




INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

DECEMBER 16, 2020



Special Report: Weaknesses in the Retrograde Process for Equipment From Afghanistan



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**INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

December 16, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Special Report: Weaknesses in the Retrograde Process for
Equipment From Afghanistan (Report No. DODIG-2021-035)

We are providing this report for information and use. This special report compiles weaknesses identified in five DoD Office of Inspector General reports related to the retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan that were issued between 2013 and 2015. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Commander, U.S. Central Command; Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan; Commanding General, U.S. Army Central; Commander, U.S. Transportation Command; Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command; Commanding General, U.S. Army Sustainment Command; Director, Joint Staff; Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, G-4; and the Director, Defense Contract Management Agency, should read this report to be aware of challenges and opportunities for improvement.

This report contains no recommendations for action. We did not issue a draft report, and no written response is required. If you have any questions, please contact me at [REDACTED]

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Richard B. Vasquez".

Richard B. Vasquez
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Readiness and Global Operations

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Special Report

DoD Office of Inspector General

Weaknesses in the Retrograde Process for Equipment From Afghanistan

Background

The purpose of this special report is to assist U.S. military, civilian, and contractor personnel responsible for the retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan by highlighting weaknesses in the retrograde process identified in previous DoD OIG reports. As the retrograde from Afghanistan accelerates over the next few months, in accordance with the February 2020 agreement with the Taliban, the Army will process billions of dollars of equipment through retrograde hubs. The Army must properly handle equipment that is turned in by redeploying units to decrease the risk of equipment loss and compromise, and to facilitate equipment reuse.¹

Five prior DoD OIG reports, issued between 2013 and 2015, identified weaknesses related to property accountability, security, and contractor oversight during previous retrograde operations. The weaknesses previously reported indicated an opportunity to improve retrograde procedures by applying lessons learned from past retrograde operations to future retrograde operations. This special report can serve as a reference for personnel overseeing and conducting retrograde activities in Afghanistan and future contingency operations. See the Appendix for a list of these five reports and the scope and methodology of our review.

Withdrawal of U.S. Forces From Afghanistan

On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a conditional agreement to remove all U.S. troops from Afghanistan by April 2021.² According to the agreement, the initial withdrawal involved a reduction of U.S. forces to 8,600 by mid-July 2020. In August 2020, the President announced that the United States would further reduce the number of troops in Afghanistan to approximately 5,000 by November 2020. In November 2020, the Acting Secretary of Defense further stated that troop levels would be reduced to 2,500 in January 2021.

¹ Redeployment is the transfer of forces and equipment to support another commander's operational requirements or to return personnel and equipment to the home station.

² "Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan Between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Which is Not Recognized by the United States as a State and is Known as the Taliban and the United States of America," February 29, 2020.

Removal of Military Equipment From Afghanistan

In addition to reducing U.S. troop levels, the U.S. military must remove from Afghanistan the equipment used by the troops as part of retrograde operations. Retrograde is the process of moving equipment from one theater of operations to a repair facility or to another theater of operations for reuse. Military equipment consists of two types—unit-owned equipment and theater-provided equipment. Unit-owned equipment accompanies the deploying unit to Southwest Asia, and returns with the unit when the unit redeploys. Theater-provided equipment is equipment owned by U.S. Army Materiel Command that is available for issue to units in Southwest Asia. Theater-provided equipment includes vehicles, computers, generators, and communications devices.

Additionally, demilitarization is the process of eliminating the functional capabilities and inherent military design features of military equipment to prevent it from being used against the United States. Methods of demilitarization range from removal and destruction of critical features to total destruction (including cutting, shredding, and melting). Historically, once equipment is demilitarized, the remaining scrap metals were sold to local vendors. The demilitarization process requires personnel to verify the demilitarization by issuing a certification of demilitarization.

