a man when he knows he can do no more. Two had died. One was living his last minutes. A wounded American lay at my feet. He had raised himself from his stretcher on one elbow and his face was tight with fear. Yellow balls of sweat stood out on it. The lips were drawn back from his teeth in his fear. His teeth were grinding together. He said something but I could not hear, because of the explosions. I put one ear close to his mouth but his teeth ground so that I still could not catch his meaning.

"It's all right,' I said.

"He lay down then, helplessly, and I returned to watching. A boy told me later that what he had been asking for was a cigarette to calm himself....

"The LCT shuddered violently under the impact of explosions from shore. Large sooty clouds of smoke sprang up from the beach, abruptly, as if prodded. The LCT began to tremble. There was debris in one cloud - big black torn chunks - and on top of the cloud, poised delicately, there was, for a moment, the body of a truck, intact. It was silhouetted so sharply in the twilight that I could make out its wheels. Then a vast blasting sound of an explosion came clapping like a hand against our ears. I turned my sickened eyes from the scene...."

June 12 - Wolfert saw a minesweeper blown up and aided in the rescue.

"This triphibious day began for me at dawn on June 7. It began with a small moment of danger--a tiny flareup that sank almost instantly back into monotonous misery. Almost all triphibious days begin that way. The war comes in hot, red moments during the day whose hours slog along grayly.

"The sea was being kicked up by the wind. Our United States Coast Guard troop transport, the BAYFIELD, rode it easily, but small boats by its sides heaved and rolled from beam to beam. The one that was to take us to shore was
being thrown five and ten feet into the air and digging deep into the troughs between the waves. The leap from a slippery ladder to a greasy hatch had to be timed nicely. The men who fell between the ship and the boat would be smashed like an egg.

"Nineteen-year-old Coxswain Elmer Nichols watched us apathetically. He had been riding his boat through the great danger for 28 hours with only brief rest and you could see in his face the distinguishing marks of triphibious day fatigue.

"Few men slept in longer than half-hour snatches.

"The mission of our boat was to accompany an LCT in transporting a task force from its reconnaissance at one place to another point. Riding the boat was like standing on the slippery back of a bucking horse, with salt, scud and spray, and sometimes the ponderous wallop of green water knocking against you. This war was not as the books have it. This was just plain, dull suffering. It kept up for nearly three hours, and then a moment of war came to us.

"War reached out and struck with one giant paw dead ahead of us. There was a big explosion, and gray smoke and white water all mingled. And rising hundreds of feet into the air out of the center of the explosion spewed a mortally stricken vessel. This was one the paw of war had picked to hit, and now the vessel was plunging, tilted. Then it righted itself and lay quietly, dying with the big gaseous look bubbling ships make when they die.

"This was a minesweeper that had hit a freshly laid mine. 'Stand by to pick up survivors,' shouted big (Lt.) John Tripson. There did not seem to be any need. The sea had returned so quickly to normal and the vessel lay so quietly in it. But the acrid smell of fuel oil, always a mark of war at sea, was rolling toward us. We tried to race, but the sea lives in a world of its own and does not cooperate with those who ask it to have a human heart. It fetched us a crack across the snout that nearly broke us and we had to slow down again and slide up the hills of water again and fall down them as carefully as before.

"We saw first those who had been blown farthest by the explosion. They were all dead. 'Leave the dead and take the living first,' cried big John.

"And then from all over the sea around us, sounding small and childlike in the wild world of waters, came
FIVE SURVIVORS WAITING TO BE HAULED ABOARD A COAST GUARD RESCUE VESSEL.
cries of 'Help! Help!' and one startling plea of 'Please help me!' We fished six men out of the water, two uninjured. Other craft had come to the rescue and we searched among them, taking only the living and leaving the dead bobbing and ebbing and awash like derelicts in an unwitting sea. One of the men we got was naked. Every stitch of clothing had been blown off him.

"Two ships were coming in on either side of the minesweeper to take survivors off its decks. A man was sitting where he had been blown, his back resting against a stack, his broken legs sprawled out. He looked almost as if he were resting, but he was bawling 'ma, ma, ma!' steadily from a wide-open mouth in deep, uncontrollable, monotonous bawls. Beside him on a sheet of metal that had been ripped from the deck and now lay flat like the torn-back cover of a tin can was a plump, balding, fatherly-looking man. He lay face sideways, head toward us, and it was plain to see that he need worry no more ever again about becoming bald. He was dead.

"'Watch for enemy planes flying high at 240!' came a warning from the loudspeaker of a ship above us and we tried again to race, this time toward open water, and again the sea refused to have a human heart and fetched us a clout across the snout that made the boat and all inside it shiver all over.

"After a few moments we made our way back to the ships alongside the minesweeper. We wanted to put our survivors on board them; we still had a mission to accomplish. The only sound from the survivors since we had taken them on board had been the small, blubbery ones, from the naked man, but now as we pulled in close to one of the ships one of the survivors said to the boy next to him: 'Joe, are you hurt anywhere?' 'No,' said Joe, 'Are you?' 'Ne neither,' said the first boy. The two looked at each other, then they began to giggle. They couldn't help it; they giggled just like girls. It suddenly seemed funny to them that both should have been so frightened and neither had been injured.

"The warship shelling of German positions in France had been nearly continuous since some ten minutes to six on the morning of June 6, and now the course of our boat took us under the shells.

"They rumbled overhead with a sound like freight trains racing over a rocky way, and as one who has himself been shelled by warships, I knew that each shell was a desperate adventure for many Germans. The point is a warship's guns
FROM COAST GUARD LANDING CRAFT, INVASION TROOPS EMERGE TO HELP SECURE THE ALLIED BEACHHEAD IN NORMANDY
never miss, but the guns do exactly what they say. Computers as unfailing as adding machines and a mass of electric wiring make the guns infallible.

"A man being shelled by them knows this, and it puts desperation in him. From the sound of the first shell on, his life consists of nothing except the prayer that the spotter's eyes will be blinded or his brains numbed or his map smudged in some way.

"Our warships here are shelling miles of Germans, and the air above them seems to me to be dense with prayer.

"Our Navy men were prepared to find Germans manning gun positions, at least, but instead they found nothing but mines and seagulls.....

"More than 600 square miles of Normandy seemed to be burning when we landed there in the early afternoon of June 7. Smoke came from American planes that had been shot down and from German mines being set off by mine detectors and from American and German guns. The German 88's were still shelling the beach and our supplies there. There was no warning when or where shells would land, but dispersal of our supplies was excellent. There are well-trained naval beach parties.....

"American life swarms up out of the water, climbs the sandy beach and disappears into the countryside in steady streams, going up endlessly toward the rumble of artillery, and the sudden, high, ugly clatter of machine guns that break out now loud and clear as we make an attack on some German position.

"Vehicles take the center of the sandy road. Troops march in single file along both sides. They have that odd preoccupied look of men going into battle, but they are a fine, bold, brawny sight as they swing along and, like all good Americans, they are quick to laugh."
THE INVASION

By Ira Wolfert, Correspondent Aboard the BAYFIELD

"This is it. This is D-Day." In half a hundred languages all over the world those words were whispered hoarsely. At last the assault on Hitler's European Fortress had begun. The tension composed of a multitude of hopes and fears was released. Millions of young men, trained as no such forces were ever trained before, received the signal and were unleashed. They flew at the enemy with deadly fierceness. Perhaps the majority of the fighting men were relieved in a strange sort of way at having the suspense over, but behind them many times the number of those in uniform were shaken with an anxiety they had never known before. D-Day was a day of prayer as thousands filled the churches to pray for loved ones in the conflict and for all mankind plunged in a terrible conflict for the survival of our civilization.

In England the people understood far better than the people of this country the horror of war. The English were in their fifth year of the conflict and they had experienced bitter attacks from the air. Once they were almost invaded after a defeat on the continent. Watching the preparations for today, their period of waiting had been a time of excruciating anxiety, but few or none could really hope that the wholesale attack on Europe could be avoided. Here, in the United States, we had not been bombed. Our losses had been to a great extent on the sea, in the Pacific and the East, in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and in the air campaign over Europe. Distressing as those losses had been, however, most people feared the toll to be taken on D-Day. What had been called "the second front," would far exceed what Americans had suffered in other parts of the global war.

Many had cherished the wishful thought that Hitler and the Nazis could be conquered through the air. Germany and Nazi installations in Western Europe had been subjected to terrific bombings. Most civilians who strove to follow the war might have been of the opinion that the R.A.F. and the A.A.F., assisted by many squadrons of other United Nations' planes, would bring the surrender of our enemy.

But the round-the-clock bombing for weeks made home observers realize that there was a part which ground forces had to take if real victory was to be obtained. Of that necessity, doubts disappeared. The systematic and diabolical cruelty of the forces that were organized and trained to conquer the Western World, which included North and South
America, became ghastly clear. Only those who shut their eyes or skipped with care the print and pictures that told what Hitler and his gangsters were up to were willing to say it was unnecessary to wipe out Nazism. The only alternative to war would be acceptance of slavery for ourselves and for generations yet unborn.

That was the spirit in which this conflict in occupied Europe and the opening of the road to Berlin were faced.

There could be no doubt about the high quality of the brains that had planned the invasion nor of the excellence with which our forces were supplied. The mightiest armadas ever to mount into the clouds, broke the way for the troops. Landing barges carried powerful weapons for use ashore. Tanks of enormous fire power broke down resistance. But the foe was also strong. The masters of the enemy armies knew that defeat for them would mean their punishment and annihilation. So long as the German forces could be made to fight, they would fight to desperation. For the Allies, there was no alternative for D-Day. It had come and they would see it through.

There was never a larger and never a more important battle than that begun on June 6, 1944, with the landings on the rim of Hitler's European fortress. Never since the invention of printing was there such complete reporting of even a small battle. Less than 24 hours after the first United Nations troops rushed through the water from the craft that had carried them across to the French coast, photographs were printed in newspapers in the United States showing the mighty fleet on which the crossing had been made.

Pictures of the Spanish Armada, which had sought the subjugation of England, were made long years afterward, with the help of artistic imaginations. On D-Day, and for days to come, Americans had before them eye-witness accounts of correspondents who either were with the invaders or looked down upon them from the sky. The report of this terrific event was hailed as superb. Among the correspondents was the well beloved Ernie Pyle.

Aboard the Coast Guard troop transport, USS BAYFIELD, Correspondent Ira Wolfert wrote his stories of history in the making. "The Blitz began for us this way. There was no music. 'Hup, two, three, four; the sergeants said.' 'Come on, come on, get up into it,' they said.

"Some English kids ran alongside the men. They didn't
AMERICAN SOLDIERS, HARDENED AND READY, LOUNGE UNDER FULL FIGHTING EQUIPMENT ON THE DECK OF A COAST GUARD ASSAULT TRANSPORT IN THE FATEFUL TRIP ACROSS THE ENGLISH CHANNEL
know what the score was. 'Any goom, choom?' they called. 'Any fags to take home to my pop?'

"Older people stood watching with silent faces. Their eyes seemed dark with terrible hope. There were a few girls, too. One was leaning against the side of a building and was crying into her hand. Something in this crowd had become the past for her.

"But only dust followed the men down the steep hill to the wharf and the cry 'hup, two, three, four,' and the clank of loosely fitted entrenching tools against ammunition bandoliers..... We were where we could get at Hitler's throat and we were going for it.

"The Navy and the Coast Guard stood by waiting to take the men. The harbor surface was choppy. Spume flew up past the bow of the small boats and into the faces of the men.

"'Hey Admiral,' one of them said to a coxswain, 'this don't taste so good.' The coxswain stood scornfully in the spray.

"'Is your stomach nervous, soldier boy,' he asked, and spat manfully to leeward out of his 19-year-old mouth.

"A fighter loaded with tanks swished by. One of them was named "The American Yanks" and the crew held up colored illustrations of German soldiers in uniform and pointed to them gleefully. 'We'll get there first,' the infantry called out over the choppy sea, and tankmen began holding their noses.

"Coast Guardsmen watched silently as men tramped on board the BAYFIELD, tracking up and cluttering their nice new ship. 'Where you guys taking us?' the soldiers asked. 'To Yugoslavia,' one of the Coast Guardsmen replied, and the soldiers laughed. They knew what it was and they thought the seamen knew, too; but actually the seamen didn't know. They weren't going to be told until all ship-to-shore communication had stopped.

"In little more than three hours, silence settled over the weather decks of the ship. Inside, the BAYFIELD was so packed with life it seemed to be teeming, but the decks were quiet and spacious. The harbor was filled with silent-seeming ships and behind it the silent-seeming town curved, climbing soundlessly up the hill and over it and out of sight. There was not a sound anywhere except the slap and seethe of water. It was as if the whole world were stilled in prayer.....
TEMPERED FOR THE BIG ASSAULT ON HITLER'S EUROPE, THE G.I. JOES ARE TAXIED FROM SHORE IN LANDING BARGES
"Yes, we had finally got to Hitler's throat and were reaching for it with all the strength in the civilized world."

AN ACCOUNT OF THE INVASION

By Lieut. (jg) Arthur H. Baum, USCGR, of the BAYFIELD

"Part of the invasion plan called for certain small landing craft to start out from England ahead of the regular convoys so that, due to their slower speeds, they would arrive off the invasion coast at the same time as the other ships and vessels. Early in the afternoon a procession of these craft filed into our harbor - they were open landing barges which had had to be chased by a destroyer and told to turn back.....

"We could not help but feel that we were in good company, looking about and seeing the impressive array of warships who were with us. They ranged from the big battle wagons and cruisers to the destroyers zigzagging in the outer screen, visible clearly only through binoculars. We were as proud as any of them - our spic and span ship keeping her place in column. Perhaps we looked a little different from the others, a transport among ships of line, but the fight and spirit in every man in the force was the same, whether he was on a rescue boat or a battlwagon! Our gun batteries were meant for defensive power, but the landing boats we carried, the troops we were transporting, the boat crews were all a part of the offensive spearhead.

"As the skies got lighter, and day began to break, we could see vast numbers of ships all around us. They covered the horizon - transports, landing craft, landing ships, cargo vessels, warships, minessweepers. Their tremendous numbers and the fact that they were there, assembled and doing the jobs laid out for them, were a tribute to the planning and foresight that had launched this attack.

"Thundering gunfire made itself felt, as battleships, cruisers, destroyers, all pounded the beach in a terrific barrage. We could watch the orange flame and dense smoke pour from the big guns, but could not distinguish individual salvos, so constant was the intense shelling.

"Presently the thunder ceased. It was H-hour, and we knew our men were landing on the beach!"
THE GERMANS WERE ROUTED BEFORE THEY COMPLETED THEIR INSTALLATIONS FOR LARGE COASTAL DEFENSE GUNS
"We had expected the Luftwaffe to throw everything they had at us, from the moment we set out in the Channel, but the swarm of Allied planes constantly over the ships and beaches apparently deterred them. Their vaunted valor was well tempered with discretion.

"That night, however, they paid their first visit on the hostile shore - not in great numbers but enough to make us take precautions against the weapons they were using. Within a few minutes after the General Alarm rang, a United States Destroyer steamed by to seaward, making dense smoke from her funnels, Small boats patrolling around the ship were running back and forth. They looked for all the world like glowworms or phosphorescent bugs skimming over the surface of the water. Our own smokestack gave out a rolling, oily cover, thick and black.

"In the early hours and days, the BAYFIELD played every imaginable role, refusing help to no one as long as it was within the ability of the crew or the facilities of the ship to provide the necessary functions. Beaten-up landing boats came alongside for repairs, were hoisted aboard, put back in commission, launched again and sent on their way. Our own boats were not the only ones that took a beating in the sea and on the beach. Other ships' boats looked to us for help as well, and the efforts put out by the repair crew were nothing short of heroic.

"From the hour of the first landing, men were at work preparing the beaches for the safe reception of additional equipment and men. This was a gigantic task, with numerous phases. Underwater obstacles had to be demolished - re-enforced concrete frameworks that would spell disaster to any boat running over them. Against the sand and concrete sea wall there was a long row of these frames, waiting to be placed - mute testimony to the fact that day by day the German occupants of the Normandy coast were strengthening their defenses against the invasion forces that we repre-

"The flanks of the beaches were the most exposed and were subjected to enemy bombardment long after the Allied forces had penetrated inland. Concealed and dug-in gun emplacements blasted spasmodically at the ends of the beach. The men in the beach battalion told of a "deserted" pillbox at the limit of our territory: they had been walking toward it early in the evening of D-Day, when one of them, always a little prone to be an alarmist, claimed he'd seen one of the ports close quickly. The others poo-pooed him. Later on, another of the men saw the same thing as he approached the small fort. This time, they took action,
blasting the door in with some left-behind German powder. The results were positive - three frightened and hungry German soldiers walked out and surrendered.

"Plenty of evidence of German occupation and resistance remained after the beach was ours and the troops were progressing inland mile by mile. Evidence such as a tremendous reinforced concrete pillbox, with walls five feet thick. That the Nazi had left in a hurry was shown by the fact that he ran out long before his ammunition was gone. This pillbox had been hit by naval gunfire, shown by a twelve-inch diameter dimple near the top. But the dent was not deep, and was far from fatally damaging. A few small pock-marks surrounded the point of contact where fragments of the shell had dug out pieces of the concrete.

"The shelter of this pillbox had been used as a First Aid Station, and even after our men had progressed inland there was evidence of the medical aid given there. Empty plasma bottles still hung there, just as they had been when they were delivering their precious fluid into the veins of the men who had laid there. Battle dressings and bandages were still scattered about.

"The ship, though her planned work ceased on D-Day when the troops left, continued to whirr with activity. Our boats were on the go twenty-four hours a day, taking messages to other ships, running Generals, War Correspondents, and Couriers into the beach, taking supplies to craft that needed them, bringing aboard casualties that ranged from emergency appendicitis cases to fighter pilots who had bailed out of their planes and landed in the water by parachute. To the boats and their crews fell a thousand and one tasks, and both boats and crews stood up under the constant work like true veterans.

"Every man was examined, his wounds dressed, those who needed immediate attention were taken care of. All were fed, made comfortable, looked after. The ship's medical staff, consisting of only three doctors and its complement of hospital corpsmen and pharmacist's mates did a colossal job that night, working without stopping, without rest, without sleep."

THE SAMUEL CHASE

TEN-MILE JOURNEY IN CHOPPY SEA

"When H-Hour finally came I had a mixed feeling of pride and being downright scared," related Robert F. Sargent, Coast Guard Combat Photographer, who landed in France with the first boat wave to
leave the CHASE. "When the order 'Lower Away' came, everything was quiet, except for the squeaking of the davits and the whispered comments of the men. The soldiers were quiet. More than anything else they dreaded the rough boat ride to the beach. We were cold and soaked to the skin even before starting our ten-mile trip shoreward, as a choppy sea broke over our square bow. As the 'task force behind us faded in the morning light, we looked ahead for our first glimpse of France."

FRENCH BEACH LOOKS DESERTED

"Battle smoke and dawn light made an eerie sight. We passed the control vessel, and almost without having us slow down, they sent us into the beach. When nearing the shore all we could see was the deserted beach, with one lone LCVP, looking like a coffin abandoned and broached on the water's edge, and a tank bogg ed down in the surf. Smoke hung over everything and as the coxswain opened his throttle to drive into the beach we saw the enemy-placed obstacles, a tangled mass of timbers, barbed wire and hidden mines. Down the beach we could see the water spouts of enemy shells rising in the air close to other landing craft, but the beach ahead looked lifeless. We were going to be the first to land at this spot. We wondered if they were waiting for us."

HIDDEN SHORE EMLACEMENTS OPEN FIRE

"My eyes were glued to the boat coming in next to ours, and on the water in between, boiling with bullets from hidden shore emplacements, like a mud puddle in a hailstorm. It seemed impossible that we could make it without being riddled. As I watched the next boat, it suddenly burst into flames and smoke, a white foglike smoke, and it tilted crazily as soldiers crowded to one side to get away from the flames. Evidently a bullet had set off a soldier's hand grenade. The flaming boat would surely swamp, I thought, but with a final burst of speed, he kept plowing ahead, and both boats drove as close to the water's edge as underwater obstacles would permit. We were in! The ramp went down and our infantrymen jumped off into chest-deep water to wade ashore, shooting as they went. But some went down, never to rise again."

PERILOUS TRIP BACK TO TRANSPORT UNDER ENEMY GUNFIRE

"By this time we were racing in reverse to get off as fast as we could. Close by, a shell from a German .38 landed, then another, and a third closer by. They had our range but we just sneak ed out from under each explosion. Again I looked at the boat which had gone into the beach ablaze. In a display of remarkable seamanship and cool headedness, the boat crew had brought the fire under control and were backing jerkily and slowly away from shore. All the boats in our wave retracted safely and we headed back to our transport, trailed for the first 1,000 yards by bursting artillery shells drounging off our stern."
ANY MOMENT NOW THESE BATTLE READY YANKEE TROOPS WILL STORM FROM THEIR COAST GUARD LANDING BARGE INTO THE SURF AND ONTO THE BEACH OF FRANCE.
ACCOUNT OF EMIL A. BACHSCHMIDT

In the initial assault off one western beach in the Cherbourg-LeHavre area, Emil H. Bachschmidt, Coast Guard Landing Boat Engineer attached to the CHASE, had three vessels shot out from under him by hidden enemy machine-gun nests, after landing two cargoes of troops safely. "The moment we dropped our ramp, rapid machine-gun fire opened up, spraying bullets all around us, but all of my soldiers got onto the beach safely," he related. "Close to the water, I saw many infantrymen who weren't so fortunate. We wasted no time backing off the beach. We were mighty lucky for a German .38 landed in the water a few yards away.

"We returned to the line of departure and there got orders from a control vessel to stand by in case it became too hot on the beach for incoming LCI's to land. We felt pretty safe lying there beyond machine-gun range, until we saw two British landing craft get direct hits by .88's. One of them blew up in a great gust of flame. The other one was luckier, and we picked up a few survivors. By now, the beach was blazing with gunfire, and the soldiers were stopped cold for the moment. We were told that we would have to make another trip in with men from a Coast Guard-manned LCI. I really dreaded the thought of facing those machine-guns again.

"This time we were able to dodge around the underwater obstacles that lined the shoreline and we beached the troops on dry land. Again they cut loose on us, but this time they hit home. Bullets sprayed into the stern of my boat as I was getting ready to back off. Then my engine conked out, and there was such a pile of gravel on our ramp that I couldn't raise it. I worked for about a half hour trying to get the engine going, but finally had to abandon my craft because by this time it was swamped. I waded ashore and flopped flat on the beach with some soldiers. I wanted someone to talk to and, besides, I was exhausted. After about a half hour I decided it was time for me to find some way to get back to my transport.

"I saw an LCT on the beach still loaded with trucks, and I thought I might ride out on it. When I reached this craft I realized why it was still loaded. There were no signs of life aboard. Every soldier but two had been mowed down. I climbed into a hatch and lit up a cigarette, thinking at least I was in a relatively safe spot. I soon saw that I was wrong, as shrapnel began to snap around me, sounding like someone throwing pebbles against steel plating. The
defenders were obviously trying to destroy these vehicles.

"I ran ashore again to join the soldiers who were literally hanging on to the beachhead by their finger nails. I must have stayed there for two hours before another boat landed. Finally, an LCT came in about 1,000 yards away. I jumped up and headed for it. I must have flopped down ten times before I reached the craft, partly because I was afraid of being hit and partly because my legs wouldn’t hold me up. The last soldier was running off the ramp of this craft as I climbed aboard, relieved that at last I had found a boat still operating. I was tired and soaked to the skin.

"No sooner had we started to back off the beach when we heard a terrific explosion and the craft took a sudden list to starboard and began to sink. We had hit an underwater mine, which blew a hole through its side. We quickly saw it was no use trying to salvage the boat because it already was filled with water and the Germans had our range. I helped the crew destroy maps and other confidential material, jumped into the water and swam ashore. My nerves were just about shot after having three crafts shot out from under me in three tries--I didn’t much care what happened to me then but, fortunately, the destroyers had moved and quickly silenced those miserable pillboxes. These "cans" saved the day just as they did at Sicily and Salerno.

"By this time, it must have been nearly four in the afternoon, wave after wave of LCI's came in, and I knew at last that I would get a ride back. The nearest ship was a Coast Guard LCI operating in our assault group, and the skipper told me he could take me to the transport area. The ride back to my ship was the grimmest part of the day; my companions were all wounded men, who didn’t get beyond 100 yards from the water's edge."

**Lieut. (jg) James V. Forrestal's Commendation**

As a first wave boat commander, Lieut. (jg) James V. Forrestal, of the CHASE, guided and directed a group of small assault boats through the rows of underwater stakes, minefields and barbed wire to land with the first infantrymen to fight on French soil in the invasion. He carried to the attack an element of the Army's most seasoned campaigners, the famed "Fighting First Division" which won a Presidential Unit Citation for its heroic work against overwhelming odds during the first day on the Normandy beach. "For coolness under fire and the demonstration of fine seamanship while leading the first ship's wave of landing craft into the Normandy beachhead shortly after H-hour," he was later commended by his Commanding Officer, Captain Fritsche.
The text of Lieut. Forrestal's commendation reads: "On the morning of June 6, 1944, you, as Wave Commander, led your boats through ten miles of heavy sea, and despite severe gunfire, landed them on time, and on the correct beach, near Colleville. Then with dispatch, you brought your wave back to the transport area for additional troops, demonstrating fine seamanship and coolness under fire. Therefore, I take great pleasure in commending you highly for your meritorious conduct."

**A COAST GUARDSMAN ON NORMANDY BEACH**

"We knew we were going to catch hell when we saw machine-gun fire spraying the water before us," said Frank W. Freeman, second class motor machinist's mate in the U. S. Coast Guard, when he told how a German bullet grazed his arm while he was attempting to salvage a shipmate's wrecked boat on the Normandy Coast.

Completely disregarding their own safety, Coast Guardsman Freeman and his bowman, Florian Chapman, seaman first class, USCG, refused to back off into safer waters after unloading assault troops, until they had gone to the rescue of a crew member's boat.

"You have no idea how miserable the Germans made that beach," said Freeman. "From a half mile off shore we could see rows upon rows of jagged obstructions lining the beach. Added to this was the debris of blown up landing crafts which had been destroyed before us.

"Because there was no cleared channel to the beach which we hit shortly after H-hour, there was nothing we could do but plough straight over many submerged logs. Luckily the ones we crashed through were not mined.

"When our ramp went down and the soldiers started to charge ashore, the Heinies let loose with streams of hot lead which pinged all around us. Why they didn't kill everyone in our boat, I will never know. You can bet we wasted no time cranking up the ramp and backing off. But before leaving we took on six badly wounded soldiers who were lying in the water before us.

"Just as we got clear of the underwater obstacles and were out of range of the worst machine-gun fire, I noticed that one of the ship's boats was stuck on the beach. It seemed to be wedged between two posts.

"We didn't think twice about going to help out a shipmate in distress. Ship spirit is at its best when
MUTE EVIDENCE OF THE TERRIFIC CONFLICT THAT PRECEDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LIBERATION BEACHHEAD
the enemy is making it tough for us. Threading our way back through the mine fields and obstructions we worked our boat close enough to throw a line to the impaled craft. 88-shells and mortars were playing hell around us. I guess the two boats close together made a good target for the snipers."

The first line wasn't strong enough and it parted the moment they threw the engine in reverse. Freeman then tossed his heavier anchor line to the stranded boat.

"I was so anxious to see whether the second line would hold that I almost forgot how close shells and shrapnel were landing. I was standing in plain view concentrating on my salvage job, when a bullet nicked the under part of my arm. This suddenly brought me to my senses, and I ducked down into the bottom of the boat with the others.

"My thoughts became befuddled for a few minutes. The bullet must have hit a nerve because my whole arm was deadened. Believe me I gladly stayed flattened, on the deck for about fifteen minutes. But I knew that I wasn't seriously hurt when I found that I could wiggle my fingers.

"Jerry must have figured he had wiped us out because things quieted down almost immediately.

"When we saw two other landing boats coming in, we decided to get back to our transport as quickly as possible because the wounded soldiers in our boat were in critical condition. It seemed the wise thing to do as we were sure the incoming landing craft together could handle the stranded boat. It was fortunate that we made this decision for the poor suffering army men were on their last legs when we reached the ship."

Coast Guardsman Freeman drew high praise from his officers when only a few minutes after coming aboard, he volunteered to make another trip to the beach. He was allowed to return to duty in his landing craft after doctors had checked him thoroughly.

"'Chappy' Chapman was cool as a cucumber under fire. He did a great job with our wounded men, giving them cigarettes, water, and keeping them as dry as he possibly could."
AFTER ROLLING INTO THE FRENCH COAST WITH THE FIRST WAVE OF D DAY INVADERS
THIS COAST GUARD MEDIUM LANDING CRAFT DASHES BACK TO ITS MOTHER SHIP
A COAST GUARD ASSAULT TRANSPORT, WITH SOME OF THE FIRST AMERICANS TO FALL WOUNDED
OFFICIAL ACTION REPORT OF THE USS SAMUEL CHASE
ON JUNE 6, 1944

D-DAY OPERATIONS

The following is taken from the Operation Report submitted by the USS SAMUEL CHASE in compliance with instructions.

1. In compliance with reference (a), a narrative report of operations for the period 6-7 June, 1944, is as follows:

At 1727 on 5 June, 1944, got underway from Portland Harbor, England, as a convoy unit in Assault Force "0," Task Force 124, on various courses and speeds. At 1800, set channel courses, passing point Xray at 1844, point Zebra at 2125 and point Easy at 2324.

At 0038 on 6 June, 1944, passed point Jig and at 0230 passed point King, maneuvering to close assigned anchorage in Transport Area, where anchored at 0315.

At 0325 lowered LCS(S) #13 to proceed to assigned duty.

At 0510 set condition 1A for lowering operations and at 0530 commenced embarking troops in rail boats. At 0536 lowered first ship's wave of boats, lowering last wave at 0601.

By 0635, hatches 1A, 2 and 4 were open and two more waves of net-loaded troops were sent to the beach at 0637 and 0700 respectively. Between 0717 and 0750 four LCT's came alongside and work of unloading vehicles was begun.

At 0730 casualties began to come out to the ship in various craft and were taken aboard. The cargo carried by the ship consisted only of vehicles and equipment loaded in hatches 1A and 4 and three Piper Cub planes in Hatch #2.

At 0847 the boats of the ship's first wave returned to the ship from the assault landing on Red Easy beach in Omaha sector, reporting strong enemy opposition to the landing, and handling of casualties.

After the initial assault, 6 LCVP's and 1 LCM were sent to other transports in accordance with the boat employment table to assist in their unloading operations, the CHASE receiving 5 LCVP's and 1 LCM initially from other vessels to net-load troops remaining aboard the CHASE.

At 11:00 all vehicles and planes had been unloaded and the LCT's cast off to proceed to beach and by 1150 all hatches had been secured.
WOUNDED AMERICAN FIGHTERS LAY ON STRETCHERS ON THE DECK OF A COAST GUARD LCI (LANDING CRAFT, INFANTRY) READY TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE SAMUEL CHASE JUST BEFORE THE SINKING.
At 1115, LCI #85, which had been hit by shell fire at the beach, came alongside and in a sinking condition. She made fast and the work of removing casualties started. During unloading of cargo a continuous stream of casualties were brought aboard from small boats. At 1200 all available LCVP's, 15 in all, were sent back to the beach to assist in the unloading of LCI's.

2. At 1340, the LCI #85 cast off, having discharged all dead and wounded Army personnel, and at 1530 began hoisting ships boats as they returned, preparatory to leaving the transport area. Six boats failed to return, having become casualties from gun fire, underwater obstacles, or swamping.

At 1833 got underway, moving to new anchorage, and at 2006 got underway a second time to depart from transport area in accordance with orders. At 2028, 6 June, passed point King proceeding in convoy bound for Portland Harbor through swept channels. At 2030 secured from condition 1A and resumed condition 2M.

On June 7, arrived in Weymouth Bay, anchoring at 0536, and at 1045 British tug QUEEN EMPIRE came alongside to take off the survivors, injured and dead who were embarked, 322 in all. By 1245, this work was completed and the QUEEN EMPIRE departed. At 1500, upon signal, weighed anchor and took assigned anchorage in Portland Harbor, where anchored at 1540.

This concluded operations in connection with the invasion of France and vessel remained at Portland until June 19th.

/signed/ E. H. FRITZCHE

OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE SAMUEL CHASE

PREPARATIONS FOR D-DAY

The USS SAMUEL CHASE, assigned to Commander Transports, Eleventh Amphibious Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, remained anchored at Portland, England from June 1 until June 5. During this time, personnel of the 1st Infantry Division, U. S. Army, and attached units embarked. At 1727 on 5 June got underway and proceeded as a convoy unit in Assault Force "Q," Task Force 124. Ships in the convoy were: USS ANCON (Guilf), USS ANNE ARUNDDEL, USS DOROTHEA DIX, USS THURSTON, USS SAMUEL CHASE, SS EMPIRE ANVIL, USS HENRICO, USS CHARLES CARROLL, USS THOMAS JEFFERSON, SS EMPIRE JAVELIN, SS PRINCESS MAUD, SS PRINCE CHARLES, SS PRINCE LEOPOLD, SS PRINCE BAUDOVIN, SS BEN MY CHREE, SS AMSTERDAM.
A COAST GUARD LCI (LANDING CRAFT, INFANTRY) LISTED SHARPLY AFTER BEING FATALLY HIT. THE WOUNDED WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE SAMUEL CHASE BEFORE THE SHIP PLUNGED BELOW THE WAVES.
BOATS LOWERED FOR ASSAULT LANDING

On the 6th at 0230 the CHASE passed point King and maneuvered to close assigned anchorage in the transport area, where she anchored at 0315. Ten minutes later LCS(S) #13 was lowered for assigned duty. At 0530 began embarking troops in rail boats, lowered first wave of boats at 0536 and last wave at 0601. Two more waves of net loaded troops were sent to the beach at 0637 and at 0700 respectively. Between 0717 and 0750 four LCT's came alongside and vehicle unloading was begun. At 0847 boats of the ship's first wave returned from Red Easy beach in Omaha sector, reporting strong enemy opposition. After the initial assault, 6 LCVP's and 1 LCM were sent to other transports in accordance with the boat employment table to assist in their unloading operations, the CHASE receiving five LCVP's and 1 LCM initially from other vessels to net load troops remaining aboard the CHASE. By 1100 all vehicles and planes had been unloaded and the LCT's cast off to proceed to beach. By 1150 all hatches had been secured. All available LCVP's -- 15 in all -- were sent back to the beach at 1200 to assist in unloading LCT's.

CASUALTIES TAKEN ABOARD

Meanwhile, during cargo unloading, a continuous stream of casualties were being brought aboard from small boats, the first group having come out to the ship at 0730. At 1115 LCI #85, which had been hit by shell fire at the beach, came alongside in a sinking condition. She made fast to discharge the dead and wounded and at 1340 cast off again. The ship's boats were hoisted as they returned, beginning at 1530, but six of them failed to come back, being casualties of gun fire, underwater obstacles or swamping. The SAMUEL CHASE moved to a new anchorage at 1833, got underway again at 2006 and proceeded in convoy. On 7 June she arrived in Weymouth Bay, where the British Tug, QUEEN EMPRESS, came alongside to take off the survivors, injured and dead (322 in all). The Transport weighed anchor at 1500 to take assigned anchorage in Portland harbor, and remained there until 19 June, when she got underway with convoy.

THE JOSEPH T. DICKMAN

RESCUE WORK

The JOSEPH T. DICKMAN took aboard the first load of survivors, 90 casualties, from the Coast Guard Rescue Cutter 16 (83377), commanded by Lieut. (jg) R. V. McPhail, operating with the Rescue Flotilla. His ship achieved the highest record, picking up 126 survivors from three ships stricken within a half mile of the beach. The 16 nosed in among the struggling groups of men floundering in diesel oil and debris and its crew quickly went about their work of rescue. Rushed aboard the DICKMAN, the survivors received medical attention and food.
"D" DAY OPERATIONS IN NORMANDY

At 0240 on the 6th the JOSEPH T. DICKMAN stopped and anchored in the transport area in the Bay of Seine, France, having begun to lower boats a few minutes previously. Cargo unloading began at 0305 and ammunition unloading at 0401. The latter was completed at 0600 and at this time unloading of troops and vehicles was being carried out. Boats carrying casualties began to return at 0800. At 1145 remaining boats returned, all cargo had been unloaded, and all troops debarked. All boats were hoisted by 1308 and the DICKMAN prepared to get underway. During the operation seven LCV(P)'s had been lost. At 1438 the DICKMAN stood out of the transport area with 153 wounded and 3 corpses aboard. The vessels formed a single column with the USS BARNETT as guide. At 1647 and again at 1751 the DICKMAN stopped all engines to allow convoy of LCT's to pass. Two members of the crew were missing. One was reported killed in action when a landing craft received direct hit during landing operations and his body went down with sunken boat. Another missing crew member was reported wounded in action and taken to an unknown U. S. destroyer for medical attention.

CASUALTIES TRANSFERRED ON RETURN TO ENGLAND

The DICKMAN stood into Portland Harbor at 2337 and anchored there at 0119 on 7 June. Casualties were removed by an English lighter, EXWEY. One hundred ten wounded were transferred to Examination Service, Weymouth, England, and 43 wounded and 3 corpses remained aboard. After the EXWEY departed at 0515, the DICKMAN stood out of Portland Harbor. She moored in Falmouth Harbor at 1517 and the USS LCT-148 came alongside and took off the remaining casualties including the 3 corpses.

