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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER
U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 250
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2487

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5800
Ser N00/S001
3 Jan 13

FINAL ENDORSEMENT on RDML Ann Phillips, USN, ltr 5800 Ser N00J/108
of 18 Dec 12

From: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command
To: File

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS SAN
JACINTO (CG 56) AND USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765)

Encl: (4) Deputy Commander, USFFC ltr 5800 Ser N01/43 of 20 Dec 12
(5) COMNAVSURFLANT ltr 5800 Ser N01L/303 of 21 Dec 12
(6) COMSUBLANT ltr 5800 Ser N00/S034 of 21 Dec 12

1. Pursuant to the Manual of the Judge Advocate General, I have reviewed the subject investigation.

2. Executive Summary: Subject to the two modifications per paragraph (3) of this endorsement, the investigating officer's executive summary at pages 6-9 of the basic letter accurately describes the events that led to the 13 October 2012 collision between USS SAN JACINTO and USS MONTPELIER during an ASW Exercise conducted as part of HARRY S. TRUMAN CSG Group Sail in the Jacksonville, Florida operating area. The principle cause of the collision was human error - poor teamwork by the USS MONTPELIER watch team, and the Commanding Officer's failure to follow established submarine periscope depth operating procedures.

(a) Additionally, the investigation revealed significant contributing factors that are threaded among the various command and control headquarters that provide training and operational oversight within Fleet Forces Command. Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command is at the top of this command and control, and as such, the failure in the chain command to properly plan and execute this exercise rests firmly with this endorser.

(b) Commander, Surface Force Atlantic said it best in his endorsement. "It is clear from the investigative findings that Group Sail is an ill-defined concept. Like other elements of the

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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) AND USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765)

FRP it should be formally defined, to include a clear definition of the objectives, command and control, SOE, and "ownership" of the event."

(c) CPFC Commander's Intent for Group Sail does not currently exist, and as such, CPFC did not ensure the rest of the chain of command provided the proper oversight and operational risk management necessary to ensure not only a safe ASW exercise but also the larger HSTCSG Group Sail.

(d) Complexity was an issue. The crawl-walk-run sequence ensures our forces train in a building block approach and reach required levels of proficiency before moving to the next, more complex stage. However, complexity is also related to individual and unit experience. Until sufficient experience is attained and a degree of competence in the basic skill sets is achieved, a novice may find fundamental exercises complex. In this case, the submarine event during the group sail was meant to be a basic exercise. Across the participating units the levels of proficiency and experience varied greatly, resulting in an exercise design that was more complex than intended. In addition, the nature of overlapping surface, air, and subsurface operations engendered a degree of complexity that was not recognized by the exercise planners and participants.

(e) It is incumbent upon us as Commanders to step back and assess the proficiency of our subordinate commanders and units as they enter the crawl phase. Commanders must proactively evaluate not just the units, but the key participants, when developing training schemes, and ensure the appropriate building block events are created. They must adjust Tactics, Techniques and Procedures and codify activities across the fleets to ensure positive oversight measures are in place. This effort must start from the Fleet Headquarters, and the leadership oversight shortfalls are mine to fix.

(f) It is important to note that the attentive watch standing of SAN JACINTO's forward lookout in spotting and reporting MONTPELIER's periscope approximately 75-100 yards off the ship's port bow provided a last second opportunity to possibly avoid the collision. The SAN JACINTO OOD took immediate and effective action upon hearing the report; however, a misunderstanding by a junior bridge watch stander led to a failure to take full advantage of that

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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) AND USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765)

opportunity. Executing emergency procedures must be instinctive to all watch standers because there is no margin for error or hesitation when an emergency situation arises. The only way to make emergency procedures instinctive is through continuous and rigorous drills and training.

3. Modifications to the Executive Summary:

(a) Delete the last sentence in paragraph (5) and replace it with the following: "In essence, as MON came to PD, SJA was on a constant bearing and decreasing range while MON CO believed SJA had slight right bearing drift and increasing range."

(b) (b)(1)



4. Per enclosure (4), Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic and Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic were provided an opportunity to review and comment on the basic investigation. They submitted enclosures (5) and (6) respectively. I considered those documents in drafting this endorsement, and they are accepted as part of this investigation.

5. The findings of fact are approved subject to the following:

(a) Modify FOF 79 by deleting the phrase "operation and proficiency" and replacing it with "operational proficiency."

(b) Modify FOF 101 by deleting "Reported" and replacing it with "Report."

(c) Modify FOF 106 by deleting the second sentence and replacing it with, "Except for the December 2011 multinational exercise during its EUCOM deployment, MON had not conducted any other interactions with surface warships in the 12 months prior to the collision."

(d) Modify FOF 205 by deleting "November" and replacing with "October."

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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) AND USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765)

6. The Opinions of the Investigating Officer are approved subject to the following:

(a) Modify Opinion (29) by deleting the second subparagraph heading "c" and replacing it with "d."

(b) Modify Opinion (84b) by removing the phrase "when he resumed the watch as FTOW."

(c) Opinions (89) and (90) are disapproved. Although, Commander, CSG-10 and Commander, Destroyer Squadron 22 failed to employ rigid operational risk management in the planning and execution of the subject ASWEX, their actions did not constitute negligence.

7. The Recommendations of the Investigating Officer are approved subject to the following:

(a) Recommendations (1) through (4) are forwarded to Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic for action he deems appropriate.

(b) Recommendations (6) and (7) are disapproved. I will personally discuss the events of 13 October 2012 and the results of this investigation with both Commander, CSG-10 and Commander, Destroyer Squadron 22.

(c) Modify recommendation (9) subparagraph b. by deleting "3" and replacing it with "8." U.S. Fleet Forces Command will direct action per recommendations (8)-(11).

(d) Recommendations (12)-(19) are forwarded to Commander, Naval Submarine Forces (CSF) for action. Per enclosure (6), CSF has already begun taking corrective measures and will provide a prioritized plan of action to address identified shortfalls by 30 Jan 2013.

(e) Recommendations (20) through (22) are forwarded to Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF). By copy of this endorsement, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet is requested to direct CNSF to take action on those recommendations.

(f) Recommendations (23), (26)-(29), and (31)-(33) are forwarded

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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) AND USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765)

to Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic (CNSL) for action. Per enclosure (5), CNSL has begun taking action on these recommendations.

(g) Recommendation (24) is forwarded to COMNAVAIRLANT for action.

(h) Recommendations (25)-(29) are forwarded to Commander, HST Carrier Strike Group for action.

(i) Recommendations (30)-(33) are forwarded to Commander, Destroyer Squadron 22 for action.

11. The number one priority in any exercise is safety. This must be ingrained in our naval force. Regrettably, it is not. US Fleet Forces Command, in coordination with CSL/CNSL, will generate a Plan of Action and Milestones to develop, and implement recommendations focused on measures that last. We must ensure the lessons learned from this accident are implanted into our officers and Sailors. We will not repeat this failure.

12. This investigation is closed.


WILLIAM E. GORTNEY

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COMPACFLT
COMNAVSURFOR
COMSUBFOR
COMNAVSURFLANT
COMNAVAIRLANT
COMCARSTRKGRU TEN
COMDESRON TWO TWO

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
SUBMARINE FORCE ATLANTIC
7958 BLANDY ROAD
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2492

5800
Ser N00/S034
21 Dec 12

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From: Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic
To: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command


Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING
USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) AND USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765)

Ref: (a) COMUSFLTFORCOM ltr 5800 Ser N01/042 of 20 Dec 12
(b) RDML A. C. Phillips ltr 5800 Ser N00J/108 of
18 Dec 12
(c) COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPAC OPORD 2000

1. (U) Pursuant to reference (a), CSL reviewed reference (b) regarding technical and procedural accuracy, appropriate accountability, and the path forward to prevent recurrence. Overall, the report is well written and thorough, illuminating both individual and chain-of-command shortfalls as well as longstanding cultural challenges inherent in submarine operations. Accordingly, Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic (COMSUBLANT) will carry out the following actions.

a. (U) The investigation revealed that USS MONTPELIER did not comply with basic procedures designed to ensure ship safety during periscope depth operations. COMSUBLANT will review the recommended assignment of accountability in the case of the MONTPELIER Commanding Officer (CO) and his crew and take appropriate disciplinary action.

b. (b)(1)
(b)(1)



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
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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS
SAN JACINTO (CG 56) AND USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765)

c. (U) From a day-to-day at sea safety aspect, MONTPELIER's continuing training program should have sustained a level of proficiency that ensured adequate safety margin to avoid this collision. COMSUBLANT will review the ship's compliance with prescribed training and ISIC awareness of their ships training status, and then implement force-wide changes to the continuing training program as required.

d. (b)(1)
(b)(1)



e. (U) Culture. Reference (b) identified cultural aspects that either directly or indirectly contributed to the unnoticed erosion of safety standards over time. The CO clearly created an environment that neutralized longstanding submarine watchstanding practices of "forceful backup" and "defense-in-depth" that ultimately, and most proximately, resulted in the collision. On the surface, these failings appear to be consistent with the root causes identified in previous collisions and groundings and call into question force-wide CO decision making and enforcement of standards. There were also indications of force-wide submarine cultural breakdowns that eroded community ownership of safety when not specifically assigned that responsibility, or that resulted in the migration away from a basic building block approach to training. COMSUBLANT will review the available data harvested from this collision and previous investigations and conduct an in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of previous corrective actions. In conducting this review, COMSUBLANT will consider using a

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broad spectrum of pay grade and platform experience to ensure a
fresh and unbiased review of the evidence.

f. (U) Detailed analysis of each of the above general areas
will be required to accurately determine the root causes.
Corrective actions will likely include procedural, training
pipeline, and doctrine changes, but more importantly, a review
and implementation of leadership and personal management
initiatives. A prioritized plan will be provided no later than
30 Jan 2013 and will include due dates and "re-visit" dates to
validate that the corrective actions were both well targeted and
effective.

2.
(b)(1)

(b)(1)

a. (b)(1)

(1) (b)(1)

(b)(1) (2) (b)(1)

(b)(1) (3) (b)(1)

b. Findings of Fact:

(1) Findings of Fact 105 and 106 appear to conflict.
105 states MON conducted an exercise in Dec 2011 with surface
ships. 106 states MON had not conducted operations with
surfaced warships in the 12 months prior to the collision.

(2) Findings of Fact 66, 67 and 68 are not material
issues and should be moved to the "MON recent Operations"
section.

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(3) Findings of Fact 88 and 89 should be sub-paragraphs
to 87. 79, "operation and proficiency" should be "operational
proficiency". 101, "reported" should be "report".

(4) Finding of Fact 250 has the incorrect PRE-EX message
month (should be October vice November).

c. Opinions: 84b, the (b)(3), (b)(6)
never resumed the watch as FTOW.

M. J. Connor
M. J. CONNOR

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER
NAVAL SURFACE FORCE ATLANTIC
1430 MITSCHER AVENUE
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23551-2484

5800
Ser N01L/303
21 DEC 2012

From: Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic
To: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING
USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) AND USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765)

Ref: (a) Deputy Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command ltr 5800
Ser N01/43 of 20 Dec 12 (S)
(b) RDML Ann C. Phillips, USN, ltr 5800 Ser N00J/108 of
18 Dec 12 (S)
(c) OPNAVINST 3500.39C

1. As directed by reference (a), I conducted a review of reference (b). I concur with the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the Investigating Officer, and offer the following additional observations:

a. The failure to properly utilize the required Operational Risk Management process contained in reference (c) was a fundamental flaw in the planning for this event. The failure to conduct in-depth, deliberate analysis to identify hazards and control the associated risks in conducting the ASWEX was a significant contributor to the collision.

b. It is clear from the investigative findings that Group Sail is an ill-defined concept. Like other elements of the FRP it should be formally defined, to include a clear definition of objectives, command and control, SOE, and "ownership" of the event. In this particular case the competing and higher priority events, such as carrier flight operations, distracted SJA from their role in the ASWEX. At the time of the collision, SJA was not fully engaged in ASW, but was instead focused on conducting administrative helo flights and returning to their position in the plane guard screen.

c. High operational tempo and the myriad additional responsibilities assumed by (b)(3), (b)(6) and his staff leading up to Group Sail illustrate a current challenge faced by our DESRONS. For example, from June to November 2012, CDS-22 was the only non-deployed DESRON in the Atlantic Fleet, assuming administrative control duties for 15 ships (to include INSURV

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preparations, Basic Phase training, LOAs, and maintenance availability planning). The staff had been split to manage both ship readiness and exercise planning. Although elements of the staff attended advanced ASW training (including IAC and SCC), the Deputy Commodore and other members of the staff remained in Norfolk to maintain administrative support of subordinate units. As a result, the command's proficiency in ASW is overstated in the investigation, particularly in Opinion 32. As with other commands in the Group Sail, CDS-22 would have benefited from a "crawl, walk, run" approach to the ASWEX and other events.

d. A review of the schedule of CDS-22's employment since last June is illustrative of the short fall in the number of DESRONs in the Atlantic Fleet. This validates the efforts to increase the number of DESRONs and manning within each DESRON.

2. While awaiting your final endorsement I will initiate action on the recommendations. Separately, I will also release guidance on Operational Risk Management to the Surface Force Atlantic.



D. M. THOMAS, JR.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE GROUP TWO
2600 TARAWA COURT SUITE 200
VIRGINIA BEACH VA 23459-3229

5800
Ser N00J/108
18 Dec 12

From: RDML Ann C. Phillips, U.S. Navy
To: Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command

SUBJ: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING
USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) AND USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765)

Ref: (a) JAGMAN, Chapter II
(b) AXP-1(D) - ALLIED SUBMARINE AND ANTISUBMARINE EXERCISE MANUAL

Encl: (1) USFF Appointment Letter Ser N01/027 dated 15 Oct 12
(2) Final Report
(3) Consolidated Evidence List

1. Pursuant to enclosure (1) and in accordance with reference (a), an investigation was conducted into the facts and circumstances surrounding the collision between USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765) (MON) and USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) (SJA) on 13 October 2012. The collision took place during Event 13070, an ASW Exercise conducted in accordance with reference (b), as a part of the HARRY S. TRUMAN Carrier Strike Group (HSTCSG) Group Sail in the Jacksonville Operating Areas.

2. The investigation team was professionally received by all commands associated with the investigation. All commands made every effort to expeditiously provide requested evidence and personnel for interviews.

3. Enclosure (2) is the investigation's final report and includes a preliminary statement, executive summary, findings of fact, opinions and recommendations developed. Enclosure (3) contains all supporting evidence collected and interviews conducted during the course of the investigation.

4. The investigation team would like to thank the following commands for the use of their facilities and exceptional support throughout the investigation: Commander, Naval Station Mayport, Florida; Commander, Submarine Group 10; Commander, Submarine Squadron 20; Commander, Naval Warfare Development Command.


A. C. PHILLIPS

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SUBJ: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING
USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) AND USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765)

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Enclosure 2

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
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SUBJ: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING
USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) AND USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765)

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Pursuant to enclosure (1) and in accordance with reference (a), an investigation was conducted into the facts and circumstances surrounding the collision between USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765) (MON) and USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) (SJA) on or about 13 October 2012 in the Jacksonville Operating Area (JAXOA).

2. Enclosure (1) directed an investigation into the cause of the collision, and any fault, neglect, or responsibility therefore, and to recommend any appropriate administrative or disciplinary action.
(b)(1)



3. Due to the breadth of the investigation, which included interviews of over 100 witnesses and visits to all vessels participating in the exercise, two of which were then underway, an extension of time was granted until 19 November 2012 and a second extension was granted until 18 December 2012.

4. RDML Ann C. Phillips, USN was the Investigating Officer.
(b)(3), (b)(6) USN served as the Deputy Investigating Officer and submarine subject matter and technical expert. (b)(3), (b)(6)
USN served as the investigation team's legal advisor. (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) provided additional legal support.
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
and (b)(3), (b)(6) provided additional support.

5. All personnel who had personal knowledge of or information relevant to this investigation at the following commands were interviewed or provided statements for the record: US Fleet Forces Command (USFFC); Commander, Submarine Forces Atlantic (CSL); Commander, Carrier Strike Group 10 (CSG 10 or HSTCSG); Commander, Destroyer Squadron 22 (CDS 22); Commander, Submarine Squadron 6 (CSS 6); USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) (SJA); USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765) (MON); USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN 75) (HST); USS GRAVELY (DDG 107) (GRV); and Maritime Helicopter Squadron 74 (HSM 74). All listed references and other relevant regulations, directives, logs, charts, reports and training records were reviewed.

6. In view of possible administrative or punitive actions that could result based on the findings of facts of this investigation, a number of the witnesses were advised of their rights in accordance with Article 31b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. All relevant interviews were

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summarized and provided as enclosures. Original, signed acknowledgement of rights and waiver forms are maintained at USFPC Staff Judge Advocate Office and are appended to each witness summary.

7. In those instances wherein the investigating team conducted multiple interviews of a witness, each individual summary is included in the enclosure along with any written statement(s) provided by the witness.

8. In certain instances specific findings of fact included in this report were repeated in more than one segment, and so are duplicative. This duplication is purposeful to provide a full narrative/sequence of facts not only for the overview, but also for sections that expand upon the role/participation of pertinent principal individuals and watchstanders.

9. Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command convened a Safety Investigation Board (SIB), which was conducted concurrently with this investigation. The SIB did not share privileged witness or derivative information with this investigating team.

10. All bearings are true bearings, all courses are true courses, and all ships' depths are in feet. Fathometer soundings are referenced to feet or fathoms beneath the keel. All times in this report are in Greenwich Mean Time. Times in several statements are referenced to ship's local time at the time of the collision, which was Eastern Standard Time (+4 QUEBEC).

11. The term "ASWEX" refers to Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise 13070 conducted 13 October 2012 during the HARRY S. TRUMAN CARRIER STRIKE GROUP (HSTCSG) Group Sail in accordance with Commander DESTROYER SQUADRON 22 Pre-Exercise Message (DTG 051929Z OCT 12).

12. All dates are in calendar year 2012, unless otherwise stated.

13. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) were not participants in the ASWEX and were not in close proximity to the collision when it occurred. They were not interviewed by this investigation team.

14. The Johns Hopkins Acoustic Intelligence, Applied Physics Laboratory (ACINT/APL) reconstructed the events of the collision using recorded data the investigating team recovered from MON.

15. COMSUBRON 12 Tactical Analysis Group reconstructed the event based on Virtual Mapping System (VMS) data from the participating units.

16. GRV provided accurate data and logs that enabled much of the reconstruction of events for the ASWEX.

Enclosure 2

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17. All Command and Decision Data (CND) from GRV, SJA, and HSM 74 were forwarded to Aegis Training and Readiness Center Dahlgren, Virginia for analysis and collision reconstruction between SJA and MON.

18. All VMS and position data for GRV and SJA was forwarded the Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS), Newport, RI for processing and track reconstruction.

19. Original records and certified copies are included to the extent they exist. Original logs and training records not enclosed were returned to SJA, MON, GRV, CDS 22 and HSTCSG.

20. In December 2009, a team led by personnel from Naval Reactors and CSL conducted a "Deep Dive" into recent submarine collisions and groundings. This investigation evaluated the issues determined to be causes in the 2009 "Deep Dive" to determine if any similar issues played a factor in the collision. Many were found to be pertinent and are addressed in this report.

21. Detailed damage assessments with final cost estimates and length of repair times were not available when this report was completed. Findings of fact and enclosures included in this report detail preliminary damage assessments and estimated repair costs.

Enclosure 2

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SUBJ: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING
USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) AND USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) (SJA) and USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765) (MON) collided on 13 October 2012, at approximately 1927:15Z during an Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise (ASWEX) in the Jacksonville Operating Area, conducted as part of the HARRY S. TRUMAN CARRIER STRIKE GROUP (HSTCSG) Group Sail (GRUSL). HSTCSG group sail participants included Commander CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 10 (CSG 10), Commander, DESTROYER SQUADRON 22 (CDS 22), Commander CARRIER AIR WING 3 (CVW 3), USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN 75) (HST), USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) (SJA), USS GRAVELY (DDG 107) (GRV), (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6). The GRUSL was scheduled for 2 - 20 October 2012, and the ASWEX was the second ASW event of the group sail, following an EMATTEX several days earlier. HSTCSG had undergone numerous schedule revisions over the past 3 months which led to an accelerated and compressed integrated training phase and pre-deployment training schedule. The Group Sail followed HSTCSG's Warfare Commander's Conference, held at Tactical Training Group Atlantic 17-28 September 2012, and was intended to allow the CSG Staffs, ships, and air wing to conduct unobserved, ungraded, serialized training to prepare for their upcoming certification event (COMPTUEX), scheduled for (b)(1). HSTCSG is scheduled to deploy on (b)(1).

2. CDS-22 was the Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE) for the ASWEX when the collision occurred. The Staff prepared a detailed CONOPS brief, which was reviewed and approved by Commander CSG10 before the ASWEX was to occur. By design, HST was the high value unit, and SJA and GRV were to take defensive screen positions between HST and the adversary submarine (MON), supported by a P-3 and three helicopters from HSM 74. MON was to simulate an (b)(1) Class Submarine, conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, and attempt an attack on HST from periscope depth (PD), as would be conducted by an (b)(1). The ASWEX commenced at 1700Z, with MON loitering around a COMEX point in the south of the designated operating areas for 30 minutes at PD, prior to submerging and commencing her approach on HST. As an (b)(1) CDS 22 expected MON would proceed at a speed of (b)(1) and that this would control her approach and maintain a speed of events that would allow the problem to unfold at a measured, and therefore, safe, pace.

3. About an hour after the COMEX, first GRV and then SJA set flight quarters to recover a logistics helicopter and moved off their assigned screen positions to the east. GRV finished with the Log helicopter first and moved west to regain station on HST. SJA's flight quarters took longer than expected, and once complete, at approximately 1820Z, CDS-22 directed SJA back into the defensive screen with urgency, which required SJA to maneuver at high speed, degrading her ASW detection capability. During this time, the surface ships traveled back and forth on westerly and then easterly courses maneuvering to keep up with HST as she conducted flight operations and reset to make the next recovery of aircraft. At 1918Z, SJA

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was to the east of HST heading west at approximately 25 knots and GRV was to the south-southwest of HST, also heading west.

4. Meanwhile, once the initial 30 minutes had passed, MON left PD and began maneuvering. She had not yet streamed her TB 34 array, and so she spent the better part of an hour completing that process before gradually proceeding to the north. At 1845Z, MON CO decided to come to PD a second time to gain insight into the positions of the surface ships, and to better strategize how to maneuver around them to get to HST. He did not clear baffles on this PD trip, as he assessed that all the ships in the exercise were well to the north, and there was no traffic in his immediate area. Upon reaching PD, with the OOD on the periscope, MON observed the ships all far to the north and barely visible. MON descended to (b)(1) the CO and OOD discussed options, and made the decision to go deep to (b)(1) and sprint to get inside the screen to survey and attack HST. At 1914Z, MON penetrated the surface screen at depth by crossing under GRV, and commenced her third trip to periscope depth (PD) inside the screen.

5. As they commenced this third PD trip, MON crew's situational awareness of the surface picture was that GRV was in her baffles astern, HST was to the left of the sub drawing left (in other words, with left bearing drift - drawing away from MON), and SJA was on MON's right drawing right. The CO and crew wrongly assessed SJA was drawing right. Initially, SJA showed some slight right bearing drift then shifted to zero bearing drift, and then near the time of the collision, shifted to slight left bearing drift. MON based their interpretations on a previously known easterly heading for SJA, but had not detected SJA's turn to the west at 1914Z while they were deep. In essence, as MON came to PD, she held SJA on a constant bearing and decreasing range while believing that she held constant bearing and increasing range. (see Figure 1 pg. 9)

6. As MON proceeded to PD, in an effort to mitigate risk, the CO manned the periscope (b)(1). On the first sweep MON CO thought he saw something and ordered the ship returned to safe depth of (b)(1). When the recorded video from MON's periscope is replayed, SJA is momentarily visible on that sweep, but is quickly obscured by waves. On the second sweep, the CO saw HST, correlated it to the contact he thought he first saw and ordered the ship back to PD ((b)(1)) in order to take a shot on the carrier IAW the ASWEX exercise objectives. On the third sweep, SJA is clearly visible with a target angle of 355R at (b)(1) (b)(1)

approximately 575 yards range from MON, with a near bow-on aspect. (See Figure 2 pg. 9). When he saw the SJA clearly, the CO immediately lowered the periscope and ordered a depth of (b)(1). Other watch standers shouted "Emergency Deep!" and the CO then ordered "Emergency Deep". MON executed Emergency Deep procedures, began to dive, and was struck by SJA aft of the

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sail and then on the rudder, with enough force to eventually cause the rudder to dislodge from the ship.

7. On SJA, the forward lookout spotted a periscope 5 degrees on the port bow at what he thought was about 100 yards and reported it to the Bright Bridge watch stander and SJA Conn. SJA Conn reported the periscope to the SJA OOD who immediately recognized that collision was unavoidable. SJA OOD immediately ordered "all back full" and the helm complied and reported "All Engines Back Full." SJA had NIXIE and TACTAS deployed, and her standing orders, as displayed in a sign hung over the helm console, were not to back down with the array deployed. As the OOD reported the periscope to the CO in combat, via Net 15, the CO responded with "OOD-TACTAS/NIXIE!" not fully understanding the extremis situation, and reminding the OOD that TACTAS and NIXIE were deployed. SJA OOD succinctly directed that bridge personnel should disregard the array in this circumstance, but, the Helm misunderstood this dialogue and placed the throttles from "All back full" to "All stop." Within seconds, SJA collided with MON; at approximately 1927:15Z.

8. Although MON was tasked with simulating an attack on the CVN, HSTCSG and CDS-22 staffs anticipated that MON would transit, as stated earlier, at approximately (b)(1) and they had no expectation of a faster speed or "aggressive" behavior. Neither HSTCSG nor CDS-22 considered the ASWEX a complex exercise, and members of their staffs believed it was "well mapped on water-space and relaxations, and it was coordinated with all surface ships."

9. A COMSUBLANT (CSL) staff review of the ASWEX PREEX recommended that the submarine operating authority approve the exercise with standard relaxations. Prior to exercise COMEX on 13 October, there was no pre-COMEX brief, no fathometer familiarization scheduled as directed by COMSUBLANT OPORD 2000, and unbeknownst to CDS-22, MON had no guidance on board for simulating an (b)(1) (they simulated a (b)(1) instead), or specific data relating the capabilities of US Naval ships.

10. Both ships suffered extensive damage. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(b)(1) . SJA's SONAR dome has extensive metal deformation, tears, layers of metal and transducer separation, and flapping metal with exposed wiring. Current cost estimates to repair both ships could exceed \$43 million.

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(b)(1)




Figure 1. History of tracks prior to collision (SJA, MON, HST, and GRV)

(b)(1)




Figure 2. MON final periscope image of SJA

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FINDINGS OF FACT

MON: TRAINING, READINESS, MANNING, OPTEMPO

MON: Key Personnel

1. Commander Thomas Winter has 19.5 years of naval service and has been the Commanding Officer (CO) of USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765) (MON) since November 2010. MON is his fourth SSN tour. He has served all his sea time on the same class of submarines. A history of his prior assignments includes:

- a. USS OLYMPIA (SSN 717)
- b. USS MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL (SSN 708)
- c. USS TOPEKA (SSN 754)
- d. Naval Postgraduate school Monterey, CA
- e. Submarine Squadron EIGHT Engineer
- f. Special Assistant to Director, Nuclear Propulsion for Officer Personnel and Policy Matters (Encl.MON-1)

2. (b)(3), (b)(6) reported to MON as the Executive Officer (XO) on 05 October 2012 (8 days prior to the collision). (Encl.MON-2)

3. The XO's prior experience includes Navigator in USS HELENA (SSN 725) in San Diego during which he participated in 6-8 ASW exercises with Surface Action Groups (SAG), similar to the one on the day of the collision. He also served as a junior officer in USS MICHIGAN (SSBN 727). (Encl.MON-2)

4. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Officer of the Deck (MON OOD) at the time of the collision and is the MON Navigation/Operations Officer. He completed a junior officer tour on the USS LOS ANGELES (SSN 688) during which time he completed 2 deployments to the Western Pacific. He had 4 hours of sleep prior to relieving the watch at 1200 on 13 October. (Encl.MON-3, MEV-75)

5. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Junior Officer of the Deck (MON JOOD) at the time of the collision, had reported on board MON in April 2011 and qualified OOD and in Submarines (earned his Dolphins) in July 2012. He was on board for MON's most recent deployment but stood watch as Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD) for only brief periods during the ship's transit from their mission area back to Norfolk. (Encl.MON-4)

6. MON JOOD's responsibility was to serve as the contact manager in accordance with the Submarine Force Contact Management Manual. He had 4-5 hours of sleep prior to relieving the watch. (Encl.MON-4) (MEV-55)

7. (b)(3), (b)(6) is MON (b)(3), (b)(6) and relieved the prior COB on 5 October 2012. His previous experience at sea included 2

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tours in USS ALBUQUERQUE (SSN 706) where he served as a Radioman and Radio LCPO, and most recently he served at Naval Submarine School. (Encl.MON-5)

8. The COB was the Diving Officer of the Watch (DOOW) Under Instruction (U/I) at the time of the collision. (Encl.MON-5)(MON-1)

9. (b)(3), (b)(6), MON Supply Officer (MON CHOP), was the Diving Officer of the Watch (DOOW) at the time of the collision. He enlisted in 2001 as a Culinary Specialist and previously served in several enlisted assignments from 2001 to 2009. He was commissioned through OCS in 2009. (Encl.MON-6)

10. (b)(3), (b)(6) served as the USS PHILADELPHIA (SSN 690) Supply officer during decommissioning until crew release and has been the Supply Officer on MON since January 2011. He qualified Submarine Supply on January 2012. The October underway was the first underway in which he had stood DOOW regularly. (Encl.MON-6)

11. (b)(3), (b)(6) reported in August 2012 to MON and was the Chief of the Watch (MON COW) at the time of the collision. He served on three prior submarines, standing watch as SONAR operator, and SONAR Supervisor. He qualified COW on a similar ship of the class but never stood COW routinely prior to arriving on MON. (Encl.MON-7)

12. MON COW stood U/I watches during a September 2012 underway and as a sea returnee, most of the COW's requalification signatures had been deleted. He was required to complete U/I watches and an Executive Officer interview. (Encl.MON-7, MEV-49)

13. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the SONAR Division LCPO (MON SONAR CPO) on MON, his sixth submarine, at the time of the collision. (Encl.MON-8)

14. MON SONAR CPO was in SONAR gathering data on tonal signatures on HST and assisting the watch team during the ASWEX and at the time of the collision. He had slept for only a couple of hours in the 24 hours prior to the collision. (Encl.MON-8)

15. (b)(3), (b)(6) reported to MON in April 2012 and was the SONAR Supervisor on MON (MON SONAR Sup) at the time of the collision. He previously stood watch as SONAR Supervisor on USS NEWPORT NEWS (SSN 750) and stood SONAR operator on USS CHARLOTTE (SSN 766) and USS BATFISH (SSN 681). He had 5 hours of sleep prior to relieving that watch at 0630. (Encl.MON-9, MEV-75)

16. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the (b)(3), (b)(6) (MON PBB Op) from approximately 1515Z until the time of the collision at 1927Z 13 October 2012. He had 5 hours of sleep prior to relieving the watch. (Encl.MON-11, MEV-75)

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17. (b)(3), (b)(6) reported on board MON in March 2012 and is qualified active, broadband, and classification operators. (Encl. MON-11)

18. Prior to arriving in MON, (b)(3), (b)(6) operated a BQQ5D SONAR system in USS JACKSONVILLE (SSN 699) where he qualified broad band, narrow band, active and auxiliary operator; most recently he completed shore duty at NNSY shop 67X and SONAR C school where he studied BQQ-5 maintenance. (Encl. MON-11)

19. (b)(3), (b)(6) has been on board MON since April 2011, was the Auxiliary operator (MON Aux Op), and operated the High Frequency Active (HFA) equipment during the ascent to PD at the time of the collision. (Encl. MON-10, MEV-75)

20. MON Aux Op completed his initial qualification on the USS MONTPELIER, attended SONAR C School, transferred to the USS PHILADELPHIA, and then reported back to MON. (Encl. MON-10, MEV-75)

21. (b)(3), (b)(6) is the fire control CPO (MON FTC) on MON and has been on board MON for 7 months. (Encl. MON-15)

22. MON FTC was assigned as the FTOW watch for the 1200 to 1800 (local) shift on the day of the ASWEX. (Encl. MON-15)

23. MON FTC was not on watch at the time of the collision but had been in the control room monitoring the performance of the tracking team for more than an hour prior to the collision. (Encl. MON-15)

24. MON FTC had previously served in USS HAMPTON (SSN 767), USS TUCSON (SSN 770), and USS SCRANTON (SSN 756) and has operated similar fire control systems to the version on MON. (Encl. MON-15)

25. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the FTOW (MON FTOW) on MON at the time of the collision, enlisted in the Navy in 2008 and reported onboard MON in May 2011. He had 6 hours of sleep prior to relieving the watch. (Encl. MON-16, MEV-75)

