



# OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS



APRIL 1, 2020–JUNE 30, 2020

## ABOUT THIS REPORT

A 2013 amendment to the Inspector General Act established the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. This legislation requires the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide quarterly reports to Congress on active overseas contingency operations.

The Chair of the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency designated the DoD Inspector General (IG) as the Lead IG for Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). The DoS IG is the Associate IG. The USAID IG participates in oversight of the operation.

The Offices of Inspector General of the DoD, DoS, and USAID are referred to in this report as the Lead IG agencies. Other partner agencies also contribute to oversight of OFS.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out their statutory missions to:

- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and evaluations.
- Report quarterly to Congress and the public on the operation and activities of the Lead IG agencies.

### METHODOLOGY

To produce this quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies submit requests for information to the DoD, DoS, and USAID about OFS and related programs. The Lead IG agencies also gather data and information from open sources, including congressional testimony, policy research organizations, press conferences, think tanks, and media reports.

The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, or evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the data and information provided by the agencies. For further details on the methodology for this report, see Appendix B.

### CLASSIFIED APPENDIX

This report normally includes an appendix containing classified information about OFS. Due to the coronavirus disease–2019 pandemic, the Lead IG agencies did not prepare a classified appendix this quarter.

## FOREWORD

We are pleased to submit this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS), for the period from April 1 through June 30, 2020. This report discharges our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to sections, 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act.

OFS has two complementary missions: the U.S. counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria–Khorasan (ISIS-K), and their affiliates in Afghanistan; and U.S. military participation in the NATO-led Resolute Support mission to develop the capacity of the Afghan security ministries and to train, advise, and assist the Afghan security forces.

This quarterly report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support of OFS, as well as the work of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development to promote the U.S. Government’s policy goals in Afghanistan, during the quarter.

This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG agencies and our partner oversight agencies during the quarter. This quarter, the Lead IG and partner agencies completed 18 reports related to OFS.

Working in close collaboration, we remain committed to providing comprehensive oversight and timely reporting on OFS.



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**Sean W. O'Donnell**  
Acting Inspector General  
U.S. Department of Defense



Handwritten signature of Diana R. Shaw in black ink.

**Diana R. Shaw**  
Acting Inspector General  
U.S. Department of State



Handwritten signature of Ann Calvaresi Barr in black ink.

**Ann Calvaresi Barr**  
Inspector General  
U.S. Agency for International  
Development



**On the Cover**

(Top row): A U.S. Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt II is refueled over Afghanistan (U.S. Air Force photo); Afghan men ride their bikes in the streets of Kabul (U.S. Army Reserve photo); U.S. and Afghan forces destroy a large amount of drugs during a raid in Farah Province (U.S. Army photo). (Bottom row): Afghan National Army commandos stand in formation (U.S. Army Reserve photo).

## MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL



**Sean W. O'Donnell**

I am pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) report on Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS).

This quarter, the United States reduced its forces in Afghanistan to 8,600, the first step toward a full withdrawal under the terms of the U.S.-Taliban agreement signed on February 29. The complete withdrawal by April 2021 is predicated on the Taliban meeting its obligations under the agreement, such as preventing terrorists from using Afghanistan to threaten the United States or its allies and holding peace talks with the Afghan government.

While the Taliban ceased attacks against U.S. and coalition targets, it has increased the frequency of attacks against Afghan security forces and the Afghan government. Furthermore, the Taliban and Afghan government have had continued disputes over the release of prisoners. As a result, the Taliban and Afghan government made little progress during the quarter on the intra-Afghan talks required by the U.S.-Taliban agreement.

In addition, the Taliban has not yet demonstrated that it is upholding its commitment to dissociate from terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. The United Nations Security Council and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) both reported that the Taliban remained supportive of al-Qaeda, even to the point of working together to attack Afghan security forces. Because the terrorist threat remained, the USCENTCOM commander said the conditions were not met for the United States to withdraw all its forces.

The coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) pandemic spread throughout Afghanistan, disrupting coalition and Afghan security initiatives and further stressing the country's fragile economy. The NATO-led coalition ceased face-to-face train, advise, and assist efforts in order to prevent the disease's spread between coalition advisors and their Afghan counterparts. Without advisors present, and as key Afghan leaders were sidelined with the virus, Afghan capabilities atrophied in areas such as information sharing and ground vehicle maintenance.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, USAID reprogrammed some of its assistance to Afghanistan and added supplemental funds to support health programs. However, USAID implementing partners in Afghanistan had difficulty acquiring personal protective equipment, which resulted in the suspension of some USAID-funded activities.

I look forward to working with my Lead IG colleagues to continue to provide oversight of and report on OFS and related U.S. Government activity, as required by the IG Act.



**Sean W. O'Donnell**  
Acting Inspector General  
U.S. Department of Defense



U.S. and Afghan forces destroy a large amount of drugs during a raid in Farah Province. (U. S. Army photo)

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## THE QUARTER IN REVIEW

### Taliban Compliance with U.S. Agreement Under Interagency Review

On February 29, 2020, after more than a year of negotiation, the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement to advance the peace process in Afghanistan. The United States committed to remove all troops from Afghanistan in two phases if the Taliban takes specific steps identified in the agreement, including preventing any group or individual, including al-Qaeda, from using Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies. The United States also committed to act as a facilitator in pursuing the release of prisoners held by the Afghan government. The Taliban committed to enter into negotiations with the Afghan government to reach a political settlement and a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire.<sup>1</sup>

The United States immediately began withdrawing military forces to meet the commitment in the agreement to draw down to 8,600 military members in Afghanistan by mid-July. According to the DoD, the United States met that target in June, ahead of schedule.<sup>2</sup> The United States committed to removing the remainder of its military forces by April 2021, if the Taliban complies with the agreement.<sup>3</sup>

Reports published during the quarter, however, indicated that the Taliban continued a high tempo of attacks targeting the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and maintained its ties with al-Qaeda, conducting some attacks alongside members of al-Qaeda's regional affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent.<sup>4</sup> General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., commander of U.S. Central Command, stated that "the Taliban needs to demonstrate that they're going to be faithful partners," and the "conditions [for a U.S. troop withdrawal] have not been fully met."<sup>5</sup> According to the DoD, the assessment of Taliban compliance with the U.S.-Taliban agreement is still under interagency review.<sup>6</sup>

### Afghan Government, Taliban Remain at Impasse

After the United States and Taliban signed the agreement in February, the Taliban ceased attacks against U.S. and coalition forces, according to United States Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A).<sup>7</sup> The Taliban focused its attacks against the ANDSF and Afghan government. Despite a brief 3-day ceasefire for the Eid holiday in late May, overall levels of violence increased from the previous quarter. Senior Afghan officials raised concerns over the Taliban's attacks, questioning whether the Taliban was serious about entering into intra-Afghan negotiations, according to the DoS.<sup>8</sup>

Amidst the fighting, the Afghan government and the Taliban did make incremental progress toward completing the prisoner releases. The Taliban submitted a list of 5,000 prisoners it wanted released; in response, the Afghan government released approximately 3,800 of those prisoners and the Taliban released 700 prisoners as of late June.<sup>9</sup> The Afghan government



Afghan National Army commandos stand in formation in Kabul. (U.S. Army Reserve photo)



deemed 600 prisoners too dangerous to release, which the Taliban claimed was a significant barrier to starting the intra-Afghan negotiations, according to media analysis.<sup>10</sup> According to Resolute Support commander General Austin S. Miller, prisoner releases are the key to intra-Afghan negotiations, but violence, poor accountability, and problematic prisoners make that “a less than straight line.”<sup>11</sup>

During the quarter, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and former Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah reached a political agreement ending their dispute over the September 2019 presidential election results. Under the terms of the agreement, Ghani remained president and Abdullah was appointed Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, responsible for leading the Afghan government’s peace process with the Taliban, and empowered to appoint half of the cabinet positions in the government.<sup>12</sup> In the wake of the power-sharing resolution, U.S. diplomats urged the Afghan government and the Taliban to implement the February agreement’s provisions and called for all sides to reduce violence.<sup>13</sup>

## Lead IG Oversight Activities

This quarter, the Lead IG and partner agencies completed 18 reports related to OFS. These reports examined various activities that support OFS, including DoD oversight of contractors who provide meals and other services to deployed forces and coalition partners at Resolute Support headquarters; the Army Contracting Command–Afghanistan’s management and administration of contracts in Afghanistan; DoS oversight and management of foreign assistance programs and international organizations related to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and Other International Organizations; foreign assistance programs of the DoS Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and the DoS Global Engagement Center; and financial accountability in humanitarian assistance programs. As of June 30, there were 36 ongoing projects and 20 other projects planned.

Lead IG investigations resulted in five debarments stemming from a fraud investigation involving medical equipment presumably destined for Afghanistan. Investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies closed 10 investigations, initiated 5 new investigations, and coordinated on 92 open investigations. The investigations involve procurement fraud, corruption, grant fraud, theft, program irregularities, computer intrusions, and human trafficking.

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; and abuse of authority. The DoD OIG has an investigator to coordinate the hotline contacts among the Lead IG agencies and others, as appropriate. During the quarter, the investigator referred 36 cases to Lead IG agencies or other investigative organizations.

## COVID-19 Spreads in Afghanistan, Hampers U.S. Efforts

As the coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19) pandemic spread in Afghanistan, U.S. and coalition advisors ceased most face-to-face advising to prevent the virus from spreading between coalition and Afghan partners. General Miller, noted that COVID-19 was an unforeseen factor that coincided with the reduction of forces following the US-Taliban agreement. The U.S. and coalition reduced non-essential personnel to decrease the overall medical burden, and has taken steps required to protect remaining forces in the future.<sup>14</sup> While the efforts reduced risk, the virus spread through the ANDSF and Afghan ministries.<sup>15</sup>

The advisors’ physical absence during the transition to a remote-advising model—using teleconferences, email, and messaging applications—exposed capability gaps in Afghan institutions, revealing areas where the Afghans were reliant upon coalition partners’ presence, according to USFOR-A.<sup>16</sup> For example, Afghans staffing the National Police Coordination Center had difficulty with information sharing and coordinating with other ANDSF institutions, degrading the quality of data used by the ANDSF to plan operations.<sup>17</sup> Elsewhere, coalition instructors were unable to continue training Afghan mechanics, decreasing USFOR-A’s ability to assess the maintenance work performed.<sup>18</sup> COVID-19



An Afghan man rides his bike in Kabul while wearing a face mask to protect himself from COVID-19. (U.S. Army Reserve photo)

also spread among the ANDSF units engaged in fighting the Taliban, potentially reducing the number of soldiers available to conduct operations. According to media reporting, an estimated 60 to 90 percent of soldiers in some units became infected, although Afghan government officials disputed the accuracy of these figures.<sup>19</sup>

USAID reported that some of its program implementers were unable to obtain personal protective equipment. Faced with a growing number of infections among the Afghan general population, USAID suspended some activities to protect its implementer staff.<sup>20</sup> Programs continued in situations where staff could work remotely from outside Afghanistan.<sup>21</sup> During the quarter, USAID released a guidebook on remote monitoring for its implementer staff, designed to facilitate better monitoring of its projects during the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>22</sup>

### ALP Members Face Uncertain Future

Afghan President Ghani issued a decree calling for the dissolution of the Afghan Local Police (ALP), a U.S.-funded local defense force, in mid-June.<sup>23</sup> The United States will cease its support and funding of the ALP at the end of FY 2020.<sup>24</sup> The ALP funding through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) expires on September 30, 2020.<sup>25</sup> The Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs plans to disband the armed local police forces, consisting of more than 18,000 members, one district at a time, giving severance pay to members based on their estimated level of effectiveness and level of security risk, helping them find new employment, and collecting their weapons and equipment.<sup>26</sup>

The COVID-19 pandemic caused the Afghan economy to contract sharply in the first half of 2020, raising concerns about the employment prospects for former ALP members.<sup>27</sup> Afghan government revenues fell more than one-third below May 2020 targets while the United Nations estimated that the Afghan government could face nearly \$250 million in costs for addressing the pandemic.<sup>28</sup> At present, it remains unclear what employment opportunities the Afghan government will be able to create for demobilized ALP members in this environment. Unless the Afghan government identifies an employment path or means for the economy to support former ALP members, it faces a challenge similar to one that arose early in the conflict when members of disbanded government-sponsored militia groups could not join the Afghan National Army and therefore faced unemployment, which drove them to join other militia groups.<sup>29</sup>

**The COVID-19 pandemic caused the Afghan economy to contract sharply in the first half of 2020, raising concerns about the employment prospects for former ALP members.**





A U.S. Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt II flies over Afghanistan.  
(U.S. Air Force photo)

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# THE QUARTER IN REVIEW

## MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

### U.S. Reviewing Taliban Compliance, Evaluating Conditions for U.S. Troop Withdrawal

The United States continues to support efforts to achieve a political settlement to end the conflict in Afghanistan. On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban concluded months of negotiations and signed an agreement that sets out a timeline for a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces that is contingent on Taliban compliance with counterterrorism commitments. The agreement also secures the Taliban's commitment to enter intra-Afghan negotiations to reach an agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan and discuss a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire.<sup>1</sup>

To comply with the agreement, the United States reduced the number of troops in Afghanistan to 8,600 in June, to be followed by a complete withdrawal by April 2021 if the Taliban upholds its commitments.<sup>2</sup> The Taliban agreed to participate in negotiations with the Afghan government and “not allow any of its members, other individuals or groups, including [al-Qaeda], to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United

U.S. airmen at the Kentucky Air National Guard base in Louisville preparing to deploy to the Persian Gulf region to fly troops and cargo across Iraq, Afghanistan, and northern Africa. (U.S. Air National Guard photo)



States and its allies,” nor allow its members to host or cooperate with such individuals or groups, nor allow them to use Afghan territory to train, recruit, or raise funds.<sup>3</sup>

The Taliban did not conduct any attacks against U.S. or coalition forces this quarter, according to United States Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A).<sup>4</sup> At the same time, the United States reduced the number of air strikes it conducted by 80 percent.<sup>5</sup> The Taliban publicly said they have a ceasefire with the United States.<sup>6</sup> However, in its semiannual report to Congress on the war in Afghanistan, the DoD reported that the Taliban increased attacks against the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and Afghan government officials, raising the overall levels of violence, except for a brief 3-day ceasefire in May for the Eid holiday.<sup>7</sup>

General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., the commander of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), said in June that the conditions for a full withdrawal, including a significant reduction in violence and a guarantee not to harbor al-Qaeda, had not yet been met.<sup>8</sup> The DoD also cited an al-Qaeda claim that the Taliban and al-Qaeda conducted attacks together.<sup>9</sup> According to the DoD, as of the end of the quarter, an interagency group was reviewing the Taliban’s compliance with its full set of commitments in the U.S.-Taliban agreement.<sup>10</sup>

## ABOUT OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL

### MISSION

U.S. forces carry out two complementary missions under Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS): 1) counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria–Khorasan (ISIS-K), and their affiliates in Afghanistan; and 2) participation in the NATO-led Resolute Support mission, under which the United States trains, advises, and assists Afghan forces and the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior Affairs to build their institutional capacity. In addition, under OFS authorities, U.S. forces provide combat enablers, such as aerial strikes and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, to the Afghan security forces as they fight the Taliban and terrorist organizations. The Department of State supports OFS through diplomatic efforts to reach a negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan, among other activities.