DEBORNS TROOPS, BAY OF SEINE

On the 12th the DICKMAN moved to Plymouth Harbor where an advance Army detail came aboard. On the 13th, afterembarking troops, she departed for firing practices and disembarkation drills. On 14 June the vessel joined convoy and the ships proceeded to the transport area, Bay of Seine, France where the DICKMAN anchored at 1345. Troops were disembarked between 1352 and 1550. Seven LCM(3)'s came from Green Beach to assist in unloading and USS LCT-476 helped in the disembarkation of troops. All boats were hoisted by 1610 and the DICKMAN stood out of anchorage at 1625. She took position in convoy, assuming convoy guide at 2300 after the departure of HMS GLENROY, who had been the guide. SS CROSSBOW and SS RAPTURE also departed at 2300. On the morning of 15 June two vessels departed the convoy and four joined the formation. The DICKMAN moored in Falmouth Harbor at 1339, and remained there until the 19th when she unmoored and joined the convoy. On the 21st the DICKMAN anchored in Loch Long Anchorage, Scotland and remained there for the balance of the month, receiving various equipment during the period of her anchorage.
WITH D DAY SWIFTLY APPROACHING
AMERICAN TROOPS ABOARD A COAST GUARD MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT ARE CARRIED
TO THE SCENE OF THEIR LAST MINUTE INVASION MANEUVERS
LOADING

(From Official Report of Operations)

The Army Transportation Quartermaster had come on board this vessel several days in advance of the loading. In conference with officers of the vessel, a carefully detailed plan of loading troops and equipment was worked out and rigidly adhered to. Troops were berthed by boat teams, rather than Army organization, to expedite passage to pre-selected debarkation stations. Debarkation of vehicles and equipment was carefully worked out and loading plans were made in accordance with measurements of space available, so that equipment could be loaded for orderly debarkation in the proper sequence. Plans included pre-loading all possible equipment and small vehicles in the proper landing craft. Much time was saved in unloading by stowing demolition explosives in cargo nets in the troop magazine - each net contained the quota of explosives for one boat. The nets were left in the boats during the run to the beach, to save time. Emphasis is placed on the necessity for meticulous detail in planning loading, if unloading is to be expeditiously completed.

TACTICAL PROCEDURE

"4. No difficulty was experienced in proceeding via proper channels. These were well marked. Weather conditions, however, were such that a number of the markers had been swept away by the afternoon of D-Day. The planting of larger permanent buoys about every five miles in the channel should be considered for future operations.

MATERIEL

"5. All materiel and equipment of this vessel functioned satisfactorily. There was no hitch in the unloading operation due to any materiel failures. All ship's gear and all boats functioned without difficulty. The state of the sea was such as to hamper unloading, and boats shipped considerable water during the run into the beach. The LCM(3) has again proved to be the ideal landing craft for APA's. Their ability to land and unload in a choppy sea without swamping and their ability to withstand moderate shelling is most noteworthy. Difficulty was experienced with the British LCA's assigned to assist in unloading. These craft are not as maneuverable and rugged as the LCVP; several were damaged alongside or partially swamped early in the operation and troops therein were transferred to LCVP's. The ship's battery did not come into action, but rocket gear and machine guns used on landing craft functioned satisfactorily. Communications were satisfactory with the excellent performance of the SCR-609 equipment.
GENERAL COMMENT

"6. The operation as a whole proceeded very satisfactorily and according to plan. In the initial assault, 1,833 troops and 130 officers were debarked with 7 jeeps, 18 M-29's, 5 one-quarter ton trailers, 38 miscellaneous hand-drawn carts and considerable amount of explosives. This was accomplished with no appreciable difficulty and in ample time for all boats to join their proper waves. All troops landed in boats from this vessel; reached the beach without serious casualty to a single soldier. Considerable difficulty was experienced in forming up boat waves in the rendezvous area. The control vessels did not keep station, their lights were too dim, and marker buoy for the rendezvous area either was not dropped or was not visible. It is strongly recommended that a clearly visible marker buoy be dropped by the control vessel. Troop officers' space adjacent to the hospital area was used to care for casualties evacuated. No casualties died aboard this vessel and all appeared to be in an improved condition when landed on the near shore.

"7. As will be noted above, this vessel made a shuttle trip to the... area on D. plus 8, June 14, 1944."

/s/ R. J. MAUERMAN

COAST GUARD RESCUE FLOTILLA NO. ONE

U. S. Coast Guard Rescue Flotilla No. One, organized at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, comprised fifty 83-foot wooden rescue boats. Lt. Comdr. Alexander V. Stewart, Jr., USCGR, commanded the Flotilla. When loaded to the danger point, the boats would dash to larger vessels, transfer their survivors, and return to search for more. The Flotilla was credited with saving more than a thousand lives, nearly five hundred of them during the first thirty-six hours of the invasion.

The small 83-foot cutters of the Coast Guard Rescue Flotilla, operating with both American and British Forces, rescued soldiers and sailors from drowning and were instrumental in keeping casualty lists far below the numbers anticipated.

The wooden cutters accompanied initial invasion waves to within 1,660 yards of the beaches. Coast Guard Boat No. 16, commanded by Lieut. McPhail, achieved the highest record, picking up 126 survivors from three ships stricken within a half mile of the beach.

Coast Guard Boat No. 34, commanded by Lieut. (jg) Gordon W. Grafos, with 32 rescues, achieved the best record of those cutters assigned to the Eastern Task Force, comprised of British units.

Lieut. McPhail's cutter, which was equally efficient while "sub-busting" in the battle of the Atlantic, aided three assault vessels
hit by the sporadically firing shore batteries. Their crews had been spilled into cold water churned by the onrushing armada of barges.

The cutter nosed in among the struggling groups of men floundering in diesel oil and debris. Although shells were splashing about it and mines were detonating, the cutter's crew calmly went about the rescue work. With 90 casualties as its first load, the cutter sped to the Coast Guard Transport DICKMAN.

The cutter returned just in time to pick up more wounded from a landing craft, tanks, which had struck a mine. McPhail maneuvered his cutter under its slowly turning side, got a line to the men and hoisted them aboard. He got away only seconds before the LCT turned turtle.

The loss of life among the survivors while aboard the rescue cutter was negligible.

**RESCUE FLOTILLA ONE - FIFTY 83-FOOTERS**

Utah Beach looked good from the start for the Army, but the Navy did not fare so well. Coastal batteries and enemy planes took a heavy toll of ships and men. Fortunately, Coast Guard craft were able to save many lives. The PC-1261 was hit on D-Day by fire from a coastal battery and her crew received orders to abandon ship. Her skipper, Lt. Comdr. Rency F. Sewell, Jr., USNR, later related that they all realized it was impossible for anyone to pick them up at that time but felt sure they would eventually be picked up. A Coast Guard vessel finally came in sight and began picking up the rafts. It was the No. 16, commanded by Lieut. (jg) R. V. McPhail.

"It was a small vessel and had not only to rescue the personnel of my ship," said Commander Sewell, "but of three others which had sunk almost simultaneously. There was quite a number of the crew in the water and we were all afraid that the Coast Guard vessel would not be large enough to pick up all the crew. However, this did not worry us as much as did the current, which was carrying our rafts toward the beach. We were afraid that we would be taken prisoners.

"The Coast Guard vessel picked us up out of the water about three hours after we had abandoned ship. It immediately carried us back to the Transport Area where we boarded a transport ship that was doing duty as a hospital evacuation ship, the USS DICKMAN."

As D-Day wore on, enemy planes came over and during the afternoon and night the waters in the areas of Utah Beach and adjacent were heavily mined from the air. The Germans dropped ground mines and, according to observers, nothing could be done about that during
(FRANCE) 14/6/44 TANK CREWS AWAIT RESCUE BY U.S. COASTGUARD CUTTER FROM WHICH THIS PICTURE WAS TAKEN, AS CARD A SINKING LCT, JUST OFF FRENCH INVASION BEACH. (COAST GUARD FOTO) SIGNAL CORPS RADOTELEPHOTO FROM LONDON #591
the night of D-Day. Mine-laying craft came to be a constant feature of life in the Utah Area. Regularly every night, somewhere between a quarter of midnight and a quarter past, German planes would fly over, usually in three groups. First came a plane dropping flares, then a small group of bombers, making quick runs at the beach and drawing all the anti-aircraft fire, while the minelaying planes glided in silently dropping the deadly mines.

The 83-foot rescue cutters of the Coast Guard flotilla saved almost four hundred and fifty men from the cold waters of the Channel on D-Day alone. Carter Barber, a Coast Guard combat correspondent aboard the Coast Guard Rescue Cutter 16 sent this description of his ship's duties on June 6. "The cutter had just made a round trip to the DICKMAN standing out in the harbor mouth, to discharge some ninety casualties picked up earlier this morning when she saw a stricken LCT which was slowly capsizing as it sank, and dashed to the aid of the stranded personnel. On the decks of the LCT over thirty men were trapped, including a wounded man with nearly severed legs, dangling only by pieces of flesh, who was unable to leave his ship. When the rescue cutter was skillfully maneuvered under the slowly lowering side of the LCT, despite the choppy seas surrounding the craft, all the other men were safely brought aboard the smaller craft, except for the wounded sailor.

"When the sailor's plight became apparent, Arthur Burkhard, Jr., a member of the cutter's crew, jumped over the side of the rescue cutter, rushed to the wounded man's side, and helped to secure a line around him, completely disregarding the smoke that was beginning to pour from the LCT's hatches. 'At that time I didn't know that the LCT was doubling as a small-arms ammunition ship,' said Burkhard. 'It was a good thing that I was able to get the line around the lad before that gigantic, sinking bomb blew up.' However, the man helped me get the line around him.

"He was the bravest man that we picked up,' Burkhard continued. 'He was unable to talk because of weakness, but he managed to keep a grin on his face. Even when we were cutting his clothes off him to administer morphine when we saw that his two legs were severed above the knees, he kept himself under control, and even winked at us.' Once the wounded sailor had the line about him, Burkhard unsuccessfully tried to lower him from the settling LCT to the smaller rescue cutter. The LCT's starboard side was dropping lower and lower as the whole ship began to capsize, and it was impossible for the skipper, Lieut. (jg) R. V. McPhail, USCGR, to keep his craft under the LCT's side lest his own be pinned beneath it.

The only alternative was for Burkhard to throw the wounded man off the LCT's deck into the water, where he could be pulled aboard the rescue craft. 'I never saw anyone so game as that man,' adds Burkhard. 'I hated to throw such a badly wounded man into the water, but that was the only way I could get him to safety. But he helped himself, and pulled himself hand-over-hand up the side of our boat when our fellows had towed him to the boat's side.' Once his charge was aboard,
SLEEK 83-FOOT COAST GUARD RESCUE CRAFT
SPEEDING OVER THE BUMPY CHANNEL WATERS AND DARING THE FIREPOWER OF NAZI GUNS
SAVED HUNDREDS OF AMERICAN LIVES IN THE CRITICAL EARLY HOURS OF
THE FRENCH INVASION
Burkhard himself had to plunge into the water and make his way back to his ship. Although he couldn't swim himself, he was dragged aboard by his mates. 'I've got a brother in the Navy, myself, and figured that he might be the man aboard the sinking LCT. So the fact that I couldn't swim didn't stop me,' said Burkhard. No more than two minutes after Burkhard and the casualties were taken aboard the rescue cutter and the boat had left the LCT, the burning ship completely turned turtle and disappeared from sight.

**RESCUE PATROL**

As D-Day broke through the clammy mists of the English Channel, scores of small Coast Guard patrol craft ran the gauntlet of thundering shore batteries and thickly-strewn mine fields to rescue Allied military and naval personnel in distress. Everett Garner, a Coast Guard combat correspondent sent in the following account.

"All night we groped our way in a huge convoy through miles of mine fields. Our path was lit only by a pale moon fitfully breaking through the overcast sky and in the distance the garish light of flares and gunfire. As night closed in on the evening of the invasion, this convoy stretched out from the sandy coast of Southern England like a weird circus parade. Plump barrage balloons waddled along close-hauled above dumpy landing craft pitching through the rough water. Transports bristled with squat amphibious tanks well deserving their nickname "ducks." Bustling along side were weirdly camouflaged landing vessels loaded with British, Canadian and American assault forces.

"Clouds of British and American fighters and light bombers sped above us in the late English twilight as we entered the long, narrow mine-swept channel for the coast of France. Lieut. (jg) B. A. Knowlton, USCG, Naval veteran of World War I, and Chief Boatswain's Mate Glen R. Vliet, clung to the tiny bridge of the small Coast Guard rescue ship striving to keep our group of cutters in positions with the transports. From above the clouds we could hear the planes. In front there was only blackness.

"The beach surrounding the Bay of the Seine was lit with explosions of heavy bombs. Hundreds of tons hit the gun defenses in our sector before 6:00 a.m. Bomb blasts sent blossoms of flames up along the beach. At 5:30 a.m., a Coast Guard Patrol boat commanded by Lt. (jg) Gordon W. Crafts, came up on the stern of the convoy approaching the assault area. A destroyer received a torpedo or mine amidships, blowing up the boilers. The stricken ship folded in half, with stem and stern protruding above the choppy sea like ends of a bent hinge."
WRAPPED IN WARM, DRY CLOTHING, THESE ARMY SURVIVORS DRINK HOT COFFEE AND MUNCH SANDWICHES ABOARD A COAST GUARD 43-FOOT RESCUE CRAFT WHICH PULLED THEM OUT OF THE CHANNEL WATERS OFF FRANCE WHEN THEIR LANDING CRAFT FOUNDRED.
"As the cutter approached the slowly sinking vessel, dozens of depth charges were seen on the stern. Without knowing whether they were set to explode or on "safe," the light cutter sped into the area, throwing out scramble nets to survivors floating in the water. Lieut. Crafts remarked later, 'If those charges had sunk we would have gone up like matchwood.' Three men were floating on a six by six timber. These men, dazed by the explosion, had to be pried loose from the jetsam. Several rafts were loaded with wounded sailors. One man, his leg shot off at the thigh, died before he could be taken from the rafts. Many other fractured and bleeding survivors were taken from that and surrounding rafts. One survivor, a veteran of many years in the Navy, told of seeing one torpedo cross the bow and two others before they ripped into the boiler. The injured were taken below to the crew quarters, given hot coffee and cigarettes, and lifted into the crews' bunks. Coast Guardsmen stripped their lockers clean, giving the chilled, dripping men all their clothes.

"Chief Motor Machinist's Mate Spaulding E. Michot, USCGR, turned emergency Pharmacist's Mate, laid the wounded out on the galley table, now an operating table. In the tiny pitching compartment, he stitched open wounds and splintered fractured legs. The compartment—the bulkheads—were smeared with dried blood. A wounded sailor being transferred to a larger ship returned to the galley to retrieve a pistol left behind. Taking it, he remarked cryptically, 'Maybe I'll get another shot at those rats.'

"At 5:30 a.m., British warships were blasting the beach and heavy gun emplacements. Large blasts were seen on the shore, appearing to be ammunition dumps exploding. After the warship bombarding, Canadian and United States assault troops began pouring ashore covered by smoke screens. Our Coast Guard Rescue vessel was circling a British transport when a German shore battery opened. Three large shells struck the water 35 feet from us. The explosions, from large calibre guns, gysered hot water into our faces. A British destroyer immediately struck out for the shore, pumping shells into the enemy emplacement and shortly silenced them.

"Later in the morning, a distress signal came from a crippled sinking amphibious tank. Four American army men soaked and badly chilled were brought aboard after efforts to salvage the tank had failed. The soldiers were taken to the galley, given hot coffee and sandwiches, and returned to another vessel to be re-outfitted. At 1:00 p.m., we were ordered to return in convoy to England. We joined troopships, a battleship, and destroyers. A floating mine adrift caused us to swerve sharply on our course. We missed it by a scarce six feet.... Arriving at our English port, we learned that several hundred survivors were saved in the first two days' operation by the U. S. Coast Guard patrol vessels off the Coast of Normandy."
A FEW MOMENTS AFTER THIS PICTURE WAS SNAPPED, THE ARMY "DUCK" TO WHICH THESE MEN ARE CLINGING WAS SUNK AND THE SURVIVORS WERE DRAGGED FROM THE ICY CHANNEL WATERS ABOARD THE COAST GUARD CUTTER WHICH HAD THEM IN TOW.
CARE OF THE WOUNDED

WOUNDED Brought Aboard
The wounded were transferred from the small craft that wobbled like empty bottles in the rough waves and banged hard against the bigger ship, but the crews managed with skill and tenderness. As G.I.'s leaned on railings and stared down, the casualties were brought aboard. Litter cases were swathed in blankets, soaked with spray, waterdrops beading the pale faces and closed eyes. Straps were slipped under the ends of the stretchers which were quickly hoisted, while guide ropes held the small craft safely off the side of the rescue craft. Wounded men able to walk came up ladders assisted from below, seized by ready hands from above. As each came aboard, two soldiers took his arms around their shoulders and escorted him inside to the dressing stations.

EMERGENCY HOSPITALS
Vessels were equipped for mercy duty, with bunks for hundreds of wounded, a fine operating room, and plasma, sulfas, penicillin and all the latest medical stores. Most of the litter cases were taken directly to the operating room below. The less seriously wounded were cared for in the wardroom, which had been made into a first-aid station. Every available space was lined with waiting litters as the wounded began coming aboard fast. In a short while one LST had a hundred. In the corridors the minor casualties sat on chairs, or lay on the floor, shivering under their blankets. The smell of blood, sweat and wet filth hung like a fog within the ship. Every man who could help was pressed into service. They cut off with knives the torn, soaked uniforms and shoes and socks. They removed temporary bandages, now wet and dirty, cleaned wounds with disinfectants, picked out stuck bits of clothing, sand, grass, and sometimes metal. For two days and nights the doctors and their helpers got no sleep, for there were amputations, chest and abdominal-cavity perforations. None of the wounded died before the ships reached England.

MINE LADEN "DUCK" IS SUNK
Sinking a "sitting duck" target which actually was an American amphibious jeep, and sinking it at the insistence of the "duck's" soldier occupants during the height of the invasion, was the paradoxical experience of Lieut. (jg) Thomas Kroetch, USCGR, commanding officer of the Coast Guard Rescue Cutter 41.

"We saw three soldiers wildly gesticulating from their 'duck' and when we got within earshot, all we could hear were these G.I.'s plaintive yells to have their auto-boat sunk," he later related. He was said to be skipper of the only American vessel to sink very calmly and deliberately another American unit off France, at high noon and without benefit of battle excitement -- or confusion.

When the crew of the Rescue Cutter 41 pulled alongside to investigate, they found two soldiers and an officer frenziedly explaining that their overwhelming desire to leave their "duck" was because
MEMBERS OF AN 83-FOOT COAST GUARD RESCUE CUTTER KEEP ALERT WATCH WHILE ON PATROL
it carried a quarter-ton of German land-mines, all ready to explode at the slightest jar.

"The soldiers were from an Army Engineer's outfit," related Kroetch, "and their job had been taking dug-up German anti-personnel, or land mines from our beachhead out to sea, and jettisoning them. They had such a load in their "duck" when we saw them, all except one mine had been desensitized. The fact that one was liable to explode made their entire cargo a potential bomb.

"They couldn't go back on the beach, lest their "duck" be jarred en route. There was nothing they could do -- except leave," the Coast Guard officer added.

The rescue cutter picked off the three men, backed away from the "duck" and opened up, with the Coast Guard Gunner's Mate, Archie King, extremely happy to fire his 20 mm. cannon for the first time since D-Day.

It was point blank range, and the first shots ripped the "duck" apart. It settled in the water quickly, and when only the windshield was visible, the mines aboard blew up. There was a terrific fountain of water blown into the sky, and the Coast Guardsmen and soldiers alike reeled from the blast!

The cutter, number 41 of the Rescue Flotilla, put the soldiers aboard an inbound boat and returned to its patrol station.

THE SNAFU NO. 56

Exceeding all totals previously reported by units of the Coast Guard Rescue Flotilla, cutter number 56, commanded by Ensign John K. Mallard, USCGR, turned in a roll of 132 English sailors saved from sinking ships during the cutter's three day patrol off the Normandy coast.

In addition to these rescue operations, the Coast Guard boat was host to General Montgomery for a 15 minute taxi run during the first week of the assault.

Hitting France with the end of the squally weather, the cutter, nicknamed the SNAFU, rushed to the assistance of a British trawler and a British cargo ship, both of whom had been damaged. After saving 46 men from the auxiliary warship, and 86 from the merchant vessel, the cutter had them aboard hospital-equipped ships before the rescue craft narrowly escaped a German divebombing attack.

"That night we had our closest call," said Coast Guard Gunner's Mate, third class Herbert H. Warner. "I was at the 20 mm. cannon when a German bomber swooped down, apparently aiming for the British frigate just ahead of us.
COAST GUARD RESCUE CRAFT SAVED HUNDREDS OF INVADERS THROWN INTO CHANNEL WATERS DURING THE EARLY HOURS OF THE LIBERATION ATTACKS ON THE NORMANDY COAST
"The bomber was so low that I could almost touch it as it streaked past our boat's bridge. I could see the tail-gunner in it trying to strafe our deck, but he didn't have a chance. His plane crashed into the frigate and exploded," added Warner.

Several men were killed by the hurtling plane on the frigate, and the warship's starboard side was damaged where her life boats were slung. Cutter 56 stood by her all night, ready for any situation.

The "SNAFU," which surpassed the rescue record of 126 lives saved by Rescue Cutter 16, by half a dozen men, also recorded the rescue involving a cross-channel tow. On D-Day the boat discovered four men on a raft, and towed them from the Bay of the Seine to England before they could be taken aboard.

Later the wooden, 33-foot craft has made several shuttle trips and its crew saw many evidences of German's attempts to disrupt the convoys constantly arriving off Normandy.

"We've seen gun-fire from marauding E-boats, magnesium flares from raiding bombers, and parachute-mines which the German planes drop at night, said David L. Atwell, 22-year-old Motor Machinist Mate of R.F.D. 1, Rockville, Connecticut.

The "SNAFU" crew became expert at aircraft recognition, and some of their proficiency was due to detailed models which were hung over their mess tables. Each of the models had a miniature propeller which spun in the windstream of the ship's fan, and made the model twist and "fly" in exact simulation of enemy planes.

**RESCUE CUTTER 62**

The night before the invasion, Lieut. (jg) Raymond M. Rosenbloom, Jr., of the Coast Guard, Commanding officer of the Rescue Cutter 16, called all hands into the tiny galley. "Well, girls," he said, "sometime tomorrow more ships than the world has ever seen will sail from England to put our troops on France."

Nobody said anything.

"We probably won't reach the beach ourselves," he continued. "And you ought to thank God."

The men stirred a bit, but remained silent. "We will be with the first convoy," said the Lieutenant, "and as you know, our job will be to pick up survivors from the torpedoed ships. We may have a lot to do, but we hope we won't."

He gave the skeleton of the plan, reminding them that the Navy's job is to put the Army on the beach and that the particular task of Coast
RESCUED FROM THE ENGLISH CHANNEL
AFTER THEIR MOSQUITO BOMBER WAS KNOCKED FROM THE SKY
TWO ALLIED AIRMEN ARE GIVEN IMMEDIATE MEDICAL CARE BY COAST GUARDSMEN
ABOARD THE RESCUE CUTTER THAT DASHED TO THE ASSISTANCE AND LIFTED THEM FROM THE SEA
Guard Cutter 62 will be to pick up Army men from the Channel and put them on the nearest large craft going to France.

"When you pull these men out of the water," he said, "they will have rifles strapped on their backs. Their first instinct, past experience has shown, will be to get rid of the rifle since even after they are pulled aboard the horror will remain that the rifle is pulling them down. You will not let them throw overboard either rifles or ammunition. The first thing you will let these men know is that the war is not over for them but that they are going to be put aboard another invasion craft."

The men maintained absolute silence throughout as if they were hypnotized. Rosenbloom, who claims to be twenty-four, (although crew members say he has added two years to keep from being youngest man aboard) spoke slowly in a matter-of-fact voice.

"We're going to have to be callous," he said. "That's going to be the hardest part of our job. When we get a load we're going to have to back away, no matter how many men are in the water. Don't feel sorry for a boy, even if he has a broken leg and is screaming to be pulled aboard. Like in a department store, our value is in a quick turnover and a quick return. As soon as we've unloaded one batch of boys on a larger ship we'll go back for another. If the boys in the water won't get out of the way we'll have to back right through them and they'll have to take a chance of being hit by the wheels (propellers).

"If a man is dead," he paused, and asked, "the pharmacist's mate told you how to tell if a man is dead, didn't he?" The men nodded.

"All right, if a man is dead, and the ship is loaded and you're rushed for time, you're not to waste any sentimentality on him because it may mean other lives. You'll cut off one of his dog tags, put your foot under him and hoist him over the rail. And keep hauling in live men as fast as you can. Even with the nets and ropes they'll have trouble getting aboard. If we lose a big ship there'll be a lot of men in the water and there's going to be no time to lose."

He gave them a few seconds to absorb each item before proceeding to another.

"The wounded," he said, "will be a problem. The damage and first aid crew under Chief Dickey will handle them as best they can. The worst wounded will be given a shot of morphine, the others quick first aid. Chief, as far as possible, if a man is wounded, let his own buddies take care of him.

"Men who are able to walk you will herd below as fast as you can. Stuff them in the fo'c'sle and stuff them in the wardroom. If the ship gets too full, stuff them in the lazarettte."
"The first men pulled aboard, if they are healthy, put to work helping you pull in the others. You will find them as meek as lambs, experience has shown. They'll do anything you say. They'll be so damned glad to be out of the water, especially at night."

He gave some miscellaneous instructions.

"Remember this. Anyone who goes below to light a cigarette must put on a pair of red goggles." (This prevents night blindness. Anyone who has lit a cigarette in a theater knows it takes some time to readjust the eyes. It actually takes 25 minutes before a complete readjustment is made).

"The only lights below will be covered with a red shield or an orange shield," Rosenthal continued, "also to take care of night blindness. These shields will not be removed under any circumstances.

"We will not fire on any aircraft unless we are directly attacked. The flashes will give away our position. In case, through confusion, one of our own ships fires on us, we will not give away our position by firing the recognition rocket unless a real salvo lands in our neighborhood. Every time we pass a ship Signalman Fernandes (Tony Fernandes of Westfield, Mass.) will keep his blinker gun trained on the bridge, ready to give the signal.

"If we are sunk ourselves and washed ashore on the German side, don't touch anything. It may be boobytrapped. Just find yourself a soft place and lie there until you see some of our troops."

"We will be on the port side of the convoy and will be vulnerable to E-boat attack. You know the E-boats. We will not fire unless we are directly attacked. If we are attacked, do the best we can with the pea-shooters. Remember, we're specialists, and our specialty is not shooting but rescuing men.

"Now have you all read your gas instructions?"

Everybody nodded.

"All right. I don't need to tell you that if you use your gas equipment correctly you will be safe. If you don't use your equipment properly--well, you've all seen gas victims of the last war walking about."

Then we had a cup of coffee and sat up late talking.
WOUNDED YANKEE INVADERS ARE TRANSFERRED FROM A COAST GUARD ASSAULT TRANSPORT TO A TANK LANDING CRAFT IN THE ENGLISH CHANNEL FOR TRANSPORT TO AN ENGLISH PORT AND HOSPITALIZATION.
AN LST SINKS
By Lieut. (jg) Coit Hendley, USCGR

"It never occurred to me that people who had ships sunk under them during the enormous amphibious operation which secured the first beachheads on the coast of France would be specially provided for -- until it happened to me.

"I thought that whatever ship picked you up cared for you, but I learned differently after our Coast Guard-manned landing craft sank as a result of shell fire and I had been taken on a Navy tug, then turned over to this survivor accommodation ship.

"The survivor accommodation ship turned out to be the old work horse of the amphibious force, an LST (Landing Ship Tank, if you don't know by now) masquerading under the high sounding name. Certain of these lumbering, wonderful mechanized equipment carriers are outfitted with special medical equipment and personnel. Once they have sent in their original load, they stand by the beaches until they have a cargo of casualties and survivors.

"The men from our ship were the first of almost 500 to be sent to her for transportation back to the United Kingdom. For three days we stayed off the French coast gathering the load.

"Bunks were stretched out on the enormous tank deck once the compartments were filled and the cocks rapidly shifted to just opening and heating a variety of canned goods and foods as the crowd outgrew the facilities of the galley.

"But it was cheerful, varied bunch of survivors. Army casualties, crews from landing craft of various sorts, warships, Coast Guard units and British Army medical units were jammed on the LST.

"The strangest part of the wait was the lack of news. Both of the ship's radios were in use officially and there was no way to get the daily news reports. Lying a few miles off the beach where the heaviest fighting was taking place, we knew nothing except what could be pieced together from the incoming survivors.

"Harold Jamison, an Associated Press correspondent, was one of the survivors to come aboard the second. He had been riding a Rhino Ferry when injured. His first hours were spent repeating all the news he knew to group after group of survivors. After that he was in the same fix as the rest of us and eagerly awaited each newcomer."
LINES HEAVED FROM A COAST GUARD LANDING BARGE ARE GRASPED BY SURVIVORS OF A SMALL VESSEL WHICH COLLIDED WITH A NAZI MINE CLOSE TO THE SHORES OF THE FRENCH INVASION COAST.
"After three days of waiting and receiving survivors, the LST joined a convoy going to an east coast port in England and discharged us to the shore authorities."

ONE HERO'S EXPERIENCE

Coast Guardsman Thomas H. Connor, motor machinist's mate, first class, USCG, was left stranded on the Normandy beach during the first hours of the American attack on June 6, 1944, when his ship, a landing craft for infantry, was forced to withdraw following an accident involving another landing craft.

He remained under fire of strong enemy emplacements in the heights back of the beach for more than 36 hours, and when he returned to his shipmates two days later he spoke modestly of "bandaging up a few soldiers and running a few errands for the Army medical corps."

But gradually the story came back to the ship from wounded soldiers, army medics and other bluejackets who had been on the beach during the hottest part of the fighting. Tom Connor was ordered to give a full account of his experience. What he told his commanding officers was sufficient to bring him an award of the Bronze Star Medal. But Connor didn't tell the whole tale then; it would have been embarrassing.

Later he loosened up and reluctantly told the rest of his story.

"A boat load of wounded attempted to make a run from the beach late in the afternoon of D-Day," Connor related. "It was a small Higgins boat and carried about 15 wounded in addition to its crew of four or five men.

"A little way off shore it hit a small mine and the boat began to sink. I could see it going down and could hear the men yelling for help.

"Several small boats circled around but none could get to the sinking boat because of the mines. I had noticed an abandoned landing craft in the water a short way down the beach and although I didn't know much about running one I decided I'd try to take it out before the wounded men drowned," Connor continued.

"It seemed as if I'd never get the motor started, but finally it turned over and I backed out into deeper water. As I got nearer the sinking boat I could see the stronger men holding up the wounded.

"They all yelled when they saw me coming and warned me to
take off and approach them from another direction because I was heading into a string of mines.

"I swung around and came in from another angle, shouting to them to watch out as I came by because I didn't know how to run my boat. One of their crew crawled aboard and took over the controls and I helped take the wounded aboard.

"It was almost impossible to get the wounded aboard without hurting them, but not one did any kicking. From what I could make out only one wounded man was drowned.

"One of the boat crew said there were doctors aboard his LST and he asked permission to get the wounded there immediately.

"At the time it didn't occur to me everyone was showing me a lot of respect, yes-sir-ing and no-sir-ing me. In the excitement of the day on the beach I had forgotten I had traded my torn, wet dungarees for an officer's khaki shirt and trousers which I found in an abandoned LCT.

"I was all done in and too tired to argue about who I was or what I was when we finally climbed aboard the LST-55. I remember that everyone treated me swell, that an officer took me to the wardroom and gave me coffee. Then he took me to his stateroom and told me to get some sleep.

"When I woke up the next morning about 7 o'clock the same officer told me he had a clean uniform for me... one of his. Suddenly I realized I had been accepted aboard as an officer rather than as an enlisted man. Nothing which had happened to me during the day before on the beach scared me half as much as the thought of what would happen to me if they found out I was just a "motor mac" dressed in officer's uniform.

"I decided it would be better all around if I just kept my mouth shut so I got the captain's permission to go ashore and make contact with my ship.

"I couldn't tell that part of my story when I got back. I was afraid of being court-martialed and even if my officers didn't court-martial me I was afraid the crew would kid me to death about playing around in gold braid."

Tom Connor was granted a 30-day rehabilitation leave following his return to the United States. He wasn't court-martialed, and they say he wasn't kidded... much.
EXPLOSION ROCKS RESCUE CUTTER
ON WAY BACK FROM FRANCE

By Carlyle Holt

"Thursday night, as we were crossing the English Channel on a United States Coast Guard rescue cutter after a two-days' visit on the beachheads, we were startled by a tremendous explosion half a mile off our beam. The night was tempestuous.... It was very rough on our little cutter. It was impossible to stand without clinging on with both hands. Everything was drenched with spray and rain. I was drinking a cup of coffee in the galley, hanging on with both feet and one hand when the thing happened.

"CBM Carl D. McNulty, a Coast Guard old-timer, who had worked out of Boston for eight years, was talking with me about the Chelsea Base when our little ship was rocked by another heavy explosion. We climbed to the deckhouse. The quartermaster and lookout were at a loss to explain the explosion.

"This area is called E-boat Alley, and one often finds German E-boats and U-boats harassing our ships.

"Our convoy had slow ships and we had quite a job shepherding two cripples who fell farther and farther behind all the way over.

"The night will be remembered by Seaman lc, P. J. Matághna, who was lying seasick in a bunk in the little cabin just above the mess table. There was a violent roll, and he fell out of the bunk, landed on top of the mess table, slid across it against a bench and so to the floor. Everything that was not lashed down came loose.

"BM lc, W. P. Dudka, opened the refrigerator door to get a snack in the middle of the night and the contents leaped out at him. Opened cans of grapefruit, tomatoes, and peas spilled to the floor; butter, bacon, and pork chops slid around; broken bottles of catsup and picaalilli were added to the mess.

"At dawn our little 83-footer was in right of the British coast and we were pleased to run under shelter to the shore and make port.

"When I boarded this Coast Guard rescue cutter Tuesday, the radio in the tiny cabin was on full blast. Gracie Allen was talking to George Burns and vice versa. Some members of the crew were due to start across the windy channel, flying just outside the harbor's entrance.

"Skip," said a sailor to the Captain of the ship, Lt. John T. Morse, "here's a letter to my girl. Sort of go over it
A CASUALTY OF THE HEAVY NAVAL BOMBARDMENT THAT ACCOMPANIES THE ASSAULT UPON THE FRENCH COAST

A FRENCH BAZAAR IS KNOCKED OUT OF BUSINESS

JUST BEHIND THE NORMANDY INVASION BEACH

BAZAR
quick, will you? Everytime I write a love letter, I can't look you in the face for three days." Lt. Moræe groaned and took the letter. "This is the letter-writingest ship afloat."

"I never heard him addressed by the crew as anything but 'Skip'—short for Skipper. The practice of the Coast Guard is to address the Commanding Officer of these small cutters as 'Skip'—except of formal occasions, when he is called 'Skipper'. The little ship is divided into a forecastle, where most of the crew sleep, a small cabin, a combination galley, mess hall, and lounge room, and the Captains's cabin, occupied by the skipper and the chief boatswain's mate, who is second in command. The space is about the size of two dog kennels for a crew of 14 men and one officer."

COASTLINE

One marvels how our men got ashore at all.

The coastline is an almost unbroken line of perpendicular cliffs, possibly 100 feet high on an average. Only in a few places do the cliffs fall away to slopes running down to the sea. Those were places where our assault waves landed. The effect of the naval bombardment was apparent along the shore. In places, great sections of a cliff had collapsed into the water. Houses along the shore were battered.

FIRST HAND ACCOUNT OF LT. COMDR. ALEXANDER STEWART, USCGR. COMMANDER, COAST GUARD RESCUE FLOTILLA ONE

The U. S. Coast Guard Rescue Flotilla One (and only) made 1,438 rescues from the English Channel during the invasion of France. Our biggest job was on "D" day, and it was for this gigantic operation that the Flotilla was formed, but three months later these tiny craft were still picking survivors out of cold, stormy waters—sometimes as many as one-hundred a day.

The idea of forming a rescue flotilla was born only a few weeks before "D" day—after all major planning was complete. Some of the reasons for such an organization means life or death to many men.

On "D" minus one, "five-thousand ships loaded with half-a-million men must cross one-hundred miles of channel waters and land full of fight on the French Coast. During the following days of "build-up" millions more must cross and relieve the initial forces.
Suppose the long absent Luftwaffe finally appeared in force! Suppose "E" boats succeed in sinking transports loaded with thousands of men! Suppose enemy mine fields—the kind that permit several ships to pass over and then suddenly pop from the bottom—were missed by the invasion sweepers! Suppose storms forced the invasion armada out of the newly swept channels! Suppose the underwater obstacles off the beaches of France proved more formidable than secret surveys had indicated! Suppose an all-out submarine attack succeeded! These, and more, were some of the discomforting thoughts that plagued the planners of the greatest amphibious operation in history—the invasion of France!

Once an invasion fleet is mounted (loaded and ready to go), everything moves with clock-like precision up to the moment when the first ship touches down on the enemy shore and for many days thereafter until a beachhead is secured, and even then a counter-attack may come at sea as well as on land. To have all of the assault forces and their support at the right place at the right time, there can be no deviation from an air-tight schedule. Though thousands of vessels participated in the Normandy attack, not one could have afforded to stop and pick up survivors. Once the ships set sail from the British ports where they were loaded, it was everyone for himself should disaster overtake a ship or convoy. Some solution to this gruesome proposition was sorely needed, and although no answer had been found in previous invasions, the planners of the French invasion found an answer.

In addition to ships of invasion, this assault included an entirely separate unit of "Sea-going Saint Bernards," whose sole duty was to rescue survivors whenever and wherever required. After the decision was made to form such an organization, things began to happen fast—it had to be fast, very little time was left.

Only a few weeks before the date set for "D" day, urgent orders went out, up and down, the East coast of the United States, U. S. Coast Guard units operating from Maine to Cuba were secretly ordered to sail scores of the eighty-three foot sub-busters to New York. Within a few days, these fast, wooden-hulled patrol craft, manned by one officer and thirteen men, began to accumulate at Staten Island where they were loaded upon decks of liberty ships, LST's, and miscellaneous freighters sailing for the United Kingdom. Under the supervision of Lieutenant Commander Perry H. Simpson, USCG, the boats were "processed" for foreign duty. The actual lifting and loading was performed by one of America's largest marine salvage contractors. There was not time to prefabricate cradles; each craft being blocked up in place while being held on the carrier's deck by a huge floating crane.
Only a few members of the crew stayed with each craft for the Atlantic crossing. These "boat keepers" included the skipper, a chief boatswain's mate, a chief motor machinist's mate, and a ship's cook. With the fuel tanks drained and filled with water, there was no power to heat the boats, and this, plus the location of the craft high on the carrier's pitching and rolling decks, made for solid discomfort. One craft, however, managed to get hooked up with a Liberty ship's power lines, and with this operated its radar at a time when the convoy was passing through an area of dense fog. On arrival in the U. K., the skipper of this particular Liberty ship stated he would like very much to keep the cutter aboard indefinitely, it being his first experience with the wonderful seeing power of radar.

