Audit of U.S. Special Operations Command Testing and Evaluation

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Controlled by: Acquisition Operations
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Objective

The objective of this audit was to determine whether the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) fielded Special Operations–Peculiar (SO-P) equipment that met performance requirements during test and evaluation (T&E).

Background

SO-P equipment is unique to USSOCOM units and funded and managed by USSOCOM. SO-P equipment is defined as equipment, material, supplies, and services required for special operations missions for which there is no Military Service common requirement. Examples of SO-P equipment include specialized communications systems; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment; vehicles to meet specific special operations mission requirements; and specialized aircraft with precision strike capability. During the SO-P equipment validation and approval process, USSOCOM officials identify mission requirements and the type of equipment needed to meet these mission requirements. USSOCOM officials record these mission requirements in capability documents, which identify the key performance parameters (KPPs) for the equipment. KPPs are those system attributes considered most critical or essential for an effective military capability.

USSOCOM Directive 71-5 assigns responsibility to the USSOCOM program managers to develop the T&E master plan for each program, which includes the requirements correlation matrix. The requirements correlation matrix identifies the KPPs and the T&E required to document the equipment’s performance. The USSOCOM Directorate of Operational Test and Evaluation is responsible for testing SO-P equipment to ensure that the equipment is operationally effective, operationally suitable, and safe for use by Special Operations Forces (SOF). The T&E also verifies that defined KPPs are met. T&E is conducted by qualified and trained SOF who represent the intended users, and is based on the KPP minimum requirements established in the validated capability documents. The T&E process culminates with a Fielding and Deployment Release (F&DR), which certifies that the SO-P equipment is operationally effective, suitable, and safe for use. According to USSOCOM officials, if SO-P equipment does not meet all KPPs, a conditional F&DR can be issued. USSOCOM Directive 70-1 states that conditional F&DRs certify the system or equipment is operationally effective, safe, and suitable for limited use for a specified period.

Finding

USSOCOM officials did not verify that all SO-P equipment met performance requirements during T&E prior to fielding for the programs reviewed. We reviewed a non-statistical sample of 10 of 28 USSOCOM SO-P programs which received full or conditional F&DRs during FYs 2017 through 2019. We determined that USSOCOM personnel followed command policy to verify KPPs passed T&E or issue a conditional F&DR that identified the KPPs that did not pass T&E prior to fielding for four programs reviewed, valued at $494.1 million. For the remaining six programs, valued at $815.8 million, USSOCOM officials did not verify that SO-P equipment passed all required T&E. For example, the Tactical Local Area Network program, which provides network communication equipment for SOF users, had 4 KPPs, but USSOCOM officials did not verify that 3 of the 4 KPPs passed T&E prior to fielding. Despite not verifying the SO-P equipment met KPPs via T&E, USSOCOM personnel issued full or conditional F&DRs that did not identify unverified KPPs for the six programs.

For the six programs, USSOCOM did not verify that the SO-P equipment passed required T&E because USSOCOM program managers did not consistently follow USSOCOM Directives.
Finding (cont’d)

70-1 and 71-5 to identify T&E required to determine whether the SO-P equipment met the required KPPs, and document this in a requirements correlation matrix. In addition, USSOCOM guidance did not require SO-P program officials to verify that the SO-P equipment met the required KPPs prior to authorizing fielding.

As a result, USSOCOM purchased and fielded SO-P equipment for the six programs, valued at $815.8 million, without verifying that the equipment meets user needs. KPPs are the equipment attributes that are most critical for mission effectiveness. Without verification through T&E, USSOCOM has no assurance that the SO-P equipment for these six programs met the KPPs. For example, the Tactical Local Area Network program contained a [REDACTED] However, users reported that they could not [REDACTED] with the equipment. USSOCOM officials did not verify that the SO-P equipment met the KPPs during T&E, and still issued a conditional F&DR for this program. Based on user comments, the equipment may not meet the requirements established in the KPPs, and therefore would not be operationally effective.

Recommendation

We recommend that the USSOCOM Commander develop internal controls to ensure USSOCOM program managers develop and maintain a requirements correlation matrix for each program that clearly matches KPPs to T&E, integrate the requirements correlation matrix into T&E, and document the results in the requirements correlation matrix. We also recommend that the USSOCOM Commander update U.S. Special Operations Command directives to require that conditional F&DRs identify the KPPs that were not met, outline any limitations on how the equipment is used, and the work required prior to issuing a full F&DR.

Management Comments and Our Response

The USSOCOM Chief of Staff, responding for the USSOCOM Commander, agreed with the recommendation, stating it is essential to verify that a fielded system meets its validated KPPs, as well as achieving mission effectiveness and suitability prior to fielding. To ensure the requirements correlation matrix is utilized and archived efficiently, USSOCOM will now require program managers to provide a requirements correlation matrix at the start of test planning. This will be used to develop the evaluation framework by the operational test organizations. At the conclusion of operational testing the operational test organizations will create a requirements validation matrix documenting the results in their test report.

The Chief of Staff also stated future F&DRs will identify whether or not KPPs were met. If any KPPs were not met, but the system is still determined to be operationally effective, USSOCOM will issue a conditional F&DR with specific restrictions on its use and state the actions needed to close the restrictions. When all conditions are closed, USSOCOM will issue an unrestricted F&DR.

