Evaluation of Niger Air Base
201 Military Construction
Results in Brief

Evaluation of Niger Air Base 201 Military Construction

March 31, 2020

Objective
(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the U.S. Air Force effectively planned, designed, and constructed Air Base 201 in Niger to provide airfield and base support infrastructure in support of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) operations.

Background
(U/FOUO) Air Base 201 is a military installation in the desert in Agadez, Niger, that the construction is complete, the base will consist of a new runway and hangars, living quarters and life support facilities, base roads, base utilities, base perimeter fence, and other infrastructure.

(U) USAFRICOM tasked U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA) to construct Air Base 201 in October 2013. AFAFRICA is the primary liaison between USAFRICOM and the military construction (MILCON) Program Manager, under the Air Force Civil Engineer Center, Europe Division–Design and Construction (AFCEC/CFED). The MILCON Program Manager had March 31, 2020 oversight and approval authority for construction scope, cost, and schedule changes. AFAFRICA planned and programmed Air Base 201 as a troop labor construction project, with on-site construction provided by the 31st Expeditionary Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadrons Engineers (31st ERHS).

(U) MILCON is defined as all the work necessary to produce a complete and usable facility. DD Form 1391 is used to obtain congressional authorization and funding for MILCON projects costing over $6 million. MILCON scope of work, in terms of function, size, and quantity, may not be increased above the amount specified in the DD Form 1391 provided to Congress.

(U) In November 2015, Congress approved $50 million of MILCON funding in the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act to construct the Air Base 201 airfield and base camp.


Findings
(U/FOUO) We determined that USAFRICOM and the Air Force did not effectively plan, design, and construct Air Base 201 in Niger to provide airfield and base support infrastructure in support of USAFRICOM operations. Specifically, we identified the following problems.

- (U/FOUO) The Air Force built runway shoulders without congressional authorization when it submitted a DD Form 1391 to Congress that excluded runway shoulders in the project scope. Furthermore, AFAFRICA significantly underestimated the project cost, which created risk that the Air Force would not complete the MILCON project. As a result, and reducing the thickness of pavement in certain areas of the airfield.
Results in Brief
Evaluation of Niger Air Base 201 Military Construction

Findings (cont’d)

- (U//FOUO) The Air Force bypassed congressional notification when it split the construction requirement for ISR operations into six O&M projects totaling $5.4 million, with each O&M project cost ranging from $399,000 to $1.8 million. Because each portion of the project was under $2 million, the Air Force was permitted to use O&M appropriation. AF AFRICA representatives stated that they programmed the six O&M projects to meet USAFRICOM’s urgent operational timeline. However, all of the projects were known and each project on its own would not result in a “complete and useable facility,” which means the projects should have been combined and reported to Congress.

- (U) The Air Force potentially violated the Antideficiency Act when it acquired 12 permanent guard towers costing approximately $3.7 million, using Procurement funds instead of MILCON funds, which required Air Force approval and congressional notification. In addition, the Air Force constructed foundations meant for temporary guard towers that could potentially be unusable because the permanent guard towers required larger foundations.

- (U) USAFRICOM and the Air Force did not perform complete site surveys to gather information needed for design and construction of the airfield. Specifically, the Air Force did not conduct complete soil sampling and topographic analysis, which created airfield pavement compaction and drainage problems. The Air Force also experienced logistical problems such as material and equipment shortages during construction because the site survey did not identify sources of construction materials.

- (U//FOUO) The Air Force did not construct Air Base 201 infrastructure to meet safety, security, and other technical requirements established in DoD, Air Force, and USAFRICOM directives. The Air Force also constructed a base perimeter fence that lacked the required without informing and requesting the required waiver from USAFRICOM. Furthermore, the Air Force installed solar airfield lighting that did not conform to the requirements to provide continuous uninterrupted visual airfield lights.

