WITNESS STATEMENT

(CJ Act 1967, s.9; MC Act 1980, ss.5A(3)(a) and 5B; MC Rules 1981, r.70)

Statement of [redacted] ..... URN: | | | | |

Age if under 18 **Over 18**..... (if over 18 insert 'over 18') Occupation: **Admiralty Pilot**

This statement (consisting of: ... **17** .... pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated anything in it which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: ..... Date: .....

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ✓ *(supply witness details on rear)*

I am the above described person, I reside at :

I am enployed by the Ministry Of Defence in the capacity of Admiralty Pilot. I have been a civil servant since May 1978.

As an Admiralty Pilot, my duties are to carry out pilotage duties involving all types and classes of Royal Navy Ships including nuclear submarines aircraft carriers and assorted surface vessels. I also conduct pilotage of Royal Fleet Auxilliary vessels and commercial vessels to/from Ministry of Defence berths, buoys, basins, anchorages and jetties. I also assume full responsibility for the ships when carrying out cold moves of vessels (the moving of ships around the harbour solely with the use of tugboats).My duties also involve pilotage of foreign or visiting ships.

I am based at the Longroom Port Control Station, Plymouth, I have full functional authority of the Queens Harbour Master to undertake these duties.

In order to maintain my office and position, I am required to requalify in certain aspects of the job description and have prepared a comprehensive and detailed list of current qualifications including dates and descriptions of courses attended. I produce this document KMB/1.

I have further produced a copy of my curriculum vitae which outlines dates of qualification in various aspects of my maritime career and gives a comprehensive overview of my experiences and triaining to

Signature: ..... Signature witnessed by: [redacted] .....

carry out my current role. I produce this document also KMB/2.

I have further produced a personal history of my maritime history illustrating detail of positions held within various maritime organisations and including detail of vessels commanded and relative dates. This document is labelled KMB/3.

I have records confirming that I have piloted vessels into and out of the Port of Plymouth on two thousand 0ne hundred and sixty times.

Following an incident at sea in the area of the Plymouth Sound on the 29th December 2006 in which I have been directly involved in the capacity of Pilot, I have been asked by the police to provide a detailed account of my involvement in the departure from the Port of Plymouth of USS Minneapolis-Saint-Paul on that date.

USS Minneapolis-Saint-Paul is a nuclear powered Los Angeles class attack submarine enumerated SSN 708. The vesssel has been on a visit to the Dockyard at Devonport Plymouth, and was scheduled to depart one hour prior to the high tide at lunchtime on Friday 29th December 2006. The vessel was berthed at No 9 wharf at Devonport dockyard during the visit.

The task of departing the vessel was allocated to me personally prior to its arrival and as a consequence, I had been in preparation for the departureof this vessel for several days prior to the departure date.

I have had personal experience in piloting this class of vessel over the past 15 years and on a number of previous occasions, I believe that I have piloted this type and class of vessel in and out of the Plymouth Dockyard. I do not recall the last occasion on which I piloted this class of vessel but estimate that the time duration is probably two years or more.

As part of the departure plan, on Thursday 28th December 2006, I attended a prearranged meeting onboard the ship at 1400hrs. This followed a telephone request from the ship to the Flag Port Control Station specifically requesting my attendance.

Continuation of Statement of [redacted] .....

Accordingly, I attended the ship on that date and was greeted by a Naval Officer whom I believe was a [redacted] I believe that the man was [redacted] but was not the [redacted] Minneapolis Saint Paul.

This officer escorted me via the forward hatch down into the vessel where I was escorted to a briefing room which also doubled as the ships canteen/messroom.

Present at the meeting were most of the senior staff commanding the vessel. The Captain [redacted] was in attendance, he personally introduced himself to me and we shook hands. Also present were the navigating officer and, I assume, all department heads responsible for the safe operation of the ship.

There was no formal roll-call at the meeting.

