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INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

JUNE 30, 2020

Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense

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Results in Brief

Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense

June 30, 2020

Objective

The objective of this audit was to examine the use of protective security details (PSDs) throughout the DoD and also determine whether DoD Components consistently provided this protection.

Background

PSDs consist of specially trained protective security personnel (military or civilian) that are capable of providing protection for individuals designated as high-risk personnel (HRP). DoD HRP are senior service members and civilian DoD employees who, by nature of their positions, are considered critical to the conduct of DoD operations and functions.

Section 714, title 10, United States Code, 2016, states that the Secretary of Defense may authorize physical protection and personal security within the United States for specific high-ranking DoD personnel and for other individuals if the Secretary determines that such protection and security are necessary.

DoD Instruction O-2000.22 (the Instruction) assigns responsibilities and prescribes the procedures for designating and protecting DoD HRP. Additionally, the Instruction designates specific DoD positions as permanent HRP, their levels of protection, the sizes of PSDs, and who serves as the protection-providing organization (PPO). The Instruction also

Background (cont'd)

includes a process for DoD Components to nominate other DoD personnel for HRP protection based on an imminent credible threat or compelling operational considerations.

The PPOs are responsible for providing protection to HRP and include the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC), Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), Defense Criminal Investigative Service, and the Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA).

Findings

We determined that PPOs protected HRP based on the HRP position instead of specific threats to the HRP and that this occurred because:

- (FOUO) the Instruction designates a [REDACTED] hold, but also states that PSD protection must be maintained at a minimum level and employed as necessary [REDACTED]
- the PPOs did not adjust their recommendations for the level of protection based on the results of the personal security vulnerability assessment; and
- the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD[HD&GS]) did not review the PPOs' performance of PSDs, as required by the Instruction.

(FOUO) In addition, we determined that HRP were allowed to [REDACTED] without a documented reason. This occurred because the Instruction does not define whether HRP can [REDACTED] of a PSD, does not discuss who has authority to approve a [REDACTED] and does not provide a provision describing when and how the protection can be [REDACTED]



Results in Brief

Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense

Findings (cont'd)

(FOUO) Providing protection based on position instead of based on the PPO's assessment of the threat to HRP may result in the overuse of resources required. Additionally, allowing HRP to [REDACTED] may leave individuals serving in the DoD's highest offices [REDACTED]

We also determined that the PPOs did not provide PSDs consistently throughout the DoD. For example, for the missions we reviewed, the PPOs did not consistently use advance personnel for missions, and at times used more days to perform advance work than each PPO's guidance or general rule suggested.

Inconsistencies in the number of days the PPOs used to perform advance work at the mission location occurred because the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) did not discuss or define in the Instruction the number of agents or days agents should use to perform advance work and the ASD(HD&GS) did not review the PPOs' performance of PSDs.

(FOUO) As another example of inconsistencies, PPOs did not [REDACTED] on PSD missions we reviewed. These inconsistencies occurred because the USD(P) did not provide guidance in the Instruction on when PSDs should maintain [REDACTED], and the ASD(HD&GS) did not provide oversight over the performance of PSDs.

In addition, as recommended by the Instruction, PPOs did not consistently use the assistance of the other PPOs and field agents local to the mission location to reduce costs, to reduce the need for large standing details on PSDs, and to increase joint operations for the missions we reviewed.

(FOUO) Inconsistent use of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] can increase the costs to protect the HRP and result in inconsistent protection for similar HRP.

(FOUO) In another example of inconsistency, the USACIDC assigned more personnel to PSDs than the other PPOs and even assigned more personnel than authorized by the Instruction. Specifically, the USACIDC assigned more personnel to the PSDs than the Instruction allowed for 5 of the 7 HRP it protects, by an overall total of 59 personnel. Again, USD(P) personnel did not clarify or define in the Instruction whether the number of agents authorized to protect HRP is determined by mission, location, or day, or applies to staffing multiple work periods during the day, and the ASD(HD&GS) did not provide oversight over the performance of PSDs. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Without oversight and direction from the ASD(HD&GS), as required in the Instruction, the USACIDC will continue to overstaff its PSDs and use financial and personnel resources that could be used to support other DoD operations.

Recommendations

We recommend that the USD(P):

- eliminate the pre-assigned levels of protection for HRP in the Instruction and assign protection for HRP based on recommendations supported in the individual HRP personal security vulnerability assessments or nominations.



Results in Brief

Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense

Recommendations (cont'd)

- (FOUO) establish a working group including representatives from each PPO to revise the Instruction to include guidance on whether and when HRP [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the appropriate use of security control rooms, and the number of personnel and days of advance work needed for PSD missions.
- require and validate that the ASD(HD&GS) reviews the PPOs' performance of PSDs annually.

We recommend that the Commanding General of the USACIDC modify the number of personnel assigned to protect each individual HRP and the number of personnel used on each mission to comply with the Instruction.

We recommend that the Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School update Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, "Protective Services," May 2013, to comply with any changes to the Instruction.

We recommend that the Commanding Generals of the USACIDC and the AFOSI, and the Director of the NCIS, develop and issue policy consistent with the Instruction emphasizing the use of assistance from other PPOs and local field agents when conducting PSDs.

We recommend that the Commanding General of the USACIDC and the Commanding General of the AFOSI determine and document whether an internal policy is necessary to limit the number of years a special agent can spend working in the PSD mission area.

Management Comments and Our Response

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, responding for the USD(P), agreed with eight of the nine recommendations. Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance addressed the eight agreed to recommendations; therefore, those recommendations are resolved but will remain open.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, disagreed with the recommendation to eliminate the preassigned levels of protection for permanent HRP in the Instruction. However, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense proposed to review the preassigned permanent HRP protection levels listed in the Instruction and perform assessments of HRP during coordination of the revised Instruction.

Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We acknowledge the USD(P)'s proposed action to review the preassigned permanent HRP protection levels for the positions listed in the Instruction. However, we request that the USD(P) reconsider his position on the recommendation and provide comments on the final report regarding assessing the need for preassigned protection levels.

The USACIDC Commanding General agreed with the three recommendations. Comments from the USACIDC Commanding General addressed the specifics of two of the recommendations; therefore, those recommendations are resolved.



Results in Brief

Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense

Comments (cont'd)

The USACIDC Commanding General agreed with the recommendation to develop and issue policy consistent with the Instruction emphasizing the use of assistance from other PPOs and local field agents. While the USACIDC Commanding General agreed, his comments did not outline plans to issue policy to endorse or emphasize the use of assistance from other PPOs and local field agents, and did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We request that the Commanding General provide the specific actions that the USACIDC will take to emphasize the use of assistance from other PPOs and local field agents when conducting PSDs when operationally feasible.

The Director, Strategic Programs and Requirements, Office of Special Investigations, responding for the AFOSI Commanding General, agreed with the two recommendations; and addressed the specifics of those recommendations; therefore, those recommendations are resolved.

The Deputy Director Operations, responding for the Director of NCIS Global Operations, partially agreed with the recommendation to issue policy emphasizing the use of other PPOs and local field agent personnel on PSD missions. The Deputy Director Operations addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved.

The U.S. Army Military Police School Director of Training and Education, responding for the U.S. Army Military Police School Commandant, agreed with the three recommendations; therefore, those recommendations are resolved.

Although not required to comment, the PFPA Acting Director agreed with the majority of the report's recommendations and looks forward to any forthcoming working groups to enhance the protective service program in the future. For the full text of PFPA's management comments on the Findings and our responses, see Appendix B.

Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy	A.1.a	A.1.b, A.1.c, B.1.a.i, B.1.a.ii, B.1.b, C.1.a, C.1.b, D.1	None
Commanding General, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command	B.2	C.3, D.2	D.2
Commanding General, Air Force Office of Special Investigations		B.4, D.3	D.3
Director of Naval Criminal Investigative Service Global Operations		B.3	None
Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School		B.5.a, B.5.b, C.2	None

Please provide Management Comments by July 30, 2020.

Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations.

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.



**INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500**

June 30, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
DIRECTOR, PENTAGON FORCE PROTECTION AGENCY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense
(Report No. DODIG-2020-097)

This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's audit. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

This report contains recommendations that are considered unresolved because the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command did not agree or did not fully address the recommendations presented in the report. Therefore, as discussed in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response sections of this report, the recommendations remain open. We will track these recommendations until an agreement is reached on the actions to be taken to address the recommendations, and adequate documentation has been submitted showing that the agreed-upon action has been completed.

DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command should provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Your response should be sent to either audityorktown@dodig.mil if unclassified or rfunet@dodig.smil.mil if classified SECRET.

For recommendations that are resolved but remain open, as described in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, the recommendations may be closed when we receive adequate documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations have been completed. Therefore, please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the recommendations. Your response should be sent to either followup@dodig.mil if unclassified or rfunet@dodig.smil.mil if classified SECRET.

If you have any questions, please contact me at [REDACTED]



Theresa S. Hull
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Acquisition, Contracting, and Sustainment



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Introduction

Objective

The objective of this audit was to examine the use of protective security details (PSDs) throughout the DoD and also determine whether DoD Components consistently provided this protection. See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and methodology and prior audit coverage related to the objective.

Background

PSDs in the DoD consist of specially trained protective security personnel (military or civilian) that are capable of providing protection for individuals designated as high-risk personnel (HRP) or their visiting senior foreign official counterparts. PSD personnel seek to ensure the personal safety and security of HRP. This protection can include daily protection, protection during specific events, protection while traveling, or for certain HRP, protection 24 hours per day.

DoD HRP are senior service members and civilian DoD employees who, by the nature of their positions, are considered critical to the conduct of DoD operations and functions. The protection-providing organizations (PPOs) provide HRP with protection and security.

Section 714, title 10, United States Code, 2016, states that the Secretary of Defense may authorize physical protection and personal security within the United States to the following persons who, by nature of their positions, require continuous security and protection:

- Secretary of Defense
- Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Secretaries of the Military Departments
- Other Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Commanders of combatant commands

According to this statute, the Secretary of Defense may also authorize and approve physical protection and personal security to other individuals if the Secretary determines that such protection and security are necessary.

Responsibilities and Procedures for the DoD HRP Program

DoD Instruction O-2000.22 (the Instruction) implements Federal policy by assigning responsibilities and prescribing procedures for designating and protecting DoD HRP.¹

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD[HD&GS]) falls under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]). According to the Instruction, the ASD(HD&GS) serves as the principal civilian adviser on policy development and implementation of the DoD HRP program to the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the USD(P). In addition to the advisory role, the ASD(HD&GS) is required to:

- coordinate, provide recommendations on, and forward nominations for all HRP protection support received from the DoD Component heads to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense for protection inside the United States, or the USD(P) for protection outside of the United States; and
- review the adequacy of DoD Component programs in meeting the requirements of the DoD HRP program, in conjunction with the General Counsel of the DoD, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and other Office of the Secretary of Defense officials and members of the Joint Staff.

HRP Levels and PSD Size Ranges for DoD HRP

~~(FOUO)~~ The Instruction defines the DoD positions designated as permanent HRP, their levels of protection, and the authorized sizes of PSDs. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

¹ DoD Instruction O-2000.22, "Designation and Physical Protection of DoD High-Risk Personnel," June 19, 2014.

(FOUO) [REDACTED]

(FOUO) [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

(FOUO)

- ¹ DoD Component heads may approve a one-time temporary augmentation of up to five additional PSD personnel for individuals in positions designated as HRP Level 1 and up to three additional PSD personnel for individuals in positions designated as HRP Level 2. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) may approve requests for permanent deviation in PSD size inside the United States and outside the United States, respectively.
- ² A personal security vulnerability assessment evaluates the vulnerability of an individual to an attack and identifies security to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or terrorism against the individual. The assessment recommends the level of HRP protection and the number of PSD personnel required to sustain the PSD.
- ³ Authorized one personal security adviser. DoD Component heads may temporarily approve up to five PSD personnel to support foreign travel requirements.

Source: DoD Instruction O-2000.22, "Designation and Physical Protection of DoD High-Risk Personnel," June 19, 2014, and the DoD OIG.

HRP Levels and PSD Size Ranges for Visiting Senior Foreign Officials

DoD Instruction O-2000.27 states that the Military Departments and Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA) provide all protective services, including security personnel, law enforcement vehicles, and a threat assessment to support the DoD Senior Foreign Official Visit Program.² According to DoD Instruction O-2000.27, senior foreign officials are protected at the level of their DoD counterparts.

The PPOs protect senior foreign officials when they arrive in the United States and throughout their official DoD-sponsored visits. Examples of senior foreign officials included ministers of defense and chiefs of defense of foreign countries.

From January 1, 2015, to September 30, 2018, the PPOs performed 72 missions supporting senior foreign officials. During that time, the DoD received visits from the Ministers of Defense of Angola, Bahrain, India, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Qatar, South Korea, Tunisia, and Vietnam. The Chiefs of Defense for Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Poland, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom also visited during this period.

Nomination and Approval Process

The Instruction states that the DoD Component heads may nominate individuals for HRP protection who are not designated in the Instruction, or modify the HRP level of permanent HRP, if there is an imminent and credible threat to the safety of the individual or compelling operational considerations, such as general threats in the individual HRP area of operations, that make such protection essential for official DoD business.³

The HRP nomination process is required to follow these steps:

1. The Component head prepares an HRP nomination package consisting of a nomination letter, a recommended HRP protection level and PSD size, and a personal security vulnerability assessment. A personal security vulnerability assessment determines the vulnerability of a particular individual to an attack and the assessment recommends the protection necessary to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or terrorism against the individual. It also recommends the level of HRP protection and the number of PSD personnel required to sustain PSDs. According to the Instruction, personal security vulnerability assessments are

² DoD Instruction O-2000.27, "DoD Senior Foreign Official Visit Program (SFOVP)," December 20, 2012.

³ For example, a compelling operational consideration may be a general threat in the individual HRP area of operations.

required to be reviewed at least annually and should be updated if the vulnerabilities or threat levels change. We reviewed 12 personal security vulnerability assessments prepared by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC), 7 prepared by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), 6 prepared by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), and 6 prepared by PFPA between December 2015 and April 2019.⁴ The PPOs generally updated the personal security vulnerability assessments annually.

2. The Component head coordinates the HRP nomination packages with the geographic combatant commander that has security responsibility for the area in which the nominee is assigned.
3. The geographic combatant commander submits the HRP nomination package, along with his or her recommended level of protection, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. The Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff submits the HRP nomination package and recommends an appropriate protection level, and forwards the nomination package to the ASD(HD&GS). If the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not concur with the recommended level of protection, it returns the nomination package to the Component head to rework or update with additional information.
5. The ASD(HD&GS) coordinates the HRP nomination package with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the DoD General Counsel before providing a recommended level of protection to the USD(P).
6. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence reviews all nominations for permanent and temporary PSD support to validate the threat analyses and must either concur or non-concur with the nomination package and the requested level of protection.
7. The USD(P) makes the final determination for personnel protected outside the United States or forwards the nomination package to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense for personnel protected inside the United States.

⁴ FPA completes personal threat assessments that include some, although not all, of the items required by DoD Instruction O-2000.22. The personal threat assessments identify any threats to the HRP; therefore, we are counting PFPA's personal threat assessments in the total number of personal security vulnerability assessments we reviewed during the audit.

Protection-Providing Organizations

The PPOs are responsible for providing protection to HRP. The PPOs include the USACIDC, the NCIS, the AFOSI, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, and PFPA.⁵ According to the Instruction, only qualified service members and civilian DoD employees who are assigned to investigative, law enforcement, or security duties with the PPOs are authorized to provide physical protection and personal security. Qualified personnel are individuals designated or classified as special agents within the USACIDC, the AFOSI, the NCIS or the Marine Corps Criminal Investigative Division; military police; security forces; Master-at-Arms; Federal police officers; Federal investigators (GS-1801, GS-1810 or GS-1811); or Federal security administrators (GS-0080). These individuals must have completed the training or certification required for their position or as required by the Instruction. Table 2 shows the numbers of personnel each PPO had dedicated to working on PSDs.

(FOUO-LES) Table 2. Number of Personnel The PPOs Had Dedicated to Working on PSDs

(FOUO-LES)		
		(FOUO-LES)

- ¹ The number of personnel presented for the USACIDC, the NCIS, and the AFOSI include personnel dedicated to protect visiting senior foreign officials.
- ² The Battalion also had an additional 77 individual mobilization augmentees that were available to support the PSD mission for up to 36 days each per year.
- ³ PFPA agents are not dedicated exclusively to protection and perform both law enforcement investigations and protection.

Source: The DoD OIG with data from the PPOs.

(FOUO-LES) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

⁵ The Defense Criminal Investigative Service can assist other PPOs in protecting HRP or senior foreign officials assigned to the other PPOs. However, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service does not provide full time protection to any permanent HRP. We did not evaluate the PSD missions conducted by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service since it did not conduct independent PSD missions and instead supported other PPOs in their missions.

~~(FOUO-LES)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Air Force Security Forces personnel, and military police assigned to three combatant commanders and U.S. Army Forces Korea.

~~(FOUO)~~ The NCIS conducts protective services for the Department of the Navy. During the time of our review, the Protective Operations Field Office had [REDACTED] personnel, including special agents and military personnel, dedicated to performing PSDs for seven designated HRP and visiting senior foreign officials.⁶

~~(FOUO)~~ The AFOSI conducts protective services for the Air Force. During the time of our review, the AFOSI had [REDACTED] special agents and [REDACTED] security forces personnel dedicated to providing PSD for [REDACTED] designated HRP and visiting senior foreign officials.⁷

~~(FOUO)~~ PFPA's Protective Services Division also conducts protective services for the DoD. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As of March 2019, PFPA had [REDACTED] agents available to perform PSDs for [REDACTED] designated HRP and visiting senior foreign officials.⁸

The Defense Criminal Investigative Service of the DoD Office of Inspector General does not have any HRP assigned to it. According to the Deputy Director of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the agents assist other PPOs with approximately two PSD missions per year for visiting senior foreign officials.