### HISTORY

On October 7, 2001, the United States launched combat operations in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom to topple the Taliban regime and eliminate al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. The Taliban regime fell quickly, and on May 1, 2003, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced an end to major combat operations in Afghanistan. Subsequently, the United States and international coalition partners transitioned to a mission designed to combat terrorism in Afghanistan while helping the nascent Afghan government to build democratic institutions in the country.<sup>11</sup>

While the new Afghan government developed, the Taliban launched increasingly deadly attacks to recapture lost territory, killing more than 800 U.S. service members and wounding more than 4,200 between the 2003 announcement and a 2009 change in strategy.<sup>12</sup> The United States recommitted to Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011 and increased U.S. forces to 100,000 troops to combat a “resurgent” Taliban. The U.S. “surge” was successful in reestablishing security within Afghanistan, but as the United States proceeded with the withdrawal of those surge forces, concerns remained about the ability of the Afghan forces to maintain security.<sup>13</sup>

OFS began on January 1, 2015, when the United States formally ended its combat mission, Operation Enduring Freedom. Under OFS, the United States conducts a train, advise, and assist role under the NATO Resolute Support mission, while continuing counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda, associated forces of al-Qaeda, and ISIS-K. In 2018, the United States increased its diplomatic efforts with the Taliban, culminating in a February 29, 2020, agreement. The United States reduced its troop levels to 8,600 in June 2020, and committed to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan by April 29, 2021, if the Taliban follows through on its commitments, including preventing any group or individual in Afghanistan, including al-Qaeda, from threatening the security of the United States and its allies.<sup>14</sup>

**U.S. and Taliban representatives participate in a signing ceremony in Doha, Qatar, on February 29, 2020. (DoS photo)**



## Afghan Government and Taliban Make Slow Progress Toward Starting Talks

The U.S.-Taliban agreement signed in February called for intra-Afghan negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban to begin by March 10.<sup>15</sup> As of June 30, the talks had not yet begun. Disagreements between the Taliban and the Afghan government over the release of Taliban prisoners have delayed the talks.<sup>16</sup>

During the quarter, both sides made progress toward resolving the prisoner release dispute. According to media reports, the Taliban submitted a list of 5,000 prisoners it wanted released, of which the Afghan government released 3,895. The Afghan government indicated that it plans to release most of the remaining prisoners. Meanwhile, the Taliban also released more than 700 of its own prisoners. Despite this progress, both sides had not resolved the dispute as of the end of the quarter.<sup>17</sup>

### SELECTED KEY EVENTS, 4/1/2020–6/30/2020

#### APRIL 1

Taliban and Afghan government representatives meet in Kabul to discuss prisoner release; the Taliban suspends talks after a week, claiming intentional delays

#### APRIL 11

The commander of USFOR-A meets Taliban leadership in Doha, Qatar, to discuss the need to reduce violence

#### MAY 12

Gunmen attack the maternity ward of Kabul hospital. No group claims responsibility

#### MAY 26

The Afghan government agrees to free 900 Taliban prisoners and urges the Taliban to extend a 3-day Eid al-Fitr ceasefire

#### APR

#### APRIL 4

Afghan officials announce the arrest of ISIS-K leader and 19 other fighters

#### APRIL 25

Afghan National Security Council reports the Taliban conducted 2,804 attacks from March 1 to April 19, averaging 55 per day, resulting in nearly 800 civilian casualties

#### MAY

#### MAY 17

Ghani and Abdullah sign power-sharing deal to end a political stalemate

**In addition to the dispute over prisoner releases, consistently high levels of Taliban violence against the ANDSF have strained the peace process and called into question whether the Taliban will approach the negotiations with the Afghan government in good faith.**

The Afghan government has refused to release some prisoners it said were too dangerous to be allowed to go free. Media reports quoted a senior European diplomat stating that some NATO countries were uncomfortable releasing prisoners believed to have committed mass casualty attacks against ethnic minorities and members of the international community working in Afghanistan. According to Afghan government sources quoted in the media, the release of the remaining prisoners is the last major remaining point of disagreement impeding the start of the intra-Afghan negotiations.<sup>18</sup> The Taliban has publicly committed to begin talks 1 week after the government of Afghanistan has released all 5,000 prisoners.<sup>19</sup> DoS officials noted that the ultimate decision regarding the release of Taliban prisoners belongs to the Afghan government.<sup>20</sup>

In June, Voice of America reported that the Taliban and Afghan government agreed that Qatar would be the setting for intra-Afghan negotiations.<sup>21</sup> However, even that agreement was subject to debate as the Taliban announced that the talks would be held entirely in Qatar while the Afghan government announced that it had agreed only to hold the first round of talks in that country.<sup>22</sup>

### Taliban Violence Complicates Start of Peace Talks

In addition to the dispute over prisoner releases, consistently high levels of Taliban violence against the ANDSF have strained the peace process and called into question whether the Taliban will approach the negotiations with the Afghan government in good faith.<sup>23</sup> In June, Voice of America quoted Abdullah Abdullah, Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, stating that Taliban attacks over the previous week had killed hundreds of Afghan security forces and that the violence tested the seriousness of the peace process.<sup>24</sup> According to the DoS, Abdullah stated on June 24 that the continued high level of Taliban violence was making it increasingly difficult for the Afghan government to justify engaging in direct talks with the Taliban.<sup>25</sup> According to USFOR-A, Resolute Support commander General Austin S. Miller, stated that the Taliban must be pressured to reduce violence, because such violence presents risk to the political pathway, the Afghan security forces, and, the coalition.<sup>26</sup>

**JUNE 9**

News media report a new Taliban splinter group—Iran-aligned Hezb-e Walayat-e Islami—opposes peace with the United States

**JUNE 23**

The Afghan government reports 291 Afghan security personnel killed in Taliban attacks in 1 week

**JUNE 28**

U.S. peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad travels to Doha to meet with Taliban leaders over intra-Afghan talks

**JUN**

**MAY 29**

The UN releases a report stating the Taliban is still supporting al-Qaeda

**JUNE 18**

USFOR-A reports the United States reduced its forces in Afghanistan to 8,600 to meet its commitment under deal with the Taliban

**JUNE 25**

The Ministry of Public Health reports 30,175 confirmed COVID-19 cases in Afghanistan, with 675 deaths related to the pandemic

**JUNE 30**

Secretary of State Michael Pompeo warns the Taliban against attacking Americans

In April, General Austin Scott Miller, the commander of USFOR-A and Resolute Support, met with Taliban leaders in Doha to discuss the need to reduce the violence in Afghanistan.<sup>27</sup> The Taliban stated that the meeting also was called to discuss what the Taliban had characterized as U.S. support of offensive ANDSF operations, a purported violation of the U.S.-Taliban agreement.<sup>28</sup> A media outlet quoted a USFOR-A spokesman as describing the U.S. operations as defending ANDSF forces under attack, which he said is consistent with the U.S. commitment in the U.S.-Taliban agreement.<sup>29</sup> The U.S. Government has set up an interagency collaborative group to monitor Taliban compliance with the agreement.<sup>30</sup> The group's membership, as well as the data and benchmarks it uses to monitor Taliban compliance with the agreement, are not publicly releasable, according to the DoS.<sup>31</sup>

## MEASURES OF SECURITY

### Resolute Support Restricts Public Release of Number of Enemy-Initiated Attacks During Quarter

Lead IG reports have regularly included data on the number of “enemy-initiated attacks” and “effective” enemy-initiated attacks provided by USFOR-A.<sup>32</sup> Incidents of violence data provide insight into the number, type, and location of enemy attacks, and past Lead IG reporting relied on these data as one measure of the conflict. Last quarter, USFOR-A withheld the data from public release, stating the information on enemy-initiated attacks is “now a critical part of deliberative interagency discussions regarding ongoing political negotiations between the United States and the Taliban.”<sup>33</sup>

This quarter, the DoD stated that the information is undergoing a classification review to determine whether it can be released.<sup>34</sup> The DoD also withheld the enemy-initiated attack data typically published in its publicly releasable semiannual report to Congress; the DoD stated that the information will be included in future classified annexes to its reports.<sup>35</sup> The DoD's report did not include the number of attacks and stated only that enemy-initiated, direct-fire attacks against ANDSF checkpoints continued to cause the most casualties to ANDSF personnel.<sup>36</sup>

Although USFOR-A did not publicly report the number of enemy-initiated attacks, the United Nations Security Council collected and reported data on “security incidents” in Afghanistan. In contrast to the Resolute Support definition of enemy-initiated attacks, the UN definition of “security incidents” includes violence initiated by Afghan and coalition forces, in addition to attacks by the Taliban, ISIS-K, and other violent organizations.<sup>37</sup>

The UN Secretary General reported that there were 5,543 security incidents between February 7 and May 14, a 2 percent decrease compared to the same period 1 year ago. During that time, neither the Afghan government nor the Taliban made significant gains in territory. While the number of security incidents was similar to that of a year ago, this year the period included the 2-week reduction in violence preceding the U.S.-Taliban agreement. In addition, after the signing of the agreement, the Taliban focused attacks exclusively against the ANDSF.<sup>38</sup> The DoD OIG noted that when considering those variables, the data appear to indicate an increase in the number of attacks against the Afghan government compared to the previous year.

**The UN Secretary General reported that there were 5,543 security incidents between February 7 and May 14, a 2 percent decrease compared to the same period 1 year ago.**

## Key Challenges—Lead IG Analysis

The February agreement between the United States and the Taliban is a step toward the U.S. objectives of ensuring that Afghanistan is never again a safe haven for terrorist groups that threaten the United States and supporting a political settlement in Afghanistan. A key part of the agreement is that the United States will gradually withdraw all its military forces from Afghanistan by April 2021, if the Taliban fulfill the terms of the agreement. However, USFOR-A faces a difficult task in continuing to meet OFS objectives while simultaneously reducing its military presence.

### PREVENTING TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS

Since 2001, the United States has conducted a counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan designed to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a place from which terrorists can plan and conduct attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. The U.S. military conducts this part of the OFS mission through a special operations force presence, focused on both conducting unilateral operations and partnering with the Afghan Special Security Forces in counterterrorism operations.

The agreement with the Taliban was premised upon assurances from the Taliban that it would not host or cooperate with terrorist organizations that threaten the security of the United States or its allies on Afghan soil. The U.S. withdrawal of military forces is expressly contingent upon Taliban action to fulfill their commitments. If the full withdrawal of U.S. forces ultimately occurs, then the United States would rely upon the Afghan government to continue the counterterrorism mission. To that end, the United States must be confident that the Taliban upholds its commitment in the agreement before the U.S. withdrawal and that the ANDSF is capable of conducting successful counterterrorism operations. The DoD OIG continues to request information about ANDSF capability assessments and counterterrorism operations to assess whether these conditions are met.

### U.S. INVESTMENTS AND REQUIREMENTS POST-WITHDRAWAL

The U.S. committed to withdraw “all military forces of the United States, its allies, and coalition partners, including all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting services personnel” from Afghanistan 14 months after signing the agreement. If the Taliban meets its commitments, the withdrawal could be completed as early as April 2021.

The DoD requested \$4.015 billion from Congress to fund the ANDSF for FY 2021, signaling that it expects to continue its investment as the military mission winds down. However, the post-April 2021 environment remains uncertain. Intra-Afghan negotiations are behind schedule, and the Taliban does not appear to be meeting its commitments necessary for a complete U.S. withdrawal.

Some major U.S. contracts in Afghanistan have end dates after April 2021, raising questions about how those contracts will be completed or if they will be modified or terminated should the current withdrawal timeline stand. Each investment requires its own analysis of whether the requirement remains after a U.S. withdrawal, to what level the United States is willing to continue investing, and whether the contract or work can be performed in the post-withdrawal environment.

As the Afghan government and the Taliban continue to work towards a peace deal and the withdrawal of U.S. personnel from Afghanistan, the Lead IG agencies will continue to seek information on funding and staffing levels, including security, necessary to conduct the U.S. diplomatic mission and humanitarian assistance programs, and to manage major programs and investments.

Similarly, USFOR-A reported that levels of violence stayed well above historic norms for the majority of the quarter, with a reduction in violence during a 3-day Eid ceasefire (May 24 to May 26). Although the Taliban conducted more attacks against the ANDSF and the Afghan government, the Taliban did not initiate any attacks against U.S. or coalition forces, according to USFOR-A.<sup>39</sup>

USFOR-A assessed that the coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19) did not affect the Taliban's ability to plan and conduct operations. USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that the Taliban's infection rates are probably similar to the general public in the areas in which Taliban units operate.<sup>40</sup>

### Insider Attacks Target ANDSF

USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that there were no insider attacks against U.S. or coalition personnel this quarter. However, there were 21 insider attacks against ANDSF personnel this quarter, in which attackers killed 83 people and wounded 21.<sup>41</sup>

### Militants Conduct Few High-profile Attacks in Kabul

USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that the only high-profile attack in Kabul this quarter took place on May 18, when several improvised explosive devices caused multiple casualties in Police District 11, located in the northern portion of the city.<sup>42</sup> There were at least two other prominent attacks in the capital that USFOR-A did not include in its reports of high-profile attacks, because the NATO definition of high-profile attacks excludes attacks that do not involve a car bomb or suicide bomber—even if the attacks are complex in nature or result in significant casualties or media attention.<sup>43</sup> On May 12, three gunmen in police uniforms stormed the maternity ward of a hospital in Kabul and killed 16 women and children, including 2 newborn babies. The United States blamed ISIS-K for the attack, according to Voice of America, but no group claimed responsibility.<sup>44</sup> On June 2, ISIS-K bombed a mosque in Kabul, killing a prominent prayer leader and one other person.<sup>45</sup>

### Civilian Casualties Increase After “Reduction in Violence” Lapses

Resolute Support reported that the total number of civilian casualties, caused by any individual or organization, increased from 1,309 last quarter to 2,085 (711 killed and 1,374 wounded) this quarter. There were 319 more casualties than reported during the same quarter last year. The provinces with the greatest number of casualties were Nangarhar, Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, and Logar.<sup>46</sup>

Last quarter, Resolute Support partly attributed low civilian casualty numbers to a reduction in violence between U.S. and Taliban forces in February preceding the February 29 U.S.-Taliban agreement.<sup>47</sup> The reduction in violence did not hold, as the number of civilian casualties nearly doubled from February to March and remained high throughout this quarter.<sup>48</sup>

USFOR-A reported that U.S. and coalition forces caused no civilian casualties during the quarter.<sup>49</sup> According to data provided by Resolute Support, the Taliban and other militant groups caused most of the civilian casualties. Improvised explosive devices caused the most casualties this quarter. The number of casualties caused by improvised explosive devices doubled from 411 last quarter to 883, which was similar to the previous year and likely resulted from increased

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
enemy operations, according to USFOR-A.<sup>50</sup> Direct fire attacks were the second-leading cause of civilian casualties (643 casualties).<sup>51</sup>

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) also provides a quarterly report of civilian casualties that includes cumulative numbers to that point in the year. UNAMA reported that it had verified 3,458 civilian casualties (1,282 deaths and 2,176 injured) during the first 6 months of 2020.<sup>52</sup> Subtracting the numbers that UNAMA reported for the first 3 months of 2020, the estimated total for this quarter is 2,165 civilian casualties (749 deaths and 1,416 injured), similar to the number UNAMA reported at the same time last year.<sup>53</sup> UNAMA reported that the Taliban caused the largest share of civilian casualties (43 percent) and the ANDSF caused the second-highest percentage (23 percent). U.S. and coalition forces have not caused a civilian casualty since February 17, according to UNAMA.<sup>54</sup>

While Resolute Support and UNAMA often report similar overall trends in civilian casualties, their data often differ in total numbers and attribution of responsible parties. This is due, in large part, to differences in methodology and interpretations of applicable law. Resolute Support assesses reports of civilian casualties using ANDSF and coalition operational reports, aircraft video footage, records of U.S. and Afghan weapons releases, and other coalition and Afghan government-generated information.<sup>55</sup> UNAMA investigates reports of civilian casualties using victim and witness accounts, statements from medical personnel, and statements from Afghan officials, and requires at least three sources to consider a civilian casualty “verified.”<sup>56</sup>

Figure 1.

**Civilian Casualties by Reporting Organization, January 2019–June 2020**



## DoD Reports One Fatality

One U.S. Army soldier died in a non-combat-related incident on May 19, 2020, for which the DoD provided no further details.<sup>57</sup> The DoD did not report any combat-related fatalities in Afghanistan this quarter.<sup>58</sup>

## ISIS-K Continues Deadly Attacks, Despite Recent Defeats

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that even after the Afghan government arrested several senior ISIS-K members during the quarter, ISIS-K will likely continue to conduct attacks in an effort to remain relevant, project an image of strength, and encourage recruitment. ISIS-K used its official messaging platforms and media outlets to draw attention to its attacks in Kabul and Nangarhar. However, the DIA assessed that ISIS-K's attempts to recruit new members will probably be unsuccessful, leaving it unable to generate the necessary support to increase its presence in Afghanistan.<sup>59</sup>

During the quarter, Afghanistan's main intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), announced the arrests of ISIS-K leader Abdullah Orakzai and other ISIS militants.<sup>60</sup> Media sources stated that NDS forces detained Abdullah Orakzai, who goes by Aslam Farooqi, on April 4, but it was unclear from the reporting where the arrests took place.<sup>61</sup> NDS officials also issued a statement on April 22, announcing the arrest of Muneeb, a former al-Qaeda member who shifted allegiance to ISIS-K. According to a media source, Muneeb, who (like many Afghans) uses only one name, was a member of ISIS-K's central council and headed its shadow court.<sup>62</sup>

On May 11, Zia ul-Haq, known as Sheikh Omar al-Khorasani, the leader of ISIS in South Asia and the Far East, was arrested along with two other members of the group in Kabul, according to the DIA. The NDS arrested Khorasani in Kabul after the other ISIS senior members arrested earlier confessed during debriefing.<sup>63</sup>

The arrests followed significant ISIS-K losses resulting from ANDSF operations and clashes with the Taliban that were discussed in the previous Lead IG report. However, according to the DoD, ISIS-K maintains the ability to defend itself and conduct mass casualty attacks despite pressure from coalition forces, the ANDSF, and the Taliban.<sup>64</sup>

According to the DoD's June 2020 report to Congress, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, terrorist groups like ISIS-K continue to pose a current threat to the stability of Afghanistan. The DoD reported that these groups anticipate that counterterrorism operations against them will be reduced significantly after coalition forces withdraw, emboldening militant groups "to build their capabilities to pose a greater threat to the region, and potentially to the West."<sup>65</sup>

An unnamed "international counterterrorism official" quoted in a report by Voice of America pointed to ISIS-K attacks "as a warning that the group's ability to survive adversity should not be underestimated."<sup>66</sup> The same Voice of America report stated that some intelligence estimates suggest that ISIS-K had been reduced to about 1,000 fighters, or otherwise "reduced to pockets in western Kunar province."<sup>67</sup> A DoD spokesperson quoted in the report said ISIS-K remains a security threat and that U.S. and Afghan security forces "continue to actively combat ISIS-K through counterterrorism operations."<sup>68</sup>

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## Regional Powers Endorse and Complicate Peace Process

### RUSSIA SUPPORTS PEACE EFFORTS AS IT ALSO SUPPORTS TALIBAN

According to DIA analysis, Russia expressed support for the U.S.-Taliban agreement to reduce violence and considers a possible intra-Afghan dialogue to be the best means to facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. On June 3, Russia hosted a video teleconference with China, Pakistan, and the United States to promote regional support for intra-Afghan talks and to press for the release of prisoners of war by the Afghan government and the Taliban, according to the DIA. The DIA reported that Russian officials expressed concern that the post-election tensions, in which both Ghani and Abdullah claimed victory in the election and held parallel swearing-in ceremonies as president, threatened to undermine the Afghan reconciliation process but expressed cautious optimism with the May power-sharing agreement between President Ashraf Ghani and Chairman Abdullah.<sup>69</sup>

