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Vision
Our vision is to be a model oversight organization in the Federal Government by leading change, speaking truth, and promoting excellence—a diverse organization, working together as one professional team, recognized as leaders in our field.

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February 29, 2016

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this assessment was to determine the extent to which U.S. and Coalition Force efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces (Sunni PMF) have enabled their combat effectiveness and successful integration into the Iraqi Security Forces. The term Sunni PMF refers to Sunni militias officially mobilized by the Government of Iraq to support Iraqi Security Forces in the fight against the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant. These forces were also called Tribal Resistance Forces by Coalition Forces in 2015.

(U) Findings

(U) The report contains five findings and three observations resulting in eight recommendations. Our findings identified four general areas requiring attention:


2. Development of logistics sustainment for equipment issued.

3. Coalition Forces development of processes and procedures for Sunni PMF integration into Iraq’s established security forces.

4. U.S. Forces’ development of processes and procedures for vetting Sunni PMF.

(U) Findings (cont’d)

(U) Findings (cont’d)

- Development of logistics sustainment for equipment issued.
- Coalition Forces development of processes and procedures for Sunni PMF integration into Iraq’s established security forces.
- U.S. Forces’ development of processes and procedures for vetting Sunni PMF.

Our observations also identified three other areas for improvement concerning:

- U.S. and Coalition Forces plans to leverage Sunni PMF successes by identifying, engaging, training, and committing additional Sunni PMF to the fight in new operating areas; and
- Clarification of guidance for Leahy vetting of Sunni PMF.
- Compliance with the mandatory reporting requirements of the Iraq Train and Equip Fund by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommended that Commander, U.S. Central Command:

- **(U) REL TO USA, FVEY** Develop metrics that capture quantitative and qualitative measures of the development and employment of Sunni PMF.

- **(U) REL TO USA, FVEY** Refine and implement command plans and conditions to address Sunni PMF roles and responsibilities beyond the Ministry of Defense and specifically increase Sunni PMF integration with the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi Police Forces.

- **(U) REL TO USA, FVEY** Issue guidance that clearly assigns responsibility for validating compliance and documentation of vetting requirements for Sunni PMF.

(U) We recommended that Commander, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve:

- **(U) REL TO USA, FVEY** Update the Iraq Train and Equip Fund Review Board’s role and process to consider logistics sustainment for Sunni PMF equipment beyond the initial purchase package, and ensure that the Review Board includes

  - **(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)** enduring logistics sustainment requirements when approving new equipment items.

- **(U) REL TO USA, FVEY** Advise and assist the Government of Iraq to develop a sustainment plan for equipment issued to Sunni PMF.

(U) We recommended the Chief, Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq:

- **(U) REL TO USA, FVEY**

(U) Management Comments

(U) U.S. Central Command comments were responsive to Recommendation 4, and 5, and partially responsive to Recommendations 1.a, and 3a. Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve comments were responsive to Recommendation 2.a and partially responsive 1.b, 2.b, and 3.b. We request management respond to nonresponsive or partially responsive comments per the Recommendations Table on the following page.
(U) **Recommendations Table**

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*Please provide Management Comments by March 31, 2016.*
MEMORANDUM FOR (U) Commander, U.S. Central Command
Commander, Combined Joint Task Force- Operation Inherent Resolve
Chief, Office of Security Cooperation- Iraq

SUBJECT: (U) U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Iraqi Sunni Popular
Mobilization Forces (Project No. D2015-D005PO-0213.000)

(U) We are providing this classified report for review and action as appropriate. The report relates to the DoD overseas contingency, Operation Inherent Resolve. It was completed in compliance with the OIG’s oversight responsibilities, as described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. We conducted this assessment from July to November 2015 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations,” published in January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

(U) We considered comments on a draft of this report. DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires all recommendations (or other issues, such as observations noted in this report) be resolved promptly. We considered the comments from U.S. Central Command to Recommendation 1.a. and 3.a to be partially responsive. Additionally, we considered comments from Commander, Combined Joint Task Force- Operation Inherent Resolve partially responsive to Recommendations 1.b, 2.b, and 3b. Please provide additional information as indicated in the Recommendations Table on page iii of the report that conform to DoD Instruction 7650.03. Describe what actions you have taken or plan to take to accomplish the recommendations and include the completion date of your actions. Send copies of the requested documentation supporting the actions taken.

(U) Please send a PDF file containing your comments to [redacted] over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature.

(U) We should receive your comments by March 31, 2016. Comments provided on this classified report must be marked and portion-marked, as appropriate in accordance with DoD Manual 5200.01. If you consider any matters exempt from public release, you should mark them clearly “for Inspector General Consideration.” You must safeguard the classified information in this report to prevent publication or improper disclosure of the information it contains.

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff during this assessment. Please direct questions to [redacted]. We will provide a formal briefing on the results, if management requests.

Kenneth R. Moorefield
Deputy Inspector General
Special Plans and Operations

Attachment: as stated
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(U) Introduction

This is the second report in a series reviewing U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip Iraq Security Forces (ISF) to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Our series of reports supports Lead Inspector General oversight of Operation Inherent Resolve. This report details the results of our review of train, advise, assist, and equip efforts supporting Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces (Sunni PMF). The term Sunni PMF refers to Sunni militias officially mobilized by the Government of Iraq to support Iraqi Security Forces in the fight against the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant. The first report in this series assessed U.S. and Coalition assistance to the Iraqi Army.

(U) Objective

The objective of this assessment was to determine the extent to which U.S. and Coalition Force efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip Sunni PMF enabled the combat effectiveness and successful integration of these forces into the ISF. We conducted a site visit in Iraq in August 2015. See Appendix A for a discussion of project scope and methodology and Appendix B for prior oversight coverage by DoD IG, the U.S. Government Accountability Office, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction related to our objective.

(U) Background

In September 2014, the President outlined a comprehensive strategy to degrade and defeat ISIL, consisting of nine lines of effort. DoD received responsibility for two lines of effort within this whole of government framework: 1) Deny ISIL Safe-Haven and 2) Build Partner Capacity. In November 2014, the President submitted to Congress a $5.6 billion budget amendment for FY 2015, $1.6 billion of which was programmed for the development of, and support to, the ISF.
(U) In December 2014, Section 1236 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2015 [Section 1236] authorized the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State,

to provide assistance, including training, equipment, logistics support, supplies, and services, stipends, facility and infrastructure repair and renovation, and sustainment, to military and other security forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq, including Kurdish and tribal security forces or other local security forces, with a national security mission, through December 31, 2016.  

(U) U.S. and Coalition Command and Control

As indicated in Figure 1, the Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) was delegated authority for U.S. Forces supporting operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Relevant to this report, the Commander identified military success as ISIL is defeated, and the ISF is credible, capable, and inclusive. In November 2014, USCENTCOM established Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) to work with and through regional partners to militarily defeat ISIL in Iraq and Syria and to enable whole-of-Coalition governmental actions to increase regional stability. The task force has coordinated the actions of the more than 60 Coalition countries contributing to the military action against ISIL.
(U) Subordinate Command Roles and Responsibilities

CJTFOIR subordinate commands are responsible for engaging, training, advising, and assisting Sunni PMF. U.S. officials stated they coordinated with representatives from the Popular Mobilization Committee\(^9\) to determine which Sunni tribes to engage for potential future enrollment in the Popular Mobilization Program\(^10\). Elements of the Special Operations Joint Task Force-Iraq (SOJTF-I), in coordination with the Tribal Engagement and Coordination Cell of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) in the U.S. Embassy, conducted initial Coalition engagement of tribes offering fighters. U.S. policy encouraged the inclusion of additional Sunni militias into the...
greater ISF to better balance the influence of sectarian and ethnic groups in Iraq, and discourage Sunni tribes' alignment with the predominantly-Sunni ISIL.

The Commander, Combined Joint Force Land Component Command-Iraq (CJFLCC-I) was responsible for preparing Iraqi Army trainers to conduct initial training of Sunni PMF fighters, and advising Iraqi Army units that were expected to integrate trained and equipped Sunni PMF fighters into operations.