CSS-6 Observations of MON

26. CSS-6 staff thought that CDR Winter was a strong, competent officer and good tactician who had high standards with a leadership style that made him effective while getting the most out of his people. (Encl. CSS-1, CSS-2, CSS-3)

27. CSS-6 Deputy thought that CO MON had been a strong CO who had been a major reason the ship's successful mission completion on deployment early 2012. (Encl. CSS-3)

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28. CSS-6 CDRE (b)(3), (b)(6) thought that the MON CO continued to work to make the ship effective despite reported weakness of the prior XO and the current engineer officer (ENG), but had not developed a rigorous enough process to provide himself backup. (Encl.CSS-1)

29. The CSS-6 CDRE had noted that the ship had not developed a rigorous enough process to manage contacts and extract as much data as possible from SONAR and fire control screens. (Encl.CSS-1)

30. CSS-6 CDRE stated that MON operators had a habit of "cutting out the middle man" in the process to collect and disseminate data in an attempt to make it available to the CO. (Encl.CSS-1)

31. CSS-6 Deputy for Readiness (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that his biggest concerns for MON were: Engineering readiness, LAN Division Chief Petty Officer Detachment for Cause, Integrity among personnel from Radio and FTs, and weak previous XO. (Encl.CSS-2)

32. CSS-6 Deputy thought that the CO of MON was working to improve the middle management of the ship and in the opinion of the CSS-6 Deputy for Readiness MON was the #2 boat in the squadron. (Encl.CSS-2)

33. CSS-6 Deputy for Engineering Readiness (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that MON seemed slightly behind in the execution of many plans but they were about average in the squadron. (Encl.CSS-3)

34. CSS-6 Deputy for Engineering Readiness stated that on several occasions, MON department heads had not been ready for the operations brief to the CO who asked numerous questions to direct their efforts. (Encl.CSS-3)

35. CSS-6 Deputy for Engineering Readiness stated MON ENG "seemed like a good guy, but could not handle the pace and tasking load demanded of the engineering job." (Encl.CSS-3)

36. CSS-6 Deputy for Engineering Readiness assessed that MON was on track for their next deployment in 2013 and that they needed very little help from the Squadron as they fixed problems themselves. (Encl.CSS-3)

37. CSS-6 Deputy for Engineering Readiness assessed that the MON NAV (MON OOD on day of collision) did not work well with his CPOs, in part due to his personality, but with some blame on the CPOs. (enclCSS-3)

38. CSS-6 Deputy for Engineering Readiness assessed that the MON CO made things happen but that he was not loud or overly forceful to make things happen. (Encl.CSS-3)

39. CSS-6 Deputy for Engineering Readiness noted that on one occasion he had seen the MON CO take the CONN to drive the ship from the bridge in

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order to train his officers. He thought this was very effective.
(Encl.CSS-3)

40. The CSS-6 Deputy for Admin and Material Readiness (b)(3), (b)(6) noted that the previous MON XO, (b)(3), (b)(6) was the weakest XO in the Squadron and that he was poor at follow-through and efficient administration.
(Encl.CSS-4)

41. (b)(3), (b)(6) noted that MON fit and fill was 85 and 95 percent respectively (Encl.CSS-4)

42. (b)(3), (b)(6) noted that MON FT Division was manned at 8, NMP was 7, BA was 9. (Encl.CSS-4)

43. Following a critique of a recent poor Operational Reactor Safety Examination (ORSE) on another ship of the Squadron, (b)(3), (b)(6) noted to the CSS-6 CDRE that he felt MON might be susceptible to a similar issue because the previous XO was weak, the Engineer was weak, their LAN CPO had been detached for cause, and they had had a recent integrity issue with several individuals including a CPO. (Encl.CSS-4)

44. (b)(3), (b)(6), CO of Norfolk Submarine Learning Facility (NSLF) felt MON was good at responding to comments concerning their performance and that they generally came back and improved on poor performance the next day they were in the trainer. (Encl.CSS-5)

45. NSLF CO felt that MON CO was very strong and took the recommendations from his team and that he worked hard during Intermediate Pre-Deployment Training (IPDT) to develop the middle managers on his tracking teams. (Encl.CSS-5)

46. NFSL CO noted that CSS-6 (Including the deputies and CDRE) had participated heavily in the MON IPDT. (Encl.CSS-5)

47. CSS-6 Operations Officer (CSS-6 Ops) (b)(3), (b)(6) noted that the MON NAV needed to work on his relationships with the CPOs in his department. (Encl.CSS-6)

48. CSS-6 Ops noted that he provides submarines to work with strike groups about twice a year. (Encl.CSS-6)

49. CSS-6 Weapons Officer (CSS-6 WEPS) (b)(3), (b)(6) noted during his ride on MON in July that on some occasions taskers and routines were not completed on time. (Encl.CSS-7)

50. CSS-6 WEPS did not recall any significant comments from the MON TRE in July 2012. (Encl.CSS-7)

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51. CSS-6 CMC, (b)(3), (b)(6) (CSS-6 CMC), rode MON for TRE in July 2012 and noted that the inspection was well executed, that things went well on MON with command level attention. (Encl.CSS-8)

52. CSS-6 CMC stated that CSS-6 EDMC reported to him that the MON CPO quarters was not effectively running the ship during an underway in September 2012. (Encl.CSS-8)

53. CSS-6 CMC has known MON CO since working together in 2000 and said he is well respected and has high standards. (Encl.CSS-8)

54. CSS-6 (b)(3), (b)(6), rode the ship in September and was underway with MON during the collision. He noted that the deck plate leadership in the Engineering Department was lacking direction and that they needed work executing the routine on time. (Encl.CSS-9)

55. CSS-6 SONAR CPO, (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he felt MON SONAR division was proficient at watch to watch routine. (Encl.CSS-14)

56. CSS-6 SONAR CPO said that he felt MON SONAR Sup (b)(3), (b)(6) was the weakest SONAR Sup on MON because he was not aggressive in "digging" data out of the displays and pushing it to the CONN. (Encl.CSS-14)

57. CSS-6 Fire Control CPO, (b)(3), (b)(6) said that his biggest concern for the MON FT division was that they were very junior; noting that their LPO was a second class Petty Officer who was not underway from 10 to 14 October. (Encl.CSS-10)

58. CSS-6 Fire Control SCPO, (b)(3), (b)(6) remembered no major deficiencies for MON FT division deriving from the MON TRE that was conducted 23-27 Jul. (Encl.CSS-11)

59. CSS-6 Fire Control SCPO said that MON FT division was very junior and the FT Chief was new but had previous experience with a similar fire control system. (Encl.CSS-11)

60. CSS-6 Fire Control SCPO said that the use of Parameter Evaluation Plot (PEP) enabled an FT to arrive at an approximate solution for a contact in the fastest manner. (Encl.CSS-11)

61. CSS-6 Fire Control SCPO said that he ensures that the FTs on CSS-6 boats are trained to use PEP to rapidly develop solutions. (Encl.CSS-11)

62. CSS-6 Supply CPO, (b)(3), (b)(6), rode MON 10-14 October 2012 and at the time of the collision, he was giving RPPO training in the Crew's mess with a low turn-out of only 7 personnel for the training. (Encl.CSS-12)

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63. CSS-6 Supply CPO noted that he felt there was good order and discipline by the MON crew in response to the collision. (Encl.CSS-12)

64. CSS-6 Auxiliaryman (CSS-6 Aux), (b)(3), (b)(6) rode MON from 10-14 October 2012. He noted that the underway drill and evolutions plan was aggressive but that the crew enthusiastically executed it. (Encl.CSS-13)

65. CSS-6 Aux noted that MON's response in shaft alley to the rudder casualty was well organized and effectively conducted and that the crew quickly regained limited control of the rudder (rudder could be moved to the right locally but not to the left). (Encl.CSS-13)

MON Material

66. During the 10 October underway, MON CO's major focus was on engineering readiness. He had established three goals for the underway:

- a. Engineering readiness
 - b. Watch station Proficiency and qualifications
 - c. Arctic Certification
- (Encl.MON-1, MON-8)

67. MON had completed several drill sets on 11 and 12 October 2012, field day on the morning of the 13 October 2012, and was in the process of completing several engineering evolutions during the exercise. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MON-8, POD)

68. During this underway, MON embarked 5 riders from the CSS-6 staff to assist in engineering readiness and in supply department routines. (Encl. MEV-21, MON-1, MON-2, MON-5)

69. MON got underway with the drain priming pump out of commission. A CO temporary standing order directed the use of the trim priming pump to establish adequate prime for operation of the drain pump. (Encl. MEV-46)

70. At the time of the collision, the MON trim priming pump was out of commission. With both the trim and drain priming pumps out of commission, the COW primed the trim pump by connecting the trim header to a pressurized trim tank prior to operating the trim pump to transfer water to trip the ship. (Encl.MON-6, MON-7, MON-19)

71. There was no formal guidance provided by the MON chain of command to the watch standers to account for the trim priming pump being out of commission. (Encl. MON-6, MON-7, MON-9)

72. Following Acoustic Intelligence (ACINT) reconstruction of SONAR data, it was determined that (b)(1) during the

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ASWBY SMEs determined that this would not have affected the (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MEV-76)

73. A groom of the (b)(1) system on MON was conducted following the collision. The system (b)(1) were fully functional with the (b)(1) (b)(1). (Encl.MEV-76)

MON Recent Operations

74. MON had been operational since completing a 6 month EUCCOM deployment in February 2012, a post deployment stand down on 18 March and entered a pre deployment cycle in March 2012 in preparations for deployment in 2013. (Encl.MON-1, MEV-45)

75. MON completed a 6 month EUCCOM deployment in February 2012 during which she conducted a multinational exercise with surface ships in Dec 2011. (Encl.MON-1, CSS 6 Ops statement, MEV-45)

76. MON operated with surface warships during their Pre-Overseas Movement Certification in the summer of 2011. MON had not conducted other interactions with Surface warships in the 12 months prior to the collision. (Encl.MON-1, CSS6-6)

77. In his assessment letters to CSS-6 in April and June 2012, MON CO noted that he was concerned for the proficiency of the crew because they only had 1 week at sea in the 3.5 months following deployment. (Encl.MEV-63)

78. In his letters to Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic in April and June 2012, Commodore, CSS-6 noted that MON had a culture that made them "Independent and steadily improving" in the areas of assessment and improvement behavior. (Encl.MEV-63)

79. In his assessment of MON performance to the Commodore, CSS-6 in April and June 2012, MON CO noted that he was concerned that his crew had not made knowledge and practical factors required by the Continuing Training Manual a routine part of their behavior and that his crew had lost some operation and proficiency following return from deployment in Feb 2012 because of limited sea time further he was concerned that MON was billeted for an FT1 and had none, and that FT Division was very junior. (Encl.MEV-63)

80. Highlights of the pre-deployment preparation in 2012 included:

a. 9-12 April: At Sea (b)(1)

b. 20 Apr - 25 May: Homeport Upkeep

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- c. Upgraded fire control and SONAR systems from BYG-1 TI 08/APB 07 to TI 08/APB 09
- d. Mobile Team Training phases 1 and 2 conducted
- e. The crew of the ship was required to pass a comprehensive written examination following the completion of the upgrades and training as required by CSL Letter dated 4 Jan 2012. (Encl.CSL Letter)
- f. 30 May-8 Jun: At sea (b)(1)
- g. 11-13 Jun: At sea (b)(1)
- h. 15 Jun-1 July: Home port (b)(1)
- i. 7-22 Jul: At sea (b)(1)
(b)(1)
- j. 23-27 Jul: At sea (b)(1)
- k. 2 Aug-12 Sep: Homeport (b)(1)
- l. 17-24 Sep: At sea (b)(1)
- m. 25 Sep-5 October: Homeport (b)(1)
(b)(1)
- n. 10-26 October: At sea (b)(1)
(b)(1)

81. COMSUBLANT TRE Team conducted an inspection of MON from 23-27 July 2012 and (b)(1)

- a. (b)(1)
 - b. (b)(1)
 - c. (b)(1)
- (b)(1)

82. MON's TRE was conducted out of Mayport, Fl with the scenario development during a transit to AUTEK, Bahamas with no military OPFOR during the inspection. (Encl.MEV-19)

83. During MON's TRE ASUW scenario, the ship conducted approach and attack and torpedo firing against range craft at AUTEK. Written evaluator comments included:

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- a. SONAR was often slow to conduct in-depth signal analysis to determine contact type
- b. Fire control watch standers were weak in utilizing all contact Data for solution development.
- c. The crew was effective in developing operational plans but weak in execution at the watch team level.
- d. The ship needed work at improving the "building block approach" to improve individual level of knowledge in support of high performing teams needed for mission accomplishment. (Only 3 of 77 knowledge SONAR knowledge assessments were complete, 19 of 409 officer knowledge assessments were complete and 12 mandatory events were overdue)
- e. Execution of the continuing training program was poor.
(Encl.MEV-19)

84. The TRE inspection team noted that MON had a solid self-assessment culture in that they conducted "Hot-wash level" critiques as part of their day to day routine but that watch sections needed to do a better job embracing this culture. (Encl.MEV-19)

85. The senior TRE evaluator stated that MON performed poorly on some force wide written exams given during the TRE. Applicable scores were:

- a. SONAR Technician Scores:
 1. 1.71 average
 2. 1 of 12 achieving a passing grade of 2.8
- b. Fire control technician Scores:
 3. 2.20 average
 4. 1 of 4 achieving a passing grade of 2.8

(Encl.MEV-19)

86. The TRE inspection team noted that these written exam scores were consistent with observed performance. (Encl.MEV-19)

87. The TRE inspection made the following contact management comments:

(b)(1)

88.

89. (b)(1)

90. MON CO noted that the two major take-aways from the TRE were supplemental evaluations and training plans. (Encl.MON-1)

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91. MON's prior XO developed a working a plan to upgrade these areas which was turned over to the current XO. (Encl.MON-1)

92. The investigation team conducted a review of MON training with MON XO. The review focused on knowledge and practical attributes that are required to be completed on a periodic basis. Highlights of the review include:

a. Several of the officer CTSS attributes were not completed in periodicity;

b. Very few of the knowledge attributes for the collision/allision lessons learned are checked off as completed;

c. Some attributes for zig analysis were not checked off in the last 2 years;

d. SONAR range discrimination attributes were checked off as satisfactory;

e. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

f. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

93. MON completed Intermediate Pre-deployment Training (IPDT) satisfactorily from 28 Sept 2012 - 05 October 2012 at Submarine Learning Facility (SLF) in Norfolk, VA. (Encl.CSS-5, MEV-25)

94. COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPACINST S3501.6A CH-2 enclosure (7) outlines the SSN deployment preparation period training and evaluation requirements. (Encl.MEV-65)

95. During IPDT MON executed a scenario briefed and approved by Commander, CSS-6 on 14 Aug 2012 utilizing MON's current BYG-1 TI08/APB-09 combat systems configuration. (Encl.CSS-5, MEV-25)

96. The IPDT scenario was tailored to MON deployment Letter of Instruction and focused on the skill sets required to execute the MON next deployment which was schedule to be a EUCOM independent deployment in March 2013. (Encl.MEV-25, CSS-5)

97. With the exception of ASUW and ASW evaluations (deleted per CSS-6 request), MON satisfactorily completed all requirements of pre-deployment

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preparations instruction per COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPACINST S3501.6A CH-2.
(Encl.MEV-65, MEV-25)

98. ASUW and ASW were not evaluated because MON CO had requested to be
evaluated in these areas in Advanced Pre-deployment training scheduled to
be completed upon return from the October underway. (b)(1)

(b)(1) (Encl.CSS-5)

99. The crew's performance during IPDT was out-briefed to the ship's
CO, XO, and COB on 09 October 2012. (Encl.MEV-25)

100. The Submarine Learning Facility (SLF) report noted:

a. MON crew's attitude was good throughout the training period as
indicated by their eagerness to learn, being very receptive to instruction,
and their ability to self assess and pass down lessons learned from watch
to watch. (SLF report)

b. The evaluation grades assigned were tailored to the intermediate
level of core competencies as defined by the Critical Training (CTSS)
manual (SLF report)

c. SLF graded the MON crew as (b)(1) which were graded as
(b)(1) weaknesses were based on inexperienced
(b)(1) and poor understanding of (b)(1). (Encl.MEV-25)

101. The SLF Reported noted the following from MON's IPDT:

(b)(1) a. (b)(1)

(b)(1) b. (b)(1)

(b)(1) c. (b)(1)

(b)(1) d. (b)(1)

e. (b)(1)

(b)(1) f. (b)(1)

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g. Contact Managers struggled to establish priorities within the contact management teams while conducting submerged operations. (Encl.MEV-25)

102. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

103. The SLF instructors would occasionally turn a simulated surface contact towards the submarine and evaluate the contact management team's ability to maneuver away from the contact to keep the ship safe. (Encl.CSS 5, MEV-25)

104. During IPDT MON was weak in (b)(1) however, the CO anticipated these weak areas due to junior teams handling these jobs. (Encl.MON-1, MEV-25, CSS-5)

105. MON conducted a multinational exercise with surface ships in December 2011 as part of the EUCOM deployment. (Encl.MON-1, CSS6-6)

106. MON had operated with surface warships during their Pre-Overseas Movement Certification in the summer of 2011. MON had not conducted other interactions with Surface warships in the 12 months prior to the collision. (Encl.MON-1, CSS-6)

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SUBJ: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING
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SJA: TRAINING, READINESS, MANNING, OPTEMPO

SJA: Key Personnel

107. CAPT William P. McKinley USN, the Commanding Officer of SJA (SJA CO) at the time of the collision had been in command for 15 days. He had no previous CG 47 class experience. His previous Command experience was in USS MITSCHER (DDG 57). (Encl.SJA-1)

108. HSTCSG CMDR stated that the current CO of SJA spent a lot of time at the HSTCSG Warfare Commander's Conference, and that the CO was well-read, had a good background and that he (RDML Sweeney) was impressed with the CO's knowledge of the ship, that they were organized and had the right approach. (Encl.CSG-1)

109. (b)(3), (b)(6) reported to SJA as the Executive Officer (XO) 31 May 2012. His previous experience as XO was in USS MAHAN (DDG 72). He has previous cruiser experience on CG 47 class, USS GETTYSBURG (CG 64), in which he served as Communications Officer and 1st Lieutenant. (Encl.SJA-2)

110. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Officer of the Deck (SJA OOD) at the time of the collision and is the SJA Navigation Officer. He is a prior enlisted Chief Electronics Technician; however, SJA is his first ship as an Officer. He arrived in SJA June 2010 and has been the Navigator since December 2011. (b)(3), (b)(6) has been a qualified Officer of the Deck (OOD) for about one year. He earned his Surface Warfare qualifications/pin in May 2012 and is considered to be one of SJA's better OODs. (Encl.SJA-2, SJA-3)

111. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Tactical Action Officer (SJA TAO) at the time of the collision and held an interim TAO qualification from the previous CO. The current SJA CO wanted to observe her for more watches before he considered her fully qualified. (Encl.SJA-1)

112. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Combat Information Center Officer (CICO) at the time of the collision. CO SJA stated that his CICO, an LDO, was very good, but had been temporarily assigned duty to GRV for much of the GRUSAIL. He also stated that (b)(3), (b)(6) would sail with SJA for the deployment. (Encl.SJA-1)

SJA: Training & Certification

113. Prior to getting underway for 1-25 October 2012 HST Group Sail, SJA had conducted and completed the Basic Phase training and certification 4 September 2012. As part of the Basic Phase certification, SJA completed Undersea Warfare certification, to include:

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- a. Anti-Submarine Warfare inport, at sea, and synthetic training, 20 July 2012. (SJA~22, SJA~21)
- b. Achieving and sustaining minimum equipment (specific items listed in FOF 135)
- c. Achieving and sustaining minimum manning, WTRP, Schools and NECs (2 Qualified Watch Sections and CSTT)
- d. Achieving and sustaining a qualified Combat Systems Training Team (CSTT)
- e. Maintaining associated Administrative programs
- f. Completing Required Reading and LOK Exams
- g. Completing ASWQ requirements
- h. Completing Required Reports(Encl.SJA~22, SJA~23, SJA~37, SJA~32)

114. SJA was delayed in completing the Basic Phase due to a combination of multiple equipment casualties, CTF-20 tasking and ship proficiency. According to the SJA's Basic phase completion report, ATG noted areas requiring continued focus to include:

a. 3M: Over 25 percent of sampled spot checks were UNSAT during last visit. Common discrepancies ranged from maintenance person not completing each step of the MRC to maintenance person not utilizing correct HAZMAT. 4 of 6 departments failed department total score.

b. CCC: Certification was delayed due to UHF/HF circuit casualty. Ship was unable to demonstrate communication over Fleet broadcast. Focused training on Visual communications was needed in order to ensure skill set did not atrophy.

c. AW/SW: Proficiency proved to be very weak, as demonstrated in first attempt of 2.4 certification event. Team cohesion and focus on data fusion and situational awareness were found lacking. CSTT required conduct of training scenarios with a building block approach in order to improve on fundamental principles as well as the aforementioned items of concern.

d. Stand-alone BEWT drills needed to be conducted to improve proficiency of the EW watchstanders. SJA was directed to focus on Log keeping, internal and external communication. (SJA~22, SJA~23)

115. SJA attended the HST CSG conducted Warfare Commanders Course 17 through 28 September 2012; however, HST CSG had not yet conducted their

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Integrated ASW Course (IAC) Phase I. This focuses on coordinated USW and SUW training for the (Sea Combat Commander) SCC, CRUDES surface tactical watch teams and the VP, HS, and HSL aircrews assigned to the Strike Group. IAC I is scheduled for 17 through 21 December 2012. (Encl.STAFFDOC-19)

116. SJA was scheduled to participate in the Submarine Command Course at the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) in 9 through 13 November 2012. (Encl.SJA-40)

117. SJA's Mobility training was completed 13 July 2012 with a few outstanding items (manning or equipment repairs) to complete, none related to her ability to participate in the Group Sail. (Encl.SJA-22, SJA-23, SJA-37, SJA-32)

118. Although SJA had worked with a live sub during basic phase training at the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC), the 13 October ASWEX was the first ASWEX for HST Group sail and the first live ASW event with the current SJA CO and chain of command. (Encl.SJA-3)

119. SJA completed the following Exercise Preparations for the ASWEX EVENT 13070 on 13 October 2012: (SJA-1, CDS-1)

a. CO SJA participated in a VTC with HSTCSG and Warfare Commanders given by CDS 22 on 11 October 12 that reviewed the ASWEX CONOPS.

b. CO SJA reviewed ASWEX relaxations

c. SJA Conducted an ASW TRACK-EX Brief on 12 October 12 during the SJA daily OPS/INTEL brief which covered:

1. Overview of CDS 22's CONOPS brief
2. NIXIE/TACTAS Streaming Information
3. NIXIE/TACTAS Streaming Requirements
4. Expected Array Depth at planned Scope (approx. 260ft)
5. Streaming Watchbill
6. Internal Communications
7. CONOPS Overview
8. NMETLS
9. Mammal Safety Considerations
10. ORM
11. Weather

120. SJA CO directed a second ASWEX Brief on 13 October 12 be completed prior to the event. Bridge, CIC and SONAR watch teams were in attendance in order to cover the initial brief above and the following:

a. Safety Course

b. Flare Distress Signals

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c. Bell-Ringing Procedures

d. Relaxations
(Encl.SJA-1)

121. On the day of the collision SJA's manning shortfalls in selected key ratings were (total number includes the 26 personnel HSM-74 detachment): (Encl.SJA-2)

Rate	On Board	BA
Total	295	318
Officers	31	37
CPOs	21	21
OS	19	28
FC	22	24
STG	14	16
QM	5	8
BM	10	16
SN	20	21

122. In accordance with COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT Instruction 3361.1, overarching guidance for Anti-submarine Warfare Qualification, SJA's minimum manning requirement for ASW is two Condition IIAS teams as depicted below: (Encl.SJA-32)

Position	Manning
TAO	2
OOD	2
ASWE	2
ASTAC	2
SONAR Supervisor	2
SONAR Operators	6
FCS Operator	2
CADRT	2
Manual Plot	8

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123. At the time of collision SJA had only one of two ASW Condition IIAS teams with the following positions manned: (Encl.SJA-34)

Position	On watch
TAO	(b)(3), (b)(6) Interim qualified)
OOD	(b)(3), (b)(6) (Q)
ASWZ	(b)(3), (b)(6) (Q)
ASTAC	Not manned (Only 1 of 3 onboard)
SONAR Sup	(b)(3), (b)(6) (Q)
SONAR Op (53)	(b)(3), (b)(6) (Q)
SONAR Op (53)	(b)(3), (b)(6) (Q)
SONAR Op (19)	(b)(3), (b)(6) (Q)
FCS Op	(b)(3), (b)(6) (Q)
DRT	(b)(3), (b)(6) (Q)
Plotter	(b)(3), (b)(6) (Q)
Plotter	Not filled ^{1/2}
Plotter	Not filled ^{1/2}
Plotter	Not filled ^{1/2}

124. At the time of collision, SJA had qualified personnel in watchstanding positions; however, three of four plotters (secondary fusion plot) and the Anti-Submarine Tactical Air Controller (ASTAC) were not manned. (Encl.SJA-39, SJA-2)

125. SJA has 1 of 3 ASTACs onboard (although ASTAC position was not manned at the time of collision) and 1 of 8 qualified plotters, and could not support standing up an additional Condition IIAS watch section without taking away from their other Condition III watches. (Encl.SJA-2)

126. Since completing the Basic Phase in September 2012, SJA incurred manning shortfalls through transfers and was unable to continue manning two Condition IIAS teams as required in accordance with COMNAVSURFPAC/LANTINST 3361.1. (SJA-1)

¹ Active EMIR submitted (SJA-47)

² Plotters 2, 3 and 4 are for secondary ASW Fusion plot. SJA was unable to man this without taking away from other warfighting capabilities due to the reduced number of OSS onboard.

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127. SJA CO stated that even though the ship recently completed 2.4 Basic Phase training, they had lost several key watchstanders and had in essence, slipped back in their level of training. (Encl.SJA-1)

128. SJA CO stated he knew he had 2 ASWes onboard, but he could not say their level of ability. (Encl.SJA-1)

129. SJA CO stated that the ships' 2 OS CPOs were the only ASTAC and AIC 0319 (Air Control Sup) and were thus not often able to supervise CIC. (Encl.SJA-1)

130. SJA had manning shortfalls in Operational Specialists (OS) rating (19 of 28). SJA did not have enough watchstanders to man the CIC Watch Supervisor position, and was restricted in their ability to man other watchstations. (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-2)

131. SJA has an active EMIR requesting BUPERS action to fill the vacancies for their Operations Specialist (OS) manning gaps labeled above'. (Encl.SJA-39)

132. SJA did not have a signed ASW Condition IIAS watchbill in accordance with COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURPLANT Instruction 3361.1.

133. SJA presented signed watchbills for the following:

- a. Conditions I and III
 - b. UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT
 - c. NIXIE Stream
 - d. TACTAS Stream
- (Encl.SJA-39)

134. SJA CO stated SJA could do one thing at a time well but they had trouble executing beyond that. (Encl.SJA-1)

SJA Material

135. SJA had the following specialized ASW equipment (listed below) installed and had the following status at the time of the collision: (Encl.SJA-8, SJA-27, SJA-24, SJA-32, SJA-39)

<u>System</u>	<u>Status</u>
a. (b)(1)	
b.	

³ References: EMIR MSG DTG 202135z AUG 2012 (encl. SJA-52)

EMIR RESP DTG 200105z SEP 2012 (encl. SJA-53)

⁴ SONAR never logged as active in any logs. (b)(3), (b)(6) SONAR Supervisor stated he was given permission to "SHINE" meaning go ACTIVE on "Lance Searcher" hull mounted SONAR

⁵ TACTAS/NIXIE Stream team Supervisor Statement and (encl. SJA-27)

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c. (b)(1)
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.
n.
o.
p.
q.
r.

136. In accordance with Commanding Officer's standing and Battle Orders, the proper ASW equipment status was displayed in SJA's Combat Information Center, SONAR Control and Bridge. (Encl.SJA~26, SJA~27, SJA~25, SJA~38, SJA~29, SJA~8)

137. On the day of the ASWEX. SJA was limited to maximum capable speed of (b)(1)
(Encl.SJA~1, SJA~22, SJA~21, SJA~27)

138. SJA engineering equipment as listed below was noted as being OOC at time of collision:

- a. GTM 2A - undiagnosed casualty
- b. Nr.1 CRP Heater
- c. Nr. 1 A/C
- d. Nr. 1 and 2 Oily Water Separators
- e. Nr.2 and 4 Fire Pumps
- f. Nr. 4 CHT Pump
- g. Group 2 Counter Measure Washdown (CMWD)
- h. Bleed Air - BA Reg Vlv chattering. No CASREP, No Log Entry. EOOW knew (MPA) and had, as a result, left Bleed Air secured unless needed for Starting GTMs.
(Encl.SJA~22, SJA~21, SJA~27)

139. Due to casualty on the Bleed Air System, Prairie and Masker Air were unavailable. Bleed Air system was only energized for use in starting gas turbine engines as required. (Encl.SJA~22, SJA~21)

⁶ SJA assigned XBT ship on 13 Oct 12. System only active when dropping XBT for reading. SONAR Supervisor noted a drop at 0400Z. (encl STAFFDOC 7)

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HSTCSG & CDS-22: TRAINING, READINESS, MANNING, OPTEMPO

STAFFS: Key Personnel

140. RDML Kevin M. Sweeney, Commander Carrier Strike Group 10 (CSG 10), has 30 years of Naval service, and is currently serving in his seventh sea tour. A history of his prior sea assignments includes:

- a. USS JOHN RODGERS (DD 983)
- b. USS ELLIOT (DD 967)
- c. DESTROYER SQUADRON 13 (CDS 13)
- d. USS ARLEIGH BURKE (DDG 51), as Executive Officer
- e. USS COLE (DDG 67), as Commanding Officer
- f. DESTROYER SQUADRON 26, as Commander and Sea Combat Commander for Harry S. Truman Strike Group (HSTCSG)
(Encl.STAFFDOC18)

141. (b)(3), (b)(6) Chief of Staff CSG 10, has 28 years of Naval service and is serving in his eighth sea tour. A history of his prior sea assignments includes:

- a. USS OKLAHOMA CITY (SSN 723)
- b. USS PARGO (SSN 650), as Engineer Officer and Executive Officer
- c. USS KAMEHAMEHA (SSN 642), as Executive Officer
- d. SUBMARINE SQUADRON 1 (CSSG 1), as Deputy for Operations
- e. USS LOS ANGELES (SSN 688), as Commanding Officer
- f. Carrier Strike Group 10, as Assistant Chief of Staff for C4I
- g. SUBMARINE SQUADRON 6 (CSSG 6), as Commander
(Encl.STAFFDOC18)

142. (b)(3), (b)(6) Commander Destroyer Squadron 22 (CDS-22), has 25 years of Naval service and has been the Commodore since January 2012, but assigned to the command since November 2010. CDS-22 is his 6th sea tour. A history of his prior sea assignments includes:

- a. USS VANDEGRIFT (FFG 48)
- b. USS KAUFFMAN (FFG 59)
- c. Atlantic Fleet Propulsion Examining Board (LANTPEB)
- d. USS CURTIS WILBUR (DDG 54), as Executive Officer
- e. USS MASON (DDG 87), as Commanding Officer
- f. CDS 22, as Deputy Commodore
(Encl.STAFFDOC17)

143. (b)(3), (b)(6) Deputy Commander CDS 22, has 23 years of Naval service and has been the Deputy Commander since January 2012. CDS 22 is his seventh sea tour. A history of his prior sea assignments includes:

- a. USS W.S. SIMS (FF 1059)
- b. USS PHILLIPINE SEA (CG 58)
- c. USS HARRY W. HILL (GG 986)
- d. USS ANZIO (CG 68)
- e. USS RAVEN (MHC 61), as Commanding Officer
- f. USS NITZE (DDG 94), as Commanding Officer
(Encl.STAFFDOC17)

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144. (b)(3), (b)(6) CDS 22 Submarine Operations Officer, has been on staff at CDS 22 since September 2010 during which time he completed workups and deployment as part of GHWBCSG. He has prior enlisted service, and following commissioning, was assigned to USS NORFOLK (SSN 714) where he had participated in 3-4 ASW Exercises in CENTCOM and CTF 80 Areas of Responsibility. (Encl. STAFFDOC 16, CDS-3)

STAFFS: OPTEMPO

145. CSG-10 participated in the following significant staff training events prior to the HSTCSG Group Sail as listed in FOF's 146 and 147. (Encl. CSG-10, STAFFDOC 19)

146. STEADFAST JUNCTURE 5-11 November 2011 (C6F Fleet Synthetic Exercise)

147. HSTCSG Warfare Commander's Course (WCC) at Tactical Training Group Atlantic (TTGL) 17-18 September 2012.

148. CDS 22 completed NAVCENT deployment from May-December 2011 as a part of GEORGE H.W. BUSH CARRIER STRIKE GROUP (GHWBCSG). CDS-22 recent training prior to the HSTCSG Group Sail included:

- a. Fleet Synthetic Training-Joint (FST-J) 13-17 February 2012;
- b. Submarine Commanders Course 32 (SCC 32) at NUTEC 13-17 May 2012
- c. 1812 Fleet Exercise 19-29 Jun 2012
- d. HSTCSG WCC at TTGL 17-18 September 2012.