⁶ Ten of the 68 personnel do not belong to the NCIS, but are assigned to the combatant commanders to support the PSD mission. The NCIS also uses local field office agents or personnel from the other PPOs to support PSD missions.

⁷ The 13 security forces personnel do not belong to the AFOSI but are assigned to support the PSD mission. The AFOSI also uses local field office agents or personnel from the other PPOs to support PSD missions.

⁸ PFPA also uses personnel from the other PPOs to support PSD missions.

Table 3 shows the PPOs and the HRP that the PPOs were protecting during our review.

(FOUO) Table 3. PPOs and HRP They Protect as of October 2018

(FOUO) [Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted] (FOUO)

(FOUO)-Table 3. PPOs and HRP They Protect as of October 2018 (cont'd)

(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	(FOUO)

¹ Does not include personnel located in combat zones.

² PFFA is the assigned PPO; however, the National Security Agency provides the PSD protection.

³ All PPOs assist with protecting visiting senior foreign officials.

Source: The DoD OIG with data from DoD Instruction O-2000.22, "Designation and Physical Protection of DoD High-Risk Personnel," June 19, 2014.

Personnel in Table 3 who were not designated in the Instruction as permanent HRP were nominated by their Component head and approved by the USD(P) or Deputy Secretary of Defense for protection.

Mechanics of a PSD

(FOUO-LES) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

- (FOUO-LES) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

⁹ PFFA provides a personal security adviser to coordinate protection for HRP Level 2.5, but the adviser is not assigned to the HRP staff.

(FOUO-LES) [Redacted]

- (FOUO-LES) [Redacted]
- (FOUO-LES) [Redacted]
- (FOUO-LES) [Redacted]
- (FOUO-LES) [Redacted]

Mission Threat Assessments

(FOUO-LES) [Redacted]

(FOUO-LES) The USACIDC told us that it follows Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, "Protective Services," May 2013, [Redacted]

¹⁰ Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, "Protective Services," May 2013.
 Air Force Instruction 71-101, Volume 2, "Protective Service Matters", May 21, 2019.
 PFFA Operating Instructions for the Threat Intelligence Center, "Production of Trip Threat Assessments," August 16, 2017.

¹¹ (FOUO-LES) [Redacted]

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]

(FOUO) [REDACTED]

(FOUO) [REDACTED]

(FOUO) The AFOSI told us that it follows Air Force Instruction 71-101, which states that the AFOSI will conduct a mission threat assessment, called a protective threat assessment by the AFOSI, for each stop on the individual HRP official travel itinerary to determine the level of protection at each location. The AFOSI completed mission threat assessments for the 27 PSD missions we reviewed. However, according to AFOSI personnel, advance agents or the personal security adviser received a threat briefing from the local AFOSI field office agents or the regional security officer upon arrival at the mission location. We determined that this occurred for of the missions we reviewed.

(FOUO) PFPA developed internal guidance that outlines the procedure for producing a mission threat assessment whenever PFPA designated HRP travel.¹³ PFPA completed a mission threat assessment for all PSD missions we reviewed. PFPA's Threat Intelligence Center creates a mission threat assessment upon notification from the HRP staff of upcoming travel. PFPA uses the Defense Intelligence Agency's assessment of the threat level in each location as a baseline, but can upgrade or downgrade the threat level based on factors such as age of the assessment and whether the visit is to a military installation. PFPA personnel document any changes to the threat level and monitor the threat level for any changes during the individual HRP trip.

¹² (FOUO) [REDACTED]

¹³ Pentagon Force Protection Agency, "Operating Instructions for the Threat Intelligence Center, Production of Trip Threat Assessments," August 16, 2017.

Advance Security Duties

(FOUO-LES) The PPOs can perform advance security duties at the individual HRP mission location. [REDACTED]

(FOUO-LES) The Instruction does not provide guidance for advance security duties. [REDACTED]

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]¹⁴

(FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FOUO) The AFOSI did not have criteria for advance security duties; however, in [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] missions we reviewed, the AFOSI used [REDACTED] or less to perform advance work per day that the HRP were at the mission location and in 4 of the remaining 8 missions, the AFOSI had local AFOSI agents perform the advance work.¹⁶

(FOUO) PFPA did not have criteria for advance security duties; however, PFPA typically used [REDACTED] or less to perform advance work per day that HRP were at the mission location. PFPA sends advance agents to locations outside of the United States when HRP stay overnight.¹⁷

¹⁴ Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, "Protective Services," May 2013.
¹⁵ Four missions that we reviewed did not have evidence that the NCIS agents performed advance security duties and are not included in the count of 16 missions.
¹⁶ Three missions that we reviewed did not have evidence that the AFOSI agents performed advance security duties and are not included in the count of 24 missions.
¹⁷ Pentagon Force Protection Agency, "Criminal Investigative and Protective Directorate Policy Memorandum, CIPD PM 9003-003," September 30, 2008, provides standard operating procedures for advance security duties. However, the procedures related to the duties of advance security agents and did not specify the number of advance days needed for PSD missions.

Security Control Rooms

(FOUO-LES) According to Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Counter Terrorism Division guidance, PSD personnel can use a security control room to monitor the permanent residence or temporary lodging of HRP who require [REDACTED] protection.¹⁸ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(FOUO-LES) The Instruction does not provide guidance on when PSDs should establish security control rooms for HRP. The USACIDC provided criteria for when control rooms should be established. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]¹⁹

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]

(FOUO) [REDACTED]

(FOUO) The AFOSI [REDACTED]

¹⁸ Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Counter Terrorism Division, "Protective Service Operations Quick Reference Guide Version 3," October 2012.

¹⁹ Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, "Protective Services," May 2013.

(FOUO) PFPA [REDACTED] for the use of control rooms. However, in [REDACTED] overnight missions we reviewed PFPA used control rooms for missions outside of the United States that did not take place on military installations.²⁰

Movements of the HRP

(FOUO-LES) A motorcade is the group of vehicles used to transport and protect HRP while in transit on the ground. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(FOUO) [REDACTED]
Source: The Army.

²⁰ Pentagon Force Protection Agency, "Criminal Investigative and Protective Directorate Policy Memorandum, CIPD PM 9003-003," September 30, 2008, provides standard operating procedures for control rooms. However, the procedures related to the duties of control room agents and did not specify when control rooms were necessary for protective security missions.

Domicile-to-Duty Movements

Transportation of individuals between their places of residence and their places of work is commonly referred to as domicile-to-duty. Section 1344, title 31, United States Code, 2012, specifically allows domicile-to-duty as “transportation for official purposes” for the following DoD HRP:

- Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense,
- Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
- Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
- Secretaries of the Military Departments, and
- Under Secretaries of Defense.

~~(FOUO)~~ Domicile-to-duty transportation is provided for [REDACTED] HRP and is subject to the requirements of DoD Manual 4500.36.²¹ For most HRP, PSD duties overlap with domicile-to-duty activities.²² For example, under the HRP program, USACIDC [REDACTED] and since the USACIDC, the NCIS, and the AFOSI considered any transportation for official purposes as a PSD mission, the PPO would always be involved in the domicile-to-duty movements.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

²¹ DoD Manual 4500.36, “Acquisition, Management, and Use of Non-Tactical Vehicles,” July 7, 2015.

²² The PPOs provide protection during domicile-to-duty movements for HRP Level 1-Enhanced and HRP Level 2. The PPOs do not provide protection during domicile-to-duty for HRP Level 2.5.

Table 4 provides a summary of domicile-to-duty movements for HRP within the National Capital Region, including the number of vehicles and personnel the PPOs used to conduct the domicile-to-duty movements.

(FOUO-LES) Table 4. HRP Within the National Capital Region Receiving Domicile-to-Duty as of September 2018

(FOUO-LES)					
					(FOUO-LES)

(FOUO-LES) Table 4. HRP Within the National Capital Region Receiving Domicile-to-Duty as of September 2018 (cont'd)

(FOUO-LES) P					

* (FOUO) [Redacted]

Source: The DoD OIG with data from the PPOs.

(FOUO-LES) The USACIDC, the NCIS, and the AFOSI provided PSD protection during domicile-to-duty movements for their assigned HRP. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(FOUO-LES) [Redacted]

[Redacted] For domicile-to-duty missions, the NCIS and the AFOSI [Redacted]

Daily Movements of HRP Within the National Capital Region.

(FOUO) [Redacted]

(FOUO-LES) [Redacted]

(FOUO) [Redacted]

(FOUO) [Redacted]

(FOUO-LES) [Redacted]

(FOUO) [Redacted]

Costs of PSDs

We also asked the PPOs for costs related to the PSDs. However, they were unable to provide us PSD personnel costs or total program costs because they do not separately track costs for the PSD program. Direct and indirect costs include agent personnel costs, travel costs, and vehicle and equipment costs. Some PSD costs are paid by DoD Components, Defense agencies, and the offices of individual HRP. As a result, we could not determine total costs for each PSD program.

Review of Internal Controls

DoD Instruction 5010.40 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls.²³ We identified internal control weaknesses related to the PPOs' planning and performance of PSDs and the USD(P)'s oversight of the PPOs. We will provide a copy of the report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in the USD(P) and PPO offices.

²³ DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013.

Finding A

PPOs Protected HRP Based on HRP Position Instead of Threat to HRP

PPOs protected the HRP based on HRP position instead of specific threats to the HRP. Specifically, we determined the following:

- (FOUO) None of the 31 personal security vulnerability assessments that we reviewed documented a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (FOUO) [REDACTED] of the 68 mission threat assessments we reviewed documented a [REDACTED] [REDACTED], we found examples where the PPO rated the mission risk as moderate, even though the mission was located on a military installation and there was no [REDACTED] to the individual.

Protecting HRP based on position instead of threat occurred because:

- (FOUO) the Instruction designates a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] but also states that PSD protection must be maintained at a minimum level and employed as necessary [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- the PPOs did not adjust their recommendations for the level of protection based on the results of the annual personal security vulnerability assessment, and
- the ASD(HD&GS) did not review the PPOs' performance of PSDs as required by the Instruction.

(FOUO) In addition, we determined that HRP were allowed to [REDACTED] without a documented reason. This occurred because the Instruction does not define whether HRP can [REDACTED] of a PSD, discuss who has authority to approve the HRP [REDACTED] or include a provision for [REDACTED] the protection.

(FOUO) Providing protection based on position instead of based on the PPO's assessment of the threat to HRP may result in the overuse of resources required to protect HRP. Additionally, allowing HRP to [REDACTED] may leave individuals serving in the DoD's highest offices [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PPOs Protected HRP Based on HRP Position Instead of Threat to HRP

(FOUO-LES) The PPOs did not consistently perform their PSDs based on the threat level to the HRP. Section 714, title 10, United States Code, 2016, authorizes physical protection for DoD personnel based on their [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]²⁴ However, the Instruction also states that PSD support must be maintained at the minimal level and employed as necessary and appropriate based on threat.

(FOUO) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] According to the Instruction, the personal security vulnerability assessment should recommend the level of HRP protection and the number of PSD personnel that are required for sustained operations.

HRP Protection Levels Not Consistent With the Personal Security Vulnerability Assessment

(FOUO) For all HRP, the PPOs are required to review, [REDACTED] a personal security vulnerability assessment. According to the Instruction, the personal security vulnerability assessment evaluates the security posture of permanent or nominated HRP. The purpose of the assessment is to identify specific vulnerabilities in the HRP safety and to recommend actions to mitigate these vulnerabilities. The assigned PPO should complete the personal security vulnerability assessment, which should [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(FOUO) We reviewed 12 personal security vulnerability assessments prepared by the USACIDC, 7 prepared by the NCIS, 6 prepared by the AFOSI, and [REDACTED] prepared by PFPA. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

According to PPO personnel at the USACIDC, the NCIS, and the AFOSI, they did not recommend a lower level of protection for permanent HRP because the Instruction already defined the level or protection the HRP should receive.

²⁴ According to ASD(HD&GS) personnel, USD(P) personnel derived the levels of protection and size ranges from a working group that reviewed the results of a study completed in January 2010 on protective security.

Although the Instruction defines the level of protection and range of personnel authorized to protect HRP based on HRP position, the Instruction also states that the personal security vulnerability assessment should recommend the level of HRP protection and the number of PSD personnel that are required for sustained operations. If the personal security vulnerability assessment findings support a change to the HRP protection level from the level prescribed in the Instruction, the DoD Component head must provide a new nomination package, including the personal security vulnerability assessment, requesting the appropriate change in the level of HRP protection to the USD(P) for approval by the Secretary, Deputy Secretary of Defense, or USD(P).

(FOUO) [REDACTED] (FOUO) [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] For example, the personal security vulnerability assessment for one combatant commander [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in the country where the HRP resides. Although there was [REDACTED] to the individual cited in the personal security vulnerability assessment, the personal security vulnerability assessment recommended that the individual receive protection at a [REDACTED] while traveling outside the United States instead of a [REDACTED] because of the individual's [REDACTED] and because the individual holds the most [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] approved the request.

(FOUO) A subordinate commander operating in the same area was not designated as HRP in the Instruction, but was approved as HRP [REDACTED] while traveling outside the United States by USD(P) personnel. The personal security vulnerability assessment also stated that there were [REDACTED] to the individual, but the individual's extensive travel to high-risk areas in the individual's area of responsibility and the individual's position as a high-ranking DoD official made the individual a great symbolic target. The personal security vulnerability assessment stated that based on the scores from the [REDACTED] the recommended level of protection for the individual was a [REDACTED]. However, the personal security vulnerability assessment recommended an [REDACTED].²⁵ Therefore, even though the personal security vulnerability assessment cited that

²⁵ In developing the personal security vulnerability assessment, AFOSI personnel use the threat vulnerability risk model as a common methodology to help evaluate the appropriate level of protection to meet the threats, vulnerabilities and risks of each HRP.

(FOUO) the two HRP faced [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] approved an [REDACTED] for the subordinate commander and the higher HRP [REDACTED] for the superior commander based on the [REDACTED] these individuals held.

(FOUO) According to the Instruction, when nominating HRP for protection, DoD Component heads must determine an appropriate protection level based on the threat, operational considerations, and the efficient use of DoD resources. However, we determined that because the permanent HRP protection levels are assigned by [REDACTED] in the Instruction, the HRP are automatically protected based on their [REDACTED] no matter the current [REDACTED]

: According to the Instruction, when nominating HRP for protection, DoD Component heads must determine an appropriate protection level based on the threat, operational considerations, and the efficient use of DoD resources.

We recommend that the DoD determine if HRP should be protected based on [REDACTED] or continue to be protected based on [REDACTED]

(FOUO) Personal Security Vulnerability Assessment Recommended a Higher Level of Protection Even Though [REDACTED] to the HRP

(FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Instruction states that if a different protection level than the one authorized is required due to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the Component head may nominate the individual for a different HRP level. The Instruction further states that PPOs will use PSD support only as necessary and appropriate based on [REDACTED]

(FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The six assessments and packages recommended higher levels of protection because of compelling operational considerations, such as extensive travel throughout the individual HRP area of operations, which included regions designated as high and significant terrorist threat levels.

(FOUO) For the seventh individual designated as permanent HRP, a combatant commander submitted a nomination and personal security vulnerability assessment to Joint Chiefs of Staff personnel requesting that protection be increased from

(FOUO) [REDACTED] which [REDACTED] [REDACTED] while the individual was in the metropolitan area of his duty station inside the United States. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the request from the combatant commander for the [REDACTED] recommendation. However, the personal security vulnerability assessment prepared by the USACIDC and attached to the nomination package stated:

(FOUO) due to no specific intelligence-based threat, compelling operational considerations, no previous instances of threats or negatively impactful incidents against the Principal, it is recommended the Principal be designated as a [REDACTED]

(FOUO) The Instruction defines [REDACTED] protection as PSD support provided to an official who requires protection during periods of official duty or travel as recommended by the personal security vulnerability assessment. The Instruction defines protection at [REDACTED] as PSD support provided to an official who requires continuous protection, as recommended by the personal security vulnerability assessment based on a finding of a [REDACTED]

(FOUO) The combatant commander and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff cited the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ASD(HD&GS) personnel forwarded the recommendation for [REDACTED] protection for the combatant commander, and the Secretary of Defense approved the nomination. Although ASD(HD&GS) personnel stated to us that they agreed that the nomination package and personal security vulnerability assessment supported a [REDACTED] designation, they also said that they did not feel empowered to make a recommendation that contradicted the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ASD(HD&GS) personnel stated that they disagreed with the level of protection requested in other nomination packages, but they did not recommend a change to the recommended level of protection for the same reason. However, according to the Instruction, providing recommendations on the level of protection for HRP is within the responsibility of the ASD(HD&GS).

Nomination Packages Returned

(FOUO) In addition, the previous combatant commander for the same area of operations, designated as permanent HRP [REDACTED] in the Instruction, received HRP [REDACTED] protection for a year, without authorization, before the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the higher HRP [REDACTED] protection. According to the Instruction, combatant commanders are designated permanent HRP [REDACTED] unless they received an approved deviation.

(FOUO) The previous combatant commander designated as permanent HRP [REDACTED] in the Instruction, received HRP [REDACTED] protection for a year, without authorization.

(FOUO) This combatant commander submitted a nomination package for HRP [REDACTED] protection in February 2016.²⁶ In September 2016, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff returned the nomination request, [REDACTED]

The decision memorandum stated that, in accordance with the Instruction, the nomination request was returned and the combatant commander was designated as an HRP [REDACTED]

(FOUO) In August 2016, acting on behalf of the Acting ASD(HD&GS) the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Defense Continuity, Domestic Counterterrorism, and Mission Assurance) issued clarifying guidance regarding continuation of HRP protection levels when nomination packages are not approved. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As a result, without an approved deviation, the combatant commander should have immediately reverted to HRP [REDACTED] protection as designated in the Instruction. However, according to ASD(HD&GS) personnel, despite the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff returning the nomination package, the commander continued receiving HRP [REDACTED] protection until his nomination package was approved 1 year later.