As the first few dozen craft began to reach various U. K. ports, the balance of their crews arrived separately, and were sent to rejoin their shipmates. Later, as the last of the cutters arrived, the number of cutters to be manned far exceeded the number of crews that had reached us, so the same crews were used over and over in bringing the cutters from their offloading ports to the flotilla base.

The preparation of these craft and their crews for the invasion operation took on frantic proportions during the few weeks remaining before "D" day. The last craft of the Flotilla actually arrived at the Flotilla base only sixty hours before the assault began.

Primarily assigned for anti-submarine warfare, these boats arrived fully equipped for that duty. Now their role was quite different—one of mercy instead of attack. Each had to be stripped of its heavy anti-submarine armament, crews had to be given intense first-aid instructions, and skippers had to be indoctrinated in the complicated operation of the invasion itself.

A small repair party of forty-two Coast Guard motor machinist's mates and carpenter's mates, under the direction of Lieutenant Glenn S. Jennings, USCG, were given the job of tuning up the hulls and engines to top efficiency. Although many of the boats had been badly shaken up by the Atlantic crossing, to the credit of this small maintenance party it can be said that on "D" day one hundred per cent of the craft were operational and fulfilled their missions.

British officers who had participated in the Dunkerque evacuation were consulted, and hurried requests for vital supplies went out. However, the hour was so late that much of the rescue equipment used by this Flotilla was constructed by the crews themselves.
With a six-foot freeboard (distance from water to deck), it was realized that men weakened from wounds, shock, and exposure would have difficulty getting aboard these ships of mercy. Tests showed that the weight of such a survivor sometimes went as high as four-hundred pounds, due to clothing and gear being soaked with water and oil. Therefore to facilitate rescues directly from the water, scramble nets were constructed of two-inch line and wood. To make room for survivors, all excess gear was stripped from the decks of the ships, life lines were loosened, and the scramble nets rigged fore and aft on both sides. To lift the wounded, regardless of weight, heavy iron davits were constructed and rigged with block and tackle. Extra stretchers of a type that held their shape under all conditions were supplied each craft, and to keep patients as warm as possible, thousands of Army blankets were issued. In addition to this, facilities were installed for quickly serving hot tea and coffee.

Visualizing the possibility of having to carry capacity loads of survivors, tests were made to determine how many people could be crowded aboard without endangering the craft's stability. With over one hundred men on deck in addition to the crew, high speed maneuver tests were successfully completed.

Prior to their departure from New York, huge first-aid kits had been placed aboard each craft, and the use of all this equipment was drilled into the crews in daily sessions, which included the showing of motion pictures depicting actual first-aid work. Two doctors, Ass't Surgeon Martin R. Boltizar and Ass't Surgeon John S. Micelli, were assigned to the Flotilla by the U. S. Public Health Service, and upon arrival of the crews, classes were held morning, noon, and night, so that on "D" day every man in the Flotilla could set a broken bone, apply an effective tourniquet, and had the rhythm of resuscitation down "pat."

Special rubber life rafts which inflated themselves automatically upon contact with the water were obtained from the RAF and supplied each cutter. These arrived only a few days before "D" day, and consisted of a multitude of parts which had to be assembled into a tight kit for stowage aboard our craft. The assembling problem was similar to that of a jigsaw puzzle and we finally had to call in an expert from one of the RAF stations to explain what some of the equipment was all about. Their original purpose was for use in waters far from land, but in our case they proved of immense value in keeping groups of survivors afloat until rescues could be made by the cutters.

At the very last minute, a shipment of California brandy arrived for issue to survivors. It was packed in small, two-ounce bottles, and when divided among the sixty boats of the Flotilla, the size of the spirited ration for each craft was conceivably less than the proverbial "cask" carried by the
COAST GUARDSMEN LINE THE RAILS TO GIVE A HAND TO G. I. JOES COMING UP OVER THE SIDE OF A COAST GUARD MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT FOR LAST MINUTE INVASION MANEUVERS SOMEWHERE OFF THE COAST OF ENGLAND
Saint Bernards of the Swiss passes. Needless to say, these few drops of concentrated "sunshine" were expended during the first few hours of "D" day.

Long before this rescue flotilla was formed, all of the other ships of the invasion armada had completed their final drills and exercises. Time after time certain selected beaches along the Cornwall coast were assaulted and captured by the various units which were to make up the actual invasion forces. During these sham shows, everyone became accustomed to the many, and sometimes unique, types of vessels to be used. Their silhouettes were impressed upon the minds of all the invasion crews, including the airmen who were to cover the operation. Because of our late arrival, it was realized that our silhouette would be unexpected, and, being seen for the first time during the excitement of the real thing, there was a good chance that our craft would be fired upon by trigger-nervous gunners long before we reached the beaches of France. To protect us from our own airmen, photographs were made of our craft underway at high speed and quickly published to the various air crews who were to participate. Even so, there was a great amount of uneasiness among our crews over the possibility of the rescue cutters being mistaken for an enemy "E" boat, whose silhouette and wake they resembled in many respects. Fortunately, however, only in one case were we fired upon by friendly vessels, and that was when we arrived directly upon the heels of an "E" boat attack on a convoy in mid-channel a few nights after "D" day. In the dark, it is not surprising that gun crews in the convoy thought a second wave of "E" boats were upon them. Recognition signals were made by us just in time, and except for a few holes in our hulls there was no serious damage.

Another of our chief worries was due to the cutters themselves. They are gasoline driven and carry several thousand gallons of high-test gasoline midships in huge tanks located almost under the bridge. The tanks are not bullet proof, and the ship's hull will not stop even a thirty calibre bullet. Attempts were made to find some way of reducing the danger of explosions after being hit in one of these tanks. Some special armament around the tanks was indicated, or else we might adopt the British method of enveloping them in "splinter protection" shields, but the construction of the craft was such that no adequate solution was ever found. In the end, each skipper was instructed to use his central tanks first, in the hope that a hit in one of the full cutter tanks would be less likely to explode than would a gaseous "empty" tank. Even so, our arrival on the French coast meant that we were carrying within our hulls explosives sufficient to blow us sky-high, and as it turned out, the only operational loss of life sustained by this Flotilla during our entire assignment came as a result of one of these "empty" tanks exploding.
COAST GUARD 83-FOOTERS RESCUED HUNDREDS OF ALLEEd FIGHTING MEN FROM ENGLISH CHANNEL WATERS IN THE D DAY INVASION

BOLDLY EXPOSING THEIR THIN WOODEN HULLS TO NAZI SHELLFIRE
For the invasion operation, we were organized into two distinct groups. Thirty boats were assigned to the British assault area and to the American. On the eve of "D" day, these two "match-box" fleets departed the Flotilla base and rendezvoused with scores of different convoys forming up along the channel coast of England. Some of these convoys were fast and consisted of assault transports. Others were slow, plodding LCI's and towed barges. Most were made up of LST's and LCI(L)'s, but all were filled to overflowing with American and Allied sailors, soldiers, and marines. All were to converge on pre-selected assault areas before dawn of 6 June.

Typical of these was one huge convoy consisting of almost a score of huge, fast attack transports and almost a hundred LCI(L)'s. A total of ten rescue craft were assigned to this one convoy and as it was to become the spearhead of the American assault, additional cutters joined up with it after crossing with other convoys. Many of the transports were manned by Coast Guard crews, and almost half of the LCI(L)'s were Coast Guard manned, so when our small cutters, flying the Coast Guard Ensign as well as the American Flag, wheeled into line with the convoy, there were many waves and shouts of "Hi, ya, Coasty" across the water.

The trip over was a nightmare for the eighty-three-footers, due to heavy seas and a bad habit developed by the transports of going full speed for a while and then suddenly slowing down. Because there was only one very narrow swept channel to use, the entire line of transports was strung out in single file. The LCI(L)'s and rescue craft were supposed to follow in the channel, but due to the recurring overlapping of the various sections of the convoy, it is doubtful if we were ever within the swept channel. This did not worry us very much because our craft were wooden-hulled and of shallow draft, and as it turned out, not a single ship of ours was lost en route to the Normandy coast. The unsung sweepers had done a great job, and lady luck was definitely on our side that night.

The arrival of the load convoys in the assembly areas directly off the beaches was closely coordinated with the start of a tremendous naval bombardment of the beaches and block houses up and down the coast. The timing of the arrival of the many convoys involved was such that although they had left the U. K. from ports hundreds of miles apart and their time of departure had been separated by many hours, the planning and execution was so accurate that all the units took their place in the Seine Bay simultaneously. The breaking up of the convoys and their anchoring in the unloading areas occurred long before dawn.

From the deck of our rescue craft the impression was that of being completely surrounded by hundreds of huge vessels, all going at breakneck speed while turning and wheeling within swept channels known to be only a few hundred yards wide. Everything was pre-arranged, and perfectly coordinated. No vessel
THIS COAST GUARD RESCUE FLOTILLA PERFORMED VALIANT SERVICE SAVING ALMOST 1500 MEN FROM THE WATERS ON D DAY AND THE SUCCEEDING DAYS
paid much attention to the others, but it is remarkable that there was no serious accident from collision.

As the different convoys arrived, our group of rescue craft soon numbered over twenty off the American beaches. In the original orders, only five had been assigned to positions between the transports and the beaches and all the rest were supposed to be staying in the vicinity of the transports, as it was expected that here the greatest disasters would occur. However, it was hardly light before it became evident that the German forces on shore were knocking out scores of small craft, LCT’s and LCI(L)’s, as they went into the beach, and it was here that our initial rescue roles were played. Frantic calls came from the first five cutters, and very soon all but a few of our craft assigned to the transports went in as close to the beach as possible. Ensign Bernard B. Wood, USCG, made one of our first rescues, operating in its assigned position less than 2,000 yards off one of the American beaches. Forty-seven soldiers and sailors were taken from the water by this cutter only a few minutes after "H" hour. Most of these men were U. S. Army personnel, wounded crews of tanks that had been knocked out before reaching the shore. The water was bitterly cold and a fairly high sea was running. The majority of the survivors were weakened from shock and immersion, so members of the CGC-1 had to go over the side and help lift the survivors bodily from the water. Shell fire from the beach was falling all around but the cutter kept underway until every man visible in the area was picked up. All the while, scores of assault craft were passing by, and regardless of the rescue operations, these craft had the right of way. This meant that the rescue cutters would have to speed in to a group of survivors and then maneuver out of the way of an assault craft as quickly as possible. Frequently, several runs would be made before dodging into position to complete a rescue.

The CGC-2, skippered by Ensign O. Tinsley Meekings, USCGR, was just as busy as No. 1, only a few thousand yards away. A number of DUKW’s loaded with Army personnel were swamped en route to the beach. Although a heavy surf was running and there was great danger of the rescue craft hitting some of the underwater obstacles just off the beach, this cutter made a number of rescues, taking aboard survivors who were in an unconscious condition. En route to the hospital ship, artificial respiration was administered to some of the seriously wounded, and not a single death occurred aboard the cutter.

Further down the beach, Cutters 3, 4, and 5 were also in the midst of trouble during the first few hours of June 6.
CGC-3, commanded by Lieutenant (jg) William J. Starrett, went in close enough to the Beach to rescue the crew of an American tank. After picking up the survivors from the tank, several small disabled landing craft loaded with essential personnel and material were seen to be floundering. The CGC-3 took these craft in tow and got them in close enough to the beach to allow them to make their landing.

A similar situation occurred when CGC-4, under the command of Lieutenant (jg) James F. Smith, noticed several landing craft, loaded with three-inch field pieces, in trouble, having been disabled by fire from the shore. Appreciating the importance of getting this material onto the beach, and despite difficult navigation in the heavy surf, to say nothing of the continual shelling from German shore batteries, Smith's cutter took the landing craft in tow and hauled them into shallow water where the gun crews were able to get their field pieces ashore. This incident took place less than thirty minutes after "H" hour.

Within the next few hours, cutter 4 picked up a total of twenty-four men out of the surf and transferred them to hospital ships.

CGC-5, captained by Ensign S. G. Pattyson, was operating in the same vicinity as CGC-4, and by noon of "H" day had made thirty-four rescues. Many of the survivors picked up were seriously wounded, and the wooden decks of this little cutter were red with blood this hectic morning. Even when she reached our base across the channel, her crew was still trying unsuccessfully to scrub away the vivid reminders of badly hurt men—men with missing arms or legs, whose day of battle had come and now was gone forever.

In many cases, the rescue cutters proved to be of great value even though actual rescues were not performed. Such an incident occurred when CGC-8, under the command of Ensign Richard S. Peer, was dispatched to standby a large steamer loaded with British troops. This ship had received a direct hit by a bomb and panic had broken out aboard her. There were a great many casualties, and the ship began to burn fiercely. Cutter 8 maneuvered alongside however and Ensign Peer discussed the situation over his loud hailer (electric megaphone) with the skipper of the steamer, indicating that he was standing by to take off casualties and survivors if and when necessary. This conversation, given with stentorian volume, could be heard by all aboard the stricken vessel, and the presence of this one small craft seemed to have a quieting effect on the panicky personnel. Before the conversation ended, the incipient panic had vanished. Commodore
PRIVATE WILLIAM BONNEVILLE, U. S. ARMY, OF CHESTER, PA., SHIVERING WITH COLD
AFTER AN EXHAUSTING STRUGGLE WITH THE CHILL CURRENTS OF THE ENGLISH CHANNEL
IS WRAPPED IN A BLANKET AND GIVEN HOT COFFEE IN THE GALLEY OF THE COAST GUARD RESCUE CUTTER
THAT PICKED HIM OUT OF THE WATER
Hugh T. England, Royal Navy, happened to be aboard the cutter at the time of this incident, and in his official report to the British Task Force Commander stated. "The cool and determined manner in which Ensign Peer informed the master that he was standing by had a most heartening effect on the men and I consider his handling of the whole situation is deserving of the highest praise."

Cutter Number 16, under the command of Lieutenant (jg) R. V. McPhail, tallied up the largest rescue job on "D" day, although his figure has since been topped. This cutter arrived with a convoy of miscellaneous invasion barges and accompanied some of these right into the shore. Floating mines were taking their toll of the initial assault craft, and shell fire from the shore was very intense. At approximately 0730, a landing craft which had been converted to an ack-ack ship was hit by a shell while about 800 yards off the beach and sank immediately. CGC–16 proceeded to engage in rescue operations. As the last survivor was picked up, a nearby PC was struck either by a shell or a mine and disintegrated completely. Men and debris were scattered over a wide area. All living survivors were picked up and taken to a Coast Guard transport in the immediate vicinity. Doctors who came aboard the "16" from the transport to help with the stretcher cases pronounced one man dead and declared another beyond all possibility of recovery and stated he would live only a few minutes. Due to the urgency of the work at hand, both the dead man and the dying man were placed in the lazarette for later disposition, and at the first opportunity a sea burial was held. It was during the ceremony for the dead man, that the man given up for dead stuck his head through the hatch and informed the ship's company, "If you guys think you are going to do that to me you've got another guess coming. How about some hot coffee, but hot——and for——sake, gimme a cigarette." A half-hour later, chalk white but still alive and full of grit, this man was put aboard an LST especially equipped for handling hospital cases. Whether he survived or not is not known. He had received a severe wound in the abdomen and the shell had carried away one whole side of his middle region. Even his name is not known to us as survivors were handled so rapidly on "D" day that it was frequently impossible to log the names of all persons taken aboard, but whoever he was he deserves the very best. When our men last saw him he was still the man who refused to die, in spite of "doctor's orders."
(FRANCE) 15/6/44 -- FROM A COAST GUARD RESCUE CRAFT THIS TANK LANDING SHIP IS PHOTOGRAPHED AS SHE POINTS HER BOW SKYWARD JUST BEFORE PLUNGING TO THE BOTTOM, VICTIM OF A NAZI MINE. (COAST GUARD PHOTO) SIGNAL CORPS RADIO TELE-

PHOTO FROM LONDON. FG 20
The "16" had no sooner completed their sea burial when an LCT, sinking by the stern, was sighted about 1,500 yards from the beach, and was still under enemy fire. The Rescue cutter maneuvered alongside and discovered this landing craft was loaded with ammunition and was on fire. After taking off all the wounded, the "16" prepared to get underway. After pulling away from the stricken vessel, Lieutenant McPhail was told by one of the survivors that there was still another man with both legs broken aboard the landing craft in one of the gun tubs. Despite the great likelihood of an explosion from the fire raging around the ammunition aboard the sinking craft, Lieutenant McPhail put about again and pulled alongside. Volunteers went aboard to get the wounded man. He was located in the gun tub and lines were slung under his arms and he was hauled clear just as the LCT turned turtle and sank. Both the volunteers and the injured man were thrown into the water, but the lines saved the soldier and the men from the cutter soon helped him aboard. These survivors, like the others, were taken to an LST hospital ship.

The log of the "16" showed that a total of 126 casualties, plus one corpse, had been handled in less than six hours.

Although the normal complement of these rescue craft is one officer and thirteen men, every man who could be spared from the base swelled the crews for the "D" day operations, and cutter 16 had aboard on this exciting day exactly a sixteen man crew. Sixteen medals arrived for this Unit, along with sixteen citations. Every man, plus the skipper, on Rescue Cutter 16 has had a Navy and Marine Corps Medal for heroism pinned on his chest.

Probably the most gruesome rescue was made by cutter 17, captained by Ensign Alvis Dexter Arnhart, USCGR. On June 16, an LCT was soon to hit a mine and began to sink. Most of the crew of the LCT were still aboard or clinging to nearby wreckage, and a total of twenty-two men were saved. Out of this number, nineteen were stretcher cases and severely wounded. Every man of the "17" went aboard the LCT to assist in transferring the wounded, and while tied up alongside, the LCT suddenly sank. The crew of the cutter quickly chopped the lines with axes and the "17" swung free just in time to prevent being dragged down with the sinking ship. After rendering all possible first-aid while en route to the nearest hospital ship, the survivors, all still alive, were transferred.
MORTALLY WOUNDED BY A DIRECT HIT, THIS COAST GUARD INFANTRY LANDING CRAFT EVACUATES ALL HANDS AND ITS LOAD OF SOLDIERS BEFORE SINKING IN THE ENGLISH CHANNEL.
With Coast Guardsmen manning several different types of landing craft, it was inevitable that some of these Coast Guard manned rescue cutters would be called upon to rescue some of their service brothers. Cutter 19, under Lieutenant (jg) Edwin N. Frost, USCG, picked up a number of survivors from a small landing craft early in the morning. Just before noon, a Coast Guard LCI(L) was seen to hit a mine and disappeared beneath the water almost immediately. The CGC-19 proceeded full speed to the scene of the sinking LCI(L) and in the next thirty minutes rescued a number of wounded Coast Guardsmen from the water.

In addition to sailors and soldiers rescued in connection with the assault, a number of airmen were picked up from time to time, including personnel of the American Air Force, the RAF, and the RCAF. On one occasion, word that a plane had "ditched" was received by Rescue Cutter 23, under the command of Ensign John N. Kellam, USCGR, while she was escorting a damaged destroyer back to the U.K. for repairs. Ensign Kellam immediately requested and received permission to proceed to the scene of the crash. En route, it was realized that the location was in very close to Le Havre, and at this time Le Havre was still in enemy hands. Despite this, the fact that it was then an hour past sundown, and there was danger from attack by enemy "E" boats and shore batteries, the "23" completed its mission, rescuing the lone survivor of the crashed plane. So protection was available for the cutter at this time, and the actual rescue took place approximately 3,500 yards from enemy shores.

Cutter 31, under the command of Lieutenant (jg) Burke I. Powers, holds the distinction of rescuing a woman, the only one encountered in hundreds of rescues. In August, while on escort duty, a British hospital ship was mined and sank very quickly. This ship was heavily loaded with wounded and was en route to hospitals in the U.K. Practically all of the survivors taken aboard the "31" were too weak to even attempt to climb up the cutter's side, so all available life rafts were thrown overboard to help in keeping casualties afloat while every member of the crew of the cutter went into the water to assist the wounded aboard. When it was seen that many were unable to swim to nearby life rafts and were drifting away with the tide, two men, George C. Betz, MoMM2c, USCGR, and R. T. Seamon, Sealc, USCGR, remained in the water assisting the seriously wounded to life rafts and seeing that they were safe until the cutter could come alongside for
THIS WOUNDED CREW MEMBER IS TAKING A WELL-EARNED REST
the final rescue. These two men were in the water during the entire duration of the rescue operations, and the saving of many lives is attributed to their meritorious work. The entire rescue operation consumed one hour and thirty minutes, and when the last survivor was aboard, this cutter was loaded with ninety-nine casualties.

Among the survivors was a British nurse, and although she was suffering from shock and immersion, she immediately turned to board the cutter and assisted in rendering first-aid to the wounded. The "31" was very proud to have her aboard, and still like to tell about the time they had their own nurse on a rescue operation.

A few days after "D" day, cutters 32 and 40 made a rescue which necessitated the crews of the two cutters boarding a sinking destroyer escort to remove casualties even after the decks of the sinking ship were awash. Some members of the cutters' crews explored compartments below deck after they were half filled with water, and in addition to removing twenty-four survivors, the crew of the "32" inspected the depth charges and set them on "safe" before the DE sank. The whole operation consumed eight minutes.

David O. Clark, SoM2c, USCGR, especially distinguished himself in this rescue by remaining on the bridge of the DE in a successful attempt to free one of the DE's crew from the CGC-40, J. S. Jordan, Sea2c, USCGR, the wounded man was rigged onto a stretcher, but by this time all avenues of escape were cut off by water as the two Coast Guardsmen and their casualty had to swim for it, and were only a few yards from the stricken vessel when it capsized and sank. They then kept the wounded man afloat until he was pulled aboard the "32."

Although many of the rescues were performed "under fire" and can be classified as dangerous operations, the skipper of the rescue cutter "35" Lieutenant (jg) George Clark, was compelled to jeopardize himself and his crew to complete a rescue of an LCT crew in another kind of fire. The LCT was carrying a considerable amount of gasoline when she struck a mine, and the sea about the area was soon an inferno of blazing oil and gas. Despite this obvious danger, Lieutenant Clark, without hesitation, sped his craft into the area and completed a very exciting though hot rescue.

A letter written on Admiralty stationery, arrived for Lieutenant Clark. It stated, "I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to inform you that they have learned with great pleasure that, on the advice of
AMERICAN TROOPS, ABOARD A COAST GUARD MANNED LCIL (LANDING CRAFT INFANTRY, LARGE) PACK THE DECKS IN H HOUR MANEUVERS BEFORE THE INVASION OF FRANCE
the First Lord, the King has been graciously pleased to award you the Distinguished Service Cross for gallantry and devotion to duty shown when in command of the U. S. Coast Guard Cutter No. 35 in the initial landings of the Allied Forces on the coast of Normandy on 6th June, 1944. The incident which prompted the British Admiralty to make this award was unknown to the Flotilla or to Clark's brother officers until a memorandum arrived from the British authorities requesting permission to make the award. Lieutenant Clark's trip report for that period had simply stated, "Survivors rescued, five, Corpses, none. Comments, none."

And so it has been with many of the rescues completed by the various units of this Flotilla. This brief account contains only a fraction of the total story of work done by Rescue Flotilla One. It was their job to perform this duty as the skippers were short on accounts when making their reports, but it can be truly said that every man distinguished himself while performing his assignment, and although some of the craft are now on the bottom of the English Channel, and some of our men will never go home, not one would have missed the show for all the world.

**COAST GUARD LCI(L) FLOTILLA**

The Coast Guard LCI(L) Flotilla, sometimes referred to as Ten, or Four, or other numbers, had been in existence since January, 1943, and during that time had traveled thousands of miles and been involved in three major amphibious operations of World War II—Sicily, Italy, and France. The landing on the Normandy beaches of France was the climax of the Flotilla's campaigns. Thousands of ships took part in the operation that broke the famed West Wall of Adolph Hitler, and among those thousands were the thirty-six LCI(L)s of the Coast Guard Flotilla.

The following story of the accomplishments of the LCI(L)-87, Captain Imlay's ship, gives an idea of the part played by the landing craft in the great invasion. Captain Imlay was Deputy Commander of Assault Group 0-1.

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF CAPTAIN MILES IMLAY**

LCI(L)s of Convoy Group One departed Weymouth Pier and Weymouth Roads at H minus thirteen hours, forty-five
FILES OF COAST GUARD LCI's (LANDING CRAFT INFANTRY)
MOVE ACROSS THE ENGLISH CHANNEL FOR THE D DAY INVASION OF THE COAST OF NORMANDY
minutes, and formed cruising disposition approximately forty-five minutes later. Ten Coast Guard Rescue Craft, departing from Poole, took station on the starboard column of the LCI(L) convoy group at Point XRAY, and immediately thereafter one of these craft returned to Poole due to engine trouble. LCI(L)s and Rescue Craft proceeded in an orderly manner abreast of the transport section of the convoy for most of the trip, as it was often impractical to follow behind due to the string-out formation and unreliable movements of some of the rear vessels. LCI(L)s of the 0-2 group were detached on time at a point five miles north of Point KING to form a temporary rendezvous area within the swept channel. Two miles from Point KING LCI(L)s of 0-3 were formed into a temporary cruising rendezvous until traffic cleared at Point KING. LCI(L)s of 0-1 proceeded to their assigned rendezvous area, arriving on time.

LCI(L) 87 proceeded to Point KING where LCT(DD)s, LCT(A)s and LCT(HE)s were ordered to depart from the main body of Convoy Group 0-2, arriving there at H minus 2h0. After failing to sight any of these craft when the 0-2 group arrived, it was assumed that they had gone to the northward of the transport area and had proceeded direct to Point KING LOVE. LCI(L) 87 proceeded to Point KING LOVE but none of the vessels were located here. Believing they may have proceeded on in and that it was necessary to have information on this point, the Deputy Group Commander in the LCI(L) 87 proceeded to go in towards the beach to investigate. At a point approximately three and one-half miles off the beach all LCT(DD)s were found except numbers 507 and 503, escorted by three LCSs. Eight LCSs were missing. It was later reported by Primacy Control Vessel EASY RED that all DD tanks of Assault Group 0-1 foundered before reaching the beach. The LCI(L) 87 then proceeded to the line of departure to check the control vessels. Both primary control vessels were in position as checked by the LCI(L) 87's radar.

It should be noted that there was very little enemy fire from the beach at this time. Only one salvo landed near the LCI(L) 87 while near the line of control and this missed by 500 yards. Only one secondary control vessel was noted stationed at the 6,000 yard lane. The SC 1307 supposed to be stationed as a secondary control vessel for FOX GREEN was missing. This vessel reported she was rounding up stray craft headed for UTAH. She arrived several hours later.
COLUMN OF COAST GUARD LCI(L)'S PROTECTED BY BARRAGE BALLOONS AGAINST LOW FLYING NAZI SPÄHFLIEGER ADVANCE UPON THE BEACHES OF FRANCE IN THE WAKE OF THE STARS AND STRIPES
To follow the activities of the LCI(L) 87 during that first crucial period will give some idea of what had to be done and what was done.

The LCI(L) 87, leading the LCI(L) section of Assault Force "0", swung from position behind the transports as they were anchoring in the transport area, ten miles from the beach, at 4 a.m. From this point the story of the LCI(L) 87 will be picked up.

Plans called for the ship to rendezvous with the LCT(DD)s, LCT(A)s, and LCT(HE)s which were to form the first waves of the assault and lead them over to the east boat channel leading to the shore where they would be met by the LCS group and led to the beaches. These craft after arriving at the area proceeded directly to the beach without bothering with the swept channel and missed the LCI(L) 87. The LCI(L) 87 thought this was what happened, but it was necessary to have information on this point, so the ship proceeded toward the beach to investigate.

A little less than three miles off the beach, all but two of the LCTs carrying DD tanks were found guided by three LCSs. Eight LCSs were missing. These DD tanks were the first wave of the assault. They accomplished nothing, as it was later reported by the Control Vessel of EASY RED sector that all DD tanks from Group 0-1 had swamped before reaching the shore.

In this connection, the Commander of Assault Force "0", Admiral J. L. Hall, jr., USN, said that one DD tank was observed burned out on Fox Green beach and it was unlikely that this tank was from one of the other assault groups as theirs were launched a short distance off shore and presumably all reached their proper beaches. At least one DD tank from Captain Imlay's group did survive, apparently, the 6,000 yard run to the beach.

After seeing that the first waves were on time and going in the right direction, the LCI(L) 87 proceeded to the line of departure to check the position of the control vessels. Radar proved that all were in position except one. The SC 1307 supposed to be stationed as a secondary control vessel was missing. This vessel was discovered rounding up stray craft and sent to her position.

The ship was doing these things at 5:50 a.m., one hour before the assault was to begin. "The beach at this time was very quiet," the commanding officer of the LCI(L) 87, Lieutenant C. F. Scharfenstein, USCG, reported. "I did not see any enemy fire although one salvo did splash about 500 yards from us."

"I was at the helm when we made that first sweep into the beach," Quartermaster Lowell E. Walkup said. "This was just at daybreak and about an hour before the first wave was due to hit the beach."
I couldn't see anything at all along the beach — no movement or explosions of any sort. We passed a number of LCTs on the way in. There was a haze over the whole area."

After looking over the beach, the ship turned and headed back for the transport area.

From here on business was fast and plentiful. On the bridge of the LCI(L) 87 (an LCI bridge is not big enough actually to hold more than three or four men comfortably but this was war) were the skipper of the ship, Captain Imlay, Lieutenant Frank Yahner (Flotilla Operations Officer), a communications officer, two signalmen and two recorders, the Captain's yeoman, and a radioman with a FM set.

One half hour before the assault, at 6 a.m., the LCI(L) 87 passed LCC 10 and two LCMs of the demolition group. The LCC stated that they were endeavoring to find the other lost LCMs. Eight more of these craft were located by the LCI(L) 87 and dispatched to their proper beaches.

The decision to unload the early waves of LCI(L)s by LCMs was a wise one, according to the engineering officer, Tom B. Hutchin of the LCI(L) 322. "It was obvious that the 88s would give us a good reception," he said. "By unloading by the small boats we undoubtedly saved a couple of LCI(L)s for later work."

The LCI(L) 320, commanded by Lieutenant W. K. Scammel, jr., USCG, and the LCI(L) 323, commanded by Lieutenant W. H. E. Schroeder, USCG, reported that they were able to land their troops without much trouble also by LCMs.

The same was true of the LCI(L) 321.

"We arrived at the line of departure with the other ships in our wave on time," Lieutenant James E. Hollis, jr., USCG, commanding officer said. "On the way in we passed a LCT put out of commission by a mine but still afloat with many survivors in the water. These men were being picked up by a LCVP. Further in we saw numerous bodies that had been washed out by the tide."

"Our wave was getting ready to beach, when an LCM came out from the control vessel and informed us that it was impossible for us to get close enough into the beach because of the runnels and the sandbars."

"We stood off the beach about one half mile and unloaded by LCMs. Several salvos from the German guns fell near us, but nothing very close. We unloaded without casualties. After unloading we resumed the duties of deputy assault commander of the Green Group and performed routine duties as directed by Commander Bresnan."
The fifth ship in this wave was the LCI(L) 319. The commanding officer, Lieutenant (jg) F. X. Riley, USCG, said that they were stopped about 2,000 yards off the beach by the control vessel and began unloading by LCM.

"This was going so slowly that it was impossible to get the troops in on time," Riley said. "I thought that I would make a try at beaching. We were assigned to salvage work and had to go in anyway. We went in closer but the assault commander ordered us not to beach. We finished unloading by LCMs."

Riley reported that the enemy was firing sporadically at the ships in the area one thousand yards from the beach at this time.

After unloading, the LCI(L) 319 began salvage work.

What happened to the survivors of the craft which had been lost on the beaches is a question of some interest.

Fireman Eugene S. Sweich of Chicago, Illinois, who was on the LCI(L) 85 when she sank, knows and said that being a survivor "was not too bad, in fact, was an interesting experience."

Sweich and the members of the crew of the LCI(L) 85 were one of the five crews from the Flotilla that went through the survivor mill after they had been returned to England from the assault beaches.

"We were taken off the LCI by a Navy salvage tug which was alongside us trying to pump the ship," Sweich said. "The next day the tug delivered us to an LST which was serving as a hospital ship and survivor accommodation ship. This LST finally brought us back to England.

"When we got on the tug they gave us a Red Cross survivor pack which contained a toothbrush, razor, towel, sweater, pants, socks, and shoes."

As the packs were intended for merchant seamen, the clothes were far from regulation. Sweich's sweater was yellow and his pants black with pin stripes. These were the clothes he wore until he reached England four days later.

The LST was crowded with survivors from various ships. Over 300 men from the transport SUSAN B. ANTHONY which hit a mine were put on board. Crews from a destroyer, a destroyer escort, and various types of landing craft were there. Even women were present in the person of about twenty nurses from a British hospital ship which hit a mine.

When the port of Cherbourg was captured by the Americans, it became a big question to the amphibious units working off the assault
COAST GUARD GUNNERS
PROTECTING A LOAD OF SOLDIERS ON THE INVASION EXPEDITION ACROSS THE ENGLISH CHANNEL
LET GO AT THE ENEMY AS THEIR LCI MOVES CLOSE TO THE SHORES OF FRANCE
beaches as to what ship would be the first to enter the mine cluttered harbor.

It was an academic question, almost, because the first vessels in had to be minesweepers.

However, the honor, dubious as it may be, of being the first craft to enter the harbor of Cherbourg on business other than minesweeping belongs to two ships of Flotilla Ten. The LCI(L) 89 and the LCI(L) 490 went into Cherbourg on July 9 towing behind them a string of Army J boats and in a state of nervous tension. The LCI(L) 89 led the other ships in so actually is the honored vessel.

By that time the crew of the LCI(L) 89 was so mine conscious that every man was wearing his lifejacket and on top side unless required by his duties to go below decks. Boatswain's Mate W. D. Elder, summed up the trip nicely when he said, "The one thing we accomplished was to make the crew acutely aware of mines. Every time we anchored we anchored in a mine field. And the whole time we were in the harbor the sweepers were exploding them around us. We saw a number of floating mines during the trip."

The two ships left Omaha beach Sunday afternoon with eight of the Army J boats in tow. These J boats are small craft the Army uses for working around harbors. Each LCI(L) was towing four of them.

As the sea was rough and a strong head wind was blowing, not much speed could be made. To make matters more complicated, not much hydrographic information on the swept waters around Cherbourg was available and no information on the condition of the harbor itself. Recognitions signals had not been received.

This matter of recognition signals did not make the ships any happier. Just that same week a destroyer had thrown a five inch shell at an LCI(L) of the Flotilla out in mid-channel.

The officers and men knew this.

The first part of the trip was quiet except for the weather. Not far from Cherbourg the first mine was sighted. The LCI(L) 490 stopped to sink it and in the maneuvering swamped two of her J boats.

Cherbourg was sighted about 3:30 a. m. and in spite of all expectations, no ships were seen around the entrance of the breakwater. This was strange because normally your would expect a guard vessel at least.

The ships anchored off Fort de l'Ouest off the western end of the outer breakwater to wait for morning and some instructions.
JUST AS THIS COAST GUARD LCI RUSHES INTO A FRENCH INVASION BEACH TO DEBAR ITS LOAD OF AMERICAN TROOPS, A NAZI MINE EXPLODES CLOSE OFF ITS PORT BOW.
As it became lighter a mine sweeper was seen inside the harbor working slowly back and forth. Her light began to blink at them.

When the message was received it read, "You are anchored in a mine field. Suggest that you move."

This caused some excitement on board the LCI(L) 89.

"We sent back a message asking them where it would be safe to anchor," Lieutenant (jg) H. H. Howard said. "We were told to come inside the sea wall. We could see several other sweeps and a few tugs and a mine layer inside. The sweep told us it was as safe inside as any place."

So the ships moved into the harbor and dropped anchor. Three times they were asked to move. The first time it was with the now familiar, "You are anchored in a mine field. Please move." The next time it was, "You are in my way. I want to sweep that spot." And the third time, "You are over two mines that we have been trying to get for two days."

In addition to these continual requests to move, the ships had to listen to the mines exploding at intervals. A mine detonating anywhere near makes a terrific thud on the bottom of a LCI(L). Occasionally the sweeps would have to shoot at one to sink it.

By the time the ship had shifted mooring about twice the crew was all in life jackets for keeps. Once they saw a mine drift down on a mooring buoy not far from them and go off, blowing the buoy to bits.

The commanding officer of the LCI(L) 89, Lieutenant (jg) Harold J. Levin, finally got permission from the naval officer in charge of the base to return to the assault beaches and they departed that afternoon leaving the J boats in Cherbourg.

Going out of the harbor, they had to maneuver around one mine which was floating in the entrance.

"We may have had the honor of being the first landing craft to go into Cherbourg," Boatswain Elder said, "but it wasn't worth the strain."

When the transport USS SUSAN B. ANTHONY hit a mine just off the French coast the morning of June 7, ships from this Flotilla were among the vessels rescuing the troops and crew on board her. All troops were saved from the fully loaded ship and only a few of the crew were lost. These men were trapped below or killed by the explosion.
ONE OF THE STURDY LITTLE 83-FOOT COAST GUARD CUTTERS ULLS ALONGSIDE A COAST GUARD ASSAULT TRANSPORT OFF THE COAST OF FRANCE TO TRANSFER SURVIVORS FOR MEDICAL ATTENTION
Rescue of 439 of these men by the LCI(L) 496, commanded by Lieutenant J. M. Hayes, USNR, was described by Earl Jackson, Seaman 1c.

"We took off the last of the men," Jackson said. "We cut our lines as she began to roll and got away just in time. Within five minutes she went down."