SOJTF-1 also determined U.S.-provided equipment requirements for Sunni PMF, with review by the Director, OSC-I, and the Commanders of CJTF-OIR and USCENTCOM. Once approved, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency procured the items.

DoD named the $1.618 billion appropriated under Section 1236 the “Iraq Train and Equip Fund” (ITEF). Officials from the office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, indicated the funding was part of a short-term bridging mechanism to resource the ISF until circumstances enabled the Government of Iraq to use routine security assistance mechanisms. DoD further allocated the fund request to: Government of Iraq Forces ($1,240M), Kurdish Forces ($354M), and Tribal Security Forces ($24M). By the end of June 2015, the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy reported $320.1 million had been expended from the ITEF.

(U) As of August 2015, one Coalition nation (Italy) was advising and assisting the Iraqi Federal Police.
(U) Section 1236 required quarterly progress reports to Congress, Congressional notification upon the obligation or expenditure of more than 25 percent of the appropriated funds, and vetting of any forces provided assistance. See Appendix C for a detailed discussion of the requirements of Section 1236.

(U) **Sunni PMF within the Iraqi National Security Force Framework**

(FOUO) Following the takeover of Mosul by ISIL in June 2014, Marja' Ali al-Sistani, an influential Shia cleric, issued a religious order summoning Iraqi citizens to defend Iraq. The Government of Iraq amended Article 41 of its Constitution and stood up the Popular Mobilization Committee to develop procedures for managing the review, vetting, acceptance, induction, and arming of volunteers responding to the call.

(C)/REL-TO-USA-FVEY The initial respondents belonged overwhelmingly to the Shia tribes. Prime Minister Abadi, after assuming office in September 2014, expanded the program to include the Sunni tribes. U.S. officials reported that of the 32.5 million people in Iraq, approximately 48-57 percent were Shia and 25-30 percent were Sunni, a roughly 2 to 1 ratio.

(C)/REL-TO-USA-FVEY Fighters were nominated for enrollment in the PMF by tribal leaders, ISF commanders, or provincial governors. The Iraqi National Security Services vetted the names of nominees and upon approval fighters could be accepted into the PMF, providing the program in that province had not reached its population-based cap. If accepted, the Iraqi National Security Services would generate a contract for signature by the fighter and the local ISF commander, enrolling the fighter as a member of the PMF. The contract defined the individual’s terms of service, including salary and death.
(U) Introduction

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

As of August 2015, Coalition Forces recognized three main elements within the PMF: Shia tribal units with ties to Iran, Shia tribal units without ties to Iran, and Sunni tribal units (called Sunni PMF by Coalition Forces). This third element is the focus of this report. Sunni PMF accepted and enrolled in the PMF met one of the statutory requirements to receive U.S. training and equipment: having a national security mission to support the Government of Iraq.

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

U.S. officials stated that the Ministry of Defense issued fighters from each of those classes a weapon, ammunition, and limited logistical support. In the spring of 2015, ISIL captured the city of Ramadi, the provincial capital of the predominantly Sunni province of Al Anbar. The ISIL occupation of Ramadi internally displaced hundreds of Sunni Iraqis who abandoned their homes to avoid living under ISIL control. In response, the Government of Iraq shifted the priority of combat operations.

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

The Iraqi Ministry of Defense was responsible for equipping Sunni PMF enrolled in the Popular Mobilization Program. Coalition Officials explained that the Government of Iraq was supposed to arm Sunni PMF enrolled in the PMF with equipment taken from existing Iraqi Army inventory.

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

 Officials in OSC-I reported the delivery of weapons by the Ministry of Defense to Al Anbar province (distributed at Al Asad Air Base, Amariyat-Fallujah, and Habbaniyah), and a commitment to deliver an additional weapons outside of Al Anbar (to Nineva and Salah ad Din).

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

13 PMF council chair Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis is a Kataib Hezbollah leader and long-time supporter of Iranian-backed Shia militias in Iraq. Coalition Forces referred to extreme Shia militias with Iranian ties as "Shia Militia Groups" (SMGs). Coalition officials reported that some of these militias were enrolled in the Popular Mobilization Program in predominantly Shia provinces.
Introduction

However, SOJTF-I representatives stated that about...

Multiple Sunni PMF leaders interviewed confirmed receipt of the...

SOJTF-I officials reported that Sunni tribal leaders circulated social...

media reports of a martyrdom mission by five tribal fighters against ISIL in the vicinity...

of Hit...

The validity of the events in these reports was...

later discredited by U.S. Forces, but according to SOJTF-I officials...

Finally, according to OSC-I officials, the Government of Iraq...

intended for mobilized Sunni PMF to formally partner with local ISF units and be led by...

designated ISF commanders during operations...

(U) Iraqi National Guard Concept

Coalition and Government of Iraq officials envisioned the...

eventual incorporation of PMF, including Sunni PMF, into the ISF as a type of Iraqi...

National Guard. This long term concept was part of the effort to create a “credible, capable, and inclusive” ISF. As of November 2015, the Iraqi Parliament was considering legislation that would transition the PMF to a National Guard. However, fundamental disagreements remained regarding issues of command and control, leadership qualifications, types of equipment to be issued, employment, and the role of provincial governors...

Introduction

OSC-I officials reported that the Shia leaders had supported the idea of an Iraqi National Guard in order to integrate active Shia militias into the ISF. Likewise, Sunni PMF enrolled in the Popular Mobilization Program had also sought permanent integration into the ISF as a way to receive additional security assistance training. The U.S. government had supported the Iraqi National Guard concept, and SOJTF-I officials stated that encouraging Sunni PMF to organize into militaristically recognizable companies and battalions would contribute to eventual acceptance into any future Iraqi National Guard.

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(U) U.S. and Coalition Assistance to Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces

Much of the early interaction by SOJTF-I with interested tribes occurred in the form of subject matter expert exchanges between U.S. or Coalition Forces and local tribal elders.

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(U) Public Law 113-291, “National Defense Authorization for 2014,” Section 1204, “Prohibition on Use of Funds for Assistance to Units of Foreign Security Forces that Have Committed a Gross Violation of Human Rights,” required vetting for gross violations of human rights (Leahy vetting). According to Coalition officials, subject matter expert exchanges were considered advise and assist activities, but were not considered security force assistance training and met the training exception outlined in a Secretary of Defense memorandum. According to Coalition officials, transition of

54 (U) Public Law 113-291, “Prohibition on Use of Funds for Assistance to Units of Foreign Security Forces that Have Committed a Gross Violation of Human Rights,” Section 1204, amended §2249e, Title 10, U.S.C, to make vetting for gross violations of human rights a permanent requirement for security force assistance provided with Title 10 funds.

55 (U) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: Implementation of Section 8057, DoD Appropriations Act, 2014 (division C of Public Law 113-76)(“the DoD Leahy law”), August 18, 2014, exempted subject matter exchanges from vetting requirements. It provided examples of exempted activities, including, “individual and subject matter expert exchanges, conducted by non-U.S. coalition partners, or training with a primary purpose of interoperability, safety and/or familiarization.”
(U) Sunni PMF into an Iraqi National Guard structure would have made Sunni PMF units eligible to receive security force assistance training at established Building Partner Capacity sites.

(5//REL TO USA, FVEY) In August 2015, SOJTF-1 elements were assisting Sunni PMF at Sunni PMF training sites were located in traditional territory of the tribal fighters being trained in order to increase training attendance and minimize the exposure of Sunni PMF fighters to sectarian violence or ISIL attacks while in transit. The Government of Iraq had responsibility to provide food, water, and billeting at these sites. See Appendix D for a map showing training sites and human geography.

(5//REL TO USA, MSEC) The CJTF-OIR definition of Sunni PMF illustrates the Coalition concept for Sunni PMF employment.

(5//REL TO USA, FVEY) According to Coalition tracking, an Iraqi Army cadre had taught the basic offensive and defensive tactical Program of Instruction to Sunni PMF fighters and Sunni PMF trained at all three sites had participated in operations. SOJTF-1 officials stated that they evaluated Sunni PMF as they completed training and during operations to identify Sunni PMF fighter capabilities and additional training needs. SOJTF-1 advisors used these observations to inform subsequent advise and assist activities.

