Enhancing Security and Stability
In Afghanistan

December 2019

Report to Congress
In Accordance With Section 1225 of the
Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015
(P.L. 113-291), as amended.

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This report is submitted in accordance with sections 1225 and 1532 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended by sections 1213 and 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92), Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2017 (P.L. 114-328), and sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2018 (P.L. 115-91); section 1223 of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232); section 1216 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92); addresses p. 348 of House Report 116-84 to accompany H.R. 2968, the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2020; and provides information sought as indicated on p. 264 of Senate Report 116-48 to accompany S. 1790, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2020. It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, and a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State and is the eighth in a series of reports required semi-annually through calendar year 2020.

This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1, through November 30, 2019. The data cutoff date for this report is October 31, 2019. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. A classified annex accompanies this report. The next report will include an analysis of efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2019 through May 30, 2020.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The principal goal of the President’s South Asia Strategy is a durable and inclusive settlement to the war in Afghanistan that protects the United States homeland from terrorist attacks. During this reporting period, the United States, and Coalition Allies and partners help execute a focused military campaign against the Taliban and intensified efforts to counter ISIS-K and Al-Qaeda, while paving the way for reconciliation. The Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation pursued an agreement with the Taliban. President Trump suspended formal negotiations in September 2019 citing an attack in Kabul that killed 1 U.S. Soldier and 11 others. The President has expressed support for re-opening formal negotiations, but the Taliban must demonstrate their commitment to peace and end senseless violence against Afghans, and U.S., NATO and coalition partners’ forces. USFOR-A and Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) aggressively combatted ISIS-K and other terrorist groups, successfully preventing them from developing the ability to export violence. As long as Al-Qaeda and ISIS-K are operating in Afghanistan, maintaining U.S. military pressure on these terrorist groups is the best way to prevent their resurgence.

In the fall of 2018, USFOR-A adjusted its campaign plan to intensify pressure on the Taliban to drive the group to participate in negotiations to end the Afghan war. Under the campaign plan, USFOR-A enabled the ANDSF and launched initiatives to enhance preparedness, effectiveness and responsiveness. For example, the Crisis Response Group (CRG) is a virtual network utilized by the ANDSF and Coalition that identifies imminent or occurring threats across Afghanistan and communicates them quickly up the chain of command. In addition, the Combined Situation Awareness Room (CSAR) is an operations center staffed by various elements of the ANDSF and Coalition, to create a common vision for focusing on GIRQA level counterterrorism objectives. The Combined Situation Awareness Room (CSAR) speeds intelligence integration and communication, and promotes a common operating picture for ongoing operations. The additional capabilities provided by these new initiatives, coupled with USFOR-A’s sustained military pressure, helped prevent the Taliban from successfully seizing any provincial centers in 2019.

During this reporting period, terrorist and insurgent groups continued to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and Coalition forces. ISIS-K maintained the ability to conduct attacks, and sought to retain territory in eastern Afghanistan despite pressure from the Coalition, ANDSF and the Taliban. Although ISIS-K continues to develop connections to other networks outside of Afghanistan, it remains operationally limited to South and Central Asia. Al-Qaeda poses a limited threat to U.S. personnel and our partners in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) remains interested in attacking U.S. forces and other Western targets in Afghanistan. However, continuing U.S. counterterrorism pressure has reduced AQIS’s ability to conduct operations in Afghanistan without the support of the Taliban.

The Taliban employed a “fight-and-talk” strategy with no reduction in violence for the first half of the reporting period. In the lead-up to the Afghan presidential election, the Taliban increased the scale and violence of its attacks against population centers, including indiscriminate attacks against civilians to disrupt the democratic process, pressure the United States and delegitimize the Afghan government.
The Presidential Election occurred on September 28, 2019, and the Taliban attempted to undermine it through high profile attacks (HPAs), civilian casualties and intimidation. However, with effective advising by USFOR-A, and by applying lessons learned from the 2018 elections, the ANDSF successfully secured polling sites and facilitated voting.

Resolute Support (RS) focused its advisory efforts on “decisive people, places and processes” that have the greatest impact on ANDSF development, make a positive contribution to campaign objectives, and increase the immediate return on investment. RS efforts to optimize its advising mission involves a networked approach across the Coalition, from the ministerial to the tactical level, to better align all efforts.

Sustained levels of violence and ANDSF casualties contributed to ANDSF attrition outpacing recruitment and retention. Although the high OPTEMPO of 2019 has stretched the ANDSF, they have denied the Taliban the ability to accomplish their campaign objectives. The Afghanistan Special Security Forces (ASSF) remain the most capable force in the ANDSF and continue to grow in their effectiveness. Reorganization of the command structure for ASSF advising has enabled the ASSF to respond more effectively to crises, and coupled with the continued improvement in capability of the Afghan Air Force (AAF), they have increased ANDSF battlefield effectiveness and self-reliance.
SECTION 1 – STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

The United States vital national interest in Afghanistan is to ensure the country is never again used as a safe haven from which terrorists can attack the United States or our Allies or interests abroad. The principal goal is a durable and inclusive political settlement that ends the war in Afghanistan on terms favorable to the United States and mitigates the terrorist threat in the region. The United States continues to pursue a conditions-based strategy focused on increasing military pressure on Taliban commanders. This has helped set the conditions for Taliban leadership to hold talks with the United States government. President Trump suspended United States negotiations with the Taliban in September and announced a restart of talks with the Taliban in November. United States strategy continues to focus on getting the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban to the negotiating table to reach a stable, inclusive political settlement.

Under Operation FREEDOM’s SENTINEL (OFS), the United States maintains approximately 13,000 military personnel in Afghanistan supporting complementary missions to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces under the NATO RS mission and to conduct counterterrorism operations. The authorities and enablers provided by OFS enable U.S. forces to partner with the ANDSF to defeat Taliban insurgents, al-Qa’ida (AQ), and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K).

Although the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan fluctuates regularly due to troop rotations and conditions on the ground, there have been no changes to DoD’s mission or to the United States commitment to our security partnership with the Afghan Government. United States personnel maintain a presence primarily at bases in Kabul and Bagram with regional hubs in Laghman and Nangarhar Province in the east, Kandahar Province in the south, Herat Province in the west, Helmand in the southwest, Paktiya in the southeast, and Balkh Province in the north. DoD continually evaluates security conditions in Afghanistan to determine appropriate force levels to implement the South Asia strategy.1

1.1 U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

The DoD approach to implementation of the South Asia Strategy in Afghanistan focuses on the “R4+S” concept—Reinforce, Realign, Regionalize, Reconcile, and Sustain.

Reinforce: The United States continued to provide the ANDSF the necessary equipment and training to improve their capacity during this reporting period and focused advisory efforts at the “point of need” with reliable security partners to increase their effectiveness. DoD continued to provide additional combat aircraft to the Afghan Air Force and plans to provide CH-47 Chinook helicopters to the Special Mission Wing to support its counterterrorism operations and replace its Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters.

1 Current and projected U.S. force presence is submitted in accordance with Section 1216 of H.R. 114-270, which accompanied H.R. 1735 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92).
Realign: The South Asia Strategy calls for the realignment of U.S. military and civilian assistance and political outreach to target key areas under Afghan Government control. During the first year of the South Asia Strategy, this realignment consisted chiefly of a United States shift in resources (lethal and non-lethal) from outside of Afghanistan into theater and the deployment of the U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB), which provided additional personnel to advise on a persistent basis at the tactical level. Beginning in the fall of 2019, however, this realignment increasingly took the form of force structure and material optimization that places more emphasis on advising where needed and with ANDSF personnel and units that can have the greatest impact on achieving campaign objectives.

Regionalize: Regional efforts aim to expand burden sharing, neutralize potential spoilers to U.S. and Coalition efforts, limit threats to our allies and partners, and develop and support a durable political settlement in Afghanistan. The South Asia Strategy prioritizes regional engagement to limit hedging against the Afghan Government and create an international consensus for peace. Pakistan, in particular, must play a key role in a peaceful resolution to the war in Afghanistan.

Reconcile: The primary goal of the South Asia Strategy is a durable and inclusive political settlement to the war in Afghanistan. The current military campaign increases military pressure on the Taliban and complements ongoing diplomatic efforts by the United States, Afghanistan, and our international partners. During this reporting period, U.S. representatives met with a Taliban delegation in Doha to discuss an agreement. President Trump suspended U.S. negotiations with the Taliban in September and announced a resumption of talks with the Taliban in November.

Sustain: The South Asia Strategy focuses on achieving specific U.S. objectives at sustainable costs. The strategy seeks to maximize fiscal, military, and political return on investment. Efforts to achieve a sustainable political outcome in Afghanistan must be feasible. The United States and NATO work to promote Afghan self-sufficiency across the security, political, and economic spheres; over the long run, such advances will make possible a steady reduction in the Afghan Government’s reliance on international support.

1.2 U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

The United States has a single vital national interest in Afghanistan: to prevent it from becoming a safe haven from which terrorist groups can plan and execute attacks against the United States and our Allies and interests abroad. Our ultimate goal in Afghanistan is a negotiated political settlement between the Afghan Government and the Taliban. During this reporting period, the Afghan government continued to make progress toward meeting shared security objectives.²

Under OFS, United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) currently conducts two well-defined and complementary missions. First, USFOR-A conducts the counterterrorism (CT) mission against al-Qa’ida, ISIS-K, and their associates in Afghanistan to prevent their resurgence and

² Section 1223 of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232) requires an assessment of the progress of the Afghan Government toward meeting shared security objectives and the efforts of the Afghan Government to manage, employ, and sustain the equipment and inventory funded by the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. The Secretary of Defense may withhold assistance if the Afghan government does not make sufficient progress in these areas. The elements of this assessment are addressed throughout this report as noted.
ability to conduct external attacks. OFS authorities also allow USFOR-A to work by, with, and through the ANDSF on the CT mission and on operations targeting the Taliban. Second, in partnership with NATO allies and operational partner nations in the RS mission, U.S. forces train, advise and assist (TAA) the ANDSF. U.S. and coalition forces conduct TAA efforts at the ANA corps level and with selected brigades and battalions; at the Afghan National Police (ANP) provincial level, and within the MoD and MoI to develop institutional capacity, integrate capabilities (e.g., intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and aerial fires), and improve tactical proficiency. United States and coalition forces also advise the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) at the tactical level, underscoring the importance of protecting U.S. investments in those two critical capabilities.

An array of operational authorities address circumstances in which U.S. forces may use force in support of the CT and TAA missions, including U.S. accompaniment with and combat enabler support to the ANDSF fight against the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

**Operational Design**

The current RS operational design has evolved since the last report as conditions within Afghanistan have changed, including changes in Taliban tactics, techniques, and procedures and the intensifying convergence of peace efforts, elections, and security. The evolution of the operational design has included efforts to improve situational awareness and crisis response; it focuses the efforts of U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces in a manner that bolsters ANDSF security of population centers and key terrain and concentrates attacks on Taliban and ISIS-K leaders and networks. Commander RS (COMRS)/COMUSFOR-A executes the operational design by synchronizing the authorities granted to him by the NATO RS mission and by the U.S. OFS mission. The operational design aligns these authorities to the commander’s priorities in order to provide assistance at the point of need. The design’s success relies upon all ANDSF components being enabled by NATO TAA and augmented by precision targeting under OFS authorities. The operational design encourages the Afghan Government to compete increasingly with the Taliban and ISIS-K to gain advantage in not just the ground and air domains but also in the information domain by highlighting ANDSF and Afghan government progress while countering Taliban and ISIS-K propaganda.

The operational design is enemy-focused, conditions-based, flexible, responsive, and informed by a clear understanding of the strategic implications in Afghanistan’s information environment. The RS “hierarchy of needs” concept ensures success of the operational design by identifying the essential resources (e.g. ISR, fires, fuel, ammo, etc.) required to sustain and enable the ANDSF in the short-term. To coordinate efforts with the Afghan Government including the ANDSF, RS has organized a series of collaborative staff planning events that help synchronize overall TAA and enabler support to the ANDSF. The key planning event for the RS staff is the Operational Design Decision Board (ODB), which reviews intelligence, sets objective priorities, allocates assets, and synchronizes operations. Additionally, RS conducts a weekly security meeting with MoD, MoI, NDS senior leaders and planners after the ODB to nest all independent and partnered operations and assess progress. RS also conducts a daily Joint Asset Allocation Meeting to review intelligence, establish daily operational priorities, and ensure support assets align to the priorities established at the ODB.
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) continued TAA optimization, building upon efforts during the last reporting period, to refine TAA efforts to complement the Operational Design priorities. TAA optimization focuses on investing advisory efforts on decisive people, places, and processes that can have the greatest impact on ANDSF development; make a positive contribution to campaign objectives; and increase the immediate return on United States and coalition investment. RS designates the people, processes, and locations as “points of need” that require mission essential TAA and revalidates these designations quarterly. Investing in reliable partners and executing TAA to the point of need are the guiding principles for the TAA mission.

Through TAA optimization, RS continues to build an effective, affordable, and sustainable ANDSF. To achieve unity of effort, CSTC-A has empowered the Ministerial Advisory Groups for Defense (MAG-D) and Interior (MAG-I) and realigned the 12 branches conducting ministerial advising under the direction and guidance of the MAGs. The advisors who engage with the MoD and MoI routinely synchronize efforts through the MAGs to ensure unity of effort when communicating with Afghan officials. RS further synchronizes advisory efforts from the ministerial level down to the Corps and Provincial levels through a series of forums designed to increase communication and cooperation among CSTC-A, DCOS Ops, and the TAACs and TFs, including elements of the Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) that are distributed among the TAACs and TFs.

During this reporting period, TAA optimization by RS and CSTC-A increased proficiency across the spectrum of warfighting functions, including helping to generate ANDSF combat and policing power, improve ANDSF accountability of personnel, ensure soldiers and police are paid, and reform logistics. This framework allowed CSTC-A to perform critical advising efforts under extreme conditions. For example, in August 2019, because of force protection concerns stemming from green-on-blue incidents, CSTC-A adjusted its TAA posture to continue providing “mission essential TAA” to decisive people, places, and processes. This change facilitated the Command’s ability to mitigate risk to advisors and mission accomplishment.

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3 This section provides information sought as indicated on p. 264 of Senate Report 116-48 to accompany S. 1790, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2020.

4 Ministerial Advisory Groups are U.S. or Coalition General Officers who serve as the senior advisor to the Minister of Defense (MAG-D) or Minister of Interior (MAG-I). Both General Officers with their staff, coordinate and align advising efforts across the Resolute Support Mission.
1.3 U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION

The U.S. CT mission complements the NATO TAA mission. The application of U.S. authorities under OFS coupled with a stronger and increasingly capable ANDSF helped preserve security gains and contributed to a maturing U.S.-Afghan CT partnership. The Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) supports U.S. CT efforts through TAA with the ASSF and accompanying the ASSF on partnered operations. During this reporting period, the ASSF used its growing capabilities to conduct both independent and partnered operations to address insurgent and transnational threats. SOJTF-A TAA, in conjunction with the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), efforts remain focused on building the ASSF’s capacity in logistics, command and control, fire support, intelligence analysis and sharing, aviation, and ASSF/conventional force interoperability. SOJTF-A/NSOCC-A restructured the NSOCC-A’s command posture to integrate intelligence and authorities with ASSF capabilities and focus TAA of ASSF on improving training, sustaining the forces, improving its operational readiness cycle, and increasing OPTEMPO. The realignment of United States and coalition advisors across the ASSF increased Afghanistan wide crisis response and better aligned the ASSF and conventional Afghan forces.

During this reporting period, the United States increasingly apportioned CT assets to maintain military pressure in support of U.S. diplomats negotiating with the Taliban, and then to sustain intensive military pressure on the heels of a suspension in diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. ASSF forces completed independent operations primarily focused on expanding security around population centers and key terrain. U.S. and Afghan forces conducted partnered and enabled operations throughout the country to increase military pressure on Taliban and ISIS-K leaders and networks. U.S. forces conducted the largest number of operations during this reporting period in the South and Southeast followed by the North and East. Roughly ten percent of operations focused on the Kabul region and preventing high-profile attacks (HPAs).

U.S. efforts against ISIS-K in Afghanistan are part of the United States’ global effort to defeat ISIS. In addition to unilateral U.S. efforts, USFOR-A enables the ANDSF to conduct independent operations against ISIS-K. Through independent and partnered operations, the ASSF forces maintained pressure to disrupt ISIS-K’s ability to conduct HPAs in Kabul. The United States is encouraging more robust intelligence and operational cooperation among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other regional partners in the effort to defeat ISIS.

U.S. and Afghan forces have maintained pressure on al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan. During the last two years, U.S.-led CT operations have killed numerous AQIS leaders and key members, disrupting and degrading the group.
1.4 NATO-LED RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

*Figure 1: Resolute Support Mission Troop-Contributing Nations, as of October 2019*\(^{56}\)

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<th>Country</th>
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The NATO-led RS mission advises the ANDSF, the MoD, and the MoI to achieve and maintain a stable Afghanistan. The United States continues to consult with NATO Allies and operational partners about RSM requirements and any follow-on NATO-led efforts to ensure that the United States and NATO missions are mutually supportive.

The United States, Germany, Italy, and Turkey serve as the RSM “framework nations,” each leading a regional TAAC responsible for coordinating support and capabilities within its respective command region. TF Southeast and TF Southwest also conduct TAA missions with the ANDSF but are not formally part of the RS mission.

The regional TAACs cover five of the seven ANA Corps and some Afghan National Police (ANP) provincial headquarters. TF Southeast and TF Southwest oversee persistent advising with the Afghan National Army (ANA) 203rd and 215th Corps, respectively. The TAACs and TFs serve as the principal connections between the Afghan ministries and fielded forces. The field commands play a central role in the coalition’s ability to assess the efficacy of its ministerial advising efforts, to determine the ministries’ ability to support ongoing ANDSF security operations, and to provide an outer ring of sensors and security for the coalition. In addition, coalition forces provide limited support complementary missions to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces under the NATO RSM and to conduct counterterrorism operations. Figure 1 references a NATO public website annotating U.S. Forces in support of NATO Resolute Support Mission.

\(^{5}\) As stated above in section 1, the United States currently maintains approximately 13,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan supporting complementary missions to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces under the NATO RSM and to conduct counterterrorism operations. Figure 1 references a NATO public website annotating U.S. Forces in support of NATO Resolute Support Mission.

\(^{6}\) As listed on the NATO public website, https://www.nato.int
non-combat enabler support, primarily ISR and MEDEVAC, to the ANDSF as the Afghans continue to field and develop their organic capabilities.

At the July 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, Allies and partners in NATO’s Resolute Support Mission reaffirmed their shared commitment to Afghanistan’s long-term security and stability. The nations committed to sustain the non-combat RSM and extend financial sustainment of the ANDSF through 2024. As of October 2019, RS consisted of approximately 17,000 military personnel from 38 nations. The United States remains the largest force contributor.

**Resolute Support Headquarters (HQ)**

The Resolute Support Headquarters (RSHQ) structure consists of two base pillars: security assistance and operations. Security assistance emphasizes ministerial advising, institutional development, and ANDSF resourcing, equipping, and sustaining. Led by Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A), these efforts enable an effective, lethal, and sustainable ANDSF and build the long-term institutional capacity to secure the Afghan population.

Operations coordinates staff elements directly tied to TAA at the corps level and consolidates simultaneous planning for all TAACs. Operations advisors and personnel seek to increase near-term operational effectiveness and integrate strategic and institutional guidance at the operational level.

*Figure 2: Resolute Support Mission Headquarters Organization*

The following offices conduct key functional TAA with the ANDSF:

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7 DCOS SA/CSTC-A was elevated to a three-star command in October 2018.
Resource Management (RM): Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute

Advising efforts in this area focus on enhancing resource management and procurement capability in accordance with Afghan laws, policies, and regulations; assisting with the drafting and execution of funding commitment letters; and helping the Afghans with the integration of various Afghan personnel management and payroll systems into the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS).

Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO)

RS TAO advisors work with MoD and MoI IGs to develop preventive programs and controls to identify areas vulnerable to corruption and put measures in place to reduce corruption.

Rule of Law (ROL)

ROL advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to ensure that the ANDSF respects and adheres to the rule of law and operates in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. ROL efforts focus on assisting the ANDSF to prevent and, when necessary, respond properly to significant acts of corruption and allegations of gross violations of human rights (GVHR), such as extra-judicial killings and child sex abuse.

Force Development (FD)

FD advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to build combat power and a professional force through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force.

