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Report No. DODIG-2020-055



INSPECTOR GENERAL


U.S. Department of Defense

JANUARY 28, 2020



(U) Evaluation of U.S. European Command's Warning Intelligence Capabilities

Classified By: Michael J. Roark,
Deputy Inspector General-Evaluations
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20450128



INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE

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Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of U.S. European Command's Warning Intelligence Capabilities

January 28, 2020

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether warning intelligence information from the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOCEUR) and the JIOCEUR Analytic Center (JAC) provided senior officials adequate information to make decisions based on notification of a potential threat to U.S. or allied interests.

(U) As part of this evaluation, we determined whether USEUCOM's warning procedures incorporated the combatant commanders' responsibilities identified in DoD Directive (DoDD) 3115.16 and Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) Execute Order, Modification 3.

(U) Background

(U) The DoDD 3115.16 establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides guidance for the Defense Warning Network within the DoD. The DoDD 3115.16 defines the Defense Warning Network as "a collaborative and integrated network made up of DoD organizations, that provides senior decision makers warning on emerging and enduring warning threats to U.S. and allied interests." An emerging warning concern is a newly identified issue relevant to national security that is significant enough to warrant temporary attention by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Enduring warning threats are longstanding potential threats to U.S. interests, which are usually linked to contingency plans.

(U) According to the Defense Warning Network Handbook, Intelligence professionals provide leaders with warning about situations that may threaten national and allied nations' security interests. Timely and insightful understanding enables effective warning and allows decision makers the opportunity to avoid or mitigate the impacts of those threats.

Background (cont'd)

(U) The DoDD 3115.16 requires combatant commanders to "maximize red team capabilities in support of the warning mission and forward red team products to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), for database integration, as appropriate."

(U) According to the Joint Publication 5-0, "red teams complement intelligence efforts by offering independent, alternative assessments and differing interpretations of information. This includes critical reviews of intelligence products, considering problem sets from alternative perspectives, and helping contribute informed speculation when reliable information is lacking."

(U) Findings

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U) Evaluation of U.S. European Command's Warning Intelligence Capabilities

[illegible]

(U) We recommend that the USEUCOM Commander:

- (U) appoint a USEUCOM Directorate lead for red team capabilities in support of the U.S. European Command's warning mission;
- (U) amend the USEUCOM Joint Intelligence Operations Center Indications and Warning Advocate Team Mission Procedures to incorporate the use of red team capabilities; and
- (U) develop procedures to forward red team products to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency for database integration.

(U) The USEUCOM Director of Intelligence, responding for the USEUCOM Commander, did not agree or disagree with our recommendations. However, the Director stated that he will hire one full-time employee as a Warning Advocate Analyst to oversee warning-related red team functions. The Director also stated that he will develop procedures to forward red team products to the Defense Intelligence Agency Director. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we receive documentation showing that the analyst has been appointed and the procedures are developed.

(U) In addition, the USEUCOM Director of Intelligence amended the USEUCOM JIOCEUR Indications and Warning Advocate Team Mission procedures to reflect red team aspects in warning activities. Therefore, this recommendation is closed and no further comments are required.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

(U) Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Commander of United States European Command	None	1.a and 1.c	1.b

(U) NOTE: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations:

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

January 28, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

SUBJECT: Evaluation of U.S. European Command's Warning Intelligence
Capabilities (Report No. DODIG-2020-055)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We consider management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) The USEUCOM Director of Intelligence addressed all the recommendations presented in the report; therefore, Recommendation 1.b is considered closed and Recommendations 1.a and 1.c are considered resolved and open. As described in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, the open recommendations may be closed when we receive adequate documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations have been completed.

(U) DoD instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the recommendations. Your response should be sent to either followup@dodig.mil if unclassified or rfunet@dodig.smil.mil if classified SECRET.

(U) If you have any questions or would like to meet to discuss the evaluation, please contact [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Michael J. Roark".