(5//REL TO USA, FVEY) SOJTF-1 officials stated that Sunni PMF fighters enrolled in the Popular Mobilization Program.

---

CJTF-OIR developed ITEF-funded equipment requests for Sunni PMF using a “pseudo-Foreign Military Sales” process. The ITEF Review Board, managed by CJTF-OIR, approved requests and amendments for Sunni PMF equipment requirements. SOJTF-I developed the original equipment requirements based on estimates of total potential Sunni PMF enrollment and perceived mission requirements.

To demonstrate initial support for Sunni PMF, Coalition Officials required that representatives from the Government of Iraq issue equipment to PMF, including Sunni PMF, from existing inventory. To encourage further progress, Coalition Force officials planned to backfill equipment issued to Sunni PMF with ITEF-purchased U.S. equipment. U.S.-purchased weapons and other equipment arrived in theater and were ready for transfer as backfill in but according to U.S.
CJTF-OIR amended the ITEF-funded Sunni PMF equipment list and planned process for equipment issue. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency was forced to procure weapons with a delivery date of.

CJTF-OIR also planned to issue the equipment to Sunni PMF units at the training sites with Iraqi Ministry of Defense officials present. The Iraqi official would still assume accountability for the equipment and demonstrate government support for Sunni PMF, but this modified process would allow U.S. officials to ensure that Sunni PMF units received the equipment. This procedure was consistent with the process used to deliver ITEF equipment and supplies directly to the Iraqi Army brigades receiving training at the Build Partner Capacity sites. 19

with input from the U.S. Embassy, the command again modified its plan, deciding to issue sets of equipment to Sunni PMF drawn from stocks purchased through ITEF and . Coalition officials reported that Sunni PMF who received the equipment had recently engaged in operations and returned to the front lines shortly after being issued the ITEF-purchased equipment. According to U.S. officials, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense's representative for the PMF signed for the remaining "man sets" designated for Sunni PMF to be issued at a future date.

19 (U) A Build Partner Capacity site is designated training site where U.S. and Coalition Forces provide a formal training Program of Instruction for ISF units. These sites are set up and maintained by the Government of Iraq.
In August 2015, we observed that U.S. Military commands were prepared to meet the accountability and property management requirements of Section 1236. We observed separate warehouse space and weapons storage facilities prepared by the 1st Theatre Sustainment Command for in-transit weapons and other equipment purchased with ITEF funds. Some of the items purchased for the ISF (and Sunni PMF), once issued, would require end use monitoring. We determined that OSC-I had related operating procedures and SOJTF-I officials were aware of the requirements and procedures. We were unable to observe implementation, as equipment had not been issued to Sunni PMF at the time of our site visit.
(U) Introduction

(//REL TO USA, FVEY) Figure 4: ITEF Equipment and Weapons in CJTF-OIR Storage Facilities

Source: DoDIG staff, DODIG-2016-055
Part I
Findings and Recommendations

(U) Part I. Findings and Recommendations

S//REL TO USA, FVEY

DODIG-2016-055 | 15
(U) Finding 1

(U) Government of Iraq Support to Sunni PMF

This existed because of:

- USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g
While the Sunni PMF initiative is just beyond the nascent stage as of the date of this report, combined with the year-long displacement of some tribes from their homes due to ISIL occupation of traditional tribal territory, led to several Sunni tribal leaders expressing frustration with program progress.

(U) Sunni Nomination and Employment into the PMF

Prior to acceptance into the Popular Mobilization Program, the Iraqi National Security Services vetted fighters according to the Government of Iraq's criteria. Sunni tribal leaders were frustrated by the initially slow pace of approval, and remained concerned over Government of Iraq vetting delays for Sunni PMF replacements, especially for those killed in action. Sunni tribal leaders interviewed

Several Tribal leaders reported losing patience with Government of Iraq support. According to Department of State officials, the Iraqi Constitution set the quota...
Finally, according to U.S. Officials, Prime Minister Abadi intended for Sunni tribal forces enrolled in the Popular Mobilization Program to be formally partnered with local ISF units and led by designated ISF commanders.

(U) Sunni PMF Compensation

There was a shared belief among Sunni tribal leaders interviewed...
U.S. advisors confirmed that Sunni PMF fighters received their initial salary after enrollment. National Security Services confirmed back payments of salaries to trained Sunni PMF with the exception of the SOJTF-I officials reported that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense issued to Sunni PMF the same leaders stated that they purchased additional weapons and commercial trucks to transport fighters to and from training and operations.
(U) Part I. Findings and Recommendations

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1.a

A senior U.S advising command document stated that a long-term strategic risk USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(U) Commander U.S. Central Command Comments


(U) Our Response

We accept the response from USCENTCOM in lieu of comments from Chief, OSC-I. We considered these comments partially responsive. We request additional information, specifically regarding plans and/or status of the advise and assist mission to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Iraqi National Security Services to develop and logistically support Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces.

(U) Recommendation 1.b

Commander, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, use available assets USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

S//REL TO USA, FVEY
(U) Commander, Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve Comments

(U) Our Response

Comments from Chief of Staff, CJTF-OIR

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g
(U) Finding 2

(U) Sunni PMF Equipment Logistics Sustainment

This situation existed because:

- USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(U) Discussion

In August 2015, Coalition Force officials decided to issue rifles to selected Sunni PMF units. Coalition officials said they also added automatic weapons to the list of equipment programmed for issue to Sunni PMF units. The equipment was purchased using ITEF funds and...
(U) Sunni PMF Equipment Purchased with the Iraq Train and Equip Fund

The decision to issue equipment was a major deviation from the original concept for equipping Sunni PMF. After exploring mitigation strategies, U.S. commanders agreed to use ITEF funds to acquire rifles for distribution directly to Sunni PMF at training sites. In addition, they modified the Sunni PMF equipment list to include additional equipment. Officials working with Sunni PMF were aware of the new equipping plan but were still waiting for the materiel at the end of the reporting period. According to USCENTCOM, lack of Government of Iraq Sustainment Support was a significant issue. CJTF-OIR officials said the Government of Iraq did not have a plan outlining logistics support for Sunni PMF.
Part II. Observations

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy officials stated in

SUNCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

Sunni PMF leaders were aware of pending legislation in the Iraqi Parliament
to integrate their forces into an Iraqi National Guard, but the outcome remained
USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g
uncertain.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) In summary, Coalition Forces amended the equipment list
designated for Sunni PMF in an effort to show continued support for tribes and bolster
Government of Iraq efforts to initiate a National Guard program.

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

Previous DoD Inspector General reports found that
USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g
Iraqi and Afghan forces with equipment sustainment issues experienced increased
desertion rates, reduced moral, and maintained defensive fighting positions.22


S//REL TO USA, FVEY
(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 2.a

(U) Commander, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, in coordination with Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency and Chief, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, update the Iraq Train and Equip Fund Review Board’s Standard Operating Procedures to include supporting sustainment needs for already issued equipment beyond the initial purchase package in the review board process, and ensure the Iraq Train and Equip Fund Review Board includes the enduring logistics sustainment requirements when approving new equipment items.

(U) Commander, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve Comments

The Chief of Staff, CJTF-OIR, responding for the Commander, CJTF-OIR, agreed with Recommendation 2.a with comment. The Chief of Staff stated that the ITEF Review Board issued a Standard Operating Procedure on which states that ITEF Review Board packages for review board consideration must include “Life Cycle Costing” estimates, including sustainment needs.

(U) Our Response

Comments from the Chief of Staff, CJTF-OIR, were responsive. However, the ITEF Review Board Standard Operating Procedures does not make the importance of this requirement depends on the types and quantities of equipment issued. Therefore, we request an updated list of equipment issued to Sunni PMF requiring sustainment and that management reconsider making.
Part II. Observations

(U) Recommendation 2.b

(U) Commander, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, in coordination with Chief, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, advise and assist the Government of Iraq to develop a sustainment plan for equipment issued to Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces in accordance with draft plans for integration of Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces into the Iraqi Security Forces.