Operational Sustainment (OS): Sustain the Force

OS advisors work with the MoD and MoI to sustain and reconstitute combat power through the development of appropriate maintenance, communications, medical, and logistics systems.


S&P personnel advise the MoD and the MoI on coordinating, planning, and executing campaigns in support of national-level objectives. Once developed, the strategic guidance and objectives translate into operational and annual campaign plans.

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8 CSTC-A commitment letters stipulate how the MoD and the MoI can allocate funding for the Afghan fiscal year and under what conditions CSTC-A will provide funding. CSTC-A commitment letters also identify various legal constraints, such as the Berry Amendment and the Leahy law, that apply to U.S. funding.

9 The Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) is an enterprise resource planning system that will integrate existing MoD and MoI systems for personnel management and payroll into a single platform providing timely and accurate accountability of all personnel, including civilians, within the MoD and the MoI. Additional information on APPS is located in Section 3.3.
**Intel TAA (INT): Develop Sufficient Intelligence Capabilities and Processes**

INT helps build MoD and MoI capacity to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations including fielding of ISR capabilities. INT advisors also help the ANP and ANA intelligence schools develop a cadre of instructors to train future intelligence personnel.

**Strategic Communication (STRATCOM): Maintain Internal and External Strategic Communication Capability**

STRATCOM advisors work with the Afghan Government to develop counter-insurgent messaging and a positive narrative for the Afghan people and the international community. The advisors help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice when addressing internal and external audiences.

**Resolute Support Gender Integration Office**

The RS Gender Integration Office conducts TAA with Afghan leadership to integrate UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325). UNSCR 13245 addresses the inordinate impact of war on women and the role that women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace—and broader women’s perspectives into all policy and strategic planning within the ANDSF.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Commands and Regional Task Forces**

RS advisors conduct their TAA mission with the ANDSF at the ANA corps and select ANP provincial headquarters levels through the TAACs and the regional task forces. Turkey currently leads TAAC-Capital (TAAC-C) in the Kabul area, the United States leads TAAC-East (TAAC-E) and TAAC-South (TAAC-S), Italy leads TAAC-West (TAAC-W), and Germany leads TAAC-North (TAAC-N). Personnel at each TAAC conduct training and provide advice and assistance to their Afghan counterparts, according to the need identified by the Coalition and their Afghan partners. TF Southwest and TF Southeast provide oversight of TAA efforts for the ANA corps and select ANP provincial headquarters levels in their regions, formerly covered by regional Advise and Assist Cells, to ensure full coverage of all ANA corps and select ANP provincial headquarters levels. Finally, the United States-led TAAC-Air provides TAA support to the AAF.

The TAACs and TFs assist Afghan units in ANA corps and select ANP provincial headquarters in operational reporting of significant activities, while reinforcing the importance of building and improving the systems and processes that support combat operations. With the dissolution of the ANP zones, the TAACs and TFs focus modest levels of TAA support at the ANP provincial headquarters level. The United States-led Southeast and Southwest TFs have also succeeded in strengthening relationships between the MoD, MoI, and ANA corps in areas without a persistent Coalition presence. RS relies on the TFs and their expeditionary advising teams to maintain progress in building Afghan capabilities in select parts of the country.

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10 Expeditionary advising teams are composed of a mission command cell to provide command and control for the advising effort; the team further augments select functional advisors, as appropriate.
Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Capital (TAAC-C)

TAAC-C, which includes Kabul Province (except Sarobi District, which falls within the 201st Corps area of responsibility), provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 111th Capital Division, Kabul City Police, Afghan Border Force (ABF), and Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF) elements operating in Kabul. Turkish forces lead the TAA effort with forces from several other contributing nations.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East (TAAC-E)

TAAC-E (Headquarters in Laghman), which includes primarily United States and Polish forces, covers Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Panshir, Parwan, and Nuristan Provinces. TAAC-E provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 201st Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – South (TAAC-S)

TAAC-S (Headquarters in Kandahar), led by United States forces, includes Daykundi, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul Provinces. TAAC-S provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 205th Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West (TAAC-W)

TAAC-W (Headquarters in Herat), led by Italian forces, includes Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat Provinces. TAAC-W provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 207th Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – North (TAAC-N)

TAAC-N (Headquarters in Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province), led by German forces, includes Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-e-Pul, and Takhar Provinces. TAAC-N provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 209th Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

Task Force Southwest

TF Southwest (Headquarters in Helmand Province) includes Helmand and Nimroz Provinces. Led by United States forces, TF Southwest provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 215th Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

Task Force Southeast

TF Southeast (Headquarters in Paktiya Province) includes Paktika, Khost, Paktiya, Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, and Bamyan Provinces. Led by United States forces, TF Southeast provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 203rd Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.
Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air (TAAC-Air)

TAAC-Air is a functional command that covers all of Afghanistan. TAAC-Air’s United States and Coalition advisors provide functionally based SFA to the AAF from the ministerial level down to the wing, group, and squadron levels. TAAC-Air assists the Afghan Air Force to develop and fully integrate aviation platforms, including the C-130, C-208, A-29, and AC-208 fixed-wing platforms, and the Mi-17, UH-60A, and MD-530 rotary-wing platforms.

NATO Air Command – Afghanistan (NAC-A)

COM NAC-A is the principal air advisor to COM RS. NAC-A is directly responsible to COM RS for planning, prioritization, coordination, execution, and monitoring of all assigned air and space operations. NAC-A provides COM RS with operational-level advice and coordinates with the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) on the conduct, integration, and synchronization of air and space power with ground operations in the CJOA-A. Additionally, COM NAC-A is responsible for the TAA of a sustainable AAF and for the operations of the US Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs) at Bagram, Kandahar and Jalalabad.

United States Army Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB)

Employment of the 2nd SFAB enabled the United States Army to conserve an Infantry Brigade Combat Team that otherwise would deploy and provided important, tailored, advisory capability to COMRS. COMRS used the 2nd SFAB to advise Afghan partners from the battalion to the ministerial level as subordinated elements within various TAACs and CSTC-A. Within Afghan tactical formations, advisors horizontally influenced across the full spectrum of combat, operational support, and sustainment capabilities; simultaneously, advisors in higher HQs shaped strategic policy and operational-level planning. 2nd SFAB enabled ANDSF partners to employ D30 systems (indirect Artillery), launch strategic convoys building ANDSF combat power across the theater, improved strategic inventory management and sustainment planning, conduct planning and preparation efforts and execute operations from coherent planning. ANDSF capacity benefited from the unique employment of the 2nd SFAB and their relationship throughout the tactical and strategic headquarters.

Combined Joint Engineers (CJ-ENG)

CJ-ENG conducts TAA with the ANDSF in infrastructure lifecycle management, general engineering, and combat engineering in order to deliver infrastructure capacity that enables a more effective, affordable and sustainable force. The TAA portion of the CJ-ENG Branch is organized around four key elements: MoD Construction & Property Management (CPMD), MoI Facilities Department (FD), MoD General Staff Engineer (GS-ENG), National Engineer Brigade (NEB). MoD CPMD and MoI FD goals are to ensure delivery of commitments after post-award execution, ensure facilities O&M and repairs are executed properly, build facility life cycle management capacity, and develop policies and procedures. MoD GS-ENG and NEB support TAA for checkpoint realignment, a national maintenance strategy, an increased attendance at the Afghan National Army Engineer School (ANAES), the promotion of a planning process discipline, and ensuring the advancement of mobility/survivability competence into the ANDSF.
1.5 RECONCILIATION

Reconciliation is the key goal of the South Asia Strategy. The Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation (SRAR), Zalmay Khalilzad, has the primary responsibility for negotiating an agreement with the Taliban to ensure terrorists could not again threaten the United States from Afghanistan. During June, July, and August of this reporting period, SRAR Khalilzad and an interagency negotiating team met with the Taliban in nine separate rounds of negotiations. The core elements of the agreement included:

1. Assurances from the Taliban that it would break with all terrorists and prevent the use of Afghan soil under its control against the United States, its Allies, or any other country;
2. A timeline for the withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan;
3. A commitment by the Taliban to meet with GIRoA in intra-Afghan negotiations;
4. Reduction in violence around areas from which the United States was withdrawing.

SRAR Khalilzad completed an agreement for review by senior leadership. In September, President Trump chose not to accept the agreement as negotiated, citing continued violence by the Taliban. The President announced during his trip to Afghanistan in November, that we are meeting with the Taliban. Any future negotiations must be on the right terms, and the Taliban must demonstrate a commitment to reducing violence.

1.6 STEWARDSHIP OF U.S. RESOURCES

The Deputy Commanding General, United States National Support Element and USFOR-A staff conducted several initiatives in support of reducing the overall cost of war. USFOR-A staff reviewed the DoD Expeditionary Civilian (DoD-EC) program to align the workforce with mission requirements and reduced 71 total civilian billets, saving an estimated $18.6 million in salaries and incentives. USFOR-A staff also regularly reviews contracts in support of United States forces in Afghanistan to gain efficiencies and reduce overall cost to the mission. In FY 2019, USFOR-A was able to avoid costs of $36 million in the pre-award phase and reduce costs by $179.4 million by de-scoping existing contracts, reducing the total number of contractor personnel by 2,177.
SECTION 2 – THREAT ASSESSMENT

Afghanistan faces a continuing threat from an externally supported insurgency and the highest regional concentration of terrorist groups in the world. These insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks constitute a threat to Afghanistan’s stability. Revenue from drug trafficking, taxation/extortion, illicit mining, and foreign financial support continues to sustain the insurgency and Afghan criminal networks. Additionally, extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks continue.

The primary threat to Afghan stability is the Taliban, which receives sanctuary and support from external actors. During this reporting period, the pace and intensity of the Taliban’s offensive operations were within seasonal norms after a slower than average start to the fighting season. The Taliban has been unable to fulfill its proclaimed fighting season campaign objectives, capture any provincial capitals, or gain any clear military advantage. The Taliban employed a “fight and talk” strategy with no reduction in violence for the first half of the reporting period, as demonstrated by 2 HPAs in Kabul on September 2, 2019 and September 5, 2019, concurrent with United States-Taliban negotiations in Doha. In the lead up to the Afghan Presidential elections, the Taliban increased the scale and violence of its attacks against population centers, including indiscriminate attacks against civilians, to disrupt the democratic process, pressure the United States, and delegitimize the Afghan government. The Taliban also targeted United States and coalition personnel and infrastructure. Insurgents continued to focus attacks on outposts, checkpoints, and other poorly defended or unreinforced ANDSF positions; the increased tempo reflect a Taliban attempt to discredit the ANDSF and the Afghan Government. Because of these attacks, the ANDSF continued to suffer casualties while inflicting heavy casualties on the Taliban.

In addition to the internal threats, there are influential regional actors that surround Afghanistan. These powers have varied—and at times contradictory—interests in the political, military, and economic future of Afghanistan and have expressed concern over how to obtain peace in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains a sanctuary for various groups, including al-Qa’ida core (AQ), al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIA), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and ISIS-K. Most of these groups focus their attacks within the South Asia region. Although ISIS-K aspires to attack the West, it likely remains limited to inspiring or enabling solitary attackers. Terrorist sanctuaries on both sides of the border present security challenges for both Afghanistan and Pakistan, pose a threat to regional security and stability, and threaten U.S. national security interests. Cross-border attacks periodically strain cross-border relations.
2.1 CURRENT SECURITY CONDITIONS

The Afghan Government retains control of Kabul, major population centers, most key transit routes, provincial capitals, and a majority of district centers. The Afghan government, however, has lost key transit routes. The Taliban and ISIS-K continue to prioritize HPAs, particularly in the capital region, to attract media attention, create the perception of widespread insecurity, and undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan Government. The Haqqani network did not conduct an HPA within the capital region from September to the end of the reporting period. The total number of high-profile attacks have steadily decreased in both Kabul and the country as a whole over the past year and a half. From June 1, 2019, to October 31, 2019, there were 19 high-profile attacks in Kabul, and 88 nationwide as compared to 17 during the same period in 2018. One such attack occurred on August 18, 2019, when ISIS-K initiated an attack against a wedding party in Kabul. The attack caused an estimated 63 civilians killed and more than 180 wounded.

Security Trends

From June 1, 2019 through October 31, 2019, the total number of effective enemy-initiated attacks was 6,122 and the monthly average was 1,224. By comparison, the total number of effective enemy-initiated attacks during the same period last year (June 1, 2018 – November 01, 2018) was 5,145 and the monthly average was 1,029.

Figure 3: Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks
The Coalition relies largely on ANDSF reporting for all metrics, including effective enemy-initiated attacks, which are a subset of all security incidents. Direct fire attacks against minimally manned Afghan outposts and checkpoints remain by far the largest source of effective enemy-initiated attacks, followed by IED attacks and mine strikes. Consistent with trends during the last several years, indirect fire and surface-to-air fire remain the least frequent sources of effective enemy-initiated attacks. The number of IED attacks and mine strikes has remained relatively steady during the last 18 months.

**Figure 4: Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type**

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11 Reports on security incidents and effective enemy-initiated attacks experience delays by several weeks due to translation and long data base reporting and processing timelines. In addition, ANDSF units frequently do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, such as indirect fire or attempted IED explosions that do not wound or kill ANDSF personnel.

12 Since ANDSF units often do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks is the most representative metric of overall security conditions rather than the total number of reported security incidents. Security incidents comprise all enemy action, including enemy-initiated direct fire and indirect fire, such as mortar, rocket, and artillery; surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks (IED explosion, mine strike); and potential or attempted attacks (IEDs or mines found).
2.2 MITIGATING CASUALTIES IN AFGHANISTAN

ANDSF Casualties\textsuperscript{13}

The number of ANDSF casualties has slightly increased compared to the same period in 2018. The number of ANDSF casualties while conducting local patrols, checkpoint operations, and offensive operations did not change significantly as compared to the same reporting period in 2018. The majority of ANDSF casualties continue to be the result of direct fire attacks at checkpoints. IED attacks and mine strikes contribute to overall casualties, but at a lower level.

U.S. Casualties and Insider Attacks

From October 2001, the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, through Oct 31, 2019, 1,901 U.S. military personnel have been killed in action (KIA), and 20,664\textsuperscript{14} have been wounded in action (WIA). During the reporting period, there were 10 United States military deaths because of hostile actions and 97 United States military personnel were WIA.

During this reporting period, there was one insider attack against U.S. personnel. U.S. forces and the Afghan Government continue their efforts to reduce the number of insider attacks (also known as “green-on-blue” attacks). Improvements included the increased use of enhanced screening techniques for existing ANDSF and new recruits.

During this reporting period, there were 57 "green-on-green" (GoG) attacks. This is an average of 11.4 events per month, which is an increase from the rate of 6.5 events per month for the previous 6 months, and a rate of 8.4 events per month for the same period a year ago. The proportion of ANDSF that were killed in action (KIA) per GoG event has decreased to 1.1 KIA per event this reporting period, compared to 2.2 KIA per event for the last period and 1.0 KIA per event for the same period a year ago. The rate of wounded in action (WIA) per GoG event has decreased from the last reporting period to 0.8 WIA per event from 3.5 WIA per event during the previous reporting period. This is a noticeable decrease of 2.7 WIA per event and a small increase from 0.8 WIA per event a year ago.

Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS)

Preventing civilian casualties remains a top priority for U.S. forces. U.S. Forces – Afghanistan takes extraordinary measures to reduce and mitigate civilian casualties. Resolute Support strives for zero CIVCAS in coalition forces operations. Coalition forces are trained on the Law of Armed Conflict, Rules of Engagement, and Tactical Guidance, which establish the minimum basis of CIVCAS mitigation and prevention. The COM RS Tactical Guidance stresses that CIVCAS is the single greatest threat to the Resolute Support Mission and directs RS forces to apply tactical patience to prevent CIVCAS in self-defense or in TAA toward ANDSF and only to use force when required.

\textsuperscript{13} Additional information on ANDSF casualties can be found in the classified annex to this report.
\textsuperscript{14} Data was accessed in the Defense Casualty Analysis System on November 6, 2019.
Possible civilian casualty incidents are thoroughly reviewed and assessed daily through a multifaceted process. When U.S. forces (working with our Afghan partners) determine that civilians have been killed or injured as a result of coalition military operations, they ascertain the facts, develop a thorough understanding of what occurred, and take appropriate steps to prevent recurrence. The RS Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team (CCMT) attempts to review and collect supporting documentation to make an initial assessment of a report of civilian casualties within 24 to 72 hours of the incident. The RS Senior Leader (General Officer) makes the final determination as to whether further investigation or assessment is warranted. In such cases, RS directs an investigation and/or a CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report (CCAR), is completed by the relevant operational command within 7 days. The command may direct a formal investigation (i.e. 15-6), at any time. Condolence payments are often considered in all cases where a credible United States, coalition force or partnered operation where civilian casualties may have occurred. The U.S. or Coalition unit responsible for the CIVCAS conducts internal evaluations and lessons learned, incorporating feedback from adjacent and supporting agencies to inform operations.

Additionally, USFOR-A transports injured civilians, adults and children to U.S. medical facilities in Afghanistan for stabilization and treatment when operationally feasible. Civilian casualties are self-reported by USFOR-A in adherence to military professional standards. It is also worth noting that, as the United Nations has documented, the Taliban routinely uses civilians as human shields and coerces civilians in order to use their dwellings both to billet their fighters and to conduct attacks, thereby deliberately placing civilians in harm’s way. In order to continue setting conditions for an Afghan State that respects fundamental human rights, the United States and its partners must continue to fight the Taliban alongside efforts to negotiate peace.

U.S. and coalition advisors continue to work closely with the Afghan Government to reduce civilian casualties by raising awareness of the importance of preventing civilian casualties. The advisor mission also focuses on practical measures that the ANDSF can adopt at the tactical level to prevent civilian casualties. Since the beginning of 2017, RS has provided training to ANDSF in the prevention and mitigation of civilian casualties, focusing on accurately defining and identifying civilians during conflict. The training also addresses mitigation efforts during pre-operational planning, execution of operations, and post-operational mitigation. The instructional package covers reporting procedures, investigations, data collection, and possible follow-on support and assistance. In addition, U.S. advisors provide Afghan pilots with extensive training on the proper employment of weapon systems and their effects during all phases of flight training, including the proper employment of Afghanistan’s rules of engagement.

RS personnel meet with UNAMA staff, at a minimum of once per month, to discuss reports of civilian casualties and to share assessments. UNAMA and RS also occasionally compare casualty figures attributed to insurgents and terrorists. The Deputy Commander, RS also meets monthly with UNAMA leadership.

DoD takes the responsibility to protect innocent lives seriously. The Secretary of Defense has designated the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to be responsible for overseeing development of and compliance with DoD civilian casualty policy across the Department. Under his direction, DoD is developing an overarching Department-wide policy to guide our continued efforts to mitigate civilian harm and to respond to civilian casualties when they occur.
Resolute Support Civilian Casualty Data From June 1, 2019, to October 31, 2019

The CCMT documented 5,436 civilian casualties from June 1, 2019, to October 31, 2019, of which there were 1,413 killed and 4,023 injured. Of the 5,436 civilian casualties, RS Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team (CCMT) attributed 56 (31 killed and 25 injured) to the United States led Coalition, 133 (51 killed and 82 injured) to the ANDSF, 5,023 (1,268 killed and 3,755 injured) to insurgents and terrorists, and 224 (63 killed and 161 injured) to other/unknown parties to the conflict.

Figure 5: CCMT Reported Civilian Casualties During Reporting Period\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{monthly_casualties.png}
\caption{Monthly Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan by Cause (June 1, 2019- Oct 31, 2019)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{15} The vast majority of the civilian casualties (85 percent killed and 92 percent wounded) can be attributed to the Taliban, ISIS-K, and other insurgent groups.
RS and UNAMA Reporting Differences for UNAMA Quarterly Report January 1 – 30 September 2019

The RS Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team (CCMT), which collects civilian casualty data for the coalition, documented 7,296 total civilian casualties from January 1, 2019 – September 30, 2019, of which 1,896 were killed and 5,400 were injured. The CCMT relies primarily upon operational reports from the TAACs and the ANDSF. During the reporting period, the CCMT attributed 6,580 casualties (1,619 killed and 4,961 injured) to insurgents and terrorists; 252 casualties (109 killed and 143 injured) to the ANDSF; and 139 casualties (81 killed and 58 injured) to United States-led Coalition forces. The CCMT attributed the rest of the 325 casualties (87 killed and 238 injured) to other parties of the conflict.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA) latest report assessed that there were 8,239 civilian casualties from January 1, 2019 – September 30, 2019, of which 2,563 were killed and 5,676 were injured. UNAMA reported that insurgents and terrorists were responsible for 5,891 casualties (1,414 killed and 4477 injured). UNAMA also reported that the ANDSF were responsible for 1,261 casualties (484 killed and 777 injured); and that international military forces were responsible for 682 casualties (468 killed and 214 injured). UNAMA attributed the remaining 405 casualties (197 killed and 208 injured) to other or unknown parties to the conflict.