Key organizations involved in the Afghanistan retrograde process are the Army and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).³ The Army uses Redistribution Property Assistance Teams (RPATs) to collect excess Army equipment that units have in Afghanistan, redistribute equipment to fill shortages, and retrograde excess equipment to the United States. The RPAT workforce in Afghanistan is composed of military, civilian, and contractor personnel. RPATs receive theater-provided equipment from redeploying Army units and transfer the inventory listings from the unit's property books to the RPAT record-keeping system. RPAT yards contain a variety of military equipment, including vehicles and weapons. Ultimately, the majority of all the Army theater-provided equipment in Afghanistan will be processed through the Bagram and Kandahar RPAT yards. RPATs are also responsible for improving property accountability of retrograde equipment and enabling visibility of received equipment during transit. To do this, RPATs should use electronic systems to track equipment location and status. Figure 1 shows an aerial view of the Bagram RPAT yard.

³ For the purposes of this report, we are using "the Army" as a general term to include all Army organizations involved in Afghanistan retrograde operations, including U.S. Army Central Command, Army 1st Theater Sustainment Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command, U.S. Army Sustainment Command, Army Contracting Command, and the 401st Army Field Support Brigade.



Figure 1. Bagram RPAT Yard
Source: The DoD OIG.

The DLA is responsible for administering the Defense Materiel Disposition Program worldwide. DLA-Disposition Services (DS) is responsible for demilitarizing equipment received from DoD activities. Figure 2 shows equipment staged at the DLA-DS facility at Bagram Airfield before disposal.



Figure 2. Equipment Staged at DLA-DS Bagram Airfield
Source: The DoD OIG.

Weaknesses Identified in Previous Retrogrades of Equipment From Afghanistan

Prior DoD OIG reports identified weaknesses in the areas of property accountability, security, and contractor oversight. Avoiding similar deficiencies at the RPAT yards and DLA-DS locations during the current retrograde of equipment will help the Army and DLA protect equipment from loss or theft during the drawdown, and facilitate the relocation and reuse of the equipment.

Property Accountability Is Critical at Retrograde Locations

RPAT and DLA-DS personnel should properly account for equipment turned in and stored at the RPAT yards and DLA-DS locations to ensure all equipment is on record and does not get lost or stolen. Specifically, according to prior DoD OIG reports, RPAT personnel should:

- be aware that, when they relieve redeploying Army units of equipment at the RPAT yards, the redeploying units' property records for the equipment being turned in may not be accurate;
- maximize the use of automatic identification technology capabilities, such as bar codes and radio-frequency identification tags, for recording inventory and tracking equipment;⁴ and
- conduct, or direct responsible contractors to conduct, recurring inventories once the RPAT accepts the equipment from the redeploying unit to ensure accurate property records.

In addition, DLA-DS personnel need to properly document demilitarization actions to ensure the Army's records accurately reflect which equipment is available for reuse and which equipment has been destroyed. Finally, RPAT personnel need to initiate property loss investigations in a timely manner to maintain an accurate count of equipment at the RPAT yards.

Ensure Accurate Records for Equipment Turned In to RPAT Yards

For RPAT personnel to properly account for equipment, they must reconcile each equipment item listed in the redeploying Army unit's property records to the physical equipment to confirm the property records are accurate. Army Regulation 710-2 states that all equipment acquired by the Army needs to be accounted for and that property book records for nonexpendable items must provide a complete audit trail for all transactions.⁵

⁴ Automatic identification technology provides the capability to track, document, and control materiel.

⁵ Army Regulation 710-2, "Supply Policy Below the National Level," March 28, 2008. Nonexpendable items are not consumed in use and retain their original identity during the period of use. Nonexpendable items are durable goods with an expected service life of 2 years or more.

Prior DoD OIG reports identified weaknesses with the accuracy of property records maintained by Army units prior to redeploying. For example, Report No. DODIG-2014-098 stated that the Army did not properly account for about \$424.5 million of equipment deployed to Afghanistan from 2001 through 2013.⁶ Specifically, the Army did not verify that receiving Army units recorded \$284.6 million of theater-provided equipment at the time of receipt; therefore, the Army could not hold the receiving units responsible for the disposition of the equipment. Furthermore, because the Army did not have accurate accountability, theater-provided equipment could have been lost, destroyed, or abandoned in Afghanistan without the Army's knowledge.