(U) Commander, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve Comments

(U) The Chief of Staff of CJTF-OIR, responding for the Commander, CJTF-OIR, agreed, with comment. The Chief of Staff stated the CJTF-OIR, working with OSC-I, planned to develop sustainment contracts for weapons systems and non-tactical vehicles issued to all ISF now and in the future.

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Chief of Staff, CJTF-OIR were partially responsive.

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g
Part II. Observations

- Command plans to advise and assist the Government of Iraq to develop sustainment capability for equipment issued to Sunni PMF; and
(U) Finding 3

(U) Sunni PMF Metrics Development

This occurred because:

- USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(U) Discussion

- USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g
(G//REL TO USA, FVEY) Finally, Section 1236 requires DoD to issue a quarterly report assessing the operational effectiveness of all forces receiving assistance using ITEF funding. In addition to better capturing progress toward campaign goals, the expansion of metrics to cover readiness and integration would also contribute to more informative mandatory progress reporting on the ITEF by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 3.a

S//REL TO USA, FVEY Commander, U.S. Central Command, in coordination with Commander, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, Director, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, and Commander, Combined Joint Force Land Component Command - Iraq, USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(U) Commander, United States Central Command Comments

S//REL TO USA, FVEY The Deputy, Analysis & Requirements Division, responding for Commander, CENTCOM agreed with Recommendation 3.a with comment. The Deputy requested Recommendation 3.a be redirected to the Commander, CJTF-OIR. He stated that CENTCOM delegated authority to CJTF-OIR to train and equip Sunni PMF for integration into the ISF in the Coalition Military Campaign Plan, and that this delegation

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(U) Our Response

S//REL TO USA, FVEY The comments from the Deputy, Analysis & Requirements Division, were partially responsive to the intent of our recommendation. The Commander, USCENTCOM can, and did, delegate authority for the development of Sunni PMF. However, he cannot delegate responsibility for the execution and oversight of USCENTCOM’s own Campaign Plan. USCENTCOM has a role in the development and monitoring of measurements of Sunni tribal engagement or training and support to the ISF, if only to ensure subordinate commands create them and that once created they satisfy command requirements.

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g
Coalition efforts represent one long-term path to resolution, with short-term goals and end-states that should be measured to determine the progress of the Sunni PMF program.

We request Commander, USCENTCOM respond to this final report explaining the development and employment of Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces will achieve campaign plan objectives.

**Recommendation 3.b**

Commander, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, in coordination with Director, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, and Commander, Combined Joint Force Land Component Command - Iraq, and Iraqi Provincial Popular Mobilization Force Generals, develop a collaborative process to combat effectiveness to facilitate continual engagement on Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces training, sustainment, and integration.

The Chief of Staff of CJTF-OIR, responding for the Commander, CJTF-OIR, agreed with Recommendation 3.b. The Chief of Staff stated the Command was informally coordinating with OSC-I and received reports from subordinate commands regarding the development of Sunni PMF operational effectiveness. The Chief of Staff also said this information is contained in the Campaign Assessments and Analysis Board by the publishing of a Monthly Coalition Assessment Report.

**Our Response**

The comments from Chief of Staff CJTF-OIR were partially responsive to Recommendation 3.b. The
(U) Finding 4

(U) Sunni PMF Integration with Iraqi Police Forces

Coalition command efforts to influence the integration of Sunni PMF into the ISF did not include developing the relationship between Sunni PMF and Iraqi Police Forces.

This occurred because:

- Effective coordination between police forces and Sunni PMF will be required to implement holding operations and the transition from federal to local security forces as the ISF re-takes territory. Additionally, excluding police from planning could potentially complicate the transition from military to civil police control in territory successfully cleared and held by Sunni PMF.

(U) Discussion

Section 1236 authorized the Secretary of Defense to “provide assistance, including training, equipment, logistics support, supplies, and services ... to military and other security forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq, including Kurdish and tribal security forces or other local security forces, with a national security mission.”

charged staff and subordinate commands with the development of the ISF to “include the Kurdish/Peshmerga Forces, Iraq Ministry of Interior Counter Terrorism Services and border security forces, and other security forces the
Government of Iraq formally agrees to regard as national security forces of Iraq.” This mission was transferred in the CENTCOM, Coalition, and CJTF-OIR Campaign Plans.

The CENTCOM Campaign plan included Lines of Effort relevant to the campaign in Iraq. The primary missions were to degrade and counter ISIL and to enable Iraqi security and governance, which included the development of tribal or provincial forces as a part of overall security sector reform.

To meet this objective, CJTF-OIR advise and assist efforts were almost exclusively focused on ISF aligned to the Ministry of Defense.

Officials from the Department of State stated and OSC-I Tribal Engagement Coordination Cell representatives reiterated

SOJTIF-I officials also confirmed Sunni PMF members were required to sign a statement that they will respect human rights and support the Rule of Law.

SOJTIF-I officials identified the need for and developed their own training presentation for Sunni PMF units. These briefings explained the Rule of Law and human rights expectations for Sunni PMF units scheduled to receive ITEF equipment.
Finally, SOJTF-I officials said that the commander CJFLCC-I was considering training local police force units. As of January 2016, USCENTCOM officials reported that CJTF-OIR began equipping Iraqi Police forces with ITEF funded mobility equipment, machine guns and sniper rifles.

The CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan built on the CENTCOM Campaign Plan, further developing the concept of Sunni PMF within the goals of defeating ISIL and security sector reform.

When asked to clarify, officials referenced an interpretation of the CENTCOM Plan and Section 1236 written by the CENTCOM Staff Judge Advocate. In the response, the official representing the Office of the CENTCOM Staff Judge Advocate restated Section 1236 authorizing assistance to “military and other security forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq, including Kurdish and tribal security forces or other local security forces, with a national security mission.” SOJTF-I officials related that judge advocate representatives from commands in Iraq, including the Department of State, met to determine whether Iraqi police forces had a “national security mission” that would qualify for equipping under ITEF. However, the meeting did not result in further guidance on the issue.
In contested areas, Iraqi Federal Police were conducting paramilitary missions and the Iraqi Police Services were charged with traditional policing functions aligned with ensuring the Rule of Law. During joint operations, Sunni PMF and Iraqi police forces were expected to operate in the same territory.

(U) Part II. Observations

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 4

Commander, U.S. Central Command, in coordination with Commander, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, and Chief, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, refine and implement command plans and conditions to address U.S. military roles and responsibilities for Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces integration with the Ministry of the Interior and Iraqi police forces.

(U) Commander, U.S. Central Command Comments

Deputy Chief, Plans Division, USCENTCOM responding for Commander, USCENTCOM, agreed with comment. The Deputy Chief, Plans Division, provided a summary of Coalition police training efforts and stated that USCENTCOM, in
EBH REJL TO efCA, PVEJY3

(coordination with OSC-I and CJTF-OIR, will continue to refine hold force requirements as conditions on the ground evolve.)

(U) Our Response

The comments from the Deputy Chief, Plans Division, USCENTCOM responding for the Commander, USCENTCOM, were responsive to Recommendation 4.
(U) Finding 5

(U) Responsibility for Vetting Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces

Responsibility for ensuring compliance with Leahy and Section 1236 vetting U.S. Military Command stakeholders training and equipping Sunni PMF.

(U) Discussion

By law, Sunni PMF must be vetted prior to the receipt of U.S.-funded assistance.

- The Leahy vetting law24 prohibits U.S.-funded assistance to individuals who have committed gross human rights violations. According to the law, “the Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, ensure that prior to a decision to provide any training, equipment, or other assistance to a unit of a foreign security force full consideration is given to any credible information available to the Department of State relating to human rights violations by such unit.”

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(U) Section 1236 prohibits U.S.-funded assistance to individuals associated with terrorists groups or groups with ties to the Government of Iran.