The difference in the reported numbers of civilian casualties between the CCMT and UNAMA is primarily due to different sources of information and different standards of evidence collection methodology. CCMT has access to a wide range of forensic data, including full-motion video, operational summaries, aircraft mission reports, intelligence reports, digital and other imagery, open-source media, social media, and other sources. CCMT’s civilian casualty assessment process requires that all reports of civilian casualties be initially assessed within 24 to 72 hours of receipt, to identify quickly whether additional assessment will be necessary to determine whether the report is likely accurate. Allegations for which there is sufficient, reliable information are forwarded to the relevant operational command for additional review. These procedures allow USFOR-A to assess with a relatively high degree of confidence the circumstances of each report of civilian casualties. The UNAMA reports rely primarily on human sources and in many cases RS cannot verify the validity of UNAMA sources.

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16 UNAMA “QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT 1 JANUARY TO 30 SEPTEMBER 2019”
Figure 6: RS CCMT vs UNAMA Reporting for January 1 - September 30, 2019

RS CCMT vs UNAMA Reporting
CIVCAS by Cause
(JAN-SEP 2019)

- RS CCMT # wounded
- RS CCMT # killed
- UNAMA # wounded
- UNAMA # killed

<table>
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<th>U.S./Coalition Forces</th>
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</tr>
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</table>
2.3 INFLUENCE OF REGIONAL ACTORS

U.S. strategy calls for a regional approach to enhance stability in South Asia by building a broad consensus for a stable Afghanistan, emphasizing regional economic integration and cooperation, stressing cooperation for an Afghan-led peace process, and holding countries accountable for their use of proxies or other means to undermine stability and regional confidence. DoD is part of a whole-of-government approach designed to isolate the Taliban and other terrorists from sources of external support and to mitigate malign influence from regional actors.

Russia

Russia engages a wide range of actors in Afghanistan—the government in Kabul, northern power brokers, key regional actors, and the Taliban—to expand its influence and mitigate instability in Central Asia. Russia supports the Taliban politically and considers the Taliban an unavoidable element of a stable Afghanistan and provides limited material support—money, ammunition, and small arms—to encourage counter-ISIS–Khorasan operations. Amid rumors of a U.S. force drawdown, Russia has expanded its efforts to influence reconciliation talks, cast the United States as an unreliable security partner, and bolstered its military capabilities in Tajikistan.

During the past six months, Russia has welcomed diplomatic overtures from the United States, agreeing to participate in bilateral consultations with the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation and United States-Russia-China trilateral consultations. In June, Russian President Putin expressed hope that cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan would stabilize the security situation, according to press reporting. Since February 2019, Russian officials have hosted two meetings between the Taliban and Afghan political stakeholders and supported calls for a complete withdrawal of foreign forces. Several nations took part in the Moscow Consultations to signal their commitment to the Afghan peace process.

Central Asia

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (collectively, Central Asia) view stability and security in Afghanistan in the context of the wider Central Asian region. Uzbekistan continues to expand trade links, allowing the shipment of Afghan materials to China. Some of the Central Asia States have expressed concerns that ISIS-K may expand from Afghanistan into Central Asia and destabilize the region. Uzbekistan played a constructive role in reconciliation as it sought to leverage its desired position as a regional leader, and key economic link, to Afghanistan to promote peace efforts and economic development.
Pakistan

Pakistan is supporting the Afghan reconciliation process. During this reporting period, Pakistan played a constructive but limited, role in driving Taliban leaders to the negotiating table. Taliban and Haqqani leaders continue to receive safe haven in Pakistan. Pakistani leaders have also met directly with leaders of Afghanistan, in bilateral and multilateral formats, to discuss the peace process and regional stability. Separately, Pakistani security forces continued fencing along the Afghan border region to stop the flow of anti-Pakistan militants from entering its territory. Pakistan’s military has taken action against ISIS-K and ISIS-Pakistan within its borders. Pakistan also continues to conduct CT operations against AQIS operational networks in Pakistan when an assessed threat is present.

Iran

Iran pursues its interests in Afghanistan by providing calibrated support to the Taliban while attempting to grow ties to the Afghan government. Iranian interests include the removal of United States and coalition presence; the elimination of ISIS-Khorasan; and increasing economic and security ties, water rights, and border security. Iran continues to pursue economic links to Afghanistan by expanding trade links and developing shared railroad infrastructure. Since December 2018, Iran has increased outreach to both the Taliban Political Commission and the Afghan Government to increase its influence in the reconciliation process and secure Iranian interests in any potential agreement. Iran has repeatedly expressed reservation over United States-Taliban talks, likely seeking to ensure their interests in Afghanistan are protected.

China

China has broadened its relationship with Afghanistan, which was largely confined to economic matters before 2015, toward a greater emphasis on political and military engagement. China has integrated Afghanistan into new multilateral security mechanisms, such as the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination mechanism. China promoted CT and economic integration between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

China is primarily concerned that Uighur militants’ transit through the Afghanistan Wakhan Corridor, which borders China’s Xinjiang Province. China believes regional stability will improve its access to trade markets, weaken western regional influence, and counterbalance India’s role and strategic expansion in the region. China is seeking to become more involved in intra-Afghan talks.

India

India works with regional state actors, the Afghan Government, and Afghan power brokers to prevent transnational terrorist safe havens, and maintain access to Afghanistan as a gateway to Central Asian markets.

India does not support the Taliban politically and continues to side with the Afghan Government, reiterating its support for an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-controlled peace process.
India has traditionally had strong ties with Afghanistan and remains the largest regional donor to the country ($3 billion since 2001). Indian aid to Afghanistan focuses primarily on four main categories: humanitarian assistance, major infrastructure projects, small and community-based projects, and education and capacity development. A significant deterioration of security conditions in Afghanistan, however, may adversely affect the ability of India to provide aid.

The Gulf States

The Gulf States seek a stable Afghanistan, and they support a ceasefire and peace process between the Afghan Government and the Taliban. Saudi Arabia and the UAE aspire to minimize Iranian and Qatari influence in Afghanistan. Qatar hosts the Taliban Political Commission (TPC) and provides a venue for reconciliation talks, including hosting 9 rounds of negotiations between the United States and the Taliban. The UAE hosted a multilateral dialogue on the reconciliation process in December 2018, and Saudi Arabia supports the reconciliation process. Qatar’s C-17 aircraft provide airlift for NATO operations in Afghanistan.

2.4 Threats from Insurgent and Terrorist Groups

Terrorist and insurgent groups continue to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, United States, and Coalition forces. The presence of more than 20 terrorist organizations in the region creates the largest concentration of terrorist and extremist organizations in the world.

The Taliban

The Taliban has the ability to attack district centers, military bases, and conduct HPAs against government and coalition facilities. The Taliban continues to pressure the ANDSF across the country through its military campaign and through coercion and co-optation in ungoverned rural spaces. Additionally, the Taliban continues to use coercion and co-optation to compel members of the ANDSF to conduct insider attacks against coalition forces and other members of the ANDSF, as demonstrated in the Kandahar Province attack on July 29, 2019, that resulted in two United States casualties.

The Haqqani Network continues to be integral to the Taliban’s effort to pressure the Afghan Government in Kabul and eastern Afghanistan, exemplified with the September 5, 2019 vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) against a convoy in Kabul that killed one United States service member. According to press reporting and public Taliban release statements, since Sirajuddin Haqqani’s installment as Deputy Leader of the Taliban in 2015, he has likely increased the Haqqani Network’s influence within the Taliban organization, as well as in areas outside of HQN’s normal operating region: Paktika, Paktiya, and Khost Provinces in eastern Afghanistan.

ISIS-K

During this reporting period, ISIS-K maintained the ability to defend itself and conduct attacks, and sought to retain territory in eastern Afghanistan despite pressure from the Coalition, ANDSF, and the Taliban. The detention of ISIS-K militants in Kabul temporarily degraded the attack tempo.
and denied the group propaganda victories. Over the past few years, ISIS-K has continued to take a more active role in the management of regional ISIS networks in India, Bangladesh, and other areas assigned by ISIS-core, but its progress in enabling or inspiring attacks outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan likely has been limited.

ISIS-K maintains the capability to conduct mass casualty attacks with the intent to weaken public support for the Afghan Government. During this reporting period, it conducted attacks primarily against Afghan Government and security forces and election targets of opportunity. ISIS-K has fewer than 2,000 fighters operating in its safe haven in eastern Afghanistan. In this period, ISIS-K remained consolidated in shrinking pockets of its primary safe haven in Nangarhar, and retained territory in Kunar Province. In November, upwards of 300 ISIS-K militants succumbed to military pressure and surrendered to the ANDSF. Social media remains the primary method for ISIS affiliates to communicate, and it is a medium through which ISIS propaganda influences online.

Regionally, the group continues to evade, counter, and recover from sustained CT and combat pressure to maintain its territorial safehaven in eastern Afghanistan, from which it plans attacks and spreads its ideology to displace al-Qa’ida and the Taliban as the predominant regional militant group. Although ISIS-K remains operationally limited to South and Central Asia.

**Al-Qa’ida**

Al-Qa’ida poses a limited threat to United States personnel and our partners in Afghanistan. Al-Qa’ida’s affiliate—Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)—poses a greater threat to those elements. AQIS routinely supports and works with low-level Taliban in its efforts to undermine the Afghan Government, and maintains an enduring interest in attacking United States forces and Western targets in the region. AQIS faces continuous Coalition CT pressure and will focus on ensuring its safe haven remains viable. Additionally, AQIS assists local Taliban in some attacks, according to al-Qa’ida statements.

The few remaining al-Qa’ida personnel focus largely on survival, while ceding al-Qa’ida’s regional presence to AQIS. AQIS continues to work toward its stated goals of freeing occupied Muslim lands, establishing an Islamic caliphate, and implementing Shar’ia law. AQIS’s interest in attacking United States forces and other Western targets in Afghanistan and the region persists, however, continuing Coalition CT pressure has reduced AQIS’s ability to conduct operations in Afghanistan, without the support of the Taliban.
SECTION 3 – OVERVIEW OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

Although the military situation in Afghanistan remains tactically unchanged, the refinement of the operational design, combined with complementary TAA optimization and ASSF TAA realignment, has increased synchronization of United States, Coalition, and Afghan lethal and non-lethal assets and intelligence to fight the enemy.

During this reporting period, the ANDSF have continued to deny the Taliban the ability to accomplish their campaign objectives. The ASSF remains the most capable force in the ANDSF and continues to grow capabilities. ASSF misuse remains a problem, but misuse levels are consistent with last reporting period and not nearly as high as one year ago. Overall, the ANDSF continues to sustain a high operational tempo to apply military pressure on the Taliban.

The alignment of advisors for TAA at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), improved schoolhouse utilization rates, and improved ANDSF leadership and facilities are helping the ANA improve the production of new Soldiers. This compares to 2018 when KMTC recruits often departed unhealthy and less well trained.

3.1 ANDSF STRUCTURE AND SIZE

The current ANDSF authorized force level remains at 382,000. The MoD is authorized 227,103 personnel and the MoI is authorized 154,626 personnel. The MoD oversees the ANA, the Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF), the Afghan Border Force (ABF), the AAF, and the MoD’s pillars within the ASSF: the ANASOC and the SMW. The MoI oversees the four ANP forces that include the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Public Security Police (PSP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP), the Afghan Local Police (ALP), and the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). The MoI also provides oversight of the General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA).

MoD forces provide security to the Afghan people through the execution of offensive combat operations against threats to the government and the Afghan populace. MoD forces also provide security along the Afghan border and protect lines of communication and critical infrastructure. MoI forces execute community policing and enforce the rule of law. In addition, they also conduct counter-corruption and counter narcotics operations. Over the past three years, Coalition advisors have assisted the MoD and MoI to account properly for ANDSF personnel and to facilitate enrollment in the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS). The collection of biometric data and other information required for APPS provides a more realistic assessment of the actual size of the force and improves financial accountability. Once APPS is fully implemented, CSTC-A will only pay salaries based on biometrically enrolled, properly slotted to a validated *tashkil* position, and personnel with time and attendance recorded. As of October 31, 2019, APPS validated 179,678

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17 Information in this section addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1223(e)(2)(C) and (D) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232).

18 The total MOI authorization of 154,626 includes the authorization for 30,000 ALP.
ANA and 112,439 ANP personnel—a total of 292,117—as enrolled in APPS and assigned to authorized positions. CSTC-A continues to pay salaries for individuals who are not fully enrolled in APPS due to system limitations, such as initial entry trainees, civilian and contract employees working for the MoD and Afghan Local Police.  

The APPS mandate for pay incentivizes the Afghan Government to make an enduring commitment to new Soldier and Police enrollment in APPS. The United States will gain greater fidelity of the true size of the ANDSF over time as APPS continues to mature within the MoD and MoI.

3.2 ANDSF OBJECTIVES

ANDSF Roadmap

Developed by President Ghani in late 2016, the four-year ANDSF Roadmap is a broad-based reform effort with four key elements: leadership development, increase fighting capabilities, unity of command/unity of effort, and counter-corruption. Two of the four priorities—leadership development and counter-corruption—are documented in CSTC-A’s Top 10 Opportunities and Challenges, and RS continues to emphasize improved unity of command, primarily through improved cross-pillar synchronization, and help to grow the ASSF. In 2020 the final year of the Roadmap, the effort to increase fighting capabilities by doubling the size of the ASSF and modernizing the Afghan Air Force will be complete.

Leader Development: RS has focused TAA on decisive leaders and massed advisory efforts on key places and processes that enable leadership development. Through TAA at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) and development of the Unified Training Education and Doctrine Command (UTEDC), advisors have noted a generational change in leadership that has resulted in “reliable partners” at senior leadership positions in the MoD and MoI. Inherent Law retirements within both ministries, as well as increasingly capable corps commanders and Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCOPs), serve as evidence of a growing cadre of young, capable, and reliable partners within the ANDSF.

Increase Fighting Capabilities: The priority of the ANDSF Roadmap is the enhancement of the ASSF and addressing Afghan aviation capability gaps. The ASSF accounts for a small portion of the ANDSF, but conducts the majority of the ANDSF offensive missions. During this reporting period, ASSF growth progressed on schedule. The United States addresses Afghan aviation capability gaps through the replacement of the Mi-17 fleet with United States-made helicopters and the delivery of additional platforms organic to the AAF and SMW. The AAF pilot training is maintaining pace with AAF growth milestones and incoming platforms.

Unity of Command/Effort: The National Military Coordination Center (NMCC) in Kabul and the National Police Coordination Center (NPCC) provide unity of command vertically from Afghan Security Institutions (ASI) to the ANDSF, and horizontally across corps and provinces.

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19 Because the Fiscal Year 2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act prohibits use of ASFF appropriated by the Act to pay salaries and benefits of ANDSF personnel who are not enrolled in APPS, CSTC-A will only use available ASFF previously appropriated prior to FY2020 for such personnel.
The NMCC and NPCC build situational understanding at a centralized headquarters by pulling operational information from the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police (ANP). During this reporting period, primary TAA efforts focused on strengthening the command and control process and using 24-hour advising at the Coordination Centers to enable these two agencies to affect the fight. Additionally, the RS weekly security meeting and the combined situational awareness room have flattened coordination.

Counter-Corruption: RS’s focus on reliable partners who demonstrate desire, will, and a bias toward action in both anti- and counter corruption efforts have empowered leaders that seek to root out corruption within the ANDSF. RS has a Counter-Corruption Advisor Group (CCAG) to analyze and target corruption networks in both the MoI and the MoD, as well as corruption stemming from criminal patronage and narcotics networks. The CCAG synchronizes counter-corruption efforts among Afghan security institutions, RS, and international partners.

ANDSF Operational Campaign

During this reporting period, campaign objectives transitioned towards election security. Operation KHALID, the ANDSF’s 2019 annual campaign plan, began in March 2019. Operation KHALID prioritized agile and responsive concentration of combat power integrated with United States CT and RS TAA operations over large, corps and brigade-level extended operations. The ANDSF continued to utilize ASSF forces for most offensive operations, and conventional ANDSF focused on wide area security with an emphasis on controlling population centers. Where possible, the ANDSF extended security around the population centers to provide the standoff necessary to engage Taliban forces massing for an attack and mitigate the risk of civilian casualties. With the current ANDSF tempo of partnered and un-partnered operations, checkpoint reform and consolidation, leadership and direction, and more aggressive action by the ASSF and AAF in particular, the ANDSF is showing a new resilience and capacity to counter Taliban operations effectively.

Presidential Election Security

Afghanistan held the presidential election on September 28, 2019. The Taliban actively attempted to undermine the election through HPAs, CIVCAS, and intimidation; however, effective TAA and CF support, coupled with ANDSF applying lessons learned from the 2018 election resulted in the ANDSF effectively providing security for polling sites to facilitate voting.

Multiple security pillars coordinated and integrated capabilities in order to distribute Sensitive Elections Material (SEM), prepare the security space for polling sites, provide security before and during the election, share intelligence, and conduct SEM recovery post-election. Although the Ministries had planned for the presidential election since the parliamentary election took place in September 2018, full-scale planning and rehearsal efforts began in July 2019, when the ANDSF conducted its first Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drill. Planning evolved in early August with provincial-level and corps-level rehearsals and continued through September when senior-level ministerial leaders held ROC drills. In the immediate lead up to elections, ground forces conducted the majority of ground movements of SEM to polling locations, with some AAF assistance.
The ANDSF postured to provide security by coordinating intelligence and employing a joint operational security concept. The CSOC, CSAR, and NPCC flattened communications and shared intelligence and operational developments to enable cross-pillar targeting in advance of the election and common operating picture on the day of the election. The ANDSF developed a so-called “Rings of Steel” concept to protect polling and registration sites leading up to and on the day of the election, a concept they implemented during the 2018 parliamentary election. The Rings of Steel encompassed three overlapping security belts around polling sites. The first security belt included the ANP, with NDS intelligence support, securing the polling site and the immediate geographic area. The ANA secured the second belt at an identified standoff distance. In the third security belt, the ANA integrated with ANASOC and AAF forces to disrupt and deny enemy forces beyond the second belt.

*Figure 7: Joint Operational Security Concept for Polling Stations*

RS supported ANDSF election security initiatives by providing TAA through security planning; command and control; support to the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) and Independent Election Complaints Commission (IECC); and planning for both the delivery and recovery of SEM. RS also hosted several senior-level ROC drills to facilitate cross-ministerial coordination.

The ANDSF experienced several election day challenges. Most situations dealt with power outages and tampering with cell phone towers. The ANDSF were well prepared to deal with these situations, which RS advisors attribute to proper prior planning, rehearsals of potential scenarios, and having key leaders at coordination centers (NMCC, and the NPCC) during the election day activities. Leaders were able to receive information and make quick turn decisions in order to keep security forces engaged, and election day activities going. These situations were similar to situations dealt with in the 2018 parliamentary election. Drawing from these lessons learned while planning and rehearsing appropriate responses and ensuring key leaders were in the right locations to make necessary decisions, the ANDSF ensured that the polls were open and accessible to citizens seeking to vote.
3.3 Developing Ministry Capacity and Capability: Indicators of Progress

To assess efforts to build the capacity of Afghan security institutions, CSTC-A focuses on the following “Top 10 Challenges and Opportunities”:

- Leader development,
- Reducing the number of vulnerable checkpoints,
- Countering corruption,
- Improving logistics,
- Improving accountability of equipment,
- Reducing attrition through better care of soldiers and police,
- Standardization of training,
- Better MoD and MoI budget execution,
- Improving processes for paying soldier and police salaries,
- Improving ANDSF facilities.

Leader Development

RS advisors assess the current cadre of senior leaders within the MoD and MoI to be reliable partners. RS’s TAA focus on decisive people centers on the belief that only through strong, effective, and reliable leadership and partnership can RS achieve success in other lines of effort. The current and last reporting periods witnessed the appointment of a new Minister of the Interior (MININT) and new Minister of Defense (MINDEF). As these new leaders have settled into their roles, they have increasingly leveraged opportunities to improve ANDSF effectiveness, affordability, and sustainability, which have rippled through their respective institutions. Furthermore, RS advisors noted that senior leaders within the MoD increasingly empower the AMoDs to think strategically about the long-term structure of the force. Both the MINDEF and MININT are leading organizational optimization accompanied by a structured implementation of Inherent Law that has brought rapid and substantial changes in the leadership and staff.