Michael J. Roark
Deputy Inspector General
Evaluations

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether warning intelligence information from the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOCEUR) and the JIOCEUR Analytic Center (JAC) provided senior officials adequate information to make decisions based on notification of a potential threat to U.S. or allied interests. As part of this evaluation, we determined whether USEUCOM's warning procedures incorporated the combatant commanders' responsibilities identified in Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3115.16 and Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) Execute Order, Modification 3.¹

(U) Background

(U) The Defense Warning Network

(S) The DoDD 3115.16 establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides guidance for the Defense Warning Network (DWN) within the DoD. The DoDD 3115.16 states that the DWN is "a collaborative and integrated network made up of the DoD organizations, that provides senior decision makers warning on emerging and enduring warning threats to U.S. and allied interests." [REDACTED]


(U) According to the DoDD 3115.16, an emerging warning concern is a "newly identified issue relevant to national security of sufficient significance to warrant temporary attention by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise." Additionally, an emerging warning concern may not be addressed in planning guidance or linked to an operation or contingency plan. As an emerging warning concern matures, it could evolve into a new enduring warning problem or be combined with an existing warning problem.

¹ (U) DoDD 3115.16, "The Defense Warning Network," December 5, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, Effective April 18, 2018. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Message, "Joint Intelligence Operations Center Execute Order," Modification 3, October 4, 2011.

(U) According to the DoDD 3115.16, an enduring warning problem is “a significant national security issue, usually linked to an operational plan or concept plan that is well defined and a longstanding potential threat to the interests of the U.S. and its allies.” Enduring warning problems focus attention, collection, and analysis on a specific threat and monitor the threat closely for a potentially indefinite period.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U) Figure 1. Decision Space Visualization



(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U) According to the DWN Handbook, intelligence professionals provide leaders with warning about situations that may threaten national and allied nations’ security interests.² Timely and insightful warning allows senior decision makers the time to make decisions regarding the threats of foreign adversaries.

² (U) Joint Staff/J2 | Defense Warning Staff, “Defense Warning Network Handbook,” November 2017.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED];
- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED];
- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U) Joint Doctrine for Current Intelligence, Warning Intelligence, and Red Teams

(U) According to Joint Publication 2-0,

current intelligence provides updated support for ongoing operations. It [current intelligence] involves the integration of time-sensitive, all source intelligence and information into concise, objective reporting on the current situation in a particular area. The term “current” is relative to the time sensitivities of the decision maker and the context of the type of operation being supported.³

(U) Additionally, according to Joint Publication 2-0,

warning intelligence provides a distinct communication to a decision maker about threats against U.S. security, interests, or citizens. Warning carries a sense of urgency, implying the decision maker should take actions to deter or mitigate the threat’s impact. Warning analysis

³ (U) Joint Publication 2-0, “Joint Intelligence,” October 22, 2013.

focuses on the opportunities to counter and alter only those threats that have detrimental effects for the U.S. This includes US military or political decision cycles, infrastructure, COA [courses of action], or loss of governance.

(U) According to Joint Publication 5-0,

the red team complements intelligence efforts by offering independent, alternative assessments and differing interpretations of information. This includes critical reviews of intelligence products; considering problem sets from alternative perspectives; and helping contribute informed speculation when reliable information is lacking.⁴

(U) In addition, Joint Publication 2-0 states that “command red teams are organizational elements of trained, educated, and practiced experts that provide the Joint Force Commander an independent capability to conduct crucial reviews and analysis, explore plans and operations, and analyze adversary capabilities from an alternative perspective.” Furthermore, Joint Publication 2-0 states that

a properly trained and augmented red team can reduce the risk associated with long-term prediction of enemy reaction by using red team methodologies designed to analyze the situation from alternative perspectives. These perspectives should be based on knowledge of the adversary’s culture, doctrine, capabilities, and other relevant factors.

(U) Combatant Command Responsibilities Within the DWN

(U) The DoDD 3115.16, the DWN Handbook, and the DIA Instruction 3000.001 establish the responsibilities for the combatant commands within the warning mission.⁵ Effective warning relies on close collaboration among analysts, collectors, collection managers, operators, planners, policymakers, allies, and partners.

⁴ (U) Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Planning,” June 16, 2017. A red team, for the purposes of this report, refers to a process within warnings intelligence that is normally focused on supporting plans, operations, and intelligence by providing alternative viewpoints from the perspective of adversaries, partners, and others.

⁵ (U) Defense Intelligence Agency Instruction 3000.001, “Defense Warning,” March 27, 2014.