The roles and responsibilities to satisfy both requirements as applicable to Sunni PMF are included in policy, memoranda, operations orders, and fragmentary orders that include multiple changes. OSC-I, CJTF-OIR, and subordinate commands implemented and tracked the vetting of Sunni PMF leadership and fighters. See Appendix C for a more detailed explanation of vetting procedures and consolidated list of criteria.

Secretary of Defense Memorandum of August 18, 2014, “Implementation of Section 8057, DoD Appropriations Act, 2014 (division C of Public Law 113-76) (‘the DoD Leahy law’),” assigned Combatant Commanders responsibility for meeting Leahy vetting requirements. Secretary of Defense memorandum of February 10, 2015, “Management of the Iraq Train and Equip Fund,” assigned to CJTF-OIR, “overall responsibility for providing assistance to military and other security forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq, including Kurdish and tribal security forces or other local security forces, with a national security mission, utilizing the ITEF.” Although vetting requirements are explicitly stated in Section 1236, vetting is an implied DoD task inherent in the management of the ITEF, as delegated by the Secretary of Defense memorandum.

When questioned regarding responsibility for the conduct of both Leahy and Section 1236 vetting for Sunni PMF, an official representing the USCENTCOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate referred to USCENTCOM FRAGO [Fragmentary Order] 23-012, February 27, 2015, “Management and Execution of the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF).” While not directly stating responsibility for vetting, the order assigns the Commander, CJTF-OIR overall responsibility for providing assistance to military and other security forces of, or associated with, the Government of Iraq under ITEF. When asked specifically which office had responsibility for ensuring compliance with Leahy and Section 1236 vetting, USCENTCOM officials replied that a group of over 20 stakeholders from the Department of State and DoD components shared responsibility for the task.
Part II. Observations

As of CJTF-OIR, SOJTF-I, and OSC-I established procedures requiring personnel in Sunni PMF units to be vetted before Sunni PMF units received training from U.S. Forces or equipment purchased with U.S. funds. CJTF-OIR developed the ITEF Review Board to manage the expenditure of ITEF funds to equip the ISF, including the Sunni PMF. The ITEF Review Board standard operating procedures required SOJTF-I officials to send a copy of vetting certifications to CJTF-OIR.

Subordinate commands and the U.S Embassy Baghdad also each established standard operating procedures.
(U) Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 5

Commander, U.S. Central Command, in coordination with Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, Commander, Special Operations Joint Task Force-Iraq, and Commander, Combined Joint Force Land Component Command - Iraq, and Chief, Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq, issue guidance USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(U) Commander, U.S. Central Command Comments

The Director of Operations Plans Division, responding for the Commander, USCENTCOM, agreed to Recommendation 5 with comment. He said that USCENTCOM released the operational framework for execution of Phase 2 of Operation Inherent Resolve in late- According to the Director, this order directs continued responsibility for build partner capacity operations in Iraq to CJTF-OIR. In addition, the Director said, USCENTCOM would release a FRAGO containing detailed guidance to CJTF-OIR for the execution of the ITEF within the updated operational framework. The Director also mentioned USCENTCOM had established a working group to address risks to compliance in the interim.

(U) Our Response

The comments from the Director of Operations Plans Division, responding for the Commander, USCENTCOM, were responsive to Recommendation 5. We request a copy of the updated USCENTCOM operational framework for execution of Phase 2 of Operation Inherent Resolve, OPORD, and FRAGO once completed and distributed to the field.
(U) Part II

(U) Observations
(U) Observation 1

(U) Leveraging Sunni PMF Successes

The Department of State and Coalition forces conducted engagements with Sunni tribes to facilitate their enrollment into the Popular Mobilization Program and become formally recognized as Sunni PMF by the Government of Iraq. Sunni PMF have demonstrated the ability to support ISF operations in their traditional tribal homelands.

Once accepted as Sunni PMF, advise and assist tasks required continued close contact between Coalition advisors and Sunni PMF fighters in their traditional tribal territory.
New training locations will be necessary and approval and establishment of an additional Sunni PMF training sites, for example, takes time. According to SOJTF-I officials, they submitted proposals to higher command on multiple occasions detailing how they could set up a small training force like that employed at additional locations.

Tribal Engagement Coordination Cell officials said they expected the next Sunni PMF training site. Given this time frame, developing plans to advise and assist the next series of Sunni PMF would help maintain momentum, reinforce success, and maximize available capabilities to engage and defeat ISIL.

Establishing adequate logistical support for Coalition advise and assist teams will require planning and resources. CJTF-OIR and subordinate commands should complete coordination and prepare for the timely identification, engagement, and training of additional Sunni PMF while continuing to develop and improve existing Sunni PMF.
(U) Observation 2

(U) Leahy Vetting Recertification Requirements

(U) U.S. Department of State policy required recertification of Leahy vetting every 12 months for foreign security forces receiving U.S. equipment or training purchased with DoD appropriations.

(U) Recertification of Sunni PMF every 12 months increased the risk that equipping of Sunni PMF units would be delayed.

(U) Department of State guidance for compliance with Leahy vetting describes the 12 month recertification requirement.

The State Department and DoD now both use a “One Year Good For” vetting policy. Under this policy, once an individual or unit is vetted, that vetting remains valid for 12 months, based on the date vetting was completed in INVEST [International Vetting and Security Tracking] if no subsequent derogatory information is found.25

(U) U.S. Embassy Baghdad guidance is consistent with State Department policy.

The “12 Month good for” vetting policy states that a favorable vetting for individuals or units is valid for a period of one year, barring the discovery of additional adverse information. Candidates which fall into this category will be matched in the International Vetting and Security Tracking (INVEST) system after post conducts the mandatory Internal Search. If a potential match is found, post is responsible for ensuring that the match is correct, and in so doing, acknowledges that the individual has not committed any human rights violations since the individual was originally vetted. Note that the “12 month good for” rule only applies if the training is to begin before the year expiration date, even if the training will end after the end of the year. If an individual is entered into vetting

within 12 months, but the training will begin after the one year period, vetting MUST be completed again.26

**FOFO** The U.S. Embassy Baghdad policy cites the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act 2013, Section 8057, which was amended by 2249e, Title 10, U.S.C. (entered into the U. S. Code as a result of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015). The language in 2249e, Title 10 U.S.C. expanded the Leahy vetting requirement to cover security force assistance, a term referring to both training and equipping for foreign forces. According to Embassy officials, DoD commands were aware that Leahy vetting applied to equipping and training and were conducting vetting properly in 2015, despite the outdated policy.

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(U) Observation 3

(U) Mandated Iraqi Train and Equip Fund Quarterly Progress Reporting

(U) Section 1236 required the Secretary of Defense to report to select congressional committees quarterly regarding the use of ITEF.

(U) The Department of Defense Under Secretary for Policy did not issue the first quarterly report, due in August 8, 2015, until October 30 2015, a delay of almost 90 days in a 90 day reporting period.

(U) Discussion

(U) Paragraph b.1. of Section 1236 required the Secretary of Defense to report to "appropriate congressional committees and leadership of the House of Representatives and Senate," the plan for assisting the security forces of the Government of Iraq prior to expending 25 percent of the ITEF appropriation. The Secretary issued the required report on May 8, 2015.

(U) After the initial notification, Section 1236 required quarterly progress reports.

Not later than 90 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits the report required in subsection (b)(1), and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide ... a progress report.\(^\text{27}\)

(U) The first quarterly progress report, due August 6, 2015, was released on October 30, 2015. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy staff attributed the reporting delay to the Department of Defense approval process, but said no further steps to ensure timely reporting had been made. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy officials should take steps to ensure timely reporting or renegotiate the reporting timeframes.

\(^{27}\) According to House Armed Services Staff, the original 30-day reporting requirement contained in the law was an error in the published legislation. They expect reports every 90 days, or quarterly, as stated in the title of the paragraph.
Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

We conducted this assessment from July to November 2015 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations," published in January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient and appropriate to provide a reasonable basis for our conclusions based on our assessment objectives.

This report was self-initiated by DoD IG's Special Plans and Operations component, in support of the Lead Inspector General's oversight requirements for Operation Inherent Resolve. The objective of this assessment was to determine the extent to which U.S. and Coalition Force efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip Sunni PMF have enabled their combat effectiveness and successful integration into the Iraqi Security Forces.