Advisors continue to train and educate senior leaders to enforce structural processes and procedures within the ANDSF to improve operational readiness across the force. Due to key leader engagements on critical reforms like APPS, enforcement of the Inherent Law, and merit-based promotions, ministerial-level focus on personnel development within the ANDSF has improved; however, more work by the ministries is required to ensure young, educated, and qualified leaders are afforded the opportunity to assume positions of influence.

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**Reducing Checkpoints**

The overwhelming majority of successful Taliban attacks against ANDSF forces and over half of the ANDSF casualties occurred at poorly manned static checkpoints. The Taliban targets these checkpoints to harass the ANDSF, attrit forces, and resupply with captured ANDSF equipment. RS—and ISAF before that—has focused on checkpoint consolidation and reduction for years. However, small, defenseless, and redundant checkpoints remain pervasive due to political sensitivities and the fact that checkpoints provide a visible, albeit false, sense of security. During this reporting period, RS focused on educating senior leaders and the ANDSF about viable alternatives to static checkpoints to reduce and consolidate the most vulnerable positions, and counter the narrative that closing a checkpoint represents ANDSF abandonment of a certain location or will result in reduced security.

Additionally, RS advisors are working with ANDSF partners to construct deliberate, defendable operating bases on operationally significant terrain while serving as secure staging areas for regional security operations. Combined with continued checkpoint reduction, the ANDSF seeks to increase combat power and become a more maneuverable and lethal fighting force. TAACs and TFs conducted senior leader checkpoint visits as part of their battlefield circulation to check the living conditions, readiness of the soldiers, and identify vulnerabilities. TAAC advisors and CSTC-A worked with ANDSF leadership to harden validated checkpoints with protective materiel and ensure the checkpoints were manned appropriately. These initiatives have helped educate the ANDSF on checkpoint alternatives and helped energize the efforts to reduce checkpoints throughout the security pillars. For example, MoI leaders developed a strategic plan to change the ANPs outlook on checkpoint infrastructure. Out of the top 214 most casualty producing checkpoints, MoI has reduced or reinforced 86. In the future, advisors plan to TAA the ministry on a pilot concept in which the ANP consolidate clusters of checkpoints into a single station for community policing. However, overuse of static checkpoints remains a significant concern for RS.

**Counter-Corruption**

Corruption, including corruption of ASFF-funded commodities like fuel, undermines ANDSF readiness and combat power. RS continues to apply pressure on senior Afghan leaders to enforce stewardship and accountability of United States funds. RS has focused advising efforts on trusted partners who demonstrate desire, will, and a bias toward taking action against corruption. For example, MoD has reorganized MoD’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to establish an independent chain of command that reports directly to the Minister of Defense, thereby streamlining reporting and insulating investigations from tampering. The Minister of Intelligence has also directed the Directorate of Police Intelligence to focus on internal intelligence gathering, and established an internal affairs committee to root out corruption within the MoI. These initiatives improved investigation of contract corruption and illegal sales of government property.

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21 Information on counter-corruption addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1223(e)(2)(A) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232).
Improving Logistics

Distribution of supplies to the southern corps and provinces was hindered during the reporting period by insurgent activity around supply routes and under-utilization of the AAF for cargo airlift support. In response, RS synchronized advisory efforts from the ministerial to the tactical level to improve the ANDSF’s ability to move supplies across Afghanistan. The focus has been on developing “push packages” to regional warehouses and executing successful convoys. Through the Distribution Working Group, OS synchronized requirements and movements with the 2nd SFAB’s advising of the ANA to conduct strategic national convoys. At the NMCC and NPCC, ANDSF personnel improved their common operating picture throughout convoy movements and helped flatten coordination between the MoD and MoI. Furthermore, the established waypoint at Kandahar improved distribution and movement of cargo across southern Afghanistan. In instances where RS determined the provision and movements of supplies to be mission essential within a short time period, it assisted through aerial cargo movements. RS continues to stress that the AAF or coalition air movements are not a sustainable long-term solution to logistics and supply issues.

Improving Accountability of Equipment

Advisors continue to support the implementation of automated systems that increase accountability of materiel procured and provided to the ANDSF with United States funds. Although use of the Core-Information Management System (Core-IMS) as a logistics automation system continues, the ANDSF remain reliant on physical property books as the primary source of information. RS advisors assess strong strategical level buy-in to the utilization and benefits of the Core-IMS, but tactical implementation remains a challenge. During this reporting period, the MoI demonstrated a renewed commitment to adhering to Core-IMS and the ANP improved in closing out in-transit tickets so that the Core-IMS accurately reflects on-hand and in-transit equipment.

Core-IMS

Core-IMS has enhanced transparency of supply and improved accountability for United States-funded materiel, including Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE), weapons, ammunition, and vehicle spare parts across the MoD’s and MoI’s warehouse networks. Inconsistent and inaccurate equipment reporting within the system at the corps and regional levels continues to restrict the ministries’ ability to track equipment transfers, identify equipment shortages, and build a procurement plan, while literacy issues have resulted in local users struggling to reconcile on-hand inventories with the system. As in previous reporting periods, human capital, literacy, computer skills, and corruption all challenge integration of Core-IMS at

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22 Core-IMS is an internet-based property accountability system of record that has evolved from a small-scale, off-the-shelf, PC-based tracking tool in 2010 to its current form. Core-IMS capabilities have expanded to allow the MoD and MoI to track transfers of equipment out of national warehouses to forward supply depots. U.S. materiel purchased for the Afghans through pseudo-FMS cases populate directly into the Core-IMS system through linkages with the SCIP, DoD’s system to track the shipment of equipment from the United States. Core-IMS software is functional at national and regional-levels of the ANDSF. At the national level, the MoD’s Central Supply Depot (CSD) and the MoI’s National Logistics Center (NLC) utilize Core-IMS. Since October 2017, the ANDSF have expanded connectivity of Core-IMS. Today, Core-IMS links to the MoD forward supply depots (FSDs), including the Corps HQs, and the MoI RLCs.
various echelons of the MoD and MoI. The ministries continue to assign untrained personnel into logistics positions, and individuals trained on Core-IMS may be employed or engaged in non-logistics related tasks.

Although equipment visibility and accountability at the national and regional levels have improved, many equipment transfers have not been completed within Core-IMS, leaving transactions unacknowledged or improperly receipted. For example, recipients typically do not close out transactions once received from the depot. This has led to a steady increase of “in-transit” items, which reduces the accuracy of the system. As noted above, the ANP demonstrated improvement this reporting period in closing out “in-transit” items.

**FMS Life Cycle Management (LCM)**

The CSTC-A Security Assistance Office (SAO) maintains responsibility for receiving and executing title transfer of all Foreign Military Sales (FMS) materiel procured in support of the ANDSF. Most FMS materiel originates from the United States and is shipped into theatre via air or surface depending on the commodity type. During this reporting period, the SAO managed $2.45 billion worth of FY 2018 pseudo-FMS cases and $1.47 billion worth of FY 2019 pseudo-FMS cases. SAO oversaw a total of 167 ongoing FY 2018 and FY 2019 cases.

All Class-II OCIE, Class-V (Ammunition), Class-VII (Weapons), Aircraft, and Class-VIII (Pharmaceuticals) arrive at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul (HKIA). Upon receipt of all FMS weapons, ammunition, and aircraft, SAO transfers title to the MoD or MoI at HKIA for integration into the Afghan supply system. OCIE and pharmaceuticals flown into HKIA are transited to nearby SAO-managed FMS Logistics Waypoints. There, items stay in temporary storage, in preparation for future title transfer to the ANDSF. Conversely, all Class-III Packaged POL, Class-VII Major End Items (e.g., Vehicles) and Class-IX Repair Parts are shipped and then trucked through Afghanistan and delivered directly to the FMS Logistics Waypoints in Kabul. SAO manages a newly established southern vehicle transfer waypoint in Kandahar and a waypoint near Kabul. The increased efficiency of both waypoints will enhance vehicle distribution to the southern and western ANDSF elements, while facilitating the steady flow of vehicles and parts into and across Afghanistan. The southern waypoints reduce annual transportation costs, reduce vehicle transit time by about 60 days, and minimize the risk of damage during transportation.

Once the SAO delivers and title transfers FMS materiel to the Afghan Government, materiel oversight and life-cycle management turns over to the corresponding coalition requirement owner, with appropriate reach-back support from acquisition program managers in DoD. For example, TAAC-Air maintains oversight and life-cycle management of all FMS-procured aircraft, whereas program managers in the United States Air Force and United States Army provide life-cycle management of the fixed-wing and rotary-wing fleets, respectively. CSTC-A’s Operations Sustainment branch maintains the same oversight and life-cycle management of all FMS-procured weapons, ammunition, vehicles, pharmaceuticals, repair parts, and OCIE, reaching back to program managers in the United States Army to manage the National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Support (NMC-GVS) and procurement of tactical vehicles and ammunition.

23 Information in this section addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Sections 1223(e)(2)(D), 1223(e)(2)(F), 1223(e)(2)(G), 1223(e)(2)(H), and 1223(e)(2)(I) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232).
When ANDSF units are ready to demilitarize FMS materiel at the end of its life cycle, the owning units request approval from the corresponding ministry. Upon approval, the owning ministry submits a Change of End Use Request (CoEUR) to the SAO, which verifies that the serial numbers included on the CoEUR correlate to an FMS-procured asset, then approves or disapproves the CoEUR. After approving the CoEUR, the ANDSF unit coordinates with the requirement owner, such as OS or TAAC-Air, to turn in the assets to DLA for demilitarization. After physically demilitarizing the asset, DLA submits a demilitarization certificate to the SAO. Finally, SAO updates the corresponding case in the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), thus completing the life cycle of the FMS asset. Although equipment title transferred to the Afghan Government is not United States property, United States advisors and personnel continue to develop the ministries’ logistics and distributions practices to ensure supplies, equipment, and weaponry supplied by the United States are appropriately distributed, employed by, and accounted for by the ANA and ANP in accordance with Security Assistance policy and law. Core-IMS serves as the primary tool to maintain property accountability and oversight.

**End-Use Monitoring**

In accordance with statutory requirements, equipment provided to the ANDSF is subject to end-use monitoring (EUM). In Afghanistan, DoD administers two types of EUM: routine and enhanced. For non-sensitive equipment provided to the ANDSF, the SAO conducts routine monitoring in conjunction with other required security assistance duties. These actions include observations made during interactions with the ANDSF, visits to defense facilities, and Afghan reporting of on-hand equipment along with serial numbers of lost or damaged equipment. Enhanced EUM for sensitive articles and technologies requires more intensive and formal monitoring. Enhanced EUM includes equipment delivery records with serial numbers, routine physical inventories of the equipment by serial number, and quarterly reporting on inventory results. In Afghanistan, night-vision devices (NVD) are the primary articles requiring enhanced EUM, but additional articles like Raid Towers and Aerostats also require enhanced EUM. SAO logistics personnel regularly perform enhanced EUM efforts to gain accountability of the NVDs. Core-IMS, with PBM and M3, will allow improved ANDSF equipment reporting and enhanced accuracy and accountability of equipment purchased and transferred to the ANDSF. Security conditions and personnel present unique challenges to SAO’s ability to conduct enhanced EUM, but SAO continues to meet mandated EUM requirements through physical inspections, visits to maintenance sites, and reliance on United States personnel at the TAACs and TFs.

**Reducing Attrition through Better Care of Soldiers and Police**

Attrition remains problematic within the ANA and ANP and threatens the sustainability of the force. ANA attrition data is more accurate than ANP attrition data due to better personnel systems and higher ANA enrollment rates in APPS. The number of personnel dropped from the rolls (DFR) accounts for the greatest portion of ANA and ANP attrition rates, but DFR rates for both the ANA and the ANP experienced a very slight downward trend over the reporting period. DFRs occur for

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24 Attrition is unplanned and planned total losses, including losses resulting from personnel dropped from rolls (DFR), killed in action (KIA), separation, and other [disappearance/captured, disability, death (not in action), retirement, exempted (e.g., AWOL or permanent medical issue), or transfer to the ANA/ANP] losses. The attrition rate uses the current month’s attrition numbers (total losses) divided by the previous month’s strength numbers.
a variety of reasons, including poor unit leadership, low pay or delays in pay, austere living conditions, denial of leave, and intimidation by insurgents. The single greatest contributor to DFRs is poor leadership. Advisory focus on key reforms, leadership development, pay, and checkpoint reductions have a secondary effect by improving care for soldiers and police and reducing the threat of factors that negatively impact attrition.

**Standardization of Training**

In 2018, the MoD established the Unified Training, Education and Doctrine Command (UTEDC). UTEDC provides “unity of command” and coordinates all efforts related to institutional training and education, as well as efforts in support of training fielded forces, and provides the MoD with an organization responsible for developing doctrine and training programs to inform activity within branch schools and PME institutions. UTEDC Achieved Initial Operating Capacity (IOC) Status in January 2019. UTEDC is scheduled to achieve Full Operational Capacity (FOC) by December 2019. In the interim, the UTEDC staff and subordinate directorates, acting as an implementation staff, have succeeded in developing basic procedures for effective staff and directorate coordination. The UTEDC commander and staff have also begun to foster basic staff and directorate proficiency in logistics, accounting, and assurance processes, and procedures. Additionally, they now have independent budgetary authority. This will improve resourcing of critical components of foundational and branch-specific training along with academic endeavors within its specialized institutions.

The Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) has improved its leadership, facilities, and program of instruction under the oversight of the Unified Training Education and Doctrine Command (UTEDC)—a positive development over the past year. The quality and welfare of recruits at KMTC continues to improve due to targeted TAA at the point of need, and KMTC classes have witnessed a steady flow of recruits from the ANA Recruiting Command (ANAREC). Coalition advisors have surged at the KMTC over the last six months and are now co-located. They are assisting the ANDSF by relooking the Program of Instruction (POI) based on lessons learned in the field.

The MoD merged its 13 branch schools into four capability schools, and advisors noted a stronger focus by the MoD on the training pipeline into the schools. During this reporting period, the MoD enrolled a third of each Basic Warrior Training (BWT) course directly into a follow on school for advanced training. Advisors attribute this success to high-level engagement and interest by the Chief of General Staff and MINDEF. Despite the growing numbers of soldiers going to follow on schools, the overall lack of advanced training and expertise contribute to higher casualties than necessary.
Better MoD and MoI Budget Execution

The decentralization and implementation of Delegation of Authority (DOA) through the MAGs for procurement expenditures down to corps and provincial HQ levels has bolstered efficiencies in ANDSF budget execution and an increase in accountability of end-user items. Within the MoD and MoI, contract award processes through the Requirements Approval Board (RAB) and Procurement Approval Board (PAB) and execution rates are improving, but progress is uneven and the standard procurement process remains slow. The MoI’s ability to build a resource-informed budget is also hindered by the lack of fiscal guidance from MoF and MoI leadership. The primary focus areas for MoI advisors going forward are to develop capable and effective senior MoI procurement and finance leaders, improve adherence to existing procurement and financial processes and procedures, and continued oversight of ASFF resources. TAA focuses on optimizing the RAB and PAB as control mechanisms; establishing adequate communication and reporting mechanisms to track United States and Coalition-funded projects at the National Procurement Agency (NPA); and streamlining requirements planning at the security ministries to increase both throughput and percentage of contracts awarded.

Improving Processes for Paying Soldier and Police Salaries\textsuperscript{25}

During this reporting period, the MoD and MoI took additional steps to implement APPS, demonstrating continued ministerial-level buy-in and commitment to improved accountability of ANDSF personnel. Both the MoD and MoI conducted an APPS Shura (meeting) during this reporting period in order to address transitions to a new \textit{tashkil} and validate or remove data from APPS. Both Shuras had six objectives:

1. Identify and schedule for re-assignment any individual who would become un-slotted during transition from the 1397 to the 1398 \textit{tashkil}.
2. Ensure all individuals in APPS are correctly slotted by MOS/paragraph/line number and at the correct rank.
3. Identify and retire any personnel who were exceeded Inherent Law age, time in service, and/or time in grade requirements.
4. Slot individuals in the active reserve to positions on the \textit{tashkil}. Note: APPS does not allow for an active reserve. All individuals in the ANDSF must be assigned to a position, separated or retired.
5. Delete from APPS individuals who were confirmed KIA, AWOL, dropped from rolls (DFR), or otherwise separated.
6. Complete all overdue promotion processes in APPS for eligible personnel.

\textsuperscript{25} Information on APPS addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1215 of the NDAA for FY 2017 (P.L. 114-328)
The MoD conducted its APPS Shura in July. Although the Shura maintained six primary goals, it also allowed the ministry the opportunity to remove any “dirty data” that had been migrated from the Afghan Human Resources Information System (AHRIMS) but was not valid. The MoD APPS Shura resulted in an overall reduction in the number of validated MoD personnel in APPS. Outcomes of the Shura included 2,919 Inherent Law retirements, 25,214 records deleted due to attrition (KIA, AWOL, DFR, or separation status), and 805 individuals assigned out of the active reserve. The MoI APPS Shura was held in October 2019. As of October 27, 2019, 94,982 ANP have been enrolled in APPS and are eligible for base pay and 17,457 ALP have been enrolled and eligible for base pay. The MoI is currently completing the cleanup of the tashkil and focused on finishing the enrollment and slotting of the rest of the ANP.

Advisors note a number of challenges ahead, including APPS optimization and utilization as well as continued utilization of APPS-trained users. Advisors assess that a persistent challenge is ministerial-level APPS utilization and optimization. Below the corps-level, ANA time and attendance remains a paper-based process, so corps and PHQs require time and attendance records on a timely basis to input the data into APPS and ensure their personnel are paid. The MoD and MoI continue to perform personnel tasks like assignments, promotions, and career progression through paper, even though APPS enables digital-based personnel actions. The ANA G1 staff currently execute a mix of old manual paper processes and the APPS process, which results in incomplete APPS records. There are multiple causes, to include inadequate training, movement of APPS trained personnel to other positions in the corps, and a large backlog of APPS actions at GSG1, which then necessitate the corps completing some processes on paper (i.e. removing Soldiers who have been killed in action so that new Soldiers can be assigned to those positions).

According to advisors, a large number of personnel previously trained on APPS no longer occupy APPS user positions. The ministries and RS have training plans to produce more APPS users, but ensuring trained personnel remain in a position to use the system remains a challenge. Over time, Resolute Support has trained roughly 4,000 individuals on APPS. Although RS has an arrangement that the MoD and MoI employ APPS-trained personnel in an APPS position for three years, the ministries do not always adhere to this arrangement. RS maintains over-the-shoulder (OTS) trainers at the corps and MoD/MoI to reinforce time and attendance record requirements, identify and reconcile pay discrepancies, and troubleshoot issues with the designated APPS users.

Personnel management requires ministerial emphasis on training, assignment, promotion and career progression. The benefits of APPS extend beyond payroll system improvements and advisors are working with the ministries to expand the functional capabilities of APPS, including an Evaluation Module that could assist future MoD promotions boards by generating reports of promotable personnel and their records. APPS alone cannot solve the problem of poor career management, and simply understanding where a soldier, NCO, or officer is assigned is insufficient

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26 AHRIMS is now a read-only system after all information migrated to APPS. The ministries and RS advisors worked throughout the reporting period to identify, correct, and normalize discrepancies in data transferred from AHRIMS. In some instances, records transferred from AHRIMS to APPS without a Transaction Control Number (TCN)—a number generated through biometric enrollment. The August 2019 DoD OIG audit of APPS (Project No. D2018-D000RJ-0135.000) identified this issue, and others, and CSTC-A continues to work through various challenges to optimize APPS data and usage.
to build a sustainable personnel management capacity. The implementation of APPS can set the conditions for a successful HRM system to grow, but continued advisor support is required.

Improving ANDSF Facilities

Limited local oversight and slow procurement processes limit ANDSF ability to maintain facilities. The ministries struggle to maintain their facilities. To TAA this problem, RS has identified points of need such as the ministries’ execution of their Operation and Maintenance contracts (O&M), connection to the commercial electric grid, and optimizing existing infrastructure rather than seeking new construction.

3.4 SECURITY OF AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS

The RS Gender Office helps the ANA and ANP implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and works to shape and influence the environment to increase women’s participation in the security sector.