Additionally, the Army did not account for equipment valued at \$139.9 million at a level that allowed the Army sufficient visibility to know the location and status of equipment. The Army allowed equipment to be tracked by a generic tracking number for a category of equipment, rather than a tracking number unique to each piece of equipment. As a result, the Army did not have enough information to identify which specific items were recorded in the property accountability system. Without proper accountability controls in place, there is a risk that the Army will lose visibility and control of equipment at RPAT yards during the unit turn-in process and that millions of dollars in equipment will be abandoned during the retrograde process. For example, Report No. DODIG-2014-098 stated that at Kandahar Airfield, the audit team identified at least \$104,000 worth of equipment in an abandoned yard that had been left unsecured and exposed to the elements for an unknown amount of time.

Use Automatic Identification Technology to Track Equipment

RPAT personnel throughout Afghanistan should maximize the use of automatic identification technology capabilities to track equipment. Both Army Regulation 710-2 and Army Regulation 735-5 state that when accounting for equipment, management must use automatic identification technologies, such as bar codes and radio-frequency identification tags.⁷ The Army maintains several automated systems to support the retrograde process and account for all equipment throughout the process.⁸ Report No. DODIG 2014-043 found that although automatic identification technology was available at the RPAT yard, the Army did not use it for tracking the location and status of equipment.⁹ Specifically, RPAT personnel did not use the technology because they expected equipment to be directly retrograded out of Afghanistan, rather than held at the RPAT yard for any additional units deploying into Afghanistan. As a result, thousands of items remained in the RPAT yards in Afghanistan instead of being retrograded. Without automatic identification technology in place, RPAT personnel may not be capable of properly tracking, documenting, and controlling equipment in the RPAT yards.

⁶ Report No. DODIG-2014-098, "The Army Did Not Properly Account For and Manage Force Provider Equipment in Afghanistan," July 31, 2014.

⁷ Army Regulation 735-5, "Property Accountability Policies," November 9, 2016.

⁸ For example, the Army uses the Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced system and the Logistics Modernization Program.

⁹ Report No. DODIG-2014-043, "The Army Needs To Improve Property Accountability and Contractor Oversight at Redistribution Property Assistance Team Yards in Afghanistan," March 4, 2014.

Conduct Regular and Recurring Inventories

RPAT personnel should conduct, or direct responsible contractors to conduct, regular and recurring inventories of equipment once the RPAT accepts the equipment from the redeploying units. Army Regulation 710-2 establishes policies for the accountability and management of equipment. Specifically, the regulation states that the purpose of an inventory is to determine the location and quantity of equipment on hand and requires that 100 percent of equipment be inventoried annually, sensitive equipment be inventoried quarterly, and weapons and ammunition be inventoried monthly. Inventories of equipment are critical to maintaining accurate property records. In Report No. DODIG-2014-043, the DoD OIG found that RPAT personnel did not conduct regular and recurring inventories of equipment.¹⁰ In April 2013, RPAT personnel completed the first inventory of equipment since the RPAT's inception in 2008, after which the Army reported \$586.8 million in equipment losses between May 2012 and May 2013. Included in these losses were weapons, weapon systems, and other sensitive equipment.¹¹ As part of that audit, the team also conducted book-to-floor and floor-to-book testing to determine the adequacy of RPAT personnel's procedures for processing equipment. Based on book-to-floor testing and statistical projections, the audit team could not account for \$157.4 million or 37.2 percent of equipment during inventory testing at the Bagram and Kandahar RPAT yards. Without regular and recurring inventories, RPAT personnel do not know how accurate their records are for equipment on hand, and proper accounting for equipment during the retrograde may be compromised.

Ensure Proper Documentation of Demilitarization Actions

DLA-DS personnel should properly account for equipment that requires demilitarization and maintain the required documentation. According to DoD Manual 4160.21, accounting records for equipment, including disposal turn-in documents, must be maintained so that each item can be traced from receipt to final disposition.¹² Specifically, when equipment is going to be demilitarized, a disposal turn-in document is required. This document provides a record of the equipment's disposition. Report No. DODIG-2014-007 found that DLA-DS personnel could not appropriately account for 62 of 93 disposal turn-in documents reviewed.¹³ The 62 disposal turn-in documents covered 1,750 inventory items with an acquisition value of \$7.5 million. For example, either personnel could not physically locate the document, the location of the document was different from what was recorded in the property record, or the document was not added to the property record. In addition, the audit team was unable to locate equipment for 29 of 58 disposal turn-in documents reviewed at the Kandahar DLA-DS facility, even

¹⁰ At the time of the audit, Army Regulation 710-2 and the Operation Enduring Freedom-Theater Property Book Office Standard Operating Procedures did not require inventories for the specific type of equipment being reviewed. The report recommended that the Army add inventory requirements in the Standard Operating Procedures, and the Army agreed.