The man who introduced himself to me as the navigating officer, commenced the meeting and gave an explanation to the delegates of the proposed means by which the submarine was to depart the port. This was without any prior consultation with me whatsoever and this was the first occasion that I was to learn of his proposals.

I am not aware of any persons present recording any notes or minutes of what was said during the meeting.

Following the navigators presentation, I was invited to give my own presentation for the proposed departure plan.

During the meeting, I gave a presentation to all present on the proposed departure plan for the vessel, proposed for the following day, the 29th.

I am unable to recall any specific details of exact conversation at the meeting, since this briefing was in every respect, similar to many previous such briefings.

Signature: ..... Signature witnessed by: [redacted] .....

Continuation of Statement of [redacted] .....

I gave a presentation to all present using a chart affixed to the bulkhead for that purpose. I used a broken coffee stirrer to represent the vessel as I explained the course, direction and proposed exit plan from the Hamoaze. The chart illustrated the Hamoaze only and not the Plymouth Sound itself.

The briefing also centred on what are known in nautical terms as the variables, weather predictions, potential hazards encountered en route to open water and the proposed point at which I would disembark the vessel upon completion of safe pilotage. I informed the briefing that I would depart the vessel at a point 'within Plymouth Sound'.

This statement was deliberately open-ended since the point at which I disembark is wholy dependant upon conditions on departure and as explained previously, my disembarkation point is a 'variable'.

I gave a detailed brief as to where the tugs would be operating in relation to the ship to assist departure and also I gave an explanation of the phenomenon known as the 'bank effect' which is peculiar to the Plymouth departure route downriver.

I explained to the delegates that the 'bank effect' was peculiar to this course of exit from the Port of Plymouth and what affect the route would have on the handling or steerage of the ship. The banks of the river would have the effect of pushing against the ship and affecting the point at which direction changes are initiated.

Also at the briefing, I informed delegates of the presence of the RFA vessel Cardigan Bay and the location at which she was lying. All present were therefore aware that the departure course would take the Minneapolis St Paul, close to the RFA Cardigan Bay.

The tactical departure meeting was concluded and at that meeting, it was established between the captain and myself that I would depart the vessel at a point 'within Plymouth Sound', once I was satisfied, in my mind, that the ship was on the correct bearing for departure and was travelling at a safe transfer speed in order for me to leave the vessel.

I was then given a tour of the ship in order to familiarise myself with the layout of the vessel.

Signature: ..... Signature witnessed by: [redacted] .....

Continuation of Statement of [redacted] .....

This is not mandatory but I accepted the invitation out of interest. During the tour of the ship, I was not advised of any specific route through the vessel that I would need to follow in order to disembark, at sea the next day.

I met with the captain [redacted] and he gave me a commemorative souvenir of the ship for which I thanked him.

After the meeting, I had walked the upper casing in order to familiarise myself with the securing points on the vessel to ascertain the best way of securing tugs.

The departure of the vessel was confirmed 'as planned' for the following day, the 29th one hour before high tide. The ultimate decision to continue the departure on schedule, was agreed by all concerned parties.

On Friday 29TH December 2006, at approximately 08.00hrs, I received a telephone call from the Flag Port Control Station at the Dockyard. The call was to establish whether or not the proposed departure was to take place as scheduled.

I had been contacted by the Flag office Plymouth, I discussed the departure with my chief pilot, [redacted] Although the wind conditions were predicted as being unsuitable for the safe departure of a surface vessel, there are no written guidelines available for wind conditions in direct relation to submarines since the majority of the vessel is submerged and is little effected by surface air movement or windage.

The Chief Pilot and I discussed the departure and he told me that he would support my decision to depart on schedule, either way.

The Longroom Port Control Station then contacted me with an up-to-date weather forecast and we discussed the SSN check-off list. This is a list of all preparations required to be considered prior to the departure of a nuclear submarine. This document will be available if required.