²⁶ According to the personal security vulnerability assessment, the assessment recommended that the HRP continue to receive HRP Level 1 protection. According to the Instruction, pending a completed and approved nomination package, incoming HRP may continue to receive the same level of protection provided to the HRP predecessor.

(FOUO) According to ASD(HD&GS) personnel, the commander was given a verbal approval from the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to continue the HRP [REDACTED] protection until the nomination package could be submitted and approved. However, according to the Instruction, only the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has the authority to approve the deviation. Ultimately, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the package based on his determination of [REDACTED]. However, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that the HRP [REDACTED] designation would not extend to the commander's successor unless a new HRP nomination was submitted and approved prior to assignment.

Mission Threat Assessments Did Not Identify Known Specific Threats to the HRP

(FOUO-LES) In addition to the personal security vulnerability assessment, we determined that the PPOs typically produce mission threat assessments specific to the mission location for HRP trips.²⁷

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition, we found examples where the PPO rated the mission risk as [REDACTED] even though the mission was located on a military installation and there was [REDACTED] to the individual.

(FOUO) Specifically, [REDACTED]

(FOUO) According to PPO guidance, the mission threat assessments should be specific to the HRP, location, and mission. Additionally, according to the Instruction the personal security adviser should evaluate and make recommendations on HRP security posture based on the available [REDACTED]. The Instruction states that protection must be determined based on an [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] The Instruction also states that PPOs will maintain PSD support at the minimal level required and PSDs will be used only as necessary based on [REDACTED].

(FOUO) We provide some examples of missions where the [REDACTED] and one where the mission threat assessment did.

²⁷ A specific threat is a named threat to the HRP versus a threat to the local area or any general military person.

(FOUO-LES) personnel rated the mission risk as medium, even though the mission was located at a military installation. Although there was [REDACTED] to the individual, according to the mission threat assessment there was no indication that the HRP was targeted at the mission location.

- (FOUO-LES) A second individual designated as permanent [REDACTED] attended the same change of command ceremonies at [REDACTED]. The individual also flew military air from [REDACTED] and did not leave the base during the short 6-hour visit. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Total travel costs for the [REDACTED] agents were \$3,170. According to the mission threat assessment, USACIDC personnel rated the mission risk as moderate, even though the mission was located at a military installation and there was [REDACTED] to the individual.

- (FOUO-LES) A third individual designated as permanent HRP [REDACTED] also attended the two change of command ceremonies and stayed at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for 6 hours. The USACIDC performed a PSD mission for the individual, who used a military aircraft from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Travel costs for the [REDACTED] agents were \$11,902. According to the mission threat assessment, USACIDC personnel rated the mission risk as [REDACTED] even though the mission was located at a military installation and there was no [REDACTED] to the individual.

(FOUO) Of the three HRP that attended the ceremonies, only one of the mission threat assessments identified a known specific threat to the HRP. The Level 1-Enhanced HRP that had the mission threat used seven agents, and the Level 1-Enhanced HRP and Level 2 HRP that did not have any threats identified for the mission used four and six agents, respectively. According to the Instruction, PSD support must be maintained at the minimal level required and employed only as necessary and appropriate based on the threat. Only one of the mission threat assessments we reviewed documented [REDACTED] against the HRP. We concluded that the DoD likely spent more money on PSDs than necessary based on the threat assessments we reviewed.

The Instruction Should Clarify Whether Protection Should Be Based on Threat or Position

(FOUO) The PPOs did not perform PSDs consistently because the Instruction defines the level of protection and range of personnel authorized to protect HRP based on [REDACTED] but also states that PSD protection must be maintained at a minimum level and employed as necessary based on [REDACTED]. PPO personnel stated that when performing the personal security vulnerability assessment they generally did not recommend a [REDACTED] than what was designated in the Instruction because permanent HRP had grown accustomed to protection at the defined level, regardless of whether that level was warranted. PPO personnel from the USACIDC, the NCIS, and PFPA said they did not feel comfortable making a recommendation that lowered the level of protection that HRP were entitled to by the Instruction. However, personnel from all of the PPOs stated that they would recommend a higher level of protection on the personal security vulnerability assessment if necessary.

(FOUO) PPO personnel stated that they generally did not recommend a [REDACTED] than what was designated in the Instruction because permanent HRP had grown accustomed to protection at the defined level, regardless of whether that level was warranted.

(FOUO) According to the Instruction, the personal security vulnerability assessment should recommend the level of HRP protection and the number of PSD personnel that are required for sustained operations. The Instruction states that if the personal security vulnerability assessment findings support a change to the HRP protection level prescribed in the Instruction, the DoD Component head must provide a new nomination package, including the personal security vulnerability assessment, requesting the appropriate change in the level of

(FOUO) HRP protection to the [REDACTED] for approval by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense. However, the Instruction does not make it clear if the change referred to in the Instruction includes an increased or decreased level of security.

Additionally, according to the Instruction, Joint Chiefs of Staff and ASD(HD&GS) personnel are responsible for reviewing the nomination package, which includes the nomination letter and the personal security vulnerability assessment, and either concurring or non-concurring with the requested level of protection.

ASD(HD&GS) and Joint Chiefs of Staff personnel told us that they disagreed with the level of protection requested in other nomination packages. However, often ASD(HD&GS) and Joint Chiefs of Staff personnel said they did not recommend a change to the recommended level of protection because neither Joint Chiefs of Staff leadership nor the ASD(HD&GS) leadership would typically non-concur with the requests of the Vice Chairman or other high-ranking military officers.

(FOUO) However, the Instruction states that protection must be determined based on an imminent and credible threat to the individuals' safety or compelling operational considerations. The Instruction also states that PPOs will maintain PSD support at the minimal level required and that PSDs will be used only as necessary based on [REDACTED]. Therefore, we recommend that the [REDACTED] eliminate the preassigned levels of protection for permanent HRP in the Instruction and revise the Instruction to clarify that protection for HRP should be based on recommendations supported in the HRP personal security vulnerability assessments or nomination packages.

HRP Declined Protection and PPOs Used Waivers

(FOUO) The DoD allowed permanent HRP to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] without documenting a reason. The PPOs provided examples of HRP who declined protection or did not notify the PPOs of travel.

(FOUO) The DoD allowed permanent HRP to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] without documenting a reason.

(FOUO) For example, an individual designated as permanent HRP [REDACTED] traveled to Dam Neck, Virginia, for official DoD business and waived his PSD. The individual signed a waiver for a temporary declination of protection for the length of the trip. The NCIS personal security adviser and the individual signed a waiver that stated:

(FOUO) I [REDACTED] [REDACTED] extended to me by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Department of the Navy. I fully understand the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] as well as those

(FOUO) accompanying me. Furthermore, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FOUO) However, the USD(P) does not clarify in the Instruction whether HRP are permitted to [REDACTED] discuss who has authority to approve a [REDACTED] or provide a provision for when and how to waive the protection.

(FOUO) The Air Force Instruction states that the personal security adviser will document in a memorandum for record all instances in which protection was [REDACTED]. Additionally, the NCIS instituted a waiver process for HRP to [REDACTED]. This process included creating a memorandum for the HRP to sign that states that the individual [REDACTED].

However, neither the USACIDC nor [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

USACIDC, NCIS, and PFPA personnel expressed concern to us over who assumes the risk if permanent HRP decline or change the type of protection planned for a mission.

HRP Declined Protection Because of Cost

(FOUO) According to PFPA personnel, an individual designated as permanent HRP [REDACTED] based on the PSD travel costs, rather than based on the threat. Unlike the other PPOs, PFPA did not provide protection to any HRP [REDACTED] or HRP [REDACTED] that required day-to-day protection, but instead provided protection to HRP [REDACTED] only during travel outside the continental United States. When an individual notifies PFPA personnel of an upcoming trip, PFPA personnel complete a threat assessment and a cost estimate and provide both documents to the individual's office. The threat assessment must include location and mission-specific information related to potential threats to the HRP. The cost estimate should include all travel expenses other than the agent's pay. PSD personnel costs are funded at the PPO level and travel for the PSD is funded through the individual HRP office.

(FOUO) The individual designated as permanent HRP notified PFPA of a multi-country trip to [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED]. PFPA provided a cost estimate to the individual's security manager with [REDACTED] of protection for the individual during this trip.

- (FOUO) The first recommendation was the most robust, and suggested using [REDACTED]. The estimated travel costs for this recommendation were \$81,000.
- (FOUO) The second recommendation suggested using [REDACTED] and only maintaining a [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED]. The estimated travel costs for this recommendation were \$57,000.
- (FOUO) The final recommendation suggested using [REDACTED] with [REDACTED]. The estimated travel costs for this recommendation were \$54,000.

(FOUO) According to the PFPA personal security adviser that provided the options to the individual HRP, he developed the options based on similar missions and [REDACTED]. Therefore, the HRP did not have threat information to [REDACTED]. PFPA personnel stated that after the individual HRP reviewed the cost estimate, the [REDACTED].

(FOUO) PFPA personnel provided another example where an individual assumed a permanent HRP position and PFPA personnel met with the individual's Chief of Staff to discuss PFPA's role and responsibility for providing protection to the [REDACTED]. The individual advised PFPA personnel that the individual was not [REDACTED].

(FOUO) PFPA personnel provided another example where instead of an individual taking a PSD for temporary duty, the individual requested support from security personnel in Israel. According to PFPA personnel, the security personnel in Israel advised they would only provide minimal security to the traveling individual due to PFPA's absence and the local support viewed the individual's [REDACTED] of PFPA's support to mean the individual did not require full protective services, leaving the individual [REDACTED] during travel.

(FOUO) PFPA personnel also expressed concerns about an individual designated as permanent HRP traveling without [REDACTED] PFPA of the travel. For example, an individual designated as permanent HRP [REDACTED] traveled for official DoD business and [REDACTED] PSD for an [REDACTED] trip to [REDACTED] the [REDACTED]. However, the individual [REDACTED].

(FOUO) [REDACTED] Because PFPA personnel were [REDACTED] PFPA personnel did not complete a [REDACTED] or have an opportunity to discuss the potential threat risks with the individual. Unlike the other PPOs, PFPA [REDACTED] and has direct knowledge of upcoming HRP travel, which creates the opportunity for HRP to travel [REDACTED]

In sum, the Instruction states that individuals designated as HRP are authorized to receive PSD support but the USD(P) does not state whether the HRP is required to use the PSD or clarify in the Instruction whether HRP can decline or waive the protection of a PSD, discuss who has authority to approve a declination of protection, or establish a waiver process.

(FOUO) Allowing HRP to [REDACTED] may compromise the safety of HRP and DoD operations. The [REDACTED] should be determined by the PPOs. We therefore recommend that the USD(P) establish a working group including representatives from the PPOs to revise the Instruction to include guidance on whether HRP can [REDACTED] provided under the guidance and establish a standardized waiver process and the circumstances in which a waiver might be appropriate.

PSD Protection Should Be Based on Threat Instead of Position

(FOUO-LES) Overall, the PPOs are basing their protection of HRP on the [REDACTED] rather than the [REDACTED] to the HRP. Providing protection based on position instead of based on the PPO's [REDACTED] to HRP may result in the overuse of resources required to protect HRP. PPOs should base protection for

(FOUO-LES) Overall, the PPOs are basing their protection of HRP on the [REDACTED] rather than the [REDACTED] to the HRP.

DoD HRP on threat assessments using intelligence documenting the need and plan for protection. Personal security vulnerability assessments and mission threat assessments should also assess

the relationship between identified [REDACTED] to the HRP and should not be based solely on the [REDACTED] an individual [REDACTED]

(FOUO) Protecting HRP based on [REDACTED] instead of [REDACTED] and allowing HRP to [REDACTED] protection occurred because the ASD(HD&GS) did not ensure consistent implementation of the Instruction. Additionally, allowing HRP to decline protection may leave individuals serving in the DoD's highest offices vulnerable to threats

~~(FOUO)~~ without adequate protection. The Instruction states that it is the ASD(HD&GS)'s responsibility to review the adequacy of DoD Component programs in meeting the requirements of the DoD HRP program. However, according to personnel at the ASD(HD&GS), it has not performed any reviews or oversight of the PPOs. ASD(HD&GS) personnel stated that as part of the Chairman's oversight program, Joint Staff personnel are conducting reviews of the PSD program at the combatant commands on a 2-year cycle. The 14 staff assist visits we reviewed assessed an overview of PSD operations, knowledge of appropriate use of PSDs, domicile-to-duty, and ethics training of the PSD members. The reviews stated that the PSD programs were generally operating in compliance with established procedures. However, the reviews did not assess how the PPOs executed individual missions and only assessed the PSDs for the combatant commands, not the PSDs for the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretaries of Defense, or Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

Additionally, ASD(HD&GS) personnel stated that they considered reviewing the nomination packages as a review of the process and that they do not have the resources to review the actual execution of PSDs at the PPOs. Yet, without oversight of the PSD program, the DoD cannot ensure that the PPOs are operating efficiently, consistently, and in compliance with the Instruction. The USD(P) should require and validate that the ASD(HD&GS) performs an annual review of the PPOs' performance of PSDs to ensure compliance with the Instruction.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation A.1

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:

- a. Eliminate the preassigned levels of protection for permanent high-risk personnel in DoD Instruction O-2000.22 and revise the Instruction to clarify that protection for high-risk-personnel should be based on recommendations supported in the individual high-risk personnel personal security vulnerability assessments or nomination packages.**

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, responding for the USD(P), disagreed with the recommendation and stated that in October 2011, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the preassigned permanent HRP protection levels in the Instruction. He stated that the permanent levels were based on recommendations in the 2010, "Independent Review of Post-9/11 Security Measures of the Department of Defense." He further

stated that all positions with preassigned permanent protection levels are listed in section 714, title 10 United States Code, 2016, which provides the Secretary of Defense statutory authority to provide continuous protection within the United States to certain persons, who by nature of their positions require such protection. Furthermore, he proposed alternative corrective actions and stated that USD(P) personnel intend to review the preassigned permanent HRP protection levels for positions listed in the Instruction, as well as complete assessments on the HRP who occupy those positions during coordination of the Instruction. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense also stated that the review will be completed during the formal coordination of the revised Instruction. He further stated that the coordination will take approximately 6 to 8 months after the formal working group established to address the other recommendations in the report completes work on the proposed changes.

Our Response

(FOUO) Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved.” We acknowledge that as written, the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, the Instruction states that the personal security vulnerability assessment should recommend the level of HRP protection and the number of PSD personnel that are required for sustained operations. Additionally, we found that [REDACTED] of the 31 personal security vulnerability assessments or [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] mission threat assessments that we reviewed documented a specific, imminent threat to the HRP. According to PPO personnel at the USACIDC, the NCIS, and the AFOSI, they did not recommend a lower level of protection for permanent HRP because the Instruction already defined the level of protection the HRP should receive. We acknowledge the USD(P)’s proposed action to review the preassigned permanent HRP protection levels for the positions listed in the Instruction. However, we request that the USD(P) reconsider his position on the recommendation and provide comments on the final report regarding assessing the need for preassigned protection levels.

Pentagon Force Protection Agency

Although not required to comment on the recommendation, the PFPA Acting Director agreed and stated that PFPA agreed with removing the predetermined HRP levels. The PFPA Acting Director also stated that the PFPA advocates for protective requirements to focus on the risks to the HRP and the compelling operational needs supporting the HRP mission. The Acting Director also stated that the DoD should further define the requirements for risk assessments as referenced in the Instruction.

Our Response

We acknowledge and appreciate the Acting Director's comments.

Naval Criminal Investigative Service Comments

(FOUO) Although not required to comment, the Deputy Director Operations, responding for the Director of NCIS Global Operations, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Our Response

We acknowledge and appreciate the Deputy Director's comments. We agree that personal security vulnerability assessments are an important part of determining the size of the PSD for HRP, and maintain that eliminating the preassigned levels of protection would allow the DoD to determine the need for protection for each individual HRP based on the actual findings supported in the personal security vulnerability assessment and nomination package versus automatically providing the preconceived level of protection currently afforded via the Instruction. The nomination process still provides the opportunity for the USD(P) or Deputy Secretary of Defense to determine and approve the level of protection and size range of personnel authorized to protect the HRP and still allows the PPOs to maintain a baseline level of security with the same flexibility to request approval for deviations when more manpower is necessary based on current threats.

- b. ~~(FOUO)~~ Establish a working group, including representatives from each protection-providing organization, to revise DoD Instruction O-2000.22 to include guidance on whether high-risk personnel can [REDACTED] protection provided under the Instruction and a standardized waiver process and the circumstances in which a waiver might be appropriate.

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, agreed with the recommendation and stated that the USD(P) will establish a working group to implement the recommendation no later than 15 business days after the DoD Office of Inspector General issues the final report.

Our Response

~~(FOUO)~~ Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, addressed all the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the Instruction includes guidance on whether HRP can [REDACTED] protection provided under the Instruction and establishes guidance on a standardized waiver process.

Naval Criminal Investigative Service Comments

~~(FOUO)~~ Although not required to comment, the Deputy Director Operations [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Our Response

~~(FOUO)~~ We acknowledge and appreciate the comments from the Deputy Director Operations. We agree and discuss the need for policy pertaining to [REDACTED] protection in the finding of the report.

- c. **Require and validate that the Assistant Secretary of Defense(Homeland Defense & Global Support) performs an annual review of the protection providing organization's performance of protective security details to ensure compliance with DoD Instruction O-2000.22.**

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, agreed with the recommendation and stated that the USD(P) will draft a policy memo for the Deputy Secretary to sign, 15 business days after the release of the final report. The policy will establish a requirement for the Component heads to submit annual reports that identify all HRP in their organization or under their commands, include a listing of the number of agents assigned to each individual HRP PSD, and provide the cost of protection for each individual HRP. The Deputy Assistant Secretary further stated that the USD(P) will incorporate the guidance into the revision of the Instruction and that the ASD(HD&GS) will establish a plan, not earlier than 90 days after the issuance of the revised Instruction, to conduct an annual review of the PPOs' performance of PSDs and their compliance with the revised Instruction.