The LCI(L) 496 was behind the ANTHONY about five hundred yards away when she was hit, but at first did not realized that the transport was in trouble.

"We thought we heard an explosion but we couldn't see anything," Jackson said. "Then the ANTHONY began to blink us. We went over to her as soon as we found that she was in trouble."

A number of other ships, including two destroyers were maneuvering to go alongside the transport whose stern was settling slowly.

"We went up to her near the bow on the port side and slammed right alongside. It was a pretty piece of ship handling by the skipper. We just handed our lines across.

"Flame was beginning to come out of her ventilators and the troops were crowded on the deck," Jackson continued. "The seamen on the ANTHONY put a big rope cargo net over the rail. We tied the bottom of this net to our upper rail."

After the net was secured, the troops began to roll, climb, and scramble from the ANTHONY to the LCI(L). One seaman broke his leg coming down but there were no other casualties.

"We had a hard time getting them on. The sea was rolling us around a lot. By the time we had the last of them, the fire had broken through and was blazing on the deck.

"I think we must have taken the last men off because as we backed away, I could see no others on deck. A British destroyer right behind us was leaving at the same time.

"The stern of the ANTHONY went down until the bow was sticking almost straight up. The bow had been dropped and this slowed down the sinking quite a bit. When the bow did go up it was straining at that anchor.

"Finally she went down and disappeared. It took 45 minutes for her to sink, from the time she was hit until she was completely gone."

After ten hours on the hottest beach in Normandy, ten hours spent making hasty temporary repairs under shell fire, LCI(L) 83 backed off the beach, although a 13 foot hole was still unpatched in her side and bottom, and managed to get back to England for dry docking.
The ship beached at 11 a.m. on Omaha beach, set off a teller mine as she was going in, received numerous hits from shells. The crew abandoned her temporarily but returned the afternoon of D day to make enough repairs to save her.

At 8:30 a.m. the LCI(L) 83 was standing into the beach but after three tries to find an opening in the obstacles, gave it up and began to call for small boats to come alongside. "We got one VP alongside," Lieutenant G. F. Hutchinson, USCGR, commanding officer, said. "Right after this boat took 36 men off a shell smashed through the bulwarks, killing three men and wounding 13."

"We were not able to get another boat until an hour later, shortly after ten o'clock. This one took in another 36 men.

"But it became apparent that we would never get unloaded this way. The VPs were just not there. Too many of them had been shot up on the beach. I decided to try a beaching."

Lieutenant (jg) A.-R. Anderson, USCGR, engineering officer, told how they moved the troops up out of the compartments before going into the beach. "We figured we might hit a mine and if we did it was better to have the men on topside."

As the ship went into an apparently clear spot she hit an obstacle and set off the mine they had been fearing.

"This mine blew up through number two troop compartment," Anderson said, "Shrapnel went through four tanks down below. One tank was completely gone — it blew out right on the weld as if someone had cut it with a torch.

"A lot of the force of the mine was taken by the big Chrysler pumper we had on the deck. This pumper toppled over on several men, injuring them. One soldier standing on deck was blown over the side. I saw him struggle to his feet in the shallow water. A burst of machine gun fire cut him down and he floated away.

"A number of soldiers standing on the ladder of number two were injured."

Anderson said the reason they had no explosions in the tanks when the mine went off was that he had cleaned them after pumping the fuel out just before the invasion. A number of other ships did not have time to do this and fire and second explosions were the result when they were hit.

"The damage control party began working right after we got hit," Anderson said. "We had a big hole in the bulkhead between number one and two. We were trying to put a plywood patch on this when the word came to abandon ship."
MOVING IN FOR A LANDING, THE LCI Ran AFOUL OF AN UNDERWATER OBSTRUCTION WHICH TORE A GAPING HOLE IN HER BOW
All of the troops were ashore by this time except the wounded.
The crew carried all these casualties to the beach and turned them over
to the medics working at the water's edge.

"A little cliff was right ahead of us. Most of us dug in there. Hutchinson and I made a trip around the ship before leaving to see that everybody was off.

By one p. m. the ship was dry, the tide having gone out.

"We returned to the ship with some army men to get blankets and food. We threw all the 10 in 1 rations we had over on the sand and all the blankets we could find. The Army picked the stuff up and carried it up the beach."

"The worse thing I saw," Anderson said, "Was the wounded men lying on the beach having chills. We couldn't watch those guys shaking and shivering. We stripped the ship of blankets."

The Army demolition gangs cleared the mines and obstacles from behind and around the ship while the tide was out. "They took long thin sacks of explosives and laid them around the base of the obstacles in a half moon and half buried in the sand. When one went off it would cut the timbers off right at the sand."

"By six that afternoon the machine gun fire had stopped and only shell fire was hitting our sector," Anderson continued. "So we began planning how we were going to save the ship."

The crew was assembled and each man assigned one certain job. One man was to start the pumps going, another to collect plywood for patches, another to pump excess fuel overboard. When the time came there was no confusion.

"At eight p. m. everybody ran back to the ship and began working feverishly. We pumped all excess fuel overboard. We pumped all excess water over. We put a patch over the hole in the bulkhead between one and two."

The tide was well on its way in by this time.

"Number one compartment we were able to pump fairly dry. The patch leaked some, but kept out most of the water. It was impossible to do anything with number two. The hole was 13 feet high and about 7 across. There was no bottom at one spot. We had to leave that compartment flooded."

"Hutchinson said to me 'Do you think it will float?' and I told him 'Sure, let's go!'"
The ship backed off the beach and for fifteen minutes it was breathless work. The bow immediately sank to about seven feet which is pretty deep when you figure that an LCI(L) normally draws about three forward.

The crew began throwing everything overboard that could be detached. Seventy-five cans of foam for fire fighting which had been stored in the bosun locker went over the side. The ammunition for the number one gun was dumped.

"Finally we got her up to about five feet. We had to keep a pump going continuously to keep the water down in number one. Number two was full of water, about three feet deep.

"We tried to use the collision mat over the big hole, more to keep the swells from coming in than anything else, but the water soon ripped it."

A shell had cut the stern anchor cable so there was no trouble about getting the anchor in.

After getting the ship so that it would float, more trouble began.

"We first sent a message to the LCI(L) 87 requesting permission to return to England. The answer came saying that Captain Inlay was on the LCI(L) 492 (he had shifted because the LCI(L) 87 had damaged one screw). We were not able to locate Captain Inlay."

The LCI(L) 83 next sent a message to the USS ANCON, force flagship, but got no answer.

By that time it was dark. So the ship drifted around all that night in the transport area waiting for morning.

"We had to stay up all night pumping to keep her afloat," Anderson said. "At one o'clock we pumped over another 800 gallons of fuel in order to lighten her some more."

The next morning the LCI(L) 83 sent a second message, priority this time, saying - "We are sinking; must return to U. K."

This brought an immediate answer in the form of a tug and two MLs.

"All of our pumps were giving us trouble so we got another pump from the tug.

"The trip back to England began then, with one ML leading, doing the navigating, and the other following in case it was needed to assist the LCI(L) 83."
AS THIS COAST GUARD LCI(L) NOSES INTO A FRENCH INVASION BEACH, A NAZI MINE EXPLODES CLOSE OFF ITS PORT BOW
"We had no trouble crossing the channel. The sea was flat and it was a good thing. Any sort of rough weather would have finished us off," Anderson said.

The ship arrived at Weymouth at three in the morning. To keep her from sinking and to give the exhausted crew some rest, Hutchinson beached her on the sands in front of the Royal Hotel.

One of the best records for salvaging other ships off the beaches of France belongs to LCI(L) 84 of this Flotilla. During a month of service as fire fighter off Omaha beach, this ship was instrumental in saving six ships although she was not designated a salvage ship primarily.

Ships which were assisted by the LCI(L) 84 were: two LCTs, one LBO, one LST, one SC, and one coaster, plus one LCVP.

"On several of these jobs we had to pump all night," Lt. (jg) Howard Hedges, executive officer, said.

"One of our best jobs was the LCT 2037. We found her tied alongside a LST almost sunken. The engine room was flooded, all the quarters were flooded, a number of her platewelds were split. The water was three feet deep in the well deck."

This LCT had landed her troops close to H hour and taken a mine in so doing. One of the officers had his leg blown off. The LCI(L) 84 began pumping around 11 p.m. and kept going all night.

"We slowly gained on the water," Hedges said. "We had six handy billys and our big Chrysler pump going. Our men had to stay down in the flooded compartments to keep the strainers on the hoses clean.

"We were able to tighten up a lot of her deck bolts and stiffen her up a bit."

The next morning the water was down enough for them to make some temporary repairs.

"We backed her up to a tug later that evening and she was towed back to England. I saw her in dry dock later and she was back in action soon."

The LCI(L) 84 put one coaster on the beach which was sinking inside the Mulberry breakwater. She went alongside and began pumping and pushing. The coaster had no engines.

"We pushed her up on the beach at high tide and then were ordered to leave her," Hedges said. "We never did find out what damage she suffered."
WOUNDED BY NAZI MACHINE GUN FIRE BURSTING AT AN LCVP AS IT HIT THE BEACH OF FRANCE, A COAST GUARD Coxswain IS MOVED FROM THE LANDING BARGE TO A COAST GUARD MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT IN THE ENGLISH CHANNEL FOR TREATMENT AND TRANSFER TO ENGLAND
Another LCT was in trouble one day, the LCT 999. She was loaded and sinking about 400 yards off the beach. The water was up over the floor boards of a jeep in her well deck.

"We came alongside her, Hedges reported, "and began pumping and pushing, our usual practice. The pumping did not do much good but we were able to get her far enough up on the beach so that at the next low tide the vehicles were unloaded."

The LCVP which the LCI(L) 84 salvaged came alongside one evening full of water and almost gone. The pumps soon had her dry. A patch was made out of a piece of plywood to cover the long rip discovered in her side.

"We saw those same boys several weeks later and they said they had no trouble with the patch and were still running on it.

"The LBO which we salvaged was fully loaded but her engines were gone. We towed her up on the beach where the shore salvage party took over.

"The English sailors on board did not have food. So we gave them a number of cases of 10 in 1 ration."

The longest pumping job the LCI(L) 84 had was when she was sent to assist the coaster CRAIGSIDE.

The coaster was found about a mile and a half off the beach sinking. She had 13 feet of water in her engine room. "We began pumping her about 10:30 that night," Hedges related. "By 1 a.m. she was lighter and we managed to put her up on the beach. We stayed alongside her until the tide went out. Some of the holes were found and repaired. That afternoon the tide came in and we had to start pumping again."

"We kept it up all that night also and kept pushing her further and further up on the beach. We kept our engines going ahead from midnight until five.

"She was far enough up by the next low tide so we made as many repairs as possible and the salvage crew took over. The whole time we had been pumping, the DUWKs were unloading her. So, by the time she was safe she was completely empty. She had a number of round holes in her bottom. We figured she must have hit some obstructions close into the beach and rolled on them."

That coaster was the longest pumping job the LCI(L) 84 had. The longest patch she made was the one put on the SC 1307. This job was done in cooperation with the LCI(L) 325 also of this Flotilla.
CROSSING THE ENGLISH CHANNEL ABOARD A COAST GUARD "ELSIE" OR(LCI)
AMERICAN SOLDIERS CATCH THEIR K RATIONS AND CELERY SOUP FROM THE TOP OF A 20 MM READY BOX
THE LCI(L) 319

The LCI(L) 319, commanded by Lieutenant F. X. Riley, USCG, is a good example of the vessels in the flotilla. Her duties included putting ashore assault troops on D day, and salvage work right off the beach during a heavy storm. Added to the difficulties of the weather were the darkness and the great weight of the barges. "We drifted into the mine field where the minesweeper TIDE had been sunk," related Lieutenant Riley, "and were in imminent danger of losing the barges on the island of St. Marcouf." They came through, however, and proceeded with their salvage duties.

The LCI(L) 319 was anchored inside Gooseberry (off Utah beach) when her anchor cable parted.

"We began to haul in the cable," Riley said. "Heavy swells forced us into the LCT 499, which was anchored just ahead. The starboard side of our ship repeatedly hit the sharp corners of the LCT causing flooding of the peak tank and number two troop compartment.

"We got out of her way and before it was possible to get steerageway, the wind had forced us into another LCT. This caused a gash in the engineroom and number four troop compartment. All of these holes we shut off with temporary patches as we were heading out of the harbor.

"The opening at the breakwater was treacherous because of the seas. One wave almost forced us against the ships forming the breakwater. Another wave hit us broadside as we were turning into the sea and almost capsized us because of the great deal of water sloshing from side to side.

"The water in number two compartment was two or more feet deep. The damage control party through hard work managed to rig temporary patches and keep it pumped out. These men, James F. Maloney, Jr., C Sp (F), USNT; Robert C Rytle, Slc, USCGR; John A. Tursich, MoMv2c, USCGR; and Lieut. (jg) Milton C. Priebe, USCG, spent over five hours in the water in the compartment which was surging with a violent sea, clearing debris, improvising shoring, keeping it under control.

"The transport BAYFIELD passed us a hawser and we rode behind her until the weather had calmed enough for us to go back to England for repairs."

The LCI(L) 319 salvaged a number of LCVPs the first days off Utah beach and on one occasion put out a fire on a Liberty ship. During an air raid on the night of June 10, the LCI(L) 319 saw this Liberty ship suffer a direct bomb hit. She went alongside and put her fire-fighters to work. This was at 4 a.m. By 4:30 a.m. the fire was out. The LCI(L) stood by until the morning to make sure she would no longer be needed.
BREAKWATER OF SUNKEN SHIPS SHIELDED LANDINGS ON NORMANDY IN VIOLENT STORM
On Utah beach the LCI(L) 319 was one of the salvage vessels working steadily for days.

Lt. W. L. Wade, USNR, on the LCI(L) 490, reported a typical incident in the day's work of that ship.

"We received a message to find LST 133 and give her a tow and whatever assistance was necessary as she had hit a mine. I ordered the LCI(L) 84 to come with us and we began to search for the ship. We looked all over the beach area but saw no sign of her.

"We saw a convoy coming in on the horizon and headed for it. The first ship knew nothing about a LST hitting a mine. We went on down the convoy until we were in the middle. Again we asked and got no information. The last LST in the column told us that one of the convoy had hit a mine and was 22 miles astern of them. So, we went out to her.

"By some chance, we found her. The two LCI(L) s went alongside the LST and towed her the 28 miles into the beach and grounded her in darkness.

"We left her on the beach at midnight and she unloaded. She was not badly damaged but had no engines so we went back the next morning and hauled her off the beach. This time we took her out to one of the block ships in Mulberry and tied her up there.

"You can do almost anything with an LCI(L)," Wade reported. "During the first four days of the invasion, our bell book showed that the engines were idle 11 hours. That is a lot of running."

Every day similar jobs were done by ships of the Flotilla. These few give some idea of what was accomplished.

The gale which practically stopped unloading over the Normandy beaches on 20 June and did tremendous damage to the smaller landing craft was one of the most trying things the LCI(L) 488 had to undergo during the operation, according to Ensign Charles L. Hedrick, and members of the crew.

The ship was inside Port Mulberry, tied alongside one of the sunken ships which formed the outer breakwater of the harbor when the blow reached its climax. The sunken ship was about 22 feet above the LCI affording some protection from the sea.

That afternoon the wind began to work the water into tremendous rollers. "The water was breaking over the top of the sunken ship and coming down 22 feet on top of us," Hedrick said. "It came down with great force and noise. Inside our ship it sounded as if we were a submarine submerging."
Reducing the violence of a storm that blew in upon Normandy invasion operations soon after D Day, a breakwater of sunk freighters shielded Allied landings and cut down the toll of destruction.
The superstructure of the sunken ship began to break away and a long gaping hole appeared amidships as she started to break in half.

The commanding officer, Lieutenant (jg) William T. Butterworth, USNR, saw that it was necessary to move away from the hulk.

To complicate matters, the LCI(L) 488's port engine was not operating. The harbor was crowded almost to saturation with all the small boats from Omaha force and the high wind and sea did not make maneuvering an easy job.

"Somehow we missed hitting anybody after we pulled away," Hedrick said. "After some running around a fairly clear spot was found and the anchor was dropped."

Before getting away from the hulk, a few men of a skeleton crew who were aboard to man the guns, were taken on board the LCI(L) 488.

Coxswain John L. Clements was working on deck with the lines as the men from the block ship were rescued.

"I saw one man washed off his feet on the block ship," Clements reported. "He was washed into the freeboard and hurt, how bad I don't know."

One of the men from the skeleton crew, name unknown, went back to help this injured man.

Clements said that the man had to "climb hand over hand up a line to the other ship." Both of them were later taken off by a small boat also helping rescue the stranded sunken ship crews.

Arthur H. Cathcart, a signalman, spent most of the night on watch on the bridge. He said that the thing that made it so tough in addition to the weather was that "all night long other ships and barges kept breaking from their moorings and drifting heavily through the massed landing craft."

"We were not hit by any of these drifting ships," Cathcart said, "but enough came close to keep us on edge."

Other ships were not so lucky. Lieutenant Grant C. Kidston, USCG, commanding officer of the LCI(L) 322, had something to say about the ships colliding during the storm.

"We arrived off Omaha in the morning with a load of medical personnel, 42 of whom were nurses and 40 of whom were sick. We anchored inside Mulberry around 11:30 a. m. as it was too rough to
COAST GUARDSMEN PACKED TIGHTLY ON THE DECKS OF A COAST GUARD ICI
disembark the load. During the afternoon we were hit by three Rhino ferries, two Rhino tugs, two LCMs, two LBOs, and one coaster. We lost two anchors, all of the bow cable, and all but 75 fathoms of the stern cable.

"We finally unloaded the personnel at the Lobitz pier and went out into the area off the harbor. A British LCT found us and ran across our stern cable. As we then had no anchors, we ran back and forth until the afternoon of the following day when the shuttle control ship took pity on us and sent us back to the United Kingdom.

"The convoy we were returning in was attacked by torpedo bombers at 11:30 p.m. The convoy escort commander, the French corvette L'ADVENTURE, brought down one enemy bomber with one burst of 20 mm just about 1,000 yards off our starboard bow. Other than that no excitement was experienced on the trip."

The LCI(L)s of the Flotilla were escorting convoys of landing craft across the channel from D day on as a part of their routine duties but occasionally the trips could be said to be not so routine as was the case with the LCI(L) 320, commanded by Lieutenant W. K. Scammel, USCGR, on her convoy job of June 11.

Friendly destroyers and enemy E boats were all after the LCI(L) before the night was over.

The convoy, consisting of LCTs, two LCI(L)s, and an English Q boat as navigational guide, departed Southampton the night of June 11, bound for Omaha beach.

"Around 2 a.m., an unknown vessel illuminated three enemy E boats broad on our port bow," Scammel reported. "The Q boat engaged the enemy, opening up with her guns. The E boats returned the fire with 20 mm and 40 mm guns. The three E boats came zooming across our bow and disappeared.

"We did not open fire as the probable result would have been to draw the enemy fire and endanger the troops on board. Neither the escort craft or the E boats seemed to have been damaged by the exchange but the convoy had lost some of its members and now was composed of only two LCTs, two LCI(L)s, and the Q boat. The others had scattered in the darkness.

"We continued on for France."

"Around 3:30 a.m. star shells suddenly broke out above our heads, illuminating the convoy. General quarters was sounded. Shortly afterward a salvo of heavy shells struck broad on our starboard bow about 100 yards off. We increased speed to flank and made a 180 degree
A CASUALTY OF THE HEAVY NAZI FIRE AGAINST THE D DAY INVASION FLEET
COAST GUARD LCI(L)s LOADED WITH TROOPS, LISTS HEAVILY
turn, following this with violent evasive action. The shelling con-
tinued for ten minutes with the salvos falling all around us. The
convoy really scattered this time and when the shelling had stopped,
we kept maneuvering to stay out of the area illuminated by the star
shells.

"We sighted a destroyer approaching us at 4:30 a. m., the
DD 461, and secured from general quarters. What had happened, apparently,
was that the convoy had been set about twelve miles to the east of the
convoy route and the destroyer had taken us for E boats.

"She escorted us to Omaha beach as part payment for the scare.

"We discovered that we had been hit by shell fragments. There
was one hole in the deck house and several stanchions had been severed."

THE LCI(L) 85

Unloading of the Coast Guard-manned LCI 85 had to be stopped
because the living could not climb over the dead. Taking the beach to
the east of the Caretán estuary was a grim affair for the American
troops and the amphibious craft transporting them, on June 6, the day
the sea-borne landings in France began. Lt. (jg) Coit T. Hendley, Jr.,
USCGR, Commanding Officer of the LCI reported, "I want to describe
what happened, without exaggeration, so you can know what our soldiers
suffered in taking that beach and getting it organized.

"Going into the beach, this craft hit a mine, careened
through a jumble of beach defenses, finally got her ramps down for the
troops to disembark. Before the unloading was completed, a cross fire
of German 88's, machine guns and sniper fire blew one ramp off, killed
15 men, wounded another 40, and set her blazing in three compartments.
Two hours after the original assault was the scheduled time for the
ship to hit the beach. On board was a mixed group of Navy and Army
men whose job was to get the beach cleared of obstacles, mark beach
exits, and handle the unloading of the amphibious craft as they came
into the beach.

"Approaching the beach from the transport area, no sign of
trouble was seen. There were flashes from the warships, ferreting out
gun emplacements. There were the usual black puffs of shellfire on
the water's edge itself. The beach itself seemed calm enough. Other
ships were on the beach, and the area just off the beach was crowded
with craft. As I was concentrated on our beaching problem, I saw little
of what was happening to others. The obstacles could be seen plainly.
They were thick over the whole of the beach, with small Teller mines
attached to most of them. Some were submerged, some half out of water.
"The only thing to do was to pick a likely spot and ram through. The ship headed in at around 12 knots. The thud of underwater obstacles could be felt on the bottom and sides of the ship. As the bow grounded, a mine exploded, ripping a hole in the forward part of the ship. One ramp went over, and a seaman went down it to the beach with a heavy line. This line was to assist the troops as they waded ashore through the waist-deep water. The soldiers started down the ramp and trouble began.

"The 88's began hitting the ship. The shells tore into the troop compartments. They exploded on the exposed deck. They smashed through the massed men trying to get down the ramp. Machine guns opened up. Men were hit and men were mutilated. There was no such thing as a minor wound. When the shells hit they blew off arms, legs, and heads. The guns seemed to concentrate on the forward part of the ship, and so well did they do their work that unloading was stopped because it was impossible to get past the pile of dead and wounded. Finally a hit finished off the ramp.

"At this stage of the fighting on the beach, the first assault troops were still on the water's edge, having gained only 20 or 30 yards during the first two hours. The Germans were machine gunning and shelling the beach continuously. According to a statement later issued by General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, Allied ground forces commander, at the end of the first day the soldiers had gained only about 100 yards. No heavy equipment was landed (this was from personal observation) and it was actually the end of the second day before the troops had forced their way back into the high ground and the naval guns had pounded the cement fortifications enough to make the beach secure for unloading.

"While the ship was standing off the beach about 100 yards, where she had backed after her ramp was destroyed, the damage control party began fighting the fires which had started in her three forward compartments, while the Army doctors on board and the Coast Guard's pharmacists' mates began doing what they could for the wounded. Small boats from the large transports came alongside and finished unloading the men who had not been able to get ashore. Luckily the fires were caught in time. The ship had a list from the water coming in through the shell holes. A check showed approximately 15 men dead and 40 wounded.

"The ship had been hit about 25 times. A leg was lying on the deck of the radio room. A shell had exploded, wrecking all the equipment and mangling the man in the room. One of the crew dragged him out of the mess and he will be all right except for the leg. The deck was so slick with blood and cluttered with bits of flesh and dead and mutilated men that it was difficult to move from one part of the ship to another. There is no need to describe all the pitiful cases. They were there and no one will ever forget."
IN A CAREFULLY PLANNED OPERATION CARRIED THROUGH IN THE WAKE OF THE LIBERATION DAY LANDINGS, COAST GUARD OFFICERS HELPED SUPERVISE THE "SCUTTLING" OF 23 FREIGHTERS LOADED WITH CEMENT, TO FORM AND IMPROVISED BREAKWATER BEHIND WHICH LANDING CRAFT WERE UNLOADED ON THE NORMANDY BEACH
"The ship made it out to the transport area, 10 miles from the beach, taking water slowly. Our emergency pumps could not keep ahead of the water. The wounded and dead were transferred to the transport by cargo boom. The Army medics and doctors who had stayed to help with the casualties climbed into a small boat furnished by the transport and headed for the beach they had just left. They took their equipment and said nothing. They knew they were needed on the beach. How many of them are living now I do not know.

"The ship backed away from the transport and a salvage tug came alongside to determine whether she could be saved. But even their pumps could not keep up with the water. Slowly she settled by the bow and finally began to turn on her side. The crew scrambled up on the tug, and she went over. She floated for a while, her stern just showing. The tug sent over a small boat with a demolition charge to finish her off. The charge went off, and that was the end of one LCI."

ARTIFICIAL HARBORS — CODE NAMED "MULBERRY" *

The idea of artificial harbors was born at the Quebec Conference, where Roosevelt and Churchill planned the invasion of Europe with their Joint Chiefs of Staff. The ground forces were sure they could seize an invasion beachhead. But holding it was another matter. Intelligence reports showed clearly that the Germans had fortified each port suitable for an invasion base, so that it would take weeks or even months to capture it — weeks during which bad weather might at any time bring our offensive to a standstill. We needed a port for a prolonged invasion; we needed a prolonged invasion to seize a port. So the military leaders decided to build their own ports. An overall plan called for the construction of two artificial harbors — code named "Mulberry."

The Army gave the following timetable of what they wanted in the way of harbors:

- **D-plus-2.** Shelter for half a mile of coastline and one thousand tons of small craft.

- **D-plus-7.** Shelters behind which coasters could unload onto ferry craft, regardless of weather.

- **D-plus-14.** Sheltered water for seventeen coasters plus seven pierheads, plus one motor transport pier for LSTs to send their vehicles directly ashore.

Plus, as soon as possible, a harbor for large ships to discharge their cargoes into lighters.

* See "Battle Report" by Karig

- 175 -
Freight cars of the Army Transportation Corps emerge from the steel jaws of a Coast Guard manned LST resting on the French beach.
"GOOSEBERRY"  For the small-craft shelter, which had to go in right on the heels of the actual landing, they took an old idea and turned it inside out. Sunken ships had been used in the past to block ports; now it was proposed to use them to build one. Ships could go across under their own power; a line of them sunk end to end along the 15-foot line would form an excellent shelter close inshore. The ship shelters were given the code name of "Gooseberry."

"PHOENIX"  For the larger harbor the experts took a half-forgotten idea and expanded it enormously. Sunken ships couldn't be used: the water where the breakwater had to go in would be so deep that they would be covered at high tide. So the engineers proposed a portable breakwater made up of sections, which could be floated over and then sunk in place. These sections were to be huge, concrete caissons, in assorted sizes, the largest being 60 feet high and weighing many tons, as much as many an ocean freighter. According to the code, one of these units was a "Phoenix."

" WHALES"  In order that the lighters might unload and the LSTs discharge their vehicles directly to the shore, piers - once more, portable - were needed. Fortunately a design for these was ready. The British War Office had developed a floating steel pier similar to a pontoon bridge in principle, known as the Loebnitz pier. This pier had a steel scow for a head, resting on an ingenious arrangement of steel stilts at the four corners so that it could rise and fall with the tide while remaining firmly fixed in place. These "spuds" could be lifted while the head was being towed, giving the scow a vague resemblance to a Mississippi River steamer.

OFFICERS CITED FOR PART IN CREATING ARTIFICIAL HARBORS

Six Coast Guard Lieutenants received letters of commendations for work in connection with creating artificial harbors of refuge off beaches in the Bay of the Seine during the invasion of France. The Lieutenants are: Kenneth M. Barnett, Charles O. O'Reilly, William H. Maddox, Benjamin F. Lombard, Duncan W. Herr, and Herbert E. Mister.

In six identical letters the Coast Guard officers, whose average experience in the service was 17 years and who were given temporary commissions from warrant officers, were advised they "exhibited outstanding ability and devotion to duty in preparation for and execution of the mission assigned this Task Force," and the their "contribution to the successful accomplishment of the mission on time and without casualty is a credit to the United States Navy." The commendations were issued by Captain A. D. Clark, USN.
THE LCIs -- THOSE STAUNCH LANDING CRAFT THAT CARRY OUR BOYS THROUGH INVASION WATERS TO ENEMY BOATS
Ships to which the six officers were assigned arrived at the Normandy beachhead in three groups. Two groups were to be planted during the first two tides while the other group would be sunk at the third tide.

Owing to strong currents the operation took two days. At times ships placed in position were turned completely around by the current. Altogether 23 ships with an average tonnage of 8,000 tons were sunk. Except for a four-hour interval, when searchlights were shut off for fear of attracting the Luftwaffe, the men worked continually to complete the operation.

Work was expedited despite shell fire from shore batteries. Bulkheads had previously been cut out, sandbag ballast had been properly stowed and charges placed. Once the ships were in place it took only from four to six minutes to sink them.

Before the breakwater was completed, unloading of an LST took from 24 to 48 hours. With the new dock the ships were unloaded in 55 minutes.

Lieutenant O'Reilly's experience as a task unit commander in taking his ship into the beach paralleled that of many Coast Guardsmen.

Proceeding in with the ship an enemy seaplane dropped either torpedoes or bombs which resulted in considerable damage although there was no direct hit. Water poured into the vessel and could not be pumped out. So full speed was ordered. Without delay the ship was guided to its designated position and sunk.

**CAPTURE OF CHERBOURG**

Once the invasion of France had begun, large ports had to be opened for the use of the Allies in order for them to handle the immense amount of war materiel necessary for the rapid and successful advance inland. Commander Quentin R. Walsh, USCG, was detached from his duty with the Hearing Units and assigned to be the Commanding Officer of a Navy reconnaissance party. In the following commendation, praising his officers and men, Commander Walsh reviews the facts surrounding the splendid accomplishments of the reconnaissance party.
LIBERATED FRENCHMEN, RETURNING TO THE RUINS OF CHERBOURG, BROWSING THOUGH A SALVAGE DEPOT TO GATHER UP WHAT'S LEFT OF THEIR PERSONAL BELONGINGS
THE COMMANDANT
Refer to file: CG650

18 August, 1945

From: Officer in Charge, Combined Reconnaissance Party, U. S. Navy
To: Unit CTU 127.2.8

Subj: Commendation

1. You were one of the handpicked members of a group of volun-
teers of the Reconnaissance Party activated on 21 April, 1944, at Base
Two, The Clyde, Scotland, for the purpose of opening large ports to
handle the immense amount of war materiel necessary to the rapid and suc-
cessful advance of the Allied forces, once the invasion of France had begun.

2. You first underwent an intensive and rigorous course of training,
and then from the tenth of June when you landed in France until late
September, 1944, you were on duty seven days a week under the most arduous
conditions, involving combat reconnaissance work and the operation of
Cherbourg. You were subjected to bombing almost every night and to 88-
millimeter fire while near the beaches. Advance elements of the Party
were strafed by enemy planes, shelled, and subject to sniper fire while
moving through territory still held by enemy units.

3. Your group was the first of the Naval forces to enter the ports
of Cherbourg, Le Havre, St. Malo, Roscoff, Morlaix, Carantec, and Brest,
and in penetrating the eastern half of Cherbourg you engaged in active
street fighting.

4. The Reconnaissance Party performed all the duties necessary in
carrying out the Navy's responsibilities in co-operating with the Army,
and in aiding to put these vital ports into quick and efficient operation.

5. Much of the success of the operation as a whole depended on the
courage and skill of each man who made up the Party. As Officer in
Charge, I consider your conduct and performance throughout most praise-
worthy, and take pleasure in commending you highly for your actions,
which were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Naval Service.

6. A copy of this letter will be forwarded to the Chief of Naval
Personnel to be made a part of your official record.

QUENTIN R. WALSH
Commander, USCG
Officer in Charge
Combined Reconnaissance Party
U. S. Navy Unit, CTU 127.2.8
The story of Commander Walsh's exploit is told in the following citation.

In the name of the President of the United States, it gives me great pleasure to award this Navy Cross to:

Commander
Quentin R. Walsh,
United States Coast Guard

CITATION

"For heroism and conspicuous bravery in the performance of his assigned mission as Commanding Officer of the U.S. Naval party reconnoitering the naval facilities and naval arsenal at Cherbourg on 26 and 27 June 1944."

While in command of a specially trained U. S. Naval reconnaissance party, Commander Walsh entered the port of Cherbourg, France, and with inspiring leadership, professional skill and conspicuous heroism penetrated the eastern half of the city, engaging in active street fighting with the enemy. While advancing through areas still subject to enemy fire and leading his party through scattered pockets of resistance, Commander Walsh accepted the surrender of and disarmed approximately four hundred of the enemy force at the Naval Arsenal and later received the unconditional surrender of approximately three hundred and fifty officers and men, at the same time releasing fifty two captured U. S. Army paratroopers who were held prisoner in the fort. His aggressive leadership and outstanding heroism were instrumental in the surrender of the last inner fortress of the Cherbourg arsenal and considerable expedited the occupation of the arsenal and its use by the Allied forces.

The exceptionally meritorious service performed by Commander Walsh in action against the enemy was in keeping with the highest traditions of initiative, aggressiveness and offensive spirit of the United States Naval Service."

/s/ HAROLD R. STARK.
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in Europe.

Commander Walsh later became chief officer for the Cherbourg port occupational forces, aiding in carrying out plans he previously had drafted in England.

Arriving in Britain nearly a year before D-day, the Coast Guard officer served with a Merchant Marine Hearing Unit. In August, 1943, he was transferred to duty with the Navy in the logistics and planning section. Here, he wrote plans for occupation and operation of the port of Cherbourg, and worked out details for a Navy reconnaissance party for use in the assault on the port.
Sailing for France with his party on June 8, Commander Walsh joined up with an Army headquarters unit at St. Mere Eglise two days later. On June 26, he moved into Cherbourg with a company which had been ordered to take ammunition to a besieged platoon near Gare maritime. After house-to-house fighting in Cherbourg streets, Commander Walsh and his party reached the harbor waterfront and established temporary naval headquarters -- the first in the port.

Early the following morning, Commander Walsh, a Seabee Lieutenant, and a party of his men entered the naval arsenal on a reconnaissance mission and succeeded in taking 400 German prisoners.

Entering Fort du Homet under a flag of truce, the Coast Guard officer negotiated unconditional surrender of the fort, and turned 350 Nazi officers and men over to the U. S. Army. Fifty-two American paratroopers were released.

After acting as chief staff officer at Cherbourg, Commander Walsh on July 15 became assistant port director, aiding in administering the work involved in rehabilitating the port for use by Allied shipping.

His reconnaissance duties later took him to St. Malo, Brest, Le Havre, and back to Cherbourg, where he was hospitalized as a result of combat fatigue. He returned to the United States October 2, 1944.

One story of how Commander Walsh took hundreds of Germans prisoners, while his own little party numbered only eleven, refers to him as the "Pied Piper of Hamelin," apparently because he had only to appear and he was followed by hundreds. While the battle of Cherbourg was raging, the Commander set out one morning with an eleven-man reconnaissance party. The Coast Guard officer and his party strode boldly into a naval arsenal and induced four hundred German warriors to surrender. One of the Americans said in effect, "Here's a kraut that speaks English, Commander." "Let's have a talk with him," said Commander Walsh, according to this story.

The Germans apparently were dubious about the ability of the Americans to capture the arsenal. "So, you don't think we'll take Fort du Homet?" Commander Walsh is reported to have asked. To this the German replied, "Der fort is impregnable! Your paratroopers haff already tried and failed. Fifty-two are prisoners there."

"All the more reason for us to take it," said Commander Walsh. Then he commanded the German to follow instructions, saying, "Since you know where the land mines are, you'll lead the way!" So authoritative was his manner that the Nazi could only obey.

Outside Fort du Homet, an American Navy Lieutenant whispered, "We have only eleven men, Commander, We'll never be able to break in."
ON THE ROAD TO CHERBOURG SHORTLY BEFORE THE FALL OF THE FRENCH PORT TO AMERICAN TROOPS
FIRST ARMORED UNITS PASS THROUGH THE RUINS OF SHELL-SHATTERED VALOGENES
"Ever play poker, Lieutenant?" quizzed Commander Walsh. "How about a good bluff?" Then he commanded, "Get a white flag up."

A short time later, two Germans came out of the fort with a white flag. "Good!" exclaimed the Commander. "Come on, Lieutenant, I think the battle is half won."

Under the flag of truce, the Coast Guard party entered the fort. A German officer then said to Commander Walsh, "You raised a white flag. You are my prisoner, hein?" To this, the Commander calmly replied, "You're a little mixed up, Colonel, it is you who are my prisoner!" And to the astonished German superman, Commander Walsh then announced, "The terms are unconditional surrender! I have eight hundred men placed strategically to back up my demands."

"Since you outnumber us," said the German, "I haff no alternative and will release your prisoners."

That evening, Commander Walsh and his small band returned to the American lines with the day's bag of seven hundred and fifty German prisoners.

**SUMMARY OF COMMANDER WALSH'S DUTIES**

Commander Walsh, while assigned to the Logistics and Planning Section, U.S. Naval Forces in London, organized Far-Side Ports to enable the Allies to operate after the capture of these ports from Germany, devoting intensive study to determine their capacities for handling cargo. He wrote the plans for the occupation and operations of the ports of Le Havre, Rouen, and Cherbourg, arranging for the allocation of personnel and materials at captured ports, and for the logistics support of such ports, and as Chief Staff and Operations Officer with Commander Ports under Task Force 127, supervised all planning of logistics. While in command of a specially trained U.S. Navy Reconnaissance Party, he entered the Port of Cherbourg, and without thought of personal safety, and with inspiring leadership, engaged in street fighting with the enemy. While reconnoitering areas still subject to enemy resistance, he accepted the surrender of 400 officers and men at the Naval Arsenal in Cherbourg, and later received the unconditional surrender of 350 officers and men at Fort du Homet, releasing 52 captured United States paratroopers. When his senior officer was killed, he assumed command of a reconnaissance party and carried out preliminary surveys of Roscoff, Morlaix, Brest, and Le Havre.