Signature: ..... Signature witnessed by: [redacted] .....

I was aware that during the night previously, a standby tug had been dispatched as an emergency precaution to attend the Royal Fleet Auxilliary vessel Cardigan Bay secured to Charlie Buoy within the Sound. I know that this vessel was so moored since I had positioned her there on arrival.

Charlie Buoy is a mooring located almost centrally within the Plymouth Breakwater and is often used to 'tie up' large vessels.

I was aware that the tug performing standby duty on Cardigan Bay was the tug 'Forceful'. I know the captain of that vessel, he is an experienced vessel master [redacted]. I spoke with him by telephone and obtained from him a verbal account of weather conditions at his location, this gave me a rough guide to the conditions at the point at which I had in mind to disembark the Minneappolis Saint Paul. I was informed that the windspeed was determined to be 40-45 knots decreasing to 35knots from the South Southwest but decreasing throughout the forenoon (navtex machine) for the area.

I subsequently telephoned the Minneappolis Saint Paul.

I was connected to a navigator on the vessel, I do not know the mans name but I am aware that the vessel carries a number of persons responsible for navigation of the ship. I asked the navigator if he had seen the weather forecast and had any particular reservations concerning the departure. He had none. I told him therefore that the departure would continue as planned.

I subsequently drove to Number 9 wharf where the vessel was berthed arriving at around 10.30 on the morning of the 29th in order to commence the departure. Once on the vessel, I examined the drawings of the ship which is not a procedural formality, however, I chose to do so on this occasion.

I was able to gain the necessary information from the American officer concerning the submerged extremeties of the submarine in order to accurately plan the positioning of tugs in order to assist in pushing the vessel. This included the location of potentially vulnerable areas on the casing.

I attended the bridge of the vessel where I was present when the engines and propulsion systems were tested. This included the main turbine propulsion system and backup or standby diesel engines. I

positioned myself at the top of the conning tower or fin where I had a good view of my surroundings through 360 degrees. I was to remain there throughout departure.

On the conning tower of the vessel were a number of technical devices to assist with the operation of the ship. I saw a ships compass, an electronic charting display information system (ECDIS), voice controls and a VHF radio. There is no equipment which might enable the vessel to be steered from that location.

Due to the size, draught and established best handling speed of this type of submarine, It was agreed verbally between the captain and I that a safe speed in the water of between 8 and 9 knots would best suit the conditions of the day. This could be determined or deemed as slightly excessive for a safe transfer at sea, but, having due regard to the handling of the ship, this type of vessel becomes extremely unresponsive to steerage at lesser speeds and the maintainence of the correct heading is more easily achieved at that speed.

Satisfactory tests were conducted on propulsion systems. I met with the captain on the bridge and explained to him the method by which the vessel was to be cast off from the wharf.

At approximately 11.30 hours that morning, the lines were let go and the vessel was manouvred from the berth by use of the two tugs present and whose services were at my disposal.

Cast off procedure was carried out without incident, I am able to give a detailed account of departure from the wharf if subsequently required so to do. This can include the positioning of tugs. The security cordon of bouys around the submarine was removed by the port authority by prearrangement.

During backing out, I engaged the captain in conversation, we spoke about times and details of high water, weather, and the location of tugs positioned for the task.

Having cast off, the submarine was manoevred backwards into the river coming to rest. The vessel was pushed onto the appropriate heading before setting off downriver under her own propulsion.

[redacted] asked me "what speed do you recommend"? I advised him "between 8-10 Knots, 10

knots being the maximum speed limit". The vessel accellerated to a speed of approximately 9 knots at my suggestion.

I am able to describe in detail the subsequent journey and course/speeds etc that the vessel was to follow on its journey downriver if required. This journey was undertaken without incident and is 'textbook' or 'bread and butter' to me having made the journey so often previously.