(Encl. STAFFDOC 16)

149. Over half of CDS-22 staff had completed deployment with the DESRON as part of GHWBCSG in December 2012 and during that time had completed several ASW exercises during workups and deployment. (Encl. CSG-1, CDS-1, CDS-3)

150. HST CSG had conducted their Warfare Commanders Course 17-28 September 2012. HSTCSG had not yet conducted their Integrated ASW Course (IAC) Phase I, which focused on coordinated USW and SUW training for the SCC, CRUDES surface tactical watch teams, and the VP, HS, and HSL aircrews assigned to the Strike Group IAC 1 is scheduled for 17 through 21 December 2012. (Encl. GRV-17)

151. CDS-22 was scheduled to attend Submarine Command Course at the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center on 09 through 13 November 2012. (Encl. GRV-17)

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152. HSTCSG Commander stated that they were on a compressed pre-deployment schedule but this underway period (GRUSL) was not compressed. This underway was well structured and was not a "pick up game." He further stated that they wanted more assets to train with but no others were available. (Encl.CSG-1)

153. The schedule of events for HSTCSG GRUSL was written in late August 2012. This was HSTCSG only underway period prior to COMPTUEX because of the compressed timeline caused by an accelerated deployment schedule, (Encl.CSG-3)

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GRV: TRAINING, READINESS, MANNING, OPTEMPO

GRV: Key Personnel

154. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Commanding Officer (GRV CO) of USS GRV at the time of the collision between SJA and MON. (Encl.GRV-1)

155. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Executive Officer (GRV XO) of USS GRV at the time of the collision between SJA and MON. (Encl.GRV-2)

156. GRV was underway with HSM 74.1 Detachment, a Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS) helicopter (MH-60R). The detachment officer in charge was (b)(3), (b)(6) who was airborne in MAGNUM 703 participating in the ASWEX at the time of collision between SJA and MON. (Encl.HSM-5, HSM-6, HSM-7)

157. GRV completed Basic Phase Undersea warfare specialized training on 06 April 2012 which included Undersea Warfare certification, In-port classroom training, At-Sea training, and Fleet Synthetic Training led by the Afloat Training Group, Norfolk, Virginia. (Encl.GRV-16, GRV-17)

158. Prior the 02-20 October 2012 HST Group sail, GRV had conducted the following Undersea Warfare training, to include:

- a. USW Basic Phase inport, at sea, synthetic training and certification 06 April 2012.
- b. Submarine Command Course at the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) 13-17 May.
- c. 1812 Fleet exercise to include Expendable Mobile ASW Training Target tracking and Submarine familiarization events 19 June-09 Jul 12. (Encl.GRV-17, GRV-18)

GRV: Material

159. The following specialized ASW equipment was installed on GRV with status at the time of the collision:

<u>System</u>	<u>Status</u>
(1) (b)(1)	
(2)	
(3)	
(4)	
(5)	
(6)	
(7)	
(8)	
(9)	

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(10) (b)(1)
(11)
(12)

(Encl.STAFFDOC-4)

160. During the ASWEX GRV's Link 11 was operational and maintained between SJA and HST. GRV's Link 16 experienced numerous issues and was down during the ASWEX. During the 0600-1100Z watch section, the Link response Team was called away due to a casualty at the following times:

a. (b)(1)
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

GRV: CONOPS

161. GRV was designated as a participating unit operating her onboard ASW system (SQQ-89) and her embarked helicopter was airborne and operating their ASW system which included dipping SONAR capability (AQS-22). (Encl.GRV-15, STAFFDOC-5, STAFFDOC-6, GRV-15)

162. GRV, along with SJA, the P-3, and MH-60R's, was a participating unit in ASWEX, and was to operate her onboard ASW system to search for, locate, and track the sub. (Encl.GRV-1, HSM-5)

163. The ASWEX CONOPS for ASWEX included the following timeline which included specific on station time for GRV:

- a. 1330Z stream Nixie;
- b. 1400Z conduct communications check on primary ASW frequency;
- c. 1500Z GRV set Condition IIAS and reported to CDS-22;
- d. 1645Z GRV arrive in assigned sector search box. (Encl.STAFFDOC 6)

164. The ASWEX CONOPS for GRV LINKTASK included:

- a. CEC: HST and SJA, GRV;
- b. HAWKLINK: SJA and 1X MH-60R and GRV and 1X MH-60R. (Encl. STAFFDOC 6)

165. GRV was authorized to energize their Prairie and Masker Noise systems. (Encl.GRV-1)

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ASWEX PLANNING

HSTCSG & CDS-22

166. (b)(3), (b)(6) CDS-22 Submarine Liaison Officer and ASWO during the collision, (CDS-22 ASWO) was the overall planning lead for the ASWEX and the principal action officer in developing the CONOPS. (Encl. CDS-3)

167. The exercise was designed such that the HST would be the high value unit (HVVU) with surface vessels, GRV and SJA in a defensive screen and MON would conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations of HST during the flight operations, and attempt to attack the CVN from PD. (Encl. CDS-3, GRV-1, HSM5)

168. GRV was designated as a participating unit operating her onboard ASW system (SQQ-89), and with her embarked helicopter as a participating unit operating their ASW system which included a dipping SONAR capability (AQS-22). (Encl. STAFFDOC 5, STAFFDOC 6)

169. In August 2012, CDS-22 ASWO met with the Ops Officer for CSS-6, (b)(3), (b)(6) to arrange submarine services for HSTCSG GRUSAIL. They determined that MON would be able to support HSTCSG training on 13, 14, and 19 October. (Encl. CDS-3, CSL-2)

170. CDS-22 ASWO exchanged several emails with the MON NAV and the CSS-6 OPS regarding the timing of the HST GRUSAIL, ASW interactions, and expectations for the remaining ASW exercises. (Encl. MEV-17)

171. By email, CDS-22 ASWO described ASWEX 13070 to the MON NAV as an ASWEX during which MON was to portray an (b)(1) and conduct ISR on HSTCSG for the purpose of forcing the ASWC to manage a (b)(1) tasked with conducting surveillance of the HST. (Encl. MEV-17)

172. CDS-22 ASWO anticipated that the (b)(1) (b)(1) and had no expectation of a faster speed or more aggressive behavior. (Encl. CDS-3)

173. Based on the MON's availability and the proposed flight schedule, CDS-22 proposed an ASWEX for 13 October and a submarine familiarization (SUBPAM), TRACKEX, and maritime dynamic targeting exercise for 14 October. (Encl. CDS-3, CSL-2, STAFFDOC 7, STAFFDOC 14, STAFFDOC 9)

174. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

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175. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

176. The change was in effect prior to the approval of the MON/HSTCSG ASWEX, but it was not included in the PRE-EX. (Encl.CSL-2, STAFFDOC 5)

177. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

178. HSTCSG and CDS-22 staffs considered the SUBFAM geared toward training lookouts, but the schedule did not fit in the preferred order due to the HST flight operations routine. (Encl.CDS-1, CDS-2, CDS-3, CSG-1, CSG-2, CSG-3)

179. The CDS-22 Commodore and staff discussed that they would have ideally (b)(1) but agreed CVN flight operations and limited availability of the submarine (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.CDS-1, CSG-3, STAFFDOC-8)

180. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(b)(1)
181. (b)(1)

(b)(1)
182. (b)(1)

183. HSTCSG N3 believed that the exercise was "well mapped on water-space and relaxations, and it was coordinated with all surface ships." (Encl.CSG-3)

184. CDS-22 transmitted a consolidated CATAS Request for GRUSL (DTG 041936Z October 12) which included requests for the following:
a. 11 October 12: ASWEX with EMATT
b. 13 October 12: ASWEX with MON
c. 14 October 12: SUBFAM and TRACKEX with MON (Encl.STAFFDOC 4, ~CSG8)

185. Throughout the planning process CDS-22 briefed safety conditions that would be set up for the exercise. (Encl.CDS-3)

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CSL

186. As part of the exercise planning process, Commander, Navy Submarine Forces Atlantic, (CSL) N322 - (b)(3), (b)(6) - received and reviewed the PRE-EX for ASWEX 13070 from CDS-22. (Encl.CSL-2)

187. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

188. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

189. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

190. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

191. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

192. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

193. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

CSL OPORD 2000

194. (b)(1)

a. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

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(b)(1) b. (b)(1)

(b)(1) c. (b)(1)

(b)(1) d. (b)(1)

195. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

196. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

AXP-1D

197. In relevant part, AXP-1D provides for the following:

(b)(1) a. (b)(1)

(b)(1) b. (b)(1)

(b)(1) c. (b)(1)

(b)(1) d. (b)(1)

(b)(1) e. (b)(1)

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(b)(1) f. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED] (Encl.MEV-83)

(b)(1) g. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED] (Encl.MEV-83, STAFFDOC 5)

198. The MON CO stated he thought Relaxation 3*K should have been in the
PRE-EX. (Encl.MEV-2)

199. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]

CSL Approval

200. CSL N322 completed a checklist for his review of ASWEX 13070 and
reported to the submarine operating authority, (b)(3), (b)(6) [REDACTED]
- that the message consisted of standard relaxations and recommended
releasing the approval message. (Encl.CSL-2)

201. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]

202. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED] (Encl.CSL-2)

203. Prior to SCC operations there would be very detailed safety briefs
for all participants. (Encl.CSL-2, MEV-62)

204. Items not discussed or included in the planning process for this
exercise were:

a. There was no pre-sail, or PRE-COMEX brief because ASWEX 13070
was not considered a "complex" exercise. (Encl.MEV-76, CDS-1, CDS-2,
CDS-3, CSG-1, CSG-2, CSG-3, MON-1)

b. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
ASWEX 13070. (Encl.STAFFDOC 5)

c. There was no attribute on the CSL exercise approval checklist
to schedule a (b)(1) [REDACTED] (Encl.CSL-2,
MEV-67)

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d. The (b)(1) [redacted] was not included in the PRE-EX. (Encl.STAFFDOC 5, CSL-2, MEV-01)

e. There was no (b)(1) [redacted] approval checklist. (Encl.STAFFDOC 5, CSL-1, MOVEV 67)

PRE-EX

205. CDS-22 transmitted the PRE-Exercise (PRE-EX) message on 5 November 2012 (DTG 051929Z OCT 12) for "ASWEX TRACKEX EVENT 13070," which was received and acknowledged by all participants. (STAFFDOC 5, MON-1, -M2, -MON-3, SJA-1, GRV-1).

206. The PRE-EX message for ASWEX 13070 included the following:

- a. CDS 22 was the designated OSE, OCE and OCS;
- b. CSG10 was the designated OTC;
- c. The exercise would last 6 hours with a COMEX at 1700Z on 13 October;
- d. (b)(1) [redacted]
- e. MON was given a COMEX position and was to begin the exercise at periscope depth (PD) and remain at PD for at least 30 minutes. Surface ships were to avoid MON by 5NM during this PD;
- f. The exercise was to be conducted IAW AXP-1(D) CH-4 dated 4 Nov 2009 - Allied Submarine and Antisubmarine Exercise Manual. (This manual was held by all participants.);
- g. The exercise was conducted within a pre-defined CVOA in the Jacksonville Operating Areas;
- h. Following the initial restrictions on MON's movements at COMEX, there were no additional restrictions on MON's operations other than those contained in AXP-1(D);

i. Notable relaxations included in the PRE-EX were:

- 1. (b)(1) [redacted]
- 2. (b)(1) [redacted]

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(b)(1) 3. (b)(1)

(b)(1) 4. (b)(1)

(b)(1) 5. (b)(1)

(b)(1) 6. (b)(1)

7. (b)(1)
j. (b)(1)

(b)(1) k. (b)(1)

(b)(1) l. (b)(1)

m. MON was tasked with providing 15 minute positional data for reconstruction and acoustic data on HST. (Encl.STAFFDOC 5)

207. (b)(1)

(Encl. STAFFDOC 5, STAFFDOC 6)

208. The PREEX for ASWEX 13070 did not make use of the CASEX tables from AXP-1(D). (Encl.STAFFDOC-5, MOVEV 83)

209. (b)(1)

210. (b)(1)

(Encl.MEV-78)

211. (b)(1) the CDS-22 Antisubmarine Warfare Assistant (CDS-22 ASWA) and ASWA on the day of the collision, drafted the PRE-EX message from the CONOPS slides. (Encl.CSG-2,CDS~5)

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212. The PRE-EX message detailed the relaxations LAW AXP-1 (Allied Submarine and Antisubmarine Warfare Manual AXP-1D) that were to be used for the ASWEX. (Encl.CDS-3)

213. CSS-6 Ops noted that the PRE-EX for ASWEX 13070 appeared straight forward. He understood that the order of ASW events for the HST Strike group was not standard. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.CSS-6, STAFFDOC-5)

214. As part of the exercise planning process, Commander, Navy Submarine Forces Atlantic, (CSL) N322 - (b)(3), (b)(6) - received and reviewed the PRE-EX for ASWEX 13070 from CDS-22. (Encl.CSL-2)

215. CTF 84 approved the PRE-EX on 10 October 12, and released the message (DTG 101633Z0CT12). (Encl.STAFFDOC 5, CSL-2)

216. (b)(1)
(Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MON-3)

(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-1, MON-2)

CONOPS

218. The ASWEX CONOPS was routed for review through CDS-22 Ops, DCOM, CORE, then the HSTCSG Warfare Commanders and approved by HSTGC Commander on the evening of 12 October 12. (Encl.CDS-8, STAFFDOC 2, STAFFDOC 6, CSG-1, CSG-2, CSG-3, CDS-3, CDS-1, CDS-2, CDS-3).

219. As a submarine qualified officer, the HSTCSG Chief of Staff (COS) also participated in the planning for the exercise to ensure the Admiral understood the details and safety. (Encl.CSG-2)

220. HSTCSG CMDR approved the ASWEX CONOPS at the 12 October 2012 brief, which was attended by the HSTCG warfare commanders and COS. (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-2)

221. SJA CO joined an ASWEX CONOPS brief via VTC on 11 October 2012 with the SJA CSO and WEPS, where CDS 22 reviewed the CONOPS plans. (Encl.CDS-1, CDS-3, STAFFDOC, 2 SAJ-1, SJA-2)

222. During the CONOPS brief with CDS-22, SJA CO was not clear on several points, in particular when, what, and how the transition to a coordinated attack would be executed. (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-2)

223. CDS-22 told SJA CO that they (CDS-22) would direct any coordinated attack, but he remained confused, as the PRE-EX indicated that ships could

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conduct simulated attacks if they had the submarine within range.
(Encl.SJA-1)

224. SJA XO was on the bridge during the VTC due to ongoing flight
quarters. (Encl. SJA-2).

225. SJA CO stated that the ASWEX CONOPS brief discussed streaming NIXIE
and TACTAS, covered the relaxations from the PRE-EX and discussed that some
of the relaxations were in HSTSG OPTASK ASW (SCC) promulgated by CDS-22.
(Encl.SJA-1)

226. The CONOPS stated mission was to safely localize, track, and report
(b)(1) . (Encl. STAFFDOC 2)

227. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

228. CONOPS expected threat stated that there were no expected
indications of hostile intent from stated threat though tensions were
rising. (Encl. STAFFDOC 2)

229. CONOPS intelligence report had assessed that the submarine was
tasked to conduct Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).
(Encl.STAFFDOC-2, STAFFDOC 6)

230. CONOPS provided the force laydown and duties to include: Hotel Zulu
as the ASWC, Anti-submarine Warfare Commander; HST as the high value unit;
SJA as shotgun, providing close-in defense and torpedo detection; GRV as
the secondary ASW asset; MH-60Rs as the primary ASW assets; and a P-3,
designated to provide surveillance and reconnaissance, and to lay sonobuoy
field. (Encl. STAFFDOC 2, STAFFDOC6)

231. (b)(1)

a. (b)(1)

1. (b)(1)

(b)(1) 2. (b)(1)

(b)(1) 3. (b)(1)

(b)(1) 4. (b)(1)

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- (b)(1) 5. (b)(1)
- (b)(1) b. (b)(1)
1. (b)(1)
2. (b)(1)
232. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. STAFFDOC-2, STAFFDOC-6)
- 233 CONOPS Phase 1 (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. STAFFDOC 2, STAFFDOC 6)
234. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
- (Encl. STAFFDOC 2, STAFFDOC 6)

235. The ASWEX CONOPS included the following direction/guidance/requirements:

- a. Bellringer
 - b. Probe alert
 - c. Underwater Telephone keyed SONAR
 - d. MK84 SUS
 - e. Contact of interest
 - f. Critical Contact of Interest
 - g. Lost and Regain contact criteria.
- (Encl. STAFFDOC 2, STAFFDOC 6)

236. The ORM section of the CONOPS brief listed collision between surface ships as one hazard that required mitigation. Mitigation of risk was to be accomplished by "employing screen sector assignment and having screen commanders on scene." (Encl. STAFFDOC 2, STAFFDOC 6)

237. The ORM section of the HSTCSG CONOPS brief did not contain a discussion of risk mitigation for a surface ship collision with a submarine. (Encl. STAFFDOC 2, STAFFDOC 6)

238. CDS-22 transmitted the CONOPS message on 13 October 12 (DTG 131200Z OCT 12), the day of the exercise, which was to commence at 1700Z. (Encl. STAFFDOC 6)

239. The expectation for the HSTCSG battle rhythm was to promulgate the CONOPS message for the exercise the night before, but for the ASWEX it was delayed until the morning because there was no sense of urgency according to HSTCSG COS. It was released with a DTG 131200Z OCT 12. (Encl. CSG-2)

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240. HSTCSG Daily Intentions Message noted that the ASWEX was scheduled for 13 October 2012 and the SUBFAM/TRACKEX was scheduled for 14 October 12. MON is not listed as participant in either event. (Encl. STAFFDOC 6)

241. Neither the CONOPS brief nor the CONOPS message were provided to MON; however CDS-22 explained that this was because MON was OPFOR and should not have been given the screen plan for the exercise. (Encl. MON-1, MON-3, CDS-3)

242. The ASWEX was scheduled on the MON underway plan, the Plan of the Day for 13 OCTOBER 12, and the CO Night Orders (CONO). (Encl. MEV-48, MEV-75).

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MON ASWEX PARTICIPATION

MON: ASWEX Preparation

243. On 11-12 October 2012 MON transited from Norfolk to the Jacksonville Operating areas during which time they conducted a CASTEX with maritime patrol aircraft and conducted ship wide drills from 0600-1800(local) daily. (Encl. MON~1, MON~2, MON~5, MON~8, CSS-6)

244. On 13 October 2012 MON participated in a CASTEX with a maritime patrol aircraft during which MON was required to run a series of regeneration points. CASTEX FINEX point at 1700Z was the COMEX point for ASWEX 13070. (Encl. MON~3, CASTEX message, STAFF PREEX MEV~29, MEV~22)

245. MON received the ASWEX 13070 PRE-EX released on 5 October and instituted a series of standing plans that culminated in the operations brief conducted 12 October. (Encl. MEV~15, MEV~14, MEV~41)

246. ASWEX 13070 was scheduled on the MON underway plan, Plan of the Day for 13 October, and the CO Night Orders (CONO). (Encl. MEV~7, MEV~75)

247. On 12 October 2012 at 1400 (Local) MON conducted a daily operations brief to discuss the next day's operations and to brief ASWEX 13070 scheduled for 1300 (Local) 1700Z the next day with the HSTSG. (Encl. MON~1, MON~2, MON~3, MON~4, MON~5, MON~8, MEV~48)

248. MON operations brief for the exercise took nearly 1.5 hours. MON CO, COB, and SONAR LCPO noted that it covered the necessary tactical and safety aspects of the exercise after interactions between MON CO and the brief participants. (Encl. MON~1, MON~5, MON~8)

249. MON had a pre-watch brief for the oncoming watch section scheduled to have watch for the ASWEX from 1045 to 1105 on 13 October 2013. This was not scheduled on the POD. (Encl. MEV~48, M~2, M~3, M~4, M~15)

250. MON XO did not attend the pre-watch brief on the morning of the exercise. He had attended some watch briefs previously to note their flavor and effectiveness. (MON~2)

251. Of the primary MON participants in the ASWEX, the CO, XO, COB, OOD and STC attended the operations brief on 12 October. The OOD, JOOD, DOOW, COW, FTC, EOOW, EWS attended the pre watch brief at 1045 on 13 October. The SONAR supervisor did not attend either brief. (Encl. MON~1, MON~2, MON~3, MON~4, MON~8, MON~9)

252. During the operations brief on 12 October 2012, MON team briefed that they would use the section tracking party to approach the surface action group. (Encl. MON~1, MON~2, MON~8)

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253. MON leadership decided manning the section tracking party would provide the appropriate level of expertise to conduct an approach on the surface action group and to keep the ship safe while maintaining a normal watch rotation. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MON-8)

254. By maintaining the section tracking party MON would be able to conduct other evolutions such as field day, engineering evolutions, and engineering training throughout the day and during the exercise. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MON-8)

255. The section tracking party was to consist of the normal watch team, augmented by the personnel with the following responsibilities:

- a. Junior Officer of the Deck (contact manager)
- b. Junior Officer of the Watch (plot coordinator)
- c. Auxiliary Electrician Aft (Contact Evaluation Plot (CEP)) (Encl.MON-2, MON-8, MON-23, MEV-5)

256. During the normal watch routine, MON manned a Fire Control Technician of the Watch and a Fire Control Operator to operate the fire control displays. (Encl.MON-2, MON-8, MEV-5)

257. For this exercise, SONAR manning consisted of one supervisor and three operators (MEV-5)

258. Prior to the collision, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) were in SONAR assisting the on watch team and collecting data for the ASWEX. (Encl.MON-8, MON-10)

259. MON NAV briefed and understood the following at the Operations Brief on 12 October:

- a. Relaxations and tactical goals
- b. (b)(1)
- (b)(3), (b)(6)
- c. HST was the HVU with SJA and GRV as escorts
- d. (b)(1)
- e. MON would conduct ISR on HST while she conducted flight operations
- f. Simulated attacks would be transmitted via UWT

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(b)(1) α. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MON-3, MON-8)

260. At the Operations Brief MON CO established a horizontal standoff distance to the surface ships of (b)(1)
(b)(1) (MON-1, MON-2, MON-3, MON-9, MON-11, MON-15, MON-16)

261. SJA(M-1) deployed her towed array. GRV(M-2) was not equipped with a towed array. (Encl.SJA-7)

262. MON assumed that both escorts were deploying a towed array. (Enc. MON-1)

(b)(1)
263 (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-1)

264. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MON-3, MON-4, MON-9)

265. MON's standoff distances from the surface ships were not promulgated in the CO's Night Orders (CONO) and some watch standers could not recall these being tripwires for the exercise. (CONO, MON-1, MON-2, MON-3, MON-9, MON-11, MON-15, MON-16)

266. MON SONAR Supervisor could not recall any promulgated minimum standoff ranges for the exercise. (Encl.MON-9)

267. The following guidance was provided by MON CO in his night orders (CONO) following the ASWEX brief:

a. "Review Trackex event 13070 and be ready to aggressively engage the enemy."

b. "We are warriors and in this exercise we get a chance to practice our craft."

c. "Prepare and execute" (Encl.MEV-7)

(b)(1) 268 (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MEV-7)

269. CONO directed deployment of the TB34 on the 0600 - 1200 watch. (Encl.MEV-7)

(b)(1) 270. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MEV-7)

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(b)(1) 271. [REDACTED]

(b)(1) 272. [REDACTED]

(b)(1) 273. [REDACTED]

274. During the operations brief, the Commanding Officer noted that he would take the CONN for the approach on the surface ships. (Encl.MON-8)

(b)(1) 275. [REDACTED]

(b)(1) MON-8, MON-24)

276. MON had performed poorly on a previous SONAR data package submission. (Encl.MON-8, CSS-14)

277. MON CO placed emphasis on providing a quality data package to the surface ships so that the (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(Encl.MON-1, MON-8)

(b)(1) 278. [REDACTED]

(b)(1) (MEV-78)

279. MON did not have NMAC OPFOR Guidance dated March 2012 on board. They had no guidance for simulating (b)(1) an KILO on board. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MON-3)

(b)(1) 280. [REDACTED]

(b)(1) 281. [REDACTED]

(b)(1) . (Encl.MEV-78)

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- (b)(1) 282. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MEV~14)
- (b)(1) 283. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (MEV~11)
- (b)(1) 284. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MEV~13)
- (b)(1) 285. (b)(1) (Encl.MEV~13)

286. CO MON stated that the CASEX with the P-3 that MON had completed just before the ASWEX was a basic exercise. (Encl.MON-1)

287. CO MON stated the ASWEX was intermediate because it had no PMI scheme, only one sub, and no water space restrictions other than the operating areas, which encompassed the exercise area boundaries. (Encl.MON-1)

288. MON intended to deploy the TB 34 towed array on the 0600 - 1200 watch on 13 October as they prepared for the exercise. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MON-3, MON-6, MON-8, MON-9)

(b)(1) 289. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.M-1)

290. MON SONAR CPO reported that the OOD informed him there was no time to slow to deploy the TB 34 prior to COMEX of the ASWEX because the OOD stated that if they slowed, they would not make the FINEX point for the prior CASTEX. (Encl.MEV~7, MON-1, MON-2, MON-3, MON-6, MON-8, MON-9)

291. The GRV Prairie and Masker systems were energized for most portions of the ASWEX. (Encl.G21, G22, G23)

292. The SJA Prairie and Masker systems were not energized because they were out of commission. (Encl.SJA-22, SJA-21)

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MON: COMEX to PD3

293. MON Engineering department training took place from 1300-1400(local) and Engineering Officer of the Watch and Engineering Watch Supervisor training took place from 1400-1500(local) on 13 October. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MEV-48)

294. The ASWEX was scheduled to take place from 1300 to 1900 local on 13 October. (Encl. STAFFDOC 5)

295. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]
- a. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
 - b. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]
 - c. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]
 - d. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]
 - e. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]

296. During the ASWEX, MON XO was engaged in executing the training evolution schedule and he periodically checked in the control room to track the progress of the exercise. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2)

297. MON CO participated in engineering training at 1400 but was called to the CONN by the XO at 1445 when preparing for and conducting PD operations as part of the exercise. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2)

298. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]

299. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]

300. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]

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301. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

302. During PD trip at COMEX:

- a. There were several ESM contacts of (b)(1)
(Encl. MON~1, MON~3, MON~4, MEV~56, MEV~1)
- b. MON varied ordered depth (b)(1) in order to
obtain a high look at the surface action group and exercise participants;
(Encl. MON~1, MON~3, MON~4, MEV~56, MEV~1)
- c. MON struggled with depth control, requiring the use of the
rudder to quickly restore depth control on one occasion when the ship came
shallow without broaching; (Encl. MEV~56, MON~6)
- d. MON held contact on the various assets participating in the
exercise visually; (Encl. MON~1, MON~3, MON~4, MEV~56)
- e. MON stayed within a 5 nautical mile circle of the COMEX point
for the first thirty minutes of the exercise; (Encl. MON--1)
- f. MON attempted to contact the DESRON staff on chat but had no
success. DESRON 22 informed them not to communicate as the RED SUB;
(Encl. MON--1)
- g. MON watch team and CO determined that the surface action group
was too far to the North ((b)(1))
so MON left PD and went deep to deploy the TB-34 towed array and to close
the range to the surface action group; (Encl. MON~1, MON~3, MON~4, --MEV~56,
--MEV~2)

303. Following the COMEX PD Trip, MON tracked the HSTSG surface action
group consisting of:

- a. HST designated as SONAR contact S-70, master contact M-3;
- b. SJA, designated as SONAR contact S-69, master contact M-1;
- c. GRV designated as SONAR contact S-68, master contact M-2.
(Encl. MON~1, MON~3, MON~4, MON~9, MON~15, MON~16, MEV~56)

304. At COMEX time, the surface action group was 15-20 thousand yards
Northeast of MON on a westerly course. The SJA(M-1) and GRV(M-2) were
performing screen duties for HST(M-3). (Encl. MEV~34, MEV~40, MEV~42)

305. After leaving PD following COMEX, MON proceeded to (b)(1)
(b)(1) (MON~1, MON~2, MON~8, MEV~2)

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306. TB-34 array deployment commenced at 1755Z. (Encl.MEV-56)

307. MON slowed (b)(1) in order to deploy the towed array, during which time the ship lost depth control and came shallower than planned. Ordered depth was (b)(1) the ship came shallow to (b)(1) during the deployment of the array. Once depth control was recovered, the array deployment was completed. (Encl.MON-6, MON-8, MEV-2)

308. During the deployment of the TB-34, MON did not maintain ordered depth, had to vary speed, and subsequently, the deployment of the array took longer than planned. (MON-1, MON-2, MON-8)

309. At approximately 1800Z MON CO attended engineering training in the crews mess. (Encl.MON-1)

310. At approximately 1810Z, MON section tracking party mistakenly swapped the master contact numbers by confusing SJA and HST. (Encl.MEV-56, MON-9, MON-1, MON-16)

311. MON section tracking party later corrected this error upon returning to periscope depth at 1848Z. (Encl.MON-9, MON-1, MON-16)

312. TB 34 (towed array SONAR) deployment (b)(1)
(Encl.MEV-56)

313. Following the array deployment, the ship increased speed in order to more aggressively close the range to the surface action group. (Encl.MON-1, MON-3, MON-4, MON-8)

314. At 1830Z there was a conversation in SONAR discussing the classification of the three surface ships because there was confusion regarding their classification. (Encl.MEV-56)

315. At approximately 1840Z, MON OOD informed MON XO that he was ready to proceed to PD to verify the range to the surface action group (PD Trip #2). (Encl.MON-2, MON-3)

316. MON XO relayed this message to the CO who was in the crew's mess. (Encl.MON-2, MON-3)

317. MON XO said he served as a "go between" the OOD and the CO, keeping the CO apprised of the exercise progress as the CO monitored training. (Encl.MON-2)

318. The audio reconstruction recorded the following concerning the formality in SONAR during this time period:

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a. On several occasions during the exercise, the SONAR supervisor used expletives when talking to his watch team and when talking to the OOD. (Encl.MEV-56)

b. At 1839 the MON SONAR supervisor reported to the OOD that, "I don't care" in response to the OOD's question concerning the designation of the contact on bearing 340. (Encl.MEV-56)

319. From 1828-1843Z MON was on course 255 tracking the surface action group. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MON-3, Deck logs)

320. At 1843Z MON ordered depth changed to 150 feet and 5 minutes later MON proceeded to PD to sight the surface action group and to engage them should the tactical picture support it. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MON-3, MEV-2)

321. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(b)(1) (Encl.MEV-56)

322. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(Encl.MEV-56)

323. MON SONAR and OOD replied that they were ready to go to PD on this course. (Encl.MEV-56)

324. At 1848Z MON CO granted permission for MON OOD to proceed to PD on course 255. (Encl.MEV-56)

325. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(Encl.MON-1)

326. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
MON-2, MON-3)

327. MON XO remembers the CO asking the OOD if he was comfortable being on the periscope for the PD trip and MON OOD replied that he was. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MON-3)

328. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

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(b)(1)

(b)(1) . (Encl.MON-1, MON-3)

(b)(1)

329.

(b)(1)

(b)(1) (MON ~ 4, MON~ 8, MON-9)

(b)(1)

330

(b)(1)

(Encl.MEV-79)

(b)(1)

331.

(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(Encl.MEV-79)

(b)(1)

332.

(b)(1)

(Encl.MEV-79)

333. While at PD during this trip (approximately 1850Z) MON CO and OOD determined that HST (M-3) was still more than 10,000 to 12,000 yards away. (Encl.MON-1, MON-3, MEV-56)

334. At 1851Z MON had visual contact on SJA (M-1), bearing 002 with a starboard 30 degree angle on the bow, estimated range of 10000 yards, to the left of HST(M-3). (Encl.MEV-56)

335. At 1852Z MON held visual contact on HST(M-3) bearing 005 estimated to be more distant than SJA(M-1) and GRV(M-2). Estimated range to, GRV(M-2) was 8000 yards, slightly to the right of HST(M-3). (Encl.MEV-56)

336. MON OOD and MON CO believed that SJA(M-1) and GRV(M-2) were masking HST(M-3) and that they were between MON and HST(M-3). (Encl.MEV-56)

337. Actual range to GRV(M-2) was 7000 yards, SJA(M-1) was 11000 yards, and HST(M-3) was 18,000 yards.

(b)(1)

338.