Comments from the Chief of Staff addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remain open. Although the Chief of Staff did not provide a completion date, we reached out to USSOCOM officials to determine whether the command would be updating its guidance to include the new policies and if so, when the command expects to complete the update. A USSOCOM official stated in an email response that the command did plan to update the criteria and that it would take approximately one year to collaborate, write, staff, and sign the directives. We will close the recommendation once USSOCOM updates the applicable criteria.

Please see the Recommendation Table on the next page for the status of the recommendation.
## Recommendation Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Recommendations Unresolved</th>
<th>Recommendations Resolved</th>
<th>Recommendations Closed</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1.a.1, 1.a.2, 1.a.3, 1.b.1, 1.b.2.a, 1.b.2.b, 1.b.2.c</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

SUBJECT: Audit of U.S. Special Operations Command Testing and Evaluation
(Report No. DODIG-2020-111)

This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General’s audit. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendation. We considered management’s comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. Those comments are included in the report.

This report contains a recommendation that is resolved. The Commander U.S. Special Operations Command agreed to address the recommendation presented in the report; therefore, we consider the recommendation resolved and open. As described in the Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, we will close the recommendation when we receive adequate documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendation is complete. Therefore, please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the recommendation. Send your responses to either followup@dodig.mil if unclassified or rfunet@dodig.smil.mil if classified SECRET.

If you have any questions, please contact me at [Redacted].

We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the audit.

[Signature]

Richard B. Vasquez
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Readiness and Global Operations
Introduction

Objective

The objective of this audit was to determine whether the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) fielded Special Operations–Peculiar (SO-P) equipment that met performance requirements during test and evaluation (T&E). See Appendix A for our scope and methodology and the list of prior audit reports.

Background

USSOCOM consists of Headquarters USSOCOM, USSOCOM Service Component commands, and theater special operations commands. The USSOCOM Service Component commands are the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, and Theater special operations commands located globally to support geographical combatant command special operations missions. USSOCOM’s mission is to synchronize special operations planning and provide special operations forces (SOF) to support persistent, networked, and distributed geographical combatant command operations to protect and advance the interests of the United States.

Special Operations–Peculiar Equipment

SO-P equipment is unique to USSOCOM units and funded and managed by USSOCOM. SO-P equipment is defined as equipment, material, supplies, and services required for special operations missions for which there is no Military Service common requirement. SO-P programs may contain diverse variations of equipment to meet the program’s stated mission. According to USSOCOM officials, there were 28 SO-P programs, valued at $1.5 billion, with fielded equipment from FY 2017 through FY 2019. Of those 28 SO-P programs, we non-statistically selected 10 of the highest dollar value programs (valued at $1.4 billion) and reviewed requirements and T&E documents for the following programs.

- (CUI) AC-130J Ghost Rider Precision Strike Package Modification (valued at $659.1 million) –
- (CUI) (valued at $120.6 million) –

Figure 1 shows the .

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1 DoD guidance defines fielding as producing and delivering requirements-compliant products to receiving military organizations.

• (CUI) Tactical Local Area Network: Field Computing Device – Wearable (valued at $136.8 million)\(^3\) –

• (CUI) Small Glide Munition (valued at $53.1 million) –

• Non-Standard Commercial Vehicle (valued at $145.5 million) – has the capability to conduct ground tactical maneuver while maintaining a commercial appearance consistent with the country where SOF are deployed. Figure 2 shows the Non-Standard Commercial vehicle during off-road testing.

\(^3\) The $136.8 million cost is based on the Tactical Local Area Network family of systems which includes the Field Computing Device, as provided by USSOCOM on December 2019. However, the value for the Field Computing Devices – Wearable is $17.8 million.
• (CUI) Ground Mobility Vehicle 1.1 (valued at $206.9 million) – USSOCOM

Figure 3 shows a Ground Mobility Vehicle 1.1 during ground clearance testing.
• (CUI) Laser Small Diameter Bomb (valued at $26.8 million) –

• (CUI) Next Generation Tactical Communications: Handheld Link 16 (valued at $38.7 million) –

Figure 4 shows an attack controller using the Next Generation Tactical Communications radio.

• Blue Force Tracker (valued at $21.1 million) – provides a reliable secure means of tracking SOF and coalition forces using communication devices.

• (CUI) MC-130J Modifications (valued at $20.3 million) – the MC-130J modification provides survivability improvements to provide situational awareness so aircrew can detect, identify, locate, and avoid airborne and ground-based threats, while providing the ability to deny, degrade, and disrupt the threat by effective countermeasures.
**SO-P Equipment Validation and Approval**

USSOCOM establishes the policy for equipment validation and approval in USSOCOM Directive 71-4. USSOCOM uses the SOF Capabilities Integration and Development System process to validate, certify, review, and approve SO-P equipment requirements. During the SO-P equipment validation and approval process, USSOCOM officials identify mission requirements and the types of equipment needed to meet these mission requirements. USSOCOM officials record these mission requirements in capability documents, which include the Capability Development Document and the Capability Production Document. The capability documents identify the key performance parameters (KPPs), which are the system attributes considered most critical or essential for an effective military capability.

The Special Operations Command Requirements Evaluation Board is a forum for the USSOCOM Vice Commander to consult USSOCOM staff, service component commands, and theater special operations commands regarding special operations mission requirements. The board reviews, validates, and approves KPPs in the capability documents. If SO-P equipment requirements change or the KPPs are updated, the board must revalidate the program’s capability documents.

**USSOCOM Acquisition Management System Policy**

USSOCOM Directive 70-1 establishes acquisition policy for USSOCOM programs, and outlines the T&E documents required for SO-P equipment programs.