Our Response

Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, addressed all the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the ASD(HD&GS) established a plan to conduct the annual reviews.

Finding B

PPOs Did Not Perform PSDs Consistently

We determined that the PPOs did not provide PSDs consistently throughout the DoD. For example,

- For the missions we reviewed, the PPOs did not consistently use advance personnel for missions, and at times used more days to perform advance work than each of the PPO's guidance or general rule suggested.
 - (FOUO) For █ of █ missions (█ percent), the USACIDC used more days to perform advance work per mission than its guidance.
 - (FOUO) █
 - (FOUO) For █ of █ missions (█ percent), the AFOSI used █ to perform advance work for each day of the mission.
 - (FOUO) For █ of █ missions (█ percent), PFPA used more days to perform advance work per mission than PFPA's general rule.
- Inconsistencies in the number of days the PPOs used to perform advance work at the mission location occurred because the USD(P) did not discuss or define in the Instruction the number of agents or days agents should use to perform advance work and the ASD(HD&GS) did not review the PPOs' performance of PSDs.
- (FOUO) For the missions we reviewed, the PPOs did not █ on PSD missions.
 - (FOUO) For █ of █ missions (█ percent), the USACIDC █ on overnight missions,
 - (FOUO) For █ of █ missions (█ percent), PFPA █ on overnight missions,
 - (FOUO) █
 - (FOUO) For █ of the █ missions (█ percent), the AFOSI █ in overnight missions. However, in █ missions, the AFOSI used █ to monitor the individual HRP hotel room █
 - (FOUO) These inconsistencies occurred because the USD(P) did not provide guidance in the Instruction on when PSDs should maintain █ for HRP and the ASD(HD&GS) did not provide oversight over the PPOs' performance of PSDs.

- As recommended by the Instruction, the PPOs did not consistently use the assistance of other PPOs and field agents local to the mission location to reduce costs, to reduce the need for large standing details, and to increase joint operations for the missions we reviewed.
 - (FOUO) For █ of █ missions (█ percent), the USACIDC did not use assistance from other PPOs or local field office agents, and according to USACIDC personnel, in 2018 USACIDC personnel used all available Battalion assets before requesting any local support from USACIDC field agents. According to USACIDC personnel, the USACIDC did not request local support consistently because it wanted to preserve the integrity of the PSD team for the safety of the team and the HRP by using primarily USACIDC personnel,
 - (FOUO) For █ of █ missions (█ percent), the NCIS did not use other PPOs or local field agents,
 - (FOUO) For █ of █ missions (█ percent), the AFOSI █ other PPOs or local field agents, and
 - (FOUO) For █ of █ missions (█ percent), PFPA did not use other PPOs or local field agents.

(FOUO) Inconsistent use of █ can increase costs to protect the HRP and result in inconsistent protection for similar HRP.

PPOs Did Not Perform Advance Security Duties Consistently

(FOUO-LES) █
 █
 █
 █
 █

(FOUO-LES) The Instruction does not discuss or define the number of agents or the number of days agents should use to perform advance work. The USACIDC follows Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, █
 █
 █
 █.²⁹ The publication also states that complex or multiple mission locations may require more advance days. Neither the NCIS, the AFOSI, nor PFPA have guidance related to performing advance work for a

²⁹ Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, "Protective Services," May 2013.

(FOUO-LES) protective mission.³⁰ AFOSI personnel stated that the number of days an agent needs to perform advance work will vary with the HRP itinerary and the complexity of the mission. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Because all the PFFA missions [REDACTED] PFFA stated that there generally should be [REDACTED] at the mission location to conduct advance work for [REDACTED] that HRP are at the mission location. For NCIS missions the advance agents would generally complete [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

and for AFOSI missions, advance agents generally [REDACTED] for each day the HRP was at the mission location. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(FOUO) For the missions we reviewed, the PPOs did not consistently use advance personnel, and at times used more days to perform advance work than each of the PPO’s guidance or general rule suggested. The USACIDC sent personnel to conduct advance work for more days than suggested in Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35 for [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] ([REDACTED] percent) missions. [REDACTED]

The PPOs did not consistently use advance personnel, and at times used more days to perform advance work than each of the PPO’s guidance or general rule suggested.

[REDACTED]

the AFOSI used more than 1 working day per mission day in [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] ([REDACTED] percent) missions, and PFFA used more working days to perform advance work than its general rule for [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] ([REDACTED] percent) missions.³¹

³⁰ Pentagon Force Protection Agency, “Criminal Investigative and Protective Directorate Policy Memorandum, CIPD PM 9003-003,” September 30, 2008, provides standard operating procedures for advance security duties. However, the procedures related to the duties of advance security agents and did not specify the number of advance days needed for PSD missions.

³¹ For four missions we reviewed, the NCIS did not provide evidence that NCIS agents performed advance security duties and those missions are not included in the 16 missions.

For three missions we reviewed, the AFOSI did not provide evidence that AFOSI agents performed advance security duties and those missions are not included in the 24 missions.

The USACIDC’s Use of Advance Days

(FOUO) Of the 17 USACIDC missions we reviewed, the USACIDC complied with the Army guidance of how many advance days there should be in 6 of the missions. However, eight missions exceeded the Army’s guidance by [REDACTED] two missions exceeded the guidance by [REDACTED] and one mission exceeded the guidance by [REDACTED]. For example, as discussed in the previous finding, the USACIDC performed PSDs for [REDACTED] individuals who attended two change of command ceremonies, each at [REDACTED] on the same day. The NCIS also performed a PSD for one individual that attended the ceremonies. Figure 2 shows the number of days each member of the USACIDC PSD teams A, B, and C, and the NCIS PSD team D used to perform advance work at [REDACTED] and the advance work they performed.

(FOUO-LES)



Note:

- (FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]
- (FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]
- (FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]
- (FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]
- (FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]

Source: The DoD OIG with data from PPO mission files.

(FOUO-LES) Individuals A, B, and D flew separate military air flights from [REDACTED] nonstop to [REDACTED] while individual C flew military air from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]. Individuals A, B, and C did not leave [REDACTED] attended the ceremonies, and spent approximately 6 hours on this mission. Individual D remained overnight in Tampa.

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FOUO-LES) Table 5. Travel Costs for Protection of HRP at MacDill Air Force Base Change of Command Ceremonies

(FOUO-LES) █	(FOUO-LES) █	Travel Costs
█	█	\$11,897
█	█	\$3,170
█	█	\$11,902
█	█	\$3,782
(FOUO-LES)	(FOUO-LES)	

Source: The DoD OIG with data from PPO mission files and the Defense Travel System.

(FOUO) Individuals A and B were designated as HRP Level █; individuals C and D were designated as █

The NCIS's Use of Advance Days

(FOUO) █
 █ █
 █
 █
 █
 █
 █

The AFOSI's Use of Advance Days

(FOUO) The AFOSI does not have criteria for advance security duties. However, we determined that it performed advance work for █ of █ missions █ per mission day that HRP were at the mission location. However, four missions used more than 1 working day per mission day and in four missions, advance work was performed by local AFOSI personnel instead of members of the permanent PSD team.³³

PFPA's Use of Advance Days

(FOUO) PFPA performed advance work for █ of █ missions within PFPA's general rule. For the missions we reviewed, PFPA typically used about █ per mission day for overnight travel outside the continental United States. PFPA personnel stated that █ are determined

³² Four missions that we reviewed did not have evidence that the NCIS agents performed advance security duties and are not included in the count of 16 missions.

³³ Three missions that we reviewed did not have evidence that the AFOSI agents performed advance duties and are not included in the count of 24 missions.

(FOUO) based on the resources available in country, international holidays, and the complexity of the trip. For example, an individual designated as HRP [REDACTED] spent [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] PFPA used [REDACTED] agents to perform [REDACTED] work [REDACTED] before the HRP to perform [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the individual visited while in [REDACTED]. The trip expenses averaged \$4,280 per advance agent and totaled \$22,718 for all the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who accompanied the individual on this [REDACTED] trip.

(FOUO) In sum, PPOs executed the number of [REDACTED] and number of agents sent for advance duties inconsistently and at times used more [REDACTED] to perform advance work than each of the PPO’s guidance or general rule suggested. This occurred because the USD(P) did not provide guidance on the number of agents or number of advance days agents should use in the Instruction. We recommend that the USD(P) establish a working group, including representatives from each PPO, to revise the Instruction and include guidance defining the size of advance teams, as well as the number of [REDACTED] of advance work that is needed for PSD missions. We also recommend that the Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School update Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35 to comply with any changes to the Instruction regarding the number of personnel and advance [REDACTED] an agent should perform at the mission location.³⁴

Additionally, the ASD(HD&GS) did not provide oversight of how the PPOs were conducting their PSD missions. We recommend that the USD(P) require and validate that the ASD(HD&GS) perform an annual review of the PPOs’ performance of PSDs to ensure compliance with the Instruction.

PPOs Did Not Consistently Use Security Control Rooms When They Performed PSDs Missions

(FOUO-LES) The PPOs did not consistently use security control rooms on PSD missions. Specifically, [REDACTED] PFPA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] ([REDACTED] percent) overnight missions we reviewed.³⁵ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and the AFOSI [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of the 24 ([REDACTED] percent) overnight missions reviewed; [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

³⁴ Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, “Protective Services,” May 2013.

³⁵ PFPA only provides protection to its HRP on missions outside the continental United States. Most of PFPA’s missions are part of larger trips that comprise multiple overnight locations.

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

(FOUO) The Instruction does not provide guidance on when PSDs should maintain security control rooms for HRP. However, the Instruction states that PSD support must be maintained at the [REDACTED] and employed only as necessary and appropriate based on the [REDACTED]

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]³⁶ Neither the NCIS, the AFOSI, nor PFPA has criteria for using security control rooms.³⁷

(FOUO) For the missions that we reviewed, [REDACTED] of the mission threat assessments cited a [REDACTED] to the individual. Table 6 shows the number of times that the PPOs used control rooms for overnight missions.

(FOUO-LES) Table 6. PPO Usage of Controls Rooms on Overnight Missions

PPO	(FOUO-LES)	(FOUO-LES)	(FOUO-LES)
USACIDC	1 ¹	1	1
NCIS	1	1	1
AFOSI	2 ²	1	1
PFPA	(FOUO-LES)	(FOUO-LES)	(FOUO-LES)

¹ Four of the five missions that used a security control room were for HRP Level 2.

² Instead of using a manned security control room, the AFOSI used a surveillance system to monitor the individual HRP hotel rooms during 5 of the 24 overnight missions.

Source: The DoD OIG with data from PPO mission files.

(FOUO) DoD Instruction O-2000.27, "DoD Senior Foreign Official Visit Program," provides guidance on when a [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

³⁶ Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, "Protective Services," May 2013.

³⁷ Pentagon Force Protection Agency, "Criminal Investigative and Protective Directorate Policy Memorandum, CIPD PM 9003-003," September 30, 2008, provides standard operating procedures for control rooms. However, the procedures related to the duties of control room agents and did not specify when control rooms were necessary for protective security missions.

(FOUO) [Redacted]

The USACIDC's Use of Security Control Rooms

(FOUO-LES) Missions Within the Continental United States

(FOUO-LES) [Redacted]

(FOUO-LES) [Redacted]

Missions Outside the Continental United States

(FOUO-LES) [Redacted]

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The NCIS's Use of Security Control Rooms

(FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ■ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The AFOSI's Use of Security Control Rooms

(FOUO) The AFOSI did [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] overnight missions we reviewed both inside and outside the United States. Instead of using a manned security control room, the AFOSI used a [REDACTED] to monitor the individual HRP hotel rooms during [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] overnight missions.³⁹

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FOUO) For example, AFOSI personnel provided protection to an HRP [REDACTED] on a 16-day trip to multiple [REDACTED] countries. They [REDACTED] in any location, and AFOSI field office agents local to the mission location did [REDACTED] permanent PSD agents were used and travel costs for the 16-day trip were \$46,999.

³⁸ (FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

³⁹ (FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PFPA’s Use of Control Rooms

(FOUO) We reviewed █ PFPA overnight travel missions outside of the United States and found that PFPA █ for █ of █ missions. █

█ Some reasons they provided for █

(FOUO) Based on our review of the █ missions for which PFPA █

(FOUO) For example, █ in █ and █ in support of an official visit by an individual designated as HRP █ The individual visited █ for █ days and visited █ for █ days. PFPA used the same █ agents to run the █ In total, █ PFPA agents from the National Capital Region, and █ USACIDC agent and █ AFOSI agent local to the mission locations supported these missions. Travel costs for the █ agents totaled \$29,261.

(FOUO) DoD Instruction O-2000.27, “DoD Senior Foreign Official Visit Program,” offers clear guidance on when █

We believe that clearer and more specific guidance on security control rooms for HRP would reduce unwarranted inconsistencies. We recommend that the USD(P) establish a working group including representatives from each PPO to revise the Instruction and include guidance on use of security control rooms. We also recommend that the Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School update Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35 to comply with any changes to the Instruction regarding use of security control rooms.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, “Protective Services,” May 2013.

PPOs Did Not Consistently Use Other PPOs or Field Office Agents Local to the PSD Mission When They Performed PSD Missions

The Instruction states that PPOs should provide mutual assistance on PSD operations to reduce costs, to reduce the need to have large standing PSDs, and to increase joint operations as recommended in the Instruction.

The PPOs inconsistently used the assistance of other PPOs or their field office agents local to the mission locations when conducting PSD missions. As discussed in the following sections, we determined the following:

- (FOUO) The USACIDC did not use assistance from other PPOs or USACIDC field office agents local to the mission location in █ of █ (█ percent), missions we reviewed.⁴¹ However, in March 2018, the USACIDC Commanding General directed USACIDC personnel to use all available Battalion assets before requesting support from USACIDC field agents. The USACIDC then stopped using other PPOs and field office agents local to the mission locations.
- (FOUO) █
█
█
- (FOUO) The AFOSI did not use assistance from other PPOs or AFOSI field office agents near the mission location in █ of █ (█ percent) missions we reviewed.
- (FOUO) PFPA did not use assistance from other PPOs in █ of █ (█ percent) missions we reviewed.

The USACIDC's Use of Other PPOs or Local Field Office Agents When Performing PSDs

The USACIDC Commanding General directed USACIDC personnel to use Battalion personnel instead of requesting assistance from USACIDC field agents.

(FOUO) The USACIDC did not use assistance from other PPOs or USACIDC field office agents local to the mission location in █ of █ missions we reviewed. Additionally, in March 2018, the USACIDC Commanding General directed USACIDC personnel to use Battalion personnel instead of requesting assistance from USACIDC

field agents. According to USACIDC personnel, the USACIDC did not request local support consistently because it wanted to preserve the integrity of the PSD team for the safety of the team and the HRP by using primarily USACIDC personnel.

⁴¹ Only 1 of the 17 PSD missions we reviewed occurred after the Commanding General directed USACIDC personnel to use all available Battalion assets before requesting support from USACIDC field agents.

(FOUO-LES) For example, an individual designated as HRP [REDACTED] traveled on official DoD business to [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] USACIDC agents. The USACIDC has a field office at [REDACTED] but instead of requesting support from the field office agents, the USACIDC sent all [REDACTED] agents from the Battalion. Travel costs for the agents were \$7,308.

The Battalion personnel stated that their mission was to provide protection and that they preferred to use Battalion personnel because they work and train together daily. Additionally, the Battalion preferred to maximize its resources and not to take “case agents” assigned to the field away from investigative work.

(FOUO) According to the USACIDC Headquarters Planning and Operations Officer, who coordinates the taskers for requesting PSD personnel from other PPOs and USACIDC field agents, the USACIDC requested support from other PPOs on [REDACTED] missions in 2016, [REDACTED] missions in 2017, and only [REDACTED] mission in 2018. The Battalion’s Assistant Operations Officer stated that the USACIDC used local support but stopped requesting personnel from other PPOs and Army units in March 2018. According USACIDC personnel, the USACIDC Commanding General directed USACIDC personnel to use all available Battalion assets before requesting support from USACIDC agents located at the temporary duty location of the HRP. According to USACIDC personnel, in providing this direction, the Commanding General stated that the primary mission of the USACIDC is to prevent crime and perform investigations and that his third priority is the PSD mission. He stated that he did not want to take field agents away from their investigative workload to perform PSD operations. However, the USACIDC not using local personnel on PSD missions does not reduce costs or reduce the need to have large standing PSD, as recommended by the Instruction.

According to a 2017 USACIDC review, the USACIDC PSD mission tasked to the field to support the Battalion accounted for 332 man-days or a 2-percent loss of personnel that could have been put toward criminal investigations.

The NCIS’s Use of Other PPOs or Local Field Office Agents When Performing PSDs

(FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The AFOSI's Use of Other PPOs or Local Field Office Agents When Performing PSDs

(FOUO) The AFOSI did not use the assistance of other PPOs in [REDACTED] of the 27 missions we reviewed. According to the personal security advisers on three AFOSI PSD teams, the AFOSI used support from other PPOs when protecting foreign dignitaries or when multiple HRP who were protected by different PPOs attended events together.

(FOUO) However, the AFOSI did use AFOSI agents in local field offices in [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] missions to assist in PSD missions rather than sending personnel from the National Capital Region. AFOSI personnel involved their local field office detachments early in the PSD planning process by sending a notification whenever HRP were expected to visit a field detachment's area of responsibility. According to the AFOSI Protective Service Operations Program Manager, field detachment agents were used because they are subject-matter experts in the area and already had points of contact established within the community. In addition, using local personnel to augment the permanent PSD teams can save on travel costs.