(U//FOUO) These problems occurred because USAFRICOM and the Air Force did not adequately oversee and coordinate with stakeholders on the delivery of Air Base 201. As a result, the airfield and base camp needed to support the USAFRICOM ISR mission was delayed by almost 3 years from the original planned date of completion. In addition, the problems that we identified relating to the aircraft rescue and firefighting facility, and airfield lights could lead to increased risk in safety and security. Furthermore, the construction of the infrastructure necessary to support has not been completed. To accept the risk associated with the lack of infrastructure, the Air Force approved temporary waivers in June 2019 to allow ISR operations at Air Base 201. However, operating without the infrastructure to support ISR increases the safety risk for personnel operating at Air Base 201.
Results in Brief
Evaluation of Niger Air Base 201 Military Construction

Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the AF/A4C Director of Civil Engineers update Air Force Instruction 32-1021 to identify oversight responsibilities when troop labor construction projects are planned and programmed at the major command level.

(U) We recommend that the USAFRICOM Commander establish a coordination and decision-making process with key stakeholders for troop labor construction projects, including a forum to directly communicate with the military construction program manager, designer of record, construction provider, and base support integrator, as applicable.

(U/FOUO) We recommend that the AAFRICA Commander:

- (U) Submit congressional notification on scope changes for the runway on the DD Form 1391 for Air Base 201.
- (U) Develop procedures to review, validate, and certify DD Forms 1391 at appropriate levels.
- (U) Conduct a review of AAFRICA records management to improve internal controls and maintenance of critical records on troop labor construction, planning, programming, and implementation.
- (U) Conduct a review of the use of airfield solar lights, in coordination with the Air Force Installation Management Support Center, Engineering Support Division and the Air Force Civil Engineer Center, Operations Directorate, to determine whether airfield solar lights meet the intent of Air Force Engineering Technical Letter (ETL 11-27) and are adequate for operational safety at Air Base 201.
- (U) Develop a plan with the 724th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron to address the deviation on aircraft rescue and firefighting services.

(U/FOUO) Submit a waiver request to USAFRICOM Commander for the

(U) We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) initiate a preliminary review to determine whether the use of Procurement funds for the acquisition of the guard towers resulted in a potential Antideficiency Act violation and, if so, conduct a formal investigation and provide the results of the review to the DoD Office of Inspector General.

(U/FOUO) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD, review the Air Force programming actions to determine whether the programming actions are in accordance with applicable appropriation laws and regulations.

Management Comments and Our Response

(U) Both the USAFRICOM Chief of Staff, responding for USAFRICOM, and the AAFRICA Commander disagreed with the overall finding, stating that USAFRICOM and the Air Force accomplished the construction of an ISR and C-17 capable airfield in an operationally challenging environment with changing requirements during the construction period.

(U) We acknowledge the immense work and efforts put forth by USAFRICOM and the Air Force. However, the circumstances did not negate the Air Force's responsibility to ensure that construction projects were programmed in accordance with appropriation laws and regulations; construction, operations, and security standards were adhered to; and the appropriate waivers were coordinated and approved by the appropriate authorities, as necessary.
Results in Brief
Evaluation of Niger Air Base 201 Military Construction

Comments (cont’d)

(U/FOUO) The AFAFRICA Commander also disagreed that the Air Force split the construction requirement for ISR operations. The AFAFRICA Commander maintained that each project is a "complete and usable facility," but did not provide additional information that addressed the requirements of the GAO appropriation guide. Therefore, we did not change our finding that AFAFRICA split multiple projects that were required to be combined into a single project.

(U) The AFAFRICA Commander also disagreed that the Air Force potentially violated the Antideficiency Act when it accounted for the permanent guard towers as equipment and acquired them with Procurement funds. The AFAFRICA Commander stated that the basis of the finding of cost, weight, time to erect and foundation requirements can be applied to assets that the DoD uses and procures as equipment. However, AFI 32-1032 stated that a guard tower structure is considered a real property construction if it is permanently installed and not relocatable in practice. Based on the description in AFI 32-1032, we considered cost, weight, time to erect, and foundation requirements as critical factors in concluding that the permanent guard towers were real property construction and should have been acquired with MILCON funds. Therefore, we did not change our finding that AFAFRICA acquired permanent guard towers without congressional notification.