¹¹ Sensitive items are defined as property requiring a high degree of protection and control due to statutory or regulatory requirements.

¹² DoD Manual 4160.21, Volume 1, "Defense Materiel Disposition: Disposal Guidance and Procedures," October 2, 2019.

¹³ Report No. DODIG-2014-007, "Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services Afghanistan Disposal Process Needed Improvement," November 8, 2013.

though the DLA's accounting and inventory management system indicated the equipment was still on site and therefore had not yet been demilitarized. While management stated that these items were demilitarized, Kandahar DLA-DS had not completed or could not provide demilitarization certifications for 28 of the 29 disposal turn-in documents at the time of the audit team's inventory inspection. If equipment required to be demilitarized is not properly documented, the Army will not have a record to verify demilitarization occurred and the equipment could be abandoned unintentionally. In addition, improper documentation could result in full demilitarization not occurring. Therefore, without proper documentation there is a risk that the equipment may instead fall into the hands of adversaries and be restored to working condition for use against the United States.

Perform Property Loss Investigations in a Timely Manner

RPAT personnel should be aware that previous ineffective procedures for processing and accounting of equipment at the RPAT yards in Afghanistan led to significant losses, which require timely investigation. Army Regulation 735-5 states that when equipment losses are identified, the accountable property officer must search for the missing equipment, initiate the property loss investigation, and notify the approving authority within 15 days of the date of the loss. Additionally, Army Regulation 735-5 requires the Army to initiate a property investigation to account for the loss, damage, or destruction of Government property.

In Report No. DODIG-2015-009, the DoD OIG documented that the Army did not effectively report FY 2013 inventory losses at the Bagram and Kandahar RPAT yards.¹⁴ Specifically, from the audit team's review of the 10 largest property loss investigations closed during FY 2013, the Army did not report 15,600 pieces of missing equipment, valued at approximately \$419.5 million, in a timely manner. The missing equipment included weapons, weapon systems, and sensitive items. Although Army policy recommends a property loss investigation be completed within 75 days, the 10 property loss investigations reviewed averaged 318 days from the date the equipment was determined to be lost to final approval of the property loss investigation. In one case, the property loss investigation took 756 days to complete.

Furthermore, once the Army identified equipment as lost, the Army did not always correctly calculate and report the total loss to the U.S. Government. According to Army Regulation 735-5, as part of the investigation process, the actual loss to the U.S. Government must be determined. Report No. DODIG-2015-009 documented the review of 10 loss investigations and identified inconsistent application of depreciation and mathematical errors when calculating the total loss to the U.S. Government. For example, two investigations over-reported property losses by about \$24 million. If RPAT personnel do not conduct property loss investigations in a timely manner, there is a risk that missing equipment will not be recovered, and that no one will be held financially responsible for the property losses.

¹⁴ Report No. DODIG-2015-009, "The Army Needs to Improve the Processes for Reporting Inventory Losses in Afghanistan," October 30, 2014.

Secure Facilities to Safeguard Equipment

RPAT and DLA personnel should properly safeguard equipment at the retrograde locations throughout Afghanistan. Specifically, RPAT and DLA personnel need to:

- secure disposition facilities and
- safeguard sensitive items.

Inadequate security of facilities and safeguarding of sensitive equipment could result in the compromise of sensitive information. These deficiencies, when compounded by ineffective property accountability controls similar to those identified at the RPAT yards in previous audits, could result in undetected theft of equipment.

Secure Disposition Facilities

According to Army Regulation 190-51, the Army must maintain physical security controls to protect all equipment from potential loss or theft.¹⁵ Additionally, the regulation states that portable communications and electronics equipment and other high-value precision equipment should, at a minimum, be separated from other equipment and stored in a separate, locked, secure area; be double-barrier protected when not in use; and access to the equipment storage area should be controlled. Double-barrier protection includes a separate building that is locked or guarded and protected by a perimeter fence, a locked steel cage within a secure storage structure, or securely affixing the item to an internal structure of a secure storage container.