(FOUO) For example, for an HRP [REDACTED] mission to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both located in [REDACTED] the AFOSI used [REDACTED] AFOSI agents from the local AFOSI field detachments to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] on the PSDs. This enabled the permanent PSD team to send only [REDACTED] agents from Washington, D.C. on the mission and save on travel costs for the [REDACTED] Washington D.C.-based agents. Travel costs for the [REDACTED] agents were \$3,289.

PFPA's Use of Other PPOs or Local Field Office Agents When Performing PSDs

(FOUO) PFPA did not use assistance from other PPOs in [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] missions we reviewed but did use the assistance of other PPOs when available. PFPA personnel stated that PFPA requests assistance from other PPOs by communicating with each PPO's protective security operations office. PFPA provides details related to the mission, such as the location, to see if any local agents that are PSD-trained are available to support PFPA. When available, agents from the other PPOs assisted PFPA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FOUO) For example, PFPA used two USACIDC personnel to support an official DoD business trip to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in June 2018. Instead of sending [REDACTED] from the National Capital Region, PFPA used support from USACIDC agents located in [REDACTED] to support the mission. The [REDACTED] USACIDC agents performed [REDACTED] for the mission in both countries. Using local support allowed PFPA to send only [REDACTED] from the National Capital Region to travel and perform the PSD. Travel costs for the [REDACTED] total agents were \$32,879. In addition, PFPA used an AFOSI agent located in [REDACTED] to assist with a site advance for an official visit in August 2015. Travel costs for the [REDACTED] total agents were \$29,261.

In sum, the Instruction states that PPOs should provide mutual assistance on PSD operations when practical to reduce costs, reduce the need to have large standing PSDs, and increase joint operations. The Instruction also states that it is the ASD(HD&GS)'s responsibility to review the adequacy of DoD Component programs in meeting the requirements of the DoD HRP program.

However, the PPOs did not consistently use the assistance of the other PPOs or local field agents on PSDs when practical to reduce costs, reduce the requirements to have large standing details, and increase joint operations as recommended by the Instruction. These inconsistencies occurred because none of the PPOs had policy emphasizing the use of local personnel or assistance from other PPOs when conducting PSD missions. We recommend that the PPO Directors and the Commanding Generals of the USACIDC and the AFOSI develop and issue policy consistent with the Instruction, emphasizing the use of assistance from other PPOs and local field agents when conducting PSD missions.

Again, the ASD(HD&GS) did not provide oversight over the performance of PSDs. The Instruction states that it is the ASD(HD&GS)'s responsibility to review the adequacy of DoD Component programs in meeting the requirements of the DoD HRP program. However, according to personnel at the ASD(HD&GS), it has not

The ASD(HD&GS) did not provide oversight over the performance of PSDs. performed any reviews or oversight of the PPOs. According to ASD(HD&GS) personnel, they do not have the resources to review the PPOs and relied on the reviews that the Joint Chiefs of Staff Inspector General performed on the PSDs conducted at the combatant commands on a 2-year cycle. The 14 staff assist visits we reviewed assessed an overview of PSD operations, knowledge of appropriate use of PSDs, domicile-to-duty, and ethics training of the PSD members. The reviews stated that the PSD programs were generally operating in compliance with established procedures. However, the reviews did not assess how the PPOs executed individual missions and assessed only the PSDs for the combatant

commands, not the PSDs for the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretaries of Defense, or Secretaries and Chiefs of Staffs of the Services. We recommend that the USD(P) require and validate that the ASD(HD&GS) perform an annual review of the PPOs' performance of PSDs to ensure compliance with the Instruction.

Conclusion

The PPOs inconsistently provided protection to HRP when advancing agents, using security control rooms, and using local field office personnel or other PPO agents for assistance. These inconsistencies occurred because the Instruction does not define or discuss proper use of advance agents or security control rooms and the ASD(HD&GS) did not provide oversight of the PPOs to ensure the consistent use of advance agents, control room and the assistance of other PPOs, which could have resulted in fewer resources expended to perform missions in accordance with the Instruction. The Instruction states that the ASD(HD&GS) is responsible for reviewing the adequacy of the DoD Components in meeting the requirements of the DoD HRP program; however, the ASD(HD&GS) has never performed a review of the PPOs' performance of PSDs. We believe that the reviews required in the Instruction are critical to ensure that PPOs operate efficiently and consistently to protect HRP.

Management Actions Taken

On February 4, 2020, PFPA issued the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, Operations Unit Instruction Number 7, "Mutual Assistance on Protective Service Missions," which states that PFPA Protective Services Division Operations is authorized to request and provide mutual assistance regarding PSDs. Furthermore, it states that for each PSD, PFPA personnel will request mutual assistance from DoD PPOs in order to reduce operational costs and manage staffing requirements at PFPA. As a result of PFPA's actions taken during this audit, we did not make a recommendation to PFPA to issue guidance emphasizing the use of other PPOs when conducting PSDs.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation B.1

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:

- a. Establish a working group including representatives from each protection-providing organization to revise DoD Instruction O-2000.22 to include guidance on:
 - i. The size and number of days of advance work needed for protective security detail missions.

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, responding for the USD(P), agreed with the recommendation and stated that the USD(P) will establish the working group no later than 15 business days after the DoD Office of Inspector General issues the final report and anticipates completing the revision to the guidance approximately 6 to 8 months after the formal working group completes work on the proposed changes.

Our Response

Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, addressed all the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the Instruction includes guidance on the size and number of days of advance work needed for PSD missions.

Naval Criminal Investigative Service Comments

(FOUO) Although not required to comment, the Deputy Director Operations [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

Our Response

We acknowledge and appreciate the comments from the Deputy Director Operations.

ii. Use of security control rooms.

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, agreed with the recommendation and stated that USD(P) will establish the working group no later than 15 business days after the DoD Office of Inspector General issues the final report and anticipates completing the revision to the guidance approximately six to eight months after the formal working group completes work on the proposed changes.

Our Response

Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, addressed all the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the Instruction includes guidance on the use of security control rooms.

- b. Require and validate that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Global Security) perform an annual review of the protection-providing organizations' performance of protective security details to ensure compliance with DoD Instruction O-2000.22.**

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, agreed with the recommendation and stated that the USD(P) will draft a policy memo for the Deputy Secretary to sign 15 business days after the release of the final report. The policy will establish a requirement for the Component heads to submit annual reports that identify all HRP in their organizations or under their commands, include a listing of the number of agents assigned to each individual HRP PSD, and provide the cost of protection for each HRP. The Deputy Assistant Secretary further stated that the USD(P) will incorporate the guidance into the revision of the Instruction and that the ASD(HD&GS) will establish a plan, not earlier than 90 days after the issuance of the revised Instruction, to conduct an annual review of the PPOs' performance of PSDs and their compliance with the revised Instruction.

Our Response

Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, addressed all the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the ASD(HD&GS) established a plan to conduct the annual reviews.

Recommendation B.2

We recommend that the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command develop and issue policy consistent with DoD Instruction O-2000.22 emphasizing the use of assistance from other PPOs and local field agents when conducting protective security details.

U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Comments

(FOUO) The USACIDC Commanding General agreed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Our Response

Comments from the USACIDC Commanding General did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. While the Commanding General agreed with the recommendation, he did not outline plans to develop and issue policy to endorse or emphasize the use of assistance from other PPOs and local field agents when conducting protective security details. We request that the Commanding General provide the specific actions that the USACIDC will take to emphasize the use of assistance from other PPOs and local field agents when conducting PSDs when operationally feasible.

Recommendation B.3

We recommend that the Director of Naval Criminal Investigative Service Global Operations develop and issue policy consistent with DoD Instruction O-2000.22 emphasizing the use of assistance from other PPOs and local field agents when conducting protective security details.

Naval Criminal Investigative Service Comments

The Deputy Director Operations, responding for the Director of NCIS Global Operations, partially agreed with the recommendation and stated that the NCIS entity responsible for policy creation and oversight of protective operations is the NCIS Headquarters Criminal Investigative Directorate, not the Executive Assistant Director of NCIS Global Operations. He further stated that the current NCIS Volume 3, Chapter 35, Protective Operations pre-dates the Instruction and that an updated Chapter 35 will be completed during FY 2020 to include language matching the Instruction.

Our Response

Comments from the Deputy Director Operations addressed all the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the NCIS issued policy emphasizing the use of other PPOs and local field agent personnel on PSD missions.

Recommendation B.4

We recommend that the Commanding General of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations develop and issue policy consistent with DoD Instruction O-2000.22 emphasizing the use of assistance from other PPOs and local field agents when conducting protective security details.

Air Force Office of Special Investigations Comments

The Director, Strategic Programs and Requirements, Office of Special Investigations, responding for the AFOSI Commanding General, agreed and stated that the AFOSI will review AFOSIMAN 71-144, volume 3, "Protective Service Operations," to ensure policy guidance is consistent with the Instruction regarding providing mutual assistance on PSD operations. The estimated completion date to implement the revision is September 30, 2020.

Our Response

Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the AFOSI revised AFOSIMAN 71-144, volume 3, to be consistent with the Instruction, emphasizing the use of assistance from other PPOs and local field agents when conducting protective security details.

Recommendation B.5

We recommend that the Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School update Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, “Protective Services,” May 2013, to comply with any changes to DoD Instruction O-2000.22:

- a. Regarding the number of personnel and number of days of advance work, an agent should perform at the mission location.**

U.S. Army Military Police School Comments

The U.S. Army Military Police School Director of Training and Education, responding for the U.S. Army Military Police School Commandant, agreed with the recommendation and stated that information in the Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35 regarding advance work is intended to be a guide for the user. He further stated that revisions to the Instruction should not limit the number of agents and time to an absolute value as it may negatively affect the detail’s ability to perform an adequate advance, which could increase risk. The Director recommended that the revised Instruction reflect Army Techniques Publication guidance as the minimum requirement and that the U.S. Army Military Police School be included as a participant in the working group tasked with revising the Instruction.

Our Response

Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We acknowledge that the number of personnel and timing of advance work may require flexibility dependent on the circumstance of each mission. However, we believe that including representatives from each PPO will provide the tactical expertise necessary to develop an acceptable range of agents and advance timing required for effective implementation. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the Army Techniques Publication is updated in accordance with the revised Instruction regarding the number of personnel and number of days of advance work an agent should perform at the mission location.

b. Regarding the use of security control rooms.***U.S. Army Military Police School Comments***

The U.S. Army Military Police School Director of Training and Education agreed with the recommendation and stated that information in the Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35 regarding control rooms is intended to be a guide for the user. The Director recommended the revised Instruction reflect Army Techniques Publication guidance as the minimum requirement and that the U.S. Army Military Police School be included as a participant in the working group tasked with revising the Instruction.

Our Response

Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the Army Techniques Publication is updated in accordance with the revised Instruction regarding the use of security control rooms.

Finding C

The USACIDC Used More Personnel Than Other PPOs and More Than Authorized in the Instruction, While the Other PPOs Used Personnel in Accordance With the DoD Instruction

The USACIDC assigned more personnel to PSDs to protect HRP than the other PPOs and assigned more personnel than authorized by the Instruction. Specifically,

- (FOUO) The USACIDC assigned more personnel to the PSDs than the Instruction allowed for █ of the █ HRP it protects, by an overall total of █ personnel.
- The NCIS was within the guidelines of the Instruction for all seven HRP it protects.
- (FOUO) The AFOSI was within the guidelines of the Instruction for all █ HRP it protects.

The USACIDC assigning more personnel to PSDs than authorized in the Instruction occurred because USD(P) personnel did not clarify or define in the Instruction whether the authorized number of agents to protect HRP is determined by mission, location, or day, or applies to staffing multiple work periods during the day, and the ASD(HD&GS) did not provide oversight over the performance of PSDs.

(FOUO-LES) █
 █
 █
 █

USACIDC Assigned More Personnel to PSDs Than the Other PPOs and Assigned More Than Authorized by the Instruction

The USACIDC did not always operate within the established guidelines and assigned more personnel to protect HRP than the other PPOs.

The USACIDC Overstaffed PSD Teams

(FOUO) The USACIDC has a dedicated Protective Services Battalion (the Battalion) to providing protection for [REDACTED] HRP. The USACIDC staffed the Battalion primarily with active duty military personnel, but supplemented it with two reserve detachments that are mobilized for 1 year at a time.

(FOUO) During the time of our audit, the Battalion’s records showed that it was authorized [REDACTED] active duty soldiers and [REDACTED] reservists. Additionally, the Battalion was authorized [REDACTED] individual mobilization augmentees that mobilized when the USACIDC needed them to support PSD travel.⁴²

(FOUO) The Instruction authorizes a maximum of [REDACTED] personnel to protect HRP assigned to the USACIDC. However, the Army had [REDACTED] personnel authorized to the Battalion and another [REDACTED] agents authorized to support PSD missions. Table 7 shows the number of personnel the USACIDC assigned to protect each HRP and the number of agents USACIDC assigned over the maximum authorized allowance.

(FOUO) Table 7. USACIDC’s Protective Services Battalion Personnel Assigned Per HRP and the Number of Agents Above or Below the Maximum Authorized Allowance

(FOUO) [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] (FOUO)

⁴² Individual mobilization augmentees are individual reservists attending drills who receive training and are preassigned to an active component, a Selective Service System, or a Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that must be filled on, or shortly after, mobilization. The augmentees can be used for up to 36 days of service per year.

(FOUO) Table 7. USACIDC's Protective Services Battalion Personnel Assigned Per HRP and the Number of Agents Above or Below the Maximum Authorized Allowance (cont'd)

(FOUO) ████████	████	████████████████████	██████████	████████████████████
█	██████	█	█	█
█	██████	█	█	█
████		██████	█	█ (FOUO)

Note: We did not include HRP that were not protected by Battalion personnel.

Source: The DoD OIG with data from the USACIDC and the DoD Instruction O-2000.22, "Designation and Physical Protection of DoD High-Risk Personnel," June 19, 2014.

(FOUO) As shown in Table 7, the USACIDC assigned more personnel to the PSD teams than the Instruction allowed for █ out of the █ HRP it protects. If the USACIDC determined that more agents were necessary to protect HRP due to threat conditions or compelling operational needs, the USACIDC could have requested from the USD(P) a temporary deviation from the number of agents allowed in the Instruction. However, the USACIDC did not request and the USD(P) did not approve any deviations, as required by the Instruction, for the USACIDC HRP in Table 7.

The NCIS Staffed PSD Teams Within Authorized Limits

The NCIS was within the guidelines of the Instruction for all seven HRP it protects. Table 8 shows the number of personnel the NCIS assigned to protect HRP and the number of agents above or below the maximum authorized allowance.

(FOUO) Table 8. NCIS Personnel Assigned Per HRP and the Number of Agents Above or Below the Maximum Authorized Allowance

(FOUO) ████████	████	████████████████████	██████████	████████████████████
█	██████	█	█	█
█	██████	█	█	█
█	██████	█	█	█ (FOUO)

(FOUO) Table 8. NCIS Personnel Assigned Per HRP and the Number of Agents Above or Below the Maximum Authorized Allowance (cont'd)

(FOUO) [Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted] (FOUO)

* (FOUO) The USD(P) approved a deviation of an additional [Redacted] agents for the Commander of U.S. Central Command. However, the NCIS assigned only [Redacted] agents. Therefore, the NCIS is not above the authorized number of agents for the Commander, U.S. Central Command.

Source: The DoD OIG with data from the NCIS and the DoD Instruction O-2000.22, "Designation and Physical Protection of DoD High-Risk Personnel," June 19, 2014.

(FOUO) As shown in Table 8, the NCIS had [Redacted] personnel, including special agents and military personnel dedicated to performing PSDs for seven designated HRP. The NCIS staffed each PSD within the guidelines of the Instruction.

The AFOSI Staffed PSD Teams Within Authorized Limits

(FOUO) The AFOSI was within the guidelines of the Instruction for all [Redacted] HRP it protects. Table 9 shows the number of personnel the AFOSI assigned to protect HRP and the number of agents above or below the maximum authorized allowance.

(FOUO) Table 9. AFOSI Personnel Assigned Per HRP and the Number of Agents Above or Below the Maximum Authorized Allowance

(FOUO) [Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted] (FOUO)

(FOUO) Table 9. AFOSI Personnel Assigned Per HRP and the Number of Agents Above or Below the Maximum Authorized Allowance (cont'd)

(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO) Allowance
(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)
(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)
(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)
(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)
(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)	(FOUO)

* (FOUO) The USD(P) approved protection at HRP (FOUO) while outside the United States.

Source: The DoD OIG with data from the AFOSI and the DoD Instruction O-2000.22, "Designation and Physical Protection of DoD High-Risk Personnel," June 19, 2014.

(FOUO) As shown in Table 9, the AFOSI had (FOUO) personnel, including special agents and security forces, dedicated to provide PSD for (FOUO)-designated HRP. AFOSI staffed each HRP within the guidelines of the Instruction.

PFPA Did Not Assign Agents to a Permanent PSD

(FOUO) Since PFPA does not (FOUO), and protects HRP (FOUO) (FOUO) PFPA did not (FOUO) (FOUO) (FOUO) The Instruction states that HRP (FOUO) do (FOUO) (FOUO) Because HRP Level (FOUO) are (FOUO) (FOUO) (FOUO)

(FOUO) USACIDC Assigned and Used More Staffing on Missions to Protect HRP [REDACTED] Than the NCIS or the AFOSI

(FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]⁴³

The Instruction authorizes [REDACTED] agents for each HRP [REDACTED] permanent PSD.

(FOUO) Table 10 shows that the AFOSI and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to the USACIDC, which assigned [REDACTED] more personnel than authorized. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] (FOUO-LES)

¹ Each stop in a multi-location trip is counted as a single mission. We did not include protection provided within the individual HRP place of duty or residence in the mission count.

² The combined size of the assigned PSD team does not include PPO leadership or administrative support personnel.

Source: The DoD OIG with data from the PPO mission files.