(b)(1)

(b)(1) . (Encl.MEV-56)

(b)(1)

339

(b)(1)

(Encl.MEV-44)

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340. At 1855Z MON OOD gave permission to verify all 4 torpedo tubes empty. This was in preparation for shooting water slugs during the engagement with the surface action group. (Encl.MEV-56)

341. MON CO and OOD decided to go deep, proceed under the escorts and come up inside the screen to attack HST. (Encl.MON-1, MON-3)

342. MON OOD and CO discussed driving around the screen to attack HST(M-3) but they determined that this would not be possible due to the time it would take when compared to the remaining time in the exercise. (Encl.MON-1, MON-3, MEV-56)

343. At approximately 1850Z SJA(M-1) maneuvered to the northeast to maintain station on HST. (Encl.MEV-34)

344. At approximately 1854Z MON left periscope depth and transited to a depth of (b)(1) and a (b)(1) in order to close the surface action group. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MEV-2, MEV-56)

345. MON CO gave direction to the OOD to close the screen and go under the outer escort to penetrate inside the screen in order to obtain a position (b)(1) with a goal of conducting Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) of HST. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MEV-2, MEV-56)

346. At 1855Z MON changed course to 350. (MEV-2, MEV-56)

347. From the time MON went to (b)(1) and (b)(1), the section tracking party believed that the contact on the surface action group was tenuous, and the SONAR watch standers manually buzzed bearings to the contacts in order to send data to the fire control system. During this time, MON SONAR watch team held contact on active sonobuoys, dipping SONAR, and active SONAR from SJA(M-1), and GRV(M-2) (Encl.-MEV-1, MON-9, MON-11, MON-16, -MEV-56)

348. During this time MON CO went to his stateroom where he could watch the tactical displays and then returned to the CONN when he observed a trace pass in front of MON travelling east to west. At the time, MON CO thought this was SJA(M-1), but it was instead GRV(M-2). (Encl.MON-1, MEV-34, MEV-56)

349. MON XO said he was periodically in control throughout the ASWEX and that the three warships were identifiable based on their active SONAR and that classification did not seem to be a problem. SJA(M-1) and GRV(M-2) could be distinguished based on their active transmissions and HST(M-3) was not transmitting active. (Encl.MON-2)

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350. During his time near the CONN, MON XO noted that the OOD seemed to be complying with the plan that had been laid out at the operations brief and did not notice any formality issues that affected the performance of the team in control. (Encl.MON-2)

351. (b)(1)
(b)(1) . (Encl.MEV-2)

352. At 1903Z MON XO entered SONAR and asked for a contact update. (Encl. MEV-56)

353. At 1906Z a SONAR operator reported that S-68 (GRV(M-2)) was, "burning in on towed array broadband" (Encl.MEV-56)

354. At 1907Z MON FTOW announced "Possible target zig on M-2 based on a difference in bearing rate. (Encl.MEV-56)

355. At 1908Z the zig on M-2 GRV was confirmed. (Encl.MEV-56)

356. At 1909Z MON came right to 070 to close all contacts. (Encl.MON-3, MEV-2)

357. At 1909Z MON changed course to 070, and remained at a depth of (b)(1) and a speed of (b)(1) (Encl.MON-3, MEV-2)

358. At 1910Z MON JOOD announces that M-2, GRV is 9000 yards away, heading north. (Encl.MEV-56)

359. Reconstruction revealed that GRV(M-2) was completing a turn to course 250 at speeds of more than 20knts, and a range of 4500 yards at this time. (Encl.MEV-56)

360. GRV(M-2) transited on a course of 250 and speed between 15 to 25 knots for more than 15 minutes following this. (Encl.MEV-34)

361. At 1911Z the section tracking party walked through a rehearsal of firing point procedures in preparation for engaging HST(M-3). (encl, MEV-56)

362. At 1912Z MON SONAR operators positively classified a broad band trace as a gain of contact on HST(M-3) based on (b)(1) (Encl.MEV-56)

363. Reconstruction showed that at approximately 1910Z, GRV(M-2) maneuvered to a course of 250 and closed the position of MON to a CPA of 1500 yards at time 1916. (Encl.MEV-34)

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364. Although the section tracking party saw the SONAR trace that indicated this maneuver by GRV(M-2), they did not recognize the range of this encounter. (Encl.MON-1, MEV-26, MEV-56, MEV-22)

365. At approximately 1912Z MON CO returned from his stateroom to the CONN. (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

366. At 1916Z the MON SONAR operator measured the bearing rate on M-2 GRV to be right 40.7 degrees per minute. (Encl.MEV-56)

367. In an interview MON CO said he noted that the contact had passed 3,000 yards to their south. (Encl.MON-1, MEV-26, MEV-56)

368. MON section tracking party tracked GRV through this maneuver at 1910Z with an estimated 40 degree per minute bearing rate and allowed GRV(M-2) inside the tripwire range that the CO had established for surface contacts (Encl.MON-1, MEV-26, MEV-56)

MON: PD3 Trip & Collision

369. At 1912Z MON SONAR regained solid contact on HST(M-3) bearing 028 drawing left (Encl.MEV-56)

370. At 1914Z MON slowed to a (b)(1) and changed depth to (b)(1). (Encl.MON-1, MON-3, MEV-2)

371. (b)(1) (b)(1) (Encl.MEV-56)

372. At 1915Z MON changed course to 340. (Encl.MEV-2, MEV-56)

373. During the maneuver to course 340, MON was changing depth from (b)(1) (b)(1) (Encl.MEV-2, MEV-36)

374. At 1915Z MON CO announced to control that MON had penetrated the screen by crossing near GRV (M-2) and said that he had estimated the GRV range was 3,000 yards. (Encl.MEV-56)

375. MON CO stated that he intended to:

- a. Observe the contact picture at 150 feet (Encl.MEV-56);
- b. Come further left than 340 in order to come to periscope depth (MEV-56);
- c. On that course he intended to come to PD (MEV-56);
- d. At PD he expected to rotate the scope to the right and see the carrier and then the destroyer. (MEV-56)

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376. In control MON CO briefed that once the initial periscope sweeps were done and he verified no close contacts he intended to conduct an observation on M-3 the carrier. (MEV-56)

377. At 1916 the fire control system solutions for the surface action group were:

- a. SJA(M-1) Bearing 049 Range 4500 yards, CS 129 Speed 6.3kts;
- b. GRV(M-2) Bearing 220 Range 3000 yards CS 202 speed 30kts;
- c. HST(M-3) Bearing 020 range 17000 yards CS 355 speed 29kts.

378. Over the next several minutes, the section tracking party updated these solutions several times. (Encl.MEV-26, MEV-58)

379. At 1917Z MON CO conversed with the SONAR watchstanders in SONAR to sort out the contacts in the surface action group. The conversation included:

a. MON SONAR supervisor pointed out the trace that corresponded to HST (M-3);

b. MON CO replied, "We're in a firing position, we have to get up there";

c. MON CO then asked SONAR Sup if there was a (b)(1) the last trip to PD;

d. MON SONAR Supervisor responded that it took them a second to get it up last time;

e. MON CO then ordered the SONAR supervisor to (b)(1) (Encl.MEV-56);

380. Conversations that were held between MON CO and SONAR that were inside SONAR, were not relayed to the section tracking party. (Encl.MEV-56)

381. At 1917:49Z MON SONAR operators placed SJA (M-1) in automatic target following (ATF) bearing 049. (Encl.MEV-56)

382. At 1918:08Z MON CO relieved the OOD of the CONN. (Encl.MEV-56)

383. At 1918:30Z MON was stable on depth (b)(1) (Encl.MEV-2, MEV-58)

384. At 1919:02Z MON SONAR operator announced that he had gained a contact on (b)(1) bearing 265. This contact was later determined to be associated with the startup sequence for (b)(1) (Encl.MEV-56)

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(b)(1) 385. MON XO left the control room approximately 1920 (b)(1)
(Encl.MON-2)

386. At 1920Z MON changed course to 300 to complete a baffle clear begun with the maneuver from course of 070 to 340 degrees. (Encl.MEV-56)

387. MON CO stated that his reason for executing this maneuver was to obtain a good bearing rate on SJA (M-1) and HST (M-3). (Encl.MON-1)

388. At 1920 MON COB stationed himself as the DOOW Under instruction after receiving permission from MON CO. (Encl.MON-1, MON-5, MEV-56)

389. At 1920Z MON (b)(1) operator reported to the MON SONAR supervisor that he was having difficulty loading the SONAR Tactical Decision Aide (STDA) data on the (b)(1) display. (Encl.MEV-56)

390. At 1920Z MON SONAR Sup reported to the CONN that he had gained HST (M-3) on (b)(1) (Encl.MEV-56)

391. MON CO corrected MON SONAR Supervisor and clarified that the M-3 was HST detected on the (b)(1) (Encl.MEV-56)

392. At 1921Z MON held SJA (M-1) on Spherical Array Passive Broad Band (SAPBB) bearing 050. (Encl.MEV-56, MEV-56)

393. At 1921:23Z MON SONAR operator gained GRV (M-2) on the sail receive array bearing 205. (Encl.MEV-56)

394. At 1921:52Z MON changed course to 015 degrees with a right full rudder. (Encl.MEV-2, MEV-56)

395. To establish his understanding of the tactical situation MON CO reviewed the SONAR screens available to him on the CONN prior to manning the periscope. (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

396. MON FTOW was working solutions on all three warships (SJA, HST, and GRV). (Encl.MON-16)

397. MON CO did not check the fire control solutions immediately prior to manning the periscope. (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

398. MON CO stated that he recalled his understanding of the tactical situation at the time they came to PD as:

a. HST (M-3) was on the left of MON drawing left at 5,000-6,000 yards, with a broad port angle on the bow; (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

b. SJA (M-1) was on the right drawing right at 3,000-4,000 yards and opening; (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

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c. GRV (M-2) was to the southwest at a range that did not make GRV a concern going to PD. (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

399. In an interview, MON CO noted that after seeing the SONAR traces on HST(M-3) and SJA(M-1) he thought there was an opening to ascend to PD and conduct the attack. With HST(M-3) on the left drawing left and SJA(M-1) on the right with what he believed to be a right bearing rate, he thought the ascent to PD was safe and that this opportunity might not present itself again. (MON-1)

400. MON CO did not look at the SONAR screens available to him on the CONN after he raised #2 periscope. (Encl.MON-1)

401. MON fire control system solutions at time 1922 were:

- a. SJA(M-1) Bearing 051 Range 5000yrds CS 051 Speed 8 kts;
- b. GRV(M-2) Bearing 208 Range 8000yrds CS 246 Speed 23 kts;
- c. HST(M-3) Bearing 356 Range 6700 CS 292 Speed 18.1 kts.

402. Based on reconstruction, the solutions for the three contacts at time 1922 were:

- a. SJA(M-1) Bearing 049 Range 5000yrds CS 250 Speed 22 kts;
- b. GRV(M-2) Bearing 240 Range 4000yrds CS 240 Speed 24 kts;
- c. HST(M-3) Bearing 350 Range 6500 CS 240 Speed 25 kts.

403. MON section tracking party used the FCS to develop a solution on SJA(M-1) that was opening. The bearing rate for their opening solution was nearly the same as that created by the SJA(M-1) on his closing course. (Encl.MEV-26, MEV-34, MEV-56)

404. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(Encl. MEV-53)

405. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(Encl.MEV-2, MEV-34, MEV-44, MEV-56 MEV-2)

406. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(Encl.MON-1)

407. On the open-mike audio recording at approximately 1922Z, MON CO stated to the control room and to SONAR over the open microphone that he believed it would be safest to come to course 015 and have HST (M-3) on the left drawing right, the cruiser SJA (M-1) on the right drawing right and the destroyer GRV (M-2) in the baffles. (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

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408. In an interview with the investigation team, MON CO agreed that this statement was made in error, that on this course, HST (M-3) would have been on MON's left drawing left (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

409. The section tracking party did not correct MON CO's erroneous statement. (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

410. In regards to his decision to proceed to PD on course 015 at 1922Z (resulting in collision), MON CO said he felt he had achieved optimal tactical positioning and that the surface picture would not stay there for very long and he might not get another shot even though there were a couple of hours left in the exercise. (Encl.MON-1)

411. MON CO asked SONAR if they were "Comfortable on this course with the destroyer in the baffles and the towed array unstable". (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

412. MON SONAR Supervisor replied that he was comfortable with course 015 in response to the MON CO earlier statement (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

413. MON CO's stated, "If you are not working on something to safely get to periscope depth and attack the carrier, than you just stop that. Remember our priorities here are to get to periscope depth safely. This is a real world contact. This is dangerous, right ... it is only safe because you are doing your job. If you have a question you've got to ask. If it doesn't feel right, ask. Carry on." (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

414. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

415. At 1922:53Z MON CO announced, "Raising number 2 scope".
(Encl.MEV-44)

416. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(b)(1) (MEV-56,
MEV-56)

417. At approximately 1924Z MON was stable on course 015. (Encl.MEV-2)

418. In an interview with the investigation team, MON OOD stated:

(b)(1)
a. (b)(1)

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b. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-3,)

419. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-3,)

420. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-3,)

421. The reconstructed audio did not capture any of the conversations remembered by MON OOD. (Encl.MEV-56)

422. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MEV-56)

423. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

424. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(Encl.MON-16)

425. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-16)

426. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(MON-3, MON-15, MON-16, MEV-56)

427. Other statements made by MON FTC and FTOW are heard on the open mike audio recording. (MEV-56)

428. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-15)

429. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MEV-56)

430. At 1924:08Z MON CO (b)(1) and he ordered the ship's
(b)(1)
(Encl.MEV-44, MEV-56, MEV-42, MON-ON VMS)

431. According to the audio reconstruction, there was no audible conversation in the control room concerning SJA(M-1) from the time MON CO ordered the ship to PD until MON CO ordered the ship to return to (b)(1)

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after seeing what he thought was SJA(M-1) on the first sweep of the periscope⁷. (Encl.MEV-56)

432. At 1926Z MON FLOW entered a solution for SJA (M-1) of "B 054.8 Rg 2,500 yards CS 258.3 Sp 7.8 knots CPA 83 yards in 6 minutes." (Encl.MON-1, MEV-26)

433. At 1926Z the FCS solution for HST (M-3) was bearing 324.1 Range 5,400 yards CS 273 Speed 23 Knots. (MEV-26)

434. MON JOOD does not remember this solution being entered. (Encl.MON--4)

435. At 1926:20Z MON arrived at 62 feet and the periscope began breaking the surface of the water. (Encl.MEV-44, MEV-56)

436. MON CO stated that a depth of 60 feet had been shallow enough on previous PD trips to get a look above the sea state and that it allowed the ship to be covert as well. (Encl.MON-1)

437. MON CO stated that after the periscope broke the surface of the water:

a. During his first 360 degree sweep, he thought he saw a contact (Encl.MON-1)

b. At the end of his second sweep he spotted HST (M-3) about where he expected and he briefly relaxed (Encl.MON-1)

c. On the third sweep he saw SJA (M-1) approximately 6 divisions in low power with a significant bow wake and he thought he ordered emergency deep and lowered the scope. (Encl.MON-1)

438. MON's periscope video recording shows that MON CO conducted two, 360 degree sweeps of the #2 periscope in approximately 16 seconds. During that time:

439. Periscope optics were obscured by wave action for portions of the sweeps (Encl.MEV-56)

440. During the first sweep, a contact is momentarily visible and when the video is paused an observer is able to make out the mast of SJA (M-1) protruding above a wave (Encl.MEV-56)

441. This contact is quickly obscured by wave action and movement of the periscope as the sweep continued. (Encl.MEV-56)

⁷ The ACINT / APL reconstruction of data from MON's instrumentation and displays is analyzed in detail below. See analysis of information available to the watch standers and their reaction to the information beginning at finding of fact 468.

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442. After the second sweep, the periscope paused on HST (M-3) for 1 second and then continued the sweep to the right (Encl. MEV-40)

443. Within another second, SJA (M-1) is clearly visible and nearly 6 divisions in low power with a narrow port angle on the bow and significant bow wake. (Encl. MEV-56)

444. When the investigation team initially viewed the video, there was no indication of SJA (M-1) during the first two sweeps of the periscope. (Encl. MEV-56)

445. After viewing the video several more times, understanding where SJA (M-1) was later found, and after pausing the video, the investigation team was able to make out the mast of SJA (M-1) protruding above a wave during the first sweep of the periscope. (Encl. MEV-56)

446. Mast height of SJA is 172 feet and at approximately 6 divisions on MON's periscope in low power the estimated distance of approximately 575 yards. (encl. MEV-15)

447. MON CO stated that on the first sweep of the periscope he might have seen something but was not sure and that this feeling subsided when he saw the HST on the second sweep. (Encl. MON-1)

448. During the first periscope sweep MON CO ordered the DCOW to make his depth (b)(1) (Encl. MON-1, MON-3, MON-4, MON-5, MON-6, MON-8, MON-15, MON-16, MON-17, MON 56)

449. After hearing the audio reconstruction, MON CO stated that he ordered (b)(1) when he thought he saw a contact on his first sweep and that his gut instinct or reaction was to get deep. (Encl. MON-1)

450. During replay of the ACINT video MON CO's first order to make depth 150 feet correlates to when the periscope had just swept past what appears to be the contact quickly obscured by waves on the first sweep. (MEV-56)

451. MON CO then ordered 60 feet after sighting HST (M-3) on the second periscope sweep. (Encl. MON-1, MON-3, MON-4, MON-5, MON-6, MON-8, MON-15, MON-16, MON-17, MEV-56)

452. MON CO then ordered (b)(1) after sighting SJA (M-1) on the third periscope sweep. (Encl. MON-1, MON-3, MON-4, MON-5, MON-6, MON-8, MON-15, MON-16, MON-17, MEV-56)

453. MON Helm and stern planesman operated the bow and stern planes in the full dive and then full rise positions when MON CO ordered a depth of (b)(1) followed by 60 feet. (Encl. MON-5, MON-6, MON-20, MON-22)

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454. At the time of the second order of (b)(1), the planes were at full rise, attempting to maintain 60 feet. (Encl. MON~5, MON~6, MON~20, MON~22)

455. In rapid succession after ordering a depth of (b)(1) MON CO ordered "All Ahead 2/3" then within seconds "All Ahead Full" (Encl. MON~1, MON~3, MON~4, MON~5, MON~6, MON~8, MON~15, MON~16, MON~17, MEV~56)

456. MON FTC recommended (b)(1) and MON CO ordered emergency deep at 1926:45. (Encl. MON~1, MON~3, MON~4, MON~5, MON~6, MON~8, MON~15, MON~16, MON~17, MEV~56)

457. MON FTC recommended coming right. He said he recommended this in order to squat the ship and get down from PD faster. (Encl. MON~1, MON~3, MON~5, MON~6, MON~15, MEV~56)

458. MON CO believed that FTC's recommendation to come right was a course recommendation and did not act on this recommendation because he thought it would extend the time in front of the SJA. (Encl. MON~1)

459. MON EOOW stated that:

- a. (b)(1)
(Encl. MON~18)
 - b. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MON~18)
 - c. (b)(1)
(b)(1) . (Encl. MON~18)
 - d. (b)(1)
(b)(1) . (Encl. MON~18)
460. (b)(1)
(b)(1) . (MON~21)

461. MON COW did not call away "Emergency Deep" on the 1MC (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MEV~56)

462. MON OOD called away emergency deep on the 1MC at 1926:43Z.
(Encl. MON~3, MEV~56)

463. MON COW flooded water on board to the depth control system and (b)(1) during the emergency deep.
(Encl. MON~7)

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464. MON Helm ordered "all ahead full cavitate". (Encl.MON-18, MON-20, MON-21)

465. MON achieved a 4 degree down angle within 25 seconds after the emergency deep was ordered. (Encl.MEV-56)

466. MON COW verified that all masts and antennae were lowered. (Encl.MON-7)

467. MON Helm and stern planesman operated the bow planes and stern planes to full dive upon the second order for (b)(1) and subsequent emergency deep order and MON helm placed the rudder amidships. (Encl.MON-20, MON-22)

468. At 1927:05Z MON CO noted that the ship was not proceeding deep as fast as he expected and stated, "Faster, deeper, flood now gentlemen..". (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

469. MON increased speed by 1.5 knots in the 30 seconds following the ordered ahead "EMERGENCY DEEP". (Encl.MON 56, MEV-44)

470. At 1927:15Z MON collided with SJA. According to the audio reconstruction, there were two hits, the second one coming approximately 2 seconds after the first. The second hit appears louder and more violent. (Encl.MEV-44, MEV-56)

471. MON CO remembers the collision sounded like a "God awful metal on metal sound" (Encl.MON-1)

472. MON continued emergency deep actions and proceeded to (b)(1). (Encl.MEV-56, MON-20, MON-22)

MON: Post-Collision

473. As a result of the collision, MON helm lost remote control of the rudder with the rudder stuck in a turn to the right. (Encl.MEV-56, MON-20, MON-22)

474. MON continued to turn to starboard after steady on depth (b)(1). (Encl.MEV-56, MON-20, MON-22)

475. MON CO addressed the crew over the IMC stating that the ship had been struck by a surface warship and directed them to report any damage. (Encl.MEV-56)

476. At the time of the collision, MON XO was in the engine room (b)(1). When the collision occurred, he quickly proceeded to the CONN. Following the collision he provided advice to MON CO regarding stabilizing the ship and making contact

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with the surface ships, supervised actions to take local control of the rudder in the engine room, and tracked overall damage control response. (Encl.MON-2)

477. At 1927Z, as a result of the collision and general emergency on the ship, MON secured the capacity test discharge of the battery. (Encl.MEV-75)

478. MON CO ordered and the watch team took emergency and then local control of the rudder. (Encl.MON--1)

479. At 1942Z MON SONAR team commenced retrieval of the TB-34. (Encl.MEV-56)

480. At 1945Z MON gained local control of the rudder under the XO's supervision but with no effect on the starboard swing of the ship. (Encl.MON-2, MEV-2)

481. At 1948Z MON determined that there was no ability to position the rudder to the left, either remotely or locally. (Encl. MEV-56)

482. At 1954Z MON ordered the outboard to be lowered and to take remote control of the outboard. (Encl.MEV-56)

483. The watch team ordered the outboard lowered and tested. At 1956Z MON ordered the outboard to be trained to starboard 090 in an attempt to arrest the right hand turn of the ship. (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

484. At 2001Z the helm started the outboard. (Encl.MEV-56)

485. Even with the outboard running, the ship continued to turn to the right. (Encl.MON-1, MEV-56)

486. In a conversation with the CSL SWO, MON CO noted that he started the outboard briefly and then secured it after there was a report of an abnormal noise in shaft alley. (Encl.MEV-74)

487. By 2000Z, TB-34 retrieval was complete. (MEV-56)

488. While in the process of operating the outboard, the ship's control party noticed that MON became approximately 4,000 pounds light aft, indicating that trim suddenly changed. The watch team felt that the most likely cause of this was the top portion of the rudder becoming detached and falling off. (Encl.MON-1, MON-5, MON-6, MEV-56)

489. After a portion of the rudder fell off, MON was able to control the starboard swing of the ship with the outboard running, trained to starboard 90 degrees. (Encl.MON-1, MEV-42)

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490. From 2000Z until 2022Z MON attempted to test and control the rudder and check the swing of the ship. In local control, the rudder could be positioned right, but not to the left. (Encl.MEV-2, MON-1)

491. At 2022 MON deck logs note that the ship regained steerageway. (Encl.MEV-2)

492. At 2025 MON steadied on course 152. (Encl.MEV-2)

493. MON XO noted that prior to and during the exercise, MON had not been in UWT communication with the surface ships. (Encl.MON--2)

494. Following the collision, prior to return to PD, MON OOD and XO could hear the UWT from the surface ships the SUS codes. (Encl.MON--1, M-2)

495. MON used mainframe SONAR to transmit SOS (Short long short) as well as continual attempts to contact the ships on UWT. (Encl.MON--1, M-2)

496. After MON was hit, MON heard the codes 0303 and XXX that were passed via the UWT and SUS buoys. (encl. MON-1, MON-2)

497. MON XO remembers hearing a response to his UWT communications that state, "Say again," but this was garbled and he could not be sure of the words that he heard. (MON-2)

498. Following interviews with the GRV and SJA and the dipping helicopters, the investigation team was unable to locate any operators who heard UWT communications from the ship during this period. (Encl. HSM 1 through 15)

499. Following the collision and before coming back to PD, MON CO and his leadership team considered launching a red flair but they chose not to do so because they reasoned that the surface ships might misinterpret this flair as a signal that the ship had bottomed. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2)

500. MON CO decided that a red flare may confuse the strike group because of its dual meaning in the exercise manual. He did not consider launching a yellow flare. (MON-1, MON-2)

501. AXP-1 states that a YELLOW FLARE means - "Keep Clear. My position is as indicated. I intend to carry out surfacing procedures." AXP-1(D) also lists a number of required actions by the submarine and surface ships following the launch and sighting of a flair. (Ref ~AXP-1 pg. 5-10)

502. AXP-1 states that a RED FLARE means - "Keep Clear. I am carrying out emergency surfacing procedures, or I am in an emergency and unable to surface/on the bottom." AXP-1(D) also lists a number of required actions by the submarine and surface ships following the launch and sighting of a flair. (Reference b pg. 5-12)

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503. Following the collision, MON CO was concerned that the periscope may have been damaged and that raising it might cause more damage or perhaps allow water into the ship. (Encl.MON-1)

504. MON CO weighed the risk of raising the periscope versus coming to PD without the periscope and then decided to raise the fairing without the scope to verify there was no damage and then raised the periscope and fairing and proceeded to PD. (Encl.MON-1)

505. XO and others in the control room were involved in the decision to isolate hydraulics to the fairing (Encl.MON-2)

506. By 2030 MON had determined there was no damage to the periscope. It had full functionality on the way to periscope depth. (Encl.MON-1)

507. After determining there was no damage to the periscope, MON cleared baffles to course 295. (encl. MEV-2)

508. At 2037Z MON proceeded to periscope depth to contact the surface action group and report the collision. (Encl.MEV-56)

509. MON contacted SJA via Bridge to Bridge channel 16 and then in chat via EHF. (encl. MON-1, SJA-1)

510. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MEV-2)

511. At 2054Z MON commenced a low pressure blow of all main ballast tanks to surface the ship. (Encl.MEV-2)

512. At 2109Z MON CO was relieved of the deck and the CONN by (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MEV-56)

Items that influenced actions in control before/during the collision

MON: Watchbill

513. MON CO and XO considered NAV (b)(3), (b)(6) to be their best department head and OOD. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2)

514. MON COB reported that the watchbill was generally well supported. (Encl.MON-5)

515. MON got underway with ESM and the Torpedo Room stood watches port and starboard. A third torpedoman had since qualified and the torpedomen were out of port and starboard watches. (Encl.MON-5)

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516. MON COB said that a qualified watchstander should be able to handle any situation except perhaps battle station level of intensity where one may need a more select group. (Encl.MON-5)

517. MON COB knew that the COW on watch at the time of the collision was new and inexperienced but that he (COB) felt comfortable with his skills. (Encl.MON-5)

518. MON CO understood that his ship's control parties were weak. (Encl.MON-1)

519. MON had adjusted the watchbills in consideration of the pairings between the ship's control parties and the OODs to account for that. (Encl.MON-1)

520. (b)(3), (b)(6) qualified FTOW 2 days prior to the collision. (encl. MEV-31)

521. COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPACINST 5400.39A (SSORM) lists that the qualification time goals for FTOW is 3 months. (Encl.MEV-57)

522. MON FTOW (b)(3), (b)(6) commenced FTOW qualification on 30 May 2011 and completed qualifications on 11 October 2012 (Approximately 16 months). (Encl.MEV-31)

523. The last knowledge FTOW signature on (b)(3), (b)(6) qualification card was obtained on February 2, 2012. (Encl.MEV-31)

524. The last under FTOW instruction watch noted on his (b)(3), (b)(6) qualification card was dated 26 July 2011. (Encl.MEV-31)

525. IAW the MON watchbill, (b)(3), (b)(6) was the assigned FTOW for the 1200-1800 (local) watch on 13 October 2012. (Encl.MON-15)

526. (b)(3), (b)(6) relieved (b)(3), (b)(6) as FTOW. (Encl.MON-15)

527. (b)(3), (b)(6) performed troubleshooting the weapons simulator in the torpedo room and returned to the control room. (Encl.MON-15)

528. (b)(3), (b)(6) did not relieve (b)(3), (b)(6) as FTOW on watch when he returned to control. (Encl.MON-15)

529. (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that he thought the exercise would be good training for (b)(3), (b)(6). (Encl.MON-15)

530. (b)(3), (b)(6) remained in control to supervise the FTOW and FCO for approximately 1 hour prior to the collision. (Encl.MON-15)

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531. MON JOOD could not recall why (b)(3), (b)(6) left control during the exercise. (Encl.MON-4)

532. When interviewed, MON CO was surprised to learn that (b)(3), (b)(6) had relieved (b)(3), (b)(6) as FTOW and had believed they had tight control of watch bill changes. (Encl.MON-1)

533. MON CO said that he decided that the engagement with the surface action group could be handled from a section tracking party basis without stationing the fire control tracking party. (Encl.MON-1)

534. MON CO felt that the addition of the JOOD, JOOW, CEP plotter and the two on watch FTs would be adequate to handle the engagement. (Encl.MON-1)

535. MON CO said that by stationing the fire control tracking party, he would not be able to accomplish other goals such as the field day, engineering training and evolutions, due to crew fatigue. (Encl.MON-1)

536. MON leadership (CO, XO, Senior Watch Officer) expected a JOOW would be stationed when the section tracking party was stationed. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2)

537. The JOOW was secured during the ASWEX event in which the collision occurred. (Encl.MON-3)

538. MON XO understood that the JOOW was secured for the section tracking party because he was routing a message to be sent off the ship concerning the Engineering R circuit which was out of commission. (Encl.MON-2)

539. The BSM Operator qualified 13 July 2012. His previous experience was in USS SAN JUAN (SSN 751). (Encl.MEV-30).

540. The Auxiliary Operator (Aux Op), (b)(3), (b)(6), was on watch and was sitting at unit 2025 (STDA). (MEV-5, MON-8, MON-9, MON 14)

541. (b)(3), (b)(6) had been relieved by (b)(3), (b)(6) but was standing behind (b)(3), (b)(6) the time of the collision. (MEV-5, MON-8, MON-9)

542. (b)(3), (b)(6) was on watch as the Broad Band Operator (BB Op). (MEV-5, MON-8, MON-9)

543. (b)(3), (b)(6) was on watch as the BB Op from 1515Z through the time of the collision. (Encl.MON-9, MON-11)

544. The STANDARD SUBMARINE COMBAT SYSTEMS DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION AND REGULATIONS MANUAL (SSN) - COMNAVSUBFORINST 5400.40 CH-1 ACN 1-2 states that the SONAR Supervisor shall ensure that watchstanders are periodically

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rotated (approximately hourly) so that no watchstander mans a given SONAR station for extended periods. (Encl.MEV-80)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
545. _____ was on watch as the Classification Operator. (MEV-5, MON-8, MON-9)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
546. _____ was not on the watchbill but had operated the Passive Narrow Band Display and then the HFA display. (MEV-5, MON-8, MON-9)

MON: Ship Control Proficiency

547. CSS-6 Aux noted that during the 10-14 October 2012 underway, he observed the COW, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, leave the head valve control switch in the "OPEN" position when preparing to ventilate on one occasion. (Encl.CSS-13)

548. The head valve switch was required to be in the "AUTO" position. In this position, the head valve would shut when water was sensed at the head valve. The head valve in "open" caused the induction mast to fill with water. It was required to be drained prior to ventilating. (Encl.CSS-13)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
549. On 12 October 2012, the ship's control watch team led by (b)(3), (b)(6) _____ (DOOW) and (b)(3), (b)(6) _____ (COW) struggled to maintain ordered depth of (b)(1) _____ due to operating the depth control system improperly. The ship came shallow to approximately (b)(1) _____ when the CO took the Conn and gave helm orders to recover control of depth and return to (b)(1) _____ (Encl.MON-6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
550. _____ had participated in 3 or 4 ships control team trainers during the IPDT which included conduct of routine and casualty procedures, including EMERGENCY DEEP. (Encl.MON-7)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
551. _____ did not recall practicing any EMERGENCY DEEP Procedures since being underway. (Encl.MON-7)

552. During the ASWEX exercise on 13 October, the ship's control party adjusted trim (b)(1) _____ on the ascent to PD at exercise COMEX. (Encl.MON-5, MON-6, MON-7)

553. Following the first trip to PD, MON maintained much of this variable ballast on board to allow rapid ascent to periscope depth with only fine adjustments to trim. (Encl.MON-5, MON-6, MON-7)

554. When deploying the TB-34 array during the ASWEX, the ship's control party was unable to maintain ordered depth band. (Encl.MON-6, MON-8)

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555. Deployment of the TB-34 array was delayed when the COW operated the depth control system improperly and flooded water into the depth control tanks instead of blowing water from the tanks as he intended. (Encl.MON-6, MON-8)

556. During the ASWEX at 1849 MON sunk to (b)(1) with an ordered depth of (b)(1). MON CO directed the DOOW to get the ship back up. The ship then entered interrupted search on the periscope due to the inability to come back to (b)(1) and to get the periscope optics out of the water. (Encl.MEV-56)

557. Although the MON CO had not seen the COB take the ship to PD as the DOOW, he believed that he was an experienced DOOW based on previous experience on other ships of the same class as MON. (Encl.MON-1)