While Russia has supported peace and reconciliation efforts, Russia believes that the Taliban is an unavoidable element of a future Afghan government and supports their inclusion in an interim government, according to the DIA. Because of this, Russia provides limited support to the Taliban. According to the DIA, U.S. officials have accused Russia of supporting the Taliban and supplying it with weapons.<sup>70</sup> Russia also provides the Taliban political support such as advocating for removing the Taliban from the UN terrorist blacklist, giving legal justification for Taliban attacks on Afghan armed forces, and criticizing President Ghani's decision to launch an offensive against the Taliban as hindering the start of intra-Afghan negotiations.<sup>71</sup>

### IRANIAN BORDER GUARDS ACCUSED OF KILLING AFGHAN MIGRANTS

The DIA reported that Iran maintained its strategy of trying to engage Kabul politically and economically, while also providing support to regional powerbrokers and lethal aid to the Taliban. Iran's strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Central Asia continue to be maintaining security and relatively stable central governments along its borders, protecting Shia populations, eliminating ISIS-K, opposing the U.S. regional presence, and securing its economic interests.<sup>72</sup>

Iran sought to maintain its influence in any future Afghan government by trying to influence politics and endeavoring to secure a central role in Taliban reconciliation talks, according to the DIA. In April, Iran's Special Envoy to Afghanistan visited the country, and Iran's Foreign Minister called top officials from Afghanistan, the United Nations, Russia, Turkey, Qatar, and India to discuss the peace process and the Ghani-Abdullah political agreement. In late May, Iran issued a joint statement with Pakistan, Russia, and China calling for an immediate ceasefire and resumption of intra-Afghan peace talks.<sup>73</sup>

However, the DIA assessed that Iran's reputation with the Afghan population and politicians has been damaged by recent high-profile incidents of violence against Afghan migrants in Iran. In early May, Iranian border guards apprehended and beat 57 Afghan migrant workers being smuggled into Iran, then threw them into the Harirod River along the Iran-Afghanistan border, killing between 23 and 34, according to statements made to reporters by eyewitnesses and Afghan officials investigating the incident.<sup>74</sup> The Iranian Foreign Ministry denied that the incident had taken place within Iranian territory.<sup>75</sup> However, the Afghan Foreign Ministry stated that Iran had agreed to a joint investigation of the incident.<sup>76</sup>

In early June, Tehran faced more public backlash when Iranian police opened fire on a vehicle carrying illegal Afghan migrants, killing at least three and wounding several others. The DIA reported that Iran attempted, but failed, to establish a compelling media counter-narrative while Afghans held protests in Kabul, Herat, and Helmand provinces in May and June over the treatment of Afghan migrants by Iran.<sup>77</sup>

### PAKISTAN URGES TALIBAN TO REDUCE VIOLENCE

The DoS assessed that Pakistan will continue to support the peace process in order to advance its efforts to counter Indian influence in the region and mitigate any spillover of instability from Afghanistan into its territory. Pakistan has continued to encourage the Afghan Taliban, including the Haqqani Network, to participate in peace talks and to reduce violence to avoid jeopardizing the peace process.<sup>78</sup>

Separately, Pakistan conducted a series of counterinsurgency operations within its territory against militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and ISIS elements in Pakistan. The Pakistani counterinsurgency operations limited the groups' ability to conduct operations and grow, and instead forced them to prioritize survival.<sup>79</sup>

### PARTNER FORCE DEVELOPMENT

Under the NATO-led Resolute Support mission, the United States works with 38 NATO member and partner states to train, advise, and assist the ANDSF.<sup>80</sup> This includes efforts to build the capacity of the ANA, ANA Territorial Force (ANA-TF), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Air Force (AAF), ALP, and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). It also includes efforts to build the capacity and long-term sustainability of the Afghan security ministries. The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) conducts capacity building activities at the ministerial level. The regional Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAAC) and regional task forces conduct these activities for echelons from the ANA corps and ANP provincial headquarters level and below.

### USFOR-A Restricts Advising Efforts During Pandemic

The Resolute Support commander directed a halt to most face-to-face advising efforts to mitigate the risk of transmitting COVID-19 between coalition advisors and Afghan partners, according to USFOR-A.<sup>81</sup> Advising continued through video teleconference systems, text and messaging applications, phone calls, and emails. USFOR-A reported that the virtual train, advise, and assist (TAA) efforts were effective in preventing the spread of the disease between coalition advisors and their Afghan partners. However, key partners throughout the ministries contracted the virus, which slowed the pace of organizational change and progress.<sup>82</sup>

According to USFOR-A, the COVID-19 pandemic and resultant cessation of most face-to-face advising exposed problems and capability gaps within the Afghan ministries, such as with interoperability and information sharing.<sup>83</sup> For example, USFOR-A discovered that the National Police Coordination Center struggled to use the National Information Management System—the ANDSF platform for intelligence sharing—without coalition advisors present. This created less interoperability with other ministerial-level security organizations, resulting in decreased quality of data to inform ANDSF operations.<sup>84</sup>

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**Afghan National Army commandos wait to be greeted by Afghan Minister of Defense Asadullah Khalid and Resolute Support Commander General Scott Miller in Kabul. (U.S. Army Reserve photo)**

Advisors also faced difficulty in assessing progress of TAA efforts during the quarter. CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that along with ceasing most face-to-face advising efforts, factors such as the U.S.–Taliban agreement, contested presidential election results, and regional political tensions with Iran greatly affected advisors’ abilities to assess the Afghan ministries’ performance. CSTC-A reported that it was developing a new feature in its Advisor Network (ANET) system, designed to enhance advisors’ abilities to assess, monitor, and evaluate ANDSF capabilities. Changes in NATO priorities, a change in contractors that support ANET, and the ANET contract manager’s departure from Afghanistan without replacement combined to delay development of this new feature. While ANET remains functional, CSTC-A described the system as “immature.”<sup>85</sup>

USFOR-A did not provide any unclassified responses to inquiries about assessing the ANA’s readiness to conduct operations without coalition TAA efforts. A media outlet quoted Afghan officials saying that COVID-19 infections among ANDSF ranks, and the diminished presence of coalition advisors, compounded concerns about ANDSF effectiveness.<sup>86</sup> The Afghan officials told the same media source that they estimated infection rates in their units to be from 60 to 90 percent, reducing the number of forces available to conduct operations or man outposts, although Afghan government officials disputed the accuracy of these figures.<sup>87</sup>

### **Significant Portion of ANDSF Still Assigned to Checkpoints**

For several years, USFOR-A has reported—and Lead IG reports have addressed—that the ANDSF relies too heavily on operating small checkpoints throughout the country.<sup>88</sup> While many checkpoints serve a legitimate security purpose and are necessary, the overreliance on checkpoints reduces the number of Afghan forces available to perform offensive operations. Furthermore, attacks on checkpoints are one of the leading causes of ANDSF casualties.<sup>89</sup>

CSTC-A estimated the ANDSF operated more than 10,000 checkpoints across the country, with an average of 10 to 20 personnel assigned to each.<sup>90</sup> These checkpoints typically lack dependable logistics support or officer leadership.<sup>91</sup>

This quarter, CSTC-A reported that the ANDSF made little progress in reducing the number of checkpoints throughout the country. CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that the Ministry of Interior Affairs Deputy Minister for Security stressed the importance of checkpoint reduction during weekly operations and intelligence meetings with provincial chiefs of police. However, Afghan government initiatives struggled this quarter because leaders at the local level used political pressure on the ANDSF to keep checkpoints open, as many local officials believe that checkpoints are the best protective measures against the Taliban.<sup>92</sup>

CSTC-A reported that since December 2019, the Ministry of Interior Affairs worked to address more than 400 of its most dangerous checkpoints, identifying the checkpoints for removal, reinforcement, or consolidation into more heavily fortified patrol bases if they have a tactical value.<sup>93</sup> CSTC-A stated last quarter that the Ministry of Interior Affairs had either reduced or reinforced 199 of the checkpoints that produced the most casualties.<sup>94</sup> This quarter, the Ministry of Interior Affairs has closed only 20 percent of the checkpoints on the remaining list—or roughly 43 out of the 217 it intended to address this quarter.<sup>95</sup> The ANP instead focused efforts on enforcement of curfews and movement restrictions, safeguarding food distribution, monitoring personnel, and securing transportation at the country's borders for Afghans fleeing the pandemic from other neighboring countries.<sup>96</sup>

CSTC-A reported to the DoD OIG that TAA efforts with the ANDSF continue to address concerns over checkpoints. During the quarter, the ANDSF and CTSC-A conducted joint planning that emphasized the need to reduce and reinforce checkpoints and patrol bases, after which the ANDSF published guidance for its tactical units.<sup>97</sup> However, decentralized execution of checkpoint reduction strategies remains a problem as local leaders exert influence to keep checkpoints open, contrary to national-level initiatives to close checkpoints the ANDSF considers unnecessary.<sup>98</sup>

CSTC-A stated that it measures the success of checkpoint reduction efforts based on the number of checkpoints the ANDSF removed or reinforced. CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that TAA efforts to reduce checkpoints have resulted in “marked improvement regarding checkpoint reduction or reinforcement measures.”<sup>99</sup> The DoD OIG noted, however, that the assessment did not appear to be supported by the data, indicating the ANDSF addressed a small portion of the checkpoints it intended to reduce or reinforce.

## Ministry of Defense Keeps Many Special Forces Soldiers on Checkpoints

In addition to general concerns about the ANDSF's overuse of checkpoints, a more specific concern is the extent to which the ANA tasks Afghan special forces with manning checkpoints. According to NATO Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) core tasks include conducting direct-action operations and augmenting conventional forces in urgent missions, typically less than 72-hours in duration.<sup>100</sup>

Senior Afghan officials in the ANA and Ministry of Defense rely upon the ANASOC to respond to crises because of its better training and capabilities compared to the

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conventional ANA, according to NSOCC-A. However, after ANASOC forces complete the initial mission, Afghan officials often keep the special forces in static positions or employ ANASOC forces in long-duration missions. In this manner, highly trained forces are left manning static checkpoints, making them unavailable to conduct the offensive operations for which they are trained.<sup>101</sup>

NSOCC-A reported that almost 1,900 of 19,000 ANASOC soldiers occupied static checkpoints this quarter and that the Ministry of Defense had maintained control of some of the ANASOC soldiers for more than a year. This use of ANASOC personnel in checkpoint operations hampered readiness and increased dissatisfaction and attrition.<sup>102</sup>

## **Decommissioned Afghan Local Police Members Face Uncertain Prospects**

According to CSTC-A, Afghan President Ghani issued a decree calling for the dissolution of the Afghan Local Police, a U.S.-funded local force, in mid-June.<sup>103</sup> The new ANA Territorial Force (ANA-TF) will take on much of the ALP's role, although with more oversight from the ANA, a former U.S. Army lead planner for the force said.<sup>104</sup> The decree directed eligible ALP members to transition to the ANA, ANP, or a government ministry.<sup>105</sup>

U.S. funding for the ALP through the Afghan Security Forces Fund will end on September 30, 2020. The FY 2020 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) budget request did not include funding for the ALP because of the planned ending of the ALP program, according to DoD. The ALP is currently funded with FY 2019 ASFF, which expires on September 30, 2020.<sup>106</sup>

As discussed last quarter, the Ministry of Interior Affairs plans to demobilize ALP units by district, give severance pay to members based on their estimated level of effectiveness and level of security risk, find them new employment, and collect weapons and equipment from demobilized ALP personnel.<sup>107</sup> CSTC-A reported that its advisors worked at the ministerial level to assist the Afghan government with the transition, accounting for the security situation and associated risks from the transition. However, as of the end of June, no ALP members had transitioned to the ANA, ANP, or a ministry.<sup>108</sup>

Last quarter, CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that integrating former ALP members into other elements of the ANDSF would help mitigate the possibility of demobilized ALP members joining the insurgency.<sup>109</sup> Previous Lead IG reporting raised questions on whether armed, and newly unemployed, ALP members would join the ranks of violent extremist groups or the militias of local power brokers.<sup>110</sup> Media reports suggested that some ALP members were already beginning to “switch sides” to join the Taliban, and more may continue to do so.<sup>111</sup>

It remains unclear what percentage of ALP members will qualify for other ANDSF positions and what employment opportunities the Afghan government will be able to create for demobilized ALP members—especially given Afghanistan's high unemployment, which has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>112</sup> The World Bank said in media reports that Afghanistan faces a “grim” economic outlook as the pandemic wipes out growth and the Afghan economy contracts.<sup>113</sup>

## ANA Territorial Force Expansion Pauses

President Ghani issued a decree in 2018 to create the ANA-TF, intended to be a locally recruited and enduring component of the ANA, and more accountable to ANDSF leadership than the ALP, according to USFOR-A.<sup>114</sup> This force serves as a “holding” force to allow conventional ANA units to focus on tactical offensive operations. USFOR-A told the DoD OIG this quarter that there were 99 operational company-level ANA-TF units, 1 unit in training, and 5 units in planning or recruiting stages.<sup>115</sup>

The ANA-TF Coordination Cell at Resolute Support headquarters provides oversight of the program, managing a network of primarily Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) advisors at the brigade and battalion levels.<sup>116</sup> USFOR-A reported that the ANA-TF Coordination Cell adjusted its TAA activities during the quarter to support COVID-19 mitigation measures. Although USFOR-A has prohibited face-to-face contact since February, the ANA-TF Coordination Cell continued to conduct remote TAA at the Afghan Ministry of Defense through senior advisors, and at the ANA corps level and below through coalition allies and SFAB advisors.<sup>117</sup>

According to USFOR-A, the ANA-TF did not suffer from lack of face-to-face contact because of the relationships built over the last 2 years of TAA activities.<sup>118</sup> USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that the ANA-TF Coordination Cell does not have metrics to assess the effectiveness of ANA-TF train, advise, and assist efforts.<sup>119</sup> USFOR-A assessed that the ANA-TF was unaffected by changes in TAA activities, noting that “more often than not the advisors’ recommendations are followed by ANA corps partners,” and that the ANA-TF participated in “steady state” security operations.<sup>120</sup>

Last quarter, the DoD OIG reported that General Miller paused plans to expand the ANA-TF until “ANA senior leadership and subordinate corps [commanders] address some of the programmatic and sustainment short-falls within the ANA-TF.”<sup>121</sup> This quarter, USFOR-A indicated that the shortfalls remain. USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that there is no mention of the ANA-TF in recent Ministry of Defense operations orders, which can be attributed to uncertainty within the Ministry of Defense and ANA corps over means to operationalize the ANA-TF.<sup>122</sup> USFOR-A stated that it takes time for planners and leadership to understand how to work with a new organizational component.<sup>123</sup>

## ANA Specialty School Attendance Remains Low, Capacity Decreases Further Due to COVID-19

CSTC-A reported that Basic Warrior Training attendance and graduation rates remained relatively high during the quarter. Basic Warrior Training is the initial 12-week course that all ANA recruits must complete before being assigned to an army unit. Four Basic Warrior Training courses finished during the quarter, and of the 3,645 enrolled in the 4 courses, 3,564 graduated.<sup>124</sup> The 97 percent graduation rate was similar to last quarter’s 97 percent (4,424 graduated out of 4,563 enrolled).<sup>125</sup>

While Basic Warrior Training attendance and graduation rates remained relatively high, advanced specialty training school attendance remained low. Since 2017, the ANA has experienced low attendance rates at specialty schools and a commensurate low rate of

Table 1.

**Training Utilization Rates of ANA Branch Schools**

ANA Branch School	March 2020 Attendance		March 2020 Utilization	June 2020 Attendance		June 2020 Utilization
	Capacity	Enrolled		Capacity	Enrolled	
<b>Combat Arms Schools</b>	1,075	535	50%	611	347	57%
<b>Combat Support Schools</b>	1,472	324	22%	495	174	35%
<b>Combat Service Support Schools</b>	2,440	518	21%	604	454	75%
<b>General Services Branch Schools</b>	210	6	3%	0	0	—

Source: CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 20.3 OFS - 22B, 6/29/2020.

soldiers who are proficient in their unique military occupational specialties. This was caused in part because in 2017, the ANA Chief of General Staff issued guidance that all basic training graduates be assigned immediately to their units and unit leaders then decide whether the soldiers should attend advanced training. The ANA leadership, who are more focused on immediate problems of attrition and needing soldiers for operations, do not see training for support functions, such as military police, as a high priority, according to CSTC-A.<sup>126</sup> As a result, ANA branch school attendance is low, particularly for support functions.<sup>127</sup>

This quarter, the COVID-19 pandemic provided another reason for the ANA to curtail specialty training. CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that on March 20, the Afghan Minister of Defense ordered all “non-frontline” training to be curtailed and directed reductions to the training capacity at the combat schools.<sup>128</sup> The schools reduced their training capacity to comply with the order and fill rates increased because of the reduced capacity; however, the overall number of attendees decreased (see Table 1).<sup>129</sup>

### **COVID-19 Prevents ANA and ANP from Reaching Vehicle Maintenance Goals**

CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that the COVID-19 outbreak hindered the ANDSF’s ability to maintain its ground vehicles as the ANDSF faced shortages in available supervisors and reassigned mechanics to backfill infantry positions at checkpoints.<sup>130</sup> The ANDSF has historically struggled to conduct maintenance on ground vehicles independent of contracted support personnel, but there was a decrease in the percentage of work performed by both ANA and ANP mechanics during this quarter.<sup>131</sup>

Under the 2018 National Maintenance Strategy–Ground Vehicle Support (NMS-GVS) contract, a DoD contractor provides maintenance services on ANDSF ground vehicles and trains ANDSF ground vehicle maintenance technicians. Over the 5 years of the contract, the contractors are expected to develop the capacity of ANA and ANP maintenance technicians so they can assume an increasing share of maintenance tasks. CSTC-A reported to the DoD

Table 2.