(FOUO) The AFOSI and the NCIS complied with the Instruction regarding the number of personnel assigned to the PSD teams. The USACIDC did not. Although the USACIDC performed more missions with the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff than the AFOSI and the NCIS, it assigned [REDACTED] more personnel to the PSD teams than authorized in the Instruction. If USACIDC personnel required additional agents, USACIDC personnel should have requested a deviation from the [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] agents authorized per team. However, USACIDC personnel did not request any deviation for additional agents.

(FOUO) The Instruction states that PPOs will maintain PSD support at the minimal level required and provides a PSD size range for each HRP level. However, the Instruction does not define whether the authorized number of agents to protect an HRP is by mission, location, or day, or applies to staffing multiple work periods

⁴³ (FOUO) We compared the number of personnel assigned to the PSD team for HRP Level 2 and the number of PSD personnel used on PSD missions for HRP Level 2. Neither the NCIS, the AFOSI, nor PFPA protect any HRP Level 1 personnel.

(FOUO) during the day. The USACIDC assigned more personnel to PSDs teams that protected [REDACTED] HRP than authorized in the Instruction. By contrast, the AFOSI and the NCIS assignments complied with the Instruction.

(FOUO) USACIDC Used More Personnel When Performing Missions for [REDACTED] HRP Than the AFOSI

(FOUO) The Instruction authorizes six to nine agents for an HRP Level [REDACTED] but does not state if the count includes personnel from DoD security forces, military police, or agents located at the site to which the HRP travel. Additionally, the Instruction does not clarify how to apply the ranges, and whether the authorized number of agents to protect an HRP is by mission, location, or day, or applies to staffing multiple work periods during the day. According to the Instruction, the size ranges for PSDs include personnel who work directly on PSDs, but not PPO leadership or administrative support personnel. Additionally, ASD(HD&GS) personnel, on behalf of the USD(P), stated that these ranges allow for annual leave, sick leave, and training time. Furthermore, ASD(HD&GS) personnel, on behalf of the USD(P), stated that these ranges represent the maximum number of agents that may be assigned permanently to the PSD, not an on-duty, daily or mission total.

(FOUO) The following is an example of a PSD mission where the USACIDC used more personnel than authorized. We determined that the USACIDC used [REDACTED] agents to provide security for an HRP [REDACTED] that traveled to five locations, four of which were overseas on official duty in February 2018. According to the USACIDC Battalion Operations Officer, the USACIDC used these [REDACTED] agents because the trip dates were too close together to send agents from one mission to the next and also complete the required advance duties. The travel costs for the [REDACTED] agents were \$128,879. Table 11 shows the number of unique agents that the USACIDC sent on each PSD mission of the multi-location trip, outside of the United States, for the individual designated as HRP Level 2 who traveled on official DoD business.⁴⁴

(FOUO-LES) Table 11. Number of USACIDC Agents Used on Each PSD Mission for a Multi-Location Trip

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	(FOUO-LES)

⁴⁴ A unique agent is one that is making a first appearance on the mission.

(FOUO-LES) Table 11. Number of USACIDC Agents Used on Each PSD Mission for a Multi-Location Trip (cont'd)

(FOUO-LES)			
			(FOUO-LES)

* If an agent worked more than one location during the mission, that agent was counted once.

Source: The DoD OIG with data from USACIDC mission files.

According to ASD(HD&GS) personnel, if the USACIDC needed additional PSD personnel to support the multi-location trip, it should have requested a deviation from the USD(P) as required by the Instruction.

(FOUO) In contrast, the AFOSI used [redacted] agents to protect an HRP [redacted] who traveled on official DoD business, on a six-location trip, with four locations outside the United States, in January 2018. Travel costs for the PSD mission were \$46,999. Table 12 shows the number of unique agents that the AFOSI sent on each PSD mission of a multi-location trip for an HRP [redacted]

(FOUO) Table 12. Number of AFOSI Agents Used on Each PSD Mission for a Multi-Location Trip

(FOUO)	Threat Level	Dates (2018)	(FOUO)
	Informal Assessment ²	Jan 23-24	
	Low	Jan 24- 30	
	Informal Assessment	Jan 30- Feb 04	
	Informal Assessment	Feb 04-07	
	Low	Feb 07-08	
	No Assessment	Feb 08-09	
(FOUO)		Total AFOSI Agents	(FOUO)

¹ If an agent worked more than one location during the mission, that agent was counted once.

² In informal threat assessments, advance agents or the personal security adviser received a threat briefing from the local AFOSI field office agents or the regional security officer upon arrival to the mission location. According to AFOSI personnel, there were no threats to the HRP disclosed during the Alaska assessment. In addition, according to AFOSI personnel, the personal security officer received a verbal threat assessment upon arrival to India and Singapore and could not provide further details regarding the specifics of the briefing.

Source: The DoD OIG with data from AFOSI mission files.

(FOUO) The AFOSI sent agents directly from one mission location to another. For example, one agent who provided protection in [REDACTED] flew directly to [REDACTED] after the HRP departed [REDACTED]. Additionally, [REDACTED] agents who provided protection in [REDACTED] flew directly to [REDACTED] after the HRP departed [REDACTED].

(FOUO-LES) Army Regulation 190-58 states that PSD size range guidelines will comply with the Instruction.⁴⁵ Additionally, the Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35 states that the number of personnel assigned to a PSD depends on several factors and must be tailored to each situation.⁴⁶ The Publication also states that the number of PSD personnel is based on current information on the threat location and resources available. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

USACIDC personnel stated that the reason they used more personnel on PSD missions was because the Instruction is unclear on whether the number of personnel authorized is per mission, location, or day, or applies to staffing multiple work periods during the day. USACIDC personnel stated that their interpretation of the PSD team sizes defined in the Instruction is on a per-day basis rather than a total team size.

ASD(HD&GS) personnel stated that these ranges represent the maximum number of agents that may be assigned permanently to the PSD, not an on-duty or daily total. The other PPOs stated that they understood the policy as written.

In March 2017, the USACIDC reviewed its protective services mission. In October 2017, the Battalion prepared a brief for the Commanding General that determined that the Battalion historically staffed PSDs up to two to three times the number of personnel authorized by the Instruction. The study further concluded that misinterpretation and/or subjectivity of the Instruction, along with expectations and requests from HRP to provide higher levels of protection, caused the USACIDC

⁴⁵ Army Regulation 190-58, "Designation and Protection of High Risk Personnel," February 25, 2018.

⁴⁶ Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, "Protective Services," May 2013.

to maintain more personnel than authorized. Based on the results, the team performing the study proposed three courses of action: clarify and operate within the Instruction, grow the Battalion, or transfer missions for select HRP to other PPOs. However, the review did not have any recommendations, and according to USACIDC members of the team that conducted the review, the USACIDC never implemented any corrective actions.

In October 2017, the Battalion prepared a brief for the Commanding General that determined that the Battalion historically staffed PSDs up to two to three times the number of personnel authorized by the Instruction.

Finally, USACIDC personnel stated that in October 2017, USACIDC personnel met with ASD(HD&GS) personnel to discuss the ranges of personnel authorized to protect HRP personnel and that ASD(HD&GS) personnel clarified how the ranges could be applied to the mission. According to USACIDC personnel, they requested that ASD(HD&GS) personnel issue clarifying guidance regarding their interpretation of personnel size ranges; however, ASD(HD&GS) personnel did not issue the additional guidance. According to ASD(HD&GS) personnel, they knew that the USACIDC routinely performed PSDs outside of the guidance of the Instruction. However, ASD(HD&GS) personnel said they did not direct the USACIDC to stay within the Instruction or hold it accountable for not doing so. According to the Instruction, the ASD(HD&GS) is responsible for reviewing the adequacy of DoD Component programs in meeting the requirements of the DoD HRP program.

The inconsistencies in the number of personnel used by the PPOs occurred because the USD(P) did not clarify and specify in the Instruction how to apply the number of personnel authorized to protect HRP and ASD(HD&GS) personnel did not provide oversight of the PPOs' performance of PSDs. Using more PSD personnel when performing PSDs increases travel and personnel costs. We recommend that the USACIDC Commanding General modify the number of personnel assigned to protect each HRP and the number of personnel used on each mission to comply with the Instruction. We also recommend that the USD(P) require and validate that the ASD(HD&GS) perform an annual review of the PPOs' performance of PSDs to ensure compliance with the Instruction. Additionally, the USD(P) should establish a working group including representatives from each PPO to clarify and revise the Instruction to include guidance on the maximum number of agents permanently assigned to an HRP team and used when performing a PSD mission. Finally, the Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School should update Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35 to comply with any changes to the Instruction regarding the number of agents necessary to perform a PSD by HRP level.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, "Protective Services," May 2013.

Conclusion

The USACIDC used more agents to perform PSDs than allowed in the Instruction and more than the other PPOs used to perform similar missions. As a result, the USACIDC spends more resources to provide protection than other PPOs.

ASD(HD&GS) personnel stated that these ranges represent the maximum number of agents that may be assigned permanently to the PSD. Without oversight and

The USACIDC used more agents to perform PSDs than allowed in the Instruction and more than the other PPOs used to perform similar missions.

direction from the ASD(HD&GS), as required in the Instruction, the USACIDC will continue to overstaff its PSDs and use financial and personnel resources that could be used to support other DoD operations.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation C.1

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:

- a. **Establish a working group including representatives from each protection-providing organization to revise DoD Instruction O-2000.22 to include clarifying guidance on the maximum number of agents permanently assigned to a high-risk personnel team and that can be used when performing a protective security detail mission.**

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, responding for the USD(P), agreed with the recommendation and stated that the USD(P) will establish the working group no later than 15 business days after the DoD Office of Inspector General issues the final report and anticipates completing the revision to the guidance approximately 6 to 8 months after the formal working group completes work on the proposed changes.

Our Response

Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, addressed all the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the Instruction includes guidance on the maximum number of agents permanently assigned to a HRP team and that can be used when performing a PSD mission.

- b. Require and validate that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Global Security) perform an annual review of the protection-providing organizations' performance of protective security details to ensure compliance with DoD Instruction O-2000.22.**

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, agreed with the recommendation and stated that the USD(P) will draft a policy memo for the Deputy Secretary to sign, 15 business days after the release of the final report. The policy will establish a requirement for the Component heads to submit annual reports that identify all HRP in their organization or under their commands, include a listing of the number of agents assigned to each individual HRP PSD, and provide the cost of protection for each individual HRP. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense further stated that the USD(P) will incorporate the guidance into the revision of the Instruction and that the ASD(HD&GS) will establish a plan, not earlier than 90 days after the issuance of the revised Instruction, to conduct an annual review of the PPOs' performance of PSDs and their compliance with the revised Instruction.

Our Response

Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, addressed all the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the ASD(HD&GS) established a plan to conduct the annual reviews.

Recommendation C.2

We recommend that the Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School update Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, "Protective Services," May 2013, to comply with any changes to the DoD Instruction O-2000.22 regarding the number of agents necessary to perform a protective security detail by high-risk personnel level.

U.S. Army Military Police School Comments

The U.S. Army Military Police School Director of Training and Education agreed with the recommendation and stated that the U.S. Army Military Police School will be unable to take corrective action to update the Army Techniques Publication until the Instruction is revised. He stated that the U.S. Army Military Police School will complete revisions to the Army Techniques Publication within 18 months of

the completion of the revised Instruction. The Director recommended that the U.S. Army Military Police School be included as a participant in the working group tasked with revising the Instruction.

Our Response

Comments from the Director addressed all the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the U.S. Army Military Police School revised the Army Techniques Publication to comply with any changes to the Instruction regarding the number of agents necessary to perform a protective security detail by HRP Level.

Recommendation C.3

We recommend that the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command modify the number of personnel assigned to protect each individual HRP and the number of personnel used on each mission to comply with the DoD Instruction 2000.22.

U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Comments

(FOUO) The USACIDC Commanding General agreed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Our Response

Comments from the USACIDC addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved; but will remain open. We acknowledge the actions that the USACIDC took in May 2019 to restructure and reduce personnel assigned to specific HRP teams. However, we also understand that the USACIDC did not reduce the size of the Battalion, but realigned protective service agents to unassigned teams designated as local support that can assist the permanent teams assigned to HRP as needed. Table 1, "Permanent HRP Levels and Protected Personnel," in the report shows the number range of personnel that the Instruction authorizes to protect each HRP. According to ASD(HD&GS) personnel these ranges allow for annual leave, sick leave, and training time. Furthermore, ASD(HD&GS) personnel stated that these ranges represent the maximum number of agents that may be assigned permanently to the PSD, not an on-duty, daily, or mission total. Additionally, we discussed in the report the process, outlined in the Instruction, for requesting a deviation from the number of personnel supporting the PSD mission for each HRP. We did not review other Executive Branch protection details as part of this audit; however, Recommendation C.1.a recommended that the USD(P) convene a working group with the PPOs to clarify guidance related to the maximum number of agents that can be used when performing PSD missions. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the number of personnel assigned by the USACIDC to protect each HRP and the number of personnel used on missions comply with the Instruction.

Other Matters of Interest

The PPO Directors Raised Concerns About Providing PSD Services to HRP

During the audit, the Directors of the PPOs shared with us concerns about providing PSD services to HRP. For example, as discussed in the following sections:

- The USACIDC Commanding General and the former AFOSI Commander expressed concerns about the overall burden on the PPOs of performing the PSD missions.
- (FOUO) [REDACTED]
- The USACIDC Commanding General and the former AFOSI Commander stated that HRP sometimes requested that PSD agents stay with the individual HRP detail for multiple tours of duty, which can cause the agents to lose their investigative skills and competitiveness for promotion.

The PSD Mission Is a Burden to the USACIDC and the AFOSI

The former AFOSI Commander and the USACIDC Commanding General expressed concerns about the overall burden on the PPOs of performing the PSD mission. The former AFOSI Commander stated that performing PSDs is only one function of the AFOSI mission, and that performing the PSD mission takes resources away from the PPOs' primary mission. He further suggested that instead of using special agents to perform the PSDs, other personnel, such as security force personnel, should be used.

The Commanding General expressed similar concerns. He stated that other assets, such as military police, should be used to perform PSDs instead of special agents who are highly trained in investigation and law enforcement. The USACIDC Commanding General also stated that the primary mission of the USACIDC is crime prevention and crime investigation, and the third priority is performing PSDs.

According to the Instruction, qualified service members and civilian DoD employees who are assigned to investigative, law enforcement, or security duties with the PPOs can provide physical protection and personal security. Therefore, the PPOs have the flexibility to assign security forces or military police rather than investigative personnel. According to the PPOs, all four PPOs use a mix of special agents and law enforcement personnel; however, each PPO handles the personnel positions differently. For example, the AFOSI uses AFOSI special agents to support the PSD mission and the AFOSI has memorandums of agreement with other Air Force commands to use their security force personnel to assist in conducting PSD missions.

In contrast, the Executive Assistant Director of NCIS Global Operations stated that performing the PSD mission is not a burden and the NCIS uses less than 2 percent of its special agent workforce to support the PSD mission. The Director of PFPA stated that protection is PFPA’s mission and PFPA would welcome more of the protective services mission than it currently executes.

(FOUO) The Instruction Requires a Personal Security Adviser to Be [REDACTED] Unless Working on a PSD

The three PPOs discussed their belief that the personal security adviser should be armed while working in the office, which is not allowed by the Instruction. The Instruction states that the personal security adviser should be a credentialed special agent who has attended approved advanced protection training. However, the Instruction further states that the personal security adviser is not authorized to be armed or to provide physical protection except when acting as a member of the PSD. According to the PPOs, special agents are required to always be armed and when the special agent performs the duties of a personal security adviser and is working in the office and not actively on a PSD mission, being armed violates the Instruction.

(FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The former AFOSI Commander stated that the AFOSI has policies that require agents to always be armed. He further stated that agents are armed based on AFOSI mission requirements.

(FOUO) The PFPA Director stated that all Federal agents are armed and that

arise in which he or she would need to protect HRP.

The Commanding General of the USACIDC did not comment on the arming of personal security advisers.

(FOUO) ASD(HD&GS) personnel, on behalf of the USD(P), stated that agents working in the capacity of a could be armed on a daily basis when working in the offices of HRP who are authorized protection in the Instruction. Furthermore they stated that if an HRP

However, according to the PPO Directors the Instruction does not clarify that interpretation. We recommend that the USD(P) establish a working group including representatives from each PPO to re-evaluate and revise the Instruction to clarify

HRP Request Agents Who Continue Working for the Detail for Multiple Tours of Duty

The USACIDC Commanding General and the former AFOSI Commander stated that HRP sometimes request PSD agents to stay with the individual HRP detail for multiple tours of duty, which caused the agents to lose their investigative skills and competitiveness for promotion. PPO personnel also stated that when an agent performs multiple tours in the PSD area, it creates issues with the rotation of agents in other critical mission areas, such as investigations.

The Executive Assistant Director of NCIS Global Operations and the Assistant Director of NCIS Global Operations also discussed the potential impacts of an agent staying on a PSD for multiple tours. They stated that when an agent or HRP requests an agent to stay on a PSD team, NCIS management discusses the long-term career effects of continuing to stay in the PSD job for an extended period, such as effects on career advancement, with the agent and then asks the agents what he or she would like to do. The Executive Assistant Director stated that the assignment is a mutual decision between the agent and HRP. In addition, he stated that NCIS leadership should be flexible and adjust accordingly.

We recommend that the USACIDC Commanding General and the AFOSI Commanding General determine and document whether an internal policy is necessary to limit the number of years a special agent can spend working in the PSD mission area.

Management Comments on the Findings and Our Response

For the full text of the management comments on the Findings and our responses, see Appendix B.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation D.1

~~(FOUO)~~ We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy establish a working group including representatives from each protection-providing organization to revise DoD Instruction O-2000.22 to [REDACTED]

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, responding for the USD(P), agreed with the recommendation and stated that the USD(P) will establish the working group no later than 15 business days after the DoD Office of Inspector General issues the final report and anticipates completing the revision to the guidance approximately 6 to 8 months after the formal working group completes work on the proposed changes.