Visibility on the day was poor at best and it was anticipated that the captain and bridge staff might get a good view of the Hoe and Plymouth shoreline but this proved disappointing due to the poor weather. The vessel had arrived in Plymouth under a different pilot in darkness.

I will continue the detailed account of the departure journey at a point passing through Smeatons Pass where under normal circumstances for instance, when piloting a British submarine, I would begin the process of handing sole control of the vessel to the master.

In this instance, I had made a prior decision that since this particular vessel was a visitor to the United Kingdom and its captain being unfamiliar with the Port Of Plymouth, that I would remain onboard considerably longer with the captain to ensure that he was accurately positioned to make good her departure from Plymouth Sound.

At this point in the journey, it is worthy of note that the other crew members on the bridge at that time were wearing 'ski masks', such was the weather condition at the time.

On the conning tower at this time were the Captain, a person whom I assumed to be the navigator, myself, and two other seamen below me at a lower level. Also, there were two other persons standing on a higher level behind me.

Having negotiated Smeatons Pass, still sailing at approximately 8-9 knots on a bearing of 169-172 degrees, before I prepared to perform the manoevre to turn to starboard on to course of 250 degrees, I spoke with [redacted] I spoke directly to the captain and told him exactly what to expect as marker buoys came into view. At this time, I was unable to see Cardigan Bay due to heavy mist. Marker bouys

then came into view as we travelled along 169 degrees as expected. Each was acknowledged in turn by [redacted]

During this leg of the journey and before the turn onto 250 degrees, RFA Cardigan Bay came into view through the mist.

[redacted] "What side do you want the pilot ladder"?

I responded, "Starboard side"

[redacted] "When are you getting off?"

I replied, "On the 250 degree leg". I did not inform him exactly where.

At this point, [redacted] asked me, "Whats that?", indicating the Breakwater. This concerned me greatly and did little to allay my fears that the captain and navigator were not at ease with departing the vessel from harbour unaided. The Plymouth Breakwater is a land mass a mile long and is clearly charted.

I gave the captain instructions as to the timing of the turn which he in turn communicated to the helmsman and the vessel turned without incident exactly as planned onto course 250 degrees heading towards the west end of the Plymouth Breakwater.

At this point, I was able to confirm information already known to me about the location of shipping in the Sound and I was able to confirm my intended route out of the harbour without deviation. It is worthy of note at this time, that the vessel Cardigan Bay, which is a sizeable ship (176 metres in length), was lying as expected on Charlie Buoy. Due to the strong winds at the time, Cardigan Bay was lying in a situation almost facing due south, the stern of the vessel therefore lying some distance 'into' the channel available for my vessel to depart,(ie-0n 250 degrees).

Having turned to starboard and settled on the bearing of 250 degrees, a course which would take my vessel directly across the Sound and close to the rear end of Cardigan Bay, I began to point out to the captain the points that he would need to be aware of in order to safely leave harbour at the western end of the Breakwater.

I indicated to the captain the location and position of the 'New Ground' buoy off to my starboard side. Beyond that, I pointed out the position where he could soon expect to see the 'Queens Ground' buoy also to the starboard side. I explained to the captain that these buoys must be maintained to the starboard side of the vessel during departure [redacted] acknowledged my instructions.

I said to [redacted] that I would be making my arrangements to depart the ship at a point at, or near the rear end of Cardigan Bay, once, and only once, he was content to depart the vessel from Plymouth Sound unaided.

Ordinarily, I would then advise the captain of the Breakwater Light to the port of the vessel which would identify the safe route between left and right. However, due to the position in which Cardigan Bay was lying, facing due south, the Breakwater Light was obscured by the ship on the buoy. It was therefore necessary to delay my departure from the bridge until a point, whilst heading on 250 degrees across the rear of Cardigan Bay, when the port Breakwater Light came into view from behind the ship at anchor.

I again repeated my instructions to [redacted], again pointing out the left and right perameters of safe exit, he convinced me to my satisfaction that he was now aware of his bearings and was without doubt, aware of the safe bearing and course for departure.