(U) The AFAFRICA Commander further disagreed that there was lack of oversight and coordination in the planning, design, and construction of Air Base 201. The AFAFRICA Commander stated that oversight of planning, design, and construction solutions were discussed and approved at the appropriate levels during key stakeholder meetings. However, AFAFRICA did not provide additional information to explain how the oversight and coordination problems in the report were addressed through the key stakeholder meetings.

(U) This report contains ten recommendations. For eight of the ten recommendations, the proposed actions in the management comments, such as the update to the Air Force Instruction on oversight responsibilities for troop labor construction projects, review of AFAFRICA’s DD Form 1391 validation procedures, and the Under Secretary of the Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD, review of the Air Force programming actions, met the intent of the recommendations, and are resolved but will remain open until we verify that corrective actions were completed. Actions taken on one of the ten recommendations, to develop a plan addressing the deviation on aircraft rescue and firefighting services, were completed during the evaluation and the recommendation was closed.

(U) In addition, one recommendation remains unresolved. Specifically, the USAFRICOM Chief of Staff, responding for USAFRICOM, disagreed with our recommendation to establish a coordination and decision-making process for troop labor construction projects, stating that the USAFRICOM J4 has effective methods in place to communicate with all stakeholders. However, we found that the communications methods that were in place were not effective because key stakeholders stated that their interaction with USAFRICOM personnel was limited and they often received new USAFRICOM requirements that were not based on USAFRICOM official taskings. Furthermore, we did not find evidence that USAFRICOM J4 recommended policies and priorities for construction and procurement of construction materials, such as the policy on the use of solar airfield lights and procurement of permanent guard towers. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We request that the USAFRICOM Commander provide comments in response to the final report.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of the recommendations.
### Recommendations Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Recommendations Unresolved</th>
<th>Recommendations Resolved</th>
<th>Recommendations Closed</th>
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<tr>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Africa Command</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
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<td>Assistance Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.d, 3.f, 3.e</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force Director of Civil Engineers (AF/A4C)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please provide Management Comments by April 30, 2020.

**Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, DoD
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Niger Air Base 201 Military Construction
(Report No. DODIG-2020-077)

This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General’s evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management’s comments on the draft report when preparing the final report.

This report contains ten recommendations. Actions taken on one of the ten recommendations were completed during the evaluation and the recommendation was closed. For eight of the ten recommendations, the proposed actions in the management comments met the intent of the recommendations, and are resolved but will remain open until we verify that corrective actions were completed.

In addition, USAFRICOM did not agree with one recommendation addressed to them; therefore, the recommendation remains unresolved. We request further comments to the unresolved recommendation by April 30, 2020.

DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. We conducted this evaluation in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation.

If you have any questions or would like to discuss the assessment, please contact [Redacted] We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation.

Randolph R. Stone
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Space, Intelligence, Engineering, and Oversight
Contents

Introduction
(U) Objective ........................................................................................................................................................................... 1
(U//FOUO) Background .......................................................................................................................................................... 1

Finding. (U//FOUO) U.S. Africa Command and the Air Force Did Not Effectively Plan, Design, and Construct Air Base 201 .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
(U) Problems Existed in the Planning, Design, and Construction of Air Base 201 .............................................................. 11
(U//FOUO) Air Force Did Not Accurately Capture Scope and Cost of Facilities on Approved DD Form 1391 ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 12
(U//FOUO) AFAFRICA Approved Six O&M Projects That Were Required To Be Combined Into a Single Project ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
(U) Site Surveys Were Not Sufficient to Prevent Airfield Design and Construction Planning Problems ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 23
(U//FOUO) Infrastructure Did Not Meet Construction, Operations, and Security Criteria ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 25
(U) USAFRICOM and the Air Force Lacked Oversight and Coordination in the Planning, Design, and Construction of Air Base 201 ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 30
(U//FOUO) Air Base 201 Infrastructure Was Delayed in Supporting USAFRICOM Operations by 3 Years ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 31
(U//FOUO) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response .................................................................................... 32
(U//FOUO) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response ................................................................................ 35