(U) Combatant Commands

(U) According to the DoDD 3115.16, the Combatant Commanders:

- (U) Provide guidance to the combatant command intelligence, operational, and planning elements on roles and responsibilities in the DWN.
- (U) Execute intelligence functions of the warning mission, including acting on assignments for national and DoD enduring warning concerns as directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the DIA Director.
- (U) Integrate appropriate subject matter intelligence expertise and warning perspectives into operations, plans, and exercises from concept through execution.
- (U) Maximize red team capabilities in support of the warning mission and forward red team products to the DIA Director for database integration, as appropriate.
- (U) Establish, as appropriate for Combatant Command missions, measures or processes to identify, assess, and convey Combatant Command-specific warning of regional developments, events, or conditions that could threaten or adversely affect U.S. interests; put U.S., DoD, or Combatant Command objectives, policies, actions, or activities at risk; or present opportunities to further U.S. objectives.
- (U) Present USEUCOM warning policy and program issues and requirements to the Defense Warning Council as appropriate.
- (U) Support and integrate the development and implementation of warning doctrine, training, experimentation, and exercises.
- (U) Serve as a member of, or provide a representative to, the Defense Warning Council.

(U) The DWN Handbook states that “Combatant Commanders typically sponsor U.S. enduring warning problems and make the final determination of a warning problem’s Watch Condition (WATCHCON).” A WATCHCON expresses the sponsor’s concern about the threat and the sponsor’s ability to provide future warning on the

(U) threat after factoring in constraints (such as limited collection and intelligence processing time). In addition, the DWN Handbook states that “Overall, Combatant Commands have responsibilities for warning, including the following:

- (U) Establishing and maintaining enduring warning problems and identifying, tracking, and alerting decision makers to emerging warning concerns.
- (U) Participating in the Defense Warning Council and assigning Defense Warning Advocates at the appropriate level, contributing to the warning Community of Interest, participating in the production of distinct DoD warning products, and maintaining up-to-date warning information on the DWN portal.⁶

(U) Combatant Commanders receive warning analysis directly from the Combatant Command’s Intelligence Directorate (J2). For USEUCOM, the JIOCEUR warning team leads intelligence analysis efforts on theater-wide warning issues, including USEUCOM’s DWN products.⁷

(U) Combatant Command Intelligence Directorates (J2s)

(U) DIA Instruction 3000.001 states that the Combatant Command J2s, in compliance with the DoDD 3115.16, must “establish and maintain enduring warning problems to identify, track, and alert decision makers to emerging warning issues in accordance with the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program.” In addition, the Combatant Command J2s must

incorporate warning perspectives derived from, for example, possibilities-based analysis and red team analysis, into current, crisis, and strategic intelligence support to the DoD customers for policy, operations, plans, exercises, and collection; provide feedback from DWN customers in partnership with the Defense Warning Staff.

⁶ (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

⁷ (U) The USEUCOM JIOCEUR warning team is composed of representatives from JAC’s production divisions and the JAC National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency element. Derived from USEUCOM JIOCEUR, “Indications and Warning Advocate Team Mission Document,” April 2019.

(U) The Combatant Command J2s also

integrate intelligence activities into the DWN and DWN processes by, for example, contributing to warning communities of interests, participating in the production of distinct DoD warning products, and providing or maintaining up to date warning information on the centralized Defense Warning virtual presence.⁸

(U) Joint Intelligence Operations Centers

(U) The Secretary of Defense directed the establishment of the JIOCs at the Combatant Commands in an April 2006 JIOC Execute Order.⁹ The JIOC Execute Order identified common JIOC principles that include all-source intelligence, with associated appropriate intelligence capabilities (such as planning, collection, exploitation, analysis, dissemination, targeting, indications and warning, and threat finance) and red teams. The JIOC Execute Order states that each JIOC must routinely employ red teams, in accordance with Joint Publication 5-0. The red teams should address the commanders' most pressing intelligence and operational issues from alternative perspectives, including assumptions, second-order effects, intended outcomes, and information operations through anticipated adversaries' perspectives. In October 2011, JIOC Execute Order, Modification 3, reiterated that each JIOC must routinely employ red teams.

(U) JIOCEUR Analytic Center

~~(C//REL)~~ The JAC is USEUCOM's primary intelligence analysis and production element. The JAC provides indications and warning, all source intelligence analysis, and area expertise to create a decision advantage for USEUCOM, its components, and national policy-makers. According to the USEUCOM JIOCEUR Indications and Warning Advocate Team Mission (Charter), JAC analysts assigned to the JIOCEUR Warning Team (the team) lead intelligence analysis efforts on theater-wide warning issues, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The team acts as a liaison to the Joint Staff J22, the Five Eyes DWN, and the NATO warning community.¹⁰ The team also advocates for [REDACTED]

⁸ (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

⁹ (U) Pentagon Telecommunications Center Message, "Joint Intelligence Operations Center Execute Order," April 3, 2006.