Our Response

~~(FOUO)~~ Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance, addressed all the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the Instruction includes [REDACTED]

Naval Criminal Investigative Service Comments

~~(FOUO)~~ Although not required to respond, the Deputy Director Operations agreed and stated that a working group should be established to review the policy on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Our Response

We acknowledge and appreciate the comments from the Deputy Director Operations.

Recommendation D.2

We recommend that the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command determine and document whether an internal policy is necessary to limit the number of years a special agent can spend in the protective security detail mission area.

U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Comments

(FOUO) The USACIDC Commanding General agreed, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Our Response

Comments from the USACIDC Commanding General addressed all the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and closed. No further comments are required.

Recommendation D.3

We recommend that the Commanding General of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations determine and document whether an internal policy is necessary to limit the number of years a special agent can spend in the protective security detail mission area.

Air Force Office of Special Investigations Comments

The Director, Strategic Programs and Requirements, Office of Special Investigations, responding for the AFOSI Commanding General, agreed with the recommendation and stated that The AFOSI reviewed its current assignment process and determined that limiting the duration of years an agent can spend in the protective service mission by policy on a protective service operations assignment is unnecessary. Currently, a typical protective service operations tour

the Air Force civilian employees. He further stated that mandating a standardized protective service operations tour length would be counterproductive for the AFOSI to ensure full mission support to the Department of the Air Force. He concluded that the AFOSI's current assignment process ensures maximized flexibility to effectively support the protective service mission, as well as the investigative mission, contingency operations, professional development, and the career choices of its personnel. The Office of Special Investigations will periodically review this process and consider the need to adjust internal policy consistent with this recommendation by the DoD Office of Inspector General.

Our Response

Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and closed. No further comments are required.

Appendix A

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from September 2018 through April 2020 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We interviewed personnel from the following organizations to determine the roles and responsibilities for managing and conducting PSDs.

1. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
2. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Global Security)
3. Joint Chiefs of Staff
4. Pentagon Force Protection Agency
5. U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
6. Naval Criminal Investigative Service
7. Air Force Office of Special Investigations

We did not evaluate the PSD missions conducted by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service since it did not conduct independent PSD missions and instead supported other PPOs in their missions.

We reviewed the following guidance related to PSDs.

1. DoD Instruction O-2000.22, "Designation and Physical Protection of DoD High-Risk Personnel," June 19, 2014
2. DoD Instruction O-2000.27, "DoD Senior Foreign Official Visit Program," December 20, 2012
3. DoD Manual 4500.36, "Acquisition, Management, and Use of DoD Non-Tactical Vehicles," July 7, 2015
4. Army Regulation 190-58, "Designation and Protection of High Risk Personnel," February 25, 2018
5. Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, "Protective Services," May 2013
6. Army Techniques Publication 5-19, "Risk Management," April 2014
7. NCIS Manual 3, 2008
8. AFOSI Manual 71-144, Volume 3, "Protective Service Operations," August 16, 2017

9. Air Force Instruction 71-101, Volume 2, "Protective Service Matters," May 21, 2019
10. Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Counterterrorism Division, "Protective Service Operations Quick Reference Guide, Version 3," October 2012

We determined how the number of agents in DoD Instruction O-2000.22 was chosen at each HRP level and whether the PPOs conducted PSDs within those size ranges. We also reviewed domicile-to-duty procedures for 12 HRP located in the National Capital Region.

We reviewed nomination packages for designated HRP to determine if packages were completed and processed in accordance with DoD Instruction O-2000.22. Additionally, we reviewed personal security vulnerability assessments completed by each PPO to determine if the HRP level recommended was reasonable based upon the threat assessment and operational considerations.

PPO Mission Files

(FOUO-LES) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We used computer-processed data obtained from the Army Law Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System, Consolidated Law Enforcement Operations Center, and Web-Based Investigative Information Management System to select a sample of PSD missions for review. We verified the data in these systems for our sample missions using supplemental data through the course of our audit work.

⁴⁸ The total number of missions does not include protection provided within the individual HRP place of duty or residence or support provided to personnel when traveling to or based out of contingency zones.

Because the Instruction does not apply to HRP protection in combat zones and areas outside the United States where contingency or expeditionary force operations are underway, we excluded these missions from our review.

We used computer-processed data from the Defense Travel System to obtain travel voucher data related to the missions in our sample for HRP and their PSD personnel. On September 25, 2015, the Defense Logistics Agency Office of Inspector General issued the results of the audit, “Statement of Standards for Attestation Engagement No. 16 SSAE 16.” The SSAE 16 audit provided reasonable assurance of the input, processing, or output of Defense Travel System data, so we concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable.

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued one report discussing PSDs. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>.

GAO

GAO -14-745 “DoD Needs to Update General and Flag Officer Requirements and Improve Availability of Associated Costs,” September 2014.

The GAO found that general flag officer personal security details, and certain enlisted and officer aide costs, were not readily available. By defining the officer aide position and general flag officer and associated aide costs, the DoD will be able to better account for the full costs of general flag officers and improve its ability to make sound workforce allocation decisions.

Appendix B

Management Comments on the Finding, Unsolicited Comments, and Our Response

Pentagon Force Protection Agency Comments

The PFPA Acting Director provided the following comments on the finding. For the full text of the Pentagon Force Protection Agency comments, see the Management Comments section of the report.

The Acting Director stated that PFPA concurred with the majority of the report's recommendations and looks forward to any forthcoming working groups to enhance the protective service program in the future.

PFPA Comments

The PFPA Acting Director stated that although the majority of information in the report is not classified, aggregating the information in the report discloses operational capabilities that could damage the program. PFPA recommended that the DoD Office of Inspector General consider increasing the report classification to Confidential or Secret.

Our Response

We acknowledge and appreciate the PFPA Acting Director's comments. We acknowledge that while there is no classified information contained in the report, a compilation of certain unclassified information could warrant a higher overall report classification. None of the other stakeholders expressed concern with the overall classification of the report. Additionally, we coordinated with the DoD Office of Inspector General Office of Security and General Counsel on the classification.

PFPA Comments

The PFPA Acting Director stated that the Instruction allows individuals to be nominated for HRP protection if there is an imminent and credible threat and does not require a specific threat for protection. The Acting Director further stated that PFPA documented imminent and credible threats in all the threat assessments the DoD Office of Inspector General reviewed.

Our Response

(FOUO) We acknowledge and appreciate the PFPA Acting Director's comments. We recognize that the Instruction does not require a specific threat to protect an individual. However, we found that [REDACTED] personal security vulnerability assessments that we reviewed, [REDACTED] documented a specific threat to the individual. PFPA does not dispute this finding in its comments.

PFPA Comments

The PFPA Acting Director stated that PFPA uses minimum advance days to complete its advance work. The Acting Director further stated that while PFPA maintains general advance time frames, each mission is unique and the number of the advance days will vary with the complexity of the trip.

Our Response

(FOUO) We acknowledge and appreciate the PFPA Acting Director's comments. We agree and acknowledge in the report that PFPA performed advance work for [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] missions within PFPA's general rule.

PFPA Comments

The PFPA Acting Director stated that PFPA provides advance criteria to its agents including standard operating procedures for site surveys and collection requirements. Furthermore, the Acting Director stated that PFPA typically uses 2 working days or less for advance work. He also stated that the report stated that "PFPA generally used 2 working days at the mission location," which is accurate but not consistent with another statement in the report that said "PFPA typically used 1 working days or less to perform advance work per day that HRP were at the mission location."

Our Response

(FOUO) We acknowledge and appreciate the PFPA Acting Director's comments. However, we explained in the report that the criteria provided by PFPA did not specify the number of advance days needed for PSD missions. PFPA stated that there should generally be [REDACTED] at the mission location for every day that HRP are at mission location. Furthermore, the report stated the number of days PFPA told auditors it typically used for advance work. Finally, we found during our review of sample missions, that PFPA typically used [REDACTED] working day or less to perform advance work per day HRP were at the mission location.

PFPA Comments

The PFPA Acting Director stated that PFPA does not typically use control rooms outside the continental United States, but uses residential security to perform nighttime protective services. Furthermore, the Acting Director stated that the residential security did not maintain a separate room and that the Pentagon Operations Center maintained command and control during these missions.

Our Response

~~(FOUO-LES)~~ We acknowledge and appreciate the PFPA Acting Director's comments.

Our report identified that a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We found that in [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] overnight missions we reviewed, PFPA used control rooms for missions outside of the United States that did not take place on military installations. Additionally, according to the mission files and PFPA personnel, PFPA typically [REDACTED]

PFPA Comments

The PFPA Acting Director stated that PFPA provided the number of personnel used for each PSD mission in our sample and work schedules to estimate costs. The Acting Director also stated that travel costs for PFPA agents are recorded in the Defense Travel System.

Our Response

We acknowledge and appreciate the PFPA Acting Director's comments. We agree that PFPA provided number of personnel, work schedules, and information regarding travel costs for missions in our sample. However, PFPA was unable to provide detailed support for the total annual costs for its PSD work because it does not separately track or segregate all costs associated with its PSDs.

PFPA Comments

The PFPA Acting Director stated that HRP positions do relate to threat and that compelling operational needs are generally associated with the position activities, not the person holding office.

Our Response

We acknowledge and appreciate the Acting Director's comments. While we acknowledge that some DoD positions may be inherently high risk, we found the threat to HRP is not always uniform across the HRP level. Additionally, we found

that because the Instruction does not define “compelling operational needs,” the term is interpreted differently across PPOs and is not always associated with position activities.

PFPA Comments

The PFPA Acting Director stated that the ASD(HD&GS) regularly requests meetings with PFPA discussing threats related to PFPA’s recommendations for PSD support on HRP travel outside the continental United States.

Our Response

We acknowledge and appreciate the Acting Director’s comments. However, the comment refers to the individual HRP nomination packages for travel outside the continental United States that PFPA sends to ASD(HD&GS) requesting additional personnel over the PSD size range designated in the Instruction. Those packages are different from the nomination packages referenced in the report, which are either 1) individuals who are designated as HRP in the Instruction but are requesting an increased level of PSD protection or 2) individuals who are not designated as HRP in the Instruction but are requesting PSD protection due to either an imminent and credible threat to the safety of the individual or compelling operational considerations.

PFPA Comments

The PFPA Acting Director stated that its mission-planning procedures always require requesting other PPOs for support of PSD missions. PFPA explained that the decision to use PPOs depends on various factors including competing manpower priorities, training objectives, and program cost saving. The Acting Director stated that PFPA received excellent external PPO support, which saved the Department money.

Our Response

(FOUO) We acknowledge and appreciate the PFPA Acting Director’s comments. However, we determined that PFPA did not use assistance from other PPOs in ■ of ■ missions. PFPA does not dispute this finding in its comments.

Management Comments

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy



HOMELAND DEFENSE
& GLOBAL SECURITY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2600

May 11, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL (ATTN: PROGRAM DIRECTOR FOR AUDIT
ACQUISITION, CONTRACTS, AND SUSTAINMENT)

SUBJECT: Inspector General of the Department of Defense Report, "Audit of Protective
Security Details in the Department of Defense"

On behalf of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, I appreciate the opportunity to review the Inspector General's draft report and provide comments on the recommendations for the USD(P) and the report's public release. Please find the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's response at TAB A, in which we agree with all of the recommendations with one exception. We also believe the report, as written currently, is marked properly for public release.

The points of contact for this response are [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Maurer".

Derek J. Maurer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance

Attachment:
as stated

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (cont'd)

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TAB A: Policy Response to Recommendations in DoD Inspector General Report, "Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense"

- **Recommendation A.1.a:** "Eliminate the preassigned levels of protection for permanent high-risk personnel in DoD Instruction O-2000.22 and revise the Instruction to clarify that protection for high-risk personnel should be based on recommendations supported in the high-risk personnel's personal security vulnerability assessments or nomination packages."
 - OUSD(P) position: Disagree.
 - Reason for disagreement: The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in October 2011, established the preassigned permanent high-risk personnel (HRP) protection levels in the DoD Instruction (DoDI). These permanent levels were based on recommendations in the "Independent Review of Post-9/11 Security Measures of the Department of Defense," completed in 2010.

All positions (except for the Under Secretaries of Defense) with preassigned permanent protection levels are also listed in Section 714 of Title 10 U.S. Code. Section 714 gives the Secretary of Defense statutory authority to provide continuous protection within the U.S. to certain persons who, by nature of their positions, require such protection. The preassigned permanent HRP protection level for the Under Secretaries of Defense was adapted from recommendations in the 2010 Independent Review.
 - Proposed alternative corrective actions: Policy intends to review the preassigned permanent HRP protection levels for positions listed in DoDI O-2000.22, in conjunction with the assessments to be completed on the individuals who occupy those positions during formal coordination of the revised instruction. Formal coordination of the revised DoDI will begin once the working group that is established to address the other recommendations in the report completes work on all proposed changes. Consistent with DoDI 5025.01, *DoD Issuance Program*, the timeline for publishing the revised DoDI O-2000.22 is approximately six to eight months.
- **Recommendation A.1.b:** "~~(FOUO)~~ Establish a working group, including representatives from each protection-providing organization, to revise DoD Instruction O-2000.22 to include guidance on whether high-risk personnel can [REDACTED] protection provided under the Instruction and a standardized waiver process and the circumstances in which a waiver might be appropriate."
 - OUSD(P) position: Agree.
 - Actions taken or planned: Policy will establish a working group to implement this recommendation and the other recommendations contained in the report.
 - Actual or planned completion dates: Policy will convene the working group, not later than 15 business days after release of the final report, to prepare for a formal revision of DoDI O-2000.22.

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Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (cont'd)

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- **Recommendations A.1.c:** “Require and validate that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense & Global Support) performs an annual review of the protection-providing organization’s performance of protective security details to ensure compliance with DoD Instruction O-2000.22.”
 - OUSD(P) position: Agree.
 - Actions taken or planned: Policy intends to draft a new policy memo for the Deputy Secretary’s signature, not later than 15 business days after release of final report, to establish a requirement for Component heads to submit annual reports that identify all HRPs in their organizations or under their commands, list the number of agents assigned to the HRPs’ PSDs, and provide the cost of protection for each HRP for the reporting period. In accordance with DoDI 5025.01, Policy will then incorporate the guidance into the revision of DoDI O-2000.22.
 - The ASD(HD&GS) intends to establish and implement a long-range plan to conduct an annual review of the protection-providing organizations (PPOs) performance of PSDs and their compliance with the revised DoDI, when completed.
 - Actual or planned completion dates: As noted, Policy intends to seek approval of a policy memorandum within 15 days of the publication of the report and then incorporate the guidance into the revision of DoDI 2000.22, along the previously noted timeline.
 - The ASD(HD&GS) intends to implement the strategy to conduct an annual review of PPOs’ performance of PSDs not earlier than 90 days after publication of the revised DoDI.
- **Recommendation B.1.a.i:** “Establish a working group including representatives from each protection-providing organization to revise DoD Instruction O-2000.22 to include guidance on the size and number of days of advance work needed for protective security detail missions.”
 - OUSD(P) position: Agree.
 - Actions taken or planned: Policy will include this action in the task list for the working group established under recommendation A.1.b. above.
 - Actual or planned completion dates: As stated previously, Policy will establish the working group not later than 15 business days after release of final report with the goal of publishing revision to DoDI O-2000.22 along the previously noted timeline.
- **Recommendation B.1.a.ii:** “Establish a working group including representatives from each protection-providing organization to revise DoD Instruction O-2000.22 to include guidance on use of security control rooms.

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Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (cont'd)

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- OUSD(P) position: Agree.
- Actions taken or planned: Policy will include this action in the task list for the working group established under recommendation A.1.b. above.
- Actual or planned completion dates: As stated previously, Policy will establish the working group not later than 15 business days after release of final report.
- **Recommendations B.1.b**: “Require and validate that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense & Global Support) performs an annual review of the protection-providing organization’s performance of protective security details to ensure compliance with DoD Instruction O-2000.22.”
 - OUSD(P) position: Agree.
 - Actions taken or planned: See Recommendation A.1.c.
 - Actual or planned completion dates: See Recommendation A.1.c.
- **Recommendation C.1.a**: “Establish a working group including representatives from each protection-providing organization to revise DoD Instruction O-2000.22 to include clarifying guidance on the maximum number of agents permanently assigned to a high-risk personnel team and that can be used when performing a protective security detail mission.”
 - OUSD(P) position: Agree.
 - Actions taken or planned: Policy will include this action in the task list for the working group established under recommendation A.1.b. above.
 - Actual or planned completion dates: As stated previously, Policy will establish the working group not later than 15 business days after release of final report.
- **Recommendations C.1.b**: “Require and validate that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense & Global Support) performs an annual review of the protection-providing organization’s performance of protective security details to ensure compliance with DoD Instruction O-2000.22.”
 - OUSD(P) position: Agree.
 - Actions taken or planned: See Recommendation A.1.c.
 - Actual or planned completion dates: See Recommendation A.1.c.

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Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (cont'd)

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- **Recommendation D.1:** “Establish a working group including representatives from each PPO to revise DoD Instruction O-2000.22 to clarify guidance on when a personal security adviser can be armed.”
 - OUSD(P) position: Agree.
 - Actions taken or planned: Policy will include this action in the task list for the working group established under recommendation A.1.b. above.
 - Actual or planned completion dates: As stated previously, Policy will establish the working group not later than 15 business days after release of final report

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Pentagon Force Protection Agency



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
PENTAGON FORCE PROTECTION AGENCY
9000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-9000



MAY 08 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Protective Security Detail in the Department of Defense Draft Audit Report (Project No. D2018-D000AW-0203.000).