The directive states that T&E, detailed in the program test and evaluation master plan, must evaluate KPPs and the overall structure and objectives of the T&E program, and determine whether a system is operationally safe, effective, suitable, and survivable. The directive also requires the program manager to prepare a requirements correlation matrix for all USSOCOM programs. The requirements correlation matrix is a spreadsheet that lists the KPPs from the program’s capability documents and identifies the T&E required to validate the equipment’s performance. The requirements correlation matrix is required for all USSOCOM programs and provides the framework for all T&E to be completed. The directive requires USSOCOM program managers to identify the T&E necessary to prove the equipment is capable of meeting its KPPs, and to document the T&E in the requirements correlation matrix.

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5 The Special Operations Command Requirements Evaluation Board includes the USSOCOM Vice Commander; Director of Force Structure, Requirements, Resources and Strategic Assessments; Director of Intelligence; Director of Operations; Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy; Director of Communication Systems; Director of Force Management and Development; and the Chief Financial Officer Special Operations Financial Management.
6 USSOCOM Directive 70-1, “Acquisition Management System Policy,” September 21, 2016. This criteria was updated on March 20, 2018, however, we used the criteria that was in effect during our sample programs’ test and evaluation.
**USSOCOM Test and Evaluation**

USSOCOM Directive 71-5 establishes the policy and guidelines for T&E and the fielding of SO-P programs. The USSOCOM Directorate of Operational Test and Evaluation is responsible for testing SO-P equipment to ensure that the equipment is operationally effective, operationally suitable, and safe for use by SOF. The directive states that T&E should also verify that defined KPPs are met. The T&E is required to be conducted by qualified and trained SOF who represent the intended users of the SO-P equipment, and is based on KPP minimum requirements established in the validated capability documents. USSOCOM Directive 71-5 assigns responsibility to USSOCOM program managers to develop the T&E master plan, which according to USSOCOM Directive 70-1, includes the requirements correlation matrix that identifies the T&E required to validate the equipment’s performance.

The USSOCOM T&E process culminates in the USSOCOM Fielding and Deployment Release (F&DR). USSOCOM uses the F&DR to certify that SO-P equipment is operationally effective, suitable, and safe for use. According to USSOCOM officials, if SO-P equipment does not meet all KPPs, a conditional F&DR can be issued. While USSOCOM Directive 71-5 does not define conditional F&DRs, USSOCOM Directive 70-1 states that conditional F&DRs certify the system or equipment is operationally effective, safe, and suitable for limited use for a specified period. According to USSOCOM officials, conditional F&DRs should identify the limitations placed on the equipment and how the equipment can be used until a full F&DR is issued. USSOCOM officials stated that conditional F&DRs are issued for up to 1 year, but can be reissued if the program is making progress toward addressing capability shortfalls. A conditional F&DR becomes an F&DR when all capability shortfalls are tested and meet the validated performance requirements.

**Review of Internal Controls**

DoD Instruction 5010.40 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. We identified that USSOCOM officials did not consistently follow USSOCOM directives to identify the T&E required to determine whether the SO-P equipment met the required KPPs and document the results in a requirements correlation matrix. We will provide a copy of the final report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in USSOCOM.

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7 USSOCOM Directive 71-5, “Force Development – Operational Test and Evaluation,” September 14, 2016. This criteria was updated on September 26, 2019 however, we used the criteria that was in effect during our sample programs’ test and evaluation.
Finding

USSOCOM Did Not Verify That SO-P Equipment Met Performance Requirements

USSOCOM officials did not verify that reviewed SO-P equipment programs met performance requirements during T&E prior to fielding. We reviewed a non-statistical sample of 10 of 28 USSOCOM SO-P programs receiving full or conditional F&DRs during FYs 2017 through 2019. We determined that USSOCOM personnel followed command policy to verify KPPs passed T&E or issued conditional F&DRs to identify KPPs not passing T&E before fielding for four programs reviewed, valued at $494.1 million. For six remaining programs, valued at $815.8 million, USSOCOM officials did not verify that SO-P equipment passed required T&E. For example, Tactical Local Area Network programs had 4 KPPs, but USSOCOM officials did not verify that 3 of 4 KPPs passed T&E prior to fielding. Despite not verifying that SO-P equipment met KPPs via T&E, USSOCOM personnel issued full or conditional F&DRs that did not identify unverified KPPs for the six programs.

For the six programs, USSOCOM did not verify that SO-P equipment passed required T&E because USSOCOM program managers did not consistently follow USSOCOM Directives 70-1 and 71-5 to identify T&E required for SO-P equipment to meet the required KPPs, and document results in a requirements correlation matrix. USSOCOM guidance did not require SO-P program officials to verify that SO-P equipment met required KPPs prior to authorizing fielding.