Prior DoD OIG reports documented instances where either RPAT or DLA-DS personnel did not provide adequate physical security of facilities. For example, Report No. DODIG-2014-007 concluded that DLA-DS personnel in Afghanistan did not have adequate access and security controls, which resulted in other-country national contractors having inappropriate access to pilferable and sensitive equipment storage facilities. Specifically DLA-DS personnel in Afghanistan did not:

- adequately secure the facilities,
- appropriately escort visitors and local national scrap-truck drivers on the facility,
- change combination locks to entry and exit points at least annually, or
- limit access to pilferable storage areas to required personnel.

In another instance, RPAT personnel did not protect controlled inventory items with double-barrier protection.¹⁶ In Report No. DODIG-2014-043, the audit team observed that 30 storage boxes containing controlled inventory items were not secured in double-barrier

¹⁵ Army Regulation 190-51, "Security of Unclassified Army Resources (Sensitive and Nonsensitive)," June 27, 2019.

¹⁶ Army Regulation 735-5 defines controlled inventory items as those items designated as having characteristics requiring they be identified, accounted for, secured, segregated, or handled in a special manner to ensure their safekeeping and integrity. Controlled inventory items are categorized as classified, sensitive, or pilferable, depending on the degree of control required.

protection and were stored close to the outer walls of the facility and mere feet away from an open freight door. The audit team opened two of the boxes and found that one box was full of radio receiver-transmitter sets with a unit cost of \$8,471 per item. In the second box, the team found a radio set with a unit cost of \$42,840. Both the radio receiver-transmitters and radio set items were controlled inventory items. Without adequate security controls in place to protect U.S. property overseas, there is a risk of theft and compromise of sensitive items.

Safeguard Sensitive Items

RPAT personnel must safeguard controlled inventory items to avoid sensitive information falling into enemy hands. Army Regulation 735-5 requires identifying, accounting for, securing, segregating, or handling controlled inventory items in a special manner to ensure their safekeeping and integrity. In addition, the Army brigade's Standard Operating Procedures for property accountability require the unit to clear controlled inventory items with hard drives and automation of all data before turning the equipment in to the RPAT.¹⁷ The brigade's Standard Operating Procedures further state that if the unit does not properly clear the item, then the RPATs cannot accept the equipment. Two prior DoD OIG reports identified weaknesses in the RPAT processes for safeguarding and handling controlled inventory items. For example, Report No. DODIG-2014-043 documented that personnel at the Kandahar RPAT accepted a counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device system and four navigation systems that were not cleared of all data. In addition, the Kandahar RPAT did not have adequate procedures in place for safeguarding the items that had yet to be cleared of all data. Instead, the items were uninstalled from the vehicles and left unattended while contractors, including other-country national contractors, had direct access to the equipment. Unless equipment is properly processed by unit personnel prior to turning it in to an RPAT yard, there is a risk of theft and compromise of sensitive information.

Perform Contractor Oversight

RPAT personnel should perform required contractor oversight to identify contractor performance deficiencies and hold contractors accountable for performance deficiencies. Additionally, RPAT personnel must be aware that contractors with custody of Government property must account for, control, protect, preserve, and maintain that property in accordance with regulatory and contractual requirements.

Identify Contractor Performance Deficiencies

RPAT personnel should determine whether a contractor is performing according to the terms of the contract, and document any instances of deficient contractor performance. To complete the responsibilities of the RPAT yards, RPAT personnel use contractors, and the contract requirements may include property accountability and security of equipment at the RPAT

¹⁷ 401st Army Field Support Brigade, "Internal Standard Operating Procedures," February 22, 2013.

yards. According to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, U.S. Government officials shall perform contract quality assurance when necessary to determine whether contractor services conform to contract requirements.¹⁸