¹⁰ (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(C//REL) [REDACTED] within JIOCEUR and its components. JAC analysts consistently monitor reporting to identify concerns and ensure that the USEUCOM Commander has the final approval on all warning decisions.

(U) Finding

~~(U//FOUO)~~

[REDACTED]

~~(U//FOUO)~~

[REDACTED]

~~(U//FOUO)~~

[REDACTED]

~~(U//FOUO)~~

[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO)

(S//NF) USEUCOM produced warning intelligence products [REDACTED] that senior officials used to make decisions. USEUCOM analysts [REDACTED] for indications that would generate the need for a warning [REDACTED] derives from a variety of [REDACTED] support USEUCOM's [REDACTED] mission. The tasking of these collection efforts are based on intelligence requirements.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]:¹¹

1. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ USEUCOM
Products [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
contributed to warning. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Based on a review of criteria, interviews, and observations, we concluded that the JAC products were produced by [REDACTED] analysts integrating information [REDACTED]

¹¹ (U)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF)

The JAC also developed and implemented the USEUCOM JIOCEUR Indications and Warning Advocate Team Mission procedures a process for the production of warning intelligence.

(S//NF) The JAC provides USEUCOM a daily intelligence update and keeps USEUCOM's senior leaders informed

We concluded, based on our review of applicable criteria, JAC products and provided information, and physical observations that intelligence analysis was performed through indications and warning analysis and specified warning production, in accordance with the Joint Staff's DWN, as outlined in the DoDD 3115.16 and the DIA Instruction 3000.001.

(S//NF) We requested feedback from the senior decision makers' regarding their satisfaction with DWN products from the Joint Staff, which manages the DWN.

However, we concluded based on a review of the DoD policy on the use of red teams, JAC information and products, and physical observations that USEUCOM warning products did not incorporate independent red team perspectives. The red team perspectives could provide decision makers additional information and analysis that may assist them in deciding the best option available in responding to a threat notice.

(U) USEUCOM Developed and Implemented a Warning Product Process

(U//FOUO)

¹² (S//NF)

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¹³ (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~(U//FOUO)~~



(U) Source: USEUCOM JIOCEUR Analytic Center.

~~(U//FOUO)~~



(U) JIOCEUR and JAC Officials Did Not Incorporate Red Team Capabilities Into the Warning Mission in Accordance With DoD Policy

(U) JIOCEUR and JAC officials did not incorporate red team capabilities into the warning mission in accordance with the DoDD 3115.16 and JIOC Execute Order, Modification 3. According to the DoDD 3115.16, Combatant Commanders maximize red team capabilities in support of the warning mission, and according to the JIOC Execute Order, Modification 3, each JIOC must routinely employ red teams. Joint Publication 2-0 further identifies that red teams provide an independent capability to conduct crucial reviews and analysis, explore plans and operations, and analyze adversary capabilities from an alternative perspective. Additionally, the DWN Handbook identifies that red team capabilities should consider, anticipate, and portray the cultural perceptions and perspectives of adversaries, partners, and other actors. This technique models the behavior of an individual or group by anticipating how an actor would think and act on or react to a particular issue, scenario, or action.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
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(U) USEUCOM Warning Products Did Not Include Red Team Contribution

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
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(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Commander of U.S. European Command:

- a. (U) Appoint a U.S. European Command Directorate lead for red team capabilities in support of the U.S. European Command's warning mission.**

(U) U.S. European Command Comments

(U) The USEUCOM Director of Intelligence, responding for the USEUCOM Commander, stated the USEUCOM Intelligence Directorate was unable to commit to developing a full red team capability due to resource constraints. However, the Director of Intelligence stated, in lieu of a full red team, the USEUCOM Intelligence Directorate

(U) shifted resources to hire one full-time employee as a Warning Advocate Analyst to oversee warning-related red team functions in accordance with DoDD 3115.16 and JIOC Execute Order, Modification 3.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, this recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once USEUCOM provides documentation showing that a Warning Advocate Analyst has been appointed to oversee warning-related red team functions in accordance with DoDD 3115.16 and JIOC Execute Order, Modification 3.