Women’s participation numbers in the ANDSF have continued to increase in both ministries. The current number of women in the ANA and the ANP is approximately 4,484, with a further 432 civilian women in service. However, the RS Gender office prioritizes setting the conditions for women’s successful integration over simply increasing numbers. The RS Gender office measures success through implementation of policies that support the integration of women, including enforcing standards of recruitment to prioritize quality over quantity, refining the force structure to support capacity-building positions for women, and encouraging appropriate workplace behavior such as preventing sexual misconduct and holding perpetrators accountable.

Both ministries have implemented a number of recruitment and retention initiatives including financial incentives to encourage increased participation; capacity-building programs such as Pashto and Dari literacy, English language, and computing and office skills; and professional development opportunities. These programs are designed to bridge the gap between opportunities typically available to men and women. However, these programs are not without their problems: without strong leadership support and messaging, they can be divisive. For example, financial incentives to attract and retain women in the security sector mean women receive higher salaries than men do.

The Deputy Minister of Defense for Training and Personnel Affairs, the senior-most woman in the Ministry, remains the strongest source of gender advocacy and integration efforts within the Ministry. Although the ministry developed a gender policy and supporting initiatives, actual implementation of the policy and initiatives has been minimal.

A large number of facilities have been constructed for women on both ANA and ANP bases, but some continue to be vacant or misused. Misuse occurs for a multitude of reasons, including

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27 Information on the security of women and girls addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1531(c) (1) (A) of the NDAA for FY 2016.
changes in security situations making areas insecure for the employment of women and a lack of ANDSF focus on integrating women in certain areas.

The RS Gender Office seeks to design programming that addresses the root causes of low female participation in the security sector, such as cultural and societal norms, high levels of illiteracy, and gender-based violence, while recognizing that these are long-term challenges.

Key initiatives this reporting period include:

- Identification and alignment of *tashkil* positions within the ANA, AAF and ANP for women.
- Initiation of a campaign by both ministries to change community perceptions about employment of women in the security sector.
- Aiding both ministries in committing to a long-term plan to enhance girls’ literacy, including support for a proposal to establish a girls’ military high school within the grounds of the ANA Officer Academy in Kabul.

Training efforts at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) continue to support women’s participation. 56 out of 226 cadets (25 percent) currently attending the six-month officer training course are female. However, women are less well represented in initial recruit training at the Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC), and less than 2 percent of enrollees at the National Military Army Academy (NMAA) 4-year undergraduate program are women.

Current recruitment levels remain mixed across the ANP. 31 students, or less than 1 percent, of the officer candidates at the Afghan National Police Academy (ANPA) are female. Women continue to attend the six-month initial training program conducted in Sivas, Turkey for Patrolwomen, NCOs and Officers. In addition, Central Training Command–Kabul (CTC-K) provides an eight-week basic course for patrolwomen as an alternative to Sivas. Discussions are ongoing to transition to a more sustainable, in-country training course, with only advanced training overseas. The Afghan government officially established a CTC-K female Police College in June 2019, which is the prospective site for future in-country training.

The Family Response Units (FRUs) continue to generate interest and support from the international community. However, the program to investigate gender based violence, forced marriage, and human trafficking has struggled due to societal reluctance to report these crimes. On average, only 110-130 cases of violence against women and girls were reported and/or registered monthly during this reporting period.

**Infrastructure Support for Women in the ANDSF**

The CSTC-A commander directed a holistic review and report of all CSTC-A managed funding used to support ANDSF gender-based facilities and recommended a remediation plan to GIRoA for any misused or vacant facilities. During the past six years, CSTC-A oversaw the execution of 51 infrastructure projects across Afghanistan to support women in the ANDSF. These projects, totaling approximately $113 million and funded by the ASFF and the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund (NATF), provided infrastructure ranging from the addition of female barracks,
to daycare facilities, to large regional training centers. In addition, CSTC-A reviewed 61 UNDP-funded infrastructure projects. A summary of the infrastructure projects’ status by funding source is below.

Figure 10: Women-focused ANDSF Infrastructure Project Status by Funding Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Proper Usage</th>
<th>Project Not Complete</th>
<th>Vacant</th>
<th>Misuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIRoA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To ensure the 14 “not yet complete” facilities are properly used, CSTC-A and the RS Gender Office will work with the ministries to update orders pertaining to facilities for women to report semiannually on project usage and to ensure physical resources and necessary positions are provided to support these projects. CSTC-A will work with the ministries to encourage proper use of facilities intended for women and create and execute remediation plans where needed. These remediation plans have been initiated at the direction of CSTC-A leadership and are not a mandatory element of ASFF or NATF funding.

Figure 11: Women-focused ANDSF Infrastructure Projects for FY 2014-2019
During the course of these projects, CSTC-A learned five key lessons to apply to ongoing and future infrastructure projects for women in the ANDSF:

- Ensure buy-in and commitment from reliable partners in the ministries before commencing infrastructure projects;
- Recognize the need to conduct comprehensive research and planning throughout the procurement process;
- Centralize budgeting and approval processes;
- Centralize accountability processes, and
- Invest in human capital to build women’s prospects for serving and leading in the ANDSF.

CSTC-A will also focus on preparing Afghan women for service within the ANDSF and ensuring they have access to appropriate working conditions and opportunities for advancement once serving.
The MoD oversees the ANA, the AAF, and the MoD’s pillars within the ASSF (ANASOC and the SMW). All relevant security and operations functions fall under the direct supervision of Chief of General Staff (CoGS), particularly directing corps Commanders to execute the Campaign Plan. The MoD continues to improve operational and tactical-level execution, but it struggles with conducting strategic and operational planning. Senior leaders often bypass the systems established through TAA by RS Forces in favor of issuing top-down ciphers and directly receiving bottom-up reports. This dynamic keeps the MoD fixated on tactical actions and outcomes rather than appropriately identifying and solving national-level issues. The MAG-D will continue to TAA vertically to focus on decisive personnel within the MoD and at the corps, who can enable
synchronized planning and execution. Closing this seam will improve unity of effort in the future, and pull MoD’s institutional focus back up to national strategic and operational levels.

**Resource Management and Procurement**

The MoD completed planning and programming development ahead of Minister of Finance (MoF) timelines and developed next year’s Procurement Plan on schedule. MoD procurement continues to require oversight of procurement plans and execution, with just over 20 percent of projects awarded this year.

As of November 1, 2019, the MoD executed 65 percent of its current budget, an increase of 45 percent since the last reporting period. During this reporting period, the MoD awarded 2 contracts valued at approximately 5 million, which represents 3 percent of its procurement budget.

With Budget planning and Execution continuing to be a challenge, CSTC-A introduced Delegation of Authority (DoA) funding as a means to enable corps Commanders and HQs the ability to identify critical needs and make purchases using Afghan Security Forces Funds (ASFF) without a protracted procurement process. Through October 2019, units identified requirements for 100 percent of DoA funds and expended over 25 percent of DoA funds.

**Personnel Management**

Personnel management remains a challenge for the ANA as they continue to develop merit-based promotion systems and retrain staff on a standardized process for promotion. This starts with annual evaluation forms and promotion recommendation letters that are combined with an annual promotion eligibility report that, beginning this reporting period, can now be pulled directly from APPS. The current process has limited promotion boards and routine use of extraordinary promotions (e.g., promotion of individual before they have served required time in present grade). Previously, many promotions were reactive (need to fill a vacancy) instead of proactive (scheduled promotion boards). During the last reporting period, MoD developed a Personnel Management Board, which drafted a Manpower Management Plan designed to set recruiting guidance and identify areas of need. The management plan struggles with proper slotting and placement of the appropriate rank structures into the right positions. Force modeling, continued review of the Personnel Manpower Plan, and more focused career management will better enable the implementation of a merit-based promotion system.

As part of the MoD optimization directed by President Ghani, the MoD sought to identify additional opportunities to civilianize the Ministry workforce. Although the MoD identified additional civilian-authorized positions, only 3,236 civilian positions have been filled, representing 55 percent of the current authorization. CSTC-A will continue its civilianization TAA efforts in order to assist MoD in identifying and encouraging young and talented civilians to assume leadership roles. Additionally, CSTC-A recommended a change to Inherent Law that would allow military retirement to be paid concurrent with civilian salaries in order to attract and retain experienced and qualified talent.
Institutional Training

The KMTC is the foundational military training pillar of the ANA Training and Education Landscape (ANA TEL) and serves as the MoD’s primary facility for Basic Warrior Training (BWT) and advanced combat training, including branch-specific training. As part of TAA Optimization, the ANA schools received revitalized attention as CSTC-A assigned additional coalition advisors with requisite expertise to advise these institutions. For this reporting period, KMTC witnessed a surge in the numbers and frequency of both foundational and career development training. In particular, the basic warrior-training component indicated higher rates of trainees and graduates over the same period in 2018. Specifically, during the reporting period, basic warrior training involved four kandak (battalion) training cycles with an average capacity of 1,195 per cycle. Graduation rates are 88 percent. In the NCO development component, both the Team Leader Course (TLC) and Master Skills Instructor Course (MSIC) have improved in terms of availability, capacity, and graduation. Due to external limiting factors, courses do not always finish within established times. The majority of fill rates improved and are now in excess of 90 percent.

Regional Military Training Centers (RMTC) are decentralized training locations overseen by each Corps Commander. RMTCs offer unit-level collective training opportunities, and the CoGS has directed that RMTCs conduct BWT four times per year. UTEDC has started developing plans to standardize POI for schools across all RMTCs. Conversely, RMTCs suffer from a lack of equipment and inconsistent or substandard curriculum and trainer cadre. Training advisors are assessing the impact of centralizing initial and advanced combat training at KMTC, and utilizing RMTCs for only collective training.

Logistics and Maintenance

The provision of food, fuel, equipment, ammunition, and maintenance, is essential to ensuring the ANDSF can complete their missions. The MoD has the logistical capacity to support and supply the ANA, and maintains robust stockpiles of equipment. However, the MOD struggles at times to have accurate awareness of its inventory. The ANA continues to make incremental progress with their supply system; however, it remains challenged with distribution of material. During this reporting period, OS worked with the SFAB to focus TAA efforts on synchronizing ground movements with major ANA clearing operations, which aimed to prevent convoys from being stopped or interdicted along GLOCs. Improving distribution of supplies to MoD Forward Supply Depots (FSDs), particularly the ANA’s Kandahar FSD+28, allows for supplies to be positioned closer to certain ANDSF corps and to achieve similar repair and supply efficiencies realized at OS-SAO’s Kandahar vehicle transfer waypoint. CSTC-A and the SFAB move critical cargo to the southern corps (205th, 215th, 207th) via coalition Space-A aircraft, but this does not solve the distribution problem. Coordinating with advisors to enhance capabilities of the NMCC, and NPCC, the SFAB worked to establish FSD+ in Kandahar, which when operational, will improve distribution to the southern corps because cargo coming through Pakistan will not have to travel to the CSD in Kabul, but will be able to go directly to Kandahar for distribution.

28 FSD+ is a forward supply depot that has increased storage capacity and capabilities beyond a typical FSD, however, it does not have the capabilities or capacity of the Central Supply Depot.
The NMC-GVS for ground vehicles improves near-term vehicle maintenance and builds long-term capacity through formal training and mentoring of ANA personnel in the maintenance and supply-chain management functions. During this reporting period, the NMS-GVS surge has increased the number of ANA vehicles getting to the NMS-GVS facilities. NMS-GVS provides contact teams for on-site maintenance, and recovery teams to bring vehicles to their locations. In addition, NMS-GVS began moving limited CL IX. NMS-GVS continues to train mechanics, but mechanics often are pulled from maintenance facilities to work on checkpoints or perform other duties. The surge for ANA forces is expected to continue based on ANA OPTEMPO in the next Option Year.

Option Year (OY) 2 of the contract began Aug 31, 2019, and adjusted the workshare for the ANA from 55 percent to 70 percent. The decrease in workshare split for ANA can be attributed to an increase of attacks and a ramp up in security operations during September and October months for the elections and other operations. A continuous lack of personnel present for work at the maintenance facilities and the ANDSF’s inability to conduct logistics operations continue to hinder the successful attainment of the workshare split set forth by the National Maintenance Strategy contract. The contractor continues to provide additional “surge” resources to the ANA by transporting parts from the FMS waypoint to the corps and providing continuous recovery capabilities around the country. Contact Teams continue to provide expedient maintenance support at remote locations in order to ensure combat power can be restored expeditiously. The ANA struggled during OY1 to attain its workshare split, and with the current increase, further challenges are expected. The contractor is limited by the scope of the contract, which depends on the ANDSF’s ability to account for all their personnel and equipment in order to conduct effective logistic and maintenance operations.

**Figure 9: Percentage of ANA – NMS-GVS Workshare Responsibility**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>% Goal for ANA</th>
<th>Actual % of ANA Workshare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>50.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>49.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>50.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>49.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>47.29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data as of October 31, 2019

**Strategic and Operational Planning**

ANA corps have transitioned from trying to “win their geographic battlespace” and conduct large-scale corps maneuvers to conducting smaller, focused operations tied to security around population centers, key terrain, and along lines of communication. In many instances, MoD ASSF operational priorities either directly overlapped with the Operational Design or provided complementary effects. At the tactical level, ASSF forces can conduct mission command from both the Brigade and Kandak Headquarters as well as plan, prepare, coordinate, and execute tactical operations while utilizing Afghan ISR and intelligence methods.

At the ministerial level, the MoD struggles to maintain a Common Operating Picture (COP) of current operations, however, as mentioned earlier, RS advisors noted that senior leaders within the
MoD increasingly empower the AMoDs to think strategically about the long-term structure of the force. The MoD and CoGS continue to get pulled into the tactical fight, but the processes and procedures established within the ministry have enabled senior leaders to engage creatively on strategic issues. The National Military Coordination Center (NMCC)\(^{29}\) provides a platform to coordinate and oversee near-term operations and manage the distribution of assets and tasks based on ministerial-level strategic guidance and priorities. If empowered, the NMCC can link ministerial-level strategy with national operational oversight, thereby alleviating past instances of MoD officials responding to and actively engaging in tactical-level decision.

**Intelligence**

Since July 2019, the ANA Chief of General Staff (CoG) stressed the requirement for Corps to integrate organic ISR platforms into all operations. As a result, Corps Commanders now brief numbers of Scan Eagle Missions Flown (including results) and amount of Wolfhound Reports processed each morning at the Security VTC. Additionally, the Acting GSG2 has created an incentives and rewards program, pitting RAID tower and Aerostat operators against Scan Eagle Pilots to see who can produce tactical effects for their Commands. Although overall education on ISR system capabilities is still lacking across many echelons of the ANA – the increased emphasis and healthy competition to prove usage and effectiveness have increased a demand for ISR assets at all levels of command.

Effective leadership by Acting GSG2, BG Abdul Qayom Sallari (acting GSG2 since May 2019), created synergies and reduced waste and corruption throughout echelons and he continues to be a reliable partner. He enabled better information sharing within both the GSG2 among corps and other staff Sections leading to a higher demand signal for all ISR collection efforts and appreciation of ANA analytical products. This higher level of involvement encourages increased discipline and morale for the collectors as their work is understood to be more important to Afghanistan and the ANDSF. Better targeting efforts also provide tangible results for collectors and analysts and motivate better products.

The ANA has a variety of intelligence equipment being utilized across Afghanistan. The majority of the equipment requires extensive field service representative (FSR) support to keep equipment mission capable.

Twenty-two RAID towers have been fielded to the ANA, and five additional RAID towers are scheduled to be refurbished, and will be fielded to the 215th corps in early FY 2020. Six TiF-25 aerostats have been fielded in Afghanistan, and two additional systems have been funded and will be fielded in FY 2020. Army PD Aerostat will assume program management in FY 2020.

One hundred twenty Wolfhound systems have been fielded to the ANA and ANASOC. The ANA provides Level-III maintenance support at Sia Sang is able to troubleshoot and repair its Wolfhound systems. ANA soldiers teach a four-week Wolfhound operations course at Sia Sang; 67 ANA Soldiers completed training during FY 2019.

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\(^{29}\) The Afghan government has established a national level coordination center for the MOD (NMCC) and MOI (NPCC) modeled after the United States National Military Command Center Concept.
Six operational ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) detachments with a total of 57 UASs have been fielded; two more detachments are scheduled to be activated in 2020. A training detachment supports these operational detachments. The Train-the-Trainer (T3) course continued in August 2019. Experienced pilots, mission commanders and maintainers are being trained to be instructors and technicians. The ultimate goal of the program is to replace the ScanEagle Training Facility instructors and Field Service Representatives on operational sites with ANA Soldiers.

The primary challenge to RAID towers and aerostat programs is logistic distribution. Currently, the ANA possesses the needed spares, but it is difficult to move the equipment to the Corps. The secondary challenge is a timely turn-around for non-mission capable cameras from Dubai (RAID Star Safire III) and Wescam (Aerostat MX-15). When the cameras are evacuated to depot-level maintenance, it can be months or years until the cameras are returned.

**Initiatives to Integrate Women into the ANDSF**

The ANA continues to struggle to recruit, retain, and manage the career progression of women. Units continue to place men in positions reserved for women because there are not enough qualified women to fill the vacant positions. NATO RS and the MoD continued working to develop policies and refine processes to address the myriad of issues that challenge integration of women into the ANA.

Women, like men in the ANDSF, suffer from the absence of a clearly defined career progression. As noted during the last reporting period, RS Gender Advisors continue to assist the MoD to develop a career path plan from recruitment to retirement for ANA women. RS Gender Advisors work closely with Human Resource Management Advisors and the MoD to integrate considerations for female personnel into ongoing development of labor management plans and development of career progression opportunities for women within the MoD.

**Education and Training**

Additional initiatives to address integration of women include the promotion of development programs, enhanced training, and salary incentives. Women in the ANA have access to an undergraduate sponsorship program, the Gender Occupational Opportunity Development (GOOD) Program, overseas training programs, childcare provisions, and retention bonuses.

The GOOD Program provides training to the uniformed and civilian members of the ANDSF in Dari and Pashto literacy, English language, computer skills, and office administration. Current GOOD Program training locations include Kabul, Herat, and MeS. RS works with NGOs in Afghanistan to ensure that efforts to improve women’s literacy are de-conflicted and not duplicative. During this reporting period, approximately 400 women attended GOOD Program training, primarily in Kabul at training locations for GCPSU, Kabul Military Hospital, HKIA, MoI HQ, and Camp Scorpion. This training seeks to improve women’s proficiency in their current duties and improve their career prospects, making them more competitive within the MoD. RS Advisors are seeking to expand training locations and enrollment for the GOOD Program.
Facilities

During this reporting period, the MoD continues to improve facilities for women. Adequate separate facilities are available in many units, however there is an ongoing requirement for smaller scale facilities such as changing rooms, bathrooms, and childcare centers to facilitate greater integration of women. The major facilities are listed below and there are many smaller scale projects ongoing.

- Camp Shaheen, 209th women’s accommodation facility
- ANCOF daycare Facility
- KMTC daycare and kitchen
- Camp Zafar daycare facility
- MoD Daycare Expansion – Kabul
- Camp commando (Morehead) female barracks
- Female tactical platoon compound (Camp Taylor)
- HKIA daycare and DFAC

4.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

The ANA General Staff (GS) commands and controls all of Afghanistan’s ground and air forces, including the ANA conventional forces, the Afghan Air Force (AAF), the Special Mission Wing (SMW), the ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC), the Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF), and the Afghan Border Force (ABF). In total, the ANA consists of 27 combat brigades, 3 combat air wings, 4 branch and basic training schools, 6 ANCOF BDEs, 7 ABF BDEs, and additional support facilities (e.g., depots and hospitals).

Afghan National Army Strength

The MoD is authorized 227,103 personnel. Attrition continues to degrade the force and outpace recruitment and retention. The primary driver of attrition is the large number of soldiers who drop from rolls for being absent without leave (AWOL) for more than thirty consecutive days. During the reporting period, MoD conducted an APPS Shura, which contributed to an increase in
separations and retirements and cleaned up APPS data. Soldiers leaving the ANA at the end of the contracted service accounts for approximately a quarter of the monthly losses. Combat casualties account for a small percentage of monthly losses.