I told him that I was now leaving the ship, he thanked me for my help in pilotage, We shook hands and I left the bridge. The speed of the vessel at the time remained constant at around 8-9 knots.

On a british submarine with which I am most familiar, the method of disembarkation would be via an internal wet ladder down the inner skin of the fin and through a small door opening onto the casing and leading directly onto the ladder to the pilot boat. This operation taking maybe one minute or so from

beginning to end. However departure from this submarine was to take considerably longer.

Due to the design of the submarine, it was necessary for me to be escorted by a seaman dedicated to that task from the bridge, to the aft hatchway. Accordingly, I met my escort in the control room of the vessel having descended the internal ladder from the bridge into the ship. He escorted me at first through several compartments before descending a further ladder to another deck below. I then followed him some distance along a lower corridor of the ship where I arrived in a mess or social area at the foot of another ladder leading to a deck hatch.

I am totally unable to describe the seaman escort.

After a short wait, I was granted permission to disembark the submarine from a seaman at the foot of the ladder. There was another seaman in this room wearing radio headphones, a non white male, sitting in the corner, I have no idea of his responsibility but would describe the headphones as being used for functional purposes connected with the vessel as opposed to entertainment.

I ascended the ladder some two decks or so to the open hatch on the aft deck. I estimate that this route to the outer casing had probably taken four or five minutes to complete. In hindsight, this was a period of time for which I had not planned to be below decks.

I stood on the top rung of the ladder for just a few seconds to orientate myself and to locate the Pilot boat which was standing off to starboard.

It was apparent to me that the ladder was not fully rigged, which explained why the pilot boat was not alongside.

I stood, still on the top rung of the ladder with my hands clutching the upper edge of the open hatch cover in front of me.

I was aware of a significant wave brewing to my port side. I turned to face it to realise without doubt that the wave was large enough to pass clear over the submarine, and likely several feet over me also as

I stood, still in the hatchway.

I gripped the hatch cover before me to steady myself and in doing so, could see over the top edge of the hatch cover, four or five members of a boat party assembled on deck attempting to secure a ladder intended for my departure.

The wave struck, in fact it passed clear over the casing and for a short while, I was submerged in sea water. The wave 'dumped' on me and a good volume of seawater passed through the hatch past me. I was thrown backwards to a seated position at the head of the ladder with the heavy hatch cover pressed against me still as I held on to it.

I recovered myself to the standing position on the top rung as before, reopening the hatch cover to its full extent in doing so. I had sustained a facial injury where the falling hatch cover had caused me to bite through my upper lip.

By now, a second wave was almost upon me, it also came from my port side although the angle with the submarine was slightly less, the captain had obviously put the vessel into a steep port turn. As I watched the second wave travel along the casing towards me, from the port front side of the vessel rearwards, I saw the wave appear on either side of the conning tower in front of me.

Unlike the first wave, this wave had struck the ship almost 'head on' and the seamen exposed on the rear casing were not this time protected by the fin. The wave swept two crewmen into the sea to my starboard side. Both crewmen were swept to the extent of their respective tethers and were 'flopping' around in the sea adjacent to where I stood on the ladder. They were however several feet below me and the casing had no physical means by which the men could hang on to anything or extract themselves.

The second wave struck me as it swept the seamen overboard, the force of the seawater was as before, except that this time I was able to prevent the hatch from striking me. I called aloud, 'Man overboard'

My automatic lifejacket inflated upon contact with the water.

I realised the uselessness of my situation within the hatchway, I could do nothing to assist the seamen in the water, and as a consequence, I retreated back down the ladder into the mess below. I estimate that I was topside in the hatchway for the passing of at least 5 or 6 waves before descending.

The mess below was in chaos. There was approximately 18 inches of seawater slopping from side to side and some of the fluorescent lighting had flickered and then failed. There was a computer teminal switched on in the mess which sparked and went dead with a flash, as did a stereo stack system which had formerly been flashing with display lights to the front when I ascended the ladder initially.