558. MON COB, who was the under instruction watch for the PD trip (resulting in the collision), stated that he ensured that the ship was properly trimmed heavy for the PD trip in order to prevent broaching. (Encl.MON-5)

559. MON COB stated he used a 7 degree up angle to ascend to PD. (Encl.MON-5)

560. During the ascent to PD that resulted in the collision, MON COW reported that he had energized the depth control system. (Encl.MON-7)

561. MON COW stated that by energizing the depth control system left it in a condition that would allow him to operate one switch and then flood water into the depth control systems, (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-7)

562. MON ascended to PD in approximately (b)(1). The ship was trimmed heavy but upward velocity was approximately (b)(1) per second for much of the ascent to PD (Encl.MON-5)

563. On the announcement EMERGENCY DEEP, The MON COW said his duties are to:

- a. (b)(1) (Encl.MON-7)
- b. (b)(1) (Encl.MON-7)
- c. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-7)
- d. (b)(1) (Encl.MON-7)

564. According to the MON COB, MON maintained a 2 degrees up angle at PD (collision PD trip) and the planesmen operated their planes at full rise

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when the order was given to make depth (b)(1) following the (b)(1)
order. (Encl.MON~5)

565. MON COB observed the COW flooding to the depth control system when the order was given for Emergency Deep just prior to the collision.
(Encl.MON~5)

566. MON CO believed that the ship was slow to leave PD and increase speed following the emergency deep (Reconstruction shows increase 1.5 knots in 30 sec). (Enc. MON~1, MEV~56)

567. MON CO stated that that his original decision to come back to (b)(1) (b)(1) after an order to proceed to (b)(1) as well as his action to delay the emergency deep call may have affected this increase in speed.
(Encl.MON~1)

MON: Day to Day Operations and Morale

568. MON COB said he was lucky to be with this CO and he thought that they could accomplish good things together. (Encl.MON~5, MON~8)

569. The MON CO noted that he struggled with the improving the performance of his previous XO and COB. (Encl.MON~1)

570. MON CO said the previous XO had a low capacity for the volume of administrative work and that he worked with his ISIC to improve the XO's performance. (Encl.MON~1)

571. During his recent 6 month deployment, the previous XO had stood CDO but the CO had "given him a very tight box in which to work" before he was required to notify the CO. (Encl.MON~1)

572. The previous COB and the CO had a difference of opinion concerning the role of the CPO quarters in executing the day to day routine of the ship. (Encl.MON~1)

573. CO MON continued to work to make the ship more effective despite the reported weakness of the prior XO, COB and the current ENG.
(Encl.CSS~1)

574. The MON crew often struggled to execute the POD and the planned routine (Encl.MON~1, MON~8)

575. MON COB said that some members of the crew did not get along with the previous XO and COB and the routine did not work well and there were some inconsistencies in how crew members were treated and disciplined. (Encl.MON~5)

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576. MON COB said that there were some reports from CPOs who had left the ship, including the previous COB, which they had not gotten along with the CO, but he had not seen any of these indications since arriving.
(Encl.MON-5)

577. MON COB felt that on some occasions, the department heads did not come to the CO with enough research done and were unprepared to brief the CO when required. (Encl.MON-5)

578. MON CO said he had high standards for the department heads and that he would often ask numerous questions concerning their operational briefs until they produced quality answers with the correct level of detail.
(Encl.MON-1)

579. MON CO said that this was his way of mentoring the department heads until they arrived at the right answers on their own; and was not meant to be embarrassing. (Encl.MON-1)

580. MON CO considered the Engineer to be a weak department head whose performance had been a drain on the ship. (Encl.MON-1)

581. MON CO had worked with his previous Commodore to have him relieved early but was not successful. (Encl.MON-1)

582. MON CO said he had been combative with the Engineer in the past but this always occurred in his stateroom behind closed doors. (Encl.MON-1, MON-2, MON-5, MON-8)

583. MON CO described his expectations for his watch teams' preparations and reports for a periscope depth trip. (MON-1)

584. He has no additional standing orders on top of the standard TYCOM COSO. He trains the OODs that they should be rigorous in their reporting of contacts held on various sensors and displays in the control room.
(MON-1)

585. Their reports to him follow a logical path, identifying contacts held on various sensors and reporting the results of the range triage conducted during the baffle clearing and TMA processes. (MON-1)

586. Following the range triage, he expects that his OODs will report all contacts in the near and mid ranges, followed by a report concerning how the ship will remain safe with respect to those contacts while proceeding to PD. (MON-1)

587. This might include a statement such as, "The contact is on the right drawing right with a CPA of XXX yards in X minutes." (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (MON-1)

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588. MON CO did not believe he put undue pressure on the OOD to proceed to PD (b)(1). Rather said he was explaining to the OOD that he (the CO) was comfortable with the OOD taking the ship to PD on the periscope. (Encl.MON-1)

589. MON OOD did not feel pressured to proceed to PD (b)(1) at the 1850Z PD trip. (Encl.MON-3)

MON: Reconstruction of Pre/Post-Collision Data

590. At 1922Z SJA (M-1) actual solution was SJA(M-1) Bearing 049 Range 5000 yds CS 250 Speed 22 kts (Encl.MEV-34, SJA-37)

591. From 1922Z until the collision at 1927:15 SONAR indications of SJA (M-1) that were available to MON SONAR, fire control operators, and personnel on the CONN were:

592. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (MEV-56)

593. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (MEV-56)

594. SJA (M-1) trace demonstrated a near zero bearing rate for greater than 5 minutes (b)(1) the spherical array, and on the TB 34 towed array. (MEV-56)

595. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (MEV-56)

596. MON SONAR displays were lined up as shown in the reconstructed ACINT presentation (MEV-56)

597. The broad band operator had all broad band displays called up on unit 4003, the classification operator had various broad band displays called up on the lower screen of unit 4002. (MEV-56)

598. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (MEV-56)

599. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (MEV-56)

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600. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (MEV-56)

601. (b)(1)
(MEV-56)

602. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

603. (b)(1)
(MEV-56)

604. There were no range constraints entered in the MON Parameter Evaluation Plot (PEP) which provided a display of SJA (available to the PTCW at the time before the collision) indicating her speed most likely greater than 20 knots. (MEV-56)

605. Most of the fire control solutions entered by MON contained speed for SJA inconsistent with the speed of the other surface ships that were operating in the same group. (MEV-56)

606. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (MEV-56)

607. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (MEV-56)

608. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (MEV-56)

609. Upon review of an image of the SONAR screen capture of the 30 minutes prior to the collision, MON CO noted that, based on the high bearing rate trace of the GRV (minutes prior to MON coming to 150 feet - approximately 1910Z) MON was inside of the tripwires he had set for horizontal separation with the surface warships of (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-1)

610. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(Encl.MON-1)

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611. MON CO did not look at the SONAR trace (b)(1)
after manning the periscope and giving the order to proceed to periscope
depth. (Encl.MON-1)

612. MON CO stated the collision was "my fault - I just came up - no way
she knew." (Encl.MON-1)

613. MON CO stated that "there was no way SJA could have known MON was
there." (Encl.MON-1)

614. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(b)(1) (Encl.MON-9)

615. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-9)

616. There were no ping steal ranges available due to the amounts of
reverberations and energy in the water. (MEV-56)

617. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (MEV-56)

618. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (MEV-56)

619. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (MEV-56)

MON: Passive Broad Band - PBB

620. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-1, MON-8, MON-9, MON-11, MEV-56)

621. When shown the ACINT reconstruction, the CO and SONAR CPO noticed a
change (b)(1) and were certain that something
had changed while other MON SONAR operators took significantly longer to
recognize such. (Encl.MON-1, MON-8, MON-9, MON-11, MEV-56)

622. MON BB Op stated that he believed the SJA was opening and not a
concern as the contact had a slight right bearing rate and that SJA must be

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opening or else the conn would not have selected the current course for coming to periscope depth. (Encl.MON-11)

623. MON BB Op thought that SJA was 5,000-7,000 yards away because the bearing rate throughout the maneuvers had not significantly changed while MON prepared for periscope depth. (Encl.MON-11)

624. MON BB Op did not notice that the (b)(1) for SJA indicated a closing contact. (Encl.MON-11)

625. Upon seeing the trace in reconstruction, the BB Op stated that this trace change could have been caused by an environmental change, aspect change or speed change or could have been caused by the contact closing range. (Encl.MON-11)

626. At the time prior to the collision, the BB Op stated that he did not observe the changes in the trace nor did he put these changes in context of a potentially closing contact. (Encl.MON-11)

627. MON BB Op stated that he did not investigate the changes adequately when he assumed that the best case scenarios had occurred instead of the worse case. (Encl.MON-11)

628. MON passive broadband operator (MON PB op) was trained that on the way to periscope depth he was to focus on contacts (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-9, MON-11)

629. MON PB op and SONAR Sup focused on the area ahead of own ship on the ascent to periscope depth (b)(1) looking for new contacts. (Encl.MON-9, MON-11)

630. The MON Classification operator stated that the contacts were expected to be close and he expected to have indications of a close contact (b)(1)
(Encl.MON-12)

631. (b)(1) to the ascent to PD associated with the collision, MON Classification operator observed contacts (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.MEV-56)

632. MON BB Op noted that (b)(1)
(b)(1) ." (MON-11)

633. MON BB Op noted that SJA(M-1) was loud in most bearings all day, and displayed very dispersed noise. (MON-11)

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MON: (b)(1)

634. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MON-10)

635. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MON-10)

636. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MON-10)

637. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MON-10)

638. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MON-9)

639. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MEV-56, PUMA, MEV-60)

640. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MEV-41, MEV-44, MEV-60)

MON: SONAR Supervisor

641. MON SONAR Sup said that he thought the trip to PD prior to the collision felt rushed and that it normally took twice as long to conduct the required preparations to ascent to PD. (Encl. MON-9)

642. MON SONAR Sup stated that he "usually waits until we are steady on course to evaluate the SONAR picture and concur with the course so I can check DBY" - this time he agreed to the proposed PD course of 015 while still on course 300. (Encl. MON-9)

643. MON SONAR Sup stated that on this trip to PD there was no check of the FC solution. He usually does this on the 4004 stack but (b)(3), (b)(6) was using it. (Encl. MON-9)

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644. MON SONAR Sup said that he did not have any experience coming to PD within 5,000 yards of surface warships in order to conduct an attack rather his experience was coming to PD much further from surface warships in (b)(1) (b)(1) . (Encl.MON-9)

645. MON SONAR Sup stated that previously during this exercise, broad band traces had exhibited (b)(1) when the contacts had changed aspect or changed speed. (Encl.MON-9)

646. MON SONAR Sup stated that he and the operators checked their screens prior to ascending to PD. When viewing the ACINT reconstruction, he could not offer any reason why they missed the change in the PBB trace for SJA(M-1). He stated that the team's primary focus on the way to PD was looking for new contacts. (Encl.MON-9)

MON: SONAR CPO

647. MON SONAR CPO, (b)(1) changed the SONAR screen line up and asked other members of the SONAR watch team questions concerning classification of the three master contacts as the ship ascended to PD. (Encl.MEV-56)

648. Upon reviewing the ACINT reconstruction, MON SONAR CPO stated that he (b)(1) if that was all the information available, because it was not persistent. (Encl.MON-8)

649. (b)(1) (b)(1) (Encl.MON-8)

650. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (M-8)

MON: CO and the CONN

651. (b)(1) (b)(1) (Encl.MON-1)

652. MON CO stated that because they were close to the surface contact he told the OOD he would take the conn himself for the PD trip to shoot the carrier to mitigate the risk. (Encl.MON-1)

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653. MON CO stated that he exercised due care in making all preparations prior to proceeding to PD (resulting in collision). (Encl.MON-1)

654. MON CO stated that in hindsight, taking the conn was an error in judgment and his being on the scope and not being able to observe other displays actually increased the risk. (Encl.MON-1)

655. MON CO did not look at the SONAR screens available to him on the CONN after he raised #2 periscope. (Encl.MON-1)

656. When shown the ACINT reconstruction, the CO noticed a change in trace dynamics (b)(1). He clearly recognized that something had changed while other MON SONAR operators took significantly longer to recognize such. (Encl.MON-1)

657. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(Encl.MON-1)

MON: Watchteam Dynamics - Tripwire management, Operator effectiveness

658. During the transit from Norfolk to the ASWEX operating areas, MON's watch teams tracked contacts that exhibited several of the indications of close contacts but were later classified as far contacts. (Encl.MON-8, MEV-55, MON-4)

659. The acoustic environment during this transit had been conducive to observing these close indicators for more distant contacts. (Encl.MON-8, MEV-55, MON-4)

660. MON SONAR CPO felt he needed to consider all contacts close until proven otherwise. (Encl.MON-8, MEV-55, MON-4)

661. The ship completed an all hands field day commencing at 0630 until 1000 on the 13 October 2012. (Encl.MON-8, MON-9)

662. The SONAR team was manned in accordance with the applicable doctrine. (Encl.MON-8, MEV-56)

663. MON SONAR displays were set up IAW the applicable tactical guidelines. (MEV-56)

664. On the day of the collision, MON SONAR Supervisor, (b)(3),(b)(6) stood watch from 0630 until 1000, and then relieved the watch again as SONAR supervisor at 1115 and was on watch when the collision occurred at 1527 (local time). (Encl.MON-8, MON-9)

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665. Approximately 30 minutes prior to the collision, the SONAR Sup
(b)(3), (b)(6) was relieved once for 5 to 10 minutes for a head call by the
SONAR CPO. (Encl. MON-8, MON-9)

666. Most members of the watchteam that were interviewed by the
investigation team recalled the tactical goals of the exercise. They
understood that MON was tasked with conducting ISR of the HST and

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

MON-4)

(MON-3,

667. Members of the contact management team on MON did not consistently
remember the tripwires for range and bearing rate that were in place at the
time of the collision (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(MON-3, MON-4)

668. During the exercise, MON intended to close the surface ships to
(b)(1) the HST
from within the screen. (Encl. MON-3, MON-4, MON-8)

669. Due to anticipated close range of (b)(1), MON operated
within several of the CMM (b)(1)
(Encl. MON-3, MON-4, MON-8)

670. As a result of close contact, MON held the following on the surface
ships:

a. (b)(1)

b. (b)(1)

c. (b)(1)

d. (b)(1)

(Encl. MON-3, MON-4, MON-8, MEV-56)

671. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

MON-8)

(Encl. MON-3, MON-4,

672. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(Encl. MEV-55)

673. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(Encl. MON-8, MON-9, MEV-56)

674. (b)(1)

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- a. (b)(1)
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. [REDACTED]
- d. [REDACTED]
- e. [REDACTED]

(Encl.MON-8, MEV-56)

675. (b)(1)
(b)(1) [REDACTED]
(Encl.MON-8, MEV-56)

676. (b)(1)
(Encl.MON-8, MEV-56)

677. (b)(1) [REDACTED] by the SONAR operators at that time but was available on reconstruction. (Encl.MON-8, MEV-56)

678. (b)(1)
(b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) (Encl.MON-9)

679. MON SONAR watchstanders believed SJA and GRV were operating their Prairie and Masker systems. (Encl.MON-8, MON-9, MEV-56)

680. MON SONAR watchstanders believed the use of the Prairie and Masker systems masked the surface ship tonal information as well as (b)(1) (b)(1) 1, precluding determination of their speed based on this information. (Encl.MON-8, MON-9, MEV-56)

681. MON's (b)(1) [REDACTED] for SJA of 27.5 knots within a minute of the collision, with the SJA range at approximately 800 yards. (Encl.MEV-56)

682. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED] (Encl.MON-8, MON-9, MEV-56)

683. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(Encl.MEV-56)

684. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) (Encl.G23, SJA-27)

685. During the 1650Z PD trip at the exercise COMEX, MON JOOD thought that the contact management team had a good handle on the three surface ships and that their range generally checked between the fire control ranges and visual ranges. (Encl.MON-4)

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686. While at PD during the exercise on two occasions prior to the collision, MON detected loud ESM contacts on the early warning receiver (b)(1) (Encl.MON-4, MON-13)

687. Between the second and third PD trips, the contact management team tracked several maneuvers by the surface action group. (Encl.MON-4)

688. The MON watch team thought that they had no "good" (b)(1) speed information on the contacts and they assessed that the surface action group seemed to be maneuvering between 3 and 35 knots. (Encl.MON-4)

689. MON CEP operator understood that his two tripwires were (b)(1) (b)(1) (Encl.M-23)

690. Most members of the watchteam that were interviewed by the investigation team recalled the tactical goals of the exercise. They understood that MON was tasked with conducting TSP of the UET and (b)(1) (Encl.MON-3, MON-4)

691. Members of the contact management team on MON did not consistently remember the tripwires for range and bearing rate that were in place at the time of the collision. (Encl.MON-3, MON-4)

692. MON CO does not recall having any (b)(1) estimate of speed on the surface ships throughout the exercise and believed that this was because they had their Prairie and Masker systems energized. (Encl.MON-1)

MON: Zig Resolution and Ascent to PD

693. Prior to the time of the collision, the section tracking party had resolved several zigs conducted by the surface action group. Several more maneuvers by the surface action group had not been noticed by the party. (Encl.MEV-56)

694. (b)(1) stated that he believed that the team was generally effective in tracking the 3 surface ships although they had not sorted out the maneuver pattern. (Encl.MON-15)

695. (b)(1) reported hearing several possible zigs called out as the ship prepared to come to PD just prior to the collision. (Encl.MON-15)

696. The FTOW (b)(1) tracked and developed solutions for Master Contacts: M-1, M-2, M-3. (Encl.MON-4, MON-15, MON-16)

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697. The FCO (b)(1) was tracking all other contacts (Encl. MON-4, MON-15, MON-16)

698. Shortly before the #2 periscope was raised in preparation to ascend to periscope depth during the PD trip resulting in the collision, the FTOW (b)(1) indicating he believed the contact maneuvered. (Encl. MON-8, MON-9, MON-11, MON-15, MON-16, MEV-56)

699. MON FTOW call of (b)(1) (Encl. MON-8, MON-9, MON-11, MON-15, MON-16, MEV-56)

700. MON Broad Band Operator (BB Op) (b)(1) out in control, (b)(1) (b)(1) he focused on the trip to periscope depth instead of the SJA trace. (Encl. MON-11)

701. Following the (b)(1), the SONAR Supervisor, (b)(3), (b)(6), and the BB Op checked the trace and noted that it did not look like a contact maneuver had occurred. (Encl. MON-8, MON-9, MON-11)

702. MON SONAR Sup, (b)(3), (b)(6) and the BB Op remember hearing that the (b)(1) and ceased further evaluation of the SJA trace. (Encl. MON-8, MON-9, MON-11)

703. The (b)(1) to the MON CO raising the periscope was not adjudicated. (Encl. MON-8)

704. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that as the CO announced that he intended to ascent to PD, he remembered thinking that the GRV was down to the south and not a concern, the SJA was to the northeast at 5000 yards, and the HST was to the northwest heading west at a range of 6000 yards. (Encl. MON-15)

705. MON JOOD remembers (b)(1) (b)(1) (Encl. MON-4, MON-15, MON-16)

706. MON JOOD recalled that he did not say anything on the way to PD about (b)(1) because he was trained that there is to be quiet in control during the ascent. (Encl. MON-4, MON-15, MON-16)

707. MON electronic fire control logs note that between times 1925Z and 1926Z, the M-1 track (SJA) solution was updated from an opening solution to a closing solution that had a CPA of 83 yards. (Encl. MON-4, MON-15, MEV-26)

708. Neither FTOW nor JOOD recall entering the new closing solution into the fire control system. (Encl. MON-4, MON-15, MEV-26)

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709. MON OOD stated there were number of (b)(1) about the time the ship was completing baffle clears but he could not recall the timing (b)(1) (Encl. MON-3, MEV-56)

710. The CO did not hear the (b)(1) made at the time the periscope was raised. (Encl. MON-1)

711. (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1) (MON-15)

712. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that reported that he recommended to the JOOD that the ship not ascend to PD until the 1922Z possible zig on M-1 (SJA) was adjudicated. (Encl. MON-15)

713. MON SONAR operators stated that they understood that the possible target zig (b)(1) (Encl. MON-9, MON-11)

714. The SONAR watch standers briefly analyzed the bearing rate and concluded that the change in bearing rate was based on the change in their ship's course and speed. (Encl. MON-8, MON-9, MON-11)

715. The (b)(1) (SJA) at time 1922 was not resolved by the tracking party. (Encl. MON-8, MON-9, MON-11, MON-15, MON-16)

716. Subsequent to the (b)(1), the SONAR watch team focused on the preparations to ascend to periscope depth. (Encl. MON-8, MON-9, MON-11, MON-15, MON-16,)

717. MON BB Op reported that he was used to evaluating contacts after (b)(1) but because he heard no further discussion of (b)(1) the initial announcement, he ceased further analysis of M-1 (SJA) trace. (Encl. MON-11)

718. Both MON OOD and JOOD report scanning the various displays on the CONN looking for threats on the ascent to PD. (Encl. MON-3, MON-4)

719. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(Encl. MON-3, MON-4)

720. These displays were available to the OOD and JOOD on the CONN. (Encl. MEV-56)

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721. Neither MON OOD nor JOOD could recall seeing any indicators (b)(1) that there was a closing contact. (Encl.MON-3, MON-4)

722. (b)(1) noted that at the time of ascending to PD (collision PD trip) he believed that SJA was on the right drawing right at a range of approximately 4,000 yards and that the trace confirmed this. (Encl.MON-8)

723. MON SONAR Supervisor believed that at the time of ascending to PD (collision PD trip) SJA was on the right drawing slightly right for the entire duration of the baffle clear. (Encl.MON-9)

724. (b)(1) believes that the watch team in SONAR was working hard to provide the best data to the section tracking party and that his watch team focused intently on the contacts as they prepared to ascend to periscope depth. (Encl.MON-8)

725. Just prior to proceeding to PD, MON CO briefed the submarine's watch team to stay focused on safety because they were operating in close proximity to the surface action group. He told them that their safety depended on each watch stander effectively conducting their jobs. This brief was heard in SONAR and in the control room (Encl.MON-3, MON-5, MON-8, MON-9, MEV-56)

726. The MON Commanding Officer's Standing orders contain a matrix that defines required aspects of briefs to be held prior to proceeding to PD. (MEV-52)

727. Prior to proceeding to PD (just prior to the time of the collision) neither MON CO nor OOD conducted elements of the briefing matrix from the CO's standing order.

728. (b)(1)

(b)(1) a. (b)(1)

(b)(1) b. (b)(1)

c. (b)(1)

d. (b)(1)

(MEV-56, MEV-52)

729. MON CEP operator stated that he thought the FTOW and the FCO were the only two in control who were concerned about (b)(1) at the time of PD. (Encl.MEV-23)

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730. The MON CEP operator said that the PD appeared rushed to him. He also stated that there was a (b)(1) [redacted]
(Encl.MEV-23)

MON: ESM

731. MON is equipped with an (b)(1) [redacted] equipped with an early warning receiver that is also audible on the CONN. (Encl.MON-13)

732. MON ESM operator reported that he had the ability to listen for audio chirping for signal strength 4&5 contacts on the ascent to PD, and that he was listening in both ears. (Encl.MON-13)

733. MON CO remembered that on at least two occasions in the 2 days prior to the collision, the ESM watches had called out collision threats when evaluating the (b)(1) [redacted]
(Encl.MON-1)

734. MON CO said that the OODs had not taken emergency deep actions during these occurrences because they evaluated them as airborne threats and not collision threats. (Encl.MON-1)

735. Following these occurrences, the watch teams discussed using the visual picture in conjunction with the ESM environment to evaluate required emergency actions. (Encl.MON-1)

736. (b)(3), (b)(6) was on as watch as the ESM operator at the time of the collision on 13 October 2012 and had been standing port and starboard watches. (Encl.MON-13)

737. (b)(3), (b)(6) had been relieved as ESM after COMEX, between the first and second PD trips. He understood that during the first PD trip, there had been several (b)(1) [redacted] signals that had been reported as potential collision threats. (Encl.MON-13)

738. (b)(3), (b)(6) understood that he was to call these potential collision threat reports to the CONN between periscope observations when possible. (Encl.MON-13)

739. During his watch relief, there was no amplifying guidance regarding reports to be made prior to the report of "No close contacts" upon arriving at PD. (Encl.MON-13)

740. There were (b)(1) [redacted] contacts that could represent collision threats when the periscope broke the surface water just prior to the collision. (MEV-56)

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741. The ESM watch did not report these contacts prior to the report of "No close contacts" by the Commanding Officer, who was on the periscope when it broke the surface. (MEV-56)

742. MON ESM search plan requires the ESM operator to report, Collision Threat if (b)(1) contacts are detected when the periscope breaks the surface of the water, prior to the report of "No close contacts". (Encl. MEV-13)

743. MON ESM operating and reporting procedures required a report of "CONN, ESM, Collision threat Hold # of signal (b)(1) contacts." This report is to be made immediately, before the OOD finishes his safety sweeps if (b)(1) contacts are detected. (Encl. MEV-13)

MON: Submarine Force Contact Management Manual (CMM)

744 (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(Encl. MEV-55)

745. CMM defines a contact of concern as - a contact that requires or will require maneuvering of the ship to prevent a closest point approach (CPA) that is too close, collision, or counter-detection. In general, a contact becomes a contact of concern if one of the tactical tripwires regarding contact management has been met or will soon be met. (Encl. MEV-55)

746. CMM defines the duties of the contact manager:

a. Directs the efforts of the various sensor operators to ensure they are operating in accordance with the applicable system operating guidelines and the most accurate contact picture is available to the tactical decision maker.

(b)(1) (b)(1)

c. Makes recommendations to the tactical decision maker regarding safe positioning of the ship with regard to the contact situation.

d. The contact manager and tactical decision maker must work together to ensure safety of ship and successful completion of the mission.

e. CMM states that the tactical decision maker is the officer responsible for ship operation, who uses all information available to achieve the goals of safety, stealth, and mission. The tactical decision maker is always the OOD or approach officer (as aided by the Commanding Officer).

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f. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(Encl. MEV-55)

747. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(Encl. MEV-55)

748. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(b)(1) (Encl. MEV-55)

749. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(Encl. MEV-55)

750. CMM states that expected reactions to a contact maneuver are:

751. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

a. (b)(1)

b. (b)(1)

c. (b)(1)

d. (b)(1)

e. Since many of these indications are subjective in nature, watch teams should discuss specific criteria applicable to their given situation

f. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

g. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

h. (b)(1)

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(b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]

(Encl.)

752. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED] (Encl. MEV-55)

753. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED] (Encl. MEV-55)

754. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED] (Encl. MEV-55)

755. CMM contains the following discussion concerning indications of a very close contact:

a. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]

b. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]

c. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]

d. (b)(1) [REDACTED]

e. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]

f. (b)(1) [REDACTED]

g. (b)(1) [REDACTED]

h. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]

i. (b)(1) [REDACTED]

756. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]
(Encl. MEV-55)

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(b)(1)⁷⁵⁷ (b)(1)

(b)(1) a (b)(1)

(b)(1) b (b)(1)

c (b)(1)

(b)(1) d (b)(1)

(b)(1) e (b)(1)

(b)(1) f (b)(1)

(b)(1) (Encl.MEV-55)

(b)(1)⁷⁵⁸
(b)(1)

(b)(1)⁷⁵⁹
(b)(1)
(b)(1)

" (Encl.MEV-55)

(b)(1)⁷⁶⁰
(b)(1)
(b)(1)

" (Encl.MEV-55)

(b)(1)⁷⁶¹
(b)(1)

(b)(1) (Encl.MEV-55)

(b)(1)⁷⁶²
(b)(1)

(b)(1) (Encl.MEV-55)

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763. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MEV-55)

(b)(1)
764. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MEV-55)

(b)(1)
765. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MEV-55)

(b)(1)
766. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MEV-55)

(b)(1)
767. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1)

(Encl. MEV-55)

(b)(1)
768. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MEV-55)

(b)(1)
769. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1)

(Encl. MEV-55)

770. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
a. (b)(1) [REDACTED]

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(b)(1) b. (b)(1)

771. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

a. (b)(1)

b. (b)(1)

c. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

d. (b)(1)

(b)(1) (Encl. MEV-55)

772. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(b)(1) (Encl. MEV-55)

773. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

a. (b)(1)

(b)(1) b. (b)(1)

(b)(1) c. (b)(1)

(b)(1) d. (b)(1)

(b)(1) e. (b)(1)

774. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(b)(1) (Encl. MEV-55)

775. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(Encl. MEV-55)

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776. The Submarine Periscope Depth Optical and Sensors Employment Manual provides the following direction for the ascent to Periscope Depth Using the Type 18 Optical Periscope as outlined in FOP'S 777-779. (MEV-81)

777. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

778. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(Encl. 1)
779. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl. MEV-81)

780. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

a. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

b. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

c. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

d. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

e. (b)(1)
(Encl. 2)

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SJA ASWEX PARTICIPATION

SJA: ASWEX Brief to COMEX

781. On 11 October 2012 at 1900Z, SJA CO attended the CDS-22 ASWEX briefing via VTC in his Unit Commander's Cabin. During the briefing CDS-22 CDRE stated that SJA did not have permission to attack the submarine and CDS-22 would control all simulated attacks. (Encl.SJA-1)

782. On 12 October 12, during the Operations and Intelligence brief, SJA conducted their first ASWEX brief. A second ASWEX brief was scheduled due to the SJA CO being unhappy with the content of the brief not including the following items: stationing, safety course, flare distress signals, BELLRINGER procedures, and relaxations. (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-2, SJA-7, SJA-8)

783. On 13 October 12 at 1400Z, SJA conducted their second ASWEX brief. The SJA CO, XO, TAO, NAV (SJA OOD), Evaluator (b)(3), (b)(6), and CA division were present at the brief. (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-2, SJA-7)

784. SJA's Tactical Action officer, (b)(3), (b)(6) and Anti Submarine Warfare Coordinator, (b)(3), (b)(6) were not present for the brief and stated they had reviewed power point briefs. (Encl.SJA-7, SJA-12)

785. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.SJA-1)

786. SJA CO stated the re-brief sufficiently covered the relaxations, which he knew and had read in the message traffic. (Encl.SJA-1)

787. The SJA's XO and SJA OOD stated that they understood the ASWEX was a TRACKEX and not tactical. (Encl.SJA-2, SJA-3)

788. Following the re-brief, SJA CO pulled the ASWO and STGC aside and had them pull the relaxations message to ensure that all facets were covered. (Encl.SJA-1)

789. Following the re-brief, SJA OOD understood that SJA was shotgun for HST and that GRV had a defined sector box for the ASWEX (Encl.SJA-3)

790. At 1500Z, SJA CO directed the deployment of TACTAS and NIXIE after being informed by SJA TAO that CDS-22 had directed the deployment of TACTAS and NIXIE. (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-2)

791. (b)(1)
(Encl.SJA-1, SJA-2)

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792. SJA CO anticipated the movement of the sub would be at (b)(1) and was surprised that it had actually moved much faster. (Encl.SJA-1)

793. At 1625Z CDS-22 directed SJA to go ACTIVE on SONAR(SQS-53B). SJA TAO requested and received permission from the CO to set Condition IIAS and go active on SONAR. (Encl.SJA-1 SJA-7)

794. SJA PRAIRIE and MASKER air were not energized due to a casualty to BLEED AIR System, the fathometer was set to max power, WQC-2 (underwater telephone) was on, and the SQS-53B SONAR was ACTIVE. (Encl.SJA-7, SJA-17, SJA-22, SJA-21, SJA-27)

795. SJA OOD, (b)(3), (b)(6) (assigned to the 1200-1700(local) watch) stated that prior to taking the watch, he reviewed the PRE-EX message and CONOPS briefs. He does not recall hearing the commencement of ASW Exercise and believed it was in progress upon assuming the watch. (Encl.SJA-3)

796. SJA OOD conducted training for the bridge watchstanders on what to look for when searching for a submarine, the proper method for reporting submarine contact and possible flares from the safety portion of the CONOPS brief. (Encl.SJA-3, SJA-5, SJA-6)

797. Shortly before COMEX Magnum 702 and 703 reported a dipper contact and entered it in the Link (approx time 1654Z). GRV later reported a correlating contact to their active hull mounted SONAR contact and CDS 22 classified first as POSSUB LOW(possible submarine contact-low confidence) and then POSSUB HIGH (possible submarine-high confidence). (Encl.SJA-12)

798. SJA CO gave specific direction to the SJA TAO, ASWC and ASWE just before COMEX on how to set up for the exercise. (Encl.SJA-1)

799. Shortly before COMEX, SJA's SQR-19 experienced a memory fault and a power fault preventing them from processing acoustics on the towed array At the time of the collision two of the SONAR operators were troubleshooting the casualty. (Encl.SJA-14, SJA-15, SJA-17)

SJA: ASWEX COMEX to Collision

800. ASWEX COMEX was 1700Z and SJA was assigned HST shotgun duties along with her duties as a part of the ASW Screen to protect the CVN. (Encl.SJA-2, SJA-1)