Appendix
(U) Scope and Methodology .......................................................................................................................................................... 43
(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data ................................................................................................................................................ 45
(U) Use of Technical Assistance ......................................................................................................................................................... 45
(U) Prior Coverage ............................................................................................................................................................................. 45
Contents (cont’d)

Management Comments
(U//FOUO) Department of the Air Force ................................................................. 48
(U) U.S. Africa Command ............................................................................................ 50
(U//FOUO) U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa ..................................... 52
(U//FOUO) Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD 56

Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................................. 58
Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the U.S. Air Force effectively planned, designed, and constructed Air Base 201 in Niger to provide airfield and base support infrastructure in support of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) operations.

(U//FOUO) Background

(U//FOUO) Air Base 201 is a military installation in the desert in Agadez. When complete, Air Base 201 will consist of a new runway; hangars; life support facilities, including living quarters; base roads; base utilities; a base perimeter fence; and other infrastructure, 1

1 (U//FOUO) Cooperative security location is a type of enduring facility with little or no permanent U.S. military presence or U.S. controlled infrastructure.

(U//FOUO) Figure 1. Air Base 201 Facilities, Life Support Area (Left), Hangars and Runway (Right)
USAFRICOM and the Air Force planned seven primary construction projects to achieve ISR operation capability for Air Base 201. Table 1 lists the seven projects with their associated DD Form 1391 project number, funding type, and amounts, as of May 2019.

(U) Table 1. Air Base 201 Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DD Form 1391 Project Number</th>
<th>DD Form 1391 Date</th>
<th>DD Form 1391 Project Description</th>
<th>Funding Type*</th>
<th>Project Cost (in thousands)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFAF 14-0005</td>
<td>Feb 2015</td>
<td>Construct airfield and base camp</td>
<td>MILCON</td>
<td>$50,000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRZA-18-0003</td>
<td>Oct 2017</td>
<td>Construct temporary munitions storage area</td>
<td>O&amp;M (UMMC)</td>
<td>704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACNK-18-0001</td>
<td>Jun 2018</td>
<td>Construct hazardous cargo pad</td>
<td>O&amp;M (UMMC)</td>
<td>1,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACNK-18-0002</td>
<td>Jun 2018</td>
<td>Construct east apron and taxiway</td>
<td>O&amp;M (UMMC)</td>
<td>1,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACNK-18-0012</td>
<td>Sep 2018</td>
<td>Construct hangar foundation for Government-owned/operated aircraft</td>
<td>O&amp;M (UMMC)</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACNK-18-0013</td>
<td>Sep 2018</td>
<td>Construct hangar foundation for air operation branch aircraft</td>
<td>O&amp;M (UMMC)</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACNK-18-0014</td>
<td>Sep 2018</td>
<td>Construct hangar foundation for Joint Special Operations Air Detachment aircraft</td>
<td>O&amp;M (UMMC)</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$55,426</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (U) We discuss the funding types in the Approval and Funding for Air Base 201 section. UMMC is unspecified minor military construction (UMMC) projects.

** (U) The $50 million project cost excludes $11.9 million of reprogrammed Military Construction (MILCON) funds and other costs funded with other appropriations. Specifically, the DD Form 1391 for project number AFAF 14-0005 included other construction costs, such as troop labor, estimated at $3.4 million; equipment funded with Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds, estimated at $168,000; and equipment funded with a Procurement appropriation, estimated at $11 million. Actual O&M and Procurement amounts differed from the amounts on the DD Form 1391, as discussed in the following sections.

Source: AFAFRICA DD Forms 1391.

