Results in Brief
Evaluation of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve’s Military Information Support Operations

February 25, 2020

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR):

- (U) planned and executed military information support operations (MISO) in accordance with joint doctrine, and
- (U) coordinated its OIR messaging efforts and planned the transition of its messaging responsibilities with allies, the host nation, and the U.S. Department of State (DOS).

(U) Background

(U) According to U.S. joint doctrine, MISO develops and conveys messages and actions to influence select foreign groups and to promote themes to change those groups’ attitudes and behaviors. U.S. joint doctrine also states that MISO influences foreign attitudes about U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power and resolve. DoD and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions require the DoD and military services to coordinate and de-conflict MISO with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, such as the Department of State, to ensure consistency across U.S. Government influence operations.

(U) In 2014, the Joint Staff directed U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) to provide a Military Information Support Team at the U.S. Embassy Baghdad to advise and assist the Iraqi Ministry of Defense with MISO competencies. USCENTCOM also provided internet-based MISO for CJTF-OIR and the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. Between 2016 and 2019, USCENTCOM and CJTF-OIR also developed campaign plans and operation orders with MISO tasks to counter Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

(U) Findings

(U) We determined that U.S. forces in Iraq planned and executed MISO in accordance with joint doctrine and also coordinated MISO with Coalition forces, the Government of Iraq, and DOS. However, after the physical defeat of the ISIS caliphate, U.S. forces and the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad did not initiate the required coordination to transition messaging from the DoD to DOS.

(U) In addition, USCENTCOM did not plan for the transition of counter-ISIS messaging from the DoD to DOS because the DoD required a request for support from DOS prior to initiating the requirements validation and force identification process. Also, USCENTCOM could not finalize MISO-related force structure, command relationships, or authorities without DOS input.
(U) Results in Brief


(U) Findings (cont’d)

(U) Additionally, USCENTCOM staff did not provide evidence that USCENTCOM had asked DOS for a request for support.

(U) If the U.S. forces and U.S. Embassy-Baghdad do not coordinate on how to transition messaging efforts, there is an increased risk that the United States will not be able to influence attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors in the Iraqi information environment following OIR. Additionally, inconsistent U.S. messaging in Iraq could occur following OIR because of the lack of coordination between DoD and DOS information activities.

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Department of State, develop a plan for interagency coordination and integration of U.S. Government messaging efforts in Iraq.

(U) We recommend that the Commander of U.S. Central Command, in coordination with the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, define U.S. forces’ roles and responsibilities and identify DOS counterparts to support the transition of U.S. Government messaging requirements and responsibilities from the DoD to the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad in Iraq.

(U) We recommend the Commander of U.S. Central Command, after coordination with the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, modify the existing transition plans and orders to assign U.S. forces’ roles and responsibilities in the transition of messaging from the DoD to the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad in Iraq.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The Principal Director of Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, neither agreed nor disagreed and

(U) stated that OUSD(P) considers transition of post-OIR MISO, and broader Information Operations, to be an operational-level planning function best led by the Combatant Command. She stated that OUSD(Policy) will facilitate higher-level discussions with interagency partners as required to enable any agreed-upon transition of CJTF-OIR messaging. As a result of management comments, we redirected Recommendation 1 to the Commander of U.S. Central Command.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Chief of Information Operations Division, U.S. Central Command, responding for the Commander of U.S. Central Command, agreed with Recommendations 2 and 3.

(U) Recommendation 1, redirected from the draft report, is unresolved, and we request that the Commander of U.S. Central Command provide comments on this revised recommendation no later than March 31, 2020. Recommendations 2 and 3 are resolved but will remain open. We will close Recommendations 2 and 3 when we verify that the Commander of U.S. Central Command has taken the agreed upon actions.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of the recommendations.
## (U) Recommendations Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(U) Management</th>
<th>(U) Recommendations Unresolved</th>
<th>(U) Recommendations Resolved</th>
<th>(U) Recommendations Closed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(U) Commander, U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>(U) 1 (Redirected)</td>
<td>(U) 2, 3</td>
<td>None</td>
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(U) Note: the following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- (U) Unresolved – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- (U) Resolved – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- (U) Closed – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.
(U) MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

(U) SUBJECT: Evaluation of Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve’s Military Information Support Operations
(Report No. DODIG-2020-065)

(U) We are providing this report for information and action, as appropriate. We conducted this evaluation from April 29 to December 19, 2019, in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations," published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

(U) We considered management comments to a draft of this report while preparing the final report. We redirected Recommendation 1 from USD(Policy) to the Commander of U.S. Central Command, who has the authority to implement the recommendation. Therefore, Recommendation 1 is unresolved, and we request that the Commander of U.S. Central Command provide comments on this revised recommendation no later than March 31, 2020. The Commander of U.S. Central Command has initiated or proposed actions that will address the underlying findings that generated Recommendations 2 and 3. Therefore, Recommendations 2 and 3 are resolved but remain open. These recommendations may be closed when we receive adequate documentation that actions to implement the three recommendations have been completed.

(U) DoD Directive 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us, within 90 days, your response concerning specific actions in progress or completed on the recommendations. Your response should be sent to either followup@DoDig.mil if unclassified or rfunet@DoDig.smil.mil if SECRET.

(U) We appreciate the cooperation and assistance extended to our staff during the evaluation. Please direct questions to Carolyn R. Hantz.

Carolyn R. Hantz
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Programs, Combatant Commands, and Overseas Contingency Operations
(U) **Introduction**

(U) **Objective**

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR):

- (U) planned and executed military information support operations (MISO) in accordance with joint doctrine, and
- (U) coordinated its OIR messaging efforts and planned the transition of its messaging responsibilities with allies, the host nation, and the U.S. Department of State (DOS).

(U) **Background**

(S//REL TO USA/MESF) According to Joint Publication 3-13.2, MISO is designed to develop and convey messages and devise actions to influence select foreign groups and to promote themes to change those groups' attitudes and behaviors. Joint Publication 3-13.2 states that these information support operations influence foreign attitudes and beliefs about U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power and resolve. MISO is integrated with the U.S. Embassy chief of mission, U.S. ambassador, and geographic combatant commander theater-wide priorities and objectives to shape the security environment to promote bilateral cooperation, ease tension, and deter aggression.

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1. (U) Joint Publication 6.0, “Joint Communications System”, defines the term “message” as a narrowly-focused communication directed at a specified audience to support a specific theme. Joint Staff J7, “Communication Strategy and Synchronization,” May 2016, states that Combatant Commands retain a messaging focus across their entire areas of responsibility.


3. (U) The U.S. Embassy chief of mission is the principal officer in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States. Currently, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq is also the Chief of Mission to the U.S. Embassy in Iraq.


This report uses the term “ISIS” for both terms. The Campaign Plan also uses MISO and PSYOP interchangeably. According to the USSOCOM MISO officer, “MISO” denotes the operation, and “PSYOP” denotes the unit and the career field of the soldiers conducting MISO.
Introduction

(U) Operation Inherent Resolve

(S//REL TO USA, MESF) CJTF-OIR partner forces liberated Mosul, Iraq, and Raqqa, Syria; cleared Tal Afar, Al Qaim, and the Hawijja corridor in Iraq; and cleared the Middle Euphrates River Valley in Syria. Although ISIS no longer controls these key areas.

(U) The U.S. Government Emphasized the Importance of Interagency Coordination of Information

(U) DoD and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instructions require the interagency coordination of MISO. Congress emphasized the importance of information operations (IO) and interagency coordination of information in FYs 2014 through 2019 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA). In 2014, Congress tasked the DoD to develop an IO strategy and leverage the capabilities of interagency partners. In 2016, the President directed the Secretary of State to establish the Global Engagement Center. The DoD included interagency IO guidance in its 2018 National Military Strategy and in its joint doctrine. The purpose of the Global Engagement Center is to coordinate and integrate Government-wide communications activities directed at foreign audiences abroad to counter the messaging and diminish the influence of international terrorist organizations, including Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al Qa’ida.

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5 (U) Joint Publication 3-13, “Information Operations,” November 20, 2014, states that Information operations is characterized as the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own decision-making capabilities.

6 (U) Executive Order 13721, March 4, 2016, “Developing an Integrated Global Engagement Center to Support Government-Wide Counterterrorism Communications Activities Directed Abroad.”
Introduction

(U) The U.S. Government Directed Interagency Coordination in the Information Environment

(U) The FY 2014 NDAA required the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a strategy, extending through FY 2020, for developing and sustaining information capabilities for future contingencies. As part of the directed strategy, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to assess challenges with leveraging the information capabilities of interagency partners.

(U) In 2016 and 2017, the Executive Branch and Congress affirmed the importance of interagency coordination of IO in the information environment. In March 2016, Executive Order 13721 directed the Secretary of State to establish the Global Engagement Center. The FY 2017 NDAA codified the establishment of the Global Engagement Center and directed the Secretary of State to coordinate with the Secretary of Defense and other agencies to establish the Center to counter disinformation efforts aimed at undermining U.S. security interests. Additionally, Congress, as part of its "Oversight Plan of the 116th Congress," 2019-2020, stated that the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, would pay particular attention to IO and interagency coordination as part of its oversight of counterterrorism policies, strategies, and operations.

(U) The DoD Directed Interagency Coordination in the Information Environment

(U) The Secretary of Defense’s 2016 “DoD Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment” answered the FY 2014 NDAA reporting requirement for an IO strategy. The Secretary of Defense stated that the DoD must be prepared to coordinate information programs, plans, messages, and products as part of a “Whole of Government” effort. Guidance in the 2018 National Military Strategy emphasized the efforts of interagency counterparts to advance national security interests through coordination of strategic messaging efforts across the interagency.

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7 (U) Executive Order 13721, March 4, 2016, “Developing an Integrated Global Engagement Center to Support Government-Wide Counterterrorism Communications Activities Directed Abroad.”
8 (U) NDAA, FY 2017, Section 1287.
10 (U) Joint Publication 3-13, “Information Operations,” defines information environment as the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.
11 (U) The definition of Military Information Support Operations (MISO) states that MISO is designed to develop and convey messages. The DOS uses the term "messaging.” The 2015 DOS Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review refers to DOS, with USAID, expanding prevention efforts to counter violent extremism, including challenging extremist messaging and strengthening its messaging to counter violent extremism.
The DoD directed interagency coordination of MISO in both DoD and CJCS Instructions (CJCSI). CJCSI 3110.05F states that MISO must be thoroughly coordinated with relevant interagency partners and further states that interagency coordination must occur at all levels within U.S. Government departments and agencies.\textsuperscript{13}

Joint Publication 3-08 states that the U.S. Government uses strategic guidance and direction to coordinate use of the informational instrument of national power.\textsuperscript{14} This doctrine states that commander's communication guidance is essential to achieving unity of effort with the DoD's interagency partners, and the DoD must be a full participant in a Government-wide approach to a more synchronized communication effort.

\textbf{(U) U.S. Central Command and CJTF-OIR Developed Plans and Operation Orders With MISO Tasks to Counter Islamic State of Iraq and Syria}

The DoD established CJTF-OIR in October 2014 to formalize ongoing military actions against the rising threat posed by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and CJTF-OIR developed campaign plans and orders that included MISO tasks and actions to counter ISIS.\textsuperscript{16}
Plan is subordinate to the USCENTCOM Campaign Plan and focuses on countering ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The CJTF-OIR updates its Campaign Plan yearly as the campaign continues.

**USCENTCOM Established MISO Objectives in its Campaign Plan in 2016 and a Modified OPORD in 2017**

The USCENTCOM Campaign Plan established MISO objectives in support of the campaign. The participating forces constitute the military Coalition and operate under the authority of the USCENTCOM Commander, the appointed Combined Forces Commander. A MISO series consists of all messages and actions developed for a single target audience to achieve a single supporting MISO objective. The USCENTCOM area of responsibility includes 20 nations and stretches from Northeast Africa across the Middle East to Central and South Asia.
The "CJOA" is defined in OPORD CJTF-OIR 20-01 as the total airspace, land area, territorial waters, and information environment of Iraq and Syria.
(U) Finding

(U) U.S. Forces and the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad Are Not Prepared to Counter ISIS Messaging in Iraq Following OIR

(S//REL TO USA, FRME) U.S. forces in Iraq planned and executed MISO in accordance with joint doctrine, and coordinated MISO with Coalition forces, the Government of Iraq, and DOS. However, after the physical defeat of the ISIS caliphate, U.S. forces and the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad did not initiate the required coordination to transition messaging from the DoD to DOS, (S//REL TO USA, MESF) This lack of coordination occurred because USCENTCOM and CJTF-OIR plans and orders did not include the requirements to plan for the transition of messaging from the DoD to DOS. For example, (U) In addition, USCENTCOM did not plan for the transition of counter-ISIS messaging from the DoD to DOS because the DoD required a request for support from DOS prior to initiating the requirements validation and force identification process. Also, USCENTCOM could not finalize MISO-related force structure, command relationships, or authorities without initial input from DOS. In addition, USCENTCOM staff provided no evidence that the USCENTCOM had asked DOS for a request for support. (U) If the U.S. forces and U.S. Embassy-Baghdad do not coordinate on how to transition messaging efforts, there will be an increased risk that the United States will not be able to influence attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors in the Iraqi information environment following OIR. Additionally, inconsistent U.S. messaging in Iraq could occur following OIR because of the lack of coordination between DoD and DOS information activities.
(U) U.S. Forces in Iraq Planned and Executed MISO in Accordance With Joint Doctrine

(U) U.S. forces in Iraq planned and executed MISO in accordance with joint doctrine. Specifically, the MISO Branch and the CJTF-OIR staff planned and executed the MISO process in accordance with established authorities. The MISO Planner coordinated and integrated IO and MISO planning with other CJTF-OIR capabilities at the CJTF-OIR command level. CJTF-OIR targeting board members reviewed and approved IO and MISO to disrupt ISIS media networks and disrupt popular support for ISIS. Additionally, USCENTCOM provided internet-based MISO, or WebOps, support to CJTF-OIR.

(U) MISO Planning and Execution Complied With Joint Doctrine

(U) U.S. forces conducted MISO in Iraq in accordance with joint doctrine. Joint Publication 3-13.2 states that MISO is planned and executed across seven MISO process phases: Planning; Target Audience Analysis; Series Development; Product Development and Design; Product Approval; Production, Distribution, and Dissemination; and Assessment. We evaluated CJTF-OIR's MISO across the seven MISO process phases in support of counter-ISIS operations in Iraq.

(S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY) The CJTF-OIR IO personnel planned and executed MISO in accordance with the MISO process, integrated MISO plans with lethal and other non-lethal capabilities in support of CJTF-OIR operations, and planned internet-based MISO support with USCENTCOM. Afterwards, the planner briefed us on the MISO process and how CJTF-OIR achieved each step. We examined the CJTF-OIR MISO planner's MISO products that supported the operation and reviewed the doctrinal process he used to plan and execute MISO.

(S//REL TO USA, MESF) We observed that the MISO planner conducted target audience analysis to determine MISO's ability to influence the target audience. As an example, ISIS fighters were the MISO target audience in a February 2019 counter-ISIS mission. The MISO objective for this mission was to undermine ISIS leadership by sending messages to these ISIS members to encourage them to choose their own safety and the safety of their families over their allegiance to ISIS leaders. The MISO planners' target audience analysis analyzed the target audience's susceptibility to the message. From the target audience analysis and a list of authorized themes, messages, and MISO objectives, the planner developed the MISO series, consisting of the messages and...
Finding

(S//REL TO USA, MESF) actions most likely to achieve the MISO objective. The CJTF-OIR Deputy Commander approved the initial concept for the MISO series. The planner then drafted a product design, recommended a means of message dissemination, and developed the concept for the MISO product for initial legal review and feedback from the CJTF-OIR Staff Judge Advocate, prior to formal review by the CJTF-OIR MISO Officer, Information Officer, and Deputy Commander for Operations. Our review of CJTF-OIR's MISO process showed that the CJTF-OIR legal personnel verified that each MISO series contained an authorized target audience, objective, theme, and method of dissemination. We also reviewed the documentation that showed the CJTF-OIR leadership reviewed and approved the plan. The MISO planner then submitted a joint tactical air request to disseminate the message and coordinated an assessment of the plan's execution.

(S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY) Additionally, the IO and MISO planners integrated IO and MISO in current operations with other CJTF-OIR capabilities. At the bi-weekly CJTF-OIR Operations and Intelligence Update to the CJTF-OIR Commander, which the evaluations team attended and observed, the CJTF-OIR IO Officer briefed the Commander on MISO's prominent role in several major CJTF-OIR operations in the Iraq information environment.22

(S//REL TO USA, MESF) Furthermore, we attended and observed two Targeting Boards at CJTF-OIR headquarters: a Fires and Effects Synchronization Board on June 19, 2019, and a Joint Targeting Board on June 20, 2019.23 The purpose of the Fires and Effects Synchronization Board was to review, coordinate, and de-conflict non-lethal fires and effects across the CJOA. The Joint Targeting Board members reviewed IO plans to disrupt ISIS.

22 (U) The CJTF-OIR Operations and Intelligence Update is a senior leader brief covering the Operational Environment Update, Joint Effects Updates, Staff Officer Updates, and Commander's Guidance.

23 (U) The purpose of the CJTF-OIR Joint Targeting Board is to approve operational priorities, distribute resources, and concur with requests for support and subordinate commands' actions and activities in support of decisive and shaping operations. The daily Fires and Effects Synchronization Board reviews, refines, coordinates and synchronizes lethal and non-lethal fires and effects across the CJOA.
Finding

(§//REL TO USA, FVEY) CJCSI 3110.05F states that, because of the increased importance of information within military operations, MISO requires a wide variety of support from the Joint Forces Command staff, including technical Web-based tasks. USCENTCOM’s WebOps supported CJTF-OIR from USCENTCOM headquarters, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The USCENTCOM IO Division staff explained and demonstrated the capabilities of USCENTCOM multi-media support provided to CJTF-OIR.

(U) USCENTCOM and CJTF-OIR MISO Processes Were Responsive to Ongoing or Planned Operations in Iraq

(§//REL TO USA, FVEY) MISO processes at USCENTCOM and CJTF-OIR were responsive to ongoing or planned operations in Iraq, in accordance with CJCSI 3110.05. CJCSI 3110.05 states that timeliness is crucial to the success of MISO and, therefore, MISO series should be approved at the lowest authorized level.

(§//REL TO USA, FVEY) Additionally, CJCSI 3110.05 states that MISO must be executed under an approved MISO program. We determined from a review of MISO requirements provided by the USCENTCOM IO Division Staff.

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24 (U) "USCENTCOM WebOps influence target audiences in the area of responsibility through the online information environment to counter adversary narratives, and shape online environments through multiple platforms, capabilities, and technologies." USCENTCOM IO Briefing to DoD OIG, May 30, 2019.
"Finding"

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) "identified a list of approved MISO objectives, potential target audiences, themes and messages, methods of product dissemination, and delegated approval authority.

(S//REL TO USA, MESE) Furthermore, the CJTF-OIR re-used approved MISO "series", when appropriate, to save planning time. A MISO series consists of all messages and actions developed for a single target audience to achieve a single supporting MISO objective. If the selected MISO series had the same target audience and MISO objective as the original planned series, then the CJTF-OIR staff could re-use the MISO series without any additional approval requirements.

The MISO Planner stated that CJTF-OIR IO staff reviewed these series regularly to determine if they need to be modified or replaced. The CJTF-OIR IO Officer stated that the IO staff reviews and re-uses MISO products when possible, and the CJTF-OIR MISO officer stated that series are reviewed every time a new MISO team arrives at CJTF-OIR. The CJTF-OIR operational law attorney confirmed that once a MISO series is approved, all products in that series are approved and can be used again. However, CJTF-OIR conducts a legal review of each new product added in support of an existing series. We reviewed legal approval documents for both, a proposed new MISO series, and for a new product in support of an existing MISO series.

(U) Additionally, we reviewed nine IO battle drills at CJTF-OIR headquarters that incorporated MISO and other information-related capabilities. Specifically, the IO battle drills listed appropriate IO and MISO procedures and responses to actual or impending incidents in the CJAOA. The IO battle drills also defined MISO's response role and actions in relation to other information-related capabilities, including Public Affairs. The CJTF-OIR IO Officer and the CJTF-OIR Public Affairs Officer (PAO) confirmed that, although each had a unique mission and audience, they had to coordinate their activities with each other. On behalf of the CJTF-OIR Commander, the PAO was prepared to respond quickly to the general public about significant events. The IO and MISO Branch had additional time to plan the command's longer-term MISO responses to events, allowing MISO to deliberately shape its target audiences.

(S//REL TO USA, MESE) CJCSI 3110.05F also states that "because of the increased importance of information within military operations, MISO requires a wide variety of support from the Joint Forces Command staff." We observed that USCENTCOM's WebOps provided responsive support to the CJTF-OIR MISO Branch, and the CJTF-OIR
U.S. Forces in Iraq Coordinated MISO With Coalition Forces, the Government of Iraq, and DOS

The U.S. forces in Iraq coordinated MISO with Coalition forces, the Government of Iraq, and DOS. Specifically, we observed CJTF-OIR Coalition forces attending command-level briefings, meetings, and boards where MISO were coordinated with other information-related capabilities and with lethal and non-lethal targets and effects. We also observed that the Coalition coordinated MISO support with USCENTCOM WebOps and with USCENTCOM's Military Information Support Task Force-Central in Qatar. Leader and staff positions for Coalition officers and soldiers existed in the MISO Branch and IO Staff. Additionally, U.S. IO and MISO officers trained, advised, and assisted messaging operations and activities with the Government of Iraq.

U.S. Forces Planned and Executed MISO with Coalition Forces

U.S. forces coordinated MISO with Coalition forces across the different levels of the command. During our evaluation, we attended and observed CJTF-OIR command-level briefings and targeting meetings, at which U.S. forces, Coalition forces, and ISF forces advisors discussed and coordinated MISO in support of Coalition counter-ISIS operations.

26 Information-related capabilities include, but are not limited to MISO, PAO, key leader engagement, cyber, and electronic warfare/space.
CJTF-OIR MISO support of operations such as Operation Proud Anvil and the Palm Series, commanded by the Joint Operations Center-Iraq and assisted by the OIR Coalition, demonstrates compliance with DoDI 0-3607.02.

The MISO Branch officers planned and executed MISO after coordination with the CJTF-OIR IO Director and de-confliction with the Coalition’s directors of other information-related capabilities. The IO Director, a senior U.K. officer, briefed the CJTF-OIR Commander on CJTF-OIR IO planning and execution, including MISO, at bi-weekly CJTF-OIR Headquarters Operations and Intelligence briefings. He also briefed the CJTF-OIR Deputy Commanders on IO and MISO at Joint Targeting Board meetings. We attended an Operations and Intelligence Briefing and a Joint Targeting Board meeting and observed the IO Director’s participation,

Additionally, U.S. forces external to CJTF-OIR supported the Coalition and coordinated the planning and execution of MISO. CJCSI 3110.05 states that:

because of the increased importance of information within military operations, MISO require a wide variety of support from the Joint Forces Command staff. Examples include...contracting support for specific product development expertise, technical Web-based tasks, opinion polling...

CJTF-OIR regularly submitted requests for internet-based MISO to USCENTCOM WebOps to support Coalition operations. Internet-based MISO support to CJTF-OIR included requests to amplify CJTF-OIR messages in Iraq, disrupt ISIS propaganda, and draft and release information on USCENTCOM influence websites. The USCENTCOM IO Division coordinated the internet MISO support throughout its MISO planning process. Additionally, USCENTCOM provided production, distribution, and dissemination support for MISO products in support of CJTF-OIR operations.
Other examples of coordination between U.S and Coalition forces included partner nations providing soldiers in support of the CJTF-OIR MISOC Cell, and an information targeting team that monitored information sources and developed targets for and MISOC in support of ISF counterterrorism operations.

(U) **U.S. Forces Planned and Executed MISO With the Government of Iraq**

Specifically, U.S. forces advised and assisted Iraqi IO and MISOC planning and execution during some weeks, reports tracked social media and MISOC messages by theme, target audience location, and message quantity, and during other weeks, reports assessed positive coverage of ISF in the traditional Iraqi media. This demonstrates increased exposure of the Iraqi population to an alternative narrative. CJTF-OIR IO advisors believe increased Iraqi exposure to messaging efforts is important to counter negative narratives that discredit the ISF.
The U.S. IO Advisor to the Joint Operations Center, supported by the CJTF-OIR IO and MISO Officers, participated in a bi-weekly non-lethal effects working group and a weekly effects working group. Her subordinate IO advisors across Iraq participated and planned IO and MISO in these groups with the help of the CJTF-OIR IO advisors.

(U) **U.S. Forces Planned and Executed MISO With DOS**

The U.S. Embassy PAO stated that, when U.S. forces began the defeat of ISIS in 2017, he worked closely with U.S. forces MISO personnel as the embassy PAO. He stated that interactions between the embassy public affairs staff and its CJTF-OIR messaging counterparts were “less robust” once the fighting began to decrease

(U//FOUO) According to CJCSI 3110.05F, interagency coordination of MISO with U.S. Embassies is a DoD requirement.
Finding

(U//FOUO) CJCSI 3110.05F states that MISO must be thoroughly coordinated with relevant interagency partners, stresses coordination of MISO with interagency partners, including U.S. Embassy country teams, and states that "thorough coordination with other U.S. Government departments and agencies ensures operations are mutually supportive and complementary."

(U) According to section 3297, title 22, United States Code, "Chief of Mission," and the Foreign Service Act of 1980, any executive branch agency having employees in a foreign country must keep the Chief of Mission fully and currently informed about all activities and operations of its employees in that country. A 2014 Congressional Research Service report states that, according to previous templates of Presidential Letters of Instruction, Presidents expect this communication between executive branch agencies and the Chief of Mission to flow both ways.²⁸

(U) U.S. Forces and the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad Did Not Coordinate the Transition of Messaging From the DoD to DOS

(S//REL TO USA, MEST) After ISIS was physically defeated, U.S. forces and the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad did not initiate the required coordination to transition the messaging from the DoD to DOS to counter ISIS messaging in Iraq after OIR.

(S//REL TO USA, FRME)

(S//REL TO USA, FRME)

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(U) USCENTCOM Identified DoD Post-OIR Iraq Messaging Priorities and Concerns

(U) In November 2019, a USCENTCOM IO Division spokesperson identified several priorities and concerns related to post-OIR support for messaging in Iraq. For example, in correspondence with the DoD OIG evaluation team, he stated a concern that, depending on the MISO support that DOS requested from the DoD after OIR, the DoD would need to ensure it had proper MISO authorities and sufficient MISO resources and force structure in Iraq to provide the support. The official also stated that the DoD and DOS needed to discuss the continuation and resourcing of Iraq high-payoff messaging operations after OIR. Finally, the USCENTCOM official believed that a portion of the MISO programs developed by USCENTCOM and CJTF-OIR could potentially be transitioned to Government of Iraq control after the OIR campaign. The USCENTCOM spokesperson stated that resolving MISO authorities, force structure, command relationships, resources, and high-payoff messaging operations would facilitate DoD’s identification and transition of MISO requirements in post-OIR Iraq. However, DoD had not initiated coordination with DOS.
(U) USCENCOM and CJTF-OIR Plans and Orders Did Not Include the Requirement to Plan for the Transition of Messaging From the DoD to DOS

USCENTCOM and CJTF-OIR plans and orders in 2019 that included transition planning did not include requirements to plan for and transition messaging from the DoD to DOS.

DoD and CJCS Instructions direct Combatant Commanders to de-conflict MISO with ongoing or planned operations conducted by other U.S. Government departments and agencies and state that this coordination and de-confliction ensures consistency across U.S. Government influence operations. However, DoD plans and orders addressing the transition of messaging in Iraq after OIR were dependent on analysis and input from both the DoD and DOS. USCENTCOM personnel reported that the DoD was awaiting an assessment of programs that support MISO, and a request from DOS for DoD MISO support before conducting a DoD MISO requirements validation process for post-OIR Iraq. In November 2019, in a draft copy of this DoD OIG report, DOS officials reviewed these USCENTCOM statements addressing the need for planning and coordination between the DoD and DOS and concurred with the DoD OIG report.

Finding

USCENTCOM Did Not Identify U.S. Forces’ Interagency Messaging Requirements and Responsibilities

- Joint Publication 3-16, "Multinational Operations," March 1, 2019, states that unified action during multinational operations involves the synergistic application of all instruments of national power provided by each participating nation, non-military as well as military forces.

- Joint Publication 3-07, "Stability," dated August 3, 2016, defines security sector reform as a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice.
Finding

(//REL TO USA, FRME) CJTF-OIR Identified MISO as a Critical Capability but Did Not Assign Any Follow-On MISO Responsibilities in the Transition to Post-OIR Iraq

(S//REL TO USA, MESF)

(U) The DoD Required an Analysis and a Request for Support From DOS Before the DoD Could Begin the Requirements Validation and Force Identification Process

(U) Neither the USCENTCOM IO Division nor the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad PAO participated in efforts to plan for the transition of messaging from the DoD to DOS for a post-OIR Iraq. A senior official from USCENTCOM’s IO Division stated in July 2019 that, although the DoD is structured to hand off operations to the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad at the end of OIR, he had not seen details on the transition of messaging after OIR and had not received requests for support from DOS or the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad. The IO Division official acknowledged the requirement for a coordinated, interagency approach

32 (U) Joint Publication 3-20, “Security Cooperation,” May 23, 2017, defines security force assistance as DoD activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.
(U) to avoid conflict among agency messages. In November 2019, a USCENTCOM IO Division official stated that the USCENTCOM staff was prepared to plan the post-OIR messaging transition with DOS but could not move forward on its own without identified DOS post-OIR messaging requirements.

(S//REL TO USA, MESP) A USCENTCOM official stated that  

He also stated that DoD required a request for messaging support from DOS in order for DoD to begin the MISO requirements validation and force identification process. However, USCENTCOM staff provided no evidence that the USCENTCOM had asked DOS for a request for support.

(S//REL TO USA, MESP) The USCENTCOM official’s statement did not meet USCENTCOM’s self-identified requirements for completing the coordination of the transition of Coalition activities prior to the final phase of the CJTF-OIR Campaign.

(S//REL TO USA, MESP) Additionally, USCENTCOM’s response is counter to USCENTCOM’s priority of competing with and defeating ISIS within the information environment. Because USCENTCOM and CJTF-OIR post-OIR plans do not acknowledge the need to plan for and transition messaging from the DoD to DOS the Command is not complying with its own requirements to set conditions for transfer of responsibilities.
(U) Uncoordinated and Inconsistent Information Efforts Increase the Risk That the United States Will Not Be Able to Influence Attitudes, Beliefs, and Behaviors in Iraq Following OIR

(U) Uncoordinated transition of messaging efforts between U.S. forces and U.S. Embassy-Baghdad risks the ability of the United States to influence attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors in Iraq following OIR. Inconsistent U.S. messaging due to lack of coordination between the DoD and DOS information activities could provide opportunities for ISIS counter-messaging, which could contribute to instability in the region.

(S//REL TO USA, MESF) The CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan and OPORDs emphasize the importance of U.S. and Coalition IO and MISO. These plans and orders do not direct the transition of messaging from the DoD to DOS at the end of the OIR Campaign.

(U) MISO influences foreign attitudes and beliefs about U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power and resolve. Coordination of messaging priorities, including priorities for counterterrorism messaging, ensures U.S. Government message consistency. Therefore, coordinated interagency decisions on the U.S. Government’s roles and responsibilities for IO in post-OIR Iraq are critical to continued counter-ISIS efforts.

(U) Other Matters of Interest

(U) U.S. Embassy-Baghdad Was Not Prepared to Provide Key Personnel to Conduct Coordinated Messaging in the Post-OIR Transition

(S//REL to USA, FVEY) The U.S. Embassy-Baghdad and USAID withdrew messaging personnel from Iraq in 2019.
Finding

(U) The USAID Public Engagements Officer in Iraq stated that she was previously assigned to the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad. However, she was recalled from Baghdad in April 2019 as part of a departure ordered by DOS. She stated that there was no plan to replace her position at the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad.

(U) Recommendations

(U) Redirected Recommendation

(U) As a result of management comments, we redirected Recommendation 1 to the Commander of U.S. Central Command, who has the authority to implement the recommendation.

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Department of State, and the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, develop a plan for interagency coordination and integration of U.S. Government messaging in Iraq.

34 (U) The U.S. Embassy-Baghdad MIST is composed of an Army Captain and four non-commissioned officers.
(U) Principal Director, Special Operations and Combating Terrorism Comments

(U) The Principal Director of Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, neither agreed nor disagreed with our original recommendation to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and stated that the OUSD(P) considers transition of post-OIR MISO, and broader IO, to be an operational-level planning function best led by the Combatant Command. She stated that OUSD(P) will facilitate higher-level discussions with interagency partners as required to enable any agreed-upon transition of CJTF-OIR messaging.

(U) Our Response

(U) As a result of management comments, we redirected Recommendation 1 to the Commander of U.S. Central Command, who has the authority to implement the recommendation. This recommendation is unresolved. We request that the Commander of U.S. Central Command provide comments on this revised recommendation no later than March 31, 2020.

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command, in coordination with the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad, define U.S. forces’ roles and responsibilities and identify DOS counterparts to support the transition of U.S. Government messaging requirements and responsibilities from the DoD to the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad in Iraq.

(U) Chief, Information Operations Division, U.S. Central Command Comments

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Chief of Information Operations Division for U.S. Central Command, responding for the USCENTCOM Commander, concurred with this recommendation.
(U) **Our Response**

(U) The Recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation when we verify that the Commander of U.S. Central Command has provided documentation that U.S. Central Command has published plans and orders, in coordination with the U.S. Embassy—Baghdad, to transition primary messaging responsibilities from the DoD to the U.S. Embassy—Baghdad.

(U) **Recommendation 3**

(U) We recommend the Commander, U.S. Central Command, after coordination with the U.S. Embassy—Baghdad, modify the existing transition plans and orders to assign U.S. forces' roles and responsibilities in the transition of messaging from the DoD to the U.S. Embassy—Baghdad in Iraq.

(U) **Chief, Information Operations Division, U.S. Central Command Comments**

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Chief of Information Operations Division for U.S. Central Command agreed.

(U) **Our Response**

(U) The Recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation when we verify that the Commander of U.S. Central Command has identified and directed the future force structure in Iraq that supports U.S. Embassy—Baghdad messaging requirements.
(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from April 2019 to November 2019 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings, conclusions, and recommendations based on our review objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings, conclusions, and recommendations based on our review.

(U) The scope of this project includes all CJTF-OIR and SOJTF-OIR U.S. and Coalition efforts to plan and execute MISO to counter ISIS in Iraq, including:

- (U) plans, policies, and IO-specific tasks in the CJTF-OIR defeat ISIS campaign;
- (U) USCENTCOM and CJTF-OIR processes and resources in place to support CJTF-OIR MISO;
- (U) CJTF-OIR approval processes for disseminating MISO products;
- (U) CJTF-OIR synchronization of MISO planning and execution with country team, Coalition multinational forces, and partner forces strategic communications; and
- (U) CJTF-OIR methodology to assess MISO impact on ISIS propaganda.

(U) Criteria

(U) Criteria are listed in Appendix B.
(U) Interviews and Site Visits

(U) We interviewed officials, in person or via video teleconference, regarding planning, execution, interagency coordination, and responsiveness of MISO. Specifically, we interviewed officials from:

- (U) The Joint Staff, including members of the CJCS J39 Communication Strategic Analysis Division, Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, and the Defeat ISIS Task Force; the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center; and the Global Engagement Center;
- (U) The DOS, including the U.S. Embassy Iraq PAO;
- (U) The USAID, including the USAID Middle Eastern Bureau; and
- (U) U.S. Special Operations Command, USCENTCOM; Special Operations Command Central; and CJTF-OIR IO and MISO leadership.

(U) We conducted site visits to MacDill AFB, Florida; Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; and Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, to meet with key officials and observe operations that support CJTF-OIR MISO.

- (U) At MacDill AFB, Florida, we interviewed key IO staff of the U.S. Central Command and Special Operations Command Central and observed operations in U.S. Central Command’s WebOps Center.
- (U) At Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, we interviewed key staff of the CJTF-OIR, observed the CJTF-OIR Joint Targeting and Fires and Effects Board meetings, and reviewed CJTF-OIR staff implementation of the seven-step MISO process.
- (U) At Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, we interviewed key staff and observed operations of the Military Information Support Task Force-Central.

(U) Evidence and Documentation Reviewed or Observed

(U) To determine whether CJTF-OIR MISO personnel planned and executed MISO in accordance with joint doctrine, we observed and reviewed USCENTCOM and U.S. Special Operations Command activities supporting MISO and reviewed USCENTCOM and CJTF-OIR authorities to conduct MISO. We reviewed USCENTCOM and CJTF-OIR efforts to assess the effectiveness of CJTF-OIR MISO through the analysis of surveys, focus groups, and responses to text messages. Lastly, we reviewed and observed CJTF-OIR staff roles, processes, and responsibilities in planning and executing MISO.
(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data
(U) We did not use computer-processed data.

(U) Use of Technical Assistance
(U) We did not require technical assistance to conduct our evaluation.

(U) Additional Oversight Coverage
(U) The DoD OIG has written four reports on MISO during the last five years. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/. 

(U) DoD OIG

(U) This report is classified. To review, submit a FOIA online request at https://www.foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/home


(U) This report determined that ACC-Redstone and SMDC did not adequately monitor contractor performance, and the contracting officer’s representative, due to a lack of knowledge of web-based MISO, authorized out-of-scope work related to web-based MISO for U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Pacific Command.


(U) This report determined that, although USCENTCOM and CJTF-OIR effectively planned and executed MISO for OIR, USCENTCOM had not developed formal, documented processes in its policies and procedures for requesting, conducting, and monitoring web-based MISO.

(U) This report is a summary of six reports pertaining to IO projects in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa. The reports identified areas of compliance with rules and regulations to conduct IO, use of contractors to perform IO, and award contracts for IO. The report identified weaknesses in synchronizing, planning, executing, and assessing IO.
(U) Appendix B

(U) Criteria for Military Information Support Operations

(U) We identified DoD Instructions, CJCS Instructions, MISO programs, and Office of the Secretary of Defense Execute Orders (EXORD) that instruct and direct specific MISO actions. The criteria below highlight DoD and Combatant Commander responsibility to coordinate MISO with the influence and messaging operations of other U.S. Government agencies, MISO’s reliance on external support, and adherence to doctrinal MISO planning and execution processes. The following publications established criteria relevant to our report.

(U) DoDI 0-3607.02 establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for MISO. DoDI 0-3607.02 states the following:

- (U//FOU0)
- (U//FOU0)
- (U//FOU0)
- (U//FOU0)
- (U//FOU0)
CJCSI 3110.05F provides Joint Staff guidance for planning and conducting MISO across the full range of military operations. CJCSI 3110.05F states the following:

- (U) Psychological Operations forces can provide defense support to public diplomacy when combatant commander and chief of mission objectives overlap.

- (U) For MISO and Interagency Coordination, MISO must support accomplishment of assigned military missions and be thoroughly coordinated with relevant interagency partners. Interagency coordination must occur at all levels and often involves the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Theater Special Operations Commands, and Embassy country teams. Thorough coordination with other U.S. Government departments and agencies ensures that operations are mutually supportive and complementary.

- (U) MISO must be executed under an approved MISO program and are subject to the MISO review and approval process.

- (U) Because of the increased importance of information within military operations, MISO requires a wide variety of support from the Joint Forces Command’s staff. Examples include all-source intelligence support related to target audience analysis and assessment and contracting support for specific product development expertise, technical web-based tasks, opinion polling, and translation services.

- (U) MISO program approval requests must address the following: MISO Objectives, Target Audiences, Themes to Stress and Avoid, Means of Dissemination Attribution Plan, Designated Approval Authority, Concept of Operations, and Concept for Assessment.

- (U) MISO may only be conducted pursuant to a collection of specific authorities.
(U) Management Comments

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE


(U) I commend the DoD Inspector General for its time and effort in evaluating Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve’s (CJTF-OIR) Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and would like to convey my gratitude for the evaluators’ thoughtful analysis and recommendations.

(U) The report recommends that the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), in coordination with the Department of State, develop a plan for interagency coordination and integration of U.S. Government messaging efforts in post-OIR Iraq.

(U) OUSD(P) considers the transition of post-OIR Military Information Support Operations, and broader Information Operations, to be an operational-level planning function best led by the Combatant Command. OUSD(P) will facilitate higher level discussions with interagency partners as required to enable any agreed upon transition of CJTF-OIR messaging.

Simone Ledeen
Principal Director
Special Operations & Combating Terrorism

Attachments:
None
(U) Commander, U.S. Central Command

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FROM: Colonel Andrew J. Whiskep

SUBJECT: (U) Response to Department of Defense Inspector General Recommendations Contained in Project No. D2019-DEVI000-0150.000

Mr. Fine,

(U) We received a draft copy of Project No. D2019-DEVI000-0150.000, "Evaluation of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve's Military Information Support Operations", which solicited comments on the recommendations contained in the document. Please see below our response to recommendations two and three.

(U) DODIG Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command, in coordination with the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, define U.S. forces' roles and responsibilities and identify DOS counterparts to support the transition of U.S. Government messaging requirements and responsibilities from the DoD to the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad in post-OIR Iraq.

(U) DODIG Recommendation 3: We recommend the Commander, U.S. Central Command, after coordination with the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, modify the existing transition plans and orders to assign U.S. forces' roles and responsibilities in the transition of messaging from the DoD to the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad in post-OIR Iraq.

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

DODIG-2020-065 | 34
(U) Commander, U.S. Central Command, (con't)
(U) List of Classified Sources

(U) SOURCE 1: (U) CJCS Execute Order (EXORD), "MISO Support to U.S. Government Efforts in Iraq" (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Declassification Date: May 16, 2039
Date of Source: May 16, 2014

(U) SOURCE 2: (U) CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan 2019, "Campaign Plan to Militarily Defeat Daesh and Set Conditions for Follow-on Operations to Increase Regional Stability" (S//REL TO USA, MESF)
Declassification Date: August 1, 2044
Date of Source: August 1, 2019

(U) SOURCE 3: (U) CJTF-OIR Fires and Effects Synchronization Board (S//REL TO USA, FRME)
Declassification Date: June 19, 2044
Date of Source: June 19, 2019

(U) SOURCE 4: (U) CJTF-OIR Operations and Intelligence Update (S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY)
Declassification Date: June 10, 2044
Date of Source: June 10, 2019

(U) SOURCE 5: (U) CJTF-OIR OPORD 20-01, "Partner Force Development to Defeat ISIS" (S//REL TO USA, MESF) Declassification Date: August 20, 2044
Date of Source: August 20, 2019

(U) SOURCE 6: (U) Department of Defense Instruction O-3607.02, "Military Information Support Operations," (U//FOUO)
Declassification Date: June 13, 2041
Date of Source: June 13, 2016

(U) SOURCE 7: (U) FRAGO 85 to Operations Order CJTF-OIR 17-08-0002 (Operations and Targeting Decisions) (S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY)
Declassification Date: June 24, 2044
Date of Source: June 24, 2019
List of Classified Sources

(U) SOURCE 8: (U) MISO Support To U.S. Government Efforts in Iraq EXORD
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Declassification Date: May 16, 2039
Date of Source: May 16, 2014

(U) SOURCE 9: (U) Operation Inherent Resolve Military Information Support
Operations (MISO) Program (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Declassification Date: February 27, 2042
Date of Source: February 27, 2017

(U) SOURCE 10: (U) Operation PROUD ANVIL Concept of Non-Lethal and Influence
Support, Version 5 (S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY)
Declassification Date: March 19, 2044
Date of Source: March 19, 2019

(U) SOURCE 11: (S//REL to USA, FVEY) Declassification Date: February 20, 2044
Date of Source: February 20, 2019

(U) SOURCE 12: (U) USCENTCOM Base Plan 1317-19, "Post-Operation Inherent
Resolve Operations Iraq: Coalition Next" (S//REL TO USA, FRME)
Declassification Date: July 12, 2044
Date of Source: July 12, 2019

(U) SOURCE 13: (U) "USCENTCOM Coalition Military Campaign Plan to Defeat ISIS,"
(USCENTCOM Campaign Plan) (S//REL TO USA, MEF)
Declassification Date: February 17, 2041
Date of Source: February 17, 2016

(U) SOURCE 14: (U) USCENTCOM Information Operations Division Brief: "DoD OIG RFI
Responses" (Overall Classification is SECRET//NOFORN)
Declassification Date: May 29, 2044
Date of Source: May 29, 2019

(U) SOURCE 15: (U) USCENTCOM OPORD to Defeat ISIS OPORD 26 MOD 2
(S//REL TO USA, MEF) Declassification Date: June 1, 2043
Date of Source: June 1, 2018

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

CJCS
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CICSI
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CJOA
Combined Joint Operations Area

CJTF
Combined Joint Task Force

DoDI
Department of Defense Instruction

DOS
Department of State

EXORD
Execution Order

IO
Information Operations

ISF
Iraqi Security Forces

MISO
Military Information Support Operations

MIST
Military Information Support Team

NDAA
National Defense Authorization Act

OIR
Operation Inherent Resolve

OPORD
Operation Order

PAO
Public Affairs Officer

SOJTF
Special Operations Joint Task Force

USCENTCOM
United States Central Command

USAID
United States Agency for International Development
Whistleblower Protection
U.S. Department of Defense

The Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman’s role is to educate agency employees about prohibitions on retaliation and employees’ rights and remedies available for reprisal. The DoD Hotline Director is the designated ombudsman. For more information, please visit the Whistleblower webpage at www.dodig.mil/Components/Administrative-Investigations/DoD-Hotline/.

For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

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