**ACCOUNT OF COMMANDER WALSH**

I arrived in England in July, 1944, and was assigned to duty at Gourack, the Clyde, Scotland, I remained on duty in the Clyde until
ROLLING STOCK FOR INVASION, INCLUDING TRUCKS, JEEPS, AND AMBULANCES RIDE THE TOP TANK DECK OF A COAST GUARD LST (LANDING SHIP TANKS) ON D-DAY INVASION SWEEP ACROSS THE ENGLISH CHANNEL TO THE NORMANDY COAST BEACHHEAD.
September, 1944, at which time I was transferred to the Staff of Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in Europe, Admiral Stark, for duty in the Planning and Logistics Section, Navy Headquarters, Grosvenor Square, London, England. Captain Neils Dietrick, USN, was in charge of the section.

The Planning and Logistics Section at this time was charged with establishing Naval bases in England, preparing the training facilities to be employed by the U. S. Navy and in preparing for the Naval phase of Europe.

I was assigned to various projects which included "Mulberry A" (artificial Port), Pluto (fuel line under the channel) the organization of Far Side Ports, the Division of Responsibility Between the Army and Navy in Far Side Ports, and the Determination of the Cargo Capacity of Ports of Northwest Europe. This required a study of all the ports of Europe from Bordeaux, France to Holland.

Eventually I was assigned specifically to the organization of Far Side Ports. This required the determination of the number of men to operate a port after capture, the amount and type of equipment to be employed, and all phases in conjunction with establishing a naval base in a combat area. It was necessary to make a complete study of the facilities of each port, the amount of cargo that could be discharged, the depth of water, tidal range, the number of ships that could enter, the type and number of landing aircraft that could be accommodated, the number and size of tugs that would be necessary in receiving ships and moving them. One of the toughest problems occurred when Commander A. L. Stanford, Lieutenant Colonel Scott and I were assigned to determine initially the capacity of "Mulberry." It was absolutely essential that this port take at least 5,000 tons of cargo a day or there was no use to build it. One whole day was consumed in completing this study, and arriving at a definite conclusion. Official reports had to be submitted setting forth our finding. Another tough job occurred when I was assigned to lay out the anchorages for Cherbourg Harbor. It had been determined that at least twelve cargo ships of the liberty class had to be berthed in Cherbourg at the same time to provide adequate tonnage to support the operations. This was the minimum number of ships that could be employed. After the assignment of Captain Clark to take command of the "Mulberry" project, I no longer had anything to do with that phase of planning.

In October, 1943, I was assigned with Captain Ives to represent the U. S. Navy in Portsmouth, England, working out a plan that provided for certain operations, in case certain contingencies should arise on the continent. This plan has never been divulged. General Huebner represented the U. S. Army and Admiral Vian represented the Royal Navy. This plan was completed by 10 January, 1944, and was ready for operation.

In November, 1943, I was assigned as Chief Staff Officer to Captain Ives, Commander Advanced Bases. This duty involved the writing of the plan for the occupation of Cherbourg and covered all phases necessary to operate and protect the port. The plan was commenced in January,
COAST GUARD MANNED LST HEADS INTO FRENCH COAST
1943, and completed on April, 1944. It was later modified for employment at Le Havre and other captured ports.

In December, 1943, it was necessary that I make the strongest recommendation to have Naval Units brought from the United States to operate various ports on the French coast in case certain operations were to be undertaken. Captain Ives was out of London at the time and a certain plan had been adopted for operation. Admiral Planean was reluctant to do this at the time, but eventually agreed that the recommendation was sound. As a result the Drew Units consisting of approximately 1,200 men were brought over in January, 1944, from the United States and sent to Base 2, Scotland, for further training. Previous to this time the Navy had considered undertaking any necessary operation by transferring men from England to France when necessary. I was against this idea from the beginning. The situation would have been chaotic if an effort was made to move all U. S. Navy Bases and personnel from England to France and try to operate in England and France at the same time. They decided finally to bring in additional personnel to operate captured ports in France on my recommendation.

Upon completion of the plan to operate Cherbourg during operation Overlord, phase Neptune, I wrote the plan for the U. S. Navy Reconnaissance Party that was to enter Cherbourg with the Army. This plan was commenced and completed in April, 1944.

Lieutenant Robert C. Banister, USNR, 149654, had been initially assigned by Captain Ives to command the Reconnaissance Party. This officer had commenced training with the Royal Marine Commandos on the south coast of England in January, 1944. In April, 1944, Captain Ives ordered me to take command of the Reconnaissance Party. I was thereupon detached from the Staff of Commander, 12th Fleet and assigned to the Staff of Commander, Task Force 122, Admiral Kirk. My duties being completed in London on 16 April, 1944, I was charged with the responsibility for organizing and training the Reconnaissance Party. The routine for training was drawn up and under the supervision of Colonel Strihler, 28th Division, 3rd Army, the program was placed in effect 24 April, 1944, at Base 2, Scotland. It consisted of various forms of combat training, including the use of bazookas, hand grenades, small arms training, rough and tumble fighting, house to house fighting, map reading, etc. The routine commenced at 0500 daily and terminated at 2200. The training was carried out on the Moors in Scotland, in the vicinity of Base and was completed 22 May, 1944, when the party went into bivouac at Loch Lomond to await departure for the south of England.

The Reconnaissance Party had been selected from personnel attached to the Drew Units at Base 2. Approximately 200 men and officers commenced the essential training. Eventually the officers and men were eliminated until the final party of 55 officers and men were selected. Lieutenant Commander Jack Kearley was assigned
(FRANCE) 14/6/44 TWO AMERICAN SOLDIERS LIE DEAD BESIDE THEIR JEEP STRUCK BY ENFILADING NAZI MACHINE GUN FIRE, AS IT ROLLED DOWN RAMP OF A COASTGUARD LANDING CRAFT. (COASTGUARD FOTO) SIGNAL CORPS RADIO TELEPHONE FROM LONDON. #889
as Executive Officer.

On 23 May, 1944, the Reconnaissance Party departed Base 2, Scotland and arrived Southampton, England, 25 May, 1944. On 26 May, I reported to Naval Headquarters, Plymouth, England, for final instructions from Admiral Wilkes and Admiral Moon, Task Unit No. 127.2.8 was assigned to the Reconnaissance Party. On 28 May, I reported to General Lawton J. Collins, in command of 7th Corp., U. S. Army. I reported to the General that my orders from Captain Ives instructed me to land the Reconnaissance Party over Beach Utah on D-day. General Collins informed me that two more German Divisions had been thrown into the Normandy area, and instead of capturing Cherbourg on D-8, he could not capture it until D-15. He therefore revised my orders, that I was to land with my Reconnaissance Party some time between D-2 and D-4, depending upon the priority that was to be assigned in the lift.

When I reported to General Collins he asked me to confirm the attachment to my command of the 250 Royal Marine Commandos that had been ordered to my command at the request of the Royal Navy. I was to have administrative control over these troops while the Army was to exert operational control.

On arriving in Southampton the Reconnaissance Party bivouacked in Area "B", Camp Cadnam approximately 6 miles west of Southampton, and remained there until 3 June, 1944. While in this area preparations were completed for departure from England. All motor vehicles were water-proofed, supplies checked and inspection of men and equipment was made. The unit departed Camp Cadnam on 4 June for the marshalling area. On 8 June, 1944, the party departed the marshalling area and boarded the Liberty ship, JAMES A. FARRELL, with all vehicles and equipment, "K" rations were fed during the voyage. The vessel departed Southampton 9 June, 1944, and arrived off Beach Utah, Normandy, France, 10 June, 1944. Personnel and equipment proceeded to debark immediately, vehicles being landed via LCI. Six jeeps hit shell holes causing them to wash out. All vehicles and equipment were landed by sunset 10 June, 1944. Part of the Reconnaissance Party proceeded to the marshalling area just east of St. Marie du Mont, while the rest of the unit stayed in the vicinity of Beach Utah to await low water to recover the vehicles caught in shell holes. The Army issued orders to dig fox holes and make preparations to withstand German paratrooper attack or enemy shelling. In the early evening we sustained terrific air attacks by German planes. Personnel in the vicinity of Beach Utah experienced no casualties, but the personnel in the vicinity of St. Marie du Mont suffered two casualties, they being Lieutenant (jg) Brassard and L. A. Jones, Rm 1/c.

The British Commandos suffered 123 casualties out of 250 men.
French Caets covered with dust from Yank Trucks and guns mooring through St. Laurent sur Mer just behind the Normandy Beachhead.
The party was completely assembled 15 June, 1944. All equipment and supplies were checked and the personnel were briefed completely for the operations that were to be undertaken.

I reported to the 7th Corp. Headquarters near St. Mere-Eglise, to Colonel King for duty. Colonel King offered me any facilities that the Army had available to carry out my mission for entering Cherbourg. The 7th Corp. was composed of the 4th Division on the right flank. The 90th Division was held in reserve. I advised Colonel King that I would work with the corps Headquarters as they approached Cherbourg, detaching my command from the 7th Corp. and going with the Division that would enter Cherbourg first. Colonel King approved this plan, and the Reconnaissance Party carried it out accordingly.

On 21 June, 1944, we were two miles north of Montebourg, just off route 13, our Headquarters being in farm house. On 22 June, 1944, I took a party of 21 officers and men and moved up to Delasse to await the outcome of the ultimatum that General Collins had delivered to Cherbourg to surrender. The surrender was to take place at noon 22 June, 1944. The Germans did not capitulate so the advanced party at Delasse took a terrific strafing and shelling from enemy outfits. The only thing I got out of this sojourn was six fresh eggs, that I got out of a dog house. Party was under terrific fire for approximately two hours, between the hours of 1100 and 1300, 23 June, 1944. The party dropped back to the vicinity of Montebourg at approximately 1600, 23 June, 1944.

On 25 June, 1944, it was apparent that the fall of Cherbourg was imminent. On the evening of 25 June, 1944, I took Lieutenant George LaVallee (234690), USNR, and four men and reconnoitered well into the 79th Division area going almost to Fort Du Roule. The information was that the troops would commence to enter Cherbourg on 26 June, 1944. On 26 June, 1944, I took Richard M. Boucher (209-09-94), SM3/c and Edward Perry (815-01-46), Y2/c and checked in at the 79th Division Headquarters. At 0400, I was advised that they were jumping off on the attack at 0600. I departed Division Headquarters at 0600 with Boucher and Perry and proceeded down route 13 until we found it blocked by shell holes and debris. It was necessary to cut to the east and proceed over through the fields and through a large farm to the east of the main highway. It was in the vicinity of this farm that we came in contact with the German forces. We waited until about 0900 until the Germans had been cleared out, we then proceeded to the vicinity of Fort du Roule. Inquiry was made at a command post as to the possibilities of getting into the town. I was advised that Company "G" of the 314th Infantry, 79th Division was departing in few minutes to carry rifle grenades to an outfit that had been stopped by the Germans. We moved into Cherbourg with Company "G" which had been ordered to bring rifle grenades to a besieged platoon near Care Maritime.
ALONG THE WATERFRONT AT CHERBOURG
At approximately 1100 we came out of a side street into Rue-de-Paris. At this time we commenced street fighting which lasted until 6 o'clock that evening. It was impossible to get across the canal which was on the left side of Rue-de-Paris. The Germans had machine guns zeroed on the intersection of Rue-de-Paris and the canal bridge that led to the west and main part of town. At least five men were killed and fifteen wounded at this intersection during the afternoon's fighting. Although the American forces had captured the upper part of Fort de Roule, the Germans still had control of the lower section which had been built into a hill. The result was that we were confronted with rifle and machine guns ahead and .88 fire from behind. It took us approximately six hours to travel the distance of about a mile. We reached the waterfront at approximately 1700, 26 June, 1944, and made an immediate reconnaissance of the area in the vicinity. At that time a message was sent that the Quai Normandy Que France was completely demolished with heavy debris but that the west side of the Care Maritime was in fair condition. Blockships were at the entrance to Darse Atlantique and Avant Port de Commerce. The arsenal was burning with indications of severe damage while the Nouvelle place was partly blocked but usable. Reconnaissance had been restricted to the eastern half of the port by sniping and machine gun fire.

Boucher, Perry and I were the first U. S. Navy personnel to enter Cherbourg. The situation existing at this time was that U. S. forces held the eastern half of the town and the Germans held the west. The arsenal was completely afame and it was impossible to move any great distance because of snipers and pockets of enemy resistance. The remainder of the reconnaissance party was brought into Cherbourg about 2000, 26 June, 1944, and bivouaced in a house at the foot of Rue-de-Paris. At approximately 2300 that night I was awakened by the challenge of a sentry outside of the house which was followed immediately by angry voices. On investigation I found out that the men had intercepted a German soldier dressed as a civilian. He was armed with several knives and a German Naval pass was found in his purse. He had approximately one-half bushel of silk stockings in a pack that he carried on his shoulder. Because of the severe casualties that had been suffered by American forces during the day the men wanted to shoot him immediately. However, I passed the man to the custody of the officer-in-charge of the sentries for safe guarding until he was turned over to the military police at daylight the next morning.
The radio section of the Reconnaissance Party had set up the communication truck south of Fort de Roule at approximately 1900, 26 June, 1944. We therefore had communications with the Commander Allied Naval Forces and Commander Task Forces 122. On 28 June, 1944, the Reconnaissance Party carried out the following duties in Cherbourg:

1. Carried out a water survey of the harbor while the area was still subject to enemy resistance and sniper fire, locating numerous wrecks and obstructions.

2. Installed communications facilities consisting of a radio station, signal station, and harbor entrance control post.

3. Reconnoitered and took over building that eventually became headquarters for Commander, U. S. Navy Advanced Bases, France, the Port Commander, and the Port Director, and their staffs.

4. Reconnoitered and requisitioned garages, officers' billets, barracks storage spaces, and work shops to expedite the occupation and rehabilitation of the port by U. S. Naval Forces.

5. Provided transportation for naval personnel in the form of jeeps and trucks ashore, and waterside transportation in the form of "ducks," requisitioned from the Army.

6. Interrogated prisoners, located and charted the mine fields in the harbor, and determined the extent of the swept channel in the Grande Rade, which was found to extend approximately 150 meters south of the digues.

7. Reconnoitered and determined the damage done to discharging facilities and wharves and piers for ships, also the amount of water along side these accommodations. Made an over-all estimate of the damage done to the port and its waterside facilities referring specifically to the damage done to Gare Maritime and naval arsenal and the waterside facilities in the vicinity of the naval arsenal.

8. Established a first-aid station.

9. Reconnoitered and determined the feasibility of rehabilitating the oil installations in the port or the possibility of constructing new installations for Naval activities at the port.

10. Established temporary naval headquarters, performing all the duties necessary in carrying out the Navy's responsibilities in cooperation with the Army and maintaining liaison with French Navy, the mayor, and other persons in responsible positions declared reliable by intelligence.

Lieutenant Jesse Stodghill (222347), USNR, was in charge of the personnel that made the waterside survey. Lieutenant Lavallee was in charge of the organization that surveyed the town for billets. Lieutenant Herman acted as duty officer at the established headquarters, at Place Napoleon.
CHERBOURG BREAKWATER BUILT BY NAPOLEON THE FIRST AND THIRD AND USED AS A FORTRESS
At approximately 0800, 28 June, 1944, I took Lieutenant Lauer and about 15 men armed with sub-machine guns and hand grenades to reconnoiter the arsenal area and determine how much of the waterside area had been damaged. On entering the arsenal we found about 25 soldiers holding some German prisoners and disarming some more enemy soldiers in pill boxes and bunkers. We picked up a German sailor who could understand a little bit of English and who had worked at the Naval arsenal for three years. He was advised that he was to act as our guide, that he was to inform us where mines were and where booby traps had been placed. He was informed that if there was any doubt as to the existence of these dangers, he was to go first and investigate. He assured me that there were no booby traps in the arsenal area, but he did inform us there were more mines in the harbor than there was water. We proceeded into the arsenal approximately one-half mile and were examining some fuel tanks when a machine gun opened up off to the left. We immediately took cover awaiting developments. The German sailor at this time told us that there were many pockets of resistance all over the arsenal that refused to surrender to anybody, most of the men being drunk. After waiting about one-half hour and deciding not to locate the position of the machine gun we decided to proceed. We had only gone on a few 100 yards when some Germans were sighted in the vicinity of a bunker. We took cover immediately. One of the Germans came toward us with his hands clasped behind his head and advised us that a Captain and 200 men decided to surrender. The German sailor acted as our interpreter.

We told the man to go back and bring out the men who were to advance with their hands behind their head. They did this and were immediately searched. Four men were designated to march these men back to the arsenal gate. After killing several snipers while carrying out our reconnaissance, about 200 more prisoners were taken in the course of the next two hours. A large number of prisoners were taken in a bunker near the power house in the arsenal. These men refused to surrender at first but a hand grenade thrown into the bunker entrance by Lieutenant Lauer changed their opinions. A small group of prisoners were taken near the E-boat pens that had been blown up. A craft of some description was burning in the water end of the pens, creating such a dense smoke it was impossible to approach it. The prisoners explained that the pens had been destroyed by piling about sixty torpedo war heads in one end and then setting them off. The pens had concrete walls about four feet thick and an overhead about eight feet thick. We passed through the pens about 1000 o'clock. It is believed Lieutenant Commander Kearley was killed by snipers in this pen about 1130, because Lauer and I heard firing in this vicinity when in the vicinity of Fort du Homet. The enlisted personnel that had accompanied us had been sent back with the prisoners. Lieutenant Lauer and I proceeded to check the oil installations in the vicinity of the dry dock and to determine what was left of the diques in the harbor area. It was in
SUPPOSEDLY IMPREGNABLE CONCRETE PILL BOX IN CHEEBURGH HARBOR KNOCKED OUT BY THE AMERICANS SHORTLY BEFORE TAKING THE CITY.
the vicinity of Fort du Homet that Lieutenant Lauer and I took the last of the German prisoners, approximately 85 men. We had been working towards the area of the dry-docks when on rounding a corner we ran into an armed German soldier. We immediately took cover, whereupon the German dropped his rifle and threw his arms over his head, indicating he wished to surrender. We told him to come forward, at which time we took his grenades and bayonet. He indicated that there were more men in a nearby bunker. We told him to go and bring out any men that were in there. In about 20 minutes he returned with about 85 men. As usual, in taking large groups of prisoners there was always one man who had lived in New Jersey or had relatives in New Jersey. Consequently, there were several that could speak English. One of these men told us that there were some American paratroopers who were prisoners in Fort du Homet. We told him that he would come with us and show us where these prisoners were. He immediately became very excited and told us he could not go because the officer commanding the fort was a madman and threatened to shoot any German soldier that surrendered. Lieutenant Lauer and I thereupon selected one of the men that could speak English and placed him in command of the group. He was told to follow the shortest route to the main gate and that all prisoners were to keep their hands behind their heads because there were American forces in the area and if this procedure was not followed, there was a good possibility of them being fired upon. Upon the departure of these prisoners Lieutenant Lauer and I made our way through the foundry which was just west of Fort du Homet.

Part of the foundry had been blown up and was still burning. At the eastern end of the building was a German military truck with the tires removed. Taking cover behind this truck, I gave instructions to Lieutenant Lauer to wave the remnant of a white parachute that he wore around his neck. By crawling underneath the truck I could get a good view of Fort du Homet with binoculars. We were at a distance of approximately 150 yards. From behind his cover Lieutenant Lauer waved a white signal for approximately one-half hour before a German soldier appeared at the gate of the fort which was on the south side. The soldier came out and looked around and went back in the fort again. About 15 minutes later a German officer appeared under a white flag. The area between us and the fort had been blown up by the Germans in an effort to isolate the fort from the mainland, but the explosives had formed a deep trench. The German indicated that we were to go to the north area of the trench to cross it. We learned later that mines had been set in the trench. Lieutenant and I crossed the trench, were met by the officer who conducted us around the north side of the fort. The German officer conducted us into the fort directly across the parade grounds to a flight of steps on the north side. These steps led up to a second story rampart, thence, through an old battery shelter that had been converted into a room. The German commander was in this room with approximately six other German officers. Through Lieutenant Lauer, with very poor German, and a smattering of English that one of the Germans could speak, we informed the
WRECKAGE OF SEAPLANE BASE IN CHERBOURG SHORTLY AFTER ALLIED NAVAL GUNS HAD FINISHED THEIR BOMBARDMENT
German Colonel that we had come to take surrender of the fort and we wanted the American paratroopers turned over to us. The officer refused to surrender, saying that he had instructions to surrender only on orders from his superior officer. He was informed that the senior officers in Cherbourg were in the hands of the U. S. Army. He refused to believe this. He immediately held a conference with the officers present, at which time the English speaking German officer advised us that one of the paratroopers could talk German fluently, and that the Commanding Officer was going to get this man to act as an interpreter. In about 5 minutes an orderly brought in two Army paratroopers, one was a Private, and the other was a First Lieutenant. The First Lieutenant had been wounded through the left shoulder and although he had been neatly bandaged the left side of his uniform was still caked with blood. Using the Private as an interpreter, we again informed the German Commanding Officer of the situation and demanded that he surrender. He still refused to believe the American forces were in control of Cherbourg. We therefore told him that we would take one of his staff officers into Cherbourg so that he could see for himself that the American forces had captured the town. The Germans immediately held another conference. The Commanding Officer then stated that he would surrender the fort if we would promise safe passage to him and his men to the German lines. This we refused to do. He therefore inquired if we had any other men with us. He was informed that we had 800 men in the vicinity of the fort. Thereupon the Germans held another conference. Finally the Commanding Officer said that he would surrender if we would separate German officers from the rest of the prisoners. We told them that was regular and that we would do it. The Commanding Officer brought out the bottle of cognac and poured a drink for each of his staff. Lieutenant Lauer and I refused to drink with them. The German Officer proposed some kind of toast, whereupon all officers drained their glasses and came to a "Heil Hitler" salute. We told the Commanding Officer we would take him with us and that the men would take over the rest of the prisoners.

The paratroopers were ordered released and Lieutenant Lauer and I started out of the fort with the German Colonel. We got outside the gate when we met a Lieutenant Colonel of our Army and half dozen men. We told the Lieutenant Colonel what had transpired and asked him if he would take over the German Colonel. We turned the Colonel over to him. Lieutenant Lauer and I then started for the vicinity of the dry dock and on the way down we were greeted by the paratroopers, 53 of them, who had been prisoners since D-day. They had been dropped by mistake in Cherbourg. They told us that the Germans had treated them fine and that during the bombardment of Cherbourg, that they had taken them into the fort for protection. They also advised us that the Germans had seen the Navy Reconnaissance Party working their way through the arsenal and several times efforts were made to bring machine guns to bear on us. The first thing the paratroopers asked for was cigarettes. The second thing they asked for was souvenirs.
We told then where we had disarmed the last prisoners we had taken. The prisoners had left their pistols, binoculars, and field equipment in a large pile. The last we saw of the paratroopers they were on their way to ransack the pile of equipment.

Several days after release of these paratroopers a major of the 101st Paratroopers Division called at Navy Headquarters to thank Lieutenant Lauer and me for obtaining release of the prisoners.

After turning over the prisoners to the Army, Lieutenant Lauer and I completed our reconnaissance and returned to Navy-Headquarters which was on the eastern corner of Square Napoleon. About this time the rest of the Reconnaissance Party had completed their preliminary survey and the results were plotted on a Cherbourg Harbor chart by Lieutenant Herman. A message to the following effect was sent that Nouvelle Place was heavily mined; both entrances to Grande Rade were mined; Entrance Petite Rade was blocked; Digue Hommet and North Side Quai Hommet were cratered; drydock caisson was partly blown otherwise the drydock was intact; entrances to the channel and all passages to the arsenal were blocked; Solglin was empty but scuttled and there were only apparent obstructions to Darse Atlantique; ten feet off Quai de France at low water showed depths of six fathoms; no obstructions were visible or found but it was reported mined; practically every building in the arsenal had been wrecked and burned out; naval headquarters were at Pie de Republic and temporary Army headquarters at the foot of Gare Maritime.

On the morning of 29 June, Lieutenant Jack Lambie, U. S. Navy Intelligence, reported in at Navy Headquarters with some Dutch boys who claimed they knew where the German mine fields existed in the harbor. At approximately 1100 on the morning of 29 June, Fort Central surrendered after a bombardment of approximately 14 hours. A message to the following effect was sent: all Cherbourg forts surrendered at eleven fifteen Baker.

One of the officers from the fort was brought into Naval Headquarters and he indicated the exact location of all mine fields in Cherbourg. All entrances to the harbor had been completely mined but there was a channel south of each dique, approximately 150 meters wide. An immediate check by the waterside reconnaissance party section confirmed this information. The mine fields were thereupon drawn upon a chart and given to Lieutenant Bannister and Lieutenant Lavallee. These officers took a small French boat with a French civilian crew, and using a sail because a motor was considered dangerous in the mine fields, they sailed out past the outer break waters and delivered the plan of the mine fields to the British Mine Sweepers that had arrived in the vicinity. A message to the following effect was sent: Information received from captured officer in Fort Centrale indicates ground acoustic and magnetic mines were laid in large numbers outside the port north of Digne Central, in Grande Rade, in Petite Rade, and Trans-atlantic Dock; estimate approximately seven to
ten days to clear mines; Navy Headquarters place was at Republic; Army Headquarters was at Hotel Atlantic; and Army Port Headquarters place was Repulic.

Captain Norman Ives arrived in Cherbourg at approximately 1600, 28 June, and relieved me as Senior Naval Officer present. I was designated as his Chief Staff Officer in which position I served until 15 July, 1944. In the meantime, we had obtained sufficient billets and garage space to quarter Navy personnel and vehicles, and to commence the operation of a Naval Headquarters. Our harbor entrance control group had located a signal tower at the south entrance to the harbor, and had blinker communication with the mine sweepers. Navy Headquarters radio communications had been set up in a large concrete blockhouse near the waterfront, and communications had been established by radio with Beach Utah and England. In the course of the next week Admiral Wilkes and his staff arrived and approximately 300 Seabees were brought in, in addition to Drew Units One and Two.

I acted as Chief Staff Officer to Captain Ives until 15 July, at which time Commodore Barton, USCG, was assigned as Port Director and requested that I be assigned as his assistant. I therefore acted as Assistant Port Director until 2 August, 1944. Of all the duties performed by any officer during the operation of Cherbourg, Commodore Barton had the most difficult task to perform. He had no facilities and his personnel assigned to him were inexperienced, to say the least. There were a great many officers who could function as Administrative Officers but very few could perform any operations.

About 1 August, Captain Ives departed with the Reconnaissance Party of approximately 75 officers and men to reconnoiter Granville and St. Malo. The majority of these men came from Drew 2. Captain Ives had requested that either I accompany this party or Lieutenant Lavallee should go. However, Commodore Barton requested that I remain in Cherbourg. Lieutenant Lavallee had been assigned to Captain Corvall, the Officer in Command of Seabees to act as interpreter and billeting officer. Neither of us, therefore, accompanied Captain Ives.

Captain Ives departed Cherbourg approximately 1 August, 1944. On 2 August, 1944, Captain Ives' Reconnaissance Party was ambushed by a force of approximately 600 Germans in the vicinity of Dol, Brittany. Captain Ives and approximately 16 men were killed or wounded. On 2 August, 1944, Admiral Wilkes gave me verbal orders to standby to carry out Reconnaissance work in Brittany. I was to take the Reconnaissance Party that entered Cherbourg with me. This party being augmented by approximately 350 Seabees under Lieutenant Commander Frorath. On 4 August, orders were issued and the Reconnaissance Party went into bivouac outside of Cherbourg. Admiral Wilkes
issued additional orders that all Reconnaissance Parties of the
U. S. Navy going into Brittany were to be under my jurisdiction,
and they were not to go west of my advanced position. The orders
issued by Admiral Wilkes are set forth as follows:

TWELFTH FLEET
U. S. PORTS AND BASES, FRANCE
C/O Fleet Post Office
New York, New York

P16-400(02-St)
File No. 3042

Serial: 278 4 August, 1944

From: Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases, France
To: Commander Q. R. WALSH, USCG, 3042
Via: Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Advance Base, Cherbourg

Subj: O-R-D-E-R-S

Encl: (A) List of Personnel and Equipment

1. Upon receipt of these orders you will assume the duties of
officer in charge of U. S. Naval Reconnaissance Party for Malvern.

2. You will assemble this party at Camp 1/2 mile south of
Orteville at 1100, August 4, 1944, and carry out intensive training
and indoctrination in preparation for movement to Malvern.

3. When directed by Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases, France,
you will proceed with this party to Malvern and carry out the
following instructions:

(a) Conduct a preliminary survey of harbor and port instal-
lations in the area allocated to the Navy and send report of
this survey by Courier to Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases, France,
within 24 hours after arrival at Malvern.

(b) Conduct a detailed survey of harbor and port installations
and facilities in the Navy area considered of value for use by U. S.
Navy.

(c) Establish guards over installations and facilities
selected (paragraph b).

(d) Prepare material and equipment lists for rehabilita-
tion of installation and facilities (paragraph b).

(e) Requisition captured enemy stores and equipment of
Naval value and use.

- 211 -
CAPTURED IN THE ALLIED CONQUEST OF THE CHEPBOURG PENINSULA FROM THE NORMANDY BEACHES
NAZI PRISONERS ARE TRANSPORTED ON A COAST GUARD MANNED LCT ACROSS THE CHANNEL TO ENGLAND, WHERE THEY WILL BE INTERNED FOR THE DURATION OF THE WAR.
(f) Report to the Commanding General VIII Corp. U. S. Army and cooperate to the fullest extent in accomplishing your mission.

(g) Take necessary steps to prevent looting and unnecessary damage to property and equipment.

(h) Maintain continuous radio communications with Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases, France Headquarters, at Cherbourg after arrival and every six hours while en route.

(i) Keep Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases fully informed concerning developments and results of survey with recommendations.

(j) Employ couriers as necessary.

(k) Exercise accepted and proven principles of warfare.

4. INFORMATION

(a) Commanding General Third Army has been requested to give clearance to your party to enter Malvern as soon as it has been declared safe.

(b) Personnel and equipment for your party is contained in enclosure (A). (Any additions must be promptly reported and record kept).

(c) The Third Army is making a rapid advance and is expected to reach Malvern at an early date.

(d) Many pockets of enemy resistance will not be cleared out until some time after the capture of the town.

(e) Extensive demolitions are to be expected in the port and harbor as well as all types of booby traps and delayed action bombs, personnel, and ground mines.

(f) Extensive barriers, booby traps of all types, descriptions, and delayed action bombs, personnel and ground mines may be expected en route to Malvern.

(g) Enemy agents are to be expected at Malvern to carry out additional demolition after capture of the town.

(h) Prompt and early rehabilitation and operation of port and harbor installation and facilities is of the highest priority.

(i) An agreement between the U. S. Army and U. S. Navy
has allocated the area off Malvern on the west side of the Penfeld River to U. S. Navy use.

(j) Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases, France, will maintain Headquarters in Cherbourg.

(k) Communication with Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases, France, will be by courier or on 3800 KC using ARMY SCR 193 (75 Watts). Authority is granted to open up on any frequency in an emergency which Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases, France, is guarding if unable to communicate on 3800 KC. 5690 KC can be used if unable to receive on 3800 KC.

/s/ John Wilkie

The Reconnaissance Party departed Cherbourg on 6 August, 1944, and reported to the Chief of Staff, 8th Corps, Third Army in the vicinity of Vergoncy, Brittany. During this movement to prevent ambush, I moved ahead of the main party with approximately 20 men. This party of 20 men was followed by another group of 30 men. The main party of approximately 350 Seabees brought up the rear. The 8th Corps was preparing to capture Fort St. Malo and although they estimated three days to capture the town it took approximately two weeks.

We entered Fort St. Malo approximately two days before the capture and on the day of surrender made a brief reconnaissance of the port. Lieutenant Commander Bishop later entered Fort St. Malo, as he was to act as NOIC and make a more thorough reconnaissance.

After the fall of St. Malo the Reconnaissance Party moved to the coast in the vicinity of Mont St. Michel. Contact was made daily with the Eighth Corp Headquarters to determine the military situation. While in bivouac near Mont St. Michel the Army requested that I accompany Colonel Beeler on reconnaissance of the north ports of Brittany. Six of my men and six Army men accompanied us. The ports of Roscoff, Morlaix and Carantec were reconnoitered.

It was the desire of the Army at this time to open these ports as soon as possible for the flow of supplies which were necessary to sustain the forces converging on Brest. A message to the following effect was sent;

Reconnoitered Roscoff and Morlaix at request of and in company with Army. Army considering possible use of both ports because railroad was not destroyed. At Roscoff, Army plans on using anchorage for Liberty ships, east of Ile Righet, distance 1 1/2 miles, with possible discharge of 1500 to 3000 tons per day into barges. At Morlaix, Army considers using Rade de
Morlaix to moor ships. If present considerations are approved by higher Army authority, Navy will be requested to make hydrographic survey and supply mooring buoys. Prospects are brighter for earlier movement to westward. Arrangements are being made for future bivouac in vicinity of Morlaix.

Q. R. Walsh

This Reconnaissance Party was the first allied force to enter the town of Roscoff. We entered the town at approximately 1500, the Germans having withdrawn at noon at this time. The Reconnaissance Party was moved from St. Michel to Carantec. I had bivouaced at Eighth Corp Headquarters which was located just outside the town of Landerneau. Lieutenant R. Kitchell and about ten men were with me when the siege of Brest commenced. Daily reconnaissance was made of the Rade de Brest from the Crozon Peninsula. Admiral Wilkes and Captain Holcomb were advised daily of results because a force of 800 men (U. S. Navy) were ready to occupy Brest as soon as it was captured. The fighting around Brest was very severe, initial estimates expected to find about 15,000 Germans, actually it was determined a force of about 35,000 Germans were in Brest, about 10,000 of these being German paratroopers.

On 23 August, 1944, reconnaissance indicated the Germans had not blown the quays and harbor facilities, the Army commenced attack on 25 August.

On 26 August, after heavy bombardment and aerial attack, only slight gains had been made by the Second, Eighth, and 29th Divisions. The following memorandum was sent to Captain Holcomb on 30 August, 1944:

MEMORANDUM TO CAPTAIN HOLCOMB

1. At the present time I am with Eighth Corps in bivouac South of Lesnevan. The Reconnaissance Party is in bivouac at Carantec. I plan to stay with Eighth Corps until such time as the fall of Brest is imminent, then I will move to 29th Division Headquarters. The 29th Division is scheduled to take the area on the West side of the Penfeld River. I have already contacted 29th Division and they have expressed their willingness to cooperate in every way possible. At about the time I move the Reconnaissance Party from Carantec to the vicinity of St. Renan, located northwest of Brest. From St. Renan the party can proceed into Brest by a good road system and it will put them on the west side of the town. When Brest falls, the Army will withdraw to the north and northeast. It is for this reason I am bringing the Reconnaissance Party in from the northwest to avoid interference, as much as possible, with the withdrawing Army elements.
BEHIND THE BARBED WIRE
A GROUP OF DISILLUSIONED NAZI SOLDIERS AWAIT A CHANNEL PASSAGE THAT WILL CARRY THEM OUT OF THE WAR
2. It looks like a long, hard fight for Brest. The Germans have a former paratroop general in command and he is apparently going to fight to the last ditch. To date the resistance has been strong and stubborn. We are making progress, but it is slow and time consuming. The Army cannot give me an estimate when we may get into the port. I personally don't think we will get in for another five days, at least. Even after Brest falls, unless the Army clears the peninsula to the southeast and south of Brest, it may be impossible for us to carry out any organized reconnaissance.

3. I am sorry that I failed to see you when you were in Carantec, but I was informed that you were coming to Eighth Corps and had arranged for you to meet the heads of the various departments. I will outline below some of the subjects which I had hoped to discuss with you:

(a) Civil Affairs of the Army has requested that all food and liquors found in the buildings to be occupied by the Navy on the west side of the Penfeld River, be turned over to the Army. I informed the Army that I would advise you of their request but for the present I intended to inventory and seal all buildings containing liquor and food, upon our arrival in the port. This is a decision that I think should be made before our arrival in the port.

(b) There is a Captain Lucas, French Navy, now attached to Eighth Division who approached me several days ago and requested that I obtain gasoline for him to transport 400 men to Brest. I suggested to him, at the time, that he leave any personnel that he desired to bring into Brest behind until conditions were more stable and that we would then arrange to have personnel brought into Brest after you and Captain Lucas had come to some agreement. The figure has now gone as high as 5,000 men that Captain Lucas desires to bring into the port of Brest. The Army has thrown the entire matter into the Navy's lap. Pending instructions from you I do not intend to assist Captain Lucas in any way in introducing personnel into Brest, and in accordance with Captain Percifield's orders I have no authority to deal with the French Navy. I do not intend to give them billets or any official status on the west side of the Penfeld River. I recommended to the Flag recently that Captain Lucas be ordered to report to you. I understand he has orders to that effect. May I recommend most strongly that he be ordered from Eighth Division to report to you immediately, in this way I think many problems that are going to arise in the future, with the French Navy, can be averted immediately. He approached me Sunday,
MEAL TICKETS IN HAND

THESE NAZI PRISONERS MOUNT THE GANGPLANK OF A COAST GUARD MANNED TROOP TRANSPORT IN AN UNIDENTIFIED ALLIED PORT
August 27, and stated he would like a conference with you to determine where U.S. sailors and French sailors are going to be bivouaced in the port of Brest. Such assumptions and line of thinking by Captain Lucas, to my way of thinking, indicates he is not familiar with the Navy's future plans for this port. That is the reason I suggest he report to you immediately, where you can be kept advised of what his activities involve.

(c) I have been advised that we are going to have about 800 men sent to the vicinity of Roscoff. It seems that the Army is prepared to turn over the western section of the town to us. If they do, we will have to have more sentries than available in the Reconnaissance Party. I would, therefore, suggest that we get at least 200 men out of the 800 men and have them standby at Roscoff for early entry into the port of Brest, to be used for sentry duty only. This will help us to control the situation when we take over.