To assess our objective, we reviewed Federal laws and Department policy, in addition to U.S. Central Command and subordinate command orders and other guidance. Limitations to our scope were:

- (U) Investigations of alleged corrupt activities by U.S., Coalition, or Iraqi organizations or individuals.
- (U) The team deployed to Kuwait and Iraq from conducting interviews with U.S. trainers and advisors. In addition, we met with Tribal Sheiks, Kurdish Pesh Merga representatives, and an Iraqi general officer responsible for the Popular Mobilization Program in Anbar Province.
- (U) We interviewed personnel from CJTF-OJR, CJFLCC-1, OSC-I, 1st Theater Sustainment Command, and SOJTF-I. We visited Sunni PMF training sites conducting interviews with U.S. trainers and advisors. In addition, we met with Tribal Sheiks, Kurdish Pesh Merga representatives, and an Iraqi general officer responsible for the Popular Mobilization Program in Anbar Province.
(U) We interviewed officials in the United States that were directly involved in Sunni PMF mission in Iraq, including officials from the U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy Iraq Desk, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Operations (J-5), Joint Staff.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this assessment.
(U) Appendix B

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) Department of Defense Inspector General


(U) Government Accountability Office


(U) **Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction**


(U) Appendix C

(U) Requirements for Equipping and Training Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces

(U) Public Law 113-291, "National Defense Authorization Act for 2015," included Section 1236, "Authority to Provide Assistance to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant," [Section 1236]. This section of the law authorized the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to assist the security forces of the Government of Iraq through the expenditure of appropriated funds. Section 1236 required the Secretary to give notice prior to providing assistance or obligating funds, vet forces receiving assistance, and report quarterly on progress.

(U) Vetting Recipients of Equipment and Training Conducted by U.S. Forces

(U) The mission to train, advise, assist, and or equip tribal militias included inherent risks resulting from knowledge gaps about host nation forces. For example, in September 2015, media channels reported that a former Georgian special operator, trained by U.S. Forces, had filled a key leadership position in ISIL commanding fighters in northern Syria and had recruited thousands of fighters from the Caucasus. The enhanced vetting requirements of Section 1236 were intended to reduce the likelihood of using U.S. funding to assist ISF who have committed human rights violations, but also included Sunni PMF.

(U) This vetting is in addition to the requirements of Section 2249e, title 10, United States Code, Section 1204 (Leahy vetting).28 This section of the code prohibits the use of U.S. funds for assistance to units of foreign security forces that have committed a gross violation of human rights.29

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28 (U) DoD defines a gross violation of human rights as stated in The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: "torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person."

29 (U) The vetting process described in Section 2249e Title 10, U.S.C. is commonly referred to as "Leahy vetting," based on the sponsor of the original legislation Senator Patrick Leahy. There are two Leahy Laws. The DoD Leahy Laws were recurring requirements the National Defense Authorizations or Appropriations Acts until Title 10 was amended in 2014. The second is Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which prohibits the furnishing of assistance authorized by the Act and the Arms Export Control Act to any foreign security force unit where there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violations of human rights.
Of the amounts made available to the Department of Defense, none may be used for any training, equipment, or other assistance for a unit of a foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. And (2) The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, ensure that prior to a decision to provide any training, equipment, or other assistance to a unit of a foreign security force full consideration is given to any credible information available to the Department of State relating to human rights violations by such unit.

DoD relied on the U.S. Department of State to vet names of Sunni PMF leadership against Department of State databases to complete Leahy vetting.

Department of State policy further required annual recertification of individuals approved by Leahy vetting.

Section 1236 required the Secretary of Defense to ensure that prior to assisting any forces described in the section, such elements were, "appropriately vetted, including at a minimum, by: (1) conducting assessments of such elements for associations with terrorist groups or groups associated with the Government of Iran; and (2) receiving commitments from such elements to promote respect for human rights and the rule of law." To accomplish Section 1236 requirements, DoD vetted Sunni PMF units against databases maintained by DoD organizations and U.S. intelligence agencies. Multiple commands and offices performed vetting, each of which developed operating procedures to manage the multiple requirements.

Secretary of Defense memorandum, August 18, 2014, implemented Leahy vetting for DoD and differentiated subject matter expert exchanges conducted by Special Operations Forces from security force assistance activities. The memorandum defines "training" and "equipment" for which Leahy vetting requirements are applicable. Regarding training, the memorandum excludes, "Individual and collective interface activities (e.g., individual or subject matter expert exchanges, military-to-military contacts, seminars, conferences, partnership, pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS), planning and coordination visits, and other small unit exchanges) where the primary focus is interoperability or mutually beneficial exchanges and not..."
Appendixes

On December 14, 2014, the Commander, CJTF-OIR published the order required subordinate commanders to ensure compliance with Leahy vetting using the international vetting and security system of the Department of State prior to executing any security assistance training. Subordinates were required to forward requests to OSC-I and a copy of the request and completion results to the CJTF-OIR J3 [operations officer]. This order incorporates OSC-I, a subordinate command of USCENTCOM, into the vetting process as the point-of-entry into the U.S. Embassy, Iraq.

In the same order, the Commander, CJTF-OIR stated that Leahy vetting was not required for, “advise and assist activities, training conducted by non-U.S. coalition partners, or training with a primary purpose of interoperability, safety and/or familiarization.” He listed examples of exempted activities, including, “individual and subject matter expert exchanges, military to military contacts, pre-training site surveys, assessments, planning and coordination activities.”

With regards to equipping Sunni PMF with U.S. funded materiel, DoD had established no waivers as of August 2015. Leahy and Section 1236 vetting were both required prior to the issuance of any equipment to Sunni PMF.

CJTF-OIR subordinate commands developed procedures for Leahy and Section 1236 vetting requirements from USCENTCOM.
On 27 March 2015, the Commander, CJTF-OIR issued

The order, specific to the Sunni PMF, acknowledged the requirement to appropriately vet assistance to tribal elements [Sunni PMF], and stated three preconditions:

- The tribe has been recognized as having a national security of Iraq mission.

- The OSC-I obtains a Government of Iraq signature on a memorandum that indicates Iraqi coordination and concurrence on the planned equipment use.

- The tribes have received both Leahy and Section 1236 vetting.

As of our site visit in August 2015, the command had not issued any Section 1236-funded equipment to Sunni PMF. However, a case had been established to purchase equipment for Sunni PMF using the pseudo-FMS process. CJTF-OIR developed the ITEF Review Board to manage the expenditure of ITEF funds to equip the ISF, including the Sunni PMF. ITEF Review Board standard operating procedures again acknowledged Leahy Law and Section 1236 vetting requirements. The procedures also required subordinate commands to report, among other items, documentation of Leahy Law and Section 1236 vetting to CJTF-OIR when expending ITEF funds. The procedures also assigned OSC-I as the requisition authority for equipment for the ISF, using a three-signature validation procedure.