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2 (U) DD Form 1391 is a project justification document used to obtain congressional authorization and funding for military construction.
(U) Approval and Funding for Air Base 201

(U) As of November 2019, the estimated total construction cost of Air Base 201 was $102.7 million. This amount included the Military Construction (MILCON) appropriation of $61.9 million, Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation of $21.5 million for equipment costing below $250,000, and Procurement appropriation of $19.3 million for equipment costing over $250,000. This amount did not include the cost for troop labor.3

(U) Military Construction

(U) According to 10 U.S.C. § 2801(2008), a MILCON project is defined as all the work necessary to produce a complete and usable facility as described in the DD Form 1391, “FY__ Military Construction Project Data.” Planners and programmers use the DD Form 1391 to describe the scope of the project requirements.4 DD Form 1391 is used to obtain congressional authorization and funding for MILCON costing over $6 million. DD Form 1391 provides detailed, informative statements about the reason the project is needed. The form must identify each primary and supporting facility required to complete the construction project, along with the unit of measure, unit quantity, and unit cost for each facility.

(U) In November 2015, Congress approved $50 million of MILCON funding in the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act to construct the Air Base 201 airfield and base camp. The Air Force reprogrammed an additional $11.9 million to Air Base 201 through two separate reprogramming actions, increasing the total MILCON funds to $61.9 million. Congress approved the first reprogramming action for $10 million in July 2017. The second reprogramming action, for $1.9 million in December 2018, did not require congressional approval because it was below the $2 million reprogramming threshold.5

(U//FOUO) Unspecified Minor Military Construction

(U//FOUO) In addition to the MILCON funding provided in the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA) planned, programmed, and approved six separate O&M construction projects to support ISR operations at Air Base 201 (listed in Table 1) using the statutory authority for unspecified minor military construction projects (UMMC)

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3 (U) Troop labor is the use of military personnel in the execution of construction projects. According to a representative from the U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa Civil Engineer Division, the reason for using troop labor was the austere location of Air Base 201.
4 (U) Programming is the process of developing and obtaining approval and funding for MILCON projects.
5 (U) DoD Financial Management Regulations, Volume 3, Chapter 7, March 2011, states that MILCON reprogramming actions that require prior notification and approval from Congress include increases exceeding 25 percent of the MILCON appropriation or $2 million, whichever is less.
authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 2805 (2017). The use of an O&M appropriation is permitted under 10 U.S.C. § 2805 (2017) when the construction project cost is equal to or less than $2 million.⁶

(U) Air Force guidance provided clarification that construction projects costing over $2 million but no more than $6 million are generally considered UMMC and funded through the MILCON appropriation under the statutory authority in 10 U.S.C. § 2805 (2017).⁷ The Air Force is required to notify Congress of UMMC-approved construction projects.

(U) In October 2019, AFAFRICA modified the programming for the six O&M projects listed in Table 1. Specifically, AFAFRICA reprogrammed projects DRZA-18-0003 and ACNK-18-0001 with FY 2020 O&M appropriations, instead of the originally programmed FY 2018 O&M appropriations. Additionally, AFAFRICA combined four projects (ACNK-18-0002, ACNK-18-0012, ACNK-18-0013, and ACNK-18-0014) into one project, which AFAFRICA submitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise–Related Construction Program for funding.⁸ To qualify for this funding, a project must support U.S. military personnel participating in a qualified joint exercise program. Projects funded through the Exercise–Related Construction Program must be compliant with 10 U.S.C. § 2801 (2008) and § 2805 (2017), as previously discussed.

(U) Operations and Maintenance

(U) O&M appropriations are used to finance equipment with unit cost below $250,000.⁹ The DD Form 1391 for project AFAF-14-0005 included provisions for equipment funded by the O&M appropriation, such as portable guard booths.

(U) Procurement

(U) A Procurement appropriation is used to finance equipment with unit costs exceeding $250,000, which is applied on the basis of the unit cost of a complete system rather than on individual items of equipment or components that, when aggregated, become a system.¹⁰ The DD Form 1391 for project AFAF-14-0005 included provisions for equipment funded by the Procurement appropriation, such as security barriers, tent flooring, solar airfield lighting, and guard towers.

⁶ (U) Effective December 12, 2017, the O&M threshold increased from $1 million to $2 million.
⁸ (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 4600.02B, Exercise-Related Construction Program Management, February 4, 2019.
(U) **Roles and Responsibilities for Air Base 201**

(U) Several DoD organizations were and continue to be involved in the construction of Air Base 201.