Afghan National Army Structure

Figure 12: ANA Corps and 111th Capital Division Boundaries

The largest ANA elements are the six regional corps. Each corps is typically composed of a headquarters *kandak*, three to four infantry brigades, and various specialty *kandaks*. The 201st Corps, 203rd Corps, 205th Corps, 207th Corps, 209th Corps, 215th Corps, and 217th Corps are responsible for their geographic regions that follow the provincial boundaries. The ANDSF divided the 209th’s previous sector to incorporate the 217th Corps. The 111th Capital Division is independent from any corps and is responsible for security in Kabul.
ANA Territorial Force (ANA-TF)

The ANA-TF is comprised of locally recruited ANA units intended to serve as a “hold force” to serve in permissive security environments. Since the last reporting period, the size of the ANA-TF has more than doubled. There are currently 58 active companies, with another 21 in training, spanning 26 of the 34 provinces. The end state goal for the ANA-TF is 105 tolays (Afghan Army companies) and the ANDSF expects to start recruiting for those units soon. Most of the active companies are performing fixed-site security of existing tactical infrastructure (field fortifications) which were previously occupied by regular ANA units. By assuming fixed site security from the regular ANA, ANA TF companies have provided the respective ANA Corps with more available combat power for maneuver.

The ANA-TF continues to struggle with the same obstacles to force generation and sustainment faced by the broader ANA. As a counter-corruption mechanism, soldiers can only be enrolled formally in the ANA through the APPS system at a single point of entry, the GSG1 enrollment branch in the ANA Recruiting Command (Kabul). When tolays are recruited and trained in remote provinces such as Herat, a mobile enrollment team completes the required actions to generate a hard copy packet, which must then be transported to Kabul for enrollment in the digital system. Transportation difficulties for the team and packets, combined with a standing backlog of packets in Kabul waiting for digital enrollment, have resulted in some units going for months without pay.

Since the ANA-TF are employed in their home districts, and not all districts have existing MoD facilities, the company often has to request funding or materials to construct field expedient fortifications, which can take a considerable amount of time to complete. Remote ANA-TF companies also suffer from sustainment shortfalls for food, ammunition, water, and fuel, due to insurgent activity along supply routes and scarcity of Afghan rotary-wing lift assets for sustainment operations. The ANA-TF do not seem to face issues of neglect or lack of support in excess of the broader ANA, but inconsistent pay and sustainment combined with poor living conditions contribute to force attrition (AWOLs). Some ANA-TF companies are suitably equipped and supported, usually as a reflection of its parent corps' capability, with 201st corps being the most positive example. By continuing to obtain corps and local buy-in, the MoD can mitigate the negative impact of these issues.

Afghan Border Force

The Afghan Border Force (ABF) consists of six Brigades under the operational control of the ANA Corps. Each Corps maintains command and control (C2) over one ABF Brigade in its geographic location (the 209th Corps maintains C2 over two ABF brigades). The ABF maintains security in the border security zone, which extends 30 miles into the territory of Afghanistan, to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers and support ANA operations against insurgent and terrorist forces.

Afghan National Civil Order Force

The Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF) consists of seven Brigades under the operational control of the ANA Corps. ANCOF missions include dealing with civil unrest, reacting to
insurgent activities in remote and high-threat areas, conducting civil order presence patrols, and providing crisis response to public unrest and terrorist attacks in urban and metropolitan areas. The ANCOF support clearing operations by providing intelligence, tactical support, and manpower to secure seized terrain.

**Afghan Air Force**

The AAF serves as the primary air enabler for the ANA and ASSF ground forces by providing aerial fires and lift support to ground and special operations forces across Afghanistan. The AAF headquarters is in Kabul and provides command and control of 18 detachments and 3 wings: the Kabul Air Wing, the Kandahar Air Wing, and the Shindand Air Wing.

The AAF continues to show steady improvement in pilot skill, ground crew proficiency, and air-to-ground integration (AGI). The AAF can independently plan and provide air assets for logistics, resupply, humanitarian relief efforts, return of human remains, MEDEVAC, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), non-traditional ISR, air interdiction, close air attack, armed overwatch, and aerial escort missions.

The AAF improved its fighting capabilities over the last year, including now-routine delivery of laser-guided bombs by A-29s as well as Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rockets by AC-208 Eliminator gunships. Advisors also noted that Afghan crews have demonstrated consistent progress in collateral damage estimate ability and have shown impressive restraint and ability to minimize civilian casualties.

Advising at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the AAF primarily occurs in Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif. NAC-A and TAAC-Air advise the AAF at the ministerial, AAF headquarters, wing, group, and squadron levels. The co-location of TAAC-Air and the AAF headquarters at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) allows for strong coordination and regular interaction between advisors and AAF personnel. The AAF Commander attends the weekly security meeting with COMRS and the TAAC-Air Commander, considerably increasing and improving synchronization of RS and MoD activities and objectives.

The Commander of the AAF has focused on increasing AAF capacity to conduct independent operations and placing effective leaders in critical positions. Nonetheless, human capital limitations remain a challenge to fully meeting recruitment needs given high standards for key positions.

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30 MEDEVAC differs from CASEVAC in the level of care provided to the patient and the type of vehicle or aircraft used. MEDEVAC missions typically have transit care provided by a medic, and make use of dedicated or specialty vehicles. CASEVAC missions are usually on an ad hoc basis, often without medical care provided en route, and in vehicles or aircraft not specifically designated for patient transfer.
Airframes

Figure 13: Summary of AAF Airframes and Aircrews*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Current Inventory</th>
<th>In Country &amp; Available or in Short-term MX(^{31})</th>
<th>Number of Qualified Aircrew (Pilots and Co-Pilots)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC-208</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15(^{32})</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23(^{33})</td>
<td>48(^{34})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44(^{35})</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60A+</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60+FFF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-35(^{36})</td>
<td>(4(^{37}))</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheetal</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>222(^{38})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The AAF has 206 aircraft, of which 163 are in-country and available or in short-term maintenance; ten are in the United States in support of Afghan training needs. The AAF’s fixed-wing platforms include C-208s, C-130s, and A-29s, and its rotary-wing platforms include MD-530s, Mi-17s, UH-60A+s, and Mi-35s. Understaffed crew positions that the AAF requires to assemble fully trained flight crews, such as flight engineers, limit some aircraft platforms.

During this reporting period, DoD approved a revision to the aviation modernization plan that caps the number of UH-60s at 53 and the number of AC-208s at 10 compared with the original objectives set in 2016 of 159 and 32, respectively. These reductions were made on the basis of a review of future operational requirements.

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\(^{31}\) Numbers represent a snapshot in time and are based on multiple reporting sources. Numbers in this column include aircraft available for tasking (combat ops/training) as well as those in short-term routine or unscheduled maintenance.

\(^{32}\) Fifteen aircraft are in Afghanistan. Ten aircraft are at Moody AFB, Georgia, for training utilization.

\(^{33}\) This number does not include the additional Mi-17 helicopters used by the SMW. Two (2) were destroyed in August of 2018 because they were at the end of their usable life and were not feasible to be overhauled or extended. There are forty five (45) in the current inventory, twenty-three (23) are currently in country and available, eleven (11) have reached the end of their usable life and are awaiting decisions on overhaul, four (4) are in Bulgaria undergoing overhaul, an additional seven (7) are undergoing extensive repairs or are awaiting decisions on divestment or disposal.

\(^{34}\) Advising mission ended in June 2019

\(^{35}\) Five (5) MD-530s were delivered in Oct 2019 and are still undergoing inspections

\(^{36}\) The United States does not provide any funding or advisory support for Mi-35s. The Mi-35s were removed from the authorized fleet in 2015 but the Afghans continue to attempt to sustain them. DoD has advised them against doing so and to instead focus on the aircraft that DoD is providing as a part of the aviation modernization program. A modification to nonproliferation sanctions that allows DoD to continue to sustain Mi-17s specifically does not include MI-35 variants. The Government of India donated four Mi-35s to Afghanistan. The AAF’s prior Mi-35 fleet reached the end of its service life and is not included in the official authorization level. All four aircraft required their 500-hour inspection and have been grounded until completed. The AAF is trying to source funding to complete repairs. The United States does not provide advising or funding for the Mi-35 aircraft or aircrew.

\(^{37}\) Not counted.

\(^{38}\) SMW aircraft are not included in this total.
The C-130 transport aircraft provides a medium-airlift capability in support of personnel and equipment transport, CASEVAC, and return of human remains.

AAF C-130Hs assigned to the Kabul Air Wing conduct operations throughout Afghanistan to locations with improved airfields, providing a strategic airlift capability for large passenger movements, CASEVAC operations, and wet-wing fuel deliveries to austere locations. C-130Hs transport cargo too large or unsuitable for the C-208 or Mi-17 aircraft, such as maintenance equipment and parts. Additionally, the C-130 is the primary mode of transportation for munitions between the AAF Wing locations.

Small fleet size, aircraft availability, and aircrew availability currently limit C-130H operations. One of the four AAF C-130Hs is currently out-of-country for depot maintenance. The AAF relies on a DoD contractor logistics support (CLS) contract for C-130H logistics and maintenance.
The C-208 aircraft provides light-lift, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and recovery of human remains capability for the ANDSF. C-208s operate primarily from Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand. The C-208 employment envelope was recently expanded to include development of soft field landing and airdrop capabilities. The C-208 fleet relies on a mix of CLS and AAF organic maintenance. NAC-A and TAAC-Air continue to help the AAF develop its nascent airdrop capability, with the intent to increase operational flexibility, but the MoD’s demand for this capability remains low. Nevertheless, C-208s conducted several combat airdrops during this reporting period. The AAF is working toward supporting airdrop operations with platform integration (AC-208, A-29, and PC-12) to facilitate safe airdrops in contested environments. Currently, airdrop capability is limited to low-threat areas due to the C-208 airdrop altitude, airspeed, lack of armor, and a maximum cargo load of 1,000 pounds. NAC-A and TAAC-Air advisors coordinate with other TAAC advisors to educate ANA commanders on the AAF’s airdrop capability.
The AC-208 Eliminator provides a range of ISR and strike capabilities in support of ANDSF ground and air operations. The AC-208 has a C-208 airframe but is equipped with a more powerful engine. Its primary capability is to employ precision-guided munitions and is equipped with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) modification to the 2.75-inch Hydra rocket. It also is equipped with the MX-15 sensor, which is the most capable in the AAF. The MX-15, along with the APKWS, allows the AC-208 to be an extremely capable armed-ISR platform. In February 2019, the first AC-208s arrived in Kabul to support the AAF with an emerging ISR and precision strike capability. Since then, AC-208 combat capabilities have risen steadily including the capability to use the MX-15’s laser-designator feature to enable an AC-208 to “buddy lase,” or guide a laser-guided bomb from an A-29, for partnered A-29 missions. The AC-208 fleet is also developing a night operations capability.
The AAF uses the A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to attack targets of strategic significance and provide close air attack in support of ground forces. The A-29 can carry Mk-81 250-lb. bombs, Mk-82 500-lb. bombs, a GBU-58 250-lb. laser-guided bomb, and a GBU-12 500-lb. laser-guided bomb. The aircraft can also fire 2.75 in. rockets and has two .50 caliber machine guns mounted in the wings. In March 2018, the AAF A-29s started using precision munitions in combat. The A-29’s accuracy has increased significantly with precision-guided munitions, and A-29 pilots continue to achieve high accuracy with unguided bombs. The first night strike by an AAF A-29 occurred on December 8, 2018, adding a significant capability to the AAF.

To date, the A-29 program has delivered 25 total aircraft to the AAF. Currently, 15 are in Afghanistan and 10 remain in the United States for training purposes. The remaining aircraft are scheduled to be delivered in 2020.

The AAF assigned A-29s to the Kabul Air Wing and a detachment at Mazar-e-Sharif. Advisors noted that AAF A-29 pilots continue to show disciplined restraint and tactical proficiency during weapons employment to accomplish their missions while minimizing the possibility of civilian casualties. The AAF continues to require CLS and supporting training contracts to maintain the combat capability of its A-29 fleet as development of its maintainer cadre occurs.
The Mi-17 helicopter conducts day and night personnel transport, MEDEVAC, resupply, close-combat attack, aerial escort, and air assault missions. The AAF is capable of deploying and operating Mi-17s throughout the country. UH-60s have been fully fielded to the AAF and, as pilot proficiency increases, they will increasingly and fully displace the Mi-17 fleet.

AAF maintainers have a proven ability to perform the majority of Mi-17 maintenance.
The MD-530 helicopter provides close-air attack and aerial escort to ground forces. The MD-530 has two weapons pylons with .50 caliber machine guns and rockets. As of October 26, 2019, the Kandahar Air Wing has three operational MD-530 Scout Weapons Teams.

The AAF’s MD-530s currently rely on a DoD CLS contract; however, the AAF has not developed any organic maintenance capability during this reporting period. Maintainer training is under way to develop organic MD-530 organic maintenance capacity. TAAC-Air continues to work with the AAF to increase the number of MD-530 pilot and maintenance students in training to maximize independence and sustainability of the fleet.

Currently, the AAF’s capability to support MD-530 operations at forward-deployed locations for short intervals without CLS presence is limited to rearming and refueling. Although the AAF previously planned to build MD-530 NVG combat capability, it is instead focusing on AC-208 night capabilities.
The UH-60A+ Black Hawk is a medium-lift, multi-role utility helicopter that performs cargo and personnel transport and patient and human remains transfer, and has the ability to operate throughout most of Afghanistan. DoD provided the AAF with mission-configured and training-configured UH-60s refurbished and upgraded to an A+ variant with the UH-60L model engine. AAF currently has 10 AAF UH-60+ (Afghan Unique) helicopters in country. Six remain at Kandahar, while four have been moved to Kabul. An additional seven UH-60+, destined for the Special Mission Wing (SMW), remain in CONUS undergoing additional modifications to support SMW requirements.

AAF UH-60 pilots receive basic UH-60 flying skills training through a the six-week Aircraft Qualification Training (AQT) conducted in other countries. Upon graduation, pilots return to Afghanistan and attend Mission Qualification Training (MQT), which is a 10-week contractor-led, academic and flight instruction course that produces mission-certified “co-pilots.” AAF squadron leadership can certify pilots as aircraft commanders once they have accrued sufficient flying time and experience. Currently, the AAF has 65 qualified UH-60 pilots. All UH-60 pilots are NVG qualified and regularly conduct NVG resupply and CASEVAC missions.
Training

Training pipelines for the AAF continue to meet growth targets. However, the lack of qualified candidates with the necessary technical skills to complete training presents a challenge and identifying suitable candidates with English skills remains difficult. Following desertion issues at AAF training locations in the United States, DoD has shifted elements of training to other countries. Those programs and pipelines continue to mature, but advisors note no noticeable difference in training quality and outputs and advisors visit and observe training at these sites quarterly for quality assurance. These training efforts allow Afghan training sites to focus on mission qualification and combat skills proficiency training, although reallocation of aircraft for training purposes presents a persistent challenge of priorities against resources.

The AAF previously did not track the training status of AAF maintainers formally. To address these concerns, TAAC-Air developed an AAF master training plan to standardize and define skill level descriptions across platforms. The AAF is working on implementing a student training database to manage the students. Initial training to achieve a routine-level maintenance competency (Level 3) takes 12 to 18 months and includes general English-language training. Subsequent training to achieve an intermediate level maintenance competency (Level 2) takes an additional two years and includes enhanced English training. Finally, achieving high-level competency (Level 1) requires an additional two years and includes continued English training to achieve literacy in technical English. The AAF master training plan now gives the AAF and TAAC-Air a guideline to follow and adjust as necessary.

In support of the AAF Master Training Plan, the MoD approved an Aircraft Maintenance Development Center (AMDC) that currently has 78 students in third country locations (UAE and Slovakia) for aircraft maintenance training. If training production remains on track, the AMDC projects sufficient entry-level, Level 3, maintainers for current requirements to be trained in the next two years. It will take an additional five years to create fully qualified Level 1 maintainers.

The AAF will always require some level of long-term contractor support, but is it on a path to independent operations for the day-to-day generation of operations. Subsequent experience level upgrades will continue through the AMDC structure, eventually supporting independent and sustainable levels of maintainers for the AAF aircraft fleets with less reliance on CLS.

The AMDC in Kabul must still overcome three specific challenges before full training capacity can be realized site selection, training aid equipment identification and procurement, and student availability. The AAF is still in the final stages of choosing a permanent training site. Secondly, the training aid equipment list was only recently received and the program office is working through the process for procurement. Lastly, student availability is a challenge. Students have not progressed through English Language Training (ELT) at the rate that was expected. ELT timelines have the potential to delay subsequent AMDC student training by up to 12 weeks.

NAC-A TAA educates leadership on the proper application of airpower and assets to ensure the proper application of aircraft and personnel. At the senior level, NAC-A is designing a training/exercise program to improve senior-level AAF leadership decision-making for the
development, sustainment, employment, integration, and command and control of the AAF within the ANDSF.

The development of qualified, experienced, and correctly slotted Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators (ATACs) is no longer an AAF training effort. The 9-week ATAC training course produced an average of 30-40 AAF ATACs per year. Although training produced approximately 180 ATACs throughout the AGI Enterprise, ANA was reluctant to leverage AAF-trained professionals during airstrike employment. Despite multiple TAA efforts across multiple Corps senior leadership teams, the problem was not resolved. Therefore, the AAF Commander has authorized the top 20 to 25 percent of the current AGI Enterprise to transition to Corps Liaison Officers (CLOs) that will be embedded with the Corps to support the new Combat Aviation Kandak (CAK) construct. The MoD will assign a CAK to each Corps commander, which will include a dedicated combination of strike and mobility rotary wing assets to meet the Corps’ needs. CLOs will provide direct assistance in order to maximize effects. Training for CLOs commenced in the early fall of 2019. The remaining 75 to 80 percent of current ATACs will be redistributed amongst the AAF and will fill vacancies in the existing tashkil.

The Combat Aviation Kandak (CAK) consists of three pillars: an Integration Cell (CLOs and AAF Regional Operations and Intelligence Centers), a Rotary-Wing (RW) Attack section made of MD-530s, and a RW Lift section (UH-60s). The CAKs will be regionally aligned with 4 Corps in MeS (209th Corps), KAF (205), Herat (207), and Jalalabad (201). The Corps Liaison Officer (CLO) will be an integration officer at the operational level advocating for the proper utilization of Afghan Air Power in support of the ANA, working both in the ANA Corps HQ and regionally aligned AAF C2 elements. The MoD will assign a CAK to each Corps commander, which will include a dedicated combination of strike and mobility rotary-wing assets to meet the Corps’ needs.

**Sustainment**

The AAF relies largely on CLS to ensure the sustainability of its fleet. AAF MD-530 maintenance capability steadily progressed during this reporting period. AAF maintainers can complete launch and recovery and most scheduled maintenance for the MD-530. However, the AAF requires CLS oversight to sign off for coalition airworthiness. Their small work force and short working days are the biggest inhibitor to completing a larger portion of MD-530 maintenance. The AAF still regularly depends on CLS assistance for trouble shooting and comprehension of English-language technical data.
Figure 14: Percentage of AAF Organic Maintenance and CLS Maintenance\textsuperscript{39}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>%Organic</th>
<th>%CLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Mi-17 data does not include heavy repair or overhauls since the MoD does not possess the organic capability required to accomplish that level maintenance.

**Operations**

Persistent advising of the AAF’s targeting process increased the quantity and impact of AAF targeting packages, but target package quality remains inconsistent. Issues like outdated imagery, clear target descriptions, and stale targets without enemy activity contribute to target package quality issues. In the past two months, advising efforts have focused on removing old, outdated target packages from the system while refreshing the relevant pending targets with updated intelligence and imagery. The AAF is able to create, staff, validate and execute target packages from all ANA Corps. The overall targeting process and enterprise of strike packages have improved over the past six months. There are currently more target packages submitted than the AAF has the capacity to support. The AAF no longer reports the total number of target packages submitted, completed or in pending status and as a result, TAAC-Air is no longer able to track them.

\textsuperscript{39} Organic maintenance data are general averages due to fluctuations in OPTEMPO, phased maintenance, and the degree of maintenance needs.
MoD Afghan Special Security Forces

Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC)

The ANASOC formations remain the premier ground offensive capability in the ANDSF. Overall growth within ANASOC remains on track and has correlated to increased combat availability. This increased OPTEMPO, has directly impacted the Operational Readiness Cycle (ORC) and unit integrity of Commando units. The ANASOC struggles to get its formations out of operations and therefore suffers, at times, a lack of consistent training and understanding of tactics, techniques and procedures. The ANASOC leadership has worked with MoD to reverse this trend over the last several months and anticipates addressing deficiencies over the winter.