Prior DoD OIG reports found that the Army did not conduct adequate oversight of RPAT contractors. For example, Report No. DODIG-2014-043 outlined that a contract required the RPAT contractor to conduct 100-percent property accountability of equipment and complete a Department of the Army Form 3161 whenever transferring equipment from one RPAT yard to another. However, the report identified equipment transfers without the required forms or proper updates in the accountability system. In one instance, the report documented that a \$1.5 million vehicle recorded by RPAT contractor personnel in the accountability system on a Bagram property record could not be located at the Bagram RPAT. RPAT personnel in Bagram stated that the item was inventoried at the Kandahar RPAT yard, but Bagram RPAT personnel did not have the necessary documentation to verify the transfer. The audit team contacted RPAT personnel in Kandahar to confirm the status of the vehicle; however, the team was informed that the vehicle was not at the Kandahar RPAT yard either, indicating that RPAT personnel could not verify the location of the vehicle. If RPAT personnel do not monitor contractor performance, there is a risk that contractors will not fulfill their duties in accordance with the contract and the Government will not receive what it paid for.

Hold Contractors Accountable for Contract Deficiencies

RPAT contracting personnel should address contractor performance deficiencies when identified. According to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the contracting officer is responsible for initiating actions to remedy any documented contractor performance deficiencies.¹⁹ Additionally, the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires the contracting officer to take necessary action to verify the contractor complies with the terms of the contract.²⁰ Prior DoD OIG reports found that contracting personnel did not take necessary action to hold contractors accountable for performance deficiencies. For example, Report No. DODIG-2014-043 documented that despite issuing 220 corrective action reports to the contractor, the contracting officer took no other action to reform performance to fully hold the contractor accountable and continued to exercise three option years. Specifically, from September 2011 through May 2013, contract oversight personnel issued 220 corrective action reports to the contractor, which included several corrective action reports documenting pervasive deficiencies, such as improperly secured containers with sensitive items and contractor personnel sleeping on the job. In addition, other corrective action reports detailed the contractor's noncompliance with property accountability, qualification and training of

¹⁸ Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 46, "Quality Assurance," Subpart 46.4, "Government Contract Quality Assurance," Section 46.401, "General."

¹⁹ Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 46, "Quality Assurance," Subpart 46.4, "Government Contract Quality Assurance," Section 46.407, "Nonconforming Supplies or Services."

²⁰ Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 1, "Federal Acquisition Regulations System," Subpart 1.6, "Career Development, Contracting Authority, and Responsibilities," Section 1.602-2, "Responsibilities."

staff, security and safeguarding of equipment, and quality control. Despite these repeated warnings from U.S. Government oversight personnel that the contractor was not satisfying its contractual obligations, the contracting officer continued to exercise three option years in January 2011, January 2012, and January 2013. The contractor's noncompliance with the performance work statement led to deficiencies in the processing and safeguarding of equipment, resulting in the loss of equipment.

Finally, Report No. DODIG-2015-126 stated that three drone systems were missing for 8 months because of confusion over contract requirements for property accountability and asset visibility, notification of property losses, and investigative research into missing property.²¹ The Marine Corps used the drone systems, each worth approximately \$500,000, as a surveillance platform to aid route clearance platoons and to counter improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan. Because the contractor did not complete all the contract requirements, for 249 days, the contractor did not know the location, status, or security of the three drone systems. Without proper controls in place to hold contractors accountable for contract deficiencies, there is a risk of noncompliance in maintaining property accountability, security and safety, and quality control. Additionally, there is a risk that the Army may lose visibility of equipment in Afghanistan, including sensitive equipment and information.

Summary

The proper accounting for and safeguarding of equipment turned in by redeploying units is critical to decrease the risk of equipment loss and facilitate its reuse. From 2013 through 2015, the DoD OIG conducted five audits on the retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan. The resulting reports identified weaknesses related to property accountability, security, and contractor oversight with significant impacts on the retrograde process. Examples of the impacts on the retrograde process included the following.

- A lack of recurring inventories contributed to the accumulated loss of \$586.8 million in equipment over a 12-month period. Included in these losses were weapons, weapons systems, and other sensitive equipment.
- A lack of timely property loss investigations resulted in the Army not having accurate accountability and visibility of equipment in Afghanistan.
- A lack of equipment security and safeguarding of sensitive items left the equipment and information vulnerable to theft and compromise.

RPAT and DLA-DS personnel, along with U.S. Government contracting and oversight personnel, should be mindful of these past weaknesses while accepting and processing equipment from redeploying units for retrograde. Otherwise, the RPAT and DLA-DS environment could be conducive to property loss.