(U) **U.S. Africa Command**

(U) USAFRICOM is the theater combatant command that established the requirement to construct Air Base 201. Two primary USAFRICOM components are involved in the construction of Air Base 201.

- (U) The Logistics Directorate (J4) is responsible for providing engineering and construction oversight and guidance toward meeting operational requirements. In addition, the J4 coordinates MILCON planning and programming. The J4 is also responsible for coordinating with the construction execution agent and the lead Service.  

- (U) The Operations Directorate (J3) is responsible for integrating security and force protection into mission execution. The J3 also maintains an antiterrorism program to protect DoD elements and personnel from terrorist attacks.

(U) **U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa**

(U) AFAFRICA is the theater air component responsible for providing air capability and infrastructure to enable USAFRICOM's operations. USAFRICOM tasked AFAFRICA with defining the MILCON requirements for Air Base 201 to support USAFRICOM's mission and operations. AFAFRICA is the primary liaison between USAFRICOM and the MILCON Program Manager. Four primary AFAFRICA components are involved in planning the construction of Air Base 201.

- (U) The Civil Engineer Division (A4C) provides MILCON planning and programming guidance to AFAFRICA. A4C developed the DD Form 1391 programming documents for the construction of Air Base 201.

- (U) The Resources and Integration Division (A4P) provides financial planning, programming, and budget execution for the construction of Air Base 201.

- (U) The Security Forces Division (A4S) provides oversight and guidance to develop the security and force protection requirements for Air Base 201.

- (U) The Staff Judge Advocate (JA) provides legal advice to AFAFRICA on policies, fiscal regulations, and procurement laws.

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11 (U) The construction execution agent is responsible for the execution of construction projects, including design, award, and management of engineering and construction contracts. The Air Force Civil Engineer Center is the construction execution agent for Air Base 201. The designated lead Service is responsible for planning, programming, and budgeting for construction requirements. The Air Force is the lead Service for Air Base 201.
(U) Air Force Civil Engineer Center, Europe Division–Design and Construction Ramstein

(U) The lead authority for administering the design and construction of Air Base 201 under the MILCON appropriation was the MILCON Program Manager, under the Air Force Civil Engineer Center, Europe Division–Design and Construction (AFCEC/CFED). The MILCON Program Manager had oversight and approval authority for applicable funding distribution and construction scope, cost, and schedule changes. The MILCON Program Manager also provided formal direction to the 31st Expeditionary Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron (31st ERHS), the on-site construction provider, on airfield and base camp design and construction changes.

(U) AFCEC/CFED’s Construction Management Officer is responsible for providing on-site project management support to the MILCON Program Manager for the Air Base 201 MILCON project. The Construction Management Officer provides independent quality assurance of design and construction activities, including coordination of material, product, and design submittals; adherence to construction specifications for facilities; and verification of quality control test results related to airfield pavement construction.

(U) Air Force Civil Engineer Center/Facility Engineering Directorate–Technical Services Division

(U) The Air Force Civil Engineer Center, Facility Engineering Directorate–Technical Services Division (AFCEC/CFTP) facilitated design reviews and provided technical criteria definition as requested by the MILCON Program Manager. AFCEC/CFTP was responsible for coordinating and referring technical guidance on the airfield pavement design and airfield lighting system for Air Base 201.

(U) 31st Expeditionary Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (31st ERHS)

(U) The 31st ERHS is the Air Base 201 on-site construction provider responsible for implementing the MILCON, UMMC, and O&M funded construction projects. The 31st ERHS is a troop labor force consisting of approximately 80 Air Force engineers and craftsmen deployed on a 6-month rotation cycle. In addition to construction, the 31st ERHS is responsible for funding execution, scheduling, and construction quality control.
(U) 823rd Expeditionary Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (823rd RED HORSE)

(U) The 823rd RED HORSE is the designer of record for Air Base 201.\(^{12}\) The 823rd RED HORSE designed the Air