**ANA and ANP Ground Vehicle Maintenance Tasks Performed by Afghans and Contractors**

Afghan National Army							
		April 2020		May 2020		June 2020	
Maintenance Facility	Afghan	339	58%	333	31%	375	26%
	Contractor	224	42%	733	69%	1,041	74%
Off-Site	Contractor Contact Team	776		2,679		981	

Afghan National Police							
		April 2020		May 2020		June 2020	
Maintenance Facility	Afghan	57	14%	69	9%	156	9%
	Contractor	345	86%	733	91%	2,330	91%
Off-Site	Contractor Contact Team	946		2,373		1,406	

Source: CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 20.3 OFS-20A, 6/29/2020; CSTC-A, vetting comment, 8/12/2020.

OIG that the ANA should be able to perform 90 percent of maintenance tasks and the ANP 65 percent of such tasks by the end of the fifth contract year in 2023.<sup>132</sup>

As noted in Table 2, the numbers of repairs completed each month, as recorded by the NMS-GVS program, as well as the work share percentages performed by the ANDSF versus contractors, decreased from April to June.<sup>133</sup> While the ANA surpassed its goal of a 55 percent work share of ground vehicle maintenance (performing 58 percent) in April, that work share dropped to 26 percent in June.<sup>134</sup> The ANP surpassed its goal of 10 percent and performed 14 percent of its vehicle maintenance in April, but the workshare dipped to 9 percent in June.<sup>135</sup> The ANP workshare was at 23 percent last quarter.<sup>136</sup> The U.S. Army Product Manager for Allied Tactical Vehicles stated that other factors may have contributed to the decrease in workshare, such as a failure to track maintenance actions performed by the ANDSF when trainers were not present, a lack of mechanics due to COVID-19, or a lack of face-to-face interaction with the advisors.<sup>137</sup>

The contract—and associated workshare ratios—does not include tasks performed outside of maintenance facilities by contractor “contact teams.”<sup>138</sup> A contractor contact team is a group of contractors who perform maintenance outside of designated maintenance facilities. For example, a contact team may be responsible for the repair of a disabled vehicle that cannot be transported to the maintenance facility. The number of contractor contact team work orders performed on ANA vehicles is often double the number of contractor tasks performed at the maintenance centers.<sup>139</sup> According to the Product Manager for Allied Tactical Vehicles, the reported workshare also does not account for work performed without NMS-GVS oversight or input. As the ANDSF also performs maintenance independent of



**A CH-47 Chinook helicopter prepares to land in preparation for the extraction of Afghan and U.S. Soldiers. (DoD photo)**

the NMS-GVS program, the total amount of maintenance the ANDSF is performing outside of NMS-GVS is unknown.<sup>140</sup>


### **CH-47 Pilot Training Slows**

As discussed in the previous Lead IG reports on OFS, the DoD is transitioning the AAF and Special Mission Wing (SMW) from the Russian Mi-17 to U.S.-manufactured rotary-wing aircraft, ending the Afghan military's reliance on the Russian-made helicopter.<sup>141</sup> The DoD reported in its June 2020 semiannual report to Congress that the Secretary of Defense approved plans to revise procurement objectives for UH-60s and AC-208s and to provide 20 CH-47 Chinook helicopters to replace the SMW's Mi-17 fleet by the end of 2023.<sup>142</sup> The DoD will field CH-47s only to the SMW—the aviation component of the Afghan Special Security Forces—to conduct helicopter assault missions, and not to the AAF, which does not perform such missions.<sup>143</sup>

The DoD told the DoD OIG that incorporating the CH-47 into the SMW requires ensuring a sufficient quantity of qualified personnel entering the training program and synchronizing training and aircraft fielding timelines. The SMW must maintain the required combat power for ongoing operations as existing pilots undergo retraining for the CH-47. The DoD reported that the SMW has identified pilot and maintainer candidates for the CH-47 program, and these individuals were in English language training during the previous quarter.<sup>144</sup> However, the COVID-19 pandemic caused delays in English language training for pilot candidates.<sup>145</sup>

According to the DoD, it completed the purchase of all aircraft for the AAF portion of the modernization plan, as modified in December 2019. In total, the DoD purchased 53 UH-60 helicopters; 30 additional MD-530 attack helicopters; 10 AC-208 light attack aircraft; and 6 additional A-29 light air support fixed-wing aircraft. The DoD has requested \$357 million in the FY 2021 ASFF request to procure 10 of a total planned 20 CH-47s.<sup>146</sup> The DoD reported

Figure 2.  
Afghan Air Force Usable Fleet, September 2018–June 2020



that 6 more MD-530s are scheduled to be delivered by the end of calendar year 2020 and the last 3 of a total of 53 UH-60s procured since 2017 are scheduled to be delivered by the end of fiscal year 2020.<sup>147</sup>

TAAC-Air reported that the AAF had 188 aircraft in its inventory as of the end of the quarter. Of those, TAAC-Air reported that 155 aircraft were usable at the end of the quarter, an increase of 1 from the previous quarter (see Figure 2).<sup>148</sup> TAAC-Air defined a “usable” aircraft as an aircraft that is in the country and available for missions or in short-term maintenance.<sup>149</sup> There were no “Class A” incidents during the quarter, referring to events that cause a loss of life, serious injury, or more than \$1 million in damage to an aircraft.

### Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing Maintenance Capabilities Remain Static

Like the ANA and ANP, the AAF and the SMW rely on contracted logistics support to provide most required maintenance on their growing fleet. Overall, Resolute Support aviation advisers are seeking to increase Afghan maintenance capacity so that Afghans can perform an increasing share of aviation maintenance tasks, with non-Afghan contractors continuing to perform the most complex tasks.<sup>150</sup> U.S. advisors organize Afghan aircraft maintenance in three levels of increasing complexity: launch and recovery, organizational, and intermediate,

with three different skill levels within each category.<sup>151</sup> As shown in Table 3, monthly variations in the percentage of maintenance tasks performed by Afghans can be attributed to the changing composition and complexity of AAF maintenance requirements from month to month.<sup>152</sup> There was no change in maintenance capabilities compared to the previous quarter.

TAAC-Air reported that AAF mechanics were proficient at the launch and recovery level for all fixed wing and rotary wing platforms except for C-130s and UH-60s. This includes general safety, aircraft servicing, and weapons loading.<sup>153</sup> For Mi-17s, the AAF also accomplishes many portions of organizational-level scheduled and unscheduled maintenance with assistance from contracted logistics support as needed. For MD-530s, the AAF accomplishes scheduled organizational maintenance with assistance from contracted logistics support as needed.<sup>154</sup>

During the quarter, the AAF continued to experience some setbacks in A-29 maintenance capability.<sup>155</sup> TAAC-Air reported to the DoD OIG that since April 2019, AAF A-29 maintenance contract problems have created a gap in maintenance training capability.<sup>156</sup> TAAC-Air added that a training contract was awarded February 2020 and set to begin in April, however, COVID-19 restrictions delayed the start.<sup>157</sup> TAAC-Air also reported that A-29 maintenance contractors were scheduled to transition responsibility for all organizational maintenance to AAF maintainers beginning in April 2020. This transition was delayed due to TAAC-Air’s concerns about AAF maintainers’ ability to understand and comply with checklists and technical orders published in English.<sup>158</sup>

Afghan aircraft maintenance personnel have performed a greater share of maintenance on the Russian-made Mi-17 helicopter, which is being phased out. However, according to the DoD, SMW maintenance capabilities on the Mi-17 regressed during the COVID-19 outbreak. Due to safety restrictions imposed during the outbreak, contracted, non-Afghan logistics support began to conduct all Mi-17 aircraft maintenance. The DoD reported that once train, advise, and assist activities resume, the Afghan SMW personnel will require retraining and mentoring from contracted logistics support technicians, with an emphasis on troubleshooting and complex maintenance tasks.<sup>159</sup> The AAF and SMW have no capability

Table 3.

**Percentage of AAF Maintenance Capability by Aircraft Type**

	Aircraft	March 2019	June 2019	September 2019	December 2019	March 2020	June 2020
Fixed Wing	C-208	40%	20%	20%	55%	40%	40%
	AC-208	—	—	—	55%	40%	40%
	AC-29	30%	20%	20%	74%	30%	30%
Rotary Wing	Mi-17	80%	85%	85%	95%	95%	95%
	MD-530	40%	20%	20%	43%	20%	20%
	UH-60	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Source: TAAC-A, response to SIGAR request for information, 7/1/2020.

to perform required periodic overhauls of Mi-17s, which are done at contractor facilities in other countries, according to the DoD.<sup>160</sup>

Afghans still do not perform any maintenance on the UH-60 helicopters or C-130 aircraft, according to TAAC-Air, and there is no intent to transition maintenance of the small C-130 fleet to Afghan mechanics. All maintenance tasks for the C-130 and UH-60 aircraft are provided by contracted, non-Afghan logistics support. TAAC-Air reported this quarter that the first AAF UH-60 maintainers graduated AAF Aircraft Maintenance Development Center and aircraft maintenance training programs, and are awaiting integration with the workforce as COVID-19 restrictions allow.<sup>161</sup>

### **TAAC-Air Shifts Major Focus from TAA to Security Cooperation Management**

TAAC-Air reported to the DoD OIG that it reorganized and transitioned its primary mission focus from TAA to security cooperation management.<sup>162</sup> The change means that, rather than tactical training and advising, TAAC-Air will instead focus on managing a portfolio of ASFF-funded contracts for AAF aircraft procurement, aircraft maintenance, pilot and aircraft maintenance, formal training schools, and infrastructure support. TAAC-Air's remaining TAA efforts will be to develop the AAF in key functional areas, including leadership development, personnel management, pilot and aircraft maintenance training management, AAF organic aircraft maintenance, command and control, and supply distribution.<sup>163</sup>

Because of the reorganization and transition from a TAA mission to a security cooperation management mission, TAAC-Air reduced total manning by more than 90 percent since November 2019.<sup>164</sup> According to TAAC-Air, the resulting staffing levels reduced functional advisor manning to minimum levels.<sup>165</sup> TAAC-Air reported that the reorganization and staff reduction is associated with the overall force reductions in the country.<sup>166</sup>

The organizational shift away from TAA happened simultaneously with the USFOR-A pause in face-to-face advising during the pandemic. As a result, TAAC-Air reported that it halted English language training, training at the Aviation Maintenance Development Center, and UH-60 and MD-530 mission qualification training.<sup>167</sup> Out-of-country pilot and maintainer training continued, after a brief pause.<sup>168</sup>

## **DIPLOMACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS**

### **Ghani and Abdullah Resolve 2019 Election Dispute, New Government Not Yet Finalized**

According to the Afghan Independent Election Commission, former Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah was deemed the runner-up in the 2019 presidential election, behind incumbent President Ashraf Ghani.<sup>169</sup> Abdullah claimed the results were fraudulent, that the IEC applied its own procedural rules inconsistently to Ghani's benefit, and that Abdullah had in fact won the election.<sup>170</sup> In March 2020, Afghanistan witnessed two simultaneous swearing-in ceremonies for the office of President of Afghanistan being held in Kabul.<sup>171</sup>

**TAAC-Air reported to the DoD OIG that it reorganized and transitioned its primary mission focus from TAA to security cooperation management.**

In May 2020, following weeks of intense negotiation and domestic and international pressure, Ghani and Abdullah came to an agreement to resolve the dispute.<sup>172</sup> The agreement stipulates that Abdullah will no longer serve as chief executive officer of the Afghan government. Instead, he will serve as the chairman of the newly formed High Council for National Reconciliation with leadership over the peace process, and members of his supporting coalition will hold 50 percent of cabinet positions in the government. In addition, President Ghani agreed to form a High Council for Governance, through which major political leaders will advise the president.<sup>173</sup>

The agreement also stipulates that General Abdul Rashid Dostum, who is one of Abdullah's most powerful supporters but is accused of the torture and sexual assault of a political rival, would be awarded the rank of Marshal, the highest rank in the Afghan military.<sup>174</sup> In addition to the promotion, General Dostum is to receive a seat on the High Council of Governance and the National Security Council.<sup>175</sup>

As of the end of the quarter, President Ghani and Chairman Abdullah had not finalized the list of cabinet members.<sup>176</sup> However, the DoS stated that during the quarter President Ghani made several cabinet and other appointments, including to the foreign ministry, public health ministry, and central bank.<sup>177</sup> President Ghani attempted to shift three departments at the Ministry of Finance to the presidential office, but rescinded the order after major international donors, including the United States, objected because the move would reduce transparency.<sup>178</sup>

**U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo meets with Dr. Abdullah Abdullah in Kabul, Afghanistan on March 23, 2020. (DoS photo)**



## Abdullah Will Lead Peace Talks with Taliban, Manage Competing Visions of Peace Process

As chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, Abdullah is to lead “national peace process affairs,” according to reporting from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.<sup>179</sup> The council as a whole is responsible for “identifying, approving, and leading the affairs related to the peace process.”<sup>180</sup> Abdullah has focused more attention on cabinet appointments than on setting up the reconciliation council, though the United States and others continue to urge him to prioritize peace efforts.<sup>181</sup> The Ghani-Abdullah agreement states that the High Council for National Reconciliation will have a Leadership Committee and a General Assembly, and that the Afghan government Ministry of Peace will serve as the new organization’s secretariat.<sup>182</sup> According to the agreement, the Leadership Committee will be composed of political leaders and national figures.<sup>183</sup> The Ghani-Abdullah agreement also states that decisions and approvals of the High Council for National Reconciliation are “final” and that their implementation is “necessarily in compliance with the Afghan Constitution.”<sup>184</sup> President Ghani likely interprets this clause as a safeguard to ensure his 5-year term as president will not be curtailed, according to the DoS.<sup>185</sup>

According to Afghan media sources, the High Council for National Reconciliation is described in the agreement as comprising political leaders, national figures, representatives of the houses of the parliament, representatives of different political, community, and civil society layers, and women and youth.<sup>186</sup> The agreement also sets out the council as an independent budget unit within the government eligible to receive funding from international sources.<sup>187</sup>

DoS officials stated that Abdullah’s actions and comments illustrate his intention to take an inclusive, unified approach to intra-Afghan negotiations.<sup>188</sup> Abdullah has stated that his goal for the council is to represent all Afghans and their shared values.<sup>189</sup> The 21-member negotiating team representing the Afghan government in the talks will report to, and take guidance from, the Leadership Committee.<sup>190</sup>

Abdullah will have to manage competing priorities and plans among factions within Afghan society. In June, Voice of America reported that Abdullah stated publicly that he was willing to discuss an interim government with the Taliban.<sup>191</sup> However, earlier that same month, President Ghani stated that he would not step down in order to allow an interim government to be formed.<sup>192</sup> According to the DoS, President Ghani deems such a step to be unconstitutional.<sup>193</sup>

According to media reporting, Afghanistan’s political actors are contesting different visions of the peace process and their respective places within it.<sup>194</sup> Abdullah’s own political party, Jamiat-e-Islami, has broken into factions based upon the outcome of the Ghani-Abdullah agreement and differences among the party’s leadership and its approach to the peace process and who would represent the party.<sup>195</sup> Acting Jamiat-e-Islami Chairman Salahuddin Rabbani is pushing a peace plan under the auspices of the Jamiat-e-Islami party, though other prominent Jamiat-e-Islami leaders have stated Rabbani’s plan is not the party’s plan.<sup>196</sup> The political party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, former warlord and presidential candidate, has also published its own vision of how the peace process will work.<sup>197</sup> Despite the competing views, the DoS stated that there is no evidence of significant political opposition to the appointment of Abdullah to lead the High Council for National Reconciliation.<sup>198</sup>

**As chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, Abdullah is to lead “national peace process affairs,” according to reporting from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.**

## U.S. and International Community Press for Peace

During the quarter, senior DoS officials, including Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, and U.S. Embassy in Kabul Chargé d’Affaires Ross Wilson, urged Afghans and their leaders to come together to take advantage of the historic opportunity for peace.<sup>199</sup> Following the announcement of the agreement between President Ghani and Chairman Abdullah, senior DoS officials urged speedy implementation of the agreement’s provisions.<sup>200</sup> Simultaneously, the DoS urged all sides to reduce violence, and encouraged the Afghan government and the Taliban to release prisoners as a confidence-building measure.<sup>201</sup>

Also during the quarter, DoS officials worked closely with the international community to encourage all sides to take the steps necessary to move quickly and open negotiations with the Taliban.<sup>202</sup> On June 30, the UN Security Council issued a press statement welcoming the efforts of all regional and international partners in facilitating intra-Afghan negotiations, and calling for the rapid release of remaining prisoners and increased efforts to reduce violence to encourage a swift start to negotiations.<sup>203</sup>

## DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

### COVID-19 Cases Increase, USAID Reports Testing Capacity Is Insufficient




As of July 1, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that 31,836 people in Afghanistan had tested positive for COVID-19 and 774 people had died due to the outbreak, including 18 healthcare workers.<sup>204</sup> However, due to limited public health resources and testing capacity, cases and deaths are likely under-reported in Afghanistan, according to OCHA.<sup>205</sup> The USAID OIG noted that while the number of reported new cases peaked in early June and then declined, the average number of tests also declined in the last two weeks of June. Males from ages 40 to 69 accounted for more than half the COVID-19 deaths in Afghanistan.<sup>206</sup> Cases were expected to continue to rise in the coming weeks with an escalation in community transmission.<sup>207</sup> The province with the greatest number of cases was Kabul, followed by Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar, and Kandahar.<sup>208</sup> On June 6, the Afghan government announced that it was extending its nationwide lockdown until the end of August.<sup>209</sup>

The high positive test rate for Afghanistan, above 43 percent, suggested that testing is insufficient.<sup>210</sup> USAID reported that the funding it provided enabled the World Health Organization (WHO) to stand up and support the COVID-19 surveillance network and increase lab capacity.<sup>211</sup> Efforts were underway by USAID to expand testing to an average of 2,000 tests per day by the end of June, according to USAID, although it acknowledged that testing capacity is not where it needs to be.<sup>212</sup> By June 28, a total of 70,788 tests had been completed.<sup>213</sup> However, in the last week of June, an average of only 952 tests per day had been reached, according to OCHA, down from an average of 1,377 per day from mid-June.<sup>214</sup> Access to test kits and consumables, due to global shortages, has been a persistent challenge to increasing and maintaining high testing throughput, according to USAID.<sup>215</sup> Furthermore, delays in funding to the WHO has slowed accreditation of additional regional laboratories and training of additional laboratory personnel.<sup>216</sup>

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# COVID-19 OUTBREAK IN AFGHANISTAN

Density of COVID-19 Confirmed Cases by Province, as of July 2, 2020



Sources: Afghan Ministry of Public Health; ARAZI; USGS; DoS.