* * * * * * * * *

(e) The C.I.C. had requested the names of officers who will be authorized to enter any building in the port of Brest. I have submitted a list of about seven officers, including yourself. Otherwise all the officers are attached to the Reconnaissance Party. I am sorry I did not know the name of your Executive Officer or I would have included his name also. These passes will allow the officers to enter any building even before intelligence has a chance to inspect them, but it will not allow documents, stores or furniture to be removed.

(f) It is requested, if possible, that some personnel familiar with refrigerating equipment be included in the 800 men to be bivouaced at Roscoff. They will come in most handy if we acquire any storehouses that are found damaged.
ABOARD A COAST GUARD MANNEO LCI ROUND FROM THE FRENCH COAST TO ENGLAND NAZI [SONERS GIVE A U.S. COAST GUARDSMAN THE LOWDOWN HOW THEY HAPPENED TO BE CAPTURED
(g) The 30th Assault Unit is ready to move in on Brest. As you may know this is a Royal Marine Commando outfit, its duties are purely intelligence. It has the highest credentials obtainable from SHAPE. I mention the entry of this outfit as a matter of information. I am sure you will be pestered with them enough after the port falls concerning billets, gasoline, food, trucks, and everything imaginable.

4. I am enclosing a sheet indicating the coordination of intelligence activities for Brest, which I think will meet with your approval.

5. General Middleton, Commanding General Eighth Corps, is apparently taking steps to avoid the confusion, looting and moving of seized materials that has existed in the capture of previous ports. I have maintained very close contact with G-2 and G-5, and feel sure that we are going to be in a position to follow a procedure that will be in accordance with the Army's wishes.

6. Information to date indicates that the Germans are commencing to blow the installed demolitions in the port. There have been several air attacks by our forces and considerable bombardment by artillery. I am not optimistic as to what the port may look like when we arrive. I expect it to be in shambles.

7. Everything is fine here. I wish that we had more to keep our men occupied because I am a firm believer in the old saying: "He who becomes motionless, becomes stagnant."

Respectfully,

Q. R. WALSH

On 30 August a message to the following effect was sent:

From: OCMC Reconnaissance Party - Malvern
To: Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases, France.

Situation as of 1800, 30 August. Brest peninsula is cleared of enemy resistance. 2nd and 29th Divisions continue to advance slowly. Observed Rade de Brest and Rade Abri this date from Plougastel. There appears to be three rows of booms in Goulet de Brest to eastward of Mengam Light. Single boom is present just inside entrance to Rade Abri extending westward. Single boom also extends from Point Portzic parallel to south jetty to entrance to Rade Abri. Large tanker is sunk in 947975. Large hospital ship is sunk parallel to quai de Laninon near
FREIGHT CARS FERRIED FROM BRITAIN BY A TRACK EQUIPPED COAST GUARD MANNED LST ROLL ASHORE IN FRANCE READY FOR USE ON THE ARMY TRANSPORTATION CORPS' GIANT RAIL NETWORK WHICH SUPPLIES ALLIED ARMIES ON THE WESTERN FRONT
drydock No. 9. Building on Mole de Ouest appears to be in ruins and afire. Naval school is partially demolished and appears extensively damaged. Medium sized vessel observed at 1:30 passing from Rade de Brest into Rade Abri and then into mouth of Penfeld river. Large floating drydock towed by tug from Penfeld river into Rade Abri at 1500 in vicinity of Quai Laninon believed to be enemy demolition charges. Large self propelled crane observed moving from submarine boat pen to jetty Sud where loaded cargo then proceeded up Penfeld river. Vessel about size of LST moved from sub pen to port de Commerce flying Red Cross flag. Large net tender anchored in 930935. From ship movements in Rade Abri it appears improbable that mines are present. Cranes still standing on Quai port de Commerce and on Quai de Laninon. Observations will continue. Our artillery fired from Daoulas peninsula into Brest.

Q. R. WALSH

On 31 August a message to the following effect was sent:

From: CinC Reconnaissance Party - Malvern
To: Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases, France

Situation as of 1800, 31 August. All quiet on all sectors shifting guns and troops for attack tomorrow, Friday. Observations this date indicate the following: sunken tanker formerly reported in 947975 now appears at 942975; a small vessel is sunk in eastern section of Passe Sud blocking approximately one third of entrance of Rade Abri; floating drydock still anchored in 940977; most of wreck visible in mouth of Penfeld river; large hospital ship remains in position previously reported; four small vessels resembling harbor tugs and lighters appear to be sunk alongside Quai de Flotilhes; Digue de Sud pierced by eight craters and eastern and reduced to rubble; western and northern sides of Bassin number five Port de Commerce cratered; five buildings on Point des Blagueurs ruined by fire also foundry and engineering bridge still standing; gates of drydocks eight and nine in place but appear damaged; large vessel in drydock number eight; drydock pumping station destroyed; Quai de Laninon cratered in four places; Digue Abri du Port de Laninon cratered in three places; eastern half of Naval School appears only slightly damaged; two and maybe three holes in roof of submarine shelter; small boats and tugs continue to move in Rade Abri; terrific explosion occurred at 1600 this date followed by smaller explosions for forty-five minutes in vicinity of submarine shelters.

Q. R. WALSH

On 3 September, the Germans commenced to destroy the harbor facilities. By 4 September the majority of harbor facilities were destroyed and most of the city was burning.
You will proceed with your reconnaissance party in time to report to Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases, France, Headquarters Cherbourg, prior to dark, 8 September, 1944.

HAROLD R. HOLCOMB

I departed Roscoff at 1030 on the 8th of September and arrived at Cherbourg at 1630 the same day. There, orders awaited me from Admiral Wilkes to assume the duties of Officer in Charge, U. S. Naval Reconnaissance Party for Le Havre. I was to proceed with the reconnaissance party next morning to the vicinity of Le Havre and upon capitulation of the city, and, when it was declared safe by the Commanding General of the First Canadian Army, to enter the city and carry out my reconnaissance duties. Upon arrival at the British Assault Area. I was to report my presence and receive whatever intelligence was available. Then I was to report to the Canadian Army Headquarters at Neufchâteau. I was to contact the Royal Navy Reconnaissance Party standing by to enter Le Havre immediately upon capitulation. They were to turn over reconnaissance duty to me and the British Port Party (No. 1571) would join my party after the city was captured. I was to keep Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases currently informed of the situation.

I left Cherbourg at 0930 next morning and reported to FOBAA at Couselles at 1330. Leaving there at 1630 on the 9th, I arrived at La Cerlangue at 0930 on the 10th and reported to the Commanding General, 1st British Corps at 1430 same day. At 1400 on the 11th I entered Le Havre and remained there until the 17th when I left for Cherbourg, having completed my temporary duty at Le Havre.

Cerlangue was a small village to the east of Le Havre to which the Reconnaissance Party of 460 men had shifted from Brest in approximately 46 hours, – no small feat considering the terrific traffic congestion that existed in the vicinity of Avranches and Rouen.

On 11th September from Munster I informed Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases, France, that I had reported to the Flag Officer, British Assault Area on 9 September and to the 49th Division which was attacking Le Havre on the 10th; that I had not reported to the Commanding General, First Canadian Army at Neuchâtel because that headquarters had shifted and existing conditions did not allow time for travelling; that I was in bivouac with the Royal Navy Reconnaissance Party at Cerlangue, about 12 miles from Le Havre; that Lt. Comdr. Freemantle of the Royal Navy was still there and would enter Le Havre with me if the port fell that day (11 September); that the 49th Division Commander and Commanding Officers of units that would occupy and operate Le Havre after capture, until relieved by our forces, were not familiar with recent changes (in Reconnaissance Party set up) and requesting that information be disseminated immediately through the proper chain of command; that otherwise, to avoid misunderstandings, I could not act independently.
The attack on Le Havre began at 1600 on 10 September, with a terrific bombardment from the RAF with 5,000 tons of explosives dropped within 2 hours. Observations from a distance of seven miles indicated the city aflame and severely damaged. At 1800, the infantry moved in the attack. Good progress was made and Le Havre surrendered at noon on the 12th of September. Lieutenant Raymond Kittock was the first Naval officer to enter Le Havre with the British Reconnaissance Party, going in from the northeast at about 0930 on the 12th. The U.S. Navy Reconnaissance Party, under my command, entered at about 1030 from the southeast.

At 2200 that day I reported that a superficial survey indicated that the city area was totally destroyed in an area bounded on the north by Boulevard Foch, as far east as Place Carnot and Bassin de la Barre, on the south by Arriere Port and the west by Boulevard Clemenceau; that the buildings in the Bassin area could be considered destroyed; that the entrance to Avant Port was blocked by at least three sunken vessels and one barge afloat; that the possibility existed of getting around the obstructions at high water; that extensive damage was observed on all quais and bassins, but that a detailed survey was impossible due to enemy action. The Reconnaissance Party would enter on the morning of the 13th and detailed reports would follow.

We found the city of Le Havre practically demolished. The French people were very bitter toward the occupying forces. On the 13th I reported the entrance of the U.S. Naval Reconnaissance Party had entered and set up headquarters at 103 Strasbourg Boulevard (in a building owned by the U.S. Lines) and requested that the U.S. Army Engineers contact me at the earliest and that I be informed of the name of the senior U.S. Army officer.

On the 14th I informed my headquarters that the minesweepers were now in Le Havre and that Avant Port had been swept for snag lines with negative results; diving would begin next day and sweeping continued; that a channel eight fathoms deep and 80 feet existed between the blockships in the entrance to Avant Port and that vessels entering should keep close to Digue Nord and then shape course to leave two boom mooring buoys close to port.

I sent a memorandum to Captain Clark asking the name, rank and possible time of arrival of the U.S. Naval officer who would be Port Commandant of Le Havre. This information was being requested by the Royal Navy in the vicinity and also by the U.S. Army Engineers. I reported that we had been severely hampered in getting around Le Havre because of the destruction caused by the bombardment. The heart of the town had been practically wiped out so that you couldn't tell where the streets began or ended. As was expected, the harbor had been systematically destroyed. The Germans had done "an excellent job" again. When they blew up the E-boat pens it was the largest explosion I had ever seen. Debris went to a height of over 300 feet and was thrown a radius of 500 yards. As
VESSEL SUNK BY ENEMY MINES IN LE HAVRE HARBOR
usual, I reported, we had run into the initial situation of snipers, spasmodic enemy resistance and land mines on the waterfront. However, to date we had been fortunate and had suffered no casualties. I requested relief on the arrival of the officer who would have command of the port, for physical reasons.

On the 15th I told my headquarters that a channel six cables wide had been swept for ground and moored mines from Point Afirm (49° 29' 42"N, 0° 07' 24"W) to Passe de Nord Quest with negative results. Passe du Nord Quest had been swept to the entrance of Avant Port for ground and moored mines with negative results. Avant Port had been swept for ground and moored mines also with negative results. The same was true of Avant Port, Arriere Port and Bassin Mere. Static sweep of the entrance to Avant Port at high water on the sixteenth was planned. Ships not to exceed 2,500 tons and speed of six knots might enter the port. This restriction on tonnage and speed was due to the possible existence of oyster mines which would take about one week to clear. The channel through the blocked entrance to Avant Port was via a course set for the southern end of Digue Nord until the bow was abreast of Digue Nord, then to starboard leaving two boom mooring buoys close to port steadied on the pill box located to east of the breach of Digue Sud. The channel was 80 feet wide and 16 feet wide at high water heaps.

On 17 September, Captain Arnold relieved me as Senior Naval Officer in Le Havre. He had about 700 officers and men with him. By this time the chest condition which had bothered me from July had become more aggravating and it was impossible for me to carry on my regular duties. The Reconnaissance Party had been on duty, both in training and operating since about the 17th of April. The men were tired and weary. All of them had lost a great deal of weight and upon my return to Cherbourg I requested that all my men be given a rest. I was immediately hospitalized at Cherbourg for combat fatigue and later flown to England. I returned to the United States aboard the WAKEFIELD, arriving at Boston on 7 October, 1944.

/s/ Q. R. WALSH

-231-
French volunteers answering the F.F.I.'s plea, aid in hauling food to Paris.
"Every French person in liberated France admires the magnificent courage of the Americans pouring into the Cotentin Peninsula, where Germans lie in wait for them at every turn and even after they have passed the turn," wrote an official spokesman for the French Committee of National Liberation.

"Yesterday evening we watched Colonel Smythe, Commander of an American regiment, coming toward us," the spokesman continued. "One minute later as we watched, he was wounded, fortunately not seriously. In the same place, through an open window a woman called for news of her son who had fled from France to join Fighting French Forces. She had no idea what had become of him. I was able to reassure her and tell her that her son had been promoted to the rank of captain, that he had been fighting in Italy, and that he was in excellent health. His mother literally screamed with joy and hysterically ran across the street to tell her neighbors that her son was a captain with de Gaulle!"

"When she came back, she said to me, 'The Allies should go see the caretaker of the cemetery, Madame Vastel. Her husband, 57 years old, was shot by the Germans. He was not the only man they murdered. Brantonne escaped. But young Delacour was only 21, Truffaut and Leveque were only 18. They murdered Pettier, who had had four little children and whose wife was expecting a fifth. When I learned that you had landed, I ran to Mme. Vastel. She cried, 'I am avenged, I am avenged.' And then she told me of her sister whom they took away and killed by slow torture.' After that she burst into tears, but she soon stopped crying, for she remembered the last words of her husband: 'You will be brave.'"

Courage! They all have it, men and women alike, and the American troops pouring in to liberate France.

"Just yesterday," the account continues, "near Equerdrville, on the hill from which we had our first sight of Cherbourg, Mme. Dubarbe was kneeling. She was holding in her arms the head of a wounded American soldier, while her little son was running for the doctor. It was already too late. But the last time this American opened his eyes, he saw her smile at him — and he smiled back. When he died, the French woman wept, not hiding her tears. Then suddenly she burst out with a shout of bitter laughing. Some 300 German prisoners were being taken along the street, each one carrying a white rag at the end of a stick. The American sergeant who guarded them called out to me: 'Here they are!' Every man in my battalion took a prisoner!"

(By cable from London. Delayed.)

- 233 -
THIS IS THE LEFT HALF OF A PANORAMIC VIEW OF THE CROWDS IN THE PLACE DE LA CONCORDE, PARIS, AS A LIBERATION PARADE PASSED BY. FRANCE, AUGUST 26, 1944
After capturing Cherbourg on June 26, thus giving the Allies a major port, the U. S. First Army launched an offensive on a 30-mile front and slowly pushed the Germans back from the base of the Cherbourg Peninsula. British and Canadian troops took Caen after a 33-day struggle and by July 20 were punching slowly forward toward Paris, 110 miles away. In the meantime, the U. S. Third Army broke out of the beachhead and made lightning thrusts across the Brittany peninsula and eastward toward Paris. One of the mechanized columns advanced 52 miles in two days, then swept ahead 42 miles on the third day. Another column turned north and forced the withdrawal of German forces which had been blocking expansion of the Normandy beachhead. As the Third Army's onrushing columns neared Paris, French patriots arose from the underground on August 23, and aided by the arrival of Allied troops, liberated the French capital.

As the Germans fell back behind the Siegfried Line, pursued by the U. S. Third and First Armies, the British Second and Canadian First Armies swung northeast through France and into Belgium and Holland.

Aachen, a city of 160,000 was the first large German city to be captured. It was blasted to rubble and then occupied by the U. S. First Army after the Germans had spurned a surrender ultimatum on October 20.

A fourth European front had been opened August 15, when an Allied force of 800 vessels landed troops in Southern France. Heavy aerial and naval bombardments softened up coastal defenses for two hours before the assault. Allied troops encountered surprisingly light resistance and as they fanned out discovered that 40 per cent of the defending troops were Russian, Czech, and Polish prisoners of war. Invasion forces of the U. S. Seventh Army pushed ahead 35 miles during the first three days, effected a junction with the Third Army on September 11, and began battering through the Belfort Gap gateway to Germany. By November 20, its teammate, the French First Army had reached the upper Rhine.

**SOUTHERN FRANCE**

**INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE**

On August 15, 1944, an Allied invasion fleet of 800 vessels appeared off the coast of southern France and our forces stormed ashore against surprisingly light resistance. The Germans, once fearful of a second front, were now confronted with a fourth. The assault was made along the Riviera between Toulon and Cannes after landings during the night by a French assault group and American and British airborne troops. Patterned after the usual amphibious
operation, heavy aerial and naval bombardments softened up coastal defenses for about two hours before the assault. Naval forces were under the command of Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, USN.

INVASION FORCES ADVANCE RAPIDLY

Within three days the invasion forces had pushed ahead thirty-five miles in places, and under the leadership of Major General Alexander M. Patch, USA, the Seventh Army was driving north toward a junction with General Eisenhower's forces from Normandy. By August 20, they were on the outskirts of Aix-en-Provence, in a drive that virtually isolated the great port of Marseilles and the naval base at Toulon, on which they were closing in, following a heavy air and naval bombardment.

ACCOUNT OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER (NOW LIEUTENANT) MARTIN D. BERG

The entire day before the invasion of southern France on August 14, 1944, the CGC DUANE was at sea in range of enemy radars and short-range aircraft. The sky was clear and the sea smooth. As the day passed and no enemy attack developed, the crew gave thanks to our air coverage, which consisted of many flights of speedy P-38's manned by pilots of almost every nationality comprising the Allied forces. As far as the eye could see, the ocean was covered with landing craft. They stretched away to the horizon astern of the ship and even after their hulls had disappeared they could be located by their sausage-like barrage balloons carried as protection against dive-bombers. These balloons were being carried at relatively low heights and in their enforced confinement swung from side to side like captive whales.

The morning of August 15, 1944, dawned with the vast invasion armada moving slowly towards the beach. As soon as it became light, flights of B-17's and B-25's plastered the landing beaches, while C-47's moved inland and dropped paratroopers. Afterwards heavy combat ships moved in and bombarded strong points previously disclosed by air reconnaissance. H-hour was at 0800, and long before that time the tiny LCVP's and LCM's, loaded with troops, had taken up their positions in preparation for the final dash to the beach. The DUANE took up her position about three miles off the shoreline at Cavalaire Bay, southern France.

At 0800 exactly the first waves hit the beaches over a stretch of thirty miles on the French Riviera. Three U. S. combat divisions - the Third, Thirty-Sixth, and Forty-Fifth - made the original landings. The DUANE was the flagship for the landing of the Third Division, while another Coast Guard ship, the combat transport USS BAYFIELD, had charge of the Forty-Fifth Division. The third flagship was our old friend, the USS BISCAYNE. Initial opposition was slight and the troops pushed rapidly inland. By the end of the first day the beachhead was secure.
U.S. NAVY ADMIRAL WILLIAM HARRISON STANDLEY DESCEDES THE GANGWAY FROM A COAST GUARD FIGHTING SHIP AFTER A QUICK VISIT DURING MANEUVERS FOR THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE
The DUANE remained at Baie de Cavalaire until the 10th of September. Although the initial assault was over, there remained the difficult task of following up the advancing troops with the supplies necessary to keep them in action. Convoy after convoy of merchant ships and transports anchored, discharged their supplies and troops, and sailed away laden only with the sorry remnants of the once proud German war machine. The DUANE supervised all the activity in her own sector and later in the entire area. Unloading over the beaches continued for over a month although it had not been contemplated that it would take so long. The delay was brought about by the prolonged resistance of the enemy bottled up in Toulon and Marseilles.

The ship remained in the Mediterranean until July of 1945. The remainder of her stay witnessed the gradual reduction of U. S. naval forces in this area until finally, just before she returned to the U. S., only a few ships flew the Stars and Stripes where formerly thousands had been. Her time was spent in the greater part in port. Short voyages to Naples, Palermo, Leghorn, Marseilles, Toulon, and Cannes, afforded the crew a change of scenery and opportunities for liberty and recreation. Never again did she see action. The departure for home in July, 1945, was eagerly anticipated by all hands. The DUANE arrived at Charleston, South Carolina, in July, 1945, thus ending a cruise during which the Coast Guard once again tackled and performed a new job in the best service tradition.

* * * * *

The DUANE, a Coast Guard cutter of the well known 327-foot class, had left Norfolk, Virginia, on April 3, 1944, bound for the Mediterranean. She was not to return to the United States until July, 1945. The ship bore little resemblance to the one that entered Norfolk Navy Yard in January for conversion to an amphibious task group commander's flagship. In place of her single heavy mast, a salient feature in peacetime, there now appeared three masts. Attached to these masts were a multitude of radio antennas, leading off in all directions. The familiar five-inch and three-inch guns and the strings of depth charge racks had disappeared, and in their places five batteries of forty millimeter anti-aircraft guns, fourteen barrels in all, now pointed to the sky. Atop the mainmast, now the highest, the antenna of an air-search radar, strangely resembling a bedspring, rotated slowly.

Inside the steel skin of the DUANE the changes were even more striking. New compartments designated as radio rooms, combat information center spaces, operation rooms, and staff offices, crowded every part of the interior. The old comfortable living quarters had vanished. Every space not used for working purposes was now
SERVING ABOARD A COAST GUARD FIGHTING SHIP
SHIP-TO-SHORE RADIO SETUPS KEEP COMMANDERS POSTED IN FINAL REHEARSALS FOR THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE
filled with bunks sufficient to accommodate the augmented ship's crew together with a new complement of staff personnel. In the months to come even these increased accommodations were to prove inadequate. A soldier sleeping on a clear space on deck or an officer stretched out on the wardroom transom were to be familiar sights.

The most unique feature of the ship was the large communication plant, made up of upwards of twenty-five transmitters and fifty receivers. More electronic apparatus was concentrated in the radio and radar rooms than was to be found in any but a few radio stations ashore. All this equipment was necessary to direct and coordinate the complex operations of modern amphibious warfare. At times over fifty men were required to operate these facilities. Most of these men worked in Radio I, the nerve center of the communication organization. Here, large panels resembling telephone switchboards provided an intricate interconnecting system by means of which almost any desired combination of equipment could be operated from any one of many remote control units located throughout the ship.

As the DUANE stood out beyond Cape Henry, where Convoy JGS-38 was forming up, the crew busied themselves in mastering the new complexities of their ship under the direction of Lieutenant Commander (now Commander) Joseph R. Scullion, the Executive Officer. Most of the crew were old veterans of the hazardous North Atlantic convoy duty. The majority of them had remained on the ship during her conversion. The Captain, Commander (now Captain) Harold C. Moore, was a veteran Coast Guard officer, especially well-endowed by personal characteristics for the tasks that lay ahead. The nature of these tasks was shrouded in uncertainty for this was a new assignment for the Coast Guard.

For the first time since her commissioning the DUANE joined the convoy as a vessel to be protected. Station was taken in the center of the formation which was typical of the composition of many other convoys traversing the Atlantic during this period. There were almost a hundred merchant ships spread out in ten parallel lines, each ship close up to the ones beside and ahead of it for mutual protection against submarine attack. Around the perimeter of the convoy in a general circular disposition steamed the escorts, three divisions of destroyer escorts. Two of these divisions were entirely manned by the Coast Guard. The escort commander's flagship was the TANEY, a sister ship of the DUANE. She enjoyed the distinction, at this time, of being the only 327-foot cutter fitted with five-inch thirty-eight caliber guns which she carried in two turrets, fore and aft. On board the TANEY were embarked Captain Duval, USN, the escort commander, and his staff.
SOMEBWHERE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, A COLUMN OF LSTs (LANDING SHIPS, TANKS) STEAMS IN LINE DURING FINAL MANEUVERS FOR THE SECOND ALLIED INVASION OF HITLER'S FORTRESS EUROPE -- THIS TIME AT THE BEACHES OF SOUTHERN FRANCE
The voyage across the Atlantic was relatively uneventful. To prepare for future contingencies routine drills of all descriptions were conducted on board the DUANE. The gunners held target practice, firing at hydrogen-inflated balloons. Damage control parties drew up and simulated defensive measures against fire and structural damage caused by bombs or torpedoes. Radiomen and technicians overhauled the elaborate electronic installation and gradually began to feel at home amidst the many new and unfamiliar pieces of equipment. At dawn and dusk the whole convoy went to battle stations during the transition between light and darkness, the period when enemy submarine attacks were most prevalent.

On April 18, 1944, Convoy UGS-38 passed through the Strait of Gibraltar, and the DUANE reported by radio to the Commander, Eighth Amphibious Force at Bizerte, Tunisia, under whose command she was to serve. Later that day a dispatch was received directing the ship to leave the convoy outside Algiers, and proceed into that port for inspection by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters. The consequences that were to result from this diversion will soon be seen.

About noon, two days after leaving Gibraltar, the sound of the general alarm and the hurried scuffle of the crew going to their battle stations heralded the first appearance of the enemy. On board the DUANE and the rest of the ships the gun crews watched in angry frustration as a German reconnaissance plane, so high as to be visible only with the aid of high-powered binoculars, spent several minutes leisurely taking pictures of the convoy, the sound of its motors coming down as a dull throbbing from the heavens. No allied air opposition appeared. After the disappearance of this plane, the DUANE left the convoy and stood into Algiers, where she moored just before sunset to the Mole at Al Djefnà.

The convoy proceeded on towards its destination at Bizerte, Tunisia. A little after sunset it was attacked by eighteen to twenty-four German torpedo bombers. The raiders came in low over the water, and acting on information supplied by the reconnaissance plane earlier in the day, pressed home their attack and disappeared into the dusk. Their torpedoes struck home on five ships, sinking two merchant vessels and the USS LANSDALE, an accompanying destroyer, which ironically enough had sortied from Algiers a few hours before to provide extra protection to the convoy. Two other merchant ships, although badly damaged, succeeded in making port the next day under tow. Had the DUANE not been unexpectedly detached, she would have been in the thick of this attack.

The next morning the crew of the DUANE lined the rails to watch the USS MENGES, and several other Coast Guard destroyer escorts, disembark the survivors of the torpedoed ships. Such sights were not
ALLIED SOLDIERS KNOW IT'S THE REAL THING WHEN THEY RECEIVE INVASION MONEY PRIOR TO HITTING THE BEACHES OF SOUTHERN FRANCE IN EUROPE'S SECOND DAY
unfamiliar to most of the crew of the DUANE, but nevertheless angry exclamations were heard as the oil-soaked seamen walked or were carried down the gangways of the rescue vessels. Standing among the survivors were two German pilots, the crew of one of the few planes downed by anti-aircraft fire. In their rumpled and water-soaked uniforms, in the midst of their victims, they were a far cry from the arrogant supermen who had set out to conquer the world.

Later this day, April 21, 1944, the DUANE was officially inspected by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, USN, then in command of all U. S. naval forces in the Mediterranean. He and his staff professed pleasure in the conversion of the DUANE which was founded to a great extent on recommendations made by men in the light of combat operations in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. Technical experts came on board and in conjunction with the ship's company conducted numerous and comprehensive tests of the radio installation under simulated combat operating conditions. The results of these tests provided an extremely valuable basis on which the operations of radio circuits were scheduled during the remainder of the cruise.

The crew of the DUANE busied themselves, during the rest of their stay in Algiers, in replenishing stores and supplies. Liberty was granted to all hands who took the opportunity to stretch their legs and see something of the interesting old city once feared as the stronghold of the pirates who harried commerce along the Barbary Coast. The Casbah, or Arab quarter, came in for the greatest attention, although it is doubtful whether the exotic atmosphere so often portrayed by the motion pictures was realized. Beside the interesting sights to be seen in the city, there were many reminders of the war on every hand. On the beach was the wreck of a large U. S. transport, the THOMAS STONE, lost during the invasion of North Africa. Several half-submerged merchant ships, victims of the Axis air attacks on convoys, were waiting to be repaired. In a drydock lay the USS HOLDER, a destroyer escort, with her bow blown off by a torpedo. This ship was later the subject of one of the strangest jobs of ship surgery produced during the war.

On April 23, 1944, the DUANE, her supplies replenished, left Algiers for Naples with the USS PIONEER, a large fleet minesweeper. Again the DUANE found herself escorted against the danger of submarine attack. It should be explained that the ship was powerless against such attack because of the removal of her echo-ranging gear, depth charges, and heavy guns during the conversion. This equipment had been removed to make way for the anti-aircraft armament necessary to offset the anticipated Axis air warfare so prevalent in the Mediterranean. Unfortunately, however, there were still several German and Italian submarines in this area.
PICTURED FROM THE DECK OF A COAST GUARD COMBAT CUTTER, A PORTION OF THE INVASION FLEET MOVES FROM AN ITALIAN PORT FOR THE ASSAULT ON SOUTHERN FRANCE.
On the morning of April 25, 1944, the DUANE entered Naples harbor. Her luck had again held, for the night before Naples experienced one of the heaviest air attacks of the war. Although the city had been taken from the Germans the previous October, the harbor was still a shambles of sunken ships, and the waterfront area composed of piles of rubble left by Allied bombings. The DUANE picked her way through the wreckage and moored alongside a capsized Italian hospital ship being used as a pier. The ship was the object of much attention from the officers of the staff of Commander Eighth Amphibious Force whose flagship, the USS BISCUIT, a converted seaplane tender, was moored at an adjacent mole.

Sarcely had the ship put out her lines and secured than Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry and his staff came on board to inspect the new acquisition to their force. The results of this inspection were so favorable that the Admiral gave immediate orders that the DUANE was to be his flagship. In consequence his ship, the BISCUIT, pulled alongside the next morning and he and his staff came on board. His two-starred Admiral's flag was broken at the peak of the aftermast where it remained for over a year. During this time the DUANE acted as flagship of all U.S. amphibious forces in the Mediterranean.

Two days later, on April 28, 1944, the DUANE left Naples, and arrived at Bizerte, Tunisia, the next day. Less than a year before, in May, 1943, the city had surrendered to American forces, but not before it had been literally wiped off the earth by sustained bombing and artillery fire, necessitated by the last ditch stand of the remnants of Rommel's Afrika Corps. Before surrendering the enemy had made an attempt to block the harbor by sinking several ships in the narrowest part. This attempt was largely successful to the extent that Allied engineers were forced to blast a channel for our ships through the sunken hulks. Even so, the entrance to the inner harbor was replete with numerous obstructions and required the most careful ship handling in passing through the channel. The DUANE negotiated these dangers and passed into the inner harbor where she moored at the former French submarine base at La Pecherie.

At this time, Bizerte was far in the rear of the invading Allied armies, but was being used as a base by the Eighth Amphibious Force. The submarine finger piers at La Pecherie were ideal for mooring small landing and patrol craft, while the adjoining seaplane base at Karouba served for beaching the larger LST's. The many warehouses, shops, and quarters formerly used by the French were employed to great advantage for storage, repairs and berthing facilities, while the large seaplane hangars were used to store the mountains of supplies and equipment necessary to supply the logistic requirements of the force. The multitudinous details of a shore establishment large enough to maintain a large force at sea had by this time been knit together into an efficient and
Columns of infantry landing craft steam through the waters of the Mediterranean with the beaches of southern France as their goal.
well-stocked base by the experience gained during the invasions at Sicily and Salerno.

When the DUANE arrived at Bizerte, the familiar ships of the Coast Guard and Navy destroyer escort divisions which had convoyed her across the Atlantic were moored in the harbor awaiting the return voyage to the U.S. with a west bound convoy from India and the Red Sea. Many reunions were held between old shipmates who had not seen each other since the departure from Norfolk. It was with genuine regret that the crew watched these ships cast off and steam out of the harbor one by one at the beginning of their long voyage home. Many wished that they could change places with the returning crews, little knowing that disaster was due to strike the outbound convoy as it had the inbound ships.

Convoy GUS-38, as it was named, left Bizerte on May 1–2, 1944. At 0130 the next morning the Coast Guard manned destroyer escort, USS MENGENES, was torpedoed off Bone, Algeria, with a loss of 31 personnel. A distress message from the stricken ship was picked up by the DUANE immediately, and the bad news communicated to the Captain. From later reports it was apparent that the MENGENES was hit in the stern by a homing torpedo guided to its target by the noise of the ship's propellers. The stern was blown completely off and it was only by means of heroic efforts by the survivors that the ship remained afloat. She was towed to Algiers where temporary repairs enabled her to make the voyage back to the U.S. under tow. When she arrived there she was repaired by grafting onto the undamaged forward and midships part of the ship the stern of the destroyer escort USS HOLDER, which the crew of the DUANE had previously seen in the drydock at Algiers. The trials of Convoy GUS-38 did not end with the torpedoing of the MENGENES. Two days after it occurred, another destroyer escort, the USS FECHTLER, was also torpedoed, but was not as lucky as the MENGENES, as she sank almost immediately.

The DUANE remained at Bizerte for a few days during which the staff settled down and adjusted itself to their new flagship. This adjustment did not take place without a certain amount of strain which happily was ironed out by a mutual spirit of give and take on the parts of the staff and ship's crew. The tact and decision of Captain Moore contributed immeasurably to the difficult readjustment of the crew of the DUANE to their new circumstances where a life of relative inaction replaced their previous strenuous and nerve-racking experiences on convoy duty. While the staff remained on board, the ship functioned only as their headquarters and there was little to occupy the minds and bodies of the ship's crew necessary maintenance.

Towards the middle of May, 1944, the DUANE proceeded to Naples and worked out of that place on her infrequent voyages to Palermo, Sicily, and Bizerte. Time lay heavy on the crew with the exception
ON THE BRIDGE OF COAST GUARD CUTTER DUANE, OFF THE COAST OF SOUTHERN FRANCE.

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN W. O' DANIEL, (IN HELMET) U. S. ARMY, OF WASHINGTON, D. C.
DIRECTS OPERATIONS IN THE D-DAY LANDINGS BETWEEN MARSEILLES AND NICE
of sporadic air raids, when the harbor would be blacked out with chemical smoke, and no sign of the attacking bombers would be seen. The staff, however, was engaged in planning for the invasion of Southern France. This planning took place in an old Italian fort overlooking the harbor where the representatives of all services were gathered together for better coordination. The fort was appropriately called the "Blockhouse." Here General Alexander Patch, commanding the U. S. Seventh Army, and Admiral Hewitt, the naval commander, set up their headquarters together with their staffs.

Up to the end of May the Eighth Amphibious Force was mainly engaged in supplying the Allied forces on the Anzio beachhead. Admiral Lowry had directed the landings at this place in January, 1944. The allied forces were unable to make any headway in the bloody fighting at Anzio, and were blocked from advancing north to the beachhead by the desperate stand of the Germans at Cassino. Consequently all our forces at Anzio had to be supplied by sea. This was the job of the little LCT's and the larger LST's which loaded at the little ports of Misida and Pozzuoli a short distance north of Naples with supplies and replacements for the beleaguered troops. Upon arrival at Anzio the ships were under constant artillery fire from the Germans entrenched in the hills surrounding the beachhead, and under determined attacks by enemy aircraft and E-boats. The lot of these men was bad but that of the crews attached to the LCT's was even worse. These LCT's were permanently stationed at the beachhead to ferry the cargoes of supply ships ashore. The crews lived in the atmosphere of sudden death for weeks on end.

The impasse at Anzio was broken towards the end of May when the Allied forces of the Fifth Army broke out of Cassino. Rome was taken on June 4, 1944, a very real accomplishment to the inadequate troops in Italy, but overshadowed in the eyes of the world by the news of the landings in Normandy. The ships and craft of the Eighth Amphibious Force were then withdrawn for repairs and preparation for the landings in Southern France.

Rehearsals for the proposed invasion occupied the month of July. The DUANE took a prominent part in these practice runs which took place in the vicinity of Gaeta, south of Rome, the port from which Mussolini's legions embarked on the way to the civil war in Spain. On July 30, 1944, Major General O'Toole, commanding general of the veteran U. S. Third Division, and his staff came on board the DUANE to take part in a final full-dress rehearsal. This practice landing was participated in by the entire division who were carried in the same ships and craft in which they would sail for the actual assault. The exercises occupied two whole days, July 30-31, 1944.

These practice landings afforded the crew of the DUANE invaluable training for the invasion in which they were shortly to participate.
The communication personnel, especially, were enabled to set up and operate all the circuits which they later used in the actual assault. At this time there were upwards of fifty communication personnel on board including an Army communication team of twenty men. All equipment to be used was thoroughly overhauled by these men and placed in first class working condition. Circuits were calibrated and emergency facilities made ready for all foreseeable contingencies.

On August 9, 1944, the DUANE left Naples on her way to the assault area. She took with her a large convoy of LCT’s for which she acted as guide. The slow speed of these craft made it necessary to run at a speed of six knots. Many of the crew hazarded the opinion that the DUANE and her small landing craft were little better off than sitting ducks. Such pessimists, however, showed the same buoyant expectancy as the rest of the crew. Now that the ship was actually on her way, all sense of strain seemed to have vanished, and the general mood was one of anticipation. On August 12, 1944, the ship and her brood entered the harbor of Ajaccio, Corsica, the birthplace of Napoleon. There was little sight-seeing, however, for all hands were strenuously engaged in making the ship as ready for action as was in their power. The night passed with several interruptions to sleep, caused by air alerts. The next day the DUANE stood out of the harbor on the final lap to the assault area.

OFFICIAL ACTION REPORT
Amphibious Landing, Southern France, 15 August, 1944

GUIDES CONVOY TO ASSAULT AREA SOUTHERN FRANCE

An amphibious landing on the Southern Coast of France was made by the United States and Allied Forces on 15 August, 1944, and the CGC DUANE had a part in this operation. On 9 August, with C.T.P. 84 (Rear Admiral F. J. Lowry, USN) and his staff, and Commanding General, Third Division (Major General J. W. O’Daniel, USA) and his operational staff aboard, the Coast Guard cutter DUANE departed Naples at 1402. At 1600, the vessel assumed guide of convoy SS-1 en route to Ajaccio, Corsica. Early on the 12th the ships of the convoy anchored in assigned anchorages at Ajaccio for fueling and staging. At 2116 the next day the DUANE got underway with Convoy SS-1 as part of Task Force 80 to effect amphibious landing on Southern Coast of France. On the 14th, she departed that convoy to join Convoy SS-1R, assuming guide of the latter at 1325 and proceeding to assault area, vicinity of Baie de Cavalaire, where they arrived at 0451 on 15 August. Previously (0400) the HML Fleet minesweeper #59 had departed for Yellow Beach area, Queen Yellow reference vessel had been sighted (at 0402) bearing 020°T at 10 miles, and general alarm had been sounded (at 0445). At 0451, the DUANE stopped all engines, the order S-T-O-P was passed to LCT convoy.
in outer transport area, and the DUANE was released as guide of
LCT Convoy SS-1B. At this time Queen Red reference vessel, bearing
31°5', was 2,500 yards from the DUANE, and at 0506 the DUANE stood
toward her, taking station on the reference vessel at 0531. Also
at 0531 the LST's were lowering assault boats.