Thank you for the opportunity to review and provide comment on the above drafted audit on protective service details in the Department of Defense. PFPA concurs with the majority of the report's recommendations and looks forward to any forthcoming working groups to enhance the protective service program in the future. Given the importance of the report, PFPA has provided a few comments for consideration to support precise findings for sound recommendations.

Issue (Cover Page): Current text reads: "...The final report that we issue from this draft will not have the "For Official Use only markings unless an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act requires the markings."

Comment: While the majority of disclosed information in and of itself is not classified, the totality of information presented in the report we feel discloses operational capabilities at a level that could be damaging to the program. PFPA recommends considering changing the overall classification to Confidential or Secret.

Issue (Page ii): Current text reads: "PPOs protected HRP based on the HRP position instead of specific threats to the HRP. Specifically we determined that: none of the 31 personal security vulnerability assessments that we reviewed documented a specific, imminent threat to HRP and even though there was no known specific threat to HRP, seven HRP received protection at a higher level than the protection designated in the instruction."

Comment: PFPA provides protective support to designated HRP level 2.5 and produces country-specific threat assessments for OCONUS official travel to support protective service detail recommendations. DoDI O-2000.22 states, the DoD Component heads may nominate individuals under their authority, direction, and control for HRP protection if there is an imminent and credible threat to the safety of the individual for whom protection is to be provided. Further, policy does not advise a specific threat to the HRP is required. Imminent threats are defined as "likely to occur at any time," and credible threats are defined as "offering reasonable grounds for being believed, of sufficient capability to be militarily effective." Under this guidance, PFPA defined imminent and credible threats in all threat assessments reviewed. (This comment is applicable to comparable statements made on Pages 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 32 of this report as well).



Pentagon Force Protection Agency (cont'd)

Issue (Page ii): Current text reads: “For missions we reviewed the PPOs did not consistently use advance personnel for missions, and at times used more days to perform advance work than each PPO’s guidance or general rule suggested.”

Comment: PFPA uses minimum advance days to complete the advance requirements. Each mission and protective program is logistically unique. For example, PFPA largely performs protective service missions OCONUS and typically has to consider longer travel times, country-specific holidays, quantity of facility on the itinerary and their travel distances, temporary residential locations, host country advance meeting schedules, threats, etc., which all dictate advance travel lead times. PFPA maintains general advance timeframes, but reviews each protective service mission independently to ensure advance objectives are achieved proficiently at the lowest operational costs possible.

Issue (Page 12): Current text reads: “PFPA did not have criteria for advance security duties; however, PFPA typically used 1 working days or less to perform advance work per day that HRP were at the mission location. PFPA sends advance agents to locations outside of the United States when HRP stay overnight.”

Comment: PFPA provides advance security criteria, to include standard operating procedures and site surveys with information collection requirements for facilities, residences, hospitals, airports and motorcades. PFPA typically uses 2 working days or less to perform advance work and sends advance agents to all locations visited. On Page 36 of this report, it states, “PFPA generally used two working days at the mission location,” which is accurate but not consistent with the aforementioned issue statement.

Issue (Page 14): Current text reads: PFPA did not have criteria for the use of control rooms. However, in 14 of the 25 overnight missions we reviewed PFPA used control rooms for missions outside of the United States that did not take place on military installations.”

Comment: PFPA typically does not use control rooms outside the United States. Of the 25 overnight missions reviewed in this report, PFPA used residential security primarily to perform nighttime protective services while the rest of the detail was recovering off duty. Residential security did not maintain a separate room for command and control purposes. The primary command and control element was maintained at the Pentagon Operations Center during these missions. For stateside missions involving foreign visitors requiring protective support, control rooms were authorized only for Ministers of Defense.

Issue (Page 18): Current text reads: “We also asked the PPOs for costs related to the PSDs. However, they were unable to provide us PSD personnel costs or total program costs because they do not separately track costs for the PSD program.”

Comment: PFPA provided the number of personnel used for each protective service mission reviewed, along with accurate work schedules for hours claimed to produce manpower costs for the program. Also, time is accurately recorded in the Defense Agencies Initiative. Mission-associated travel costs are recorded in the Defense Travel System, and travel estimates were produced for each mission and provided.

Pentagon Force Protection Agency (cont'd)

Issue (Page 28-29): Current text reads: “However the Instruction states that protection must be determined based on an imminent and credible threat to the individuals’ safety or compelling operational consideration. The Instruction also states that PPOs will maintain PSD support at the minimal level required and that PSDs will be used only as necessary, based on threat. Therefore, we recommend that the USDP should eliminate the preassigned levels of protection for permanent high-risk personnel in the DoD Instruction O-2000.22 and revise the Instruction to clarify that protection for high-risk personnel should be based on recommendations supported in the high-risk personnel’s personal security vulnerability assessments or nomination packages.”

Comment: PFPA concurs to remove predetermined HRP levels that dictate protective resources differently between HRPs. PFPA advocates to focus protective requirements on both the risk of all associated hazards to an HRP as well as compelling operational needs to support the HRP’s mission. PFPA recommends the Department formally characterize personnel security vulnerability assessments in terms of risk and further define the requirements for risk assessments, as referenced in the DoDI 2000.22.

Issue (Page 31-32): Current text reads: “Overall, the PPOs are basing their protection of HRP on the position rather than the threats to the HRP.”

Comment: HRP Positions do relate to potential threats. DoDI O-2000.22 states PSVA recommendations will be based upon the criticality, vulnerability, and threat related to the position. PSVAs require focus on several areas associated with the HRP position, such as online public information, position visibility and travel, security awareness, daily routine, office, other frequented locations, and specific threats to DoD personnel. Further, compelling operational needs is generally associated with the position activities, not the person holding office.

Issue (Page 32): Current text reads: “Additionally, ASD (HD&GS) personnel stated they considered reviewing the nomination packages as a review of the process and that they do not have the resources to review the actual execution of PSDs at the PPOs.”


Comment: HD&GS has consistently requested threat justification meetings for PFPA nomination packages supporting HRP OCONUS travel. In one instance, HD&GS policy representatives did not believe PFPA justified a compelling threat or operational need and non-concurred with PFPA’s recommendation to provide protective detail support.

Issue (Page 47): Current text reads: “PFPA did not use assistance from other PPOs in 14 of 26 (54 percent) mission we reviewed.”

Comment: PFPA maintains mission-planning procedures that always require asking other PPOs for protective detail support. Decisions to use external PPOs are based on numerous factors, to include competing manpower priorities, training objectives and program cost saving. Overall, PFPA received excellent external PPO support, which saved the Department money. (This comment is applicable to comparable statements made on Page 49 of this report as well).

Pentagon Force Protection Agency (cont'd)

Thank you for your time and consideration. We look forward to serving an active role in any working groups developed to address the Inspector General findings and recommendations.



Daniel P. Walsh
Acting Director

U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND
27130 TELEGRAPH ROAD
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-2253

CIOP-ZA

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General

SUBJECT: Response to the Office of the Inspector General's Audit: "Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense", Project No. D2018-D000AW-203.000

1. Reference: DoD Instruction (DoDI) O-2000.22 (Designation and Physical Protection of DoD High-Risk Personnel), 19 June 2014.
2. Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the recommendations in the subject audit report. Attention to these issues should further strengthen fiscal responsibility and clarify guidance in the execution of this important mission of providing protective services to the most senior leaders within the Department of Defense.
3. DoDIG Recommendation B.2: *We recommend that the Commanding General, USACIDC develop and issue policy consistent with DoD Instruction O-2000.22 emphasizing the use of assistance from other protection-providing organizations (PPOs) and local field agents when conducting protective security details (PSDs).*

Official Response: We agree with this recommendation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

We look forward to supporting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy working group to revise the Instruction as noted in your Recommendation C.1.

4. DoDIG Recommendation C.3: *We recommend that the Commanding General, USACIDC modify the number of personnel assigned to protect each HRP and the number of personnel used on each mission to comply with the DoD Instruction O-2000.22.*

Official Response: We agree to this recommendation with comment. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (cont'd)

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CISA-ZA

SUBJECT: Response to the Office of the Inspector General's Audit: "Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense" Project No. D2018-D000AW-203.000

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

We look forward to supporting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy working group to revise the Instruction as noted in your Recommendation C.1.

5. DoDIG Recommendation D.2: *We recommend that the Commanding General, USACIDC determine and document whether an internal policy is necessary to limit the number of years a special agent can spend working in the PSD mission area.*

Official Response:

a. We agree with this recommendation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (cont'd)

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CISA-ZA

SUBJECT: Response to the Office of the Inspector General's Audit: "Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense" Project No. D2018-D000AW-203.000

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6. The point of contact for this memorandum is [REDACTED], USACIDC G-2/3, at [REDACTED].

VEREEN,KEVIN [REDACTED]

KEVIN VEREEN
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Naval Criminal Investigative Service




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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS
NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
27130 TELEGRAPH ROAD
QUANTICO VA 22134-2253

INFO MEMO

May 11, 2020


FOR: PROGRAM DIRECTOR FOR AUDIT, ACQUISITION, CONTRACTING AND SUSTAINMENT, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE


FROM: C. R. Baldwin, III, Deputy Director Operations 

SUBJECT: (U) NCIS Response to DoD Inspector General Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense

Reference: DoD IG Draft Audit of DoD Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense

- (U) This Memorandum serves to comply with the reference.
- (U) NCIS comment to the draft DoD Inspector General Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense are as follows:
 - (U) Recommendation A.1.a: Eliminate the preassigned levels of protection for permanent HRP's in DoD Instruction O-2000.22 and revise the instruction to clarify that protection should be based on recommendations supported in the HRP's PSVA or nomination package.

- ~~(FOUO)~~ 

- ~~(FOUO)~~ 

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Naval Criminal Investigative Service (cont'd)

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a baseline of security, acts as a deterrent, and ensures the continuity of national command structure.

- (U) Recommendation A.1.b: Establish a working group, including representatives from each protection-providing organization, to revise DoD Instruction O-2000.22 to include guidance on whether HRP's can decline protection provided under the Instruction and a standardized waiver process and the circumstances in which a waiver might be appropriate.

- ~~(FOUO)~~ [REDACTED]

- (U) Recommendation B.1.a.i: Establish a working group to revise DoDI O-2000.22 to include guidance on the size and number of days of advance work needed for protective security details.

- ~~(FOUO)~~ [REDACTED]

- (U) Recommendation B.3: We recommend that the Director of NCIS Global Operations develop and issue policy consistent with DoDI O-2000.22 emphasizing the use of assistance from other PPO's and local field agents when conducting protective security details.

- (U) NCIS partially concurs with the recommendation of emphasizing in policy the use of assistance from other PPOs and local field agents when conducting protective security details. The NCIS entity responsible for policy creation and oversight of protective operations is the NCIS Headquarters Criminal Investigation Directorate, not the Executive Assistant Director of NCIS Global Operations. The current NCIS Volume 3, Chapter 35, Protective Operations pre-dates DoD Instruction O-2000.22 as guiding policy. An updated NCIS Chapter 35 will be completed during FY20 and we will ensure language matching the current DoD Instruction O-2000.22 (2018) is included: "Protection-providing organizations (PPOs) should provide mutual assistance on PSD operations when practical to increase joint operations, and to reduce costs and the requirement to have large standing details."

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Naval Criminal Investigative Service (cont'd)

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- (FOUO) [REDACTED]

- (FOUO) [REDACTED]

- (FOUO) [REDACTED]

COORDINATION: NCIS Legal Counsel, Inspector General, and Criminal Operations Directorate

Prepared By: [REDACTED]

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Air Force Office of Special Investigations



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA

27 April 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: HQ OSI/XR
27130A Telegraph Road
Quantico, VA 22134

SUBJECT: OSI Response to DoD Office of Inspector General Draft Report, "Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense" (Project No. D2018-D000AW-0203.000)

1. This is the Department of the Air Force, Office of Special Investigations (OSI) response to the DoDIG Draft Report, "Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense" (Project No. D2018-D000AW-0203.000). OSI concurs with the report as written and welcomes the opportunity to further discuss the implementation of the recommendations that the DoDIG developed for the Department of the Air Force Protective Service Operations program.

2. OSI/XR in coordination with SAF/IG will address recommendations for OSI identified in this report and develop and implement a corrective action plan outlined in the following recommendations:

RECOMMENDATION B.4: The DoDIG recommends that the Commanding General of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations develop and issue policy consistent with DoD Instruction O-2000.22, *Designation and Physical Protections of DoD High-Risk Personnel*, emphasizing the use of assistance from other PPOs and local field agents when conducting protective security details.

OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS RESPONSE: The Office of Special Investigations concurs with this recommendation and will review AFOSIMAN 71-144, Volume 3, *Protective Service Operations*, to ensure policy guidance is consistent with DoDI 2000.22 regarding, "Protection-providing organizations (PPOs) should provide mutual assistance on PSD operations when practical to increase joint operations, and to reduce costs and the requirement to have large standing details." The estimated completion date to review, update, and implement a revised AFOSIMAN 71-144, Volume 3, is 30 Sep 2020.

RECOMMENDATION D.3: The DoDIG recommends that the Commanding General of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations determine and document whether an internal policy is necessary to limit the number of years a special agent can spend in the protective security detail mission area.

OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS RESPONSE: The Office of Special Investigations concurs with this recommendation. We reviewed our current assignment process and determined that limiting the duration of years an agent can spend in the protective service mission by policy

Air Force Office of Special Investigations (cont'd)

on a Protective Service Operations assignment is unnecessary at this point. Currently, a typical Protective Service Operations tour length is 2-3 years for active duty members and 3-4 years for Department of the Air Force civilian employees. Mandating a standardized Protective Service Operations tour length will be counterproductive for the Office of Special Investigations to ensure full mission support to the Department of the Air Force. The Office of Special Investigations current assignment process ensures maximized flexibility to effectively support the protective service mission, as well as the investigative mission, contingency operations, professional development, and the career choices of its personnel. The Office of Special Investigations will periodically review this process and consider the need to adjust internal policy consistent with this recommendation by the DoDIG.

3. The OSI/XR point of contact is [REDACTED], or via e-mail:

[REDACTED]

MEHTA.JAMES
S [REDACTED]

Digitally signed by
MEHTA.JAMES.S

JAMES S. MEHTA, Colonel, USAF
Director, Strategic Programs and Requirements

U.S. Army Military Police School



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY MILITARY POLICE SCHOOL
14030 MSCOE LOOP, SUITE 1061
FORT LEONARD WOOD, MISSOURI 65473-8926

ATSJ-T

22 April 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR Internal Review and Audit Compliance HQ, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 705 Washington Blvd., Fort Eustis, VA 23604-5704

SUBJECT: Command Reply to DODIG Draft Report on the Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense (D2018-D000AW-0203.000)

1. USAMPS' reply to the subject draft report is enclosed. We concur with comment for Recommendation B.5.a, concur with comment for Recommendation B.5.b and concur with Recommendation C.2, as addressed to Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS).

2. Point of contact is [REDACTED], USAMPS Directorate of Training & Education, DSN [REDACTED].

GRAGG.MATTHEW.R
ONALD [REDACTED]

MATTHEW R. GRAGG
COL, MP
Director of Training & Education

Encl

U.S. Army Military Police School (cont'd)

Response to Draft Audit Report Recommendations

Draft Report, Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense
(Project D2018-D000AW-0203.000)

Recommendation B.5: We recommend that the Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School update Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, "Protective Services," May 2013, to comply with any changes to DoD Instruction O-2000.22:

B.5.a. Regarding the number of personnel and number of days of advance work, an agent should perform at the mission location.

B.5.b. Regarding the use of security control rooms.

USAMPS Response to Recommendation B.5.a: Concur with Comment. ATP 3-39.35, chapter 4, page 4-3, paragraph 4-8 states: "As a general rule, there should be one working day to properly complete advance work for every day of the mission. A complex or multisite mission may require more days. A less complicated mission with less sites required to survey may require less days. Sample site surveys can be found in appendix B. These examples should not be used as all-inclusive checklists, but rather starting points that can be modified as location and mission dictate". This information is intended to be a guide for the user. Revisions to the DoDI should not limit the number of agents and time to an absolute as it may negatively impact the detail's ability to perform an adequate advance, which could increase risk. Recommend any revision to DOD Instruction O2000.22 reflects ATP 3-39.35 guidance as the minimum requirement.

USAMPS Response to Recommendation B.5.b: Concur With Comment. ATP 3-39.35, chapter 4, page 4-8, paragraph 4-31 states: "At a minimum, a security control room is established when the principal will remain overnight or be at a location longer than 24 hours. However, a security control room may also be established on shorter missions as the security or threat level require." This information is intended to be a guide for the user. Recommend any revision to DOD Instruction O2000.22 reflects ATP 3-39.35 guidance as the minimum requirement.

Recommendation C.2: We recommend that the Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School update Army Techniques Publication 3-39.35, "Protective Services," May 2013, to comply with any changes to the DoD Instruction O-2000.22 regarding the number of agents necessary to perform a protective security detail by high-risk personnel level.

USAMPS Response to Recommendation C.2: Concur with Comment. USAMPS cannot take corrective action to update ATP 3-39.35 until the DOD completes its revision of DODI O-2000.22. Upon completion of the DOD revision, USAMPS will complete revisions to ATP 3-39.35 within 18 months.

U.S. Army Military Police School (cont'd)

Response to Draft Audit Report Recommendations

Draft Report, Audit of Protective Security Details in the Department of Defense
(Project D2018-D000AW-0203.000)

Additional Comments for DODIG's Consideration:

Recommend that USAMPS be included as a participant in the working group tasked with revising DOD Instruction O-2000.22.

Reference FOUO markings:

The existing markings are appropriate and no further information in the document requires FOUO markings.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFOSI Air Force Office of Special Investigations

ASD(HD&GS) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security

HRP High-Risk Personnel

NCIS Naval Criminal Investigative Service

PFFPA Pentagon Force Protection Agency

PPO Protection Providing Organization

PSD Protective Security Detail

USACIDC U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

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