Hospitals reported a lack of personal protective equipment, testing kits, and medical supplies; a limited number of trained staff further impacted by some staff becoming infected; and financial limitations, according to OCHA.

## USAID Procures Ventilators for Afghanistan as Hospitals Report a Lack of Basic Equipment, Supplies, and Trained Staff

USAID is procuring 100 ventilators for Afghanistan as part of a broader U.S. Government initiative. However, limitations on Afghanistan's access to personal protective equipment, medical supplies, or trained medical staff, have prompted questions about the relative benefit of this procurement.

USAID reported that Afghanistan does not have sufficient health facilities or resources to respond to the COVID-19 outbreak.<sup>217</sup> According to USAID, a general lack of hospitals or other facilities to provide specialized care has hampered case management.<sup>218</sup> According to OCHA, hospitals reported a lack of personal protective equipment, testing kits, and medical supplies; a limited number of trained staff that was further reduced by some staff becoming infected; and financial limitations.<sup>219</sup>

While health facilities in Afghanistan continued to provide routine reproductive, maternal, and child health services and emergency services in addition to COVID-19 treatment, according to USAID, a few facilities were temporarily closed as a large proportion of healthcare staff became infected.<sup>220</sup> Healthcare workers constituted almost 5 percent of the total confirmed COVID-19 cases in Afghanistan, according to OCHA.<sup>221</sup> Improved infection prevention and control practices are needed to protect patients and healthcare workers, according to USAID.<sup>222</sup>

While many other types of interventions are available to help reduce COVID-19 transmission and address mild cases, most critically ill COVID-19 patients, according to the WHO, will require mechanical ventilation.<sup>223</sup> The Ministry of Public Health estimated that Afghanistan had only 40 to 80 invasive ventilators in the public and private sector, according to USAID, although it is difficult to determine exactly how many were present in Afghanistan due to a lack of data.<sup>224</sup>

Afghanistan initiated a ventilator facility assessment survey and while USAID did not have information on the number of ventilators, both invasive and non-invasive, that were needed, it reported that the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank were in the process of procuring non-invasive ventilators for Afghanistan.<sup>225</sup> USAID reported that it was procuring 100 invasive ventilators to be manufactured and then distributed to Afghanistan in July.<sup>226</sup>

These ventilators are part of a wider, global U.S. Government initiative to provide ventilators and related equipment to affected countries.<sup>227</sup> USAID reported that it is not selecting the countries for distribution. Instead the U.S. Government decisions concerning the selection of countries in need and number of ventilators to be distributed have been made at the White House and the National Security Council, according to the USAID COVID-19 Task Force, the internal USAID unit responsible for coordinating USAID's global COVID-19 response effort.<sup>228</sup>

Members of Congress have raised questions about the effectiveness of USAID's ventilator procurement and distribution effort and extent to which ventilators will meet the needs of receiving countries, and have called for more transparency around the decision-making process.<sup>229</sup> USAID OIG plans to conduct an audit on USAID's procurement and distribution of ventilators as part of its COVID-19 response.

## USAID Announces \$45 Million in New and Redirected Funding for COVID-19 Response but Disbursements Not Yet Completed

USAID reported that it had committed approximately \$21 million in supplemental funding for the COVID-19 response in Afghanistan by June 30, but had obligated only 36 percent of those funds and had disbursed only 1.5 percent of the funds committed.<sup>230</sup> An additional \$24 million in prior year funding was also redirected by USAID to support the response.<sup>231</sup> USAID reported \$770,000 in supplemental funding had been committed and \$10.7 million had been redirected to support the health sector.<sup>232</sup>

Supplemental funding supported the improvement of national and regional laboratories by the WHO to expand COVID-19 testing through the Disease Early Warning System (DEWS), a program that had previously supported polio surveillance for approximately 17 years.<sup>233</sup> Staff and facilities previously used to conduct disease surveillance, including polio, were redirected to monitor and test for COVID-19, although the polio surveillance activity continued to operate and identify polio cases.<sup>234</sup>

The funding for this WHO activity was obligated prior to the U.S. Government announcement of a pause on funding and termination of relations with the WHO.<sup>235</sup> USAID reported that it continued to coordinate with the WHO on DEWS activities, which it considered to be the backbone of USAID's COVID-19 response in Afghanistan.<sup>236</sup> Current funding for DEWS was expected to end in the first quarter of FY 2021; future COVID-19 surveillance would then become supported by a new USAID National Health Technical Assistance Program, according to USAID.<sup>237</sup>

Overall, the COVID-19 outbreak slowed down the implementation of some USAID activities and prompted adaptations and additional efforts in other areas.<sup>238</sup> USAID also announced supplemental funding and in some cases, the redirection of existing program funds to support the COVID-19 response in the health, gender, and education sectors, as well as infrastructure and additional humanitarian assistance. COVID-19 adjustments and adaptations played out across several programming sectors.

Health sector programs, for example, underwent several adaptations. In the Helping Mothers and Children Thrive activity, hospital support was accomplished through telemedicine (meetings by telephone).<sup>239</sup> In the Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition activity, some community-level work could not be done.<sup>240</sup> In addition to the health sector:

- **Gender:** In response to the impact of the pandemic in the gender sector, USAID redirected approximately \$314,000 to the USAID Afghan Women in the Economy Program and proposed the redirection of \$2 million for a 1-year extension to the PROMOTE/Musharikat Project.<sup>241</sup> For the Women in the Economy Program, which primarily focuses on helping Afghan women increase their leadership in the economy, USAID reported that it was exploring e-learning opportunities for up to 2,500 female healthcare workers to be trained in COVID-19 clinical care response, community testing, and as COVID-19 laboratory technicians.<sup>242</sup> Other related efforts included expanding the skills of female health workers in tele-health triage and consultation.<sup>243</sup>

USAID reported that it had committed approximately \$21 million in supplemental funding for the COVID-19 response in Afghanistan by June 30, but had obligated only 36 percent and had disbursed only 1.5 percent of the funds committed.

The PROMOTE/Musharikat project, which supports women’s civil society organizations and coalitions, was being extended to focus on gender-based violence prevention and response, and on COVID-19 prevention-related messaging to reach approximately 30,000 Afghans.<sup>244</sup>

- **Education:** In the education sector, the lockdown and closure of schools affected educational services delivery through the Afghan Children Read Project.<sup>245</sup> Shifting support to home-based learning created budget savings, according to USAID, for use in COVID-19 fund redirection.<sup>246</sup> USAID redirected \$300,000 to produce public service announcements and train 20,000 basic education teachers to communicate COVID-19 prevention messaging to 100,000 Afghans in the cities of Kabul, Nangarhar, Herat, and Laghman.<sup>247</sup> USAID also reported that it was exploring alternative education delivery systems to support students in higher education during the lockdown.<sup>248</sup>

To mitigate the longer term impact to the education system during the recovery phase, USAID stated that it had committed \$36 million for the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Education Quality Reform in Afghanistan Project.<sup>249</sup> Since this funding is intended to contribute to longer-term recovery goals, USAID reported that it did not include this amount in its publicly announced COVID-19 response package.<sup>250</sup>

- **Infrastructure:** USAID also planned to redirect \$4.6 million as a potential contribution to the UNICEF Rural Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene Program, in response to the COVID-19 outbreak.<sup>251</sup> These funds would be used to conduct surge handwashing and hygiene activities, including hygiene promotion and distribution of essential water, sanitation, and hygiene supplies in markets, communities, health facilities, schools, child care centers, internally displaced persons sites, informal settlements and urban slums, returnees from neighboring countries, and for conducting awareness campaigns.<sup>252</sup>
- **Humanitarian assistance:** USAID reported \$17.7 million in supplemental funding for water, sanitation and hygiene, health, and protection activities to support acutely vulnerable populations (including internally displaced persons).<sup>253</sup> USAID reported that this funding will also support the provision of emergency medical care, support for the mental well-being of healthcare workers, and clean water and soap for up to 300,000 people.<sup>254</sup> According to USAID, all COVID-19 humanitarian assistance funding would be obligated by July 31, 2020. Approximately \$3.4 million of this supplemental funding was designated by USAID for activities in 13 provinces in Western, Central, Southern, and Eastern Afghanistan, including the major cities of Herat, Kabul, Lashkar Gah, and Jalalabad.<sup>255</sup> Activities in Eastern Afghanistan, including Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar, and Nuristan would receive \$600,000 and activities in Western Afghanistan’s Herat and Ghor provinces would receive \$900,000 in supplemental funding.<sup>256</sup> An additional \$1.5 million of this supplemental funding will go to one USAID implementer for COVID-19 related health, nutrition and water, sanitation and hygiene activities in Balkh, Faryab and Nangarhar, according to USAID.<sup>257</sup> In addition, \$12 million in food assistance from the COVID-19 International Disaster Assistance supplemental funding was committed for vulnerable populations in Herat and Kabul cities.<sup>258</sup>

## Some USAID Implementers Suspend Support for Activities Due to the Lack of PPE

Although USAID does not track how many implementer staff have tested positive for COVID-19, USAID reported that adoption of effective infection prevention and control practices is weak in the general population and many implementer staff have been infected by the disease.<sup>259</sup> A pause on the procurement of PPE due to domestic shortages may also have contributed to delays in resources reaching implementers in the field, according to USAID.<sup>260</sup>

By the end of the quarter, USAID reported that some of its implementers had not been able to procure PPE, resulting in the suspension of some USAID activities.<sup>261</sup> Due to the COVID-19 outbreak, some USAID implementer staff worked remotely from outside of Afghanistan and expatriate staff (non-Afghans living and working for implementers in Afghanistan) have departed.<sup>262</sup> To facilitate better monitoring of projects in the new COVID-19 environment, USAID released a “Guide for Adopting Remote Monitoring Approaches During COVID-19,” on May 19, describing remote monitoring techniques and when they can be employed by Agency staff and implementers.<sup>263</sup>

**By the end of the quarter, USAID reported that some of its implementers had not been able to procure PPE, resulting in the suspension of some USAID activities.**

## Afghan-Pakistani Trade Slowly Reopens After COVID-19 Closures, but Obstacles Remain

In June, Afghanistan and Pakistan reopened cross-border trade as well as pedestrian access at key border crossings that had been closed by the COVID-19 pandemic, albeit at reduced total operating capacity.<sup>264</sup> The two largest border crossings, Torkham and Chaman, increased operating hours from 3 to 6 days a week in June while also allowing for pedestrians to traverse the border 1 day a week.<sup>265</sup> On June 22, a third border crossing located at Ghulam Khan in North Waziristan was opened for trade and business.<sup>266</sup> A Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs press statement characterized the openings as reflecting “both countries’ desire to further increase mutual trade, in view of strong fraternal ties.”<sup>267</sup>

Despite the recent progress in reopening these border crossings, Afghan businesspeople and industry officials have complained that COVID-19 mitigation measures from the Pakistan government appear to be unnecessary.<sup>268</sup> For example, Pakistan requires that all Afghan trucks be fully disinfected prior to crossing the border, a requirement that is not a World Health Organization recommendation, according to DoS.<sup>269</sup> Similarly, Afghan traders have objected to the Pakistani requirement that truck drivers be switched at the border.<sup>270</sup> According to the DoS, while these measures have impeded the flow of trucks crossing the border, Pakistani officials have acknowledged the situation and it is now improving.<sup>271</sup>

According to the DoS, since the start of COVID-19 closures, traders on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border have suffered huge losses.<sup>272</sup> Second quarter Afghan customs revenue is down by half, suggesting that trade levels have fallen by a similar amount.<sup>273</sup> Afghan traders also continue to face losses while waiting for Pakistani customs to allow the transit of empty containers into Afghanistan.<sup>274</sup> According to DoS contacts in Pakistan, the closure, and the more restrictive clearance procedures imposed by Pakistan, are driving

Afghan importers and business partners to look at alternative routes, including Iran, instead of transit through Pakistan.<sup>275</sup>

## Food Prices Initially Increased Due to Border Closures, Export Quotas, and Hoarding

USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance provided more than \$91 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan in FY 2020, as of June 12, including food assistance.<sup>276</sup> The World Food Programme (WFP), to which USAID contributes funds, reorganized food assistance distributions to incorporate physical distancing guidelines, constructed hand washing stations near cash and food distribution points, and distributed hygiene promotion materials in local languages.<sup>277</sup> USAID reported indications of hoarding and food supply disruptions due to COVID-19-related border closures, export quotas, and speculation.<sup>278</sup> Food access (as opposed to availability) remained a challenge for Afghans due to continued high prices of staple foods, declining remittances, and reduced incomes and purchasing power due to lockdowns and movement restrictions.<sup>279</sup>

Afghans expressed concerns about shortages due to panic buying, according to USAID, which led to actual shortages in some cases, and to a cycle of panic buying and further shortages, early in the pandemic.<sup>280</sup> These shortages decreased and the supply chain was functioning after some initial panic buying.<sup>281</sup> According to the WFP, almost all main food commodity prices had increased by the end of the quarter compared to March 14, pre-COVID-19 prices.<sup>282</sup> As of July 1, WFP reported significant increases in the price of wheat (13 percent); high quality rice (8 percent); low quality rice (21 percent); cooking oil (40 percent); beans, lentils, and other pulses (32 percent); and sugar (22 percent).<sup>283</sup> Elevated prices were a particular concern in urban areas, where households depended primarily or solely on markets for access to food.<sup>284</sup>

The gradual reopening of border crossings with Pakistan and the gradual lifting of wheat export quotas by Kazakhstan improved the availability of food in Afghan markets, according to USAID.<sup>285</sup> While Kazakhstan is the largest exporter of wheat to Afghanistan, it imposed global wheat export quotas in March due to domestic concerns about its own food supply and initially cancelled a 75,000 metric ton shipment of wheat to Afghanistan.<sup>286</sup> In April, Kazakhstan raised its monthly export quotas to roughly 75 percent of Kazakhstan's historical export levels and on June 1, Kazakhstan lifted its wheat export restrictions completely.<sup>287</sup> USAID reported that as a result, wheat imports were expected to return to normal levels and food prices would likely remain stable, following seasonal trends, although at above-average levels.<sup>288</sup>

## SUPPORT TO MISSION

### United States Decreases Troops in Afghanistan

The United States reduced its military force in Afghanistan to 8,600, thereby fulfilling its commitment in the February 29 agreement with the Taliban. According to the DoD, if the United States determines all conditions for further reductions have been met, the United States has committed to the withdrawal of remaining U.S. and coalition forces from Afghanistan, including from all remaining bases, within 14 months of the signing of the

agreement.<sup>289</sup> Further reductions below current levels will, however, reflect the conditions-based approach to determining Taliban compliance, assessing the overall security environment, and the commander assessing and the capabilities he needs, the DoD said.<sup>290</sup> According to USFOR-A, General Miller said that as the U.S. footprint decrease, U.S. forces will continue to support NATO, conduct TAA where needed, and retain force protection capabilities. General Miller added that the Resolute Support mission will adapt along with U.S. forces to support the Afghan peace efforts while supporting, defending, and advising the ANDSF.<sup>291</sup>

In addition to the military presence, there are approximately 550 DoD civilian employees and 25,650 contractors supporting the OFS mission in Afghanistan. Of the contractors, 9,776 are U.S. citizens, 10,163 are other-country nationals, and 5,711 are Afghan nationals.<sup>292</sup>

## USAID Non-humanitarian Assistance Funding Projected to Level Off at \$270 million in Fiscal Years 2021–2023

USAID projected that the decline of its non-humanitarian assistance funding in Afghanistan for fiscal years 2021 through 2023 will level off at \$270 million, down slightly from fiscal year 2020 (\$295 million).<sup>293</sup> Approximately \$1.78 billion remained in the funding pipeline as of June 30, down from \$1.98 billion as of March 31, according to USAID.<sup>294</sup>

## USAID Staff Reduced Further Due to COVID-19

USAID's direct hire personnel and U.S. and third-country personal service contractor staffing levels at the embassy, originally authorized at 114 and dropped to 70 U.S. direct hire personnel as a result of the August 30 posture adjustment, were further reduced to 11 staff last quarter due to the COVID-19 outbreak and related authorized departures.