**PLANES AND VESSELS STRIKE**

Planes were overhead at 0532 en route to
bomb the beach area and scouts and raiders
departed at 0555. At 0600, when wave #1
of the assault boats were circling in vicinity
of Queen reference vessel, the naval bombardment of shore
targets commenced. Haze and twilight limited the visibility, but
at 0604 the shoreline became visible. There was an alert at 0607,
the alarm was sounded and all hands were at general quarters as
fighters circled overhead. Enemy aircraft was reported 10 miles N.E.

**WAVE #1 DEPARTS**

Wave #1 departed Queen reference vessel at
0617. A fire in LCT, astern to port, was
observed at 0613, but from the DUANE it
could not be determined whether it was a
burning vessel or barrage balloon. At 0629 there was a Red 2 alert
and aircraft were flying east over Sitka area. Wave #2 departed
at 0632. At 0638, there was a loud explosion and column of water
east of transport area, cause undetermined. At 0643, a TBS report
stated that friendly aircraft would arrive from southeast in waves
at 5 minute intervals on bombing missions. Wave #3 departed at
0650 and wave #4 departed at 0700. At 0703, the DUANE with all
assault craft, proceeded from outer to inner transport area of
Red Beach, stopping engines at 0716. A plane, a P-47, had been
seen to fall at 0738 and burst into flames on crashing into the
sea. The pilot, who had bailed out, was picked up by PC-1169,
one mile ahead of the DUANE. An 0742 radio report had stated that
Romeo force was bombed by own planes.

**WAVE #1 LANDS AT "H" HOUR LITTLE OR NO RESISTANCE**

At 0749, according to TBS radio report, wave
#1 was one mile off the beach, and a report
received at 0813 stated that this wave had
landed on Yellow Beach at 0800. 0800 was
"H" hours of "D" day of the Anvil or Dragoon
operation. LCT's proceeded toward the beach
at 0807, LCI wave at 0821, DUKW wave at 0830,
last of LCI wave with DUKWs following at 0832, and LCT wave at 0855.
A TBS radio report at 0825 stated that the waves #1 and #2 had landed
on Red Beach on schedule, at 0903 there was a report of little or no
resistance on either Red or Yellow Beaches, and at 1022 a report
that Alpha Red Beach operations were progressing very satisfactorily.
Smoke blowing from the beaches at 1043 reduced visibility. At 1044,
Major General O'Daniel and part of operational staff departed the
DUANE in an LCVP.
ABoard Coast Guard Combat Cutter Duane Participating in the Invasion of Southern France.
A smoke screen was laid down at 1230, west of the DUANE, to prevent attack on shipping by shore batteries, and another smoke screen was laid down at 1440 along the western edge of Inner Red Transport area. At 1500 an LCVP departed with Captain D. Wickersham and additional members of the Army staff. At 1507 the HMS ORION, lying east of the DUANE, began firing over her in a shore bombardment, and at 1530 it was reported that gun emplacements in area M-16 had been knocked out by the ORION, who by then ceased firing. At 1612 the DUANE got underway for anchorage, mooring at 1648 in Baie de Cavalaire. At 1705 unidentified planes were approaching. It was observed at 1710 that LST's were unable to beach directly on Red Beach and that one pontoon causeway was being used. At 2046 ships in the vicinity began making smoke. The DUANE's jammer equipment operator at 2055 reported receipt of glider bomb signals on five frequencies and commenced jamming. Radar reported "Bogey" and friendly aircraft indications merged on bearing 040°.

Fires on Enemy Plane

The DUANE shifted anchorage at 1042 on the 16th. On that date at 2051 there was a report that glider bomb-carrying aircraft were in the air, and three minutes later, at the time of a red alert, anti-aircraft fire was visible on an unidentified plane. At 2100 all batteries on board fired at plane identified as enemy. 164 rounds of 40 mm, H.E.T. were expended, but no hits were observed. There was no battle damage. Smoke generator was put in operation and No. 4 boat was lowered away to make smoke with portable equipment, laying screen ahead of ship. The All Clear was given at 2325. On the 17th, Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, USN, Commander Eighth U. S. Fleet, came aboard for an official visit, departing at 1119. All ships in the anchorage began making smoke at 1013. Early on the 18th the smoke generator was in operation and the boat crew was standing by to windward to drop smoke pots. Smoke making ceased at 0022 and the DUANE was secured from general quarters.

Report on Engagement of "E" Boats

A TBS radio report at 0025 stated that "E" boats were being engaged by outer defense patrol craft. Strong glider bomb signals were received at 2054, and jamming equipment was put in operation. Surrounding vessels opened fire on aerial target at 2100, but ceased at 2105 when it was learned that target was friendly. On the 19th, at 1700, a "Bogey" at 15 miles was reported by radar, but was identified as friendly at 1703. On the 20th at 1044, Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry, USN, Comoth Phib and Commander Alpha Attack Force, departed for official visit on board the USS LIVERMORE, returning shortly afterwards. Gunfire by shore batteries at unidentified planes was observed at 2046. To cover shipping in the harbor a smoke screen was laid at 2052. At 2100, the DUANE's fire control officer...
AS COAST GUARD COMBAT CUTTER DUANE MOVES SHOREWARD IN OPERATIONS JUST PRECEDING THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE, PART OF THE VAST INVASION ARMADA WHICH CARRIED ALLIED FORCES AND THEIR SUPPLIES STRETCHES OUT BEHIND IT.
reported sighting what was thought to be a glider bomb, and gun-
fire at aircraft was also sighted. That "H" boats were in the
outer Alpha area and that one might have gotten through was re-
ported at 0150 on the 21st by TBS radio. All ships in Alpha
area were ordered darkened at 0200, and later they were instructed
to remain darkened for the rest of the night. At 2019 various
units in the area opened fire on a plane which passed out of
range and dropped recognition signal.

MEDICAL
DEPARTMENT
PREPARES FOR
AMPHIBIOUS
OPERATION

In preparation for the invasion operation
the DUANE, according to usual practice,
took on board a maximum of medical supplies
and augmented her medical personnel by two
second class pharmacist's mates, one of
them a surgical and operating room techni-
cian. Medical stores were distributed
throughout the ship, including sick bay, the wardroom (to be used
as an auxiliary surgery), and the after officer's quarters. First
aid teams and stretcher bearer teams were assigned. Five steward's
mates were drilled as stretcher bearers and 10 extra radar and
C.I.C. enlisted men were drilled as first aid teams. Chemical
warfare was anticipated as a possibility, so preparations were
made for treating such casualties. Major and minor surgical packs
were made up and sterilized. The department's facilities were not
called into use except for routine medical cases as the DUANE
treated no casualties due to enemy action, either en route or at
the assault area.

ADDITIONAL ACTION REPORT
During Amphibious Operations against Southern France
Dated 10 September, 1944

COMMANDS
COMBINED
LCT CONVOYS

C.T.F. 6th, in CGC DUANE as flagship, was
assigned to command the combined LCT con-
voys of all three Task Forces because of
the suitability of the flagship with steam
turbine engines for the slow accurate speed
required. Due to the 'staging, fueling and repairing of craft in
Ajaccio and to the accurate navigation possible with the DUANE, all
LCT convoy sections were released at the proper time and place and
all reached their respective Transport Areas on time. Subsequently,
the DUANE was the amphibious flagship for Commander Task Force 6th,
and very satisfactorily performed duties during assault and follow-up
in Baie de Cavalaire.

THE BAYFIELD

After a short period allowed for necessary repairs the BAYFIELD
was assigned to Task Group 120-6, which was formed on 5 July and

- 259 -
directed to sail for Oran, Algeria. The Task Group arrived at Oran on 10 July where the unit was dissolved. Reassigned to Convoy UGF-12, the BAYFIELD proceeded to Naples, Italy, on 12 July. Task Force 87 was organized upon arrival at Naples. Following the death of Admiral Moon, Rear Admiral Spencer Lewis, USN, assumed command of Task Force 87. Training exercises were held on 6 and 7 August to prepare Task Force 87 for the invasion of Southern France. On the 13th of August the BAYFIELD left for the assault on the southern coast of France. In this assault she debarked the Commanding General and troops of the 36th Division near St. Raphael on the early morning of the 15th. On 29 August, Captain Rutledge B. Tompkins, USN, became Commander Task Force 87. On 5 September Captain Spencer was detached and Commander Gordon A. Littlefield, USCG, Executive Officer of the BAYFIELD, assumed command. The BAYFIELD returned to Naples on 10 September. On 13 September she was ordered to Oran via Bizerte for duty. 16 September found the BAYFIELD underway for the United States in Convoy GUF 14. She arrived at Norfolk on 26 September where passengers embarked at Oran were discharged.

THE SAMUEL CHASE

Two months after the Normandy invasion, Lt. Forrestal landed again in France, but this time on the Riviera coast as the leader of the first boat wave to grind ashore at H-hour. Said the Coast Guard Lieutenant about the second invasion of France, "Though the beachhead was practically secured before we hit, the approach was just as nerve-wracking as at Normandy. We didn't know until we landed and the smoke of the preliminary bombardment had cleared away that the Jerries had run out on us."

ASSAULT ON FRANCE

The SAMUEL CHASE got underway at 1130 on the 13th in accordance with Commander Task Force 84 Secret Operation Order Bigot-Dragoon of 5 August. She was under direct command of Task Group 84.114.1, Alpha Section, Convoy SF-1B, USS HENRICO flagship and guide. She maneuvered to form sortie cruising disposition #1. At 1736 cruising disposition #2 was formed, and at 1807 cruising disposition #3 was formed as follows:

| DERBYSHIRE | CHASE | HENRICO | DUNERA |
| HIGHWAY    | BOERON | ARUNDEL | CATOCTIN |
| LORRAINE   | ANDROMEDA | THURSTON | |

The vessels continued toward their destination in Southern France, and at 0415 on 15 August they arrived at the transport area. Here the CHASE stopped and set condition 1A. She commenced debarking troops for assault at 0546, completing this at 0600; opened hatches 1, 2, and 4; and at 0750 closed Yellow Beach, Bay of Pampelonne, Southern France. The first assault wave from the CHASE landed on

- 261 -
MEN WHO FELL ON THE INVASION BEACHES OF SOUTHERN FRANCE WERE SWIFTLY TRANSFERRED TO SHIPS STANDING OFF SHORE FOR HOSPITALIZATION
Yellow Beach on schedule. Because of hitting a submerged object in the water, LCVP #9 was lost after retraction. During the assault, enemy fire was moderate and two members of boat crews received gun shot wounds.

UNLOADING HAMPERED BY LACK OF LCM's

Upon the return of the boats from the beach, casualties were brought aboard. Unloading of cargo began at 1040, but proceeded slowly because numerous heavy vehicles could not be unloaded without LCM's. Two LCM's fitted with rocket racks, reported for duty, but one of these was in poor operative condition, and before it could be used, it was necessary to unbolt the heavy rack frame and hoist it aboard ship, this work taking about three hours. At 1337, the CHASE got underway to close the beach again, and anchored 30 minutes later, having closed to about 1.5 miles from the left flank of Yellow Beach. The unloading of hold #4 was completed at 1510, and at 1726 LST-827 came alongside to assist in unloading hatches 1 and 2. Casualties were received throughout the day and air alerts occurred frequently. At 2107 all vessels in the area opened fire on an enemy plane which was overhead but dropped no bombs. At this time all vessels made smoke until 2135, when the red alert was changed to yellow. By 2240 all holds were completely unloaded and hatches were secured. As boats returned from cargo trips, they were hoisted aboard.

MORE CASUALTIES BROUGHT ABOARD

On the 16th of August the CHASE remained at anchor until evening. During the day she received 54 casualties, including 2 wounded prisoners of war, 2 dead (whose remains were transferred to the beach), and a third who died after being brought on board. She was secured from condition 1A at 1200 and set condition 2M. During the afternoon, fuel, water, and provisions were given to a number of SC's and LCT's. At 1956, the CHASE got underway to form return convoy for Oran. Shortly after leaving anchorage she observed enemy air action near the beach, in which vessels of the return convoy took no part except to assume battle stations for one hour.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

The invasion was marked by complete air coverage and little enemy resistance of a determined character. At an early hour good penetration was made ashore and casualties were relatively light. On the 16th many prisoners were observed being evacuated from the beach. Boat operations were satisfactory. It was again demonstrated that LCT's are most valuable to unload transports quickly, and an insufficient number of them slowed the unloading. Large bulldozers and other heavy equipment require at least one LCT, and the additional LCM's furnished were of little help because of their operating condition, it being apparent that they were intended only to discharge rockets on the initial assault and that no great thought had been given to using them for subsequent unloading.
CAPTAIN R. J. MAUERMAN
COMMANDING THE JOSEPH T. DICKMAN
INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE

The DICKMAN stood out of anchorage on 15 August and proceeded in convoy. At 0417 on 15 August, she was standing toward Transport Area #2. All stations were manned and ready at 0449, and at 0520 the DICKMAN stopped, drifting in Transport Area #2, and commenced lowering troops. At 0947 she got underway standing towards Transport Area #1, in which area she stopped at 0955. At 1050 boats were returning while the DICKMAN continued to debark troops. At 1050, she opened five holds preparing to unload vehicles and cargo. At 1120, she got underway, stopped 25 minutes later, drifting abreast of reference vessel "C", and began to unload vehicles and cargo. HMS LCT-617 and USS LCT-561 assisted in unloading operations. At 1555, all vehicles, cargo, and remaining troops were debarked and the DICKMAN commenced hoisting boats. All boats were hoisted by 1815. The DICKMAN got underway at 1818, stopped at 1931, drifting in vicinity of Point "E", then got underway again at 2002 following USS STANTON. She carried the following casualties: one member of the ship's crew, coxswain, USN-I, wounded by machine gun fire during action with the enemy; three U. S. Army; and five enemy casualties. As 16 August began, the DICKMAN was underway as before from Bougon Bay, France, to Naples, Italy. The USS ARCTURUS joined the convoy at 0320. The vessels reached Naples on the 17th, the DICKMAN anchored at 1122 in Naples Harbor, and transferred one Navy, one Marine Corps, four Army casualties, and five prisoners of war to Peninsula Base Section, Naples, for hospitalization, and also transferred an enlisted man of the Navy to U. S. Naval Dispensary, Naples, for in-patient treatment.

***


17 August, 1944

From: Commanding Officer, USS JOSEPH T. DICKMAN
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet
Subj: Report of Operations, 13-17 August, 1944

"1. This vessel landed the 3rd Battalion, 180th Infantry and supporting detachments from 179th Infantry, 40th Engineers, 4th Beach Battalion, U. S. Navy, 10th and 11th Field Hospital Corps, 2nd Auxiliary Surgical Group, 50th Medical Detachment, 93rd Evacuation Hospital, 450th Engineers, 157th Infantry, 71st Signal Corps, 682nd Ordnance, 171st Field Artillery, 83rd Chemical Battalion, Naval Demolition Units 83, 47, 197, 28, 29 and 30, 693rd Port Company, and 389th Medical Collecting Company, on Blue Beach, Baie de Bougon, France, on 15 August, 1944, in accordance with reference (d). A total of 1,790 troops, 136 officers, 80 vehicles, and approximately 10 tons of stores was landed without damage or casualty.

- 265 -
CHARGING ASHORE FROM THE MIGHTY AMERICAN INVASION FLEET THAT CRASHED INTO SOUTHERN FRANCE, THESE TWO DUCKBOYS WERE KILLED ATTACKING A GERMAN DUGOUT ON THE BEACH.
"2. Weather conditions were very favorable there being a light variable breeze, light sea and no swell. Visibility was excellent except for a slight haze.

"3. The vessel departed the Naples area in assigned convoy at 1300 on 13 August, 1944, and reached its station and stopped in the convoy area, latitude 43°10'N, longitude 60°53'E, at 0520, 15 August, 1944. Early boats were launched at once and unloading proceeded in an orderly fashion according to schedule. All troops and vehicles were debarked by 1547 and the vessel proceeded as ordered to join return convoy. Return was made without incident and anchored in the Naples area at 1122, 17 August, 1944.

"4. The following casualties were incurred by members of this vessel's company: ARCHIBALD, William B. (830-67-35), Coxswain, USN-I, wounded in the face by machine-gun bullets, and Ensign Albert M. LOW, (320728) D-V(G), USNR, slight superficial scratch in buttocks by shell fragment. There was no damage to the vessel, its gear or its boats.

"5. All personnel performed their duties efficiently, loyally and expeditiously. All ship's equipment and gear functioned satisfactorily. Since the vessel was not under direct attack, the ship's defensive ordnance did not come into use. Boat ordnance and munitions performed satisfactorily except for jamming of .50 cal. machine-gun on LCS(S) boat #14.

"6. This vessel treated a total of 11 action casualties, classified as follows:

(a) Two French civilians were treated and returned to Blue beach.

(b) Two Army casualties were treated and evacuated to Army hospital at Naples.

(c) Two members of the crew were treated and one evacuated to hospital at Naples.

(d) Five wounded enemy prisoners of war were received, treated, and turned over to the U. S. Army, 17 August, 1944, at Naples, together with their effects.

No deaths occurred to any of the above while under treatment of this medical department.

"7. Enemy fire in the landing area was light. Two boat waves were compelled to maneuver vigorously to avoid being bracketed by enemy artillery fire. LCS(S) boats from this vessel took under fire several beach strong points in the early phase of the assault. These strong points were silenced by fire from the LCS(S)'s and supporting
SILHOUETTED BENEATH THE LONG MUZZLE OF A GUN ABOARD COAST GUARD COMBAT CUTTER DUANE, PART OF THE HUGE ALLIED ARMADA WHICH INVADED SOUTHERN FRANCE STEAMS SHOREWARD IN LANDING MANEUVERS WHICH PRECEDED THE ACTUAL ATTACK
destroyers. A number of rockets from LCT(R)'s fell short and exploded around the LCS(S) boats. There was, fortunately, no damage caused. Boat wave officers report some delay due to apparent confusion on Charlie reference vessel.

"8. All communications functioned well, without failure or breakdown. The SCR sets again proved their superiority over the TBY's. The Communication Officer offers the following constructive comments:

(a) Reduction of the radio channels guarded. Personnel available were insufficient to properly guard all channels assigned and several channels carried no essential traffic for this vessel.

(b) Considerable unnecessary repetition of messages was observed on all circuits especially channel...(not legible). The TBF was used for dispatches other than tactical.

(c) To save time and avoid confusion, the use of plain voice, rather than a cumbersome voice code, is suggested for the assault phase.

"9. Several pertinent comments follow:

(a) The Transport Quartermaster assigned was not a member of the Assault Battalion and at times it was difficult to obtain needed information.

(b) Unloading was delayed by the failure of LCT's 344 and 389 to appear in accordance with reference (d). These vessels were finally sighted behind LSF's near reference vessel Charlie. In response to signals requesting them to assist in unloading, they answered that they acted only on instructions from Charlie reference vessel. It is believed that this should be investigated. It is further desired to note that boat wave officers report Charlie reference vessel as being uncooperative.

(c) The officer in charge of the LCS(S) boat carrying the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer suggests that a method be devised for directing communications support fire by visual means instead of grids. He notes considerable delay in the use of the grid system and also comments on the fact that LCF's and LCG's were not on the Naval gunfire Liaison Officer's circuit. The use of the Very signals or the development of a 'smoke bullet' accurate to approximately 2,000 yards has been suggested.
EXIT FROM ACTION FOR NAZIS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE
"10. The Salvage Officer suggests that in future operations each APA and AKA be equipped with a standard motor-driven two wheel portable pump for use in salvaging swamped boats. Had weather conditions been less favorable, several boats would have been lost on Red beach due to swamping.

"11. The substance of the Executive Officer's report is contained herein.

"12. Passage to and from the assault area was without notable incident. Since this vessel is scheduled to remain in Naples, to and including D plus 10 days, it is deemed advisable to submit this report now inasmuch as the Commanding Officer, Captain R. J. Mauerman, U. S. Coast Guard, will be detached and relieved by Captain S. A. Leamy, U. S. Coast Guard, within the next few days. If further items of interest in connection with the operation occur before D plus 10 days, supplementary report will be prepared to cover the provisions of Appendix 7 to Annex T to reference (d), paragraph (b) (1).

/s/ R. J. MAUERMAN

Typical of awards received by Coast Guard officers and men for action during the Landings in France are the following:

Lieutenant Commander Alexander H. Stewart, Jr., USCGR, was awarded the Bronze Star Medal by Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, in the name of the President "for meritorious service as Commanding Officer of a U. S. Coast Guard Rescue Flotilla during the invasion of the coast of France in June, 1944." His citation reads, in part, "Lieutenant Commander Stewart achieved and maintained a high state of efficiency in the operation of the units of his flotilla throughout the initial assault and build-up period immediately following the landing. All obstacles were surmounted despite limited time due to late arrival. His craft rescued fourteen hundred and thirty-eight survivors and accomplished in a prompt and efficient manner many missions as escort, navigational leader, and dispatch boat. The contribution of this command to the success of the invasion was substantial."

The French Croix de Guerre with silver star was awarded to Commander Lance J. Kirstine, USCG, by Rear Admiral Lemonnier, General Chief of Staff of the Navy and Commander Naval and Naval Air Forces of the French Admiralty. The French citation reveals that "during the landing of French troops on an enemy held island in June, 1944, he led the LST's to the designated beaches and successfully carried out the landings in spite of violent enemy gunfire, giving proof of his courage and fearlessness." He appears to be the only Coast Guardsman who has received this high French award.
HAVING MARKED MONGOLOID CHARACTERISTICS, BUT NOT JAPS, THESE TWO WARRIORS OF THE NAZI ARMIES WERE CAPTURED BY AMERICAN TROOPS ON THE FRENCH INVASION COAST
Previously, Commander Kirstine had been awarded the Legion of Merit by the Commander, United States Eighth Fleet, in the name of the President, for "outstanding services as a Commander of landing craft ... during the amphibious invasion of Southern France in August, 1944." This latter award cited him for his "professional skill, sound judgment and outstanding devotion to duty" in organizing, training and maintaining in perpetual readiness the LCT's allocated to the Task Force. It states that he skillfully controlled their operations directing them safely in convoy to the proper unloading points on the assault beaches. "In past assault operations, his efficient control of offshore unloading activities contributed materially to the effective support rendered to the rapidly advancing Allied Armies into enemy-held territory," the citation concludes.

For meritorious performance of duty as Assistant Boat Group Commander aboard the USS SAMUEL CHASE while that ship was engaged in the assault on France, June 6, 1944, Lieutenant (j.g.) Edward R. Tharp, USCG, was awarded the Bronze Star. Lieutenant Tharp was of great assistance in planning the assault boat schedule which was then in operation. Despite enemy gunfire, he closed the beach many times in order to provide the Assault Group Commander with valuable data for carrying out the assault. The efficiency and professional ability displayed by Lieutenant Tharp on this occasion was in keeping with the best traditions of the U. S. naval service.

COAST GUARD FERRIED ASSORTED NAZIS TO UNITED STATES

The first motley mob of German prisoners from France — several thousand ersatz editions of Nazi supermen including Orientals, "Russian-Germans" from Turkestan, Poles and natives of the Sudetenland and the countries along the German borders were unloaded from a giant Coast Guard manned Transport, at an East Coast United States port.

Gone from this portion of the vaunted Wehrmacht was all the fight they had shown but several days before boarding ship when they were nabbed by Yank paratroopers and other Allied forces in Normandy. Gone were the usual sullen, domineering masks of Nazi prisoners of war.

The first invasion haul netted an odd assortment of prisoners, pink cheeked, tow headed boys of 14 and 15; gaunt whiskered, war-withered, tall men; little, middle-aged runts. The prisoners wore all sorts of uniforms, blue gray and green — all cheap and filthy.
FAR FROM FEARSOME BESIDE THE TALL, GRINNING SIX-FOOT MARINE GUARD WHO IS WATCHING OVER THEM, TWO ERSTWHILE NAZI "SUPERMEN" APPEAR PUNY AND DISILLUSIONED AS THEY ARE HEADED AWAY FROM THE WAR TO PRISON CAMPS IN AMERICA
Some, particularly the baby-soldiers, were more talkative. Many jabbered away as they formed lines for their first shipboard meal of skin-bursting frankfurts, sauerkraut, C-I beans, bread, butter, jam and strong Navy coffee with milk and sugar. They spoke of themselves although the Army and Marine Corps guards assisting in the handling of the prisoners obeyed orders not to strike up conversations with the prisoners.

Guards who brought the prisoners to the dock told stories of the Germans looting Allied soldiers who fell under Nazi fire before the beaches were established, taking many items from the dead from wedding rings to shoes. None of this stolen gear was brought aboard by this group of prisoners.

On orders of the ship's commanding officer, Captain Roy L. Raney, USCG, the crew were forbidden to barter, collect souvenirs, talk with, or fraternize with the prisoners. Attempts of the prisoners to barter their "souvenirs" met only blank silence.

Warning against abusing the prisoners and citing the need for impassiveness toward German jeers and insults, Captain Raney said, "remember constantly that any thoughtless act on the part of the ship's personnel may be reflected on thousands of Americans now imprisoned. Violence offered a prisoner could be reported through the International Red Cross to Germany and used as an excuse for vicious treatment of American prisoners."

During the voyage to the States the vessel's Marine Guard, under command of Lieutenant Gilbert Olson efficiently handled the prisoners. Reports disclosed no action, either by the prisoners or guards that warranted any officer's attention.

The prisoners displayed a decided weakness for the sugar bowls usually left on the tables in the mess halls. During the first meal, each man ate about one-half pound of sugar, using a half cup of sugar with each mug of coffee until Lieutenant George B. Kefover, USCGR, commissary officer, instituted rationing.

Paris was liberated on August 25, 1944. Germany surrendered to the Allies, at Reims, on May 7, 1945. Four months later, Japan surrendered. President Truman announced the end of the war on September 1, 1945 — six years later to the day when the war started, On September 1, 1939, with the invasion of Poland.

Steps in the German defeat, as given in General Marshall's Official Report, were as follows: 1. Failure to invade England. 2. Campaign of 1941 in the Soviet Union. 3. Stalingrad. 4. Invasion of North Africa. 5. Invasion of France. 6. Ardennes Counterattack. 7. Crossing of the Rhine.
GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, GREETED CONGRESSMEN AT HIS ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS IN EUROPE
Decisive factors of the world struggle at its most critical moments were disclosed as follows by captured German officers, interrogated by General Eisenhower. 1. Hitler's original plan was to create a greater Reich to dominate Europe. 2. No evidence that German High Command had any overall strategic plan. Military judgment was subordinated to Hitler's personal dictates. No General Staff objection was expressed when Hitler made the fatal decision to invade Soviet Russia. 3. Italy's entry into war was undesired by the German Army. It caused Germany over-extension - the Balkan and African campaigns - and led to the German defeat. 4. There was no close strategic coordination between Germany and Japan. All three aggressor nations were eager for loot yet unable to agree on a strategic, overall plan for accomplishing a common objective.*

The establishment of the Allied foothold on the European continent was a tribute to everyone involved. After every phase of the daily operation became routine, it was still a tremendous enterprise. Perhaps the best summary is expressed in General Eisenhower's message of June 11, 1946. "To soldiers and sailors, and merchant seamen, and all others of the Allied Expeditionary Forces: One week ago this morning, there was established through your coordinated efforts, our first foothold in Northwestern France. High as was my preinvasion confidence in your courage, skill, and effectiveness in working together as a unit, your accomplishments in the first seven days of this campaign have exceeded my brightest hopes. You are truly a great Allied team, a team in which one part gains its greatest satisfaction in rendering maximum assistance to others. No matter how prolonged or timely the struggle that lies ahead, you will do your full part toward the restoration of a Free France, the destruction of the Nazi machine. I truly congratulate you upon a brilliantly successful beginning to this undertaking. Liberty loving people everywhere would today like to join me in saying to you I am proud of you."

APPENDIX A

U. S. S. JOSEPH T. DICKMAN

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF OPERATIONS

Report of Operations, 5-17 June, 1944, Invasion of Normandy, France.

26 June, 1944

From: Commanding Officer, USS JOSEPH T. DICKMAN
To: Naval Commander, Western Task Force
Subj: Operation Narrative Report of Participation of JOSEPH T. DICKMAN

"1. Chronological narrative report of subject operation follows:

5 June 1944
1227 - departed Tor Bay anchorage. Proceeded without notable incident to transport area...in accordance with plan.

6 June 1944
0240 - anchored in assigned anchorage.
0300 - set condition #1.
0353 - all boats over.
0800 - began to receive casualties from beach.
0830 - began recovering boats.
1210 - completed unloading.
1308 - all boats returned and hoisted, except four LCVP's damaged by gunfire and three LCVP's swamped. These boats had succeeded in landing their troops, but were of necessity abandoned on the beach. All personnel returned with boats, except GLOWACKI, Stanley A. (558-106), Seaman 1/c, USCGR, badly wounded and believed dead, body not recovered, and ROCHE, Jack E. (560-260), Seaman 2/c, USCGR, badly wounded and placed on destroyer #629 (SHUBRICK).
1438 - underway. Departed assault area in convoy as ordered.

7 June 1944
0119 - anchored in Portland Harbor; passage from transport area having been made without notable incident. Transferred 107 casualties for hospitalization.
0521 - departed Portland Harbor.
1517 - anchored Falmouth Harbor. Transferred 37 casualties for hospitalization.

12 June 1944
0155 - departed Falmouth Harbor.
0750 - anchored Plymouth Harbor.
13 June 1944
0835 - embarked 313th Regiment Infantry.
1935 - departed Plymouth Harbor in convoy as ordered.

14 June 1944
1345 - anchored off Green beach...as directed, passage having been made without notable incident. Debarked troops.
1625 - underway.
1743 - anchored as directed by Shuttle Control to await formation of returning convoy.
1836 - underway in convoy as ordered.

15 June 1944
1339 - anchored in Falmouth Harbor, passage having been made without notable incident.

Anchored as before.

"2. COMMENT ON ASSEMBLY:
Assembly was effected without difficulty in all movements of this vessel."
APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF FIFTH YEAR OF WORLD WAR II

From article by Prof. Edgar McInnis
University of Toronto (Americana, 1945)

Short Summary

The fifth year of the war was marked above everything else by the unfolding of the grand Allied design for the crushing of Germany. The tide which had turned at Stalingrad and Alamein, and which had steadily gathered power during the year that followed, was running full strength by the summer of 1944. The superiority of the Allies in manpower and resources and productive capacity had been translated into action. Some of this strength made itself felt in the Pacific, where the advance toward Japan was marked by the lengthening strides which carried the Americans from the Gilberts to the Philippines. But the really massive operations were in Europe, where from east and south and west the concerted power of the United Nations closed on Hitler's Reich.

By autumn the final stage of the European war was in sight. The Germans had been expelled from all but the last remnant of the lands they had overrun, and were battling desperately within their own borders. The Russian advance had rolled westward from the Dnieper to the Vistula. Eastern Poland and the Baltic States had been freed; Finland and Bulgaria and Rumania had been knocked out of the war; Russian armies had entered East Prussia and were battling at the gates of Warsaw and Budapest. The Nazis had been forced to abandon Greece. The Liberation of Yugoslavia was in sight. Rome had been freed, and the Allies in Italy had driven to the edge of the Lombard plain. The successful invasion of Normandy had been followed by a powerful and brilliant offensive which freed France and Belgium and drove the Germans back to the Siegfried Line. Germany stripped of the food and materials which she had drawn from conquered Europe, with her air force crippled and her armies depleted and many of her industrial cities in ruin, was trying to stave off defeat for a little longer by a last desperate stand against the closing ring.

PREPARATIONS FOR INVASION

MASSING OF MEN AND SHIPS

Throughout the winter and spring, while the Russians were pressing on toward Poland and Rumania, the Allies in the west were bending all their energies toward preparing for the invasion of France. The preparations involved not only the massing of men and supplies and ships, but also strenuous efforts to soften up Germany's defensive power on the Atlantic Wall; and this was a task which rested primarily on air power.
ATTACK ON BERLIN

At the beginning of the year the major feature of the bombing offensive was the attack on Berlin. A sustained effort was in progress to knock out the capital as an effective center of production and communications and administration. Between 18 November, 1943, and 2 January, 1944, Berlin was hit by 14,000 tons of bombs. A series of attacks in the latter part of January added another 10,000. These raids were carried out by night bombers which saturated selected areas. At the beginning of March the daylight bombers took up the attack against specific targets which had escaped destruction by area bombing. Three raids in four days (6 - 9 March) virtually completed the offensive. There were later attacks to wipe out the work of reconstruction, but the major effort of the bombers was turned against other targets.

ATTACK ON LEIPZIG AREA

In particular, offensive efforts during the spring were directed against German production of fighter aircraft. The Germans were trying urgently and with considerable success to build up their defensive power in the air, and this had to be beaten down in preparation for the invasion. A week of good flying weather in February gave the Allies an opportunity for which they had been waiting. A night raid on airplane factories in the Leipzig area on 19 February was followed by sustained day and night raids over a side area. There were fierce battles in the air which cost the Allies 360 heavy bombers in the period of 19-25 February, but the Germans lost 640 fighters in the air in addition to many more destroyed on the ground, and the outcome was a fatal blow to German air strength. Production of fighter planes was set back to the level of the autumn of 1942, and the Allies were able to hold it down by selective raids in the subsequent months while they turned their attention to German oil production and to the tactical objectives connected with the invasion.

ROBOT BOMBS

German tactics and activities were a testimony to the telling effects of these blows. Fighter planes were hoarded for defense of the most vital objectives, and it was chiefly over a few special targets in central and southern Germany that Allied opposition to the invasion and gave only meager support to the ground forces in France and Italy. Their attempts at counterblows took the form, not of a new bombing offensive against Britain, but of attacks by jet-propelled pilotless bombs. The attack began on 15 June from launching sites along the Channel coast. As a military weapon the robot bomb was relatively ineffective; but as a weapon against the London area it caused considerable damage and inconvenience. Bombing of the launching sites and the development of defensive methods which combined the balloon barrage and fighter patrols and anti-aircraft fire proved however to be increasingly effective. Out of 8,000 missiles launched, only 2,300 got through to London, and by September the proportion reaching this target was only 9 per cent. It was, however, the conquest of the
Channel coast that brought this particular menace to an end and permitted the announcement on 7 September that the Battle of Britain was over. This did not mean freedom from all attack. Robot bombs were now being launched from planes instead of from land sites; and by October another form of attack had developed from the giant rocket projectile which the Germans called V-2. Nonetheless, the intensity of the attack was greatly reduced by the pushing back of the Germans to their own frontiers; and this also meant that Germany herself was under more concentrated attack than ever. The demands of the invasion had not prevented a steady hammering by Allied bombers at German production, particularly at oil production which was increasingly vulnerable when the Russian advance deprived the Nazis of their sources of natural oil; and by autumn the methodical shattering of the Rhineland cities hit not only at production centres, but at the communication points which were vital to the defense of the West Wall.

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

A further prelude to the invasion in the west was the launching of a major offensive in Italy. Here there already existed a land front on which the Allies had concentrated substantial forces, and where a strong attack would at least pin down some 25 German divisions, and might force the Nazis to draw still further on their available strength and possibly destroy the German forces south of the Alps.

CASSINO

At the beginning of the year the Allies were held up by strong positions some 80 miles below Rome. The pivot of the German defense was around the strong mountain positions at Cassino which guarded the main route along the Via Casilina. Flanking and frontal attacks at this point had alike failed to dislodge the Germans. In an effort to divert their strength, the Allies turned to amphibious operations. On 22 January an invading force was landed at Anzio in the hope that this threat to their rear would force the Germans to withdraw part of their strength from Cassino, where a new Allied attack might then achieve a break through.

BITTER FIGHTING

This ultimate aim was not achieved. The landing force successfully established itself at Anzio and held a strong bridgehead against a series of German counter attacks. But the need to consolidate the position prevented a swift expansion inland across the main German lines of communication. Consequently the Germans were able to contain the bridgehead with reinforcements from reserves in the north, and did not feel obliged to weaken their defenses at Cassino. As a result, the Allies were unable to break through. Their attack carried them into Cassino but failed to dislodge the Germans completely from the town or from the dominating height of Monte Cassino above it. Much bitter fighting followed. By June 1, 1944, Rome was in Allied hands. As a result, the Allied
invasion of Normandy took place at a time when the Germans in Italy were in full retreat.

**INVASION OF FRANCE**

METHODICAL "SOFTENING" CAMPAIGN

The invasion of Normandy began on 6 June. Air power had played a vital preparatory part, not only in breaking the strength of the Luftwaffe, but also in disorganizing the German defenses along the Atlantic Wall. A methodical campaign had crippled the whole railway system between the coast and the Rhine, delaying the movement of troops and supplies and driving the Germans on to the highways where they were mercilessly harried by Allied planes. Nearly every bridge across the Seine and the Loire has been wrecked, further contributing to the isolation of the region between the two rivers. Heavy and comprehensive bombing of the coast defenses immediately preceded the invasion. A few hours before the landing, three divisions of airborne troops were dropped in Normandy to seize vital positions around Caen and the Cherbourg Peninsula and to take the coast defenses from the rear.

INVASION CROSSING UNMOLESTED

The invasion itself was given perfect air cover. The great convoys, so tempting as bombing targets, crossed the Channel un molested. The covering naval force of 600 warships guarded the convoys and conducted their bombardment of the coast defenses with little danger from the air. The invasion by German naval forces, principally motor torpedo boats with some submarines and destroyers, but Allied losses were only six destroyers and 8 smaller warships and a single troopship during the first month of operations.