(CUI) As a result, USSOCOM purchased and fielded SO-P equipment for the six programs, valued at $815.8 million, without verifying the equipment met user needs. KPPs are the equipment attributes that are most critical for mission effectiveness. Without verification through T&E, USSOCOM has no assurance that the SO-P equipment for these six programs met the KPPs. For example, the Tactical Local Area Network program

However, users reported that they could not with the equipment. USSOCOM officials did not verify that the KPPs were met during T&E, and still issued a conditional F&DR for this program. Based on user comments, the equipment may not meet the requirements established in the KPPs, and therefore would not be operationally effective.
USSOCOM Program Managers Did Not Verify Six Programs Met All Program Requirements During T&E

USSOCOM officials did not verify that all SO-P equipment met KPPs during T&E prior to fielding for the programs reviewed. USSOCOM Directive 71-5 requires T&E to validate the system performance with KPPs prior to issuing an F&DR, which certifies that the equipment is operationally effective, safe, and suitable for use. We reviewed a non-statistical sample of 10 (valued at $1.4 billion) of the 28 (valued at $1.5 billion) USSOCOM SO-P programs which received full or conditional F&DRs during FYs 2017 through 2019. To determine whether the SO-P equipment passed T&E, we obtained capability documents to identify the KPPs for each of the 10 reviewed programs. We obtained T&E results for each of the 10 programs, and compared these to KPPs to align the T&E results to the specific KPPs. If we could confirm that the T&E results aligned with the KPPs for a program, we determined whether the SO-P equipment met KPP requirements. If we were unable to align KPPs to T&E results, we requested that USSOCOM SO-P program managers identify the T&E results for those KPPs. As an independent verification, we also requested the DoD OIG Research and Engineering experts align the T&E results to KPPs. Finally, we obtained F&DRs issued by USSOCOM for the 10 reviewed programs to determine whether USSOCOM issued F&DRs for programs that did not pass T&E for all KPPs. Our analysis determined that for 4 of the 10 programs reviewed, USSOCOM personnel followed command policy to verify that SO-P equipment met KPPs during T&E or issued a conditional F&DR that identified KPPs not met during T&E. However, for the remaining six programs we reviewed, USSOCOM officials did not verify that all SO-P equipment KPPs were tested. These six programs contained a total of 29 KPPs, however, we could only determine that 6 of 29 KPPs were tested before USSOCOM issued F&DRs and fielded the SO-P equipment.

USSOCOM Verified T&E Results for Four Programs

We determined that USSOCOM personnel verified that the SO-P equipment either passed T&E or USSOCOM personnel issued conditional F&DRs for the equipment with KPPs that did not pass T&E for 4 of the 10 programs valued at $494.1 million. For these four programs, we obtained the capability documents and identified the KPPs for each program. We then compared the KPPs to T&E results to determine whether the equipment met the KPPs. For three of the four programs, we determined that USSOCOM personnel verified that all KPPs met the requirements; and issued full F&DRs for the three programs. For example, for the Non-Standard Commercial Vehicle program, the Signature Management KPP states...
that the vehicle must maintain a commercial appearance and prevent unaided detection as a tactical vehicle from an observer at 100 meters. USSOCOM officials were able to

For the Ground Mobility Vehicle, the Table 1 shows the number of KPPs for the four programs that verified the equipment passed T&E or had conditional F&DRs issued before the equipment was fielded.

Table 1. Programs that Verified KPPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Total Number of KPPs</th>
<th>KPPs Verified by T&amp;E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Blue Force Tracking</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ground Mobility Vehicle</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Non-Standard Commercial Vehicle</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The DoD OIG.

For the fourth program, USSOCOM personnel verified that KPPs for the were tested and 7 of 9 KPPs met KPP requirements. Specifically, when the KPP that established in the KPP. USSOCOM issued a conditional F&DR that does not limit operational use, but required the program to demonstrate the ability to meet the before a full F&DR would be issued. The conditional F&DR states that USSOCOM will use prior to issuing a full F&DR. The decisions by USSOCOM to issue full F&DRs for the three programs with verified KPPs that passed T&E and a conditional F&DR for the program comply with policy established in USSOCOM Directive 71-5.
**USSOCOM Officials Did Not Verify T&E for Remaining Six Programs Prior to Fielding**

For the six remaining programs, USSOCOM officials did not verify that all 29 KPPs for the programs were tested before fielding the SO-P equipment. For the six programs, we determined that USSOCOM personnel performed T&E for 6 of the 29 KPPs for the programs and met the KPPs. However, we could not determine whether USSOCOM tested the remaining 23 KPPs for the six programs prior to issuing F&DRs. We obtained capability documents for the six programs, identified the KPPs for each program, and attempted to identify T&E results showing that the SO-P equipment was tested and met KPPs. However, for the 23 of the 29 KPPs under the six programs, we were unable to determine whether T&E performed by USSOCOM personnel actually measured the equipment’s ability to meet the requirements outlined in the KPPs. Because we could not readily determine if the 23 KPPs were tested, we requested that USSOCOM officials review the T&E results and identify those that would verify the equipment was tested and met the 23 KPPs. USSOCOM officials were unable to align the T&E to the specific 23 KPPs, and were therefore unable to verify that the KPPs were tested before the SO-P equipment was fielded. Table 2 outlines the six programs with the total the number of SO-P equipment KPPs; the number of KPPs USSOCOM verified were tested, and the number of KPPs that USSOCOM did not verify were tested.

**Table 2. USSOCOM SO-P Programs that Could Not Verify KPPs Were Tested**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Total Number of KPPs</th>
<th>KPPs Verified by T&amp;E</th>
<th>KPPs That Could Not Be Verified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. AC-130J Modification</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. MC-130J Modification</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Small Glide Munitions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Laser Small Diameter Bomb</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tactical Local Area Network</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Next Generation Tactical Communications</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The DoD OIG.