These figures fell further this quarter to seven (four U.S. direct hire and three personal services contractors) because of the pandemic and authorized departures.<sup>295</sup> In addition to the 7 staff at the embassy, 32 U.S. direct hire and 31 U.S. and third-country personal services contractors continued to operate remotely in support of USAID operations in Afghanistan.<sup>296</sup> Approximately 70 percent of the 145 locally employed Afghans who support the USAID mission at the embassy are teleworking.<sup>297</sup> Those unable to work remotely lacked internet connectivity or had power issues in residential areas, according to USAID.<sup>298</sup>

## COVID-19 Spreads Among U.S. Embassy Personnel

The COVID-19 pandemic spread among the staff at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. A media outlet reported in June that at least 20 personnel, including diplomats, contractors, and locally employed staff in the U.S. Embassy in Kabul had contracted COVID-19.<sup>299</sup> The U.S. Embassy in Kabul released a public statement that it was implementing measures to mitigate the spread of the virus within the embassy, according to media reporting.<sup>300</sup>


Table 4.

### USAID Projected Non-humanitarian Assistance Funding in Afghanistan, in Millions of Dollars

<b>FY 2020 (allocation)</b>	\$295
<b>FY 2021 (request)</b>	\$270
<b>FY 2022 (projected)</b>	\$270
<b>FY 2023 (projected)</b>	\$279

Source: USAID OAPA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/29/2020.

Figure 3.  
**Personnel Supporting DoD Efforts in Afghanistan, March 2019–March 2020**



## Funding

This quarter, the DoD Comptroller released the DoD’s congressionally mandated Cost of War report, which details the DoD’s spending on overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere through December 31, 2019. According to this report, the DoD has spent \$1.58 trillion in support of contingency operations since September 11, 2001. The total cost of operations in Afghanistan over that time was \$782.7 billion, of which \$207.6 billion has been obligated in support of OFS since that operation began in 2015.<sup>301</sup>

The Comptroller reported that the DoD obligated \$10.3 billion for OFS during the first quarter of FY 2020, an increase of approximately 34 percent from the \$7.7 billion spent on OFS in the first quarter of FY 2019. Average monthly spending on OFS in the first quarter of FY 2020 was reported at \$3.4 billion. According to the DoD Comptroller, these obligations cover all expenses related to the conflicts, including war-related operational costs, support for deployed troops, and transportation of personnel and equipment.<sup>302</sup>





Afghan men ride their bikes while wearing face masks to protect themselves from COVID-19 in the city streets of Kabul. (U.S. Army Reserve photo)

# OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

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## OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

This section of the report provides information on Lead IG strategic planning efforts; completed, ongoing, and planned Lead IG and partner agencies' oversight work related to audits, inspections, and evaluations; Lead IG investigations; and Lead IG hotline activities from April 1 through June 30, 2020.

### STRATEGIC PLANNING

Pursuant to Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, the Lead IG develops and implements a joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for each overseas contingency operation. This effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed oversight, management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects. The Lead IG agencies issue an annual joint strategic plan for each operation.

### FY 2020 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan Activities

In 2015, upon designation of the DoD IG as the Lead IG for Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), the three Lead IG agencies developed and implemented a joint strategic oversight plan for comprehensive oversight of OFS. That oversight plan is updated each year.

The *FY 2020 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Operation Freedom's Sentinel*, effective October 1, 2019, organized OFS-related oversight projects into three strategic oversight areas: 1) Military Operations and Security Cooperation; 2) Governance, Humanitarian Assistance, Development, and Reconstruction; and 3) Support to Mission. The oversight plan for OFS was included in the *FY 2020 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations*.

The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group serves as a primary venue to coordinate audits, inspections, and evaluations of U.S. Government-funded activities supporting overseas contingency operations, including those relating to Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. The Joint Planning Group meets quarterly to provide a forum for information sharing and coordination of the broader federal oversight community, including the military service IGs and audit agencies, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and the OIGs from the Departments of Justice, the Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Security.

In May 2020, the Joint Planning Group held its 50th meeting, carried out virtually to accommodate participants because of coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19) limitations. Vice Admiral James Malloy, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, spoke about the Navy's role in improving security and stability in the region, particularly in the Middle East area of operations.



**FY 2020  
Comprehensive  
Oversight Plan  
for Overseas  
Contingency  
Operations**

## Lead IG Strategic Oversight Areas

### MILITARY OPERATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION

*Military Operations and Security Cooperation* focuses on determining the degree to which the contingency operation is accomplishing its security mission. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Conducting counterterrorism operations against violent extremist organizations
- Conducting unilateral and partnered counterterrorism operations
- Providing security assistance
- Training and equipping partner security forces
- Advising, assisting, and enabling partner security forces
- Advising and assisting ministry-level security officials

### GOVERNANCE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, DEVELOPMENT, AND RECONSTRUCTION

*Governance, Humanitarian Assistance, Development, and Reconstruction* focuses on some of the root causes of violent extremism. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Countering and reducing corruption, social inequality, and extremism
- Promoting inclusive and effective democracy, civil participation, and empowerment of women
- Promoting reconciliation, peaceful conflict resolution, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces, and other rule of law efforts
- Providing food, water, medical care, emergency relief, and shelter to people affected by crisis
- Assisting and protecting internally displaced persons and refugees
- Building or enhancing host-nation governance capacity
- Supporting sustainable and appropriate recovery and reconstruction activities, repairing infrastructure, removing explosive remnants of war, and reestablishing utilities and other public services
- Countering trafficking in persons and preventing sexual exploitation and abuse

### SUPPORT TO MISSION

*Support to Mission* focuses on U.S. Government administrative, logistical, and management efforts that enable military operations and non-military programs. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Ensuring the security of U.S. Government personnel and property
- Providing for the occupational health and safety of personnel
- Administering U.S. Government programs
- Managing U.S. Government grants and contracts
- Inventorying and accounting for equipment

## AUDIT, INSPECTION, AND EVALUATION ACTIVITY

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees, as well as contractors, to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and provide consolidated planning and reporting on the status of overseas contingency operations.

Some oversight staff from the Lead IG agencies are stationed in offices in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, and Germany. Oversight teams from these offices and from offices in the United States travel to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other locations in the region to conduct fieldwork for their projects.

However, the COVID-19 global pandemic continued to affect the Lead IG agencies' ability to conduct oversight on projects related to overseas contingency operations. Due to the evacuation of many deployed staff and country-imposed travel restrictions, some oversight projects by Lead IG agencies have been delayed or deferred. For some projects, the scope of the work has been revised or narrowed. The Lead IG agencies reported that their personnel were able to conduct some work while teleworking and practicing social distancing.

Despite these restrictions and limitations, the Lead IG and partner agencies completed 18 reports related to OFS during the quarter. These reports examined various activities that support OFS, including DoD oversight of contractors who provide meals and other services to deployed forces and coalition partners at Resolute Support headquarters; the Army Contracting Command–Afghanistan's management and administration of contracts in Afghanistan; the DoS's implementation of the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa program; the DoS Bureau of Counterterrorism's oversight and management of its foreign assistance programs, the DoS Global Engagement Center's management and monitoring of its Federal assistance awards, and financial accountability in humanitarian assistance programs.

As of June 30, 2020, 36 projects related to OFS were ongoing and 20 projects related to OFS were planned.

## Final Reports by Lead IG Agencies

### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

#### ***Audit of Coalition Partner Reimbursement of Dining Facility Services at Resolute Support Headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan***

DODIG-2020-096; June 24, 2020

The DoD OIG conducted an audit to determine whether the DoD sought full reimbursement from coalition partners at Resolute Support Headquarters (RSHQ) for dining facility services provided under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract.

LOGCAP is an Army program whereby contractors provide logistics support to deployed forces, including coalition partners. Coalition partners agree to receive the services on a reimbursable basis under Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) authority. U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), U.S. Army Central Command, and senior national representatives from 17 Coalition partner nations are responsible for ACSA transactions at RSHQ dining facilities.

The DoD OIG determined that USFOR-A did not seek full reimbursement for dining facility services provided to coalition partners at RSHQ. From January 2016 to September 2019, ACSA coordinators did not initiate monthly billing to coalition partners in 53 percent of instances, did not consistently initiate bills or calculate the amount owed in accordance with USFOR-A guidance, and did not establish terms and conditions with each coalition partner before dining facility services were provided to coalition partners. As a result, DoD contractors provided an estimated \$6.3 million in unbilled dining facility services to coalition partners. In addition, the DoD OIG found that USFOR-A under-billed coalition partners \$2.9 million. DoD records indicated that ACSA coordinators initiated bills for only \$4.7 million, and as of October 2019, coalition partners had reimbursed the DoD only \$880,000.

The DoD OIG made several recommendations, including that the USFOR-A Multinational Logistics Branch Chief develop agreements with each coalition partner for dining facility services at RSHQ before providing those services, and that the USFOR-A negotiate collection for past due amounts. Management agreed with the recommendations.

### ***Audit of Army Contracting Command–Afghanistan’s Award and Administration of Contracts***

DODIG-2020-094; June 18, 2020

The DoD OIG conducted this audit to determine whether Army Contracting Command–Afghanistan (ACC-A) awarded and administered contracts in accordance with applicable Federal regulations and Army Contracting Command (ACC) procedures. As of January 2020, ACC-A managed a contract portfolio valued at approximately \$20 billion.

Since 2010, the DoD OIG, the Army Audit Agency (AAA), and SIGAR, along with congressional and DoD commissions, have issued 25 reports identifying significant challenges and risks in military contracting in overseas contingency operations. The most common deficiencies identified in these reports were non-performance of contracted activities and improper payments made to contractors.

During this audit of ACC-A, the DoD OIG determined that ACC-A did not award and administer any of the 15 contracts in its sample in accordance with applicable Federal regulations and ACC procedures. In addition, ACC-A contracting officials could not always access the Army’s contract award and administration systems to perform their duties, resulting in missed deadlines for mission-critical functions.

As a result, ACC-A did not have reasonable assurance that it successfully mitigated contracting risks, such as contractor non-performance, improper payments to contractors, and mismanagement of U.S. Government property by contractors.

The DoD OIG made several recommendations to address contracting risks, including that the ACC-A Commander develop and implement a plan to improve the hiring process for civilian contracting personnel.

The ACC Commanding General disagreed with a recommendation that the ACC develop and implement a force structure or similar manpower authorization document for the ACC-A, stating that the recommendation should be directed to USFOR-A. The DoD OIG disagreed with this assessment, and revised the recommendation to clarify the responsibilities of the Commanding General to develop and implement an organizational document for ACC-A. The recommendation is unresolved and remains open.

The ACC Commanding General disagreed with a recommendation to establish a timeline for the ACC-A hiring process. Comments from the Commanding General did not address the specifics of the DoD OIG's recommendations, and the recommendation is unresolved and remains open.

Management agreed with the other recommendations.

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

### ***Review of the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program***

AUD-MERO-20-35, June 16, 2020

The FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the DoS OIG to review eight obstacles to effective protection of Afghan allies through the special immigrant visa (SIV) program. The SIV program was established to resettle Afghans who worked on behalf of the U.S. Government and who experienced ongoing and serious threats as a result of their employment with the U.S. Government.

The DoS OIG evaluated the eight obstacles identified in the NDAA. The DoS OIG found two of the eight obstacles did not significantly affect the DoS's implementation of the Afghan SIV program; one obstacle, the uncertainty of visa availability, affected implementation of the Afghan SIV program but depended on SIV allocation by Congress; and five obstacles, if not addressed, would remain impediments to implementing the Afghan SIV program and achieving the statutory goal of issuing SIVs within 9 months of receipt of a valid application. The DoS OIG found that these obstacles existed, in part, because the Senior Coordinating Official position, which was intended to oversee and direct the Afghan SIV program, had been vacant since January 2017. As a result, the DoS's management of resources and strategic planning for the Afghan SIV program were decentralized and lacked the focus needed to continuously evaluate the program and seek improvements.

The DoS OIG made six recommendations to the DoS intended to improve the SIV program. The DoS's Undersecretary for Management concurred with all six recommendations. Based on the Undersecretary for Management's comments and the actions the DoS took in response to the recommendations, including the Secretary of State designating the DoS's Undersecretary for Management as the Senior Coordinating Official for Afghan SIVs, the DoS OIG considered one recommendation closed and five recommendations resolved pending further action at the time the report was issued.

### ***Inspection of U.S. Mission to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva, Switzerland***

ISP-I-20-16; June 12, 2020

The DoS OIG inspected the executive direction, program and policy implementation, resource management, and information management operations of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva, Switzerland (Mission Geneva). Geneva is home to more than 100 UN and international organizations. The U.S. Government engages with these multilateral institutions through Mission Geneva. Among the international organizations based in Geneva are several—including the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—through which the U.S. Government directs substantial portions of its humanitarian assistance funding for migrants, refugees, and others affected by conflicts in the Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. For example, the UNHCR works in Afghanistan to protect and assist 2.5 million refugees and displaced people.

Among other things, the DoS OIG found that the Charge d’Affaires and the Acting Deputy Chief of Mission led Mission Geneva in a professional and collegial manner; Mission Geneva and the DoS’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs did not have shared procedures for promoting and tracking U.S. citizen employment at Geneva-based UN and other international organizations; Mission Geneva had deficiencies in its procurement program, including unauthorized commitments and poor contract administration; and while Mission Geneva’s Information Management Office met customer needs, the Mission did not always carry out information security responsibilities, putting the DoS’s information systems at risk of compromise.

The DoS OIG made 20 recommendations—18 to Mission Geneva, 1 to the DoS Bureau of International Organization Affairs, and 1 to the DoS Bureau of Global Talent Management—to address the shortcomings identified in the report. Management agreed with the recommendations.

The DoS OIG also completed a classified annex to this report after the quarter ended, which was distributed to authorized recipients.

### ***Management Assistance Report: Quarterly Reporting Involving the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program Needs Improvement to Fully Comply with Congressional Requirements***

AUD-MERO-20-34; June 8, 2020

During the course of the DoS OIG’s inspection of the of the Afghan SIV program—the results of which are described in more detail above—the DoS OIG issued a management assistance report to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul to prompt actions to address identified deficiencies. Specifically, the DoS OIG found that the method for collecting, verifying, and reporting on applicant wait times was inconsistent and potentially flawed.

A provision of the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required the DoS and the Department of Homeland Security to publish quarterly reports that describe the average wait times for an SIV applicant through four stages of visa application and issuance.

The DoS OIG found that the DoS and the Department of Homeland Security were using different methodologies to perform their calculations. Moreover, the DoS OIG found that none of the 23 quarterly reports published between April 2014 and October 2019 contained descriptions of necessary efficiency improvements, a piece of information required by the FY 2014 NDAA. The DoS OIG determined that the different methodologies and incomplete reports occurred because the DoS, having assumed the lead role in preparing the reports, had not developed guidance that would ensure that each entity involved in the Afghan SIV process was using a uniform and consistent method to calculate and report the average wait times. Similarly, the DoS OIG determined that the DoS had not established internal controls to ensure that the information in the quarterly reports contained all required pieces of information.

The DoS OIG made three recommendations to the DoS Bureau of Consular Affairs to address the deficiencies identified. The Bureau of Consular Affairs concurred with all three recommendations and the DoS OIG considered all three recommendations resolved pending further action at the time the report was issued.

### ***Inspection of the Bureau of Counterterrorism's Foreign Assistance Program Management***

ISP-I-20-14; June 1, 2020

This report was among three issued based on an inspection of the DoS Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT Bureau), which is discussed below (Inspection of the Bureau of Counterterrorism; ISP-I-20-13).

During the DoS OIG's inspection of the CT Bureau, the DoS OIG inspected the CT Bureau's management of its foreign assistance program. The CT Bureau leads the DoS's efforts on international counterterrorism strategy, policy, and operations. The CT Bureau advances its efforts, in part, through its foreign assistance programs, which also aim to strengthen partner countries' capabilities to help achieve U.S. counterterrorism policy goals and objectives. The CT Bureau managed more than \$384 million in foreign assistance funds during FY 2018. Among the interagency agreements and Federal assistance awards the DoS OIG reviewed was the nearly \$1.5 million Afghanistan Counterterrorism Finance project awarded to the U.S. Department of Justice.

The DoS OIG determined that the CT Bureau's monitoring and evaluation framework did not fully comply with DoS standards because the CT Bureau had yet to develop performance management plans for 13 of its 15 major programs; the CT Bureau relied on third-party contractors to help with foreign assistance program oversight, and these contractors inappropriately performed inherently governmental functions in some instances; Federal assistance award files did not always include documentation to show whether a recipient performed the award in accordance with the statement of work; and the CT Bureau returned \$51.9 million in expired and canceled funds from FYs 2016 to 2019, partly as a result of weaknesses in its oversight and management of foreign assistance awards.

The DoS OIG made seven recommendations to the CT Bureau to resolve the management weaknesses and gaps identified during the inspection. Management agreed with the recommendations.

The third report associated with this inspection was a classified annex distributed to authorized recipients on May 4, 2020.