SOME OPPOSITION TO LANDING

The landings took place between a stretch of coast between the mouth of the Orne and the tip of the Cherbourg Peninsula. An American force in the center one of three principal beaches ran into serious opposition during the first day, but elsewhere the coast defenses were quickly overcome, and by next morning 250,000 troops had been put ashore and were driving inland. To supply and reinforce them, prefabricated ports were towed across the Channel in sections and set up at the little fishing villages of Arromanches and St. Laurent-sur-Mer. These improvised harbors had a capacity as large as Dover, and through them during the following weeks flowed the stream of men and supplies which by October had built up the Allied force to 3,000,000 men.

CHERBOURG TAKEN

The gaining of a foothold was the first phase. The next was the expansion of the beachhead. On the left, British and Canadian troops drove to the outskirts of Caen, where an airborne force
had seized and held a vitally important position. At Caen, the Germans organized a stiff resistance which checked the advance, but this absorbed the greater part of the available German forces and aided the success of the Americans on the right flank. On 12 June, they secured the road and rail center of Carentan at the base of the peninsula. On 18 June, other forces driving from St. Mere Eglise cut across the peninsula, isolating the port of Cherbourg. A ring was swiftly flung about the port itself, and on 26 June Cherbourg was in Allied hands, though German demolitions prevented its full use as a port for several weeks after its capture.

CAEN AND ST. LO TAKEN

The next month saw a bitter and tenacious struggle, with the Allies trying to gain elbow-room and the Germans striving to contain them while they gathered forces for a counteroffensive. It was the Allies who maintained the initiative and stabbed at one part of the line after another, keeping the Germans off balance and slowly widening their gains. Caen was taken on 9 July. Farther west, the Americans took St. Lo on 18 July.

ALLIES READY TO BREAK OUT INTO OPEN

These were two of the most important centers in the area, and the Allies with the strength they had accumulated were now in a position to launch a full-scale drive in an effort to break out into the open.

LIBERATION OF FRANCE

DRIVE TOWARD PARIS AND ORLEANS

The offensive began on 25 July with twin thrusts from Caen and St. Lo. The former made only limited progress, but it helped to pin down strong German forces, including the bulk of the armored divisions in Normandy, and so aided the American drive at St. Lo. Here too the first day brought only limited gains in spite of the massive assault by 1,500 heavy bombers which preceded the attack. But on the second day two narrow gaps were driven through and armored forces were at once thrown in to widen and exploit them. The Germans tried tenaciously to restore their line and to keep a grip on the coast with their left flank, but the capture of Avranches on 31 July meant that the Allies had gained a corridor through which their tank forces could pour to overrun the peninsula of Brittany and to sweep eastward toward Paris and Orleans.

DRIVE TOWARD FALAISE

The Germans made a desperate effort to restore the situation. Gathering the remnants of 6 armored divisions, they counterattacked against the Avranches corridor on 6 August in an attempt to cut it and to isolate the Allied spearheads beyond. The attempt failed, and it gave the Allies a chance to envelop the main German forces in Normandy. Their armored forces which had reached Le Mans
wheeled north to Argentan. A new attack was launched from Caen toward Falaise. Behind these prongs of the pincers, British and American forces threw a sack around the German Seventh and Fifth Panzer armies, while their artillery and air forces laid a curtain of fire across the narrow gap between Falaise and Argentan which offered the only route of escape.

GERMANS WITHDRAWAL
SECOND SET OF PINCERS

Part of the German force succeeded in withdrawing at the price of heavy losses. The rest were caught when the pincers finally closed on 19 August. Prisoners totalled over 40,000, and by the end of August, General Eisenhower estimated that the battle of Normandy had cost the Germans 400,000 casualties, of whom half were prisoners. Contributing to this was the further maneuver by which the Allies thrust a second set of pincers toward the Seine between Paris and Le Havre, forcing the Germans who escaped from the Falaise pocket to run still another gauntlet under the battering of Allied planes before they gained a brief respite from pursuit behind the line of the Seine.

PARIS LIBERATED ON 25 AUGUST

The enemy was given no chance to stabilize his defenses on that line. As soon as the Falaise pocket was formed, the sweep to the east was resumed. While one spearhead established a foothold across the Seine to the west of Paris at Mantes, other forces fanned out to occupy the north bank of the Loire and to thrust east beyond Orleans, while still others crossed the Seine in a sweep below Paris which curved beyond it to cross the Marne and the Aisne and head toward the Moselle. Paris itself, which the Allies had meant to bypass, became the scene of a rising on 19 August, and the appeal for help from the French Forces of the Interior brought the diversion of two divisions and the liberation of the French capital on 25 August.

ALLIED ATTACK ON SOUTH COAST

To complete the German rout the Allies by this time had also struck at the south coast. On 15 August, after several postponements due to the weather, a strong force landed between Toulon and Cannes. The defeat in Normandy and the retreat to the Seine already meant that the Germans has lost all hope of holding southern and central France, where their position was already jeopardized by the increasing success of the French Forces of the Interior. The new invasion forced the Germans to hasten their withdrawal. The Allies occupied Marseille (23 August) and Toulon (27 August) and their main force struck up the Rhone valley in the wake of the retreating Germans, while a smaller flanking force drove rapidly north to Grenoble and then cut west to the Rhone across the line of flight. The Germans who were intercepted at Livron managed to break through after serious losses, only to be harassed by close pursuit. Lyon fell (3 September) without a struggle. Part of the German force was herded toward Dijon, where along with other forces that had fled from the west it surrendered.
on 16 September. The remainder withdrew toward the Belfort Gap, and in that region the Allied force from the south made contact with that in the north on 11 September.

**DRIVE TO GERMANY BY FOUR ALLIED ARMIES**

By this time the Germans had been swept from the whole of France, except for Alsace-Lorraine and the ports to which isolated garrisons still clung. From the Seine, four Allied armies fanned out rapidly toward the borders of Germany. The First Canadian Army, which captured Rouen on 30 August, drove along the coast. From its bridgeheads between Paris and Rouen, the Second British Army struck out on 29 August in a spectacular drive which carried it across the Somme and through Amiens and Arras and Brussels to reach Antwerp on 4 September, a distance of 225 miles in six days. The advance cut across the path of retreat of the Germans along the Channel coast and forced them to retire northward before the pressure of the Canadian Army. Meanwhile between the British and the American Third Army, which had swung through Rheims (30 August) toward Nancy and Metz, the American First Army swept forward along an expanding front toward the border.

**CROSS GERMAN BORDER**

It drove through Belgium, capturing Namur (5 September) and Liege (8 September) and plunging across the German border to drive a wedge into the defenses near Aachen before its impetus was checked. Its capture of Sedan (7 September) was followed by a rapid advance through Luxembourg and another crossing of the German border near Trier. On 15 September, the Third Army captured Nancy and strengthened its footholds across the Moselle.

**RAPID ADVANCE OF ALLIES STRAINS THEIR SUPPLY LINES**

By this time the impetus of the pursuit was ebbing. The rapid advance of the Allies had seriously strained their supply lines, and the Germans had managed to stiffen resistance along the West Wall in the center and the water lines on either flank. The advance beyond the Moselle was held in check. The British had forced their way across the Albert and Escaut canals beyond Antwerp, but they too had been brought almost to a halt, and the Canadians established a foothold across the Leopold Canal only after bitter fighting. It began to seem as though the Germans could count on a breathing space in which to organize a new stand.

**WATER LINES MAIN OBSTACLES TO ADVANCE**

In an effort to avert the threatened deadlock the Allies embarked on a gallant and daring venture. The main obstacles to a continuance of the advance at the northern end of the front were the water lines of Belgium and Holland.

If these could be crossed, and particularly if the advance could be pushed beyond the lower Rhine, the West Wall could be outflanked and the way opened to the plains of northwest Germany.
FIRST
AIRBORNE ARMY
IN HOLLAND

To achieve this, the Allies called upon the newly formed First Airborne Army. On 17 September, in a striking demonstration of the Allied air superiority, a great armada of planes dropped three divisions of troops in broad daylight at selected spots in Holland. Simultaneously, the Second British Army attacked northward with strong armored spearheads in an attempt to link up with the lightly armed airborne forces before the Germans could crush them by overwhelming strength.

ALLIES SECURE
BRIDGE TO
NIJMEGEN

The venture had a remarkable degree of success. By the evening of 18 September, after an advance of 16 miles, the Second Army had made contact with the first airborne force at the road and rail center of Eindhoven. Next day an advance of 37 miles carried it through Grave, where the airborne forces had secured the bridge over the Maas, to Nijmegen on the southern branch of the lower Rhine. Here the airborne troops had been unable to capture the great bridge across the Waal, but the arrival of the ground forces made possible a combined attack on the northern and southern ends of the bridge which secured it intact on 20 September. Only one more step remained to crown the operation with triumph — the completion of contact with the last of the airborne forces which had been dropped north of the other branch of the Rhine (known as the Lek) at Arnhem, 10 miles farther on.

EPIC STAND
AT ARNHEM
LACK OF SUPPLIES
ENDED IN TRAGEDY

But the Allies were halted short of their final goal. The Germans organized a stubborn defense between the two branches of the Rhine. The British spearhead was checked at the village of Elst, 5 miles beyond Nijmegen. Counterattacks against the thin corridor to the south cut the main supply road on several occasions. The airborne forces at Arnhem meanwhile were surrounded and battered with artillery and tanks. Bad weather made it difficult to supply or reinforce them or to give adequate air support against the attacking Germans. Though they held out for a terrible 9 days, it became clear that contact could not be established in enough strength to hold the position. On the night of 25 September, the Arnhem force was ordered to cross the Rhine and join up with the main force to the south. Of an original force of about 6,500 some 2,200 made their way to safety; the remainder were dead or prisoners. It was an epic venture which ended tragically, but it made a vital contribution to the important measure of success which the effort had achieved.

BATTLE FOR
THE PORTS

The withdrawal from Arnhem meant that no quick decision could be hoped for in the west. The German positions were now too strong for the forces the Allies could bring to bear. They must gather their strength for a new effort; and the need to mass
supplies meant that they must now turn their attention to the securing of adequate ports. The Germans in their efforts to impose delay had left garrisons in nearly all the important ports while the main retreat went on. The harbors were certain to be damaged before these were given up, but their possession had become essential to the Allies. Their efforts were now concentrated on this objective. Brest, which had been besieged on 5 August, held out until 20 September in spite of determined assaults and bombardment from sea and air. Other coastal ports were reduced more quickly, most of them by units of the Canadian Army which British, Polish, and Czech troops were included.

After a month of grim and dogged fighting, the Allies drove the enemy from the port of Antwerp on November 7. Meanwhile the British, who had been pushing one wall of the Arnhem corridor eastward toward the Maas, had simultaneously struck westward in a drive which threatened to pocket the remaining Germans in southwest Holland. The Nazis were forced to withdraw from that area; and the clearing of the whole region, together with the easing of the supply situation which was now assured by the liberation of Antwerp, gave a solid foothold and assured supply prospects which made possible the launching of a new general offensive along the whole western front.

The opening moves were in the south. As assault on Metz on 6 November was followed by attacks toward Belfort and Strasbourg. German resistance was in the nature of a delaying action covering a retreat under pressure toward the Rhine. By 20 November Belfort and Metz had been taken, and Strasbourg fell on 23 November. The Allies had reached the upper Rhine and were pushing into the Saar basin. At the northern end of the front, where the capture of Aachen (20 October) paved the way for an attack toward the Cologne plain, opposition was much fiercer. At the end of November the Allies were fighting to dislodge the Germans from positions along the Roer River and from their last footholds west of the Maas in the region of Venlo.

The Germans opened an offensive on the Belgium and Luxembourg fronts. Helped by a dense fog which covered the terrain for days, they launched their attack on 16 December along a 60 mile front, turning what had been a broad, steadily advancing Allied drive into hasty attempts to stem a German avalanche. It was estimated that 10 German divisions, totalling perhaps 200,000 men and 30,000 vehicles (including 2,500 tanks), were involved in the German push. For nearly ten days the Nazi army advanced, overwhelming desperate resistance offered by the United States First Army, and penetrating 50 miles.
The fighting was bitter and the toll exacted on both sides was heavy. But the Americans held, and Allied war planes struck in enormous strength at German points of troop concentration and lines of communication, both within the salient and far behind it. The town of Bastogne, completely engulfed by the Nazi tide, held out against immense odds until its siege was lifted, furnishing one of the year's most heroic episodes. It was at Bastogne that Brigadier General Anthony Clement McAuliffe, given two hours in which to surrender on 22 December, puzzled and baffled the besiegers by replying with the one word — "Nuts!" On 27 December, the German offensive was stopped and on that day the reinforced American First, Patton's Third and American and British divisions under Field Marshal Montgomery began steadily rolling it back.
APPENDIX C

COAST GUARD VESSELS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE INVASION & BOMBARDMENT OF COAST OF FRANCE, 6-25 JUNE, 1944

USS BAYFIELD
USS SAMUEL CHASE
USS JOSEPH T. DICKMAN
USS CHARLES CARROLL*
USS BARNETT*

LST-16
LST-27
LST-262
LST-326
LST-361

(U.S. LST'S assigned to British)

LST-17
LST-21
LST-261
LST-327

LCI(L)-83
LCI(L)-84
LCI(L)-85
LCI(L)-86
LCI(L)-87
LCI(L)-88
LCI(L)-89
LCI(L)-90
LCI(L)-91
LCI(L)-92
LCI(L)-93
LCI(L)-94
LCI(L)-95
LCI(L)-96
LCI(L)-319
LCI(L)-320
LCI(L)-321
LCI(L)-322

* Note: Vessels not listed in the Floating Units Plan as being Coast Guard ships or Coast Guard manned (that is, vessels having only a few Coast Guardsmen aboard) are starred thus*. 

- 291 -
LCI(L)-323
LCI(L)-324
LCI (L)-325
LCI(L)-326
LCI(L)-349
LCI(L)-350
LCI(L)-520

(USCG SEA RESCUE CRAFT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USCG 1</th>
<th>USCG 21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(83300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(83301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>(83302)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>(83303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>(83304)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>(83305)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>(83306)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>(83307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>(83308)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>(83309)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>(83310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>(83311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>(83312)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>(83313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>(83314)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>(83315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>(83316)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>(83317)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>(83318)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>(83401)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>(83402)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>(83403)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>(83404)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>(83405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>(83406)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>(83407)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>(83408)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>(83409)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>(83410)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>(83411)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>(83412)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>(83413)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>(83414)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>(83415)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>(83416)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>(83417)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>(83418)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>(83419)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>(83420)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>(83421)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>(83422)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>(83423)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>(83424)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>(83425)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>(83426)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>(83427)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>(83428)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>(83429)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>(83430)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>(83431)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>(83432)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>(83433)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>(83434)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>(83435)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>(83436)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>(83437)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>(83438)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>(83439)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>(83440)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>(83441)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE, 15 August - 25 September, 1944

BARNETT (APA-5)*
BAYFIELD (APA-33)
CHARLES CARROLL (APA-26)*
SAMUEL CHASE (APA-26)
JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13)

- 292 -
ARCTURUS (AKA-1)*
BETELGEUSE (AKA-11)*
CEPHBUS (AKA-18)
DUANE, USCG (AGC-6)
PC-545
PC-556
LCI(L)-520
LCI(L)-562
LCI(L)-581
LCI(L)-583
APPENDIX D

COAST GUARD MANNED SHIPS ENTITLED TO OPERATION AND ENGAGEMENT STARS

INVASION OF NORMANDY E5

BAYFIELD (APA-33)
SALUTEL CHASE (APA-26)
JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13)
LCI(L)-83
LCI(L)-84
LCI(L)-85*
LCI(L)-86
LCI(L)-87
LCI(L)-88
LCI(L)-89
LCI(L)-90
LCI(L)-91*
LCI(L)-92*
LCI(L)-93*
LCI(L)-94
LCI(L)-95
LCI(L)-96
LCI(L)-319
LCI(L)-320
LCI(L)-321
LCI(L)-322
LCI(L)-323
LCI(L)-324
LCI(L)-325
LCI(L)-326
LCI(L)-349
LCI(L)-350
LCI(L)-520

LIST-16
LIST-17
LIST-21
LIST-25
LIST-27
LIST-361
LIST-326
LIST-327
LIST-331
LIST-381

USCG 1 (63300)
USCG 2 (63304)
USCG 3 (63320)
USCG 4 (63321)
USCG 5 (63327)
USCG 6 (833314)
USCG 7 (833377)
USCG 8 (833600)
USCG 9 (833611)
USCG 10 (833621)
USCG 11 (833666)
USCG 12 (833700)
USCG 13 (833722)
USCG 14 (833733)
USCG 15 (833750)
USCG 16 (833777)
USCG 17 (833760)
USCG 18 (833963)
USCG 19 (833990)
USCG 20 (834100)
USCG 21 (834102)
USCG 22 (834107)
USCG 23 (834108)
USCG 24 (834109)
USCG 25 (834111)
USCG 26 (834112)
USCG 27 (834115) **
USCG 28 (834116)
USCG 29 (834117)
USCG 30 (834125)
USCG 31 (834128)
USCG 32 (834311)
USCG 33 (834320)
USCG 34 (834335)
USCG 35 (834391)
USCG 36 (834400)
USCG 37 (834412)
USCG 38 (834430)
USCG 39 (834453)
USCG 40 (834471)
USCG 41 (834460)
USCG 42 (834683)
USCG 43 (834684)
USCG 44 (834665)
USCG 45 (834666)
USCG 46 (834668)
USCG 47 (834710) **
USCG 48 (834733)
USCG 49 (834900)
USCG 50 (834930)
USCG 51 (834943)
USCG 52 (835000)
USCG 53 (83501)
USCG 54 (83502)
USCG 55 (83503)
USCG 56 (83511)
USCG 57 (83512)
USCG 58 (83513)
USCG 59 (83514)
USCG 60 (83516)

INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE  E7

BAYFIELD (APA-33)
CEPHEUS (AKA-18)
SAMUEL CHASE (APA-26)
JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13)

LCI(L) 520
LCI(L) 562
LCI(L) 581
LCI(L) 583

PG 545
PG 556

USCGC DUANE (AGC 6)

* Struck mine Northern France 6/6/44.
** Foundered off France 6/21/44.
APPENDIX E

OPERATION NEPTUNE
NAVAL OPERATION - NORMANDY

A list of events that took place after arrival at the line of departure are submitted in chronological order:

0530 - LCI(L) 87 with Deputy Assault Group Commander 0-1 departed line of departure to return to the transport area.

0545 - LCT(A)s and LCT(HE)s were checked on their way into the beach, and were found to be approximately on schedule.

0600 - Located LCC10 and two LCMs of the demolition group. LCC 10 stated that it was endeavoring to find the other lost LCMs. Eight LCMs of the demolition group were located during this time.

0615 - LCT 569 of Force 0-2 was found in the wrong boat lane and was directed to the proper course to reach his objective Control Vessel.

0630 - A group of LCVPs, due to land at H plus 50 and carrying troops from the HENRICO in boats from the DIX, were found well to the eastward of the boat lanes. These boats were guided back to the proper boat lane and set on the proper course for the beach.

0640 - Four LCTs were found off course heading to the eastward of the boat lanes, and they were directed to the proper beaches.

0700 - Two DUKWS were found floundering in the boat lane, and two CGR vessels were directed to assist them.

0730 - Upon arrival in transport area, LCI(L) 87 proceeded to the SAMUEL CHASE to report on condition in boat lanes.

0745 - Requested LCI(L)s 83, 85, and 89 to increase speed in departing from transport area as they were ten minutes late.

0805 - Checked the unloading of LSTs (Force 0-1) and found them to be unloaded as follows: LST 314 - 60%; LST 357 - 40%; LST 376 - 40%; LST 374 - completely unloaded. The slow unloading from LSTs to Rhino Ferries was apparently occasioned by the choppy sea which made it difficult to carry these craft, and required an appreciable time to get each vehicle off the ramps. The LCI(L) 87 then cruised the transport area directing vessels returning from the beach to assist APAs that were still unloading.

0920 - LCT 540 returned to transport area with damaged ramp and wounded personnel. This vessel was directed to the SAMUEL CHASE to unload the wounded personnel and to transfer its load to an undamaged LCT.
0940 - Directed CGR craft to assist drifting DUKWS.

1010 - Received message from control vessel off EASY RED beach that LCMs were required to unload LCI(L)s that were being held up by heavy gunfire. It developed later that these were LCI(L)s of Assault Group 0-3 which were being held up by the beachmaster because of the stranding under heavy fire of earlier waves of LCI(L)s.

1035 - Requested permission from Assault Group Commander 0-1 to assist at line of departure. Having been granted permission, the LCI(L) 87 proceeded to control vessel at EASY RED.

1100 - The LCI(L) 85, which was found returning to the transport area and listing badly from holes sustained by enemy fire, was dispatched to the SAMUEL CHASE to remove wounded, and then directed to proceed to a salvage tug for repairs.

1115 - Eight LCMs, which were drifting in the boat lane between the line of departure and transport area, were rounded up and guided to the line of departure to assist unloading LCI(L)s of Assault Group 0-3.

1145 - Upon arrival at line of departure, LCMs were directed to assist LCI(L)s and the latter were ordered to beach, and where necessary use LCMs to assist. At this time it was found that conditions were somewhat out of hand off the beaches in that a number of the boat waves that had been sent in by the control vessel were not beaching due to obstacles and heavy gunfire from enemy batteries on their beach, but were waiting to use a very small portion of EASY RED beach which had been cleared of obstacles. It was through this gap that all vessels were then being funneled and great congestion was occurring off the beach at this point.

General Wyman, embarked on the PC 553, Control Vessel of EASY RED, at this time requested that a survey be made of the beach conditions. The LCI(L) 87 cruised along the FOX and EASY beaches to determine the amount of obstacles still on the beach, whether any exits were open, and how the troops were advancing. At this point it was noted that heavy mortar and artillery fire was concentrated on the beaches, but the Deputy Assault Group Commander was unable to determine the location of the latter. It is believed that some of this heavy artillery was larger than that of a .50mm, inasmuch as the concussion from a near miss of approximately 20 feet from the stern of the LCI(L) 87 was much greater than any similar shock felt by near misses at Salerno, which landed at approximately the same distance. It was also noted that the LCI(L)s 91, 92, 93 and 83 were stranded on the beach and subjected to heavy gunfire, and that the 91 and 92 were burning badly amidships. It should be noted further that the LCI(L) 83, although badly holed in a number of places, retracted on the next high tide. The commanding officer and crew of this ship deserve great commendation for their
perserverance in sticking by their ship and freeing her on the next high tide. It was further noted during this survey that heavy fire had pinned down all troops on the FOX beaches at the high water mark, that no exits were operating, and that several tanks had been hit and were burning at the high water mark on FOX GREEN. No exits were operating on EASY beaches, but there were holes in the obstacles and vehicles were being landed under enemy fire.

After reporting conditions to General Wyman, he requested that a similar survey be made of the DOG beaches. Conditions off DOG beaches were found to be even more difficult than those off FOX and EASY beaches in that there were apparently no exits or openings in the obstacle; heavier enemy fire was being encountered, and no landing craft were being landed in this area at this time.

1420 - Requested information from EASY RED to determine the possibility of landing Rhino Ferries under present conditions, and received a reply that the beach required more clearing before ferries could be land. Inasmuch as the area between the beach and the control vessels was jammed with craft awaiting opportunity to land, it was decided that all craft not waiting to land immediately off the beaches should be returned to the line of control and formed into their proper waves to await traffic to clear before sending them in. This was done to restore order and to reduce the possibility of vessels being hit by enemy fire as they lay within range off the beaches.

1500 - Requested information from the beachmasters to ascertain if they could locate the positions of enemy batteries on the beach in order to use the gunfire support group in an attempt to silence these strong points. The Task Group Commander of the gunfire support group had previously stated that he was willing and anxious to help if he could simply locate the positions of enemy batteries. No information was forthcoming from the beaches in this regard.

1540 - Admiral Cook and General Handley came aboard the LCI(L) 87 and requested an LCM to take them to EASY RED beach. The LCM was located and the party departed.

1600 - A request from the beachmaster to round up all LCMs with demolition gear and LCTs with bulldozers was made, and these vessels were ordered to the beach to assist in the removal of obstacles.

1700 - LCI(L)s arriving with Force B were ordered to beach on the left flank of EASY RED.

1730 - Established LCI(L)s 89 and 90 as rendezvous control vessels for small craft operating in east and west boat lanes, respectively.

1740 - 20 LCMs carrying tanks were discharged from the LSD OCEAN WAVE and were ordered into the beach.
1800 - CTF 124 reported that Force B was moving into anchorage off the beaches.

1805 - Admiral Cook and General Handley returned to the LCI(L) 87 and requested transportation to the ANCON. A signal was sent to the LCI(L) 84 to help assist in directing Force B to proper anchorage.

1840 - Admiral Cook and General Handley were transferred to a CGR vessel for transportation to the ANCON. The LCI(L) 87 proceeded to assist in directing Force B to move to proper anchorage. The LCI(L) 87 then proceeded to try to locate Rhino Ferries for LSTs not towing same.

1930 - LCMs were directed to block ships to remove personnel. It was later discovered that a majority of these had been removed by CTF 128.

1950 - The LCI(L) 87 damaged one screw, and the Deputy Assault Group Commanded transferred to the LCI(L) 492 in order to be able to act with greater mobility during the night of D Day. The remainder of the night of D Day and the early morning of D plus 1 was spent trying to locate and send in priority material such as blood plasma, hospital dressings, special types of ammunition, and in checking on the unloading of LSTs by Rhino Ferries and LCTs to insure that all vessels were working at a maximum capacity. It should be noted at this point that requests for the special material mentioned above were very difficult to meet inasmuch as this material was not listed in any information available to the Assault Group Commanders as to its location. It was necessary to go around and check various vessels until the material could be located. A large amount of time and energy was thus lost, and it is suggested that in the future a manifest of early arriving convoys be furnished Assault Group Commanders.

1959 - Received message from CTF 124 to send in more heavy artillery as it was urgently needed. All LSTs carrying this type of material were contacted and unloading arrangements were made to try to send in this material as soon as possible.

2000 - A message was received that FOX GREEN was open for traffic. During this period, a message from CTG 124.3 was received stating that the SAMUEL CHASE was leaving the area, and that the Deputy Assault Commander 0-1 was ordered to assume the duties as Assault Group Commander 0-1.

At first light on D plus 1 the Assault Group Commander 0-1 departed for Point KING to escort the incoming convoy to its anchorage. After completing this work he transferred back to the LCI(L) 87 as the urgency for greater mobility was now lessened.
FOLLOW-UP PHASE - From the morning of D plus 1 until D plus 5 the Deputy Assault Group Commander was engaged in the following types of work:

(a) Moving reluctant MT vessels and Coasters closer to the beach.

(b) Locating and making arrangements to ferry to the beach priority material, i.e., special types of ammunition, special medical supplies such as blood plasma, tetanus toxoid; specialized signal equipment (certain size wire) and certain types of vehicular equipment. This demand for specialized material was extremely difficult to meet as manifests for early convoys were not available.

(c) Making arrangements to site dumb barges or reseat them after they drifted off the beach due to lack of proper mooring by the engineer shore brigade.

(d) Making arrangements to get stevedores for ships being unloaded or, when these were not available, to persuade the crew of the vessel and the drivers of the vehicles to unload without assistance. In most cases the crews and drivers cooperated splendidly. However, it was difficult to get these vessels to work during hours of darkness.

(e) Checking Rhino Ferries and LCTs to see that they were working at their assignments. Numerous LCTs were found anchored during the hours of darkness. Their explanation was that (1) they could not locate the vessel to which they were assigned, which was undoubtedly true as vessels were anchored haphazardly. (2) They were exhausted. (3) They were unassigned. These explanations were unsatisfactory excuses, and the situation was remedied only after repeatedly taking the matter up with LCT flotilla commanders.

(f) Much valuable time was lost trying to locate vessels requested by the Army to be unloaded, which had been sent to the wrong beach, or which had not arrived. It should be noted here that of the 72 LBV type of craft destined for OMAHA only 54 vessels arrived.

(g) Guiding vessels to the proper beach during hours of darkness. Due to the fact that a large amount of equipment had been lost in the surf when landing, the beach battalions had very poor marker and lighting equipment during the early stages of the follow-up. It was practically impossible for ferry craft to distinguish any one particular beach during darkness, much less the channels into the beach. This resulted in many craft damaging their propellers on sunken objects. Many loaded ferry craft anchored just off the beaches during darkness rather than risk damage from sunken vehicles or other craft. Where possible these craft were guided to the proper beach.
(h) Arranging for evacuating casualties and prisoners.

From D plus 5 to D plus 11 the Deputy Assault Group Commander 0-1 assisted NOIC OMAHA acting as Port Director. In order to help place the regularly assigned Port Director organization on its feet and operating according to plan, the Deputy Assault Group Commander 0-1 acted chiefly in the capacity of an advisor and as an instrument to increase the tempo of the work. Many small faults were discovered, due chiefly to the inexperience of personnel, but the overall plan was found to be very sound. As was to be expected, it took considerable time to indoctrinate young and inexperienced officers to a point where they could satisfactorily cope with the problem of handling daily maritime traffic comparable to that of the larger ports of the world.
APPENDIX F

PREMATURITE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INVASION

How a "phony" Invasion Report started on June 3rd was told by the Associated Press in the following story.

A young British girl teletype operator, employed in the London Bureau of the Associated Press, punched out a strip of practice tape and within a matter of moments was responsible for transmission throughout the United States and Latin America of an erroneous announcement that the Allies had landed in France.

Through almost incredible circumstances the error slipped through the most elaborate system of safeguards and censorship ever established both by the Associated Press and Allied authorities. The girl, Joan Ellis, had been practicing on a disconnected machine and in violation of instructions included in her exercise this urgent message: "Flash Eisenhower's headquarters announce Allied landings in France."

At 4:30 p.m., Eastern War Time, the flash appeared on the AP's direct London printer in New York and was relayed immediately throughout the United States and to Latin America. Less than two minutes later came a message, "Bust that Flash," and word was sent out at once to editors to withhold publication. At 4:41 p.m. another London message directed that the flash be "killed," and this was done.

The girl telegrapher in London explained that she wanted to test out the wires to see if they were working, so she sent out the message that Allied troops had started the invasion. The wires were working all right. She said she didn't like the sound of "Now is the time for all good men to come to the aid of their party." She wanted something different - something people would pay attention to. She got her wish.
SOURCES

War Diary Abstracts.

Correspondence.

Interviews with Coast Guard officers and other officials.

Interviews with officials of other agencies, among these the French Embassy.


Magazines and newspapers.

Books, pamphlets, especially the following books:


"Peace and War" United States Foreign Policy 1931-41; State Department.

"Prelude to Invasion" by Henry L. Stimson.

"Great Soldiers of World War II" by deWeerd.

"War in Our Times" by H. C. Morris and H. B. Henderson.

"The War Fifth Year" by Edgar McInnis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Crane ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Destroyer tender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AE</td>
<td>Ammunition ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Provision store ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Miscellaneous auxiliary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO</td>
<td>Combined operations communications headquarters ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGP</td>
<td>Motor torpedo boat tender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGS</td>
<td>Surveying ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH</td>
<td>Hospital ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>Cargo vessel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKA</td>
<td>Cargo vessel, attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKN</td>
<td>Net cargo ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKS</td>
<td>General stores issue ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKV</td>
<td>Aircraft supply ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>Large minesweeper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMb</td>
<td>Base minesweeper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>Coastal minesweeper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Net layer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Oiler.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOG</td>
<td>Gasoline tanker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Transport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>Transport, attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Coastal transport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APD</td>
<td>Troop transport (high speed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APH</td>
<td>Transport for wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APL</td>
<td>Hotel barge (barracks ship).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>Mechanized artillery transport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Auxiliary cargo submarine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APV</td>
<td>Aircraft transport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Repair ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARB</td>
<td>Repair ship, battle damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARD</td>
<td>Floating drydock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>Internal combustion engine tender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARH</td>
<td>Heavy hull repair ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARL</td>
<td>Repair ship, landing craft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARS</td>
<td>Salvage vessel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARV</td>
<td>Aircraft engine overhaul and structural repair ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Submarine tender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASR</td>
<td>Submarine rescue vessel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Oceangoing tug.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATR</td>
<td>Rescue tug.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV</td>
<td>Seaplane tender (large).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVC</td>
<td>Catapult lighter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVD</td>
<td>Seaplane tender (converted DD).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVP</td>
<td>Seaplane tender (small).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AW</td>
<td>Water distilling and storage ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY</td>
<td>Auxiliary tender, small.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB</td>
<td>Battleship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Heavy cruiser.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAZ</td>
<td>Auxiliary unallocated as to type (conversion).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CB</td>
<td>Large cruiser.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>Light cruiser.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Mine layer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMc</td>
<td>Coastal mine layer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>Aircraft carrier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVB</td>
<td>Large aircraft carrier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Aircraft carrier escort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVL</td>
<td>Small aircraft carrier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Destroyer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Destroyer escort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Light mine layer (high speed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMS</td>
<td>Minesweeper (high speed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>Unclassified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td>Landing craft, control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCI(L)</td>
<td>Landing craft, infantry (large).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCM(2)</td>
<td>45' landing craft, mechanized, Mk. II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCM(3)</td>
<td>50' landing craft, mechanized, Mk. III.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCM(6)</td>
<td>56' landing craft, mechanized, Mk. VI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP(L)</td>
<td>36' landing craft, personnel (large).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP(R)</td>
<td>36' landing craft, personnel (with ramp).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP(N)</td>
<td>Landing craft, personnel (nested).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCR(L)</td>
<td>Landing craft, rubber (large).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCR(S)</td>
<td>Landing craft, rubber (small).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCS(S)</td>
<td>Landing craft, support (small).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCT(5)</td>
<td>Landing craft, tank, Mk. V.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCT(6)</td>
<td>Landing craft, tank, Mk. VI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCV</td>
<td>Landing craft, vehicle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCPV</td>
<td>Landing craft, vehicle and personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>Landing ship, dock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM</td>
<td>Landing ship, medium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing ship, tank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVT(1)</td>
<td>Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVT(2)</td>
<td>Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVT(3)</td>
<td>Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVT(4)</td>
<td>Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVT(A1)</td>
<td>Landing vehicle, tracked (armored).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVT(A2)</td>
<td>Landing vehicle, tracked (armored).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVT(A3)</td>
<td>Landing vehicle, tracked (armored).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>173' submarine chaser.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE</td>
<td>180' patrol craft escort vessel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE(R)</td>
<td>180' patrol craft escort vessel, rescue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>136' submarine chaser.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE</td>
<td>Eagle Boat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Frigate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PG</td>
<td>Gunboat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGM</td>
<td>Motor gunboat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>River gunboat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Motor torpedo boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Yacht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PYc</td>
<td>Coastal yacht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>110' submarine chaser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YA</td>
<td>Ash lighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAG</td>
<td>District auxiliary, miscellaneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YC</td>
<td>Open lighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YCF</td>
<td>Car float</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YCK</td>
<td>Open cargo lighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YCV</td>
<td>Aircraft transportation lighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YDG</td>
<td>Degaussing vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YDT</td>
<td>Diving tender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YF</td>
<td>Covered lighter; range tender, provision store lighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YFB</td>
<td>Ferryboat and launch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YFD</td>
<td>Floating drydock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YFT</td>
<td>Torpedo transportation lighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YG</td>
<td>Garbage lighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YHB</td>
<td>Ambulance boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YHB</td>
<td>Houseboat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMT</td>
<td>Heating scow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS</td>
<td>Motor minesweeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMT</td>
<td>Motor tug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YN</td>
<td>Net tender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YNg</td>
<td>Gate vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YNT</td>
<td>Net tender (tug class)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YO</td>
<td>Fuel oil barge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YCG</td>
<td>Gasoline barge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOS</td>
<td>Oil storage barge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YP</td>
<td>District patrol vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YPK</td>
<td>Pontoon stowage barge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YR</td>
<td>Floating workshop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YRD(H)</td>
<td>Floating workshop, drydock (hull)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YRD(M)</td>
<td>Floating workshop, drydock (machinery)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YS</td>
<td>Stevedore barge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YSD</td>
<td>Seaplane wrecking derrick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YSP</td>
<td>Salvage pontoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YSR</td>
<td>Sludge removal barge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YT</td>
<td>Harbor tug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YTT</td>
<td>Torpedo testing barge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YW</td>
<td>Water barge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class of airplane</td>
<td>Model designation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter, 2-eng...........</td>
<td>F7E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XF5U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F3A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F4U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F2G-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F4F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F6F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XP6B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scout Bomber, 1-eng.....</td>
<td>SB2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SBW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SB2C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BTD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SBF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SBN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SBEU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedo Bomber, 1-eng...</td>
<td>TBY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T2D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TB2M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TBF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Bomber, boat,</td>
<td>PB2Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-eng.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Bomber, boat,</td>
<td>PB2P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-eng.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PBY-5, 5A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P4Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PB4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PB4M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PB4N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CANSO &quot;A&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomber, land, 4-eng.....</td>
<td>PB4K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomber, land, 2-eng.....</td>
<td>PB4O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PB4J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XP2V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class of airplane</td>
<td>Model designation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation Scout, 1-eng.</td>
<td>OY-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S03C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S2E-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OS2N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OS2U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility, 2-eng.</td>
<td>JRB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JhF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JM-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility, 1-eng.</td>
<td>J2F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, 1-eng.</td>
<td>GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AE-4 (IE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, 4-eng. land</td>
<td>RY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R5D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, 2-eng. land</td>
<td>RB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R5C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R3D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RL-D-1, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RL-D-2, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RL-D-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R5O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, 4-eng. Sea</td>
<td>PB2Y-3R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JRH (XPB2M-1R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JR2S-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, 2-eng. Sea</td>
<td>PBM-3R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training, 1-eng. primary</td>
<td>N3N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N2S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N2T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XN5N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XNL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training, 2-eng. ad- vanced</td>
<td>SNB-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SNB-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SNV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SNC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SNJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Purpose, 2-eng...</td>
<td>TDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TD3R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TD2R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TD3R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TD2R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TD3R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TD3R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TDN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class of airplane</td>
<td>Model designation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Purpose, 1-eng.</td>
<td>TDN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TD2C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter, 1-eng........</td>
<td>HNS-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HO28-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HOS-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XHOS-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>