801. HST was designated the guide for the screen and SJA's initial assigned position was at 090-180T from HST at a range of 3,000-12,000 yards. (Encl.SJA-6, SJA-12, SJA-21)

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802. From 1700-1815Z SJA XO was on the bridge until the arrival of SJA CO. During his time on the bridge he queried the under instruction watchstanders about SUB hunting and the exercise. (Encl.SJA-2)

803. As the exercise started SJA CO entered CIC and found that the watch team was not as prepared as he would have liked: They did not have the PRE-EX out or the relaxations available nor did they did have the CONOPS brief available, and COND IIAS was not set. (Encl.SJA-1)

804 (b)(1)
(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(Encl.SJA-3, SJA-7)

805. At 1725Z, SJA set flight quarters to recover a helicopter, call sign "DUSTY DOG 610" (Encl.SJA-7, SJA-12, SJA-24, SJA-38)

806. SJA was out of sector to maneuver for flight operations (winds were easterly) to take 3 technical representatives onboard. (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-3)

807. At 1745Z, SJA came to course 085T for winds. (Encl.SJA-7, SJA-12)

808. Once onboard SJA, "DUSTY DOG" was delayed on deck (on deck approximately from 1750-1810Z) and during this time HST shifted to a westerly course (approx 075T from VMS) for flight ops. (Encl.SJA-7, SJA-24, SJA-38)

809. SJA TAO did not receive the CONOPS message until one hour after COMEX. (Encl.SJA-7)

810. At 1815Z, SJA's CO was on the bridge and SJA XO departed the bridge to execute the plan of the day. (Encl.SJA-2)

811. At 1820Z, "DUSTY DOG" launched from SJA. SJA changed course to 240T to regain station in assigned sector. (Encl.SJA-7, SJA-24, SJA-38)

812. SJA was maneuvering to stay on station as directed, and had been "chastised" by SCC (CDS-22) once already, during flight operations with "DUSTY DOG", to regain station on the CVN at best speed. (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-7)

813. All contacts reported were located to the South and East of SJA approximately 25,000 yards and closing to 12,000 yards. (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-12)

814. While SJA was active on the SQS-53B SONAR, she was using a single frequency to support deconfliction of frequency management with GRV and HSM helicopters using dipping SONAR. (Encl.SJA-1)

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815. GRV had helicopters in the air with good tracks on the MON, but the SJA had not yet launched helicopters. (Encl.SJA-1)

816. SJA did not have contact on MON. (Encl.SJA-1)

817. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1)

(b)(1) (Encl.SJA-3,
SJA-14, SJA-15)

818. SJA was maneuvering at speed between 20-27 knots in order to maintain assigned sector from HST (conducting flight ops). (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-21)

819. SJA CO explained to the TAO that they were not at a good ASW search speed and they discussed maneuvering to within their assigned sector and slowing, which the TAO relayed to the OOD. (Encl.SJA-1)

820. SJA OOD recalled that SJA SONAR wanted the ship to go slower, but the last FLEET TAC signal, passed via SJA TAO with her concurrence, was for HST to head 250T at 25 knots and SJA was going fast enough to keep up with HST. (Encl.SJA-3)

821. Approximately 10 minutes prior to the collision (b)(3),(b)(6) called the SJA SONAR Supervisor to ensure that the SONAR operators were listening to the WQC-2 (underwater telephone) for any transmissions. SJA SONAR operators had been listening to the underwater telephone but had not heard anything with it set at full volume. (Encl.SJA-15)

822. At 1926Z, SJA ASWC and ASWE received a possible active contact from the SONAR SUPERVISOR range 3,000 yards. The ASWC verified having no RADAR contact out to 3nm. SJA ASW team evaluated the contact to be reverberation and non-sub. (Encl.SJA-8, SJA-12, SJA-15, SJA-17)

823. By the time SJA ASWC reported the SONAR bearing clear, she heard the voice report from the bridge that the contact was 30 yards off the port bow. (Encl.SJA-12, SJA-16, SJA-17, SJA-18, SJA-21)

824. Moments before the collision, a FLEET TAC signal was passed indicating HST was changing course to 250 at 15 knots, increasing her speed to 25 knots, and then decreasing speed to 15 knots. (Encl.SJA-3, SJA-19)

825. SJA received a FLEET TAC signal from CDS-22 to turn from a heading of 270 to 250 with speed 25 kts. (Encl.SJA-3, SJA-19)

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826. Just prior to the collision, SJA was on station and monitoring the screen formation's movement via RADAR; SJA Forward Lookout (SJA FWD LOOK) (b)(3), (b)(6) and the CONN, (b)(3), (b)(6) were on the starboard bridge wing. (Encl.SJA-3, SJA-4, SJA-9)

SJA: Collision

827. At approximately 1923:00Z (VMS/GPS time which correlates to 1923:53Z SJA Bell Log time) indicates SJA's ordered speed was 25 knots and "actual speed position was 25 knots." (Encl.SJA-28)

828. At approximately 1926:07Z (VMS/GPS time which correlates to 1927:00Z SJA Bell Log time) indicates SJA's ordered speed was 16 knots and "actual speed position was 19.5 knots." (Encl.SJA-28)

829. SJA Forward Lookout said he saw what he believed to be a "small red light bearing 000 relative to SJA and it was rising out of the water." (Encl.SJA-4)

830. SJA Forward Lookout immediately made a report to SJA Bright Bridge stating "surface contact bearing 000 - it's a sub." (Encl.SJA-4)

831. SJA Forward Lookout said he showed the contact to the Conning Officer (SJA CONN) (b)(3), (b)(6) and asked to confirm "is that a sub?" (Encl.SJA-4, SJA-19)

832. SJA CONN confirmed the periscope off the port bow between what he estimated at 60-240 feet (20-80 yards). (Encl.SJA-19)

833. SJA CONN ran into the bridge and yelled "NAV (who was SJA OOD) SUB, SUB, DEAD AHEAD!" OOD said, "What? Where? ... "Oh, shit!" (Encl.SJA-13, SJA-19)

834. SJA Forward Lookout then told SJA Bright Bridge that the contact was "RIGHT AHEAD, 75 TO 100 YARDS." (Encl.SJA-4)

835. SJA Forward Lookout described the submarine as the periscope rising out of the water approximately 5 degrees off SJA's port bow and then was at 000 relative while he was reporting the contact. (Encl.SJA-4; SJA-5)

836. SJA OOD recalled that he was looking at the SPS-73 and trying to hook/re-acquire GRV when the LOOKOUT and CONN stepped in from bridge wing and yelled to report a periscope on the bow. (Encl.SJA-3)

837. SJA OOD stepped to the center of SJA's bridge and said he saw the periscope approximately 100 yards off their port bow. (Encl.SJA-3)

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838. SJA OOD said that it was hard to see if the periscope was going up or down as the seas that day were about 6 feet, with whitecaps. He noted, however, that the periscope was visible directly in front of ship looked to be about 100-150 yards off port bow. (Encl.SJA-3)

839. SJA HELM stated that he thought the periscope was 50 yards off SJA's bow. (Encl.SJA-5)

840. SJA OOD looked at the periscope for a second, processed the relative motion and realized SJA was on a collision course. (Encl.SJA-3)

841. SJA OOD stated that with the limited distance from the periscope, there was no safe way to turn, he instantly knew they were going to hit - it was just a matter of where they were going to hit, and he was afraid about it being a nuclear sub. (Encl.SJA-3)

842. SJA OOD called "All Back Full" and then called the CO on NET 15 handset and reported periscope and again yelled "ALL BACK FULL!" (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-3, SJA-5, SJA-7, SJA-9, SJA-10, SJA-13, SJA-19)

843. SJA CONN directed SJA HELM to "all engines back full." (Encl.SJA-5, SJA-19)

844. SJA HELM paused until the order from the CONN to move the Integrated Throttle Controls (ITC) to "All Back Full." SJA HELM said he repeated the order back and then completed the order for all back full and informed SJA CONN that he had did as directed. (Encl.SJA-5)

845. SJA LOOKOUT stated sub's periscope continued across SJA's bow (right drift) inside of 75 yards until it disappeared in the water approximately 10 degrees on the starboard bow and about 5 seconds later he felt the a shutter of the collision. (Encl.SJA-4, SJA-6, SJA-19)

846. SJA OOD recalled that someone reported on Net 15 about the TACTAS and SJA CO said he had responded on NET 15 to the OOD saying "OOD - TACTAS/NIXIE" because backing was prohibited and the CO did not "fully comprehend the report." (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-3, SJA-19)

847. SJA OOD and CONN said "fuck TACTAS! All back emergency, all back emergency!" (Encl.SJA-3, SJA-19)

848. SJA HELM said that he heard the OOD say "Fuck, the TACTAS and NIXIE are out" and both the SJA OOD and CONN looked at the HELM. (Encl.SJA-5)

849. SJA HELM said that at this point he put the engines at all stop and reported this to the CONN. (Encl.SJA-5)

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850. SJA OOD did not order "ALL STOP" and was very surprised to learn during the interview with the investigation team that SJA HELM said he shifted throttles to "ALL STOP." (Encl.SJA-3)

851. SJA HELM stated that when TACTAS and NIXIE are deployed they are not supposed to back down as this will ruin the equipment by getting them wrapped in the screws. (Encl.SJA-5)

852. SJA OOD said that if SJA had not slowed down the two vessels would have hit bow to bow. (Encl.SJA-3)

853. A detailed reconstruction follows: At approximately 1927:04Z⁶ (VMS/GPS time which correlates to 1927:57Z SJA Bell Log time) SJA's ordered speed was "ALL BACK 1/3" and the Integrated Throttle Control (ITC) Positions were:

Port: negative 22% / 55 RPM
Starboard: negative 13% / 55 RPM
(Encl.SJA-31)

854. At approximately 19:27:09Z (VMS/GPS time which correlates to 1928:02Z SJA Bell Log time) SJA's ordered speed was "ALL BACK 2/3" and the Integrated Throttle Control (ITC) Positions were:

Port: negative 49% / 55 RPM
Starboard: negative 49% / 55 RPM
(Encl.SJA-31)

855. At approximately 19:27:14Z (VMS/GPS time which correlates to 1928:08Z SJA Bell Log time) SJA's ordered speed was "All Back STOP" and the Integrated Throttle Control (ITC) Positions were:

Port: 0% / 55 RPM
Starboard: 0% / 55 RPM
(Encl.SJA-31)

856. SJA HELM said "it was no more than a second" from the time he put the engines at all stop to the collision. (Encl.SJA-5)

⁶ Based on the statement provided by SJA Helm and the data collected from SJA Bell Log (see table infra), at some point between 1928:02z and 1928:08z on the SJA Bell Log time SJA Helm moved SJA's integrated throttle control from "All Back 2/3" to "All Stop." Because the potential 5 second delta is not dispositive of any finding of consequences in this report, for the purposes of this investigation it is assumed that the collision occurred at 1928:08z on SJA Bell Log which correlates to the MON data reconstruction time of 1927:15z based on MON VMS/GPS time.

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857. On his way to the bridge from CIC, SJA CO felt the ship start to slow and back down then he felt the ship shake and heard a loud crack. (Encl.SJA-1)

858. SJA XO said he was in his stateroom discussing a HAZMAT issue with SUPPO when he felt the ship shaking in a manner that was not normal. He left his stateroom for the bridge and heard GQ. (Encl.SJA-2)

859. SJA/MON collision time appears to be 1927:15Z based on WSN-7 data processed by Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren (Encl.SJA-42)

860. SJA Bell Log indicates that ALL BACK Order was acted upon at 1927:57Z (1927:04Z on VMS) and completed sometime between 1928:02Z and 1928:08Z (1927:09Z and 1927:15Z on VMS) but the ordered bell was never realized on shaft indications because of the HELM's action placing the Integrated Throttle Controls (ITC) at all stop at 1928:08Z (Encl.SJA-28)

861. SJA Bell Log indicates the following (Encl.SJA-28):

Time (Z)*	Integrated Throttle Control (ITC) Position		Pitch Position		Ordered Speed (Knots)	Actual Speed Position (Knots)
	Port Pitch / RPM	Starboard Pitch / RPM	Port Pitch / RPM	Starboard Pitch / RPM		
1923:53	100% / 128	100% / 129	100% / 126	100% / 132	25	25
1925:55	100% / 101	100% / 100	100% / 126	100% / 126	20	24.5
1927:00	100% / 78	100% / 79	100% / 97	100% / 100	16	19.5
1927:07	100% / 76	100% / 76	100% / 89	100% / 92	15	18
1927:21	100% / 76	100% / 76	100% / 78	100% / 79	15	15.5
1927:36	100% / 76	100% / 76	100% / 77	100% / 76	15	14.5
1927:41	100% / 76	100% / 76	100% / 69	100% / 71	15	14
1927:55	100% / 76	100% / 76	100% / 71	100% / 71	15	14
1927:57	Neg 23% / 55	Neg 13% / 55	93% / 71	94% / 70	All Back 1/3	n/a
1928:02	Neg 49% / 86	Neg 49% / 87	55% / 83	61% / 80	All Back 2/3	n/a
1928:08†	0% / 55	0% / 55	10% / 88	24% / 85	All Stop	n/a
1928:22	0% / 55	0% / 55	0% / 52	0% / 55	All Stop	All Stop

* Note that times are from SJA Bell Log and are not automatically correlated to SJA and MON VMS/GPS resulting in a discrepancy of approximately 53 seconds (i.e. Bell Log time is 53 seconds faster than VMS/GPS time).

† Estimated VMS/GPS time of collision is 1927:15Z correlates to approximately 1928:08Z on SJA Bell Log.

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SUBJ: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING
USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) AND USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765)

SJA: Post-Collision

862. After the collision, SJA OOD ordered the ship to GENERAL QUARTERS and the sounding of the Collision Alarm before SJA CO arrived on the bridge. (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-4, SJA-6, SJA-13, SJA-19, SJA-13, SJA-20)

863. SJA CO reported to the bridge and said the ship was at "All Stop" when he got to the bridge and at that time did not know why it was not in "ALL BACK FULL." (Encl.SJA-1)

864. SJA CO ordered the OOD to man the TACTAS/NIXIE retrieval teams and retrieve them both. (Encl.SJA-1)

865. SJA TAO stated she then checked the status of manning for GENERAL QUARTERS and status of setting material condition ZEBRA. She also verified that SJA was using all available means to contact the SUB since it had not surfaced. (Encl.SJA-7)

866. SJA TAO stated they were going out on WQC-2 and ensured the FATHO was set to maximum power then dropped a SUS Buoy set to Code 5 (ESTABLISH COMMS WITH SCC or SUBOPAUIH) at CO's direction and concurrence of SCC(CDS 22). (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-7)

867. Immediately following the collision SJA lost steering, throttle and the entire console went blank, but the ship's momentum kept them moving forward. Steering was shifted to manual control and restored in the pilot house within minutes. Thrust Control was maintained in CCS from collision until returned at 21:17Z to the bridge. (Encl.SJA-5, SJA-22, SJA-21, SJA-27)

868. SJA ASWC made the radio report to HZ (CDS 22) that SJA had collided with an underwater object. SJA later confirmed it was a sub in a report to CDS-22. (Encl.SJA-12)

869. SJA then retrieved TACTAS and NIXIE, noting that there no indications of damage to either, however they had realized a loss of SONAR dome pressure and took action able to isolate the sonar dome. (Encl.SJA-1, SJA-17)

870. SJA ASW Evaluator ordered that the SONAR dome be isolated due to perceived obvious significant damage and recommended to the bridge and CO to maintain 5 knots or less IAW the technical manual. (Encl.SJA-9, SJA-17)

871. SJA's SONAR dome pressure fluctuated between 12-14 psi (tolerance is 34-36 psi) and all attempts to increase dome pressure via bypass valves FM 430 and 434 were unsuccessful. (Encl.SJA-17)

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872. Following the Collision, SJA OOD did not give the CONN back to SJA CONN (b)(3), (b)(6) because they were still looking for the sub.
(Encl.SJA-3)

873. Following the collision, SJA steered to the predefined safety course of 000T IAW CDS-22 direction and made about 3 knots while numerous personnel were topside looking for the sub. (Encl.SJA-3)

874. SJA OOD was informed that TACTAS/NIXIE was recovered and that there was a report of flooding in TACTAS that was later determined to be due to the "ALL BACK FULL" engine order. (Encl.SJA-3)

875. At the CMC's recommendation, SJA CO ordered a muster to ensure that all personnel were aboard. (Encl.SJA-1)

876. SJA CMC thought the CO's collected approach on the 1MC calmed the crew. (SJA-24)

877. Upon arriving on the bridge after the collision, the SJA XO described it as being fairly calm. The OOD was there still giving orders, the CO was on the radio making a report, and the GQ watchstanders were arriving for turnover. (Encl.SJA-2)

878. SJA CO attempts to contact CDS-22 Navy Red were unsuccessful, succeeded in contacting HST on NAVY RED. (Encl.SJA-1)

879. SJA attempted to contact MON on the WQC-2 with no success.
(Encl.SJA-12)

880. Approximately one hour and fifteen minutes after the collision, MON contacted SJA on bridge to bridge at about 2,600 yards off SJA starboard quarter where SJA could see MON broached and said she intended to surface which she did. (Encl.SJA-1)

881. SJA OOD stated that once communications were established, MON reported no steering, propulsion was fine, no injuries, but it would be a while to surface and they requested all ships remain clear. (Encl.SJA-3)

882. SJA OOD said that combat (CIC) relayed MON's surfaced position with latitude and longitude, he then plotted it at bearing 141T at 3.75-4nm; off SJA's starboard quarter. SJA was on safety course (Encl.SJA-3)

883. Initially SJA escorted MON, but GRV was directed to close SJA and MON and take over escort duties. (Encl.SJA-1)

884. SJA was directed to head for Mayport, FL with a maximum speed of 5 knots. (Encl.SJA-1)

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SUBJ: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION INVOLVING
USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56) AND USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765)

STAFF ASWEX PARTICIPATION

STAFF: Pre-COMEX

885. At 0800 local on the morning of the exercise, CDS-22 ASWO was preparing the CDS-22 watch floor. (Encl.CDS-3, STAFFDOC-10)

886. CDS-22 noted the following occurred on the morning of the ASWEX:

- a. There were issues related to communications shift;
- b. The P-3 was not on station at the briefed time;
- c. Only 2 of the 3 SH-60Rs were available;
- d. The weather favored the sub with seas and wave heights making it harder to spot a raised sub mast.
(Encl.CDS-1)

887. MAGNUM 702 checked on station and assumed Maritime Air Controller (MAC) at 1545Z. (Encl.HSM-11)

888. During the ASWEX, Maritime Air controller (MAC) was cycled between P-3 callsign "Goldfinch 71E" the MH-60R helos callsign "MAGNUM."
(Encl.HSM-5, HSM-7)

889. At 1622Z, the P-3 established contact with the MON, via a DICASS RF 37 buoy, and the MON was stationary. (Encl.HSM-11)

890. The MH-60Rs launched, immediately went out and dropped DIFAR/DICASS buoys (SONOBUOYS) and very quickly gained passive contact on MON
(Encl.CDS-3)

891. GRV was not up in Link 15; GRV established Link 11 with SJA and HST. The helos and the P-3 established Link 16 with the HST and the SJA. The GRV attempted to reestablish Link 16 and commenced troubleshooting with HST. HAWKLINK was established between MAGNUM 703 and GRV. (Encl.HSM-7, GRV-7, GRV-9, GRV-24)

COMEX up to Collision

892. With winds out of the east, HST was conducting cyclic flight operations running generally northeast at 10 knots for winds with high-speed (20-25 knots) southwest legs to reset. (encl. GRV-1, GRV-11, GRV-4)

893. Due to the high speed of HST (b)(1) while conducting flight operations, CDS-22 was struggling to manage the screen sector assignments for GRV and SJA. (Encl.CDS-3)

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894. CDS-22 had ordered GRV and SJA to make best speed to maintain sector around HST. (Encl.GRV-4)

895. MON reported on station SE of the surface formation at approximately 1643Z. (Encl.GRV-1)

(b)(1)

a.

b. MON's checked in with CDS 22 staff via chat and then told not to communicate as they were the "RED" Sub.

896. A P-3 and helicopters from HSM-74 participated in the ASWEX. At COMEX the P-3 had contact and continued to prosecute MON while making contact reports. (Encl.CDS-3)

(b)(1)

897.
(b)(1)

898. During the exercise the P-3 had occasional contact with a directional buoy but had to remain off station due to HST flight operations. (Encl.HSM-5, HSM-7)

899. At 1700Z MAGNUM 703 launched from GRV and checked on station to participate in ASWEX. The Helo had 11 passive buoys, 4 active buoys, and a dipper for prosecution. (Encl.HSM-5, HSM-11, GRV-1, GRV-5, GRV-12)

900. The MAGNUMs conducted an ASW search using dipping SONAR to the southeast of the surface ship formation, attempting to gain contact on the MON. (Encl.GRV-1)

901. HSM-74 helos participating in the exercise initially held and maintained contact on MON for approximately 30-50 minutes and CDS-22 ASWO stated that the helos continued to maintain intermittent contact throughout most of the exercise. (Encl.CDS-3, CSG-4, CSG-6)

902. At 1714Z, MAGNUM 703 reported DICASS (RF 37) losing contact MON. Course 088R speed 2 Kts; SJA bearing 025R/9.8NM. (Encl.HSM-11)

903. At 1718Z, GRV held active contact was classified as potential mutual interference. (Encl.GRV-5)

904. At 1725Z, MAGNUM 703 suspected MON of diving and sprinting, while the SJA was bearing 023T with a range 5.15nm from GRV. (Encl.HSM-11)

905. At 1734Z MAGNUM 703 regained contact on MON with a DICASS Sonobuoy and held MON at a course of 070T at 10 knots and held SJA bearing 033T at 4.09nm on course 075T at 6 knots from the sonobuoy. (Encl.HSM-11)

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906. At 1743Z, MAGNUM 703 reported DICASS buoy solution on MON on course of 039T and speed of 8.4 knots, with low confidence. (Encl.HSM-11)

907. At 1746Z, MAGNUM 703 held MON on DICASS buoy drifting on course 040T speed 2kts and held SJA 078T at 10kyds. (Encl.HSM-11)

908. At 1816Z, MAGNUM 703 held contact with Dipper then lost contact shortly thereafter. (Encl.HSM-11)

909. MAGNUM 703 then held MON on a sprint course of 350T at (b)(1) At this point SJA was bearing 016T/Range 3.33nm from GRV. (Encl.HSM-11)

910. At 1830Z, MAGNUM 703 assumed MAC. (Encl.HSM-11)

911. GRV and SJA conducted recovery and launch of helos; both ships veered off assigned screen position for flight operations. (Encl.GRV-4)

912. CDS-22 queried SJA about expected time to launch the Helo and directed SJA to return to sector upon completing flight quarters. SJA acknowledged and replied they were ready to launch and would be returning to sector at best speed. (Encl.GRV-1)

913. At 1850, SJA returned to assigned sectors after flight quarters, approximately 2-3nm of HST, GRV maneuvered south course 180T to open distance to SJA. (Encl.GRV-1, GRV-12)

914. Approximately 15-20 minutes prior to collision, GRV held two contacts along the same line of bearing, one believed to be the MON (correlated to the SJA with approximately 6,000 yards of separation). (Encl.GRV-4)

915. At 1904Z (approximately 22 minutes prior to the collision) CDS-22 received a report from one of the helos which estimated a force datum. (Encl.CDS-5, STAFFDOC-11, STAFFDOC-12)

916. SJA was steady on westerly course of 261T and her speed was 24 knots. (Encl.HSM-11)

917. Approximately 10 minutes prior to the collision report from SJA, the SJA and HST had turned to the west for flight operations. (Encl.CDS-3)

918. At 1922Z, there was report from the P-3 of a subsurface contact from a sonobuoy 3NM to the south of the surface force. (Encl.CDS-7, STAFFDOC-10)

919. Watchstanders in the DESRON module on HST recall that about two minutes prior to the collision (approximately 1925Z), SJA called a feather in the water and gave a partial report via radio. The ASWA said she started to type the log entry and waited about 20 seconds and then asked

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them to repeat the message. SJA's reply was to disregard/negate their last call, so CDS-22 ASWA deleted what she was typing. (Encl.CDS-5)

920. MAGNUM 703 dipper's submerged contact was transmitted via link and GRV's SONAR tagged a submerged contact shortly before collision. (Encl.GRV-7)

921. At 1927Z, MAGNUM 703 reported a contact near the same position and the P-3, reported hot buoy (83) with contact at 3101N 0793W. At the same time the watch team began to try classifying the contact, they received a report that SJA collided with an underwater object. (Encl.GRV-5, CDS-7, STAFFDOC-10)

922. There was not enough time prior to the collision to establish a force datum or force track on the contacts reported at 1922Z and 1927Z. (Encl.CDS-5, STAFFDOC-10)

923. At 1928:00Z, MAGNUM 703 held a dipper contact close aboard SJA and the MAGNUM 703 crew suspected a bad fix, but the sensor operator reported differing frequency from SJA. (Encl.HSM-5, HSM-11)

STAFF: PD3 Trip & Collision

924. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

925. CDS-22 ASWA recalled hearing SJA saying "Hotel Zulu, we've collided with an underwater object." (CDS-6)

926. When SJA reported the collision, CDS-22 ASWO asked, "what did they say?" The CDS-22 ASWA replied "they said they collided." (Encl.CDS-5)

927. The HSTCSG watchstanders stated that there was an open radio call of "Oh my God, they hit it" or words to the effect. (Encl.CSG-4, CSG-5, CSG-6)

928. Immediately after the collision report, CDS-22 ASWO made a voice report to "knock it off," (Encl.CSG-4, CSG-5, CSG-6, CDS-3, CDS-4, CDS-5, CDS-6, CDS-8)

929. After the collision, ZULU (CDS-22) directed ships to the safety course. (Encl.CSG-4, CSG-5, CSG-6)

930. At the time of the collision, the CDS-22 Commodore and Deputy Commodore had been attending a Warfare Commanders' planning session in the War Room and were informed of the collision by the CDS-22 STAO. (Encl.CDS-1, CDS-2, CDS-3, CDS-7)

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STAFF: Post-Collision - CDS-22 & HSTCSG

931. CDS-22 Commodore reported to the ZULU module and then directed the ships come to the safety course of 000 T, but SJA could maneuver as needed to recover her array. (Encl.CDS~1)

932. The HSTCSG Commander, RDML Sweeney arrived in the ZULU module at approximately 1932Z. (Encl.CDS~7)

933. After the collision, CDS-22 directed all units to go passive on SONAR and to maintain fathometer on a high setting. (Encl.GRV~4)

934. CDS-22 began coordination via Navy Red with SJA, HST, and GRV. (Encl.GRV~1)

935. HSTCSG BWC initiated chat and voice reports to USFFC about the collision. (Encl.CSG~5, CSG~6, STAFFDOC~8)

936. About 5 minutes after the collision, the CDS-22 ASWA chatted to SUBLANT and reported that SJA collided with an underwater object and SUBLANT created a discrete Chat for discussion of the event. (Encl.CDS~5)

937. Following the collision, there was directed effort to use every available asset to find the submarine. At the same time the other surface ships were directed not to approach the last known location of the submarine because such a move might keep the sub from coming to PD. (Encl.CSG~2)

938. SJA reported to CDS-22 that the sub had gone sinker and was not in communications with the surface ships. (Encl.CDS~3)

939. CDS-22 ASWO ordered the helos to drop buoys and transmit emergency codes to the submarine via SUS as well as underwater telephone (UWT). (Encl.CDS~3)

940. 2002Z, CDS-22 directed GRV to employ Mine Avoidance SONAR to attempt to determine MON's location, which it did in Small Object Avoidance Mode (SOA Mode) (Encl.GRV~1, GRV~5, GRV~12)

941. GRV obtained on hit, but no further returns and was directed by CDS-22 to secure mine avoidance SONAR. (Encl.GRV~1)

942. CDS-22 directed GRV to conduct Probe Alert and Underwater Telephone. GRV received no response from MON. (Encl.GRV~1, GRV~4, GRV~5, GRV~12)

943. CDS-22 directed GRV to announce Underwater Telephone (WQC-2) "Are you safe to surface" but GRV received no response (Encl.GRV~1, GRV~4, GRV~5, GRV~12)

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944. CDS-22 ASWO also attempted to contact MON via UWT onboard HST.
(Encl.CDS-3)

945. RDML Sweeney said that following the collision the CO of SJA was calm and had his priorities right. (Encl.CSG-1)

946. HSTCSG and CDS-22 felt that MON was being very aggressive in the exercise were surprised by the sub's aggressiveness in proceeding to attack position so close to the surface ships. (Encl.CSG-1, CDS-1, CDS-3)

947. The CSG & CDS leadership and staffs were communicating with the appropriate chains of command (USFFC and CSL) and apprising them of the situation while the sub remained under water and missing to the task force. (Encl.CSG-2, CDS-3)

948. The submarine warfare qualified officers on both the CDS-22 and CSG-10 staffs thought that it would be about an hour before the sub would attempt to surface. (Encl.CDS-1)

949. The CSG-10 COS stated that CSL intended to send a sub lost message but this was later cancelled. (Encl.CSG-2)

950. There was no answer from MON for approximately one hour and 15 minutes. (Encl.CDS-3, CDS-6)

951. At 2047Z MON surfaced and established bridge-to-bridge communications with SJA. (Encl.GRV-1, GRV-5)

952. The initial reports CDS-22 received from SJA were that MON was on the surface with level trim, had a small leak in her ballast tank, and the helo aircrew observed that her rudder was not visible. (Encl.CDS-3)

953. CDS-22 received MON's report regarding their difficulty in maneuvering (Encl.CDS-1)

954. MAGNUM 703 recovered, refueled, and launched from HST and subsequently recorded FLIR (forward looking infrared) video of MON. (Encl.HSM-5)

955. SJA was directed to proceed to Naval Station Mayport, and CDS-22 and CSG-10 staffs worked together to ensure HSM helos followed MON to Naval Submarine Station Kings Bay, Georgia. (Encl.CDS-1)

956. Mon was escorted by GRV to King Bay, Georgia (Encl.G1, G21, G24)

957. According to NAVSEA IWS, CVTSC Version 6.1, a module for data fusion onboard HST, has limited recording capability (recording must be initiated by the watchstanders and manually deleted by the watchstanders).