Whilst I waited in the mess, two of the deck party followed me down the ladder from topside. They arrived at the foot of the ladder soaking wet and both appeared to be injured. Crewmen in the mess covered both men in blankets and both were ushered away from the mess to the wardroom. I did not see either again. I am unable to describe eather seaman.

There came a message from the bridge, 'Pilot to the Bridge', to which I responded immediately with an escort. I retraced the route followed previously to the bridge and on arrival, I took up a position high on the railing giving good 360 degree peripheral vision. I again greeted the captain. The captain had clearly made a decision in my absence to return to the Sound and was coming about to starboard which explained the slopping of the water from side to side whilst I was below decks.

The captain said to me, "I am going back in". I could see the tethered seamen being tossed around in the wake of the ship. They were being tossed from side to side completely over the casing and occasionally being dumped on the deck. The tethered seamen were being thrown around like 'rag dolls', the captain asked me, "Can you get the police launch to cut them off"? There was absolutely nothing that they could do, the Police Rib was attempting to close onto the casing to free the men but there was again, absolutely nothing that could be done due to the sea state. I told [redacted], "There is absolutely no way they can get in".

I called the pilot boat as requested but received the response expected, that there was nothing that the pilot boat could do since it could not get in close enough.

I saw one of the still tethered sailors at one point whilst deposited on deck by the sea, still moving, he was trying to protect his head from the deck with his arm using it to cushion his head from the casing.

The other seaman appeared lifeless at that time.

The rear hatch cover now was closed.

I could not look directly down at the sides of the fin due to the presence of wings located on the conning tower itself. However, I could see the after casing and the propulsion systems to the rear and as I looked rearwards, I saw a further seaman washed overboard being bounced along adjacent to the port casing towards the rear submerged guidance and propulsion systems.

[redacted] responded immediately at seeing the man overboard and gave a direct order below to 'full port rudder', which had the effect of 'slewing' the rear of the submarine very quickly from the path of the floating seaman. He was washed beyond the rear of the vessel into open water having passed very close to the rudders. I later saw this seaman picked up by a small vessel accompanying the flotilla, probably a police boat.

I then, although with great difficulty, turned my attention away from the activity at the rear of the boat and concentrated my attention on safely piloting the vessel back into harbour.

I contacted both tug vessels and issued instructions via VHF radio. I wanted the tugs in a specific position to be able to again turn the submarine safely in the water at the rear of Cardigan Bay. Exact conversation will be recorded at the Longroom if required. I explained to the captain what to expect once we had returned to flat water.

Once in calm water, a further problem was apparent in that the submarine had retracted the securing bollards for departure, they were still stowed and there was nowhere for the tugs to secure to the submarine.

I recall requesting a helicopter by VHF radio, I recall communication with the tugs, exact speech will be

recorded and is available if required.

The submarine now turned to port and faced back out to sea mainly under its own power. The police Rib, though still attempting valiantly to reach the tethered men, ran a significant risk of crushing the men against the casing and therefore stood off.

There seemed to be an inordinately long period of time elapsing before the rear hatch opened on the submarine.

Open it eventually did, and two seamen emerged to cut the tethers. The hatch could have been opened at least 5 minutes earlier. I saw the lines cut, the bodies of the seamen in the water were recovered into the police launch.

I had by now positioned a tug on the bow to assist in turning the submarine to face back out to sea.

This provided exactly the required position of the boat, it provided a lee for the sailors to recover the bodies and the submarine was secured against the southerly wind.

The vessel turned to face open water. The submarine was stopped in the water.

I said to the captain, that this was my time to disembark, I confirmed with [redacted] that he was aware of his route out of the Sound and he agreed that the time for my departure was 'now'.