(CUT) Of the 23 KPPs that USSOCOM did not verify were tested before fielding, one example is the Next Generation Tactical Communications program. For this program, the USSOCOM program manager for Next Generation Tactical Communications program provided T&E documentation for the KPP that consisted of e-mails between a user and
(CUI) the equipment contractor in which the user stated that the equipment “worked great.” The e-mail communication did not provide sufficient information or evidence that the KPP was tested or passed T&E; therefore USSOCOM could not verify that KPP was tested and meet the requirements of the KPP outlined in the capability document.

(CUI) Despite not verifying the SO-P equipment met KPPs, via T&E, USSOCOM personnel issued full or conditional F&DRs that did not identify the KPPs that were not verified for the six programs. USSOCOM uses F&DRs to verify that the SO-P equipment is operationally sufficient, operationally effective, and safe for use by the user. According to USSOCOM policy, before issuing an F&DR, USSOCOM officials should verify that KPPs met requirements through T&E. If the T&E shows KPPs did not meet the requirements, the USSOCOM policy allows USSOCOM personnel to issue a conditional F&DR that lists the areas that need improvement and require retesting prior to a full release being issued. Of the six programs that USSOCOM did not verify T&E before fielding the SO-P equipment, the three programs were issued conditional F&DRs that did not list the unverified KPPs as conditions that must be met before receiving a full release. These conditional F&DRs did not limit the equipment’s operational use, but did require the programs to show progress on the areas identified. However, in these three programs, the KPPs that were not verified by T&E were not included in the conditional F&DR. For example, USSOCOM personnel issued a conditional F&DR for the Tactical Local Area Network that stated but did not identify the three KPPs that were not verified by T&E.

(CUI) For the other three programs that received full F&DRs, USSOCOM officials could not verify that all the KPPs were tested. For example, USSOCOM personnel issued a F&DR to the Next Generation Tactical Communications program, despite only having 4 of the 7 KPPs verified through T&E. However, USSOCOM officials could not provide T&E documentation showing that this KPP was tested and passed. The decision by USSOCOM personnel to issue conditional and full F&DRs for all six programs, despite not verifying that 23 KPPs were tested and meet its requirement, did not comply with policy established in USSOCOM Directive 71-5.
USSOCOM Officials Did Not Consistently Follow Guidance to Document T&E

USSOCOM could not verify that KPPs were tested for the six programs because USSOCOM program managers did not consistently follow USSOCOM Directives 70-1 and 71-5 policy to identify T&E that was required to determine whether the SO-P equipment met required KPPs, and document this in a requirements correlation matrix. USSOCOM Directive 70-1 requires program managers to prepare a requirements correlation matrix for all USSOCOM programs. The requirements correlation matrix identifies KPPs and the T&E required to document the equipment’s performance for these attributes.

USSOCOM Directive 70-1 states that the requirements correlation matrix should include the threshold and objective technical requirements from all relevant requirements documents, identify when the T&E should be accomplished, and identify the responsible testing organization for each requirement. USSOCOM officials could only provide completed matrices for 2 of the 10 programs, and both of these programs were in the group of 4 that we were able to verify T&E results. Program managers for the Ground Mobility Vehicle and the Non-Standard Commercial Vehicle programs provided completed requirements correlation matrices for their programs that identified KPPs for the programs, the T&E needed to verify the equipment could meet those requirements, and the results of the T&E. We were able to use this documentation to validate that the equipment met KPP requirements prior to fielding.

For the six programs for which the T&E of the KPPs was not verified, USSOCOM officials could not provide completed requirements correlation matrices, and we were not able to verify the KPPs for the programs that were tested. For example, USSOCOM personnel performed tests on the AC-130J Ghost Rider program; however, without a sufficient requirements correlation matrix for this program, we could not determine how this T&E measured the equipment’s ability to meet KPPs.

However, Without a requirement correlation matrix that clearly identifies what T&E should be performed

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8 Threshold technical requirements are the minimum capability the equipment must possess to meet mission requirements. Performance below the threshold value is not operationally effective or suitable or may not provide any improvement over current capabilities. The objective technical requirement is a higher level of performance that represents a significant increase in operational utility.
Finding

(U.S.) performed in order to verify the equipment meets the KPPs, USSOCOM could not verify whether the KPPs were met. Therefore, the USSOCOM Commander should develop controls that will ensure USSOCOM program managers develop and maintain the requirements correlation matrices for USSCOM SO-P acquisition programs as required by USSOCOM Directives 70-1 and 71-5. The requirements correlation matrix should identify all KPPs for a program and the T&E that is necessary to verify the equipment can meet the requirements. In addition, the USSOCOM Commander should develop policies to ensure that the T&E performed for each KPP integrates the requirements correlation matrix, and that the matrix is used to document the results and whether the equipment met the KPP requirements.

In addition, USSOCOM Directive 71-5, which was updated in 2019, requires the Directorate of Operational Test and Evaluation to ensure all KPPs can be traced back to T&E results through the requirements correlation matrix. The Directorate of Operational Test and Evaluation is required to ensure program requirements are testable and traceable to the KPPs. However, the USSOCOM directive does not require the validation of KPPs prior to issuing an F&DR. If the guidance contained a requirement to verify that T&E was complete and that it showed that the SO-P equipment met the KPP requirements before issuing an F&DR, USSOCOM could ensure that the fielded SO-P equipment would meet mission requirements. Therefore, the USSOCOM Commander should update USSOCOM guidance to include a requirement that a completed requirements correlation matrix be submitted and the KPPs validated prior to issuing an F&DR for SO-P programs. In addition, the guidance should also include a requirement that conditional F&DRs identify the specific KPPs that were not validated during testing, require the conditional F&DR to outline what limitations are placed on the equipment, and document what work needs to be performed prior to issuing a full F&DR.