²¹ Report No. DODIG-2015-126, "Contract Oversight for Redistribution Property Assistance Team Operations in Afghanistan Needs Improvement," May 18, 2015.

Appendix

Scope and Methodology

We analyzed five reports issued by the DoD OIG between 2013 and 2015 that reviewed the Afghanistan retrograde process. From these reports, we identified weaknesses related to property accountability, security, and contractor oversight. Using these weaknesses, we highlighted lessons learned for personnel overseeing and conducting retrograde activities in Afghanistan and future contingency operations.

Additionally, we summarized the relevant recommendations and management actions taken in response to those reports.

- Report No. DODIG-2014-007, “Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services Afghanistan Disposal Process Needed Improvement,” November 8, 2013
 - While the DoD OIG did not make any formal recommendations in this report, the DoD OIG informed DLA-DS management of all findings and recommendations while on site, which enabled management to proactively take action to address the deficiencies identified. Specifically, DLA-DS management developed local standard operating procedures to address facility security, visitor access, and pilferable storage; modified facilities to deter physical access; and required additional monitoring of scrap truck drivers. Further, management added additional personnel and procured updated equipment to better facilitate the demilitarization process.
- Report No. DODIG-2014-043, “The Army Needs to Improve Property Accountability and Contractor Oversight at Redistribution Property Assistance Team Yards in Afghanistan,” March 4, 2014
 - The DoD OIG recommended updating standard operating procedures, to include establishing inventory requirements for equipment in the RPAT yard, and that the requirements should include regular and recurring inventories. Army management’s response stated that it would perform a minimum 100-percent inventory conducted on a yearly basis in compliance with the 2011 RPAT Standard Operating Procedures.
 - The DoD OIG recommended that Army management employ automatic identification technology for equipment. Army management subsequently implemented and provided training on newly installed automatic identification technology.
 - The DoD OIG recommended that Army management establish controls to ensure that the contracting officer is initiating action on corrective action requests issued to the contractor and, if necessary, initiate action to remedy identified performance deficiencies. In response, Army management

established controls for continuous direct communications with the contracting officer, and scheduled regular teleconferences to discuss open corrective action reports and any contract deficiencies with the contractor.

- These recommendations are closed.²²
- Report No. DODIG-2014-098, “The Army Did Not Properly Account For and Manage Force Provider Equipment in Afghanistan,” July 31, 2014
 - The DoD OIG recommended that Army management identify and account for all nonexpendable components by serial number in the Army property accountability systems. In response, Army management stated that using line item numbers in property accountability systems is the appropriate accounting procedure for nonexpendable components. However, Army management stated that the nonexpendable components will be accounted for, at all times, at the end-user level.
 - The DoD OIG recommended that Army management require quarterly reconciliations of equipment listed in the property accountability system with equipment that has been deployed to the theater of operations.
 - These recommendations are closed.
- Report No. DODIG-2015-009, “The Army Needs to Improve the Processes for Reporting Inventory Losses in Afghanistan,” October 30, 2014
 - During the audit, the DoD OIG made suggestions to the Army to resolve the reporting and processing problems with property loss investigations. Army management resolved several of the concerns identified, such as training property accountability personnel and revamping property accountability processes. Additionally, Army management instituted more structured training for property loss investigation personnel and planned to require all units to examine the accountability of theater-provided equipment before redeployments.
- Report No. DODIG-2015-126, “Contract Oversight for Redistribution Property Assistance Team Operations in Afghanistan Needs Improvement,” May 18, 2015
 - While the DoD OIG did not make any formal recommendations in this report, during the audit the DoD OIG informed officials from the 401st Army Field Support Brigade, U.S. Army Sustainment Command, and Army Contracting Command–Rock Island that they needed to clarify the language in the new contract’s performance work statement to establish clear roles and responsibilities for the contractor. During the audit, Army management initiated actions to resolve the issues identified. For example, Army management updated the contract’s performance work statement to include revised requirements for inventories, notifications, and research into the loss of sensitive items.

²² Recommendations are considered closed when the DoD OIG has verified that the agreed-upon corrective actions were implemented.



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