ASSF misuse slightly increased during this reporting period, and Coalition advisors continue to utilize concepts of employment developed last reporting period to provide an outline of the roles, tasks, responsibilities, and relationships of ANASOC and the coordinating headquarters that have a role in their deployment. This document highlights the unique mission capabilities defining the appropriate operational employment for greatest mission success. However, misuse or overuse persists and originates from several sources including convenience, necessity, and politically motivated operational decisions.

The ANASOC is a corps-level organization responsible for command and control of all ANA special operations forces. ANASOC consists of four Special Operations Brigades (SOB) and a

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40 Afghan Sorties vs Coalition Sorties 2019 chart data ends October 31, 2019 and does not display the entire year of data.
National Mission Brigade (NMB). Ten battalion-sized ANA Commando Special Operations Kandaks (SOK), eight Mobile Strike Kandaks (MSK) and Cobra Strike Kandaks (CSK), and seven support elements are spread across the corps. The ANASOC’s mission is to increase the Afghan Government’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations and, as directed, execute special operations against terrorist and insurgent networks in coordination with other ANDSF pillars. The ANASOC can respond to simultaneous crises across the country, as well as conduct future operations planning with other ASSF components and the ANDSF. During this reporting period, the realignment of NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A TAA to support regional level contingencies was instrumental in improving crisis response.

SOKs, the ANASOC’s primary tactical elements, conduct core special operations tasks against threat networks to support regional corps’ COIN operations. They provide a strategic response capability against select threats and can forward-deploy expeditionary mission command packages in support of planned offensive and contingency operations. All 10 SOKs and all 8 MSKs align with regional SOBs and have the ability to work with the ANA Corps as necessary. The 6th SOK, assigned to the NMB and located in the Kabul area, functions as the ANA’s national mission unit.

MSKs and CSKs utilize maneuver with combined arms to conduct lightning strike, enhanced direct-fire lethality, strongpoint penetration, and high-mobility operations. This capability enhances ANASOC’s firepower, mobility, survivability, and lethality on the battlefield. General Support Kandaks (GSK) conduct emergency resupply and facilitate delivery of SOF-specific equipment and supplies to the Kabul Cluster units.

The NMB provides the President of Afghanistan and the MoD with rapidly deployable special operations forces capable of conducting national-level operations to achieve strategic effects across Afghanistan. The NMB has a deployable mission-command package, including the 6th SOK, Ktah Khas (KKA), and two Special Forces Kandaks. The NMB conducts short-notice, theater-wide counterterrorism operations, crisis response, national emergency response, and internal defense and development. The NMB performs direct action, hostage rescue, special reconnaissance, security forces assistance, and counterinsurgency, and it can integrate Afghan ISR) into operations. MoI and NDS liaisons serve in the NMB HQ to ensure ANA-ANP coordination. The SMW and the AAF provide priority support to the NMB. During this fighting season, the NMB has maintained a fighting force strength with 50 percent of their assigned strength on duty. The NMB maintains an offensive posture and high operational tempo to maintain pressure on the Taliban and threat networks. As a result, the NMB has not maintained a functional ORC, but has managed to ensure forces were available and active throughout the AOR.

The KKA is a light infantry SOK assigned to ANASOC’s NMB. The KKA has eight companies that remain nearly at full strength: three operational companies, a training company, an engineer company, a military intelligence company, a support company, and a headquarters company. These additional companies support the KKA training cycle and operations, including transportation for the KKA strike forces, explosive ordnance disposal to conduct counter-IED (C-IED) operations, and supporting the female tactical platoon, which enables interactions with women and children on missions. KKA platoons and companies conduct successful intelligence-driven counterterrorism raids, particularly against high-value individuals, and vehicle interdictions.
Training

The ANASOC School of Excellence (SOE) trains and develops newly recruited ANASOC Commandos and Special Forces leaders. Nearly half of ANASOC recruits have prior experience within the ANDSF, leading them to maintain higher rate of selection than new recruits flowing from KMTC and the RMTCs. The SOE qualifies selected recruits through the 14-week Commando Qualifications Course (CDOQC). Furthermore, the SOE offers specialty courses like Communications, Engineering, Mortar, Sniper, and Medical courses; leadership courses like English, Master Diver, and Officer/NCO classes; and advanced courses such as Advanced Special Forces Medical Training class.

The Cobra Strike Maneuver Course (CSMC) trains Mobile Strike Kandaks to become Cobra Strike Kandaks (CSK). The 12-week course covers topics like dismounted infantry collective training, vehicle commander training, gunnery skills training, Mobile Strike Fighting Vehicle (MSFV) platoon collective training, and Battalion Senior Leader and Staff training. The ANASOC has two qualified CSKs and six MSKs; however, all MSKs are in the process of converting to CSKs. High demand for maneuver strike capabilities affects ANASOC’s ability to place the remaining six MSKs into the CSMC. Therefore, the ANASOC plans to restructure by transitioning the CSK growth plan from eight CSKs consisting of three companies to six CSKs made up of four companies. This transition should allow ANASOC to reinforce operational readiness. Once all MSKs are converted CSKs, the ANASOC plans to continue utilizing the CSMV to perform refresher training.

The SOE also employs mobile training teams (MTT) to conduct on-site training and refresher courses for deployed SOKs, MSKs, and CSKs. MTTs provide tailored training at the request of the ANASOC Corps and are essential to addressing training requirements for kandaks unable to block off time to pursue collective training.

Sustainment

Sustainment is a critical issue, which affects ANASOC operations. By way of example, ANASOC units regularly report sustainment concerns both internally and through their respective sustainment networks. Although some of these concerns can be attributed to shortfalls in what is a maturing ANDSF sustainment system, responsibility rests with the individual units through inadequate logistic planning relative to operational requirements. The ANASOC’s organic logistical support extends for roughly 72 hours when commandos deploy in support of conventional ANA forces, after which the unit or company should return for refit and resupply. In cases where the ANASOC deploys beyond that timeframe, units rely on logistical support from the ANA corps and MoD for rations, OCIE, and ammunition. This logistical dependency upon the ANA corps subjects the ANASOC to ANA competing priorities, long logistics trains, and inconsistent Corps support, which compound the effects of misuse. Furthermore, ANASOC does not have clear doctrine on whether kandaks request support to SOBs, FSDs, or BSKs.
Operations

RS focuses ANASOC TAA on building combat power, achieving unity of effort across the wider security pillars, leadership development, disciplined ORCs that will help improve the effectiveness of ASSF forces in preparation for the fighting season, development of future annual plans, and concurrently ensuring the safety of Coalition TAA forces.

This year the Crisis Response Group (CRG) has been most impressive. This group is able to identify imminent or occurring threats throughout the country. The group coordinates through the Combined Situation Awareness Room (CSAR), which is a collection of soldiers and airmen from across ANDSF and Coalition Forces, which are able to respond rapidly and move resources to the point of need. This capability has stopped the Taliban from taking any District or Provincial Centers this year. Advisors noted that the ANASOC improved their independent operational capability by utilizing an indigenous intelligence picture they have built to go after enemy in locations that the security pillars deem to be of high value.

Special Mission Wing (SMW)

The SMW is a special operations aviation wing that provides operational reach for the ASSF during counterterrorism (CT) and counter narcotics (CN) missions designed to disrupt insurgent and narcotics networks in Afghanistan. It supports helicopter assault force raids and provides resupply, CASEVAC, and ISR support for the ASSF. The SMW is the only ANDSF organization with night-vision and rotary-wing air assault capabilities. Its structure consists of assault squadrons in Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif and an ISR squadron in Kabul that provides ASSF with operational reach across the country and integrates with the AAF to provide real-time intelligence to its A-29 light attack aircraft.

The SMW’s ability to conduct unilateral operations improved, with all four squadrons now effectively conducting operations. SMW misuse remained a concern\(^4^1\) during this reporting period. Challenges to long-term SMW recruitment and growth remain, due to high recruiting standards, additional levels of screening, competition with other ANDSF forces, and training timelines. The SMW recruits ground specialties from the AAF, ANDSF, and ASSF, but selects aviation recruits from initial entry rotary-wing and fixed-wing students. Once identified, the SMW vets candidates via a comprehensive background check and recruiting board review. Advisors are concerned that the growth in the SMW tashkil will challenge recruiting efforts. The SMW does not currently have any challenges with retention.

During this reporting period, DoD approved a plan to provide the SMW with CH-47 Chinooks to fully replace its Mi-17 fleet by the end of 2023.

\(^4^1\) SMW misuse is defined as tasking the SMW to conduct operations outside of their normal scope, and missions tasked from influential figures outside of the established tasking process.
**PC-12 Aircraft**

The SMW utilizes the PC-12 fixed-wing aircraft to conduct ISR in support of CT and CN operations, including over watch of ASSF ground assault forces and helicopter assault force raids, during both daytime and nighttime operations. In addition, the PC-12 integrates with AAF A-29 aircraft in support of strike operations, providing target identification and collateral damage scans.

PC-12 aircraft provide the ANDSF with day and night surveillance and air-based signals intelligence capabilities. The PC-12 can send full-motion video (FMV) to a ground station and the onboard crew can perform real-time analysis of collected data. PC-12 ISR capabilities continued to mature during this reporting period.

**Mi-17 Helicopter**

The SMW Mi-17 conducts day and Night Vision Goggle (NVG) air assault CN and CT operations. Additionally, the Mi-17s conduct resupply operations, CASEVAC, quick reaction force missions, and personnel movement.
Training

The SMW makes use of multiple CLS training opportunities, including maintenance, English language, and flight training. All SMW personnel attend English classes, including conversational, aviation, and maintenance vocabulary.

The SMW SOAG Standardization mentors the SMW to produce General Flight Rules, Aircrew Training Management Program, and Tactical Standard Operating Procedures publications to provide the foundation for the SMW’s training efforts. Current TAA priorities include increasing Mi-17 NVG capability, developing an operational readiness cycle to facilitate aircrew progression and training, increasing the sustainability of organic Mi-17 aircrew progression rather than contractor supported training, and increasing the depth of PC-12 ISR capability and integration. The SMW is also focused on preparation for the arrival of the UH-60 by identifying training support requirements and developing a cohesive transition plan. Each squadron completed a validation exercise (VALEX) as part of the annual squadron rotation to ensure they were adequately prepared to conduct operations in their new area of operations. The VALEX consisted of academics, emergency procedure skills assessment in the simulator, local area orientations, and two full-mission profile evaluations.

Sustainment

This reporting period saw a shift from a contractor-led to an Afghan-led scheduled maintenance posture. Afghan performance increased to 60 percent of scheduled maintenance and 40 percent of unscheduled maintenance. The SMW is building maintenance capability by conducting seminars and courses and currently has twelve maintainers actively in class and five seminars to commence at the outstations. Twenty-five maintainers certified at their training level in the last quarter. The SMW is overcoming the challenge of conducting academic classes at outstations by working with CLS and training contractors to identify personnel ready for upgrade training.

The SMW is working to develop a pass-back maintenance construct with CLS to increase the organic to CLS ratio, but a significant challenge is the requirement to maintain United States standards of airworthiness on the aircraft. CLS mentors supervise and coach Afghan maintainers who are performing the inspections to overcome this challenge. Another challenge to Afghan maintenance capability is the proficiency of Afghan maintainers with respect to their level of qualification. This is being resolved through follow-on maintenance training seminars that advance the Afghan maintainers’ proficiency level. These seminars improve Afghan maintainers’ ability to perform tasks that they were previously unable to perform and resulted in an increase in capability for scheduled inspections.

Operations

The SMW operates four rotary-wing squadrons and one fixed-wing squadron capable of conducting independent missions in support of ASSF elements. The SMW conducts day and night infiltration and exfiltration from three locations throughout Afghanistan in support of the ASSF. The SMW increased their helicopter assault missions by 90 percent, flying an average of 19 assaults a month, up from 10 in previous years.
During this reporting period, the SMW sustained a unilateral execution rate of 80 percent, in line with last reporting period. This included helicopter assault, A-29 strike support, casualty evacuation, resupply, unit rotation, assault support, preparation of the battlefield, ISR, overwatch, Quick Reaction Force, and unit staging. Ten percent of these missions were in support of counter narcotics and 90 percent were in support of counterterrorism. During this reporting period, the SMW achieved full operational capability for Fast Rope Insertion Extraction System and Aerial Sniper Platform.
During this reporting period, the MoI strategically focused on its future role in a stabilized Afghan security environment. “Reblueing” is pivotal to a MoI conceptual transition from a semi-paramilitary security force to a more traditional police force that focuses on “community policing” and rule of law. The MoI is preparing to play a vital role in the future of Afghanistan and is positioning itself accordingly. This was evident during the August 2019 Future Force Conference as the MoI planned and strategically developed what its identity should be in a more stable, “post-peace” environment. This reporting period also saw substantial leadership changes within the MoI. The ministry overhauled the PCoP leadership by replacing 27 of 34 PCoPs in an attempt to improve efficiency and police activity.

Resource Management and Procurement (RM)

During this reporting period, RM worked with its MoI counterparts to develop a more comprehensive procurement process that provides flexibility to respond to emerging needs. The MoI instituted a tiered approach that includes three types of funding streams: Delegation of Authority (DOA), Standard Procurement, and Emergency Procurement. With assistance from

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42 Information in this section addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1223(e) (2) (B) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232).
RM, the MoI developed a user guide for MoI personnel to assist in the budget and procurement cycle and to clarify roles and responsibilities. The guide contains a checklist that walks the user through the steps to procure resources.

DOA allows local commanders to procure basic items rapidly through an expedited approval process. Leaders can submit a DOA request to a ministerial-level representative that validates the requirement against a checklist of DOA authorized items. The representative, along with the relevant TAAC or TF, has the authority to approve the procurement and disperse funds within a cap established by CG CSTC-A. Standard Procurement is the MoI’s normal procurement process, which remains a time consuming process that can take approximately four to seven months. When needed, Emergency Procurement can be used twice during a fiscal year and the costs are deducted from the normal unit budget.

The MoI's budget for this fiscal year is roughly $141.4 million. As of November 1, 2019, the MoI executed 43 percent of its current budget, an increase since the last reporting period of 26 percent. During this reporting period, the MoI awarded 13 contracts valued at approximately $2.0 million, which represents 2 percent of its procurement budget.

**Personnel Management**

The MoI lacks a refined human resource and career management capability. The majority of the MoI’s personnel management activities for this reporting period consisted of enrolling and slotting ANP personnel in the APPS system. Maintaining a clear picture of the ANP force size and ensuring police are paid is a fundamental service that the MoI must accomplish before it can develop additional human resource management tools. The MoI continues to struggle with an inadequate promotion process and an ambiguous career path structure. A functional Performance Appraisal system to support the promotion process does not exist. Instead, the ministry relies on the High Oversight Board (HOB) and advisory assistance to standardize promotion.

One element of MoI optimization is to “civilianize” part of its workforce, emphasize strong civilian leadership, leverage subject matter expertise, and build continuity within the MoI, in accordance with the MISP and MoI optimization efforts. The MoI civil servant Subject Matter Expert (SME) and the Capacity Building for Results (CBR) programs were designed to integrate specialized civilian talent to manage critical ministerial programs and build Afghan civilian capacity within the ministry. Unfortunately, the MoI has been unable or unwilling to leverage the SME program to continue to civilianize positions and attract new recruits. To date, the MoI remains reliant on the international community to fund and maintain this program.

The MoI assesses that headquarters organizations are bloated while operational units have insufficient personnel, and is working to optimize its structure through the *tashkil* review process. Consequently, the MoI has a goal of 30 percent reduction of its headquarters personnel and plans to move these positions and personnel to operational police departments. In August, the MoI Force Management Directorate identified approximately 800 positions for optimization. The First Deputy Minister directed the Deputy Minister for Personnel and Training to identify up to 3,000 positions for optimization in the Kabul headquarters organization. Advisors reviewed and
provided feedback to this list in September, and will continue to work with the ministry on optimizing its personnel.

The process of civilianization has stalled due to competing demands (operations, elections, and counter-corruption). The last successful civilianization efforts was in the MoI’s finance and procurement sections.

**Institutional Training**

The MoI lacks an institutional training arena that reinforces community policing and lacks training to create a professional cadre of police. Initiatives like the MoD’s UTEDC are notably absent within the MoI and, furthermore, the MoI lacks human resource expertise and career management. Over time, the Coalition has refocused efforts away from combat training for the ANP and towards community policing. Advisors will continue to focus at the ministerial level to assist the MoI as it transitions its force to become professional police focused on community engagement and rule of law.

The ANP recruit locally at 1 of the 34 Provincial Recruiting Stations and sends new recruits to 1 of the 10 Regional Training Centers (RTC) for police training. Police training generally consists of an 8 to 12 week training course. Beyond early training, the ANP still lacks an institutionalized leadership development program at the district and local level. Furthermore, mid-level ANP leaders lack leadership development opportunities.

**Logistics and Maintenance**

Similar to last reporting period, the MoI maintains a robust stockpile of supplies, but struggles to execute distribution processes. Through the Top 10, CSTC-A provided TAA on the decisive processes that would help improve the MoI’s logistics, but inadequate convoy security for logistics re-supply, lack of trained logisticians capable of understanding and correlating warehouse inventory with automated systems, poor retention of qualified logistics specialists, and inaccurate consumption reporting of commodities represent persistent roadblocks to ANP logistics maturity. The ANP’s lack of supply chain management and poor coordination and distribution of parts have direct impacts on equipment maintenance and the ANP’s ability to supply and sustain its forces properly.

The NMC-GVS continues to enable the progressive transfer of responsibility from the contractor to the ANP. As per the contract agreement, Option Year (OY) 2 began Aug 31, 2019, which directed the workshare increase for the ANP from 10 percent to 25 percent. The ANP’s past performance exceeded the required goal of 10 percent during the first year and they are on track to reach and exceed the current goal of 25 percent. The September and October workshare goals were not reached largely due to the preparation and security of the Afghanistan Presidential elections, but did see a six-percent increase. Currently CSTC-A is developing plans to implement additional measures in order to assist the ANP in reaching and exceeding their assigned goals. This includes actions such as the transportation of parts from the FMS waypoint directly to the customer in order to aid in the expedient distribution of Class IX. Contact teams will also be increased to ensure the expedient repair of equipment at any site. Recovery assets and training will also be
implemented for the ANP in order to assist in the recovery and repair of lost or damaged vehicles. Unfortunately, as with the ANA the contractor is limited by the scope of the contract which depends on the ANDSF’s ability to account for all their personnel and equipment in order to conduct effective logistic and maintenance operations.

**Figure 17: Percentage of ANP - NMC Workshare Responsibility**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>% Goal for ANP</th>
<th>Actual % of ANP Workshare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>18.90%</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>23.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24.88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data as of October 31, 2019*

**Strategic and Operational Planning**

The MoI has improved its strategic planning at the ministerial level and saw improvements in its ability to streamline operational planning across its forces. Weekly security working groups (security meetings), which were hosted by RS DCOS-OPS and attended by MoI senior leaders, improved information sharing and collaborative planning. The MoI increasingly demonstrated an ability to produce operational plans and senior MoI leaders hosted meetings twice a week with all PCoPs to discuss operations. Throughout the reporting period, the plans department within the Plans and Operations Directorate planned security for the voter registration process in June 2019 and produced operational plans for the day of the election. Finally, MoI leaders are determined to address unnecessary casualties at checkpoints and have issued a series of orders designed to reduce casualties, reform urban policing, and collaboratively work with the MoD on security infrastructure.

Advisors noted marked improvements in the processes and capabilities at the NPCC and the MoI’s ability to synchronize the NPCC with the NMCC. The NPCC builds situational understanding at a centralized headquarters by pulling operational information ANP. Within the NPCC, a trained cadre of MoI personnel conduct planning, track current operations, and integrate intelligence. Additionally, the MoI utilized the NPCC to track movements of SEM, strategic convoys, and maintain a common operating picture. RS advisors continue to TAA at the NPCC to enable it as a critical C2 node.

**Intelligence**

Cooperation among the various intelligence stakeholders within the MoI has increased over time, but intelligence integration in operations requires more work. The operational design has driven some MoI progress towards intelligence integration, especially through the security shuras, which provide a forum for the MoI to share its organic intelligence and integrate intelligence from other security pillars.

The Combined Special Operations Cell (CSOC) is a new special operations cell within the Afghan Government. The cell’s personnel will train on NIMS and the Protected Internet Exchange (PIX)
in order to view and analyze important intelligence and information data. The cell can also utilize the updated mapping tool that will exist on the new NIMS server. The new NIMS server will be installed into the CSOC facility within the next few months.