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Due to CDS 22's and CSG 10's limited experience with this system (this underway period), none of the DESRON's or CSG Staffs data regarding the evolution of the sequence of events was available for review.
(Encl.STAFFDOC-20, STAFFDOC-21)

STAFF: Post-Collision - COMSUBLANT

958. (b)(3), (b)(6) is a qualified Commander Submarine Force Atlantic (CSL) Submarine Watch Officer (CSL SWO1) who assisted (b)(3), (b)(6) the on-watch SWO (CSL SWO2), in the hours following the MON collision.
(Encl.CSL-1, CSL-1)

959. CSL SWO2 reported that at approximately 1935Z he received a report via whisper in chat from the CDS-22 that SJA had contacted an underwater object and a few minutes later, CDS-22 confirmed that SJA had collided with MON. (Encl.CSL-1)

960. CSL SWO2 notified his Chain Of Command up through CSL N00 (VADM Connor) of the collision (Encl. CSL-2)

961. CSL SWO2 reported that the CSL Communications Watch Officer (CWO) monitored all voice circuits to establish communications with MON and that the CWO attempted to contact MON on Net 668 every 5 minutes until communications were established. (Encl.CSL-1)

962. CSL SWO2 reported that at 1951Z he established a chat room on the USFF Primary Chat server for all concerned parties to pass information concerning the collision. (Encl.CSL-1)

963. CSL SWO2 reported that CSL N3, (b)(3), (b)(6) directed the initiation of SUBLOOK procedures at approximately 2015Z. At that point, the SWO directed that the SUBLOOK checklist be followed and phone calls initiated. (Encl.CSL-1)

964. CSL SWO2 logs indicate that SUBLOOK procedures were initiated by checklist at 2040Z. Actions for SUBLOOK and ISMERLO notifications had been in progress since the collision. (Encl.CSL-1)

965. CSL SWO2 reported that at 2040Z he received a report that MON was sighted and he subsequently established communications with MON on Net 668.
(Encl.CSL-2)

966. CSL SWO2 reported that (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at approximately 2100, contacted the OPNAV BWC and then in coordination with N3, directed that a SUBLOOK cancellation message be sent. (Encl.CSL-1)

967. At 2313Z a SUBLOOK cancellation was sent. (COMSUBLANT MSG 132313Z OCT 12) (Encl.CSL-1)

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968. CSL SW01 reported that he assisted in completing the checklist for initiating SUBLOOK procedures following the collision. (Encl.CSL-1)

969. CSL SW01 reported that a SUBLOOK cancellation message was sent once MON was located on the surface. This message was designed to cancel the actions that had been initiated although a SUBLOOK message had never been sent. (Encl.CSL-1)


970. CSL SW01 reported that once the MON was on the surface, the CSL watch floor focused on MON stability and steerageway. CSL watch floor initiated a 30 minute check in routine with MON and organized the efforts at Kings Bay to ensure tugs understood the nature of the assistance required to bring MON safely in to port. (Encl.CSL-1)

971. CSL SW01 reported that Mon was directed to return to port Kings Bay. Throughout the night, CSL manned a battle watch captain and fleet watch officer to track and direct the MON return to port. MON was met by Kings Bay tugs late in the midwatch 14 October 2012. (Encl.CSL-1)


972. (b)(1)
(b)(1)



a. (b)(1)
(b)(1)



b. (b)(1)



(b)(1)
(Encl.MEV-17)

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GRV ASWEX PARTICIPATION

GRV: PRE-COMEX

973. GRV deployed her NIXIE at 13:43Z, and she was actively transmitting her fathometer. (Encl.GRV-1, GRV-15)

974. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (Encl.GRV-5, GRV-14, GRV-11, GRV-12)

975. At 16:54Z the GRV received a transmission from HZ that designated a possible submarine with high confidence Force Track (FT01), bearing 180T 1412 yards from an established reference point. (Encl.GRV-5)

976. GRV assumed Alternate Air Defense Coordinator (HC) at 1505Z for HSTSG. (Encl.GRV-14)

977. GRV set Condition IIAS - a modified condition of ASW of readiness - at 1500Z. (Encl.GRV-15, GRV-11)

GRV: COMEX UP TO COLLISION

978. During the ASWEX GRV's Link 11 was operational and maintained between SJA and HST. GRV's Link 16 was intermittent experienced numerous issues and was not operational during the ASWEX. (Encl.GRV-24, GRV-14)

979. GRV was stationed SSW of HST, and SJA was assigned a sector station SSE of HST, mirroring GRV's sectors. (Encl.GRV-1)

980. From 1700-1749Z GRV conducted flight quarters to recover and launch helo callsign "DUSTY DOG" (HST HH-60). At 1749Z, GRV secured from Flight Quarters and Helo 'DUSTY DOG' shifted to SJA control. (Encl.GRV-5 GRV-12)

981. GRV energized her Prairie and Masker Noise systems, which remained operational during the ASWEX at the following times:

- a. 1721Z MER 1 and MER 2 - On;
 - b. 1733Z MER 1 and MER 2 - OFF;
 - c. 1745Z MER 1 and MER 2 - ON;
 - d. 1935Z MER 1 and MER 2 - OFF.
- (Encl.GRV-1)

982. At 1707Z, GRV set Quiet Ship (Q2). (Encl.GRV-14, GRV-12)

983. At 1709Z, GRV reported new track, tag #18 Bearing 230T, Range 15K yards, classified POSSUB LOW (Encl.GRV-1)

984. At 1715Z, GRV conducted ASW evasive maneuvers (MAD MAGGIES). (Encl.GRV-5)

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985. At 1721Z, GRV's MER 1 and MER 2 Prairie and Masker Noise systems were energized and operational. (Encl.GRV-1)

986. At 1733Z, Both of GRV's Prairie and Masker Noise systems were secured. (Encl.GRV-1)

987. At 1741Z, GRV launched helicopter 'DUSTY DOG' after passenger transfer and fueling. GRV then changed course and speed, 27 kts, to regain sector. (Encl.GRV-1, GRV-5)

988. GRV CO stated that one aircraft reported to CDS-22 contact on 3 buoys, but he did not specify a time. (Encl.GRV-1)

989. GRV detected electronic support (ES) indicative of BTS 15 (primary submarine surface search RADAR) bearing 132 relative at 1728Z, but lost then lost the bearing. (Encl.GRV-5)

990. GRV's active SONAR detected a possible submerged contact at 1729Z then lost the contact following three sweeps with no active return. Last contact information was bearing 229T, range 11,000 yards. (Encl.GRV-11)

991. In order to regain station GRV had to make high-speed runs greater than break point speed for hull mounted SONAR (the speed above which search is degraded and above recommended search speed). (Encl.GRV-4)

992. At 1813Z, GRV changed course to 110T with speed 10 Kts. (Encl.GRV-12)

993. 1813-1846Z, GRV's course was between 110T and 095T with speed between 7-10kts. (Encl.GRV-12)

994. At 1813Z, GRV returned to assigned sectors approximately 6nm south of HST. (Encl.GRV-12)

995. From 1810-1816Z, the MAGNUM 703 again had contact from a DICASS Sonobuoy on MON drifting a course of 040T with a speed of 2 knots. The SJA was on a course of 078T with a range of 5.05nm, which it held only momentarily. (Encl.HSM-11)

996. At 1840Z, GRV gained new active contact with a bearing rate of 129T, and a range of 10,000 yards, which it classified as possible sub (POSSUB), low confidence 2. (Encl.GRV-11)

997. Two minutes later, GRV had 3 active sweeps with no return and reported it lost active SONAR contact; last bearing was 135T with a range of 9,000 yards. (Encl.GRV-11)

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998. At 1850Z, HST assigned GRV sectors 180-270T at 3,000-18,000 yards. GRV turned east to match HST's course and speed and stay on eastern edge of assigned sector between the general threat (the sub) and the HVU (HST). (Encl.GRV-1, GRV-5, GRV-12)

999. At 1857Z, GRV gained a new active contact with a bearing rate of 198T and a range of 6,000 yards, which it classified as possible sub, low confidence 2. (Encl.GRV-11, G-12)

1000. Between 1902-1907Z, CDS-22 stated GRV was driving towards submarine "Furthest On Circle" (an expanding circle centered on the datum with radius based on the calculated maximum speed of the submarine in relation to the amount of time that has passed) and GRV maneuvered to the North with increased speed to close the surface force. (Encl.GRV-1, GRV-12)

1001. At 1905Z, GRV reported loss of contact based on 3 active sweeps with no active return. The last bearing rate was 225T, at a range of 6,000 yards. GRV course was 000T at speed of 25 knots. (Encl.GRV-11, GRV-12)

1002. At 1913Z, MAGNUM 703 reported Negative contact on MON and held SJA in a port turn. (Encl.HSM-11)

1003. MAGNUM 703 and the P-3 continued ASW search operation to the south and East of GRV. (Encl.GRV-1)

1004. At 1911Z, GRV changed course to 250T at speed 15kts. Shortly after, HST turned WSW for flight operations "reset" leg, and GRV maneuvered to match HST course. (Encl.GRV-1, GRV-4, GRV-8, GRV-12)

1005. Between 1911-1946Z, GRV course was 250-230T at a speed 20-25 knots. (Encl.GRV-12)

GRV: PD3 TRIP AND COLLISION

1006. The collision between SJA and MON occurred at approximately 1927:15Z. (Encl.GRV-12)

1007. At the time of the collision, GRV was transiting about 6 NM southwest of collision positioned between SJA and MON. HST had a bearing north at 7NM (Encl.GRV-12, GRV-28)

1008. GRV ASWC stated that at 1931Z SJA reported a collision with underwater object. (Encl.GRV-9)

1009. At 1930Z, GRV set flight quarters to launch MAGNUM 704 at 2000Z. (Encl.GRV-1, HSM-5)

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1010. At 1935Z GRV received reports that SJA had collided with a submarine. (Encl.GRV-1, GRV-24, HSM-5)

GRV: POST COLLISION

1011. Upon direction from CDS-22 GRV secured active SONAR operation, Prairie and Masker Noise systems, slowed to 5 knots and began Nixie recovery. (Encl.GRV-1, GRV-17, GRV-3, GRV-4, GRV-5, GRV-12)

1012. MAGNUM 703 used dipper to ask MON to establish Communications and could hear SJA and GRV going out XXX SOS. (Encl.HSM-5)

1013. SJA reported not seeing any debris or oil in the water after collision. (Encl.GRV-1)

1014. IAW CDS-22 direction to the surface force, GRV assumed pre-designated safety course of north, and to slow to 3 knots. (Encl.GRV-1, GRV-8, GRV-3)

1015. At 2002Z, CDS-22 directed GRV to employ Mine Avoidance SONAR to attempt to determine MON's location, which it did in Small Object Avoidance Mode (SOA Mode). (Encl.GRV-1, GRV-6, GRV-12)

1016. At approximately 2010Z, GRV launched MAGNUM 704 in search of MON. (Encl.GRV-1)

1017. At 2013Z, GRV reported to CDS-22 that they had one "1" active return down the line bearing in the vicinity SJA - bearing 065T Range 3733 Yards - but lost that SOA Mode contact at 2016Z. (Encl.GRV-1, GRV-5)

1018. At 2017Z, MAGNUM 704 launched from GRV and at 2021Z GRV Secured flight Quarters. (Encl.GRV-1)

1019. IAW CDS-22 direction, GRV announced Underwater Telephone (WQC-2) "Are you safe to surface" but received no response (Encl.GRV-1, GRV-4, GRV-5, GRV-12)

1020. 21:53Z 13 October 2012, GRV assumed duty to escort MON to Kings Bay, Georgia. (Encl.GRV-1, GRV-5, GRV-12)

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DAMAGES

MON: Initial Damages Assessment

1021. Between 19-22 October 2012, the TRIDENT Refit Facility (TRF), Kings Bay, GA, inspected USS MONTPELIER, both externally and internally, while moored to the pier at NSB Kings Bay. Nine damaged areas were initially identified:

a. The upper rudder and stock are missing, and the upper longitudinal member for the rudder post through the non-pressure hull is damaged severely.

b. There is a 23" long crack, which is 2" wide at the top and 4" wide at the bottom, in the Main Ballast Tank (MBT)/mud tank at frame 143.

c. The non-pressure hull plating adjacent to the lower rudder is dented.

d. There were miscellaneous areas of damage on the special hull treatment (SHT).

e. The anchor light cable was missing.

f. There was a 6" by 8" hole over the top of the mud tank, which was separate from the rudder stock hole.

g. The skin of the mud tank was dented.

h. There was structural damage/cracking in the bulkhead between MBT-5A and MBT-5B.

i. There was structural damage in the boundary between the mud tank and both MBT-5A and MTA-5B.

(Encl.MEV-59)

1022. A secondary inspection of MON by TRF revealed damage to a 30 foot section of acoustic skin tiling on the starboard side starting at Frame 94 and going aft (Encl.MEV-59)

1023. Damage repair cost estimate ranges from \$30 million (Norfolk Naval Shipyard) to \$41 million (Huntington-Ingalls Inc.-Newport News Shipyard) as of 14 November. (Encl.MEV-59)

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SJA Initial Damage Assessment

1024. On 18 and 19 October 2012, Seaward Marine Services Inc. completed a level II inspection of USS SAN JACINTO SONAR dome. (Encl.SJA-43)

1025. Six areas on the port side of the SONAR dome contained damage:

j. From the 0 through the 345 degree mark, there were 25 1/2" long horizontal cuts, with exposed wires.

k. From the right of the 330 degree mark through the 90 degree mark, there were 80" long horizontal cuts, with separation and exposed wires.

l. At the 330 degree mark, there was a vertical cut 32" long with separation and exposed wires.

m. At the 15 degree mark, there was a 35" long and 40" deep vertical cut with metal separation and a dent.

n. Left of the 0 degree mark, there was a 12" long by 12" wide horizontal and vertical separation of the metal, which was flapping.

o. On the Banjo, at the 30 degree mark to the right of the 270 degree mark, there were 53" long and 207" wide horizontal and vertical tears and abrasions.

(Encl.SJA-43)

1026. Ten areas on the starboard side of the SONAR dome contained damage:

p. Left of the 0 degree mark, there was a 13" horizontal cut with exposed wires.

q. Right of the 15 degree mark to the left of the 30 degree mark, there was an 82" cut with separation and wires exposed.

r. Left of the 90 degree mark, there was an 80" vertical cut with separation and exposed wires.

s. Left of the 105 degree mark and right of the 135 degree mark, there was a 76" long cut with separation and exposed wires.

t. Right of the 135 degree mark there was a 14" horizontal cut with exposed wires.

u. Right of the 330 degree mark through the 90 degree mark, there was a 14' horizontal cut with exposed wires.

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v. Left of the 330 degree mark to the right of the 270 degree mark on the Banjo, there was a 106" long tear with separated metal.

w. At the 270 degree mark on the Banjo - the closure plate and fairing angle - there was a 63" long by 12" wide tear with flapping metal.

x. Left of the 0 degree mar, there was a 111 1/2" cut with separation and exposed wires.

y. From the 270 degree mark left to the 30 degree mark on the Banjo, there was 53" long by 207" wide horizontal dent with abrasions.
(Encl.SJA-43)

1027. During docking inspection of SJA SONAR dome damage was discovered to the High Frequency WQC-2 transducer was damaged/crushed and cable to the transducer is also damaged (Encl.SJA-43)

1028. Damage repair cost estimate from BAE via SKRMC is approximately \$12.2 million as of 7 November 2012. (Encl.SJA-43)

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OPINIONS

DIRECT CAUSES

1. MON CO blurred the distinction between an exercise and tactical/wartime engagement such that he lost sight of the required safety aspects dictated by the applicable publications (The Approach and Attack Manual and the Contact Management Manual.) (FOF 56-59, 79-85, 101, 403, 308-321, 378-415, 746-779)
2. With only a small window of opportunity to consummate an attack on the CVN, MON CO rushed the ascent to PD without developing a "good enough" solution on SJA to safely come to PD. (FOF 266, 370-81, 386, 388, 396-404, 407-408, 415, 419, 436)
3. As MON prepared to come to PD (collision PD trip #3), MON failed to detect the 180 degree turn SJA executed to stay on station with HST and incorrectly assumed SJA continued on an easterly course away from the sub, instead of her actual westerly course toward the sub. (FOF 377-402, 404-405, 407-436, 800, 811, 817, 819, 823-824, 826-827)
4. As MON prepared for PD, MON CO and watchstanders misinterpreted the near-zero bearing drift and other data available on SJA's track. (FOF 417-433, 817, 819, 823-824, 756, 769-779, 826-827)

PROXIMATE CAUSES

5. MON CO failed to have a watch team in place during the ASWEX that could have provided him backup in such a pressed, dynamic tactical environment with multiple close surface contacts maneuvering at high-speed. (FOF 56-59, 79-85, 101, 378-415, 251-252, 371-433, 532-537, 589-618, 650-656)
6. MON CO's typical practice was to monitor displays/data in control during ascent to PD while the OCD manned the periscope. During the collision PD, however, he believed that he could best mitigate risk involved in coming to PD inside the surface screen, with multiple surface ships in close contact, by manning the periscope himself. By doing so, he missed the opportunity to observe key indicators and take action that could have kept the ship safe. (FOF 414-461, 650-457)
7. During the ascent to PD trip and while manning the periscope, MON CO did not hear the FTOW call (b)(1). However, MON FTC, JOOD, OOD, SONAR Sup, and Passive Broadband Operator all heard the (b)(1) and failed to provide forceful backup to the CO by:

- a. (b)(1)

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b. Making MON CO aware of the (b)(1) (FOF 413-433, 697-720)

8. During the periscope sweeps, MON CO overrode his initial instinct that a surface contact was present and close by countermanding his initial order to go deep to (b)(1) and instead remained at (b)(1). (FOF 436-446, 650-656)

9. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

approximately 5/5 yards with AOB port five) - MON CO accurately assessed the dire nature and impending danger. (FOF 823-824, 826-827)

10. MON CO failed to order "EMERGENCY DEEP" when he saw SJA dangerously close through the periscope. His order to make depth (b)(1) did not initiate the mandatory immediate action items associated with "EMERGENCY DEEP" that would have contributed to a more expeditious descent. Additionally, the series of depth orders most likely kept MON near PD longer than necessary. (FOF 428-471)

11. Despite the SJA OOD's "All engines back full" order, which SJA Helm initially executed, SJA Helm became confused when he heard the CO's voice over the NET 15 speaker commenting about TACTASS and NIXIE being deployed. SJA Helm looked at the warning sign in front of him, which stated "TACTASS Deployed, No Backing Bells" or words to that effect, and wrongly shifted the throttles back to "All stop." (FOF 838, 840-850)

12. It is possible that collision may have been avoided or further mitigated had there been no delay in the Emergency Deep order and SJA throttles remained at "All back full" instead of being shifted to "All stop." (FOF 838, 840-850)

13. Assumptions by the CSG Commander and CDS 22 Commodore, based on CDS-22's recent and significant ASW experience, did not fully appreciate or consider risk of warships, submarines, and aircraft operating at high speeds in close proximity, juxtaposed with the experience and proficiency levels of the HSTCSG surface ships and assigned submarine, and their abilities to execute coordinated strike group operations. (FOF 144-50, 152-57, 170, 191, 184-186)

14. The CSG Commander and DESRON Commodore did not proactively manage or fully consider the risks inherent in the dynamic nature of the "free play" exercise that was detailed in the PREEX, particularly with regard to the infrequency of US sub and surface ship interactions. (FOF 174, 179-189)

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TRAINING

MON - Training

15. MON was progressing on track in the pre-deployment process for deployment in early 2013. (FOF 75)

16. MON CO was a demanding leader with high standards who pushed his crew to meet those standards. He was well-respected by his crew and by outside personnel who interacted with MON. He was a strong tactician and effective leader who was receptive to backup or recommendations if/when provided by his crew. There are no indications that he was abrasive or demonstrated other negative leadership traits. (FOF 26-45, 587-608)

17. Under MON CO leadership, MON had completed a highly successful EUCOM deployment in February 2012. (FOF 75)

18. MON CO had the requisite experience to operate in the dynamic environment of the ASWEX. but he was also concerned with Engineering training (b)(1) (b)(1)) and Arctic Certification. (FOF 26-28, 32-39, 43, 45, 54, 56-68)

19. Since returning from deployment, key members of MON including the XO, COB, 3 SONAR supervisors, FT LCPO and the Weapons Officer had transferred. While the previous Weps was generally considered to be the best Department Head and OOD, the previous XO was a weak performer, as was the previous COB who was also divisive and drove a wedge between the CO and Chief's Quarters. (FOF 34-37, 40, 43, 54, 77-79, 568-581)

20. MON XO and COB were relieved approximately one week prior to the collision. It appeared as if MON's new XO and COB were making progress upgrading the ship's routine and day to day operations. However, on the day of the collision, neither the XO nor the COB provided forceful backup to the Commanding Officer as he led the watch team engagement of the Surface Action Group. (FOF 3, 7-8, 348-351, 484)

21. Transfer of several key MON personnel from the Weapons Department and the Wardroom resulted in proficiency deficits that had not been rectified. Personnel were on board to fill the billets but had not developed proficiency to make up for lost experience. (FOF 77-79, 515, 546-561)

22. MON CO had been placed in a situation where his personal intervention was required to run many aspects of his ship while supporting weak Department heads (ENG), a weak former XO, and a combative/derisive former CMC. This compelled him to attempt to make almost anything happen on board MON by himself, and led the crew and his watch teams rely on that

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as well, such that they did not provide the CO forceful backup. (FOF 33-39, 43, 40, 43, 54, 77-79, 562-588)

23. MON CO struggled with improving the effectiveness of some of his key leaders. Weak personnel in key leadership positions throughout the ship had resulted in below average execution of the day to day routine and some key training and qualification programs. MON CO effectively addressed the more important issues and shortfalls that had arisen during his time in command. (FOF 26, 45, 47, 49, 54, 56-57, 566-588)

24. MON was a capable boat and crew making good progress toward deployment. They could generally identify and fix their own problems and needed little assistance from their ISIC. In areas where MON had identified they needed help, their ISIC was responsive and provided assistance in the form of riders and mentorship. (FOF 26-29, 45, 47, 49, 54, 56-57, 567-588)

25. During her pre-deployment training, MON demonstrated weaknesses in several elements of effective contact management. As of the day of collision, however, neither CSS-6 nor MON had an effective method in place to track the more important deficiencies, several of which were contributors to the collision. (FOF 29-30, 43, 45, 56-57, 59, 81-92, 100-103, 357-363)

26. MON had not improved the required "building block approach" to develop individual knowledge levels in support of high performance watch teams needed for mission accomplishment. (FOF 30, 40, 43-47, 49, 52, 54, 56-57, 65)

27. At the time of the collision, MON ship control parties were inexperienced, with only four qualified DOOWs; only one of which was a CPO. (FOF 11-25, 57, 59, 301-07, 546-566, 914-916)

28. MON Fire Control Division was very junior:

- a. PO1 billet was gapped.
- b. LPO was a PO2 who was not underway during the collision.
- c. The most senior FT in the division other than the CPO was a PO3. (FOF 11-25, 29, 30, 46, 57-59, 539-551)

29. MON's section tracking party was inexperienced with tracking a surface action group, and, they were unfamiliar with:

- a. Expected speed for the escorts when maneuvering information with HST.
- b. The ability to determine escort speed (b)(1)

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c. The effect of prairie and masker on the noise signature of escorts.

c. Expected maneuver patterns for the escorts.
(FOF 11-25, 29, 30, 46, 57-59, 97, 105-106, 519-45, 677-679, 711-897)

30. Although qualified, several MON watch standers lacked the proficiency to operate at the level necessary to provide required recommendations and backup to supervisors during the ASWEX. (FOF 29, 30, 46, 57-59, 519-545)

31. Without the support of a skilled watch team, MON CO placed an undue burden upon himself by taking the CONN and eliminating his own ability to take advantage of his experience in monitoring all sensors available to him to ascertain surface ships' positions. (FOF 26-30, 38, 56, 435-457, 620-656)

STAFFS - Training

32. As of the day of the collision, CDS 22 had developed a considerable amount of ASW training and experience since completing predeployment training in 2011 and NAVCENT deployment in 2011. Since 2011, they had completed four LAC courses, two SCC course events, and most recently, the HSTCSG Warfare Commanders Course at Tactical Training Group Atlantic. The staff was organized and proficient in preparing and briefing their intentions to the HST Strike Group Commander. (FOF 152-57)

SJA - Training

33. SJA's XO, Senior Watch Officer, CIC, and ASW teams should have been better prepared for a coordinated free play ASWEX involving multiple simultaneous taskings, coordinated complex close-quarters Surface Action group tactics, and a simulated adversary submarine maneuvering aggressively at high-speed. The Commanding Officer's personal presence in CIC was required to fully engage the watch team to focus on the exercise while the events were already underway. (FOF 127, 131-33, 135, 138, 140, 781-783, 787, 791, 802, 805)

34. Manpower shortfalls and an inadequate management resulted in SJA's failure to operate at a level commensurate with completion of ASW certification (obtained in July 2012). This certification process had required manning two sections of Condition IIAS watches, however, transfer of key personnel and lack of an aggressive qualification process resulted in SJA failing to maintain or man a condition IIAS watchbill during the ASWEX. (FOF 127, 131-33, 135, 138, 140, 781-783, 787, 791, 802, 805)

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PLANNING

35. Although HSTCSG's GRUSL schedule of events was well-scripted, compression of their overall pre-deployment training schedule compelled an aggressive approach to maximize training opportunities. (FOF 151-153)

36. Compressed training schedules and limited availability of assets resulted in the ASWEX on 13 October 2012 being the first opportunity for a newly consolidated carrier strike group (on an accelerated deployment schedule) to participate in a live exercise with a submarine during this Group Sail (GRUSL) underway, their first as a Strike Group. (FOF 173, 181-182)

37. Efforts to maximize training opportunities and ongoing CVN flight operations resulted in scheduling the more tactical and complex submarine-surface ship free-play ASWEX training event (mis-labeled as a TRACKEX) a day prior to measured and controlled training events of SUBFAM (lookout training), and TRACKEX (surface tracking of sub on a coordinated track). (FOF 173-179, 186-187, 891-892)

38. Assumptions by the CSG Commander and CDS 22 Commodore, based on CDS-22's more advanced ASWEX experience level, did not fully appreciate or consider the experience and proficiency levels of the HSTCSG surface ships and their abilities to execute coordinated strike group operations. (FOF 144-50, 152-57, 170, 191, 184-186)

39. The risk of warships and aircraft operating at high speeds in close proximity was understood by those scheduling and participating in the exercise. However, the mitigations in place did not fully account for proficiency levels of all participants, the dynamic nature of the "Free play" exercise that was detailed in the PREEX, or the infrequency of US sub and surface ship interactions. (FOF 174, 179-189)

40. Although pre-ASWEX communications between surface and sub planners included several emails regarding timing, ASW interactions and expectations, direct communication via voice or chat could have ensured full and complete common understanding of expectations and assumptions for MON's simulation. (FOF 170)

41. Surface planners and leadership belief that the ASWEX was a basic/simple exercise involving a benign, slow-moving sub, was not fully consistent with the PRE-EX message tasking MON to conduct simulated attacks, and thus portray an aggressive participant. Direct communication could have mitigated any uncertainty as to MON's tactical OPFOR role. (FOF 177, 183-189, 191, 193, 244, 911)

42. The ASWEX as described in the PRE-EX and as interpreted by MON's CO had the potential to become a complex "ASW Free Play." This interpretation was reasonable, as a plain reading of the message instructs how to simulate

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attack on the CVN at ranges and with tactics that compelled MON to penetrate the surface screen and come to PD to consummate the attack. (FOF 212-217, 244, 246, 247, 250, 252, 257, 266, 271)

43. Had MON fully comprehended CDS-22 assumptions and desires that she would operate at speeds (b)(1) and (b)(1) simulation limitations during this ASWEX, the chance of high speed and close interaction between the surface ships and the submarine would have been minimized. Despite CDS 22 ASWO's email regarding this simulation, these assumptions and desires were not clearly contained in the PRE-EX. (FOF 174, 179, 224, 258, 262, 301, 791)

44. Due to fleet scheduling restrictions, the (b)(1) CDS-22 staff took actions to mitigate these risks, but because of the potential nature of an "ASW Free Play," the mitigations were not effective in instructing MON to remain clear of close interactions with the surface vessels. (FOF 169, 170, 173, 174, 177, 178, 179, 182, 183, 185)

45. CDS 22's proficiency at SCC OPS did not fully prepare the entire HSTCSG team for an open water free play ASWEX. (FOF 87-88, 182-84, 191, 192, 210-211)

46. CDS 22 used the same message templates for the ASWEX PREEX that they used for SCC OPS. This included a need for fixes every 15 minutes from MON, and the direction that the data collected be forwarded by message to HST within 2 hours of finishing the event for data reconstruction purposes. This added an unnecessary timeline to MON's data collection that, while convenient for the staff, was not a requirement for the Group Sail events or data reconstruction. (FOF 212-224)

47. CDS 22 Commodore and Deputy Commodore both believed they had added points to the TRACKEX PRE-EX message for MON to follow. When shown the message, both acknowledged that the points in question were boundaries for the CVOA, and were not a track for MON to follow. As there was no track, this was not a TRACKEX, this was an ASW Freeplay exercise, a more complicated event, that required more careful attention to safety and operational risk management. (FOF 212-249)

48. CDS 22 and CSG 10 staffs were not aware of, or did not consider SJA's state of training as impacted by manning shortfalls as a part of her tasking and assigned duties on 13 October. (FOF 127-140, 212-213, 224-232)

49. CDS 22 and CSG 10 were not aware of the state of training of MON and they assumed, reasonably, that the CSL preex authorization meant MON could execute any tasking based on her training and experience prior to the exercise on 13 October. They did not share the detailed CONOPS with MON once developed or explain to her in any detail what their expectations were for her duties for the event when they had opportunity as the event

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commenced. This pushed MON to operate more aggressively than CSG or DESRON intended, or more than was necessary to complete the event. (FOF 184-86, 188-89, 191, 194, 225-49)

50. CDS 22 and CSG 10 request for MON to conduct ISR and acoustic surveys of HST placed additional burdens on the sub (b)(1)
(b)(1)

assumptions could have been avoided had MON been included in the pre-sail conference or through formal communications prior to the event. (FOF 212-249, 258, 262)

51. Some aspects of the exercise preparation and planning were informally executed. Specifically:

a. Expectations for the ASWEX were not clearly coordinated among all participants. The ASWEX was not developed utilizing some of the guidance of AXP-1(D), OPORD 2000 and other required documents.

b. MON's ability to adequately discharge her duties as the OPFOR submarine was hampered by her lack of prior experience operating against US warships, CVN OPS and US Ship/CRUDES Capabilities and Limitations, in particular WRT towed array deployment, NIXIE deployment, equipment held by ships in company, and fathometer, ESM, and SONAR frequencies.

c. Not all required safety precautions were included in the ASWEX PRE-EX. Some of the checklists and SOPs used by the planners at CDS 22 and CSI had not been updated to reflect required safety precautions and recommendations following recent changes to operating procedures.

d. The planning process for the ASWEX did not contain the rigorous focus on safety that was inherent in past exercises such as COMPTCTEX and ASW exercises associated with the Submarine Command Course. DESRON 22 had recent experience at these two events. Although the planning of this ASWEX listed these safety precautions and restrictions, there was not a specific focus on them outside of the tactical goals of the ASWEX.

e. Submarine and surface ship familiarization and benign tracking exercises were scheduled for the day after the ASWEX. As such, the participants were not ideally familiar with characteristics of each other for the ASWEX. Prior completion of these events could have enhanced safety throughout the ASWEX.

f. AXP-1(D) requires manning a continuous UWT watch during the ASWEX involving submarines and surface ships. Although this was accomplished, testing communications between the submarine and surface and air assets was never performed. During the post collision actions, communication was ineffective via UWT. Communications checks conducted as

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a part of familiarization may have improved the likelihood of successful post collision UWT communications. (FOF 174-213, 258, 262, 277-284, 290-91, 301)

WATCH TEAM PERFORMANCE/EXECUTION

MON Watch Team

52. The primary cause of the collision was the failure of MON CO to adequately mitigate the risk associated with proceeding to periscope depth, in the vicinity of multiple surface warships, maneuvering at high speed. Specifically MON CO:

a. Took short cuts when coming to periscope depth on two occasions by proceeding to periscope depth (b)(1) prior to the collision PD trip, and by executing shortened legs and a compressed process for target motion analysis on the collision PD trip.

b. Failed to adequately analyze surface tactical picture (including rapid change due to the high speed and frequent maneuvers by the surface contacts) and misinterpreted the direction of SJA travel as easterly based on his snapshot of situational awareness of the surface picture.

c. Through his desire to simulate attack on the HST and her escorts, pushed his team to develop solutions and position the ship at a pace faster than they were able to maintain accurate solutions.

d. Failed to put into place a watch team that could provide him forceful recommendations and backup after he took the CONN and manned the periscope on the ascent to PD.

e. Believed that personally manning the periscope was the best risk mitigation despite that fact that he was the most experienced person onboard, and so was most capable of detecting changes in the display, indications, and interpreting data associated with past surface contacts while ascending to PD. (FOF 57, 263, 314-323, 324-334, 343-344, 373-433, 403-405, 434-457, 532, 589-632, 650-656, 673-729, 743-774, 817, 823-824, 826-827)

53. MON watch team was not proficient at safely operating in close proximity to three warships maneuvering at high speed while attempting to tactically engage them. Indicators contributing to this lack of proficiency were:

a. MON section tracking party failed to evaluate the near zero bearing rate on the SJA. Contributing to this oversight was:

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- i. They did not focus TMA efforts (b)(1) in order to ascend to periscope depth.
 - ii. They did not determine a more detailed solution for contacts that were expected to be inside of 5,000 yards.
 - iii. To mitigate risk MON should have;
 1. Crossed the line of sight for SJA .
 2. Maintained steady on course for a sufficient time to determine bearing rate or contact relative motion.
 3. Used an appropriate speed for SJA(M-1) incorporating historical data and the PCS PEP algorithm.
- b. MON watch team was not proficient at several aspects of range triage as defined in the Submarine Contact Management Manual.
- c. MON watch standers did not accurately identify and/or understand information available on their displays that indicated a close aboard contact as the ship prepared for and conducted the PD trip. Specifically:
- i. The PBB operator, SONAR Supervisor, JOOD, and OOD did not detect and correlate indications that SJA was closing MON.
 - ii. The HFA operator, SONAR Sup, JOOD, and OOD:
 1. Failed to detect the indications of (b)(1) (b)(1)
 2. Were not familiar with indications of a rapidly closing contact.
 3. Continued to look (b)(1) (b)(1) was not available because SJA closed range rapidly.
 4. (b)(1) (b)(1)
- (FOF 609-38, 653-59, 667-69)

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5. Did not direct their search towards known contacts, nor did they correlate the (b)(1) trace available for SJA with the (b)(1) available and displayed on the same bearing as the (b)(1)

6. Became distracted by the failure of STDA to (b)(1) ((FOF 411, 412, 414, 418, 419, 434, 598, 600, 602, 636, 637, 646)

iii. MON SONAR watch team:

1. Focused primarily on detecting new contacts near the bow.

2. Did not analyze the SJA trace which had a near zero degree bearing rate for nearly 10 minutes by the time of the collision.

iv. MON FTOW and JOOD did not effectively utilize the FCO to assist in tracking the close surface ships such that the FTOW was overwhelmed by tracking all three surface ships and unable to rapidly develop an accurate solution on SJA.

d. MON did not appropriately modify tripwires to account for expected close contacts. During the ASWEX MON operated with several indications of close contacts that would normally have served as effective tripwires.