Finally, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, U.S. Army Central Command, was responsible for the storage, management, and transfer to ISF units of equipment purchased with ITEF funds. The Command was directly responsible for the release of equipment to an approved and vetted representative of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, usually in the presence of SOJTF-I officials in the case of equipment for Sunni PMF. That the command was a U.S. Army command, subordinate to the Army component command of USCENTCOM, and with no direct command relationship to CJTF-OIR, added additional complexity.
(U) Criteria Establishing Vetting Processes for Sunni PMF

(U) The list of documents containing criteria or defining a role or responsibility for vetting Sunni PMF is listed below:

(U) Statutes:
- 10 USC § 2249e (2014), "Prohibition on Use of Funds for Assistance to Units of Foreign Security Forces that Have Committed a Gross Violation of Human Rights"

(U) Memoranda:
- Memorandum, Secretary of Defense, August 2014, Implementation of Section 8057, DoD Appropriations Act, 2014 (division C of Public Law 113-76) ("the DoD Leahy law")
- Memorandum, Secretary of Defense, Feb 10, 2015, Subject: Management of Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)

(U) Operational Orders:
- USCENTCOM FRAGO 23-012, "Management and Execution of the Iraq Train and Equip Fund, February 27, 2015"

(U) Guides and Procedures:
- EMBASSY BAGHDAD Guide for Leahy Amendment Human Rights Vetting (August 2013)
- Compliance with the State and DoD Leahy Laws; A guide to Vetting Policy and
(FOUO) Process (September 2012)

(FOUO) CJTF-OIR ITEF Standard Operating Procedures (September 15)

(FOUO) SOJTF-I Leahy and 1236 Vetting Policy (18 April 2015 V2)
Appendix D

Map of Iraq – Human Geography Around Training Sites

Figure 7: Map of Iraq – Human Geography Around Training Sites

Source: National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
(U) List of Classified Sources

1. (U) DoD OIG, Assessment of DoD/USCENTCOM and Coalition Plans/Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Iraqi Army to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, September 30, 2015
   (Document is classified Secret//REL to USA, FVEY.)
   Declassify Date: No Date

2. (U) USCENTCOM “Operation Inherent Resolve: Regional Campaign Plan to Defeat ISIL-DAESH,” January 21, 2015
   (Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, FVEY.)
   Declassify Date: No Date

3. (U) CJTF-OIR, Campaign Plan 15-02, version 1.0, June 2015
   (Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, MESF.)
   Declassify Date: No Date

4. (U) CJTF-OIR OPORD 15-001, December 16, 2014
   (Document is classified Secret//REL.)
   Declassify Date: No Date

   (Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, MESF.)
   Declassify Date: No Date

6. (U) OSC-I, Tribal Force Mobilization Update, August 16, 2015,
   (Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, FVEY)
   Declassify Date: No Date
7. (U) SOJTF-I, Tribal Status, August 18, 2015
   (Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, FVEY)
   Declassify Date: No Date

8. (U) SOJTF-I, Iraq Equipping Status Report to Tribal Resistance Forces,
    July 30, 2015
   (Document is classified Secret, REL to USA, MESF)
   Declassify Date: No Date

9. (U) OSC-I, Tribal Train and Equip Update, August 15, 2015
   (Document is classified Secret, REL to USA, MESF)
   Declassify Date: No Date

10. (U) SOJTF-I Daily SITREP December 17, 2014
    (Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, FVEY.)
    Declassify Date: No Date

11. (U) SOJTF-I Daily SITREP December 18, 2014
    (Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, FVEY.)
    Declassify Date: No Date

12. (U) CJTF-OIR, MOD 2 TO FRAGO 119 TO OPORD 15-001, August 14, 2015
    (Document is classified Secret, REL to USA, MESF)
    Declassify Date: No Date

13. (U) CJTF-OIR, Iraqi National Guard SSR Slide, June 29, 2015,
    (Document is classified Secret, REL to USA, FVEY)
    Declassify Date: No Date

14. (U) CJTF-OIR, 1st TSC OCP Consolidated Sustainment Situation Report,
    September 9, 2015
    (Document is classified Secret, REL to USA, MESF)
    Declassify Date: No Date
Finding 1
16. (U) OSC-I, Tribal Force Mobilization Update, August 9, 2015,
(Document is classified Secret/REL TO USA, FVEY)
Declassify Date: No Date

Finding 2
17. (U) CJTF-OIR response to DOD OIG original request for information,
August 18, 2015
(Document is classified Secret, REL to USA, FVEY)
Declassify Date: No Date

Finding 3
20. (U) USCENTCOM “Coalition Campaign Plan: July Assessment,” August 17, 2015
(Document is classified Secret/REL TO USA, MESF.)
Declassify Date: August 17, 2040

21. (U) CJTF-OIR “Battle Update Assessment,” August 8, 2015
(Document is classified Secret/REL TO USA, MESF.)
Declassify Date: No Date
22. (U) CJTF-OIR “CJTF-OIR 041900Z JAN 15 MOD 02 TO FRAGO 01 TO OPORD 15-001,” January 4, 2015 (Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, MESF.)
Declassify Date: No Date

(Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, FVEY.)
Declassify Date: No Date

24. (U) CJTF-OIR “Battle Update Assessment,” October 10, 2015
(Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, MESF.)
Declassify Date: No Date

25. (U) SOJTF-I, Trident 1731 Brief, August 22, 2015
(Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, FVEY.)
Declassify Date: No Date

Finding 4

26. (U) SOJTF-I Daily SITREP December 16, 2014
(Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, FVEY.)
Declassify Date: No Date

27. (U) SOJTF-I Daily SITREP December 21, 2014
(Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, FVEY.)
Declassify Date: No Date

Finding 5

(Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, MESF.)
Declassify Date: No Date

29. (U) CJTF-OIR 2917002 JUL 15 MOD 01 TO FRAGO 119 TO OPORD 15-001, July 29, 2015
30. (U) CJTF-OIR 041800Z MAR 15 MOD 03 to FRAGO 01 to OPORD 15-001, March 4, 2015
   (Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, MESF.)
   Declassify Date: No Date

31. (U) CJTF-OIR FRAGO 01 to OPORD 15-001, December 16, 2014
   (Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, MESF.)
   Declassify Date: No Date

Observation 1 No classified sources

Observation 2 No classified sources

Observation 3 No classified sources

Appendix A No new classified sources

Appendix B No classified sources

Appendix C

32. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy “Section 1236 Report: Department of Defense Plan for Authority to Provide Assistance to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant,” No Date Listed
   (Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, MESF.)
   Declassify Date: No Date

Appendix D

33. (U) National Geospatial Agency, November 09, 2015
   (Document is classified Secret//REL TO USA, FVEY.)
   Declassify Date: December 31, 2040
MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General, Special Plans and Operations

SUBJECT: Response to Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) Draft Report "U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Iraqi Tribal Resistance Forces" (Project No. D2015-000SPO-213.000), Recommendation 1.a. (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE: DODIG requests a USCENTCOM review of the subject report findings, and responses to the report recommendations. USCENTCOM IG Office delegated to the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate the review and response to Recommendation 1.a.

2. (U) DISCUSSION: Recommendation 1.a states: "Chief, Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq, in coordination with Commander, Combined Joint Land Component Command-Iraq, advise and assist the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Iraqi National Security Services to develop and logistically support Tribal Resistance Forces."

3. (U) USCENTCOM J5 RESPONSE: Concur with Recommendation 1.a.

4. (U) POINT OF CONTACT: [Redacted]

USCENTCOM (b)(6)

Classified by: USCENTCOM (b)(6) 10 USC 130b (b)(6)
Derived From: DODIG Project No. D2015-000SPO-213.000
Declassify On: 20401216
MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General, Special Plans and Operations,

(U) SUBJECT: Response to Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG), U.S. and Coalition Effort to Train, Advise, and Equip Iraqi Tribal Resistance Forces (Project No. D2015-D00SPO-0213.000), Report Recommendation 3.a

Refs: (a) FRAGO 023-012 Management and Execution of the Iraqi Train and Equip Fund, 272140Z Feb 15,
(b) USCENTCOM OPORD to Dismantle DAESH OPORD 024, 251510Z Nov 15.

1. (U) PURPOSE:

DODIG requested a USCENTCOM review of the subject report findings and response to the report recommendations. USCENTCOM IG office delegated to USCENTCOM CJ8 to review and respond to finding recommendation 3.a, Commander, U.S. Central Command, in coordination with Commander, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, Director, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, and Commander, Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Iraq, to provide guidance to CJTF-OIR to train Sunnis for integration into the Iraqi Security Forces as part of the overall Coalition Military Campaign Plan and through this action has delegated the requirement for tracking progress of the TRF program to them. CJTF-OIR states in their response that because of the Government of Iraq's (GoI) continued inability to pass the Iraqi National Guard legislation, ISF will not be

2. (U) DISCUSSION:

3. (U) USCENTCOM RESPONSE:

Recommend concur with comment. Per the Finding this recommendation should be assigned to CJTF-OIR. USCENTCOM has provided guidance to CJTF-OIR to train and equip Sunnis for integration into the Iraqi Security Forces as part of the overall Coalition Military Campaign Plan and through this action has delegated the requirement for tracking progress of the TRF program to them. CJTF-OIR states in their response that because of the Government of Iraq's (GoI) continued inability to pass the Iraqi National Guard legislation, ISF will not be
(U) Management Comments: U.S. Central Command (cont’d)

authorized to integrate Sunni PMF as originally anticipated. DODIG observation made under that premise is likely to be invalid in the short to mid-term.