During this reporting period, the MoI instituted leadership changes within the intelligence community. The Intelligence Train, Advise, and Assist (INT TAA) MoI Police Intelligence Team (PIT) is working with the General Directorate of Internal Security (GDIS) Director, Counter Terrorism Police (CTP) Director, and the General Directorate of Intelligence and Counter Crimes Director (GDICC) in order to influence this leadership more effectively to provide improved intelligence sharing and coordination within the MoI. Currently as observed, intelligence sharing primarily occurs between ANP organizations such as CTP and DPI; however, it is not occurring at its most optimal level. It appears that intelligence sharing among the ANP only occurs whenever the director of the organization deems it important enough for sharing to either the entity the intelligence involves and/or whenever a crisis event occurs.

The NPCC has created a COP on the NIMS to allow the NPCC Chief and staff to see the same information and to make well-informed decisions. The NMCC also established a COP, however, the two ministerial organizations are not sharing the data they receive, thereby preventing cross-organization COP access. The senior advisor to the NPCC and NMCC has continuously tried to get the NPCC and NMCC to sign a cipher that allows the sharing of this data in order for both ministerial organizations to see the same COP.

**Gender Integration Initiatives**

Approximately 3,077 (registered in the APPS and eligible for base pay) women serve in the Afghan National Police with 8,898 tashkil positions available to women. A recruitment campaign focused on acquiring an increased number of female recruits produced positive results, with an increase of 138 (Afghan PERSTAT) more women serving in the ANP between June and September 2019.

**Education and Training**

Unique training and education opportunities provide incentives for women to join the ANP. The MoI continues female police training at Sivas, Turkey as its most successful program with 250 attendees annually. Despite female-only training capacity at some training centers, in-country training for initial recruits remains low. 1,100 women applied for out of country training in Sivas, Turkey’s, 2019 session, but female attendance at in-country initial recruit training was only 128 for the period March – August 2019.

**Facilities**

Advisors continued to review female facilities to confirm appropriate use of facilities, particularly Regional Training Centers, to ensure women in the ANP have access to adequate facilities. Adequate separate facilities are available in many units; however, there is an ongoing requirement for smaller-scale facilities such as changing rooms, bathrooms, and childcare centers to facilitate greater integration of women.
The international community continues to assist in the construction of facilities in support of gender integration to ensure safe and appropriate working environments. Current high visibility female facility projects within the MoI include:

- Construct RTC PD-9 Training Bldg
- WPP Police Town Ph I (NATF)
- WPP Police Town Ph II (NATF)
- Construct Kabul Police Academy Ph II
- Family Response Unit PD 4
- Family Response Unit PD 8
- Family Response Unit PD 12
- Family Response Unit PD 17

5.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

The ANP mission is to maintain civil order; reduce corruption; prevent the cultivation, production, and smuggling of illegal narcotics; provide security for individuals and the community; and safeguard legal rights and freedoms. Although ANP work with and alongside the ANA to fight the insurgency, the ANP lack training and are not equipped for traditional counterinsurgency tactics. The ANP’s focus on and employment in COIN military functions have hindered the development of anti-crime and other community policing capabilities, and the ANP are several years behind the ANA in terms of development.

The desired ANP end-state is a professional and effective police force focused on community-centric, traditional, evidenced-based law enforcement policing. Milestones include determining the proper operating model and force distribution to police Afghanistan effectively, redefine ANP roles and responsibilities, assign ANP pillar responsibilities, and establish training standards and work ethics to facilitate effective policing.

Afghan National Police Strength

The MoI is authorized 124,626 personnel.\textsuperscript{43} As with the ANA, the number of ANP personnel dropped from the rolls continues to comprise the largest portion of overall ANP attrition. The combination of frequent and lengthy deployments to remote checkpoints with minimal provisions and equipment, difficult living conditions, and the near-constant prospect of attacks contribute to the high ANP attrition.

Afghan National Police Structure

The ANP is composed of four pillars (AUP, PSP, ABP, and AACP) and three sub-pillars (ALP, APPF, and CNPA). The GCPSU is the MoI’s component of the ASSF. The ALP and the APPF do not count as part of the 124,626 authorized levels; however, they provide additional security under the MoI. The ALP receive funding from ASFF, while the APPF do not receive any United States funding.

\textsuperscript{43} See Section 3.2 for more information on size of the ANDSF.
**Afghan Uniform Police**

The AUP is the largest police agency in Afghanistan and the primary police force the local populace encounters in their daily lives. The AUP consists of the traffic police, fire and rescue departments, and a Provincial Police Headquarters (PHQ) in each of the 34 provinces.

The AUP mission is to maintain the rule of law, provide security and civil order, prevent cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, and prevent the smuggling of weapons and other public property, such as historical and cultural relics. Other AUP duties include the detention of criminal suspects to be handed over to the judicial system, maintenance of reliable security measures for key infrastructure including roads and facilities, intelligence collection, and the provision of firefighting and rescue services during natural or man-made disasters. Leadership across AUP units varies, but generally senior MoI and AUP leaders do not empower lower-level leaders to make decisions. Moreover, local AUP units and leaders are susceptible to influence by local power brokers and government officials.

**Afghan Local Police (ALP)**

The ALP provide security within villages and rural areas to protect the population from insurgent attacks and to protect facilities. NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) provides TAA support to the ALP at the ALP Staff Directorate (SD) level. ALP personnel are not included in the overall ANDSF authorization and the United States funds the salaries for the ALP.

**Public Security Police (PSP)**

The PSP provide urban and metropolitan security, including anti-riot security, for major gatherings and can act as a medium-level response force for situations that exceed the capabilities of the regular uniformed police. The PSP consist of seven reserve support battalions subordinate to the PSP directorate in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, MeS, and Kunduz. As a marked success for the MoI, five of the seven planned PSP Kandaks are at FOC, with the remaining two at IOC. The MoI recognizes that these units need to be equipped and employed properly, demonstrating emerging progress towards a community-policing model based around public security.

**Afghan Border Police (ABP)**

The ABP secure and safeguard national borders and provide security at Afghanistan’s international airports to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers. The ABP HQ is located in Kabul.

**Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP)**

The AACP provide specialist police expertise and counterterrorism, anti-corruption, criminal investigation, biometrics, forensics, and specialized security detail support. Coalition subject matter experts work alongside their Afghan counterparts in the AACP’s forensic and biometric
programs to support evidence-based operations. AACP personnel also work closely with criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges to ensure the police, not the military, remain the primary face of the rule of law. The AACP organizational structure includes the AACP headquarters, the Criminal Investigation Directorate, the Counterterrorism Police Division, and the Major Crimes Task Force.

**Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)**

The CNPA is the lead ANDSF pillar for counter-narcotics efforts with regular narcotics police and specialized units located in all 34 provinces. Specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and the Intelligence Investigation Unit.

The MoI’s NIU and SIU conduct interdiction operations that target senior narcotics traffickers. NSOCC-A supports the NIU for joint CN and CT operations, training, and sustainment. These advisors collaborate with other United States Government departments and agencies, including the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Agency.

**MoI Afghan Special Security Forces**

**General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU)**

The GCPSU met ASSF personnel growth milestones during this reporting period and remains the MoI’s preeminent police component. Unlike some elements of the ASSF, the GCPSU does not suffer from high levels of misuse. Advisors noted that the quality of the GCPSU training pipeline enabled the growth and professionalism of the National Mission Units (NMU) as advisors noted that the GCPSU does not struggle to fill training courses. The NMUs are still the first choice ASSF unit for crisis response in urban areas across Afghanistan, and the only option for HPA response within the Kabul Cluster. During this reporting period, GCPSU operational tempo within Kabul increased by 300 percent. The biggest challenge to the GCPSU as its national contribution grows will be remaining a policing unit, working within Afghan law, and not becoming another paramilitary force.

The GCPSU is the most capable law enforcement component of the MoI. It conducts rule of law operations, including CT, CN, and counter-organized crime, and can execute high-risk arrests and crisis response operations such as hostage recovery. The GCPSU is composed of a HQ responsible for C2 of all special police units, 6 NMUs, 33 Provincial Special Units (PSU), and 25 Provincial Intelligence (J2) Detachments. Advisors noted that misuse and low operational readiness rates of GCPSU special police were minimal during this reporting period.

The ANDSF Roadmap calls for the expansion of the GCPSU HQ and Training Directorate, an increase in the number or Provincial J2 Detachments, and the creation of three additional NMUs as part of ASSF expansion. The new NMUs will provide crisis response, HPA prevention and reaction, and high-risk arrest capabilities to areas in western, northern, and eastern Afghanistan. Two of the new NMU squadrons were operational for the majority of the 2019 fighting season,

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44 Evidence-based operations entail arresting individuals for whom there is sufficient unclassified evidence to attain a conviction in an Afghan court of law.
during the fourth phase. By October 2019, the new NMUs received their third operational squadron. The NMU growth plan will be complete by March 2020, and will see that all NMUs have four squadrons, enough to maintain an effective ORC. With the expansion of the GCPSU, challenges associated with maintaining the effectiveness of existing NMUs while distributing the necessary equipment and leadership may grow. The NMUs have increased by 50 percent over roughly 18 months. As a result, the highly trained and experienced officers at the mid to senior level have been spread thin to lead the new NMUs. This has not had an effect at the operational level, but at the tactical level, the lack of experienced officers has led to junior officers leading squadrons. Additionally, the MoI transferred many of the most experienced and capable mid-grade officers to serve as PCoPs. This has had mixed results. Although they are effective due to their experience within the GCPSU, some PCoPs with former GCPSU experience have demonstrated a willingness to overuse, over rely upon, or misuse the GCPSU within their AOR.

Misuse of GCPSU Units continues to take place. The NMUs are seen as prestigious at the MOI level. When another ministry, provincial governor, or Corps commander asks for support, the MOI will often send a NMU squadron. These tasks can range from supporting checkpoints to simply guarding PCoP HQs. The general trend over the last six months, however, is reduction in misuse of the NMUs.

There has been no drop in capabilities within the existing NMUs due to a combination of growth within the established training pipeline, and the old NMUs conducting “big brother” operations with the new NMUs. Essentially, the capability to provide HPA response across Afghanistan, particularly in the major population centers, has increased. The existing NMUs are conducting fully independent HAF operations utilizing SMW, and acting on Afghan-derived targets. However, NMUs—and the GCPSU—remain reliant on coalition enablers, including ISR support, to be fully effective.

PSUs provide a quick reaction capability and special investigative element for the provinces and hold broad responsibilities for public order, high-risk arrests, and evidence-based policing operations within the rule of law construct and other police tasks not suited to the conventional ANP. PSUs directly support to the PCoP in their assigned province, but reside under operational control of the GCPSU HQ. The GCPSU HQ maintains responsibility for the provision of manpower, training, and equipment of the PSUs, while the PCoP sustains the units through provisions of ammunition, food, pay, and other sustainment material. The PSUs consist of three Special Response Teams (SRT) and an intelligence detachment that provides localized human intelligence.

GCPSU recruits attend the Special Police Training Center (SPTC) for basic police training. The Special Police Training Wing (SPTW) provides advanced special police training. SPTW courses provide advanced training on topics like special reconnaissance, explosive ordnance, ATAC, and sensitive-site exploitation. Advisors plan to leverage the SPTW to enable NMU growth so that new units learn specialized skills such as special reconnaissance and explosive ordnance.

The MoI does not differentiate between the ANP and GCPSU when it comes to logistic support. There is no reliable way to move GCPSU units via air around Afghanistan without the support of the MoD. The NMUs use the M4 rifle, yet the MoI holds very limited stocks of M4 ammunition.
and again relies on the MoD. The NMUs rely on local MoI logistics depots, often run by the ANP and do not have SBU status in order to manage their own stores, therefore, the PCoPs and ANP at the provincial level will often prioritize their own units.
SECTION 6 – FINANCING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

The ANDSF continues to be funded primarily through annual congressional appropriations to the DoD via the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). This appropriation enables the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to fund the Afghan Forces. The majority of ASFF funds sustainment and operations of the Afghan forces. NATO Allies and partner nations also play a prominent role in the financial support of the ANDSF by contributing to the NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF), which supports the ANA, and the UNDP-administered Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) that pays the salaries of police and builds MoI capacity. In addition, the Afghan Government draws upon its domestic revenues to contribute to ANDSF sustainment operations for ANDSF personnel. The ANDSF will continue to depend on coalition security and advisory assistance and donor financial assistance for 2020 and beyond.

6.1 U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS

The United States provides the bulk of funding necessary to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF through the ASFF. The ASFF provides the ANDSF with the resources needed to fund ongoing ANDSF operations while developing the ANDSF into an effective and independent force capable of securing Afghanistan, protecting the Afghan people, and contributing to regional security. The majority of ASFF funding is executed through DoD contracts on pseudo-FMS cases; the remainder is provided directly to the Afghan Government primarily to fund ANDSF pay, logistics, and facilities sustainment contracts. Since FY 2005, Congress has appropriated more than $77 billion for ASFF.

In many cases, Afghan nationals are employed in Afghanistan by DoD contractors to support United States forces, including DoD sustainment contracts that support Afghan forces. Figure 15 displays the number of Afghan nationals employed by or on behalf of United States forces in Afghanistan from June 1 through October 31, 2019.45 The Department projects that United States forces in Afghanistan will continue employing approximately 4,700 Afghan nationals until the next reporting period.

45The Department provides numbers of contractor personnel in Afghanistan employed by the U.S. forces in a quarterly report to Congress in accordance with section 1267 of the NDAA for FY 2018 (Public Law 115-91). The Department also publishes quarterly data of contractor employees in Afghanistan on its website at https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/ps/CENTCOM_reports.html for public viewing. The next contractor quarterly census report is due in July 2019.
6.2 INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

At the July 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, the international community agreed to extend financial sustainment of the ANDSF through 2024. NATO’s commitment enables the Afghan Government and its security forces to preserve past gains and maintain progress towards steadily increasing its financial contributions to security, and helps set the conditions for an Afghan-led political settlement. Future funding levels will depend on the current and future ANDSF force size and structure with the goal of ensuring the ANDSF maintains the capacity and capability to apply the appropriate amount of military pressure to compel a negotiated peace settlement with the Taliban and secure the Afghan Government and populace. The magnitude of NATO’s past financial contributions and its reliability in the future are critical to the effectiveness of Afghan security forces on the battlefield.

NATO allies and partners will revisit their contributions prior to completion of the current 2017-2020 funding cycle, as previously established at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. At the 2012 Chicago Summit, donors agreed to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the ANDSF until the end of 2017. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, donor nations pledged about $900 million in annual funding for the ANDSF until the end of 2020, totaling approximately 93 percent of the contributions pledged at Chicago Summit. The United States does not commit to a specific amount but funds the majority of ANDSF requirements by annually seeking an ASFF appropriation from Congress.

International donors provide funding either on a bilateral basis or through one of two multi-lateral channels, NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF) and Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). Approximately one-half of annual international contributions pledged at Warsaw expect to flow through the NATF, with the remainder through LOTFA. United States funding is not part of the Warsaw commitment. To provide transparency and accountability, donor nations can participate in the Kabul-based ANDSF Funding Oversight and Coordination Body, co-chaired by the Afghan MoF and representatives from major international donors.

NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF)

The NATO ANA Trust Fund serves as a flexible, transparent, and cost-effective mechanism to support and sustain the ANDSF. Created in 2007, the NATF was adapted, following agreement at the 2012 Chicago Summit, as part of NATO’s commitment to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the ANDSF beyond 2014. Over time, the scope of the

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46 The number of Afghan national contractor personnel employed by U.S. forces during the previous six months and the projected number of such personnel who U.S. forces employ is submitted in accordance with Section 1216 of H.R. 114-270, which accompanied H.R. 1735 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92).
Trust Fund expanded to support the sustainment of the ANA, literacy and professional military education, women’s participation in the ANSDF, and capacity-building activities. In early 2018, the NATF Board took additional steps to enhance the overall reliability and transparency of the Trust Fund while increasing flexibility to apply support to some areas to other elements of the Afghan security forces, thereby providing donor nations with broader visibility into Trust Fund projects and NATO’s support to ANDSF sustainment.

The United States is responsible for overall trust fund management and execution of funds transferred from the SHAPE ANA Trust Fund Account to the ASFF in line with the ANA Trust Fund Implementation Plan and in line with national caveats on donated funds. Since the NATF’s inception in 2007, 34 nations have contributed nearly $2.8 billion. In 2019, nations pledged $367.6M, and to date we have received $249.3M and are expecting to receive $147M in the month of December. Pledge amounts will be exceeded by $28 million dollars. Several countries either donated without a pledge or exceeded their pledge.

Activities funded through the NATF are directly linked to mission requirements generated, reviewed, and approved by the CSTC-A. The NATFO Board monitors the NATF and reviews its costs effectiveness, financial integrity, and accountability, including through quarterly performance reports and annual financial audits. Since 2018, all NATF-funded projects primarily have been executed through DoD or NATO Support and Procurement Agency contracts rather than as direct contributions to the Afghan Government.

**June 2019 Plenary Session at NATO HQ**

In June 2019, NATO HQ hosted the annual NATO ANA Trust Fund Plenary session with the NATO Secretary General leading the meeting. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia briefed attendees on behalf of the Department of Defense. DASD (APC) underscored the importance of transforming the 2018 Brussels Summit political commitments into formalized financial contributions to the ANSDF, provided the Department’s view of Trust Fund management, and discussed the need for continued financial support no matter the security environment in Afghanistan. CG CSTC-A reviewed the priorities of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) priorities, provided an in-theater assessment of the ANSDF, and discussed the effectiveness of the Trust Fund. The Afghan Minister of Finance and the Deputy Minister of Defense also briefed attendees. During the Plenary, Allies and partners reaffirmed their commitment to the financial sustainment of the Afghan security forces and the importance of strong security forces to peace in Afghanistan.

**Law and Order Trust Fund**

The UNDP has managed LOTFA since its inception in 2002. The UNDP receives and manages donor contributions through LOTFA to pay the salaries of up to 124,626 members of the ANP47. CSTC-A coordinates closely with the UNDP regarding the use of LOTFA, and donor nations can participate in the LOTFA Project Board, which provides oversight over LOTFA-funded activities.

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47 The salaries of the 30,000 ALP is paid for solely by U.S. funds.
6.3 Afghan Government Contributions

At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, participants agreed that, as the Afghan economy and revenues grow, Afghanistan’s annual share of the cost of the ANDSF will increase progressively from at least $500 million in 2015, with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces. At the 2012 exchange rate, $500 million equals about 25 billion afghani. The 2016 Afghan national budget allocated 24.7 billion Afghanis ($387 million) for the ANDSF, falling just short of the goal in afghani terms. In 2017, the Afghan national budget allocated 26.9 billion Afghanis ($396 million) and in 2018, the Afghan Government allocated 30.3 billion afghani ($445 million) for the ANDSF. In 2019, the Afghan Government plans to allocate 34.1 billion afghani ($448 million). Therefore, the Afghan Government has continued to meet its 2012 pledge. Given the persistence of the insurgency and continued slow growth of the Afghan economy, however, full self-sufficiency by 2024 does not appear realistic, even if levels of violence and, with it, the ANDSF force structure, reduce significantly. DoD continues to review the costs of ASFF-funded programs to ensure responsible stewardship of United States taxpayers’ funds to address long-term affordability of the ANDSF.

Efforts to Increase the Afghan Government’s Financial Responsibility for the ANDSF

The Afghan Government remains dependent on international support to fund both security and non-security sector costs. Donor nations are working with the Afghan Government to implement economic reforms with a goal to increase economic growth and government revenues. Continued international support for economic development is based on the Afghan Government’s progress towards economic and social reforms necessary to remove constraints on private-sector investment to spur economic growth and job creation.

Realistically, however, Afghanistan will remain reliant on the international community to fund its forces, even in a post-reconciliation environment. Afghan government funding for its MoD and MoI forces—about $500 million per year—is equivalent to about two percent of its GDP and about one fourth of total government revenues. It will be years before the Afghan economy would fully generate sufficient government revenues to finance a peacetime force, even if there was no more risk that terrorist groups could use Afghanistan as a safe haven.
## ANNEX A – ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACP</td>
<td>Afghan Anti-Crime Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABF</td>
<td>Afghan Border Force</td>
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<td>ACJC</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Justice Center</td>
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<td>Attorney General’s Office</td>
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<td>Afghan Human Resource Information Management System</td>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
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<td>ALS</td>
<td>Afghan Logistics Specialist</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
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