**USSOCOM Does Not Have Assurance That SO-P Equipment Met All KPPs**

(U.S.) USSOCOM purchased and fielded SO-P equipment for the six programs, valued at $815.8 million, without verifying the equipment meets user needs. KPPs are the equipment attributes that are most critical for mission effectiveness. Without verification through T&E, USSOCOM has no assurance that the SO-P equipment for these six programs met the KPPs. For example, the Tactical Local Area Network program contained a KPP that stated the

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Finding

(CUI) We contacted units USSOCOM identified as having received the equipment to determine if the units had experienced any difficulties using the equipment. One user of the Tactical Local Area Network stated that they expected [REDACTED]. The user stated that the capability was “still in the works I believe.” Another user stated that operators [REDACTED], which is a priority for training and real world communications. During our review, we could not confirm that USSOCOM verified that this KPP was tested during T&E, but USSOCOM personnel issued a conditional F&DR for the program. The condition placed on the F&DR did not mention [REDACTED] but stated that the program [REDACTED].

(CUI) Likewise, the Next Generation Tactical Communications program contained a [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED]. When reached for input on the equipment, users from units that had received the equipment stated that “[REDACTED].” Like the Tactical Local Area Network, we could not determine whether USSOCOM verified that this KPP met requirements during T&E, but USSOCOM officials issued this program a full F&DR.

In both cases, USSOCOM officials could not provide documentation to show that they verified that the KPPs were met during T&E, and still issued F&DRs for these programs. Based on user comments, the equipment may not meet the requirements established in the KPPs, and therefore would not be operationally effective.

Management Comments on the Background and Our Response

USSOCOM SOF Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Comments

The USSOCOM Deputy Director for Acquisition provided comments to address statements in the draft report. The Deputy Director stated that the audit team listed the prior versions of USSOCOM Directives 70-1 and 71-5. The Deputy Director also stated that the current version of USSOCOM Directive 70-1 is dated March 20, 2018, and the current version of USSOCOM Directive 71-5 is dated [REDACTED].
September 26, 2019. In addition, the Deputy Director stated that the audit team identified the MC-130J as an air refueling aircraft, and asked that this be removed as that is not the appropriate mission design of the aircraft.

**Our Response**

We agree with the Deputy Director’s comments and we have updated the report. The audit team was aware of the updates to the USSOCOM guidance, but used the guidance that was in effect during the test and evaluation of the programs we reviewed as the basis for the findings. We updated the footnotes in the background of the report to state that the guidance had been updated. For the MC-130J, the audit team agrees that the aircraft’s mission is not solely refueling, and we updated the description based on information contained in the program capability documents.

**Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response**

**Recommendation 1**

We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command:

a. Develop internal controls to ensure that U.S. Special Operations Command program managers:

1. Develop and maintain a detailed requirements correlation matrix for each Special Operations-Peculiar acquisition programs that clearly matches the key performance parameters to test and evaluation.

2. Integrate the requirements correlation matrix into test and evaluation.

3. Document the results of test and evaluation for each key performance parameter in the requirements correlation matrix.

**USSOCOM Chief of Staff Comments**

The USSOCOM Chief of Staff, responding for the USSOCOM Commander, agreed with the recommendation, stating that it is essential to verify that a fielded system meets its validated KPPs, as well as achieving the broader mission effectiveness and suitability determined in Operational Test and Evaluation, prior to fielding. The Chief of Staff also stated that the requirements correlation matrix or similar document is currently a required program manager document in accordance with USSOCOM Directives 70-1 and 71-5. Therefore, to ensure it is utilized and archived efficiently, USSOCOM Force Structure, Requirements, Resources, and Strategic Assessments Operational Test and Evaluation directorate will now require program
managers to provide a requirements correlation matrix or similar document to the Test Integrated Process Team at the start of test planning. This will be used to develop the evaluation framework by the operational test organizations. At the conclusion of operational testing the operational test organizations will create a requirements validation matrix documenting the results in their test report.

**Our Response**

Comments from the Chief of Staff addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open. Although the Chief of Staff did not provide an estimated completion date, we reached out to USSOCOM officials to determine whether the command would be updating its guidance to include the new policies and if so, when the command expects to complete the update. A USSOCOM official stated in an e-mail response that the command did plan to update the criteria and that it would take approximately one year to collaborate, write, staff, and sign the directives. We will close the recommendation once we validate that USSOCOM has updated the applicable criteria to include the new processes.

b. Update U.S. Special Operations Command directives related to fielding and deployment releases to:

1. Require that a requirements correlation matrix, including test and evaluation results, be submitted and validated prior to issuing a fielding and deployment release for Special Operations-Peculiar programs.

2. Require that conditional fielding and deployment releases:
   a. Identify the specific key performance parameter that was not met during test and evaluation.
   b. Outline any restrictions on the use of the Special Operations-Peculiar equipment.
   c. Document what work must be completed before a full fielding and deployment release can be issued.

**USSOCOM Chief of Staff Comments**

The USSOCOM Chief of Staff, responding for the USSOCOM Commander, agreed with the recommendation, stating that future F&DRs will identify whether or not KPPs were met. If any KPPs were not met, but the system is still determined to be operationally effective, USSOCOM will issue a conditional F&DR with specific restrictions on its use and state the actions needed to close the restrictions. When all conditions are closed, USSOCOM will issue an unrestricted F&DR.
Furthermore, USSOCOM is currently creating a digital document archive to store all documents referenced in the F&DR to ensure easy and ready access to these documents in the future.