(U) Recommend to read:
(U)Recommendation 3.a
(U) Changing this recommendation also effects the Results in Brief (page ii) section of the report which will need to be updated to reflect the above changes from Commander, Central Command to Commander, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve.

USCENTCOM (b)(3) 10 USC 130 b, (b)(6)
MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General, Special Plans and Operations


2. DISCUSSION: Recommendation 4 states: “Commander, U.S. Central Command, in coordination with Commander, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, and Chief, Office of Security Cooperation-iraq, USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

USCENTCOM (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Italians officially agreed to provide police training. CIB USCENTCOM began developing a plan (Operation "Trojan Sentinel") to train local Police as a hold force for the Mosul counter attack. The Plan was finalized in mid-February and training of USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

In accordance with conditions on the ground, USCENTCOM and CJTF-OIR will continue to refine hold force requirements as conditions on the ground evolve.

4. POINT OF CONTACT: USCENTCOM (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

((U) Management Comments (cont’d))
MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General, Special Plans and Operations.

SUBJECT: Response to Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG), U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Iraqi Tribal Resistance Forces (Project No. D2015-D008FO-0213.000), Report Recommendation 5. (U)

Reqs: (a) FRAGO 23-012 Management and Execution of the Iraq Train and Equip Fund, 272140Z Feb 15.
(b) USCENTCOM OPORD to Dismantle DAESH OPORD 24, 251510Z Nov 15.

1. (U) PURPOSE: DODIG requests a USCENTCOM review of the subject report findings, and responses to the report recommendations. USCENTCOM JG Office delegated to USCENTCOM Operations Directorate the review and response to Finding and Recommendation 5, Responsibility for Vetting Tribal Resistance Forces (TRF).

2. (U) DISCUSSION:

A. Finding 5. The DODIG assessment reports the responsibility for ensuring compliance with Leahy and Section 1236 vetting was

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

B. (U) Recommendation 5. USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g
SUBJECT: Response to Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG), U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Iraqi Tribal Resistance Forces (Project No. D2015-D005PO-0213.000), Report Recommendation 5. (U)

3. (U) USCENTCOM RESPONSE: Concur with Recommendation 5

A. (U) Reference (a) was the original USCENTCOM order directing CJTF-OIR authority for the management of Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF). This order detailed the concept of operations and tasks associated with the program.

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

B. (U) Reference (b) providing the operational framework for execution of Phase 2 of OIR. This order directs continued responsibility for initial capacity operations and programming for Train, Advise, Assist, and Equipment within the adjusted operational framework. This FRAGO clearly articulates assigned responsibilities for validating compliance and processing documentation associated with the tribal resistance forces included, and directs subordinate guidance development to ensure OIR ITEF stakeholders clearly comprehend reporting structures and procedures for

(1) (U) Interim, the USCENTCOM Partner Force Development Working Group is taking immediate action to review and refine the TRF vetting responsibilities and reporting procedures to mitigate risk identified in the subject DODIG report. This working group conducts regularly scheduled meetings and has representation from all ITEF stakeholders.

4. (U) POINT OF CONTACT: 

USCENTCOM (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)
MEMORANDUM THRU United States Central Command – Inspector General (CC-IG), MacDill AFB, FL 33621
FOR Office of the Department of Defense – Inspector General, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: Response to Draft Report D2015-D00SPO-0213, Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans/Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Iraqi Tribal Resistance Forces

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide official responses as requested by the DoD-IG in their draft report dated 16 December 2015 related to their assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans/Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Iraqi Tribal Resistance Forces.

2. Enclosure 1 to this memorandum combines the responses from this headquarters and SOJTF-I.

3. We appreciate the efforts of the DoD-IG Team in their assessment and will incorporate your observations into our logistics and assessment processes in the ongoing train, advise, and assist mission with the Government of Iraq.

4. The point of contact for this document is the Chief of Internal Review at DSN: 000.

Enclosure

KEVIN J. KILLEA
BGen, USMC
Chief of Staff, CJTF-OIR

UNCLASSIFIED/FOC
General Comments

1. The term Tribal Resistance Forces (TRF) is no longer widely used. In an effort to nest our tribal operations efforts under a sanctioned Goll Popular Mobilization Program (PMP), we now use the term “Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)” or Anbar / Ninewa [or tribal name] Sunni PMF.

Recommendation #1.b

Commander, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve

Agree, with comment. The Tribal Engagement Coordination Cell (OSC-I) and advisor teams from SOJTF-I continually engage with tribal leaders and communicate their concerns up to the CJTF-OIR command level.

Response from CJTF-OIR

Commander, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve

Commander, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, in coordination with Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency and Chief, Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq, update the Iraq Train and Equip Fund Review Board’s Standard Operating Procedures to include supporting sustainment needs for already issued equipment beyond the initial purchase package in the review board process, and ensure the Iraq Train and Equip Fund Review Board includes the enduring logistics sustainment requirements when approving new equipment items.

Response from CJTF-OIR

Agree, with comment. Para. 7, ITEF Review Board Packet Requirements, ITEF SOP, dated 1 September 2015, states that packages for ITEF Review Board

Consideration must include “Life Cycle Costing. When estimating the total cost of a requirement, requesting activities and board members will consider all life cycle costs to include start-up, sustainment, reconstitution, and termination costs of the project, as appropriate.”

Recommendation #2.b

Commander, Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve, in coordination with the Chief, Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq, advise and assist the Government of Iraq to conduct a weekly review of sustainment initiatives. USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

Response from CJTF-OIR

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Agree, with comment. CJTF-OIR, in coordination with OSC-I, conducts a weekly review of sustainment initiatives. USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

Additionally, there is no requirement for enduring USG-provided logistics sustainment for much of the ITEF-issued equipment to Sunni PMF. ITEF requests for the Sunni PMF are not focused on U.S.-particular weapons or equipment that require continued USG support and logistics (e.g., M16s). The GOL specifically does not want the USG to issue M-16 rifles or US-manufactured heavy weapons to Sunni PMF. Mobility platforms are commercial/civilian flatbed pick-up trucks that can and should be sustained by the GOL. Furthermore, ITEF for Sunni PMF focus predominantly on arms prevalent to Iraqi Security Forces (e.g, VZ-58s or AK47s). In many cases, Sunni PMF

provide their own weapons. Other ITEF items for Sunni PMF include uniforms, boots, and personal protective equipment, which require no long-term USG sustainment.

Recommendation #3.b

Recommendation #3.b

Response from CJTF-OIR

Agree, with comment. Currently, CJTF-OIR is coordinating with OSC-I (however, it is important to understand this coordination is informal as OSC-I works for the U.S. Embassy and not for CJTF-OIR) and receiving reports from the CJTF-OIR subordinate commands, CJFLCC-I and CJJSOTF-I, on the development of...

USCENTCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d. (b)(1)1.4g

The current format for this version of the Tribal IROC or TriROC, captures the necessary information to evaluate, track, assess, and eventually trend capabilities across the spectrum of tribal areas influenced by CJSOTF-I.

CJTF-OIR aggregates, analyzes and reports the IROCs to the CJTF-OIR CG through the Partner Force Development Cell assembles a final roll-up of the analysis into an annex of the Monthly Coalition Assessment Report (MCAR) and posts it on the CJTF-OIR BICES SharePoint site. Finally, CJTF-OIR publishes copies of this report to interested parties.
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>CJFLCC-I</td>
<td>Combined Joint Force Land Component Command - Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF-OIR</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
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<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
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<td>Iraq Train and Equip Fund</td>
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<td>Popular Mobilization Forces</td>
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<td>USCENTCOM</td>
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