I again returned with an escort via the same route to the rear hatch where I waited for permission from the bridge to climb out. I was at first refused permission and was kept waiting for several minutes.

I knew the sea state above and expressed to the seaman controlling the lower ladder that the captain had given permission for my departure. I was still not permitted to climb.

I exchanged my lifejacket for one from the submarine since mine had activated and would make any future attempt at climbing the ladder difficult.

Finally, I was permitted to follow a seaman and began to climb the ladder to daylight above, the hatch was opened for me. The mess was in my opinion not a safe place to be in view of the vast quantity of seawater in which I had been standing. Furthermore, I was becoming stressed for the safety of the ship, I did not know what the tugs were doing or where they were, I needed to be topside.

On the casing, there was no ladder rigged for obvious reasons since the seamen rigging it were all washed overboard or dead, the pilot boat came alongside and I stepped between the vessels as I had done many times before.

In the pilot boat, was a US Diver still in his wetsuit. He had injured and bleeding legs. The diver told me that at some time during the confusion, that he had pushed past me on the ladder and exited the vessel before me, I do not recall this happening.

I was conveyed to shore by pilot boat where I subsequently attended hospital for treatment to a minor lip injury.

To assist any future enquiry, I have produced and marked on some old admiralty charts, the direction and points of referrrence at different stages of the departure journey. I exhibit chart 30, with the course downriver highlighted thereon, KMB/6.

I further produce old Admiralty chart 871 upon which I have highlighted the route and resultant position of the submarine when I disembarked. I have also marked on the chart in green, the periods of time when I was below decks in preparation for my disembarkation. This chart is exhibited KMB/4.

I further produce a photograph of a Los Angeles Class Submarine upon which I have illustrated the relative positions of the hatch and deck ladder, and also some additional featured submerged features of this type of vessel. This is exhibit KMB/5.

I have handed all documentary exhibits to [redacted] at 1400 hours on Saturday 30th December 2006.

Signature: ..... Signature witnessed by: [redacted] .....

Continuation of Statement of [redacted] .....

Signature: ..... Signature witnessed by: [redacted] .....

RESTRICTED – FOR POLICE AND PROSECUTION ONLY
(when completed)

Home address: .....

..... Postcode: .....

Home telephone number ..... Work telephone number **AA**.....

Mobile/pager number ..... Email address: .....

Preferred means of contact: **MOBILE 24/7** .....

(delete as applicable) Date and place of birth: .....

Former name: ..... Height: ..... Ethnicity Code: .....

Dates of witness non-availability **TBA**

.....

Witness care

a) Is the witness willing and likely to attend court? **Yes**. If 'No', include reason(s) on MG6. What can be done to ensure attendance?

b) Does the witness require 'special measures' as a vulnerable or intimidated witness? **No**. If 'Yes' submit MG2 with file.

c) Does the witness have any specific care needs? **No**. If 'Yes' what are they? (Healthcare, childcare, transport, disability, language difficulties, visually impaired, restricted mobility or other concerns?)

Witness Consent (for witness completion)

a)	The criminal justice process and Victim Personal Statement scheme (victims only) has been explained to me	Yes ☐	No ☐	
b)	I have been given the leaflet 'Giving a witness statement to police — what happens next?'	Yes ☐	No ☐	
c)	I consent to police having access to my medical records in relation to this matter:	Yes ☐	No ☐	N/A ☐
d)	I consent to my medical record in relation to this matter being disclosed to the defence:	Yes ☐	No ☐	N/A ☐
e)	I consent to the statement being disclosed for the purposes of civil proceedings e.g. child care proceedings (if applicable)	Yes ☐	No ☐	N/A ☐
f)	The information recorded above will be disclosed to the Witness Service so they can offer help and support, unless you ask them not to. Tick this box to decline their services:		☐	

Signature of witness: .....

Statement taken by (print name): [redacted] .....

Station: [redacted] .....

Time and place statement taken: [redacted] .....

Signature of witness: .....