**Our Response**

Comments from the Chief of Staff addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open. Although the Chief of Staff did not provide an estimated completion date, we reached out to USSOCOM officials to determine whether the command would be updating its guidance to include the new policies and if so, when the command expects to complete the update. A USSOCOM official stated in an e-mail response that the command did plan to update the criteria and that it would take approximately one year to collaborate, write, staff, and sign the directives. We will close the recommendation once we validate that USSOCOM has updated the applicable criteria to include the new processes.
Appendix

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from September 2019 through June 2020 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The audit team reviewed capability documents such as capability development documents and capability production documents in order to identify the KPPs for each program. Once we identified KPPs, we then compared the test results to verify that all KPPs were tested and that the equipment met the KPP requirements in order to receive an F&DR. Finally, we contacted SOF units to determine whether the equipment met their mission needs.

SO-P Equipment Universe and Sample

(CUI) To determine whether the SO-P equipment met KPPs prior to fielding, USSOCOM provided a universe of SO-P equipment that contained F&DRs dated from FY 2001 through 2019. Based on the universe data, we selected SO-P programs that were at the SECRET classification level and below and had F&DRs dated from FY 2017 through 2019. We used the SECRET classification level as a threshold because we do not have the storage qualifications to handle any documentation or information above the SECRET level. We identified 28 programs. Out of the 28 programs, we selected the programs with the highest total values and identified a non-statistical sample of 10 programs to review. We reviewed the sample programs to ensure that the sample contained programs from across the different USSOCOM program offices, with five of eight program offices included in the sample. We also ensured that the sample included programs with both a large number of fielded equipment, such as the Next Generation Tactical Communications program that has [redacted], as well as a small amount of fielded equipment, such as the [redacted]. Based on the non-statistical sample selection, the 10 programs accounted for approximately 96 percent of total dollar value.
We reviewed the following DoD and USSOCOM criteria.


**Use of Computer-Processed Data**

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit. We requested that USSOCOM provide a universe of the programs that received fielding and deployment releases from FY 2017 to FY 2019. USSOCOM program managers performed a data call that identified the programs that received the fielding and deployment releases along with the value of the equipment purchased. We reviewed the data provided and identified discrepancies in how the programs reported their purchase costs. We requested that USSOCOM perform a review of their purchase costs and they provided an updated universe. Therefore, based on the verification performed we consider the data to be accurate for how the program values are used in the report. Specifically, the dollar value was not relied upon to draw conclusions, they were only used to give magnitude to our finding.

**Use of Technical Assistance**

When the audit team could not verify that KPPs met requirements in T&E based on their knowledge, they requested assistance from each USSOCOM program manager to align the KPPs to the documented T&E results. The audit staff used the program manager’s input and coordinated with the DoD OIG Research and Engineering directorate for their determination on whether the T&E results matched the KPPs. We provided Research and Engineering a listing of the KPPs for selected programs along with the T&E results we received from USSOCOM. We asked DoD OIG Research and Engineering personnel to determine whether the T&E results provided by USSOCOM showed that SO-P equipment met KPPs. Research and Engineering responded that some T&E results plausibly measured KPP performance and that the T&E that was performed could possibly cover the KPPs. However, without more detailed information about what USSOCOM did during the T&E, Research and Engineering could not definitively determine whether the KPPs were measured. In addition, Research and Engineering stated that for other KPPs, it was not possible to determine due to vague language in the KPPs.
Appendix

**Prior Coverage**

During the last 5 years, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued three reports discussing test and evaluation and programs being fielded with shortcomings during testing. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at [http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html](http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/).

**DoD OIG**


The DoD OIG found that the Navy declared Initial Operational Capability for the three Mine Countermeasures mission package systems reviewed prior to demonstrating that the systems were effective and suitable for their intended operational uses. As a result, this could lead to degraded mission performance, delayed delivery of needed capability to the warfighter, and the need to pull those units offline and spend additional money to correct shortcomings in the fielded units.


The DoD OIG found that Navy program managers did not request waivers when the program did not meet the certification criteria needed to enter initial operational test and evaluation. Additionally, the program managers held operational test readiness review briefings that did not fully document that they had met certification criteria for entering initial operational test and evaluation. Further, Navy program managers and system sponsors did not fully implement Navy policies for requesting waivers and deferrals before certifying program readiness for initial operational test and evaluation supporting the final production decision.


The DoD OIG found that USSOCOM officials effectively validated capability requirements for the six SO-P programs reviewed. However, USSOCOM officials fielded an All Environment Capable Variant Small Unmanned Aircraft system that did not meet KPPs during testing. The DoD OIG also found that USSOCOM officials did not consistently upload SO-P program documentation...
into the Joint Staffs Knowledge Management/Decision Support system as required by Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. Specifically, the Joint Staffs Knowledge Management/Decision Support system did not contain requirements documentation for 103 of the 147 SO-P programs with equipment delivered from FY 2010 through FY 2013.
Management Comments

U.S. Special Operations Command

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE, ALEXANDRIA, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: U.S. Special Operations Command Response to the Draft Report for
Department of Defense Inspector General Project Number D2019-D000RG-0214.000,
Audit of U.S. Special Operations Command Testing and Evaluation

1. REFERENCES:
   a. Draft Report, Department of Defense Inspector General Project Number D2019-
      D000RG-0214.000, Audit of U.S. Special Operations Command Testing and Evaluation.
   c. Memorandum, USSOCOM Releasable Information in DoD IG OTE Audit Memo,
dated 15 July 2020.