### ***Inspection of the Bureau of Counterterrorism***

ISP-I-20-13; May 7, 2020

The DoS OIG inspected the DoS CT Bureau's executive direction, policy and program management, administrative operations, and information management and information security activities. The CT Bureau leads the DoS's efforts on international counterterrorism strategy, policy, and operations. The CT Bureau is responsible for a complex set of policies and programs ranging from international information sharing to foreign assistance programs, including in Afghanistan. The CT Bureau's policy mandate includes areas such as terrorist detention and repatriation, countering violent extremism, and management of aspects of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

This report is a companion report to the DoS OIG Inspection of the Bureau of Counterterrorism's Foreign Assistance Program Management (ISP-I20-14, discussed above). The DoS OIG determined that the CT Bureau established effective internal policy coordination and communication processes; the head of the CT Bureau spearheaded interagency efforts to increase the pace and number of terrorist designations in 2018, which resulted in more than 50 designation packages being completed; employees from other DoS bureaus and Federal agencies expressed differing opinions about the CT Bureau's effectiveness in promoting its policy goals in interagency processes; the CT Bureau did not provide sufficient policy guidance, training, and administrative support to overseas employees who are responsible for coordinating and reporting on regional counterterrorism issues; and the CT Bureau's statutorily mandated annual Country Reports on Terrorism—the CT Bureau's flagship product, on which Congress, the media, and the public rely as an authoritative statement of terrorist incidents worldwide—were submitted late in seven of eight instances reviewed during the inspection.

The DoS OIG made 11 recommendations to the CT Bureau to address the deficiencies identified in the report. Management agreed with the recommendations.

### ***Audit of Global Engagement Center Federal Assistance Award Management and Monitoring***

AUD-MERO-20-26; April 22, 2020

The DoS OIG conducted this audit to determine whether Federal assistance awards provided by the DoS Global Engagement Center (GEC) aligned with the GEC's statutory mandate and authority and whether the GEC monitored those awards in accordance with Federal requirements, DoS policies and guidance, and the terms and conditions of each award. The NDAA for FY 2017 mandated that the GEC "lead, synchronize, and coordinate efforts of the U.S. Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining United States national security

interests.” GEC counter-disinformation efforts relate to state actors including Russia, China, and Iran, and non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda.

The DoS OIG reviewed all 39 grants and cooperative agreements that the GEC awarded in FY 2018 and found that the stated purpose of 38 of 39 awards aligned with the GEC’s statutory mandate and authority. However, the DoS OIG selected 10 of the 39 awards for detailed testing and found that the GEC did not consistently manage and monitor those awards in accordance with Federal requirements, DoS policies and guidance, and award terms and conditions. Specifically, the DoS OIG found that GEC officials did not always clearly designate roles and responsibilities for grants management personnel; 3 of 10 risk assessments for the selected awards contained errors; and 9 of 10 monitoring and evaluation plans for the selected awards did not include all required elements and did not demonstrate a direct link to the award’s scope of work. Moreover, the DoS OIG found that GEC officials did not review award recipients’ performance reports. The DoS OIG determined that these deficiencies occurred, in part, because the GEC did not have enough experienced personnel to issue, manage, and monitor cooperative agreements when the FY 2018 awards were issued, and the GEC had not formally adopted internal policies, processes, and procedures for managing and monitoring Federal assistance awards.

The DoS OIG made five recommendations to the GEC that were intended to improve the GEC’s administration of Federal assistance awards. Management agreed with the recommendations.

## **U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

### ***USAID Needs to Improve Policy and Processes to Better Protect Information Accessed on Personal Devices***

A-000-20-006-P; June 19, 2020

USAID OIG conducted this audit to determine whether USAID implemented key internal controls to protect information available in the external cloud when accessed through staff’s personal devices. The internal controls under review are based on controls recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Services Advisory Group, and the Federal Chief Information Officers Council.

USAID staff—including those serving at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul—rely on both the agency’s internal computing systems and external cloud computing systems to conduct their daily business. USAID OIG found that USAID had implemented some internal controls to address the risk of information security breaches. For instance, USAID required staff to take training on protecting sensitive information and having users sign an agreement of conduct. USAID also required staff to use an agency-issued electronic secure authentication device when accessing the external cloud on personal devices. However, USAID OIG concluded that there were significant gaps in USAID’s policies on the use of personal devices, and that these gaps presented an increased risk of security breaches to the external cloud and the information contained within the cloud.

USAID OIG made four recommendations to USAID’s Chief Information Officer to address the gaps in internal controls identified in the audit. On the basis of the responses USAID provided, USAID OIG considers three of the recommendations closed, and one of them resolved but open pending completion of planned activities.

### USAID COMPLETED FINANCIAL AUDITS

USAID OIG issued six financial audits reports on USAID’s Afghanistan program this quarter. The financial audits covered \$106,639,615 in program funds and found a total of \$1,297,275 in questioned costs. In total, the audits identified six instances of material noncompliance, and two instances of material internal control weaknesses.

Table 5 lists the released report title and report number.

Table 5.

#### USAID OIG Financial Audit Reports Issued this Quarter

Report	Release Date
<b>U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</b>	
<i>Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of Management Systems International, Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency Project, Task Order 306-AID-306-H-17-00003, August 23, 2017 to September 30, 2018</i> 8-306-20-039-N	June 29, 2020
<i>Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of The Asia Foundation Under Multiple Awards in Afghanistan, 2017-2018</i> 8-306-20-037-N	June 29, 2020
<i>Financial Audit of USAID Resources Managed by Norwegian Refugee Council in Multiple Countries Under Multiple Awards, January 1 to December 31, 2018</i> 4-000-20-084-R	June 26, 2020
<i>Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of the American University of Afghanistan, Support to the American University of Afghanistan Project, Cooperative Agreement AID-306-A-13-00004, August 1, 2015 to June 30, 2019</i> 8-306-20-034-N	June 25, 2020
<i>Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of DT Global, Inc., Strengthening Watershed and Irrigation Management Program in Afghanistan, Contract AID-306-C-17-00001, October 1, 2018 to September 30, 2019</i> 8-306-20-036-N	June 25, 2020
<i>Closeout Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., Services under Program and Project Offices for Results Tracking (SUPPORT II) Program in Afghanistan, Contract AID-306-C-12-00012, April 1, 2018 to July 4, 2019</i> 8-306-20-027-N	May 21, 2020

## Final Reports by Partner Agencies

### ARMY AUDIT AGENCY

#### ***Reachback Contracting Support***

A-2020-0043-BOZ; April 1, 2020

The AAA conducted this audit to determine whether the Army has an effective plan, procedures, and organizational structure in place to directly provide contracting support during contingency and expeditionary operations.

In military contracting, reachback is the process of obtaining products, services, and applications; forces; equipment; or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. This support allows contracting offices in the United States to assist deployed contracting offices during expeditionary and contingency operations such as OFS. The audit included work conducted at the Army Contracting Command–Afghanistan, which provides operational contracting support for USFOR-A and the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A).

The AAA determined that the Army had only limited plans and procedures to establish a well-defined way to provide reachback support for expeditionary contracting. For example, the Army did not have full visibility over all reachback support provided by U.S.-based contracting offices. Further, the AAA determined that the Army needed controls and other capabilities to oversee the use of reachback support.

As a result, the AAA found that the Army did not have effective visibility and oversight of reachback support efforts. Without a more structured and formal program, the AAA determined that the Army may not be able to maximize the benefits of using reachback support, to include minimizing the risk of contracts not meeting operating needs in future contingency and expeditionary operations.

The AAA made three recommendations in the report: one recommendation to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology to require an automated information system to identify reachback contracts that support expeditionary contracting operations; and two recommendations to the ACC Commanding General to include the use of reachback contracting support in future operating plans and to establish plans and procedures to enable better visibility over reachback support for expeditionary requirements. Management agreed with the recommendations.

### GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

#### ***Security Force Assistance: Army Has Made Progress Developing New Advisor Brigades, but Actions Are Needed to Better Equip and Train Them for Future Deployments***

GAO-20-226SU; June 5, 2020

The GAO conducted this audit to determine whether the DoD, in conjunction with NATO, had defined advisor team missions, goals, and objectives; and whether advisors were trained and equipped for their specific missions in Afghanistan. The audit also examined the ability of the Army's Security Force Assistance Brigade to meet current and future advisor requirements in

Afghanistan and elsewhere; and the adjustments, if any, being made to the manning, training equipping, and deployment of the second and third Security Force Assistance Brigades. The GAO issued the report as for official use only to Congress and relevant federal agencies, and did not issue a publicly releasable report.

## **SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION**

### ***Afghan National Army and Train Advise Assist Command–Air Joint Air Force Hangar I Complex: Construction and Renovation Generally Met Requirements and Standards***

SIGAR 20-38; May 28, 2020

SIGAR inspected the demolition and construction of an Afghan National Army (ANA) and Train Advise Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air) Joint Air Force (JAF) hangar to determine whether the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards and whether the hangar is being used and maintained properly.

In 2014, the Taliban fired several rockets at the military section of North Kabul International Airport, hitting a storage hangar for the ANA and TAAC-Air. The attack resulted in extensive damage to the hangar and an attached building. Due to its importance as an inspection and maintenance facility for ANA aircraft, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in 2016 awarded a roughly \$2.5 million contract to an Afghan company to demolish the damaged hangar and build a new one at the same location. The contract also included other renovations. The contract’s value eventually increased to \$2.9 million. The work ended in June 2019, and USACE transferred the facilities to CSTC-A, which had requested and funded the project. CSTC-A transferred the facilities to the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) on September 23, 2019.

SIGAR found that the ANA TAAC-Air JAF hangar complex work performed generally met contract requirements and applicable standards. For example, the contractor demolished the existing hangar and replaced it with a new one and painted the walls and replaced the ceilings in the attached building. However, the contractor finished the project about 14 months later than initially scheduled, and SIGAR noted six deficiencies resulting from the contractor’s non-compliance with the contract that raised concerns about the quality of the work at the complex. Among the deficiencies SIGAR identified were non-functional exterior lights and several holes that needed to be patched in the exterior wall of a room on the lower floor.

During visits to the complex, SIGAR identified concerns regarding whether the complex was being operated and maintained to allow it to function as intended. In addition, SIGAR noted that the ANA did not have operation and maintenance manuals in Dari as required in the contract. USACE is withholding almost \$110,393 in payments until the contractor corrects all identified deficiencies.

SIGAR made several recommendations to USACE and CSTC-A to ensure that the complex meets all contract requirements and construction standards. The recommendations included ensuring that the MoD and the ANA performed appropriate operations and maintenance during the warranty period. USACE did not concur with a recommendation to continue to withhold payments until the contractor corrects all identified deficiencies. The recommendation remains open.

## Ongoing Oversight Activities

As of June 30, 2020, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 36 ongoing projects related to OFS. Figure 3 describes the ongoing projects by strategic oversight area.

Tables 6 and 7, contained in Appendix C, list the title and objective for each of these projects. Appendix C also identifies ongoing projects that the DoD OIG suspended due to COVID-19; those projects will restart when the DoD OIG resumes normal operations. The following sections highlight some of these ongoing projects by strategic oversight area.

### MILITARY OPERATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION

- The **DoD OIG** is evaluating target development and prosecution processes and civilian casualty evaluation and reporting procedures to determine if there are accurate accounts of potential civilian casualties resulting from OFS airstrikes.
- The **GAO** is conducting an audit to determine the extent to which the DoD has modified its approach for U.S. military personnel to advise and assist partner forces based on lessons learned.
- **SIGAR** is conducting an audit to determine to what extent the DoD and its contractors have conducted the required oversight of the ScanEagle unmanned aircraft systems contracts.


### GOVERNANCE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, DEVELOPMENT, AND RECONSTRUCTION

- **SIGAR** is inspecting the Afghan National Army's s Northeastern Electrical Interconnect Power System in Pul-e-Khumri, and inspecting the Women's Compound at the Afghan National Police Regional Training Center in Herat.

### SUPPORT TO MISSION

- The **DoD OIG** is conducting an audit to determine whether the military services properly stored, tracked, and safeguarded pharmaceuticals at their overseas locations supporting overseas contingency operations.
- The **DoS OIG** is conducting an audit to determine whether the DoS considered established procedures, guidance, and best practices to adjust the size and composition of Missions Afghanistan and Iraq.
- **USAID OIG** is conducting an audit of USAID's risk management and project prioritization in Afghanistan to determine the extent to which USAID applied risk management principles in selecting staff positions and programs for reduction in Afghanistan.
- **USAID OIG** is conducting an audit to determine the extent to which USAID used the USAID Multi-Tiered Monitoring Strategy for Afghanistan to manage projects.

Figure 3.  
Ongoing Projects by Strategic Oversight Area



## Planned Oversight Projects

As of June 30, 2020, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 20 planned projects related to OFS. Figure 4 describes the planned projects by strategic oversight area.

Tables 8 and 8, contained in Appendix D, list the title and objective for each of these projects. The following highlights some of these planned projects by strategic oversight area.

### MILITARY OPERATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION

- The **DoD OIG** intends to evaluate whether Theater Support Activity’s tactical signals intelligence processing is sufficient to satisfy priority intelligence requirements.
- **SIGAR** intends to conduct an audit to determine the extent to which the DoD’s use of appropriated funds have promoted recruitment and retention of women in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.

### GOVERNANCE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, DEVELOPMENT, AND RECONSTRUCTION

- The **DoD OIG** intends to evaluate whether USCENTCOM screened, documented, and tracked DoD service members suspected of sustaining a traumatic brain injury were given adequate attention and care before returning to duty.
- **SIGAR** intends to review DoD gender advising programs for the MoD and Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoI).
- **SIGAR** intends to conduct an audit to determine whether the DoD and the MoI have developed and implemented policies and procedures to account for vehicles purchased with U.S. funds

Figure 4.

#### Planned Projects by Strategic Oversight Area



### SUPPORT TO MISSION

- The **DoD OIG** intends to conduct an audit to determine whether the DoD Military Services and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service accurately calculated hazard pay and other supplemental pay rates for combat zone deployments.
- The **DoS OIG** intends to conduct an audit to determine the extent to which DoS oversight of grants complied with Federal regulations and DoS guidance.
- **SIGAR** intends to conduct a follow-up audit of the Afghan National Police personnel and payroll systems.

## INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINE ACTIVITY

### Investigations

The investigative components of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies continued to conduct criminal investigations related to OFS during the quarter. The Lead IG agencies use criminal investigators forward deployed to the region, as well as criminal investigators in the United States, to investigate OFS-related fraud and corruption. The Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), the criminal investigative component of the DoD OIG, has an office at Bagram Airfield and in Kabul within the NATO Resolute Support compound. The DoS OIG has two auditors assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, and also maintains an office in Frankfurt, Germany, from which investigators travel to Afghanistan. DoS OIG investigators in Washington also travel to Afghanistan as necessary. USAID OIG's Afghanistan office consists of two Foreign Service criminal investigators and two Foreign Service national investigators located in Kabul, along with one investigative analyst based in Washington, D.C.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, DCIS has temporarily removed investigative personnel from Afghanistan. However, DCIS personnel in Kuwait have been able to work cases related to OFS. DoS OIG and USAID OIG investigators based in Frankfurt have been teleworking from their residences.

In addition, these investigative components continue to investigate “legacy” cases pertaining to actions committed during Operation Enduring Freedom, which concluded in December 2014.

### INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY RELATED TO OFS

During the quarter, Lead IG investigations resulted in five criminal debarments related to a fraud investigation. Those actions are discussed below.

The investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies closed 10 investigations, initiated 5 new investigations, and coordinated on 92 open investigations. The open investigations involve grant and procurement fraud, corruption, theft, computer intrusions, and human trafficking allegations.

This quarter, the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group conducted 2 fraud awareness briefings for 92 participants. The dashboard on the opposite page depicts activities of the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group.


### Five Debarred for Fraud Scheme

On April 13, 2020, the U.S. Air Force Office of the Deputy Counsel, Contractor Responsibility and Conflict Resolution debarred one person, along with four companies, from doing business with the U.S. Government based on a Food and Drug Administration Office of Criminal Investigations (FDA OCI) investigation into fraud allegations.

The investigation disclosed that the chairman of the Dubai-based Uniworld Group, Byramji Javat, told U.S. manufacturers that he was a pharmaceutical supplier for the DoD. Javat sought deep discounts from the manufacturers by claiming that the goods were supporting

# ACTIVITY BY FRAUD AND CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIVE WORKING GROUP

OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL  
As of June 30, 2020



OPEN INVESTIGATIONS\*  
**92**

## Q3 FY 2020 ACTIVITY

Cases Opened	5
Cases Closed	10


## Q3 FY 2020 BRIEFINGS

Briefings Held	2
Briefing Attendees	92


## Q3 FY 2020 RESULTS

Arrests	—
Criminal Charges	—
Criminal Convictions	—
Fines/Recoveries	—
Debarments	5
Personnel Actions	—
Contract Terminations	—


## OPEN INVESTIGATIONS BY WORKING GROUP MEMBER\*



## SOURCES OF ALLEGATIONS



## PRIMARY OFFENSE LOCATIONS (PROVINCES)



\* Some investigations are joint with more than one agency and some not joint with any other agency. Therefore, the total number of Joint Open Cases may not equal the total number of Open Cases. Open Cases as of 6/30/2020.

U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Instead, Javat diverted the supplies from Afghanistan and sold the deeply discounted products in the United States at a significant profit.

Javat was a DoD contractor and owned several companies, including in Afghanistan, and he had received numerous contracts awarded by the U.S. Air Force from 2013 to 2017. As a result of the FDA OCI investigation, Javat pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in August 19, 2019. On December 16, 2019, Javat was sentenced to 10 years in prison. In January 2020, DCIS presented the case to U.S. Air Force officials for debarment to ensure Javat and associated contractors would not be able to obtain DoD contracts overseas, including those supporting OFS.

As a result of the actions taken during this quarter, Javat, and business entities Proton Contracting, Proton Afghanistan, Uniworld FZE, and Uniworld Afghanistan, were all debarred for 3 years.

**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY RELATED TO LEGACY CASES**


The Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies have 30 ongoing “legacy” cases involving the OFS area of operation that occurred prior to the designation of OFS as an overseas contingency operation.