- b. (U) Amend the U.S. European Command Joint Intelligence Operations Center Indications and Warning Advocate Team Mission Procedures to include red team requirements, in accordance with the Department of Defense Directive 3115.16 and the Joint Intelligence Operations Center Execute Order, Modification 3.**

(U) U.S. European Command Comments

(U) The USEUCOM Director of Intelligence, responding for the USEUCOM Commander, stated that the USEUCOM Intelligence Directorate amended the USEUCOM JIOCEUR Indications and Warning Advocate Team Mission procedures to reflect red team aspects in warning activities. The Director stated that the new guidance directs alternative analysis production and publication aimed at each of USEUCOM's Defense Warning Network enduring warning problems and directs alternative analysis focusing on the USEUCOM Intelligence Directorate's main analytic lines.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation. We verified that the updated USEUCOM JIOCEUR Indications and Warning Advocate Team Mission procedures reflected the new guidance identified in the Director of Intelligence's response. Therefore, the recommendation is closed, and no further comments are required.

- c. (U) Develop procedures to forward red team products to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, for database integration, as appropriate, in accordance with the Department of Defense Directive 3115.16.**

(U) U.S. European Command Comments

(U) The USEUCOM Director of Intelligence, responding for the USEUCOM Commander, stated that the USEUCOM Intelligence Directorate will publish red team-related analysis to Defense Intelligence Agency systems in accordance with the recommendation.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once the Intelligence Directorate provides documentation showing that the alternative analysis products were forwarded to the Director Defense Intelligence Agency.

(U) Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from April 2019 through December 2019 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors general on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The scope of this project focused on USEUCOM’s capability to perform warning intelligence. This project’s scope did not include an evaluation of any other Combatant Commands’ warning intelligence capabilities and did not evaluate the DoD’s Defense Warning.

(U) Site Visits and Interviews

(U) We conducted site visits and interviewed personnel at the following locations to perform our evaluation.

- (U) USEUCOM, Stuttgart, Germany
- (U) JAC, Royal Air Force Station Molesworth, United Kingdom
- (U) U.S. Army Europe, Lucius D. Clay Kaserne, Wiesbaden, Germany
- (U) U.S. Air Forces Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Ramstein-Miesenbach, Germany
- (U) Marine Forces Europe, Panzer Kaserne-Barracks, Boblingen, Germany
- (U) U.S. Special Operations Command Europe, Stuttgart, Germany
- (U) Joint Staff J22, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
- (U) Europe Eurasia Regional Center, DIA, Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, D.C.

(U) We reviewed the following applicable guidance and DoD issuances.

- (U) DoD Directive 3115.16, "The Defense Warning Network," Incorporating Change 1, Effective April 18, 2018
- (U) The Joint Staff J2, Defense Warning Staff, "The DWN Handbook," November 2017
- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U) Joint Intelligence Operations Center Execute Order, Modification 3, October 4, 2011
- (U) Joint Publication 2-0, "Joint Intelligence," October 22, 2013
- (U) Joint Publication 5-0, "Joint Planning," June 16, 2017
- (U) DIA Instruction 3000.001, "Defense Warning," March 27, 2014
- (U) Joint Doctrine Note 1-16, "Command Red Team," May 16, 2016
- (U) USEUCOM, "USEUCOM JIOCEUR's Indications and Warning Advocate Team Mission," April 2019

(U) We conducted a formal request for information where we requested the following information from USEUCOM, JAC, the Europe Eurasia Regional Center, DIA, and the Joint Staff J22.

- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) To determine whether USEUCOM's warning intelligence information provided senior officials adequate information to make decisions [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] we interviewed senior, mid-level, and junior personnel throughout USEUCOM who contribute to the warning mission. We also reviewed applicable DoD,

~~(S//NF)~~ USEUOCM, and USEUCOM component-level criteria and products related to the DWN [REDACTED]. Furthermore, we reviewed USEUCOM's process to develop and produce warning products.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, there were no reports discussing warning intelligence.