2. In response to the Inspector General (IG), Department of Defense (DOD), draft
report, dated June 15, 2020, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) concurs
with the report's recommendations. USSOCOM agrees with the DOD IG report that it is
essential to verify that a fielded system meets its validated Key Performance
Parameters (KPPs), as well as achieving the broader mission effectiveness and
suitability determined in Operational Test and Evaluation, prior to fielding. The validated
KPPs must be met. Though USSOCOM did not efficiently locate and provide the
appropriate documentation, we are certain that we did test and meet such requirements
for the six programs identified in Table 2 of the IG report. As such, USSOCOM agrees
the recommendations illuminated that we did not fully document and archive our results.

3. DOD IG Recommendation 1, A:
   a. Recommendation: Develop internal controls to ensure that USSOCOM program
      managers:

      (1) Develop and maintain a detailed requirements correlation matrix for each
      Special Operations-Peculiar acquisition program that clearly matches the key
      performance parameters to Test and Evaluation.

      (2) Integrate the Requirements Correlation Matrix into Test and Evaluation.

      (3) Document the results of Test and Evaluation for each KPP in the requirements
correlation matrix.
U.S. Special Operations Command (cont’d)

SOCS
SUBJECT U.S. Special Operations Command Response to the Draft Report for
Department of Defense Inspector General Project Number D2019-D00RG-0214.000,
Audit of U.S. Special Operations Command Testing and Evaluation

b. USOCCOM Response CONCUR – The Requirements Correlation Matrix (or
similar document) is currently a required Program Manager (PM) document in
accordance with USOCCOM Directives 70-1 and 71-5. To ensure it is utilized and
archived efficiently, USOCCOM Force Structure, Requirements, Resources, and
Strategic Assessments Operational Test and Evaluation (J8-O) will now require PMs to
provide a Requirements Correlation Matrix (or similar document) to the Test Integrated
Process Team at the start of test planning and will be used to develop the evaluation
framework by the Operational Test Organizations (OTO). At the conclusion of
operational testing the OTO will create a Requirements Validation Matrix documenting
the results in their test report.

4. DOD IG Recommendation 1 B.

a. Recommendation Update U.S. Special Operations Command directives related
to fielding and deployment releases to

(1) Require that a Requirements Correlation Matrix, including Test and Evaluation
results, be submitted and validated prior to issuing a fielding and deployment release for
Special Operations-Peculiar programs.

(2) Require that conditional fielding and deployment releases:

(a) Identify the specific KPP that was not met during Test and Evaluation.

(b) Outline any restrictions on the use of the Special Operations-Peculiar
equipment.

(c) Document what work must be completed before a full fielding and
deployment release can be issued.

b. USOCCOM Response CONCUR – Future Fielding and Deployment Release
(F&DR) documents will identify whether or not KPPs were met. If any KPPs were not
met, but the system is still determined to be operationally effective, USOCCOM will
issue a conditional F&DR with specific restrictions on its use and state the actions
needed to close the restrictions. When all conditions are closed, USOCCOM will issue
an unrestricted F&DR. Furthermore, USOCCOM is currently creating a digital
document archive to store all documents referenced in the F&DR to ensure easy and
ready access to these documents in the future.

5. Three enclosures are provided: the USOCCOM request to correct factual errors
memorandum DODIG Audit Response DDA, dated 15 July 2020 (Enclosure 1),
USOCCOM Releasable Information in DoD IG OTE Audit Memo dated 15 July 2020
(Enclosure 2), and Draft Report, Department of Defense Inspector General Project
U.S. Special Operations Command (cont’d)

SOCS
SUBJECT: U.S. Special Operations Command Response to the Draft Report for
Department of Defense Inspector General Project Number D2019-D000RG-0214.000,
Audit of U.S. Special Operations Command Testing and Evaluation

Number D2019-D000RG-0214.000, Audit of U.S. Special Operations Command Testing
and Evaluation (Enclosure 3).

6. The point of contact for this memorandum is ____________________________.

Encls

as

TONY D. BAUERNFEIND
Major General, U.S. Air Force
Chief of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR DODIG, 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE, ALEXANDRIA, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: USSOCOM request to correct factual errors in the draft report for DODIG Project No. D2019-D000RG-0214.000, Audit of U.S. Special Operations Command Testing and Evaluation

1. In response to the Inspector General, Department of Defense, draft report dated 15 June 2020, U.S. Special Operations Command, SOF AT&L requests the following be corrected in the report:

   a. Page 17 lists the previous versions of USSOCOM Directives 70-1 and 71-5. The current version of USSOCOM Directive 70-1 is dated 20 March 2018, and the current version of USSOCOM Directive 71-5 is 28 September 2019. Request these be listed in addition or instead of the previous versions.

   b. Page 4 states the MC-130J is as an air refueling aircraft. Request this be removed as that is not the appropriate mission design of the aircraft.

2. Point of contact for this information is [redacted]

   WILLIAM J. INNES
   Deputy Director for Acquisition
## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>F&amp;DR</td>
<td>Fielding and Deployment Release</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPP</td>
<td>Key Performance Parameter</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
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<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>Special Operations–Peculiar</td>
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<td>Test and Evaluation</td>
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U.S. Department of Defense

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For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

Congressional Liaison  
703.604.8324

Media Contact  
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