**Hotline**

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority. The DoD OIG has an investigator to coordinate the hotline contacts among the Lead IG agencies and others, as appropriate. During the quarter, the DoD OIG investigator referred 36 cases to Lead IG agencies and other investigative organizations.

As noted in Figure 5, the majority of the cases opened during the reporting period were related to personal misconduct, reprisal, criminal allegations, and personnel matters.

Figure 5.  
**Hotline Activities**









A U.S. Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt II is refueled over Afghanistan by a U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker. (U.S. Air Force photo)

# APPENDICES

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## APPENDIX A

# Classified Appendix to this Report

This report normally includes a classified appendix that provides additional information on Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). Due to the coronavirus disease–2019 pandemic, the Lead IG agencies did not prepare a classified appendix this quarter.

## APPENDIX B

# Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Quarterly Report

This report complies with sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, which requires that the designated Lead Inspector General (IG) provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on an overseas contingency operation. The Chair of the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) designated the Department of Defense (DoD) IG as the Lead IG for OFS. The Department of State (DoS) IG is the Associate Lead IG for the operation.

This report contains information from the three Lead IG agencies—DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG), DoS OIG, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) OIG—as well as from partner oversight agencies. This report covers the period from April 1 through June 30, 2020.

To fulfill its congressional mandate to produce a quarterly report on OFS, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, and evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or requests for information to Federal agencies.

### INFORMATION COLLECTION

Each quarter, the Lead IG agencies gather information from the DoD, DoS, USAID, and other Federal agencies about their programs and operations related to OFS. The Lead IG agencies use the information provided by their respective agencies for quarterly reporting and oversight planning.

### OPEN-SOURCE RESEARCH

This report also draws on the most current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report include the following:

- Congressional testimony
- Press conferences and official U.S. Government briefings
- United Nations reports
- Reports issued by nongovernmental organizations and think tanks
- Media reports

Materials collected through open-source research provide information to describe the status of the operation and help the Lead IG agencies assess information provided in their agency information collection process.

## REPORT PRODUCTION

The DoD OIG, as the Lead IG, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG draft the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies. The Lead IG agencies then provide those offices that provided information with opportunities to verify and comment on the content of the report.

Each OIG coordinates the review process with its own agency. During the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask their agencies to correct inaccuracies and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG agencies incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review. Each Lead IG agency participates in reviewing and editing the entire quarterly report.

## APPENDIX C

# Ongoing OFS Oversight Projects

Tables 6 and 7 list the title and objective for Lead IG and partner agencies' ongoing oversight projects related to OFS.

Table 6.

### Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OFS by Lead IG Agency, as of June 30, 2020

#### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

##### ***Audit of the Core Inventory Management System Implementation***

To determine whether the DoD's implementation of the Core Inventory Management System improved weapons and vehicle accountability.

##### ***Audit of Management of Pharmaceutical Inventories in Support of Overseas Contingency Operations***

To determine whether the military services properly stored, tracked, and safeguarded pharmaceuticals at their overseas locations supporting overseas contingency operations.

##### ***Evaluation of DoD Processes to Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices***

To evaluate the process to counter improvised explosive devices by using tactical jammers.

##### ***Audit of the U.S. Air Force's Contract for Maintenance of the RQ-4 Global Hawk***

To determine whether the U.S. Air Force monitored the RQ-4 Global Hawk maintenance contract to ensure the contractor provided proper maintenance.

##### ***Evaluation of U.S. Central Command's Kinetic Targeting Processes and Reporting Procedures***

To evaluate U.S. Central Command's target development and prosecution processes, as well as post-strike collateral damage and civilian casualty assessment activities.

*\*Suspended due to coronavirus disease 2019. Project will restart when the DoD OIG resumes normal operations.*

##### ***Evaluation of Tactical Signals Intelligence Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination Support to Operation Inherent Resolve and Operation Freedom's Sentinel***

To determine whether Theater Support Activity's Tactical Signals Intelligence Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination support is sufficient to satisfy OIR and OFS priority intelligence requirements.

*\*Suspended due to coronavirus disease 2019. Project will restart when the DoD OIG resumes normal operations.*

***Evaluation of Combatant Command Counter Threat Finance Activities in Support of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. European Command Priorities***

To determine whether U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command are planning and executing counter threat finance activities to impact adversaries' ability to use financial networks to negatively affect U.S. interests.

*\*Suspended due to coronavirus disease 2019. Project will restart when the DoD OIG resumes normal operations.*

***Evaluation of U.S. Special Operations Command Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center***

To determine whether U.S. Special Operations Command's Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center provides U.S. combatant commanders the increased capability to conduct Internet-based information operations globally.

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

***Audit of the Staffing Review Processes for U.S. Mission Iraq and U.S. Mission Afghanistan***

To determine whether the DoS used established procedures, guidance, and best practices in its approach to adjust the size and composition of Missions Afghanistan and Iraq and has aligned resources invested at these missions with established U.S. Government foreign policy priorities.

***Audit of Department of State's Risk Assessments and Monitoring of Voluntary Contributions to International Organizations***

To determine whether DoS policies, processes, and guidance for voluntary contributions ensure that 1) risks are identified, assessed, and responded to before providing funds to public international organizations and 2) funds are monitored to achieve award objectives.

***Audit of Food Service Support under the Afghanistan Life Support Services Contract***

To determine whether the DoS is administering the food services task order under the Afghanistan Life Support Services contract in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and whether the contractors are complying with contract terms and conditions.

***Audit of Department of State's Post Security Program Review Process***

To determine whether the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security manages the Post Security Program Review process in accordance with DoS policies and guidelines.

***Inspection of U.S. Mission to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva, Switzerland —Classified Annex***

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva.

**U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

***Audit of USAID's Self-Reliance Initiative***

To determine whether USAID's self-reliance metrics have been incorporated into its development programming strategy; and to identify what challenges USAID faces in implementing development activities as envisioned under the Journey to Self-Reliance Initiative.

***Audit of USAID's Initiative Against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse***

To determine whether USAID took action to prevent and detect sexual exploitation and abuse; and the effectiveness of USAID's process for responding to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

***Audit of USAID's Risk Management and Project Prioritization in Afghanistan***

To determine whether USAID applied risk management in selecting staff positions and programs for reduction in Afghanistan.

**Audit of USAID's Contract Termination Practices**

To assess USAID's procedures guiding acquisition award terminations, and whether selected acquisition awards were terminated in accordance with established requirements.

**Audit of USAID Compliance with the Senator Paul Simon Water for the World Act of 2014**

To determine whether USAID designated high priority countries and allocated water access, sanitation, and hygiene funding based on the Senator Paul Simon Water for the World Act of 2014.

Table 7.

**Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OFS by Lead IG Partner Agency, as of June 30, 2020****GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE****Budget Justification Review: DoD's Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Execution Trends**

To evaluate execution trends of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund since the fund's inception in 2005.

**SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION****Audit of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan's Use of Conditionality**

To examine Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan's use and enforcement of conditionality to improve accountability and transparency in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.

**Department of Defense's Construction of Infrastructure for Women in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces**

To identify DoD projects to build infrastructure supporting women in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and determine how these projects were selected; assess the extent to which the DoD measured the success of these projects; and assess the extent to which facilities are being used for their intended purposes.

**Department of Defense's Efforts to Train and Equip the Afghan National Army with ScanEagle Unmanned Aircraft Systems**

To assess whether the DoD and its contractors conducted the required oversight of the ScanEagle unmanned aircraft systems contracts; achieved their stated objectives; addressed implementation challenges; and enabled the Afghan National Army to operate and sustain the ScanEagle unmanned aircraft systems.

**Department of Defense's End-Use Monitoring Efforts for Defense Articles Provided to the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces**

To determine whether the DoD has, since FY 2017, implemented an end-use monitoring program in Afghanistan in accordance with applicable laws and regulations; conducted required routine and enhanced end-use monitoring of items provided to the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces; and investigated and reported potential end-use violations.

**Inspection of the Afghan National Army's Northeastern Electrical Interconnect Power System in Pul-e-Khumri**

To assess whether construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and the power system is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police Northern Electrical Interconnect Expansion Project in Kunduz**

To determine whether the design and construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and the resulting product is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of the Afghan National Army's Northeastern Electrical Interconnect Power System in Dashti Shadian**

To inspect the Naiabad substation expansion and the construction of the new substation at Camp Shaheen. Specifically, to assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the power system is being used and maintained properly.

**Inspection of Afghan National Army Ministry of Defense Headquarters Infrastructure & Security Improvements**

To assess whether the design and construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and the project is being used and maintained.

**Inspection of the Afghan National Army Ministry of Interior Headquarters Infrastructure and Security Improvements Project in Kabul**

To determine whether construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications, and the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**U.S. Government Counter Threat Finance Efforts Against the Afghan Terrorist and Insurgent Narcotics Trade**

To review the DoD's, the DoS's, the Department of Justice's, and the Department of the Treasury's counter threat financing efforts and funding in Afghanistan since 2017.

**Department of Defense's Effort to Develop a Professional Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing**

To examine the extent to which the DoD ensures that the Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing recruit, train, and retain qualified personnel needed to operate and maintain the aircraft currently in and expected to be added to their fleets; and the Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing modernization plan addresses validated capability gaps.

**U.S. Accountability for Fuel Provisions to the Government of Afghanistan's Ministries of Defense and Interior Affairs**

To determine the extent to which the DoD has, since April 2018, acted upon SIGAR recommendations to review and assess fuel accountability, including coordinating with the Ministries of Defense and Interior Affairs; and planned to ensure accountability and oversight for Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces fuel provisions in the future.

**Inspection of the Afghan National Army's Kabul National Military Hospital Elevator System Replacement**

To assess whether the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and the elevator system is being used and properly maintained.

**Vanquish Worldwide's National Afghan Trucking Contracts**

To assess the U.S. Army's oversight and management of contractor payments for the U.S. Army's National Afghan Trucking Services contract and determine whether a specific contractor was appropriately paid for its services.

**Armored Ambulances**

To determine whether DoD missed an opportunity to use excess military items to fulfill an the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces immediate need; adequate measures are in place to ensure that DoD considers Defense Logistics Agency excess items as a potential source of equipment for pseudo Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Afghanistan; and whether there are any current the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces shortage items that could be fulfilled through Defense Logistics Agency excess defense articles.

**Financial Audit of Costs Incurred under DoD Awards for Afghanistan Reconstruction, PAE Government Services Inc.**

To audit the Maintain and repair Afghanistan National Defense Security Forces' vehicles and ground equipment; Award Number: W56HZV17C0117, for the period of 5/23/2017 – 8/30/2019; Obligation Amount: \$192,295,663.

**Financial Audit of Costs Incurred under DoD Awards for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Engility Corporation**

To audit the Law Enforcement Professionals Program contract; Award Number: W91CRB-13-C-0021, for the period of 7/1/2018 – 6/30/2020; Obligation Amount: \$22,035,442.

## APPENDIX D

# Planned OFS Oversight Projects

Tables 8 and 9 list the title and objective for Lead IG and partner agencies' planned oversight projects related to OFS.

Table 8.

### Planned Oversight Projects Related to OFS by Lead IG Agency, as of June 30, 2020

#### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

##### ***Audit of the Department of Defense Military Payroll for Combat Zone Entitlements***

To determine whether the DoD military components and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service accurately calculated hostile fire pay, imminent danger pay, family separation allowance, and combat zone tax exclusion for combat zone deployments.

##### ***Audit of Entitlements and Allowances for Processing for Military Service Reserve Deployments***

To determine whether the deployment process resulted in accurate and timely entitlements and allowances for deployed members of the military service Reserves.

##### ***Audit of Afghanistan Air Theater Movement Contracts***

To determine whether U.S. Transportation Command performed adequate oversight of air theater movement services contracts in Afghanistan to ensure contractor's performance complied with contract requirements, such as aircraft provision, operational readiness, and reporting requirements.

##### ***Audit of Depot-Level Maintenance for U.S. Military Heavy Lift Helicopters***

To determine whether the depot-level maintenance for U.S. Military Heavy Lift Helicopters enables the fleet to maintain required aircraft availability and readiness rates.

##### ***Audit of National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Systems Contract Oversight***

To determine whether Army Contracting Command monitored contractor performance for the National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Systems contract to ensure the contractor provided training, maintenance, and supply chain management support services to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.

##### ***Audit of the U.S. Army Central Command's Modernized Enduring Equipment Set in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility***

To determine whether the Army's implementation of the modernized enduring equipment sets in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility is meeting mission goals.

##### ***Evaluation of Traumatic Brain Injury Screening in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility***

To determine whether U.S. Central Command properly screened, documented, and tracked DoD service members suspected of sustaining a traumatic brain injury to determine whether a return to duty status for current operations was acceptable, or evacuation and additional care was required.

#### DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

##### ***Audit of DoS Implementation of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security***

To determine whether the DoS Office of Global Women's Issues has tailored applicable DoS engagements and programs to help women be more prepared for, and able to participate in, decision-making processes related to conflict and crisis; established metrics and targets to evaluate, measure, and report DoS performance; and created a process to modify or redirect program resources on the basis of performance that informs resource allocation and planning.

##### ***Audit of Use of Sole Source Contracts in Overseas Contingency Operations***

To determine whether the DoS followed acquisition policy when awarding sole source contracts related to overseas contingency operations and whether there were urgent and compelling needs to justify awarding sole source contracts.

Table 9.

**Planned Oversight Projects Related to OFS by Lead IG Partner Agency, as of June 30, 2020****SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION*****Review of Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units***

To determine the extent to which counternarcotics police specialized units are achieving their goals; to assess the oversight of salary payments made to personnel in the specialized units; and to assess the long-term sustainability of the specialized units.

***DoD's Gender Advising Programs for the Ministries of Defense and Interior Affairs***

To identify the DoD's gender-related goals for the Ministries of Defense and Interior Affairs; to determine how the DoD has incorporated these goals in its strategies, plans, and other directives related to its ministry advising efforts; to identify how the DoD measures the results of its gender-advising efforts; to determine the extent to which these efforts have been met and are effective; to identify the impediments, if any, that may be prohibiting greater success in gender-related areas of improvement at the Ministries of Defense and Interior Affairs; and to determine how the DoD is addressing any issues identified.

***Audit of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Pharmaceutical, Medical, and Surgical Materials (Class VIII)***

To assess the extent to which the DoD and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces developed and validated the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Class VIII needs; provided needed Class VIII supplies in accordance with DoD and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces requirements; and oversaw the proper storage, maintenance, and usage of Class VIII supplies and equipment.

***DoD's Use of Funds Appropriated to Recruit and Retain Women in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces***

To determine how much of the appropriated funding meant to support women in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces the DoD has spent; to identify the efforts the DoD has implemented using this funding; to determine how the DoD selects which efforts to fund; and to determine how these efforts have promoted recruitment and retention of women in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.

***Inspection of Women's Participation Program—Afghan National Police Kabul Police Academy 2***

To determine whether the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and the facility is being used and maintained properly.

***Inspection of Afghan National Army Afghan Electrical Interconnect Electrical Infrastructure Marshal Fahim National Defense University/Darulaman/Commando***

To determine whether construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications, and the facility is being used and maintained properly.

***Inspection of Afghan National Army Afghan Electrical Interconnect Electrical Infrastructure Pol-i-Charkhi***

To determine whether construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications, and the facility is being used and maintained properly.

***Inspection of Afghan National Army Kabul National Military Hospital Entry Control Point 1&2***

To determine whether the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications and whether the facility is being used and maintained properly.

***Follow-up Audit of Afghan National Police Personnel and Payroll Systems***

To assess the processes through which the Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, the United Nations Development Programme, and the Afghan government collected personnel and payroll data for Afghan National Police personnel assigned and present-for-duty; to determine how the Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, the United Nations Development Programme, and the Afghan government stored, accessed, transferred, and used this data; and to determine the extent to which the Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, the United Nations Development Programme, and the Afghan government verified and reconciled Afghan National Police personnel and payroll data to determine the accuracy of the data.

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***Audit of the Afghan National Army-Territorial Forces (ANA-TF)***

To determine whether U.S. Forces-Afghanistan evaluated and implemented the ANA-TF program in accordance with guidance; ANA-TF members were being recruited, were mobilized, and were performing; and the ANA-TF program met cost expectations.

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***Ministry of Interior Affairs' Accountability for Vehicles***

To assess whether the DoD and the Ministry of Interior Affairs have developed and implemented policies and procedures to account for vehicles purchased with U.S. Government funds and to determine whether those policies and procedures enabled the DoD and the Ministry of Interior Affairs to accurately account for those vehicles.

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## ACRONYMS

Acronym	
AAF	Afghan Air Force
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANA-TF	Afghan National Army Territorial Force
ANASOC	Afghan National Army Special Operations Command
ANDSF	Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
ANP	Afghan National Police
ASFF	Afghan Security Forces Fund
ASSF	Afghan Special Security Forces
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
COVID-19	coronavirus disease-2019
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DEWS	Disease Early Warning System
FY	fiscal year
IG	Inspector General
ISIS-K	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan
Lead IG	Lead Inspector General
Lead IG agencies	DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMS-GVS	National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Support
NSOCC-A	NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan

Acronym	
NDS	National Directorate of Security
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCO	overseas contingency operation
OFS	Operation Freedom's Sentinel
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OUSD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
SFAB	Security Force Assistance Brigade
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SMW	Special Mission Wing
TAA	train, advise, and assist
TAAC	Train, Advise, and Assist Command
TAAC-Air	Train, Advise, and Assist Command-Air
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USFOR-A	United States Forces-Afghanistan
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization



## ENDNOTES

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