1. (b)(1)

1. (b)(1)

2. (b)(1)

3. (b)(1)

4. During the time at PD MON held ESM contact on multiple (b)(1) contacts correlated to surface ships and airborne contacts.

e. MON Watch team did not effectively promulgate the tripwires that they did have, and few in the party understood them.

f. Two important standing tripwires that were known to be in place by some members of the team (b)(1) and a (b)(1) as acted upon, would have caused the team to focus on SJA broadband trace and could have resulted in action to avoid the collision.

g. MON watch team was not aggressive or formal in their resolution of (b)(1) and failed to analyze (b)(1)

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during the collision PD trip, or make it known to MON CO, who had the CONN and was operating the periscope.

h. Although SJA had not maneuvered, at the time MON raised the periscope in preparation for PD that resulted in the collision, the zig indications that were present indicated that the team's assumption of an opening solution was invalid and that SJA was closing at a high rate of speed.

i. MON OOD, JCOD, and FTC knew that there was a potential maneuver by SJA as the MON CO raised the scope, and they failed to keep the MON CO informed of this potential maneuver.

j. MON did not station the fire control tracking party, which risked overwhelming the watch team with contact management, and the ship's control party with rapid depth changes and tactical ascents to PD.

k. Lack of recent exposure to tracking/engaging a maneuver warship and action group. The section tracking party that was on station had only very recent simulator experience working as a team that did not include ASW and ASUW tracking exercises.

l. MON did not maintain established safety protocol tripwires by closing GRV within prescribed stand-off range when penetrating the escort screen. The watch team did not realize this at the time, and in hindsight, MON CO recognized he should have viewed this as a sign.

m. The watch team was unable to assimilate the data available at a rate fast enough to develop a "Good enough" solution on the three contacts as they ascended to PD for attack.

n. Because of the rush to bring the ship to PD, some MON watchstanders on MON did not effectively execute the routine necessary to determine that SJA was a collision risk.

o. MON CO, XO, and OOD, and JCOD had not rigorously enforced the PD preparation routine during previous training opportunities which contributed to the inability to execute the PD trip properly.

p. MON FTOW did not utilize the functionality of the PEP algorithm to rapidly develop a solution to the contacts of concern when coming shallow. Additionally, he failed to use system functionality to constrain speed of the solution as would have been appropriate after tracking the contacts for more than 2 hours.

q. MON's focus on the tactical aspects of the ASWEX distracted them from safety fundamentals.

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r. MON OOD, JOOD, FTC, SONAR Supervisor did not take a more aggressive leadership role in providing the CO backup when he took the CONN.

s. Failure to rotate the PBB operator hourly as required effectively may have degraded his effectiveness and contributed to his failure to analyze the SJA PBB trace.

t. MON ship control party lacked proficiency in basic depth control. Although there are no indicators that their performance contributed to the collision, they required significant oversight and were not capable of providing MON CO with recommendations or backup during a dynamic maneuvering situation associated with ascending to PD near SJA, and ultimately during the time surrounding the collision. (FOF 251-267, 258, 262-266, 300-304, 307, 309-310, 313, 352-363, 366-367, 372-433, 516-532, 542-543, 589-645, 647-649, 657-659, 665-670, 673-682, 684-687-, 689-723, 756, 724-774, 817, 823-824, 826-827, 891-893, 915, 937, 978)

54. There was some unprofessional language in MON SONAR spaces while tracking the Surface Action Group, especially as the tension level rose. Lack of professionalism in SONAR did not seem to distract the operators from their duties, but it was an indicator of overall lack of rigid supervision in the SONAR spaces. (FOF 317)

55. MON CO's decision to take the CONN and man the periscope resulted in the following:

a. Preventing the most experienced person on the CONN (MON CO) from interpreting the data available on SJA. As SJA closed he did not view the data.

b. Because MON CO had announced his view of the tactical situation (Including a discussion of SJA being 3,000-4,000 yards away and drawing right,) the watch team incorrectly assumed this was correct, and stopped looking to disprove this view. The watch team failed to use available indications to prove that SJA was closing.

c. MON CO conversed directly with SONAR operators, MON SONAR Sup, and MON STSC, and therefore effectively disabled the process for recommendations to flow to him through his watch team regarding tactical positioning and safety. (FOF 271, 378-379, 381, 406-407, 410-416, 435-457, 600-656, 697-723, 817, 823, 826-827, 914-917, 978)

56. MON CO conducted an appropriate visual search upon arrival at periscope depth. (FOF 435-457, 775-779)

57. MON CO was the most experienced periscope operator in MON. When conducting his initial periscope sweeps at PD, MON CO had a "gut feel" there was a close aboard contact that was mostly obscured by wave action.

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Had he acted on the "gut feeling," MON most likely would have avoided the collision. (FOF 435-457)

58. MON CO focused his watch team on safety just prior to the ascent to PD that resulted in the collision. His focus on overall safety with generic words did not provide specific direction to the watch standers that it should have in order to focus their attention on the indications that could have kept the ship safe. (FOF 412)

59. There was no evidence of abusive or dysfunctional relationship issues between the CO and his watch officers and supervisors, or between watch officers and individual watch standers and supervisors, that played any role in the collision. (FOF 467-488)

60. MON planning process resulted in conducting a number of training and maintenance events during and around the ASWEX that precluded some elements of the command leadership from focusing adequately on the exercise. (FOF 266-267, 292, 294-299)

61. MON watch team preparations for the ASWEX focused primarily on the tactical aspects of the engagement. MON CO night orders emphasized the engagement as an opportunity to hone the team's warrior skills. During interviews, MON watch teams remembered most of these tactical goals but did not remember or understand the tripwires necessary to keep the ship safe during the ASWEX. (FOF 242-256)

62. MON standing plans for combat systems employment and ESM employment were not tailored to the exercise. Specific parameters of the warships involved in the ASWEX were not integrated into these plans. This hampered the ability of watch standers to translate data available to them into tactically useful information for decision makers. (FOF 272-276, 244)

63. MON inability to execute the daily routine complicated the ASWEX by shifting the TB-34 deployment and the battery test discharge into the watch during which the ASWEX was conducted. TB-34 deployment distracted the Section Tracking Party from gaining familiarity with, and tracking, the Surface Action Group. In hindsight, having a fully depleted battery while operating in close proximity to the Surface Action Group resulted in additional risk to MON. (FOF 28-89, 287-289, 292, 305-307, 311-312, 561-588)

64. Because MON had had a poor result from a SONAR data package earlier in the year, they were very focused on the data collection for this event. This detracted from their ability to maintain adequate focus on the watch standing requirements prior to and during the ascent to PD. (FOF 274-276, 288, 646-649)

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SJA Watch Team

65. SJA CIC watch team, headed by the TAO, was not fully prepared for the ASWEX, which, along with maintaining a screen position on a high speed, rapidly maneuvering guide, multi-tasking (including flight operations), and limited SONAR capabilities due to transit speeds, resulted in below average situational awareness. Notably, however, CIC Team's performance did not directly or proximately cause SJA to collide with MON. (FOF 817-819, 826, 839)

66. SJA Bridge and CIC Team communications were poor during the ASWEX. This resulted in SJA Bridge being unaware that MON was within 12,000 yards, less than 30 minutes prior to the collision, when this was known in CIC. (FOF 794, 798, 816, 818-819, 821-826, 891-893, 916-917, 978)

67. SJA's priorities as shotgun for the CVN and conducting administrative helo transfers during the ASWEX required her to transit at higher than optimal ASW search speeds to maintain screen position. (FOF 788, 799-800, 803-807, 806-825, 891-893, 903, 916-917, 978)

68. The DESRON and CSG staffs' tasking SJA to take a LOG helo and maintain a planeguard position as a screening ship tethered to HST made her ASW capability less than effective. This required high speed maneuvering that complicated TAO's and the CIC Team's ability to respond. (FOF 795, 832-841, 845-846, 849, 851-856, 859)

69. Despite having two CRUDES ships, a P-3 and multiple MH-60Rs during the ASWEX, ASW efforts near the HVD were significantly reduced and perhaps limited to only one ship (or none) with its organic helos due to the following:

a. CVN flight operations precluded the P-3 from conducting ASW near the CVN within the immediate area of the surface screen.

b. Screen positioning necessarily involved high-speed maneuvering rendering CRUDES ASW sensors deaf due to:

1. CVN flight operations: maintaining speeds for winds during event launches/recoveries and sprints downwind to set up for next event.

2. Multiple launches/recoveries of helicopters required of SJA and GRV for reasons not associated with the exercise, forced them out of position throughout the ASWEX.

3. SJA and GRV speeds in returning to and maintaining screen positions necessarily required them to maneuver rapidly and at high-speed, rendering their ASW suites ineffective. (FOF 788, 799-800, 803-807, 810-811, 816-25, 891-893, 911, 978, 979, 986)

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70. SJA OOD did an excellent job of preparing his watchteam for the ASWEX. Upon sighting the periscope, SJA OOD recognized the extremis situation from the impending collision course and appropriately ordered an emergency backing bell. His quick response to the lookout's and CONN's report slowed SJA and mitigated the effects of the collision. (FOF 795, 832-841, 845-846, 849, 851-856, 859)

71. Prior to the collision, the initial SJA bridge team coordination and immediate action items were exceptionally well executed:

a. With no prior notice or indication the SJA Forward Lookout accurately and immediately identified the periscope on SJA's port bow and reported it to Bright Bridge and the CONN.

b. With a true sense of urgency, SJA CONN immediately reported the periscope to SJA OOD.

c. Without delay, SJA OOD sighted the periscope, accurately and immediately assessed the danger of collision and correctly ordered "All back full." (FOF 828-851)

72. SJA Helm failed to understand that a conning order from the OOD overrides the presence of the Conning Officer, and he paused momentarily and waited for SJA CONN to order "All back full." (FOF 838, 840-850)

73. When SJA Helm moved the throttles from "All back full" to "All stop" without being ordered to do so, SJA Helm made and executed decisions that he was not trained or qualified to make. (FOF 838, 845-850)

74. SJA Helm's only intent in coming to "All stop" was to respond to SJA CO's comment on Net 15 regarding the towed array vice the OOD's order to go to "All back full." (FOF 845-850)

POST COLLISION ACTIONS

75. MON's CO and leadership team effectively focused the crew's effort following the collision. They were able to stabilize the ship, regain steerageway, retrieve the towed array, assess damages, attempt to contact other exercise participants, and return to PD to surface the ship in a controlled manner. (FOF 8, 472-511)

76. Given that returning MON to PD to surface the ship in a controlled manner took approximately one hour and twelve minutes, MON should have made a more concerted effort to contact the surface and airborne vessels that were conducting a search for MON. (b)(1)

(FOF 410-511)

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77. MON was slow to return the PD because she was in close proximity to SJA and her crew was involved in assessing damage. SJA CO and HSTSG should have considered positioning SJA further to the north along the safety course after initial efforts to contact MON failed. (FOF 409-511, 872-873, 878-880, 936-944)

78. HSTSG conducted every reasonable action possible to locate MON following the collision. Serving as the OTC, HSTCSG kept the chain of command at USFPC and CSL informed via Chat and multiple other communications circuits on the status of MON, SJA, and efforts to locate MON. (FOF 930-957, 1011-1020)

79. The CSL watch floor executed the checklist for SUBLOOK and ISMERLO notifications via phone calls, chat, and the ISMERLO website. CSL did not send a SUBLOOK message or activate an ISMERLO alert. CSL watch floor later sent a formal SUBLOOK cancellation message to cancel the previous actions the watch floor had put in place. (b)(1)
(b)(1) formal SUBLOOK procedures could have been activated. Without contact on the submarine for more than an hour, CSL should have considered sending a (b)(1) message. (FOF 957-971)

ACCOUNTABILITY

80. Although contributing factors exist, no individuals from HSTCSG, CDS-22, SJA, or GRV were personally responsible for the direct causes of the collision. Aspects of planning and operational risk management by the CSG and DESRON Commanders should have been executed in more detail and with broader interest in full understanding of the experience and material and personnel status of all the exercise participants. Further, planning and execution should have included communication with all participants and an event brief prior to event COMEX. Finally, the omission of sub/surface collision from the CONOPS ORM analysis should have been addressed. While staffing, administrative, execution, and operational risk management shortfalls created a situation where relatively inexperienced submarines and surface ships were executing a high speed maneuvering ASW free-play exercise as their first live event together in the GRUSAIL without sufficient safety and controlling processes in place, this did not relieve MON CO of his responsibility to keep his ship safe during the ASWEX by maintaining stand-off distances from surface vessels during PD trips. (FOF 781, 783, 788, 799-807, 810-811, 816-825, 838, 840-850, 891-893, 903-978)

81. The MONTPELIER Commanding Officer (MON CO) was negligent in the performance of his duties in that:

a. He took short cuts when coming to periscope depth on two occasions. This included conducting short legs and a compressed process for target motion analysis and proceeding to periscope depth (b)(1)

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(b)(1) on one occasion. By doing so, he placed the ship at more risk than would have been appropriate for the training exercise.

b. He did not consider that the surface tactical picture could rapidly change due to the high speed and frequent maneuvers by the surface warships when developing and enforcing appropriate tripwires that were designed to keep MON safe.

c. His desire to close and simulate an attack on HST and her escorts pushed his team to develop solutions and position the ship at a faster pace than they were able to keep up with.

d. He did not put a team in place that could provide him forceful recommendations and backup after he took the CONN and manned the periscope on the ascent to PD. Thus, he eliminated his ability as the one person on MON who was most capable of detecting and mitigating the risk associated with ascending to PD, and his team failed to back him up and provide him with the required indications available to them.
(FOF 198-202, 314-324, 373, 427-471, 650-656)

82. The MONTPELIER Officer of the Deck was negligent in the performance of his duties in that:

a. He failed to observe the indications of a closing contact on SJA that were available to him during the ascent to PD.

b. He failed to effectively supervise the (b)(1) at time 1922 and failed to keep the MON CO, who had the CONN, appraised of the status of (b)(1) on the ascent to PD.
(FOF 373-434, 698-718)

83. The MONTPELIER Junior Officer of the Deck was negligent in the performance of his duties in that:

a. He failed to effectively execute (b)(1) at time 1922 and failed to keep the MON CO, who had the CONN, appraised of the status of (b)(1) on the ascent to PD.

b. He failed to observe the indications of closing contact on SJA that were available to him during the ascent to PD. (FOF 373-434, 698-718)

84. The MONTPELIER Fire Control Leading Chief Petty Officer was negligent in the performance of his duties in that:

a. He did not aggressively provide MON CO with data that was available to him, which MON CO needed to make the decision to ascend to PD.

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b. He was informal in the management of the watch bill when he resumed the watch as FTOW and allowed an inexperienced operator to manage the solutions of rapidly maneuvering warships with inadequate supervision. (FOF 373-434, 698-718)

85. The MONTPELIER SONAR Supervisor was negligent in the performance of his duties in that:

a. He failed to properly supervise the PBB operator (b)(1) and instead focused on ascending to PD to engage the HST. (b)(1)

b. He failed to correlate the changes in the SJA trace and (b)(1) with other signs that the SJA was closing. (FOF 372-434, 640-645, 698-718)

86. The MONTPELIER Passive Broad Band Operator was negligent in the performance of his duties in that failed to observe the indications of closing contact on SJA that were available to him during the ascent to PD. (FOF 372-434, 640-645, 698-718)

87. The MONTPELIER (b)(1)

(b)(1) . (FOF 372-434, 640-645, 698-718)

88. The SAN JACINTO Helmsman was negligent in the performance of his duties in that he did not correctly follow orders from SJA OOD and CONN but instead moved the throttles independently (without being ordered to do so) to ALL STOP when he overheard the CO mention the TACTASS was deployed. (FOF 843-844, 846-856)

89. (b)(1)

90. (b)(1)

178, 179, 181-183, 204-206, 218-220, 236-238, 241)

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MISCELLANEOUS

91. Some data and information was not available due to the limited recording capability of HST's current CVTSC Version 6.1. This version is limited insofar as the watchstanders must manually initiate and delete the data. Due to limited experience with this system the data that should have been recorded and could have been made available to the investigation team was not available. (FOF 957)

92. The audio data recorder by MON's "open mic" system proved highly valuable in reconstructing the events, analyzing crew actions, critiquing their performance, and drawing lessons learned. No such audio was available from SJA or GRV as digital recording capability is not installed as a program of record in US Navy surface combatants. Further, SJA'S ability to record voice from Combat Systems communication nets, such as NET 15, was also inoperable and so none of SJA's CIC voice data was recoverable. Had audio data from SJA been available, reconstruction and analysis of actions by the Bridge and CIC watchstanders could have been completed with a much greater degree of precision and certainty. (FOF 318, 421)

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Accountability

1. MON CO:

a. MON CO MON should be relieved of command due to his failure to adhere to documented processes and procedures for keeping his ship safe when coming to periscope depth.

b. MON CO should be processed for non-judicial punishment for potential violations of Article 92, Dereliction of Duty, and/or Article 110, Negligently Hazardous to a Vessel.

c. MON CO should not be required to show cause for retention in the Navy despite the recommendation to be relieved of command and processed for non-judicial punishment. Although his actions contributed directly to the cause of the collision, this should not foreclose an opportunity to continue to serve and contribute to the overall success of the Navy, as he has throughout his otherwise outstanding career. (OPINION 1-5, 7-8, 10, 25-26, 29, 31, 52-57, 61, 84)

2. MON OOD, FTC, SONAR Sup:

a. These individuals contributed directly or proximately to the causes of the collision. This group, by the very nature of their experience and supervisory roles, bear more responsibility and thus accountability action are warranted. These individuals should have been able to interpret available information then communicate it to the CO and thus provide forceful backup. Their actions and/or negligence directly contributed to the resulting collision.

b. The following individuals should be processed for non-judicial punishment for potential violations of Article 92, Dereliction of Duty.

i. OOD: (b)(3), (b)(6)

ii. FTC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

iii. Sonar Sup: (b)(3), (b)(6)

c. MON OOD, (b)(3), (b)(6) should not be required to show cause for retention in the Navy despite the recommendation to be processed for non-judicial punishment. Although his failure to provide backup to the CO contributed directly to the cause of the collision, this should not foreclose an opportunity to continue to serve and contribute to the overall success of the Navy, as he has throughout his otherwise unblemished career.

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d. Although not on watch, (b)(3), (b)(6) was positioned such that he understood the potential gravity of the situation and did not make strong recommendations that could have assisted in avoiding the collision. (OPINION 3, 5, 40, 57-59, 66, 86, 87, 90)

3. MON JOOD, (b)(1) Operator, PBB Operator, SONAR CPO:

a. By the nature of their watch qualifications these personnel should have been able to detect indicators of impending collision and provide forceful backup. Because of their experience level, however, it appears that they were unable to effectively keep up with the increased tempo of the complex problem.

b. The following MON personnel should be considered for award of a Non-punitive Letter of Caution:

- i. JOOD: (b)(3), (b)(6)
- ii. (b)(1) : (b)(3), (b)(6)
- iii. PBB OP: (b)(3), (b)(6)
- iv. SONAR CPO: (b)(3), (b)(6)

c. In the case of the (b)(1) the training or experience to correlate the (b)(1) indicators. (OPINION 3, 5, 30, 53-54, 57, 61, 82, 90-91)

4. Sonar CPO:

a. Although not on an assigned watch position, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the sonar room for the majority of the exercise. By the nature of his responsibilities as Sonar LCPO, his experience, and his seniority he should have been able to identify and correct the sonar watchstanders who failed to provide adequate backup thus contributing to the causes of the collision. (OPINION 3-4, 30, 53-54, 57, 61, 64)

5. SJA Helm:

a. Although SJA Helm did not follow orders from SJA OOD and CONN correctly by choosing to place the throttles at all stop without being ordered to do so, he should not be punished for his actions. He took action in response to hearing his CO over NET 15 speaker and incorrectly believed-based on lack of adequate training, that the CO's desires in regard to the array were what he should follow. (opinion 65, 73-75)

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6. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

7. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Exercise Preparations and Execution Recommendations

Commander CTF 80 Recommendations:

8. Commander Task Force 80 (CTF 80)/United States Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) should direct a comprehensive review by Commander, Naval Submarine Forces (CSF) and Commander, Strike Force Training Atlantic (CSFTL) of the preparation process for exercises involving sub-surface interaction to include: source documents, checklists, and risk management procedures based on the Findings of Fact and Opinions contained in this report. Following this review, these commands should provide training to planners and units on incorporating the specific safety elements contained in source documents into daily tactics, techniques, and procedures at the unit and Squadron and Strike Group level. (OPINION 36, 39-41, 61)

9. Given the infrequent interactions between US submarines, surface ships and other ASW assets, recommend implementing the standard operating procedures for stringent safety preparations that currently take place prior to Submarine Command Course operations, COMPTUEX or JTFEX as requirements for any combined exercise. Specifically the following are recommended:

a. CSF/CSFTL/Tactical Training Group Atlantic (TTGL):

i. Review/modify training TTP's to include ORM resolution for potential collisions between surface ships and submarines vice only surface ships.

ii. Separate preparations required for safety from expected tactics.

iii. Identify specific communications methods and practices as "go/no go" criteria to facilitate exercise control (EXCON) during the conduct of ASW events, and in particular for exercise events not held on an

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instrumented range and when CSFTL and a Submarine Operation Coordinating Authority (SOCA) Liaison Team are not embarked.

b. Upon completion of Recommendation 3 above, CTF-80 should:

1. Direct CSFTL and Strike Group commanders to require basic submarine familiarization and/or TRACKRX exercises be completed prior to more complex interactions.

2. Direct via CSF, CSFTL, and Strike Group Commanders that all submarines and surface ships conducting OPFOR for events or series of events be required to verify they are in receipt of and have an understanding of the applicable references that define their role as OPFOR elements.

3. Direct that all participants in any Group Sail (GRUSAIL) event, including submarines, be present for a pre-sail conference that reviews at a minimum the SOE, safety procedures, waivers, and objectives for each event. Include submarine participants in pre-sail and pre-COMEX briefs for GRUSAIL and other integrated events as a go/no go criterion.

4. Direct that CSL and CSFTL develop a specific series of check-in procedures to be considered as go/no go criteria for communications with OPFOR submarines participating in any exercise with surface units outside of fully instrumented ranges.

5. Validate need for data collection and specify specific practices as best practices to be followed to achieve a desired outcome for acoustic, ESM, and other potential data collection and track reconstruction requirements. (OPINION 19, 22, 25-32, 46, 56, 73-78)

10. CTF 80 should direct CSF, COMNAVSURFLANT (CNSL), and CSFTL to evaluate the actions taken aboard ship and at the staff level following the collision. This should include promulgation of revisions as stated below, including coordination and implementation across both CTF 80 and CTF 30 constituents:

a. Methods for the impacted submarine to contact the remaining exercise participants;

b. Methods for the surface ships to contact the submarine and avoid hindering their ascent to PD; and

c. Expectations for staff response to a known missing submarine (opinion 73-78)

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USFPC Recommendations

11. USFPC should conduct and/or direct implementation of a program of record to equip all surface ships with bridge digital voice recording capability to serve primarily as a training/critique/debrief tool for crews on a daily basis, but also in preserving a record of events for future investigations. (opinion 90)

CSF Recommendations

12. CSF should provide a summary of the lessons learned for this event to the submarine force as a training product focused on contact management, individual skill deficiencies, and watch team dynamics. Training should include:

a. The nuances of the Contact Management Manual (CMM) that exist when operating in close proximity to contacts that represent a hazard to the submarine or that could exist in wartime situations.

b. A review of the indications of close aboard and closing contacts that were missed by the MON watch team. This should include elements that comprise a "good enough solution" for a low bearing rate contact. Additionally, a detailed review of the trace dynamics, indications of near field effect, and (b)(1) indications including both (b)(1) should be included.

c. A review of the available indicators of close contacts on the ascent to PD.

d. A review of PD search techniques to include a review of the PD video that was recorded from MON periscope on the day of the collision.

e. A review of the extremis ship handling lessons learned on the SJA and MON. (OPINION 9-10, 36-37, 58, 65-70)

13. CSF should include applicable findings from this report concerning Commanding Officer leadership, backup, and command management as part of the SCC training pipeline. This should include a discussion of CO tactical proficiency and the use of the CO's "Gut feel" as the most experienced ship driver on the boat to keep the ship safe. (OPINION 16, 18-22, 26, 31, 50-53)

14. CSF should evaluate if initial and continuing training or (b)(1) is adequate to expose operators and supervisors to the fundamental safety aspects of display interpretation. (OPINION 52)

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15. CSF should re-emphasize to the force the fundamental operator role in safety during exercises, real world events, and in trainers. (OPINION 52-53)

16. CSF should review the findings of the Naval Reactors 2009 report on Submarine Collisions and Groundings to verify progress of actions on the recommendations and incorporate lessons learned/factors from this collision. Specifically, the report identified a number of common aspects in 11 accidents including issues with maintaining shipboard standards, some unintended effects of the force's handling of incident reports and inspections, and weaknesses in sensor data interpretation. Many of the commonalities determined by the 2009 report were evident in the events surrounding the MON-SJA collision. (opinion 52-53)

17. CSF should re-evaluate their method of tracking ship manning and performance issues to determine common themes that may permeate through evaluations, inspections, and day to day performance. (opinion 19, 21-25, 28, 30)

18. CSF should require familiarization of US surface forces in their routine training programs as well as situational training prior to submarine on surface ship interactions. (opinion 19, 57)

19. CSF Should ensure that all the Radar Target Summary Lists used by submarines are updated with the current systems and frequencies for US Naval ships and aircraft as applicable. (opinion 57)

COMNAVSURFOR Recommendations

20. COMNAVSURFOR should provide training for the ships and staffs of the SURFACE force on the lessons learned from this event, specifically shipboard preparations, watch bill lessons learned, and a review of the extremis ship handling lessons learned on both SJA and MON. (opinion 8, 33-34, 70-75)

21. COMNAVSURFOR should include applicable findings from this report concerning Commanding Officer leadership, forceful backup, and command management as part of the Command training pipeline. This should include a discussion of CO tactical proficiency and the use of the CO's "Gut feel" as the most experienced ship driver on the ship to keep her safe. (opinion N 8, 33-34, 70-75)

22. COMNAVSURFOR, with USFFC, continue the efforts in progress to understand the Readiness Kill Chain as it applies to stabilizing shipboard manning FIT and FILL during the pre-deployment phase. (opinion 11-34)

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COMNAVSURFLANT Recommendations:

23. COMNAVSURFLANT should:

a. Complete a full review of SJA shipboard training, PQS, watchbill replacement and personnel management programs, and current certification status. (opinion 5)

b. Direct additional training and provide support as required to facilitate SJA preparation and positioning to resume her operational schedule upon completion of her repair availability.
(OPINION 5)

c. Direct a complete examination of SJA Smart ship time inputs for automated systems to include but not limited to SJA's Machinery Control System (MCS), Automated Bell and Data Logger, Gyro Compasses (WSN-7) and Command and Display (CND). Inspection should ensure all systems are receiving time inputs as designed. Time differentials between WSN and Bell Log systems (approximately 53 seconds) on SJA found during reconstruction (FOF 827, 828 and 860) could not be fully explained after considerable efforts by the investigation team. However, the investigation team believes they should not be occurring according to the Ship's Information Book. All times should be fed from the same source, NAVSSI.
(opinion 91-92)

COMNAVAIRLANT Recommendations:

24. Upon completion of HST CVTSC Upgrade to version 7.0, COMNAVAIRLANT should ensure adequate training on the full functionality of the system to include recording and data capture and preservation capability is provided for all watchstanders in ship's company, Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) and CSG Staffs. (opinion 91-92)

HSTCSG Recommendations:

25. Conduct a comprehensive review of the preparation process for future exercises and real-world events involving sub-surface interaction to include: source documents, checklists, and risk management procedures based on the lessons learned from this event and Findings of Fact from this report. Following this review, provide training to planners and units on incorporating the specific safety elements and operational risk management procedures contained in source documents into daily tactics, techniques, and procedures for HSTCSG and embarked DESRON Staff. In support of proactive operational risk management, specific actions should include:

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- a. Review/modification of training TTP's to include ORM resolution for potential collisions between surface ships and submarines vice only surface ships.
- b. Separate preparations required for safety from expected tactics.
- c. Identify specific communications methods and practices as "go/no go" criteria to facilitate HST/DESRON exercise control (EXCON) during the conduct of ASW events, and in particular for exercise events not held on an instrumented range when CSFTL and a Submarine Operation Coordinating Authority (SOCA) Liaison Team is not embarked.
- d. Further, ensure basic submarine familiarization and/or TRACKEX exercises are completed prior to more complex interactions.
- e. Ensure submarines and surface ships conducting OPFOR for events or series of events be required to verify they are in receipt of and have an understanding of the applicable references that define their role as OPFOR elements.
- f. Ensure all participants in Group Sail (GRUSAIL) or similar event, including submarines; and be present for a pre-sail conference that reviews at a minimum the SOE, safety procedures, waivers, and objectives for each event. Include submarine participants in pre-sail and pre-COMEX briefs for GRUSAIL and other integrated events as a go/no go criterion.
- g. Validate the need for future data collection and ensure all participants in events that include data collection are aware of and understand the specific circumstances, unit positioning, and additional watchstanding requirements, if any, to execute the data collection event. (opinion 19, 22, 25-32, 46, 56, 73-78)

HSTCSG With COMNAVSURFLANT Recommendations:

26. Complete a full review of SJA shipboard training, PQS, watchbill replacement, personnel management programs, and current certification status. Rebaseline SJA Certification and qualification status as reflected in this review and as appropriate under her current maintenance/repair availability timeline. (opinion 5)
27. Develop and support additional training as required to facilitate SJA preparation and positioning to resume her operational schedule upon completion of her repair availability. (opinion 5)
28. Support a complete examination of SJA Smart ship time inputs for automated systems to include but not limited to SJA's Machinery Control System (MCS), Automated Bell and Data Logger, Gyro Compasses (WSN-7) and

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Command and Display (CND). Inspection should ensure all systems are receiving time inputs as designed. Time differentials between WSN and Bell Log systems (approximately 53 seconds) on SJA found during reconstruction (FOF 827, 828 and 850) could not be fully explained after considerable efforts by the investigation team. However, the investigation team believes they should not be occurring according to the Ship's Information Book. All times should be fed from the same source, NAVSSI. (opinion 90-91)

29. HSTCSG with COMNAVAIRLANT: Upon completion of HST CVTSC Upgrade to version 7.0, ensure adequate training on the full functionality of the system to include recording and data capture and preservation capability is provided for all watchstanders in ship's company, embarked Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) and HSTCSG Staffs. (opinion 90)

COMDESRON 22 Recommendations:

30. Conduct a comprehensive review of the preparation process for future exercises and real-world events involving sub-surface interaction to include: source documents, checklists, and risk management procedures based on the lessons learned from this event and Findings of Fact from this report. Following this review, provide training to planners and units on incorporating the specific safety elements and operational risk management procedures contained in source documents into daily tactics, techniques, and procedures. In support of proactive operational risk management, specific actions should include:

a. Review/modification of training TTP's to include ORM resolution for potential collisions between surface ships and submarines vice only surface ships.

b. Separate preparations required for safety from expected tactics. Identify specific communications methods and practices as "go/no go" criteria to facilitate DESRON exercise control (EXCON) during the conduct of ASW events, and in particular for exercise events not held on an instrumented range when CSFTL and a Submarine Operation Coordinating Authority (SOCA) Liaison Team is not embarked.

c. Further, ensure basic submarine familiarization and/or TRACKEX exercises are completed prior to more complex interactions wherever possible.

d. Ensure submarines and surface ships conducting OPFOR for events or series of events be required to verify they are in receipt of and have an understanding of the applicable references that define their role as OPFOR elements.

e. Ensure all participants in Group Sail (GRUSAIL) or similar event, including submarines, be present for a pre-sail conference that

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reviews at a minimum the SOE, safety procedures, waivers, and objectives for each event. Include submarine participants in pre-sail and pre-COMEX briefs for GRUSAIL and other integrated events as a go/no go criterion.

f. Validate the need for future data collection if and when required, and ensure all participants in events that include data collection are aware of and understand the specific circumstances, unit positioning, and additional watchstanding requirements, if any, to execute the data collection event. (opinion 19, 22, 25-32, 46, 56, 73-78)

SJA With COMNAVSURFLANT Recommendations:

31. Complete a full review of training, PQS (with emphasis on helmsman and lee helmsman qualification), watchbill replacement, personnel management programs, and current certification status. Rebaseline Certifications and qualification status as reflected in this review and as appropriate under the current maintenance/repair availability timeline. (Opinion 5)

32. Develop a plan to support additional training as required to facilitate preparation and positioning to resume ship's operational schedule upon completion of repair availability. (Opinion 5)

33. Ensure a complete examination of Smart ship time inputs for automated systems to include but not limited to Machinery Control System (MCS), Automated Bell and Data Logger, Gyro Compasses (WSN-7) and Command and Display (CMD). Inspection should ensure all systems are receiving time inputs as designed. Time differentials between WSN and Bell Log systems (approximately 53 seconds) found during reconstruction could not be fully explained after considerable efforts by the investigation team, and the investigation team believes they should not be occurring according to the Ship's Information Book. All times should be fed from the same source, NAVSSI. (Opinion 90-91)

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