(U) Management Comments

(U) United States European Command



HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
UNIT 30400
APO AE 09131

ECJ2

08 Jan 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Headquarters, U.S. European Command Response to Report No. D2019-
DISPA2-0113.00, "Evaluation of U.S. European Command's Warning Intelligence
Capabilities"

1. References:

- a. Report No. D2019-DISPA2-0113.00, 12 Dec 2019
- b. Defense Warning Handbook (Nov 2017)
- c. Defense Warning Network, DOD Directive 3115.16, 5 Dec 2013,
Incorporating change 1, Effective 18 Apr 2019
- d. Defense Warning DIA Instruction DIAI 3000.001, 27 Mar 2014
- e. JIOC EXORD Mod 3, 04 Oct 2011
- f. Joint Publication 5-0

2. Reference (a) is the draft report.

3. This memorandum responds to the recommendations in the final report. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Director of Intelligence, Brigadier General Thomas Hensley, USAF, is overseeing the response to and implementation of the report's recommendations.

4. Recommendation 1: Appoint a USEUCOM Directorate lead for Red Team capabilities in support of USEUCOM's warning mission.

USEUCOM Response: USEUCOM Intelligence Directorate (ECJ2) is unable to commit to developing a full Red Team capability as described in REF F due to resource constraints. Resourcing is of particular concern, given resource cuts to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Military Intelligence Program billets and as a result of a defense-wide review that will impact ECJ2 starting in FY21. In lieu of a full team, ECJ2 shifted resources to hire one full-time employee as a Warning

(U) United States European Command (cont'd)

ECJ2

SUBJECT: Headquarters, U.S. European Command Response to Report No. D2019-DISPA2-0113.00, "Evaluation of U.S. European Command's Warning Intelligence Capabilities"

Advocate Analyst to oversee warning-related Red Team functions. We anticipate this hiring action to be complete in second quarter of FY20.

5. Recommendation 2: Amend ECJ2's Indications and Warning Advocate Team mission procedures to incorporate the use of Red Team capabilities, in accordance with REF C and REF E.


USEUCOM Response: ECJ2 amended the subject document to reflect Red Team aspects in warning activities. The new guidance directs alternative analysis production and publication aimed at each of USEUCOM's Defense Warning Network enduring warning problems. It further directs alternative analysis focusing on ECJ2's main analytic lines. The mission description for the amended ECJ2 Indications and Warning Advocate Team is enclosed.

6. Recommendation 3: Develop procedures to forward Red Team products to the Director of DIA for database integration, as appropriate, in accordance with REF C.

USEUCOM Response: ECJ2 will publish Red Team-related analysis to DIA systems per the above response to recommendation two. We interpret this as satisfying guidance in REF C to "forward Red Team products to the Director, DIA, for database integration." Of note, REFs B through F provide no guidance on applying Red Team functions to warning-related analysis. We interpret this as giving ECJ2 considerable latitude for how to incorporate Red Team analysis and publication. Many of the structured analytic techniques outlined in the U.S. Army's University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies Red Team Handbook are core DIA analytic tradecraft techniques that are taught to all DIA analysts as part of the mandatory Professional Analyst Career Education curriculum. These Red Team methods are also part of the DoD All-Source Analysis Professional Certification Program.

7. If you have questions, my point of contact is [REDACTED] He may be reached at [REDACTED]

Encl
USEUCOM JIOCEUR's Indications
and Warning Advocate Team Mission


THOMAS K. HENSLEY
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Intelligence

(U) List of Classified Resources

- Source 1:** (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff message, "Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) Execute Order (EXORD) Modification 3,"
Declassification Date: September 30, 2021
Date of Source: October 4, 2011
- Source 2:** (S) USEUCOM Operation Plan [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- Source 3:** (U) Joint Staff J2 Defense Warning Staff, "Defense Warning Network Handbook," fourth edition
Declassification Date: Not provided
Date of Source: November 2017
- Source 4:** (U) Joint Staff J22 email response to a DoD OIG "Request for Information," on senior decision makers
Declassification Date: December 31, 2044
Date of Source: June 10, 2019
- Source 5:** (U) JIOCEUR Analytic Center, "Response to 17 April [2019] DoD IG RFI Regarding Evaluation of EUCOM's Warning Capabilities (Project No. D2019-DISPA2-0113.000),"
Declassification Date: Not Identified on Source Document
Date of Source: April 30, 2019
- Source 6:** (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DWN	Defense Warning Network
J2	Intelligence Directorate
JAC	Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe Analytic Center
JIOC	Joint Intelligence Operations Center
JIOCEUR	Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USEUCOM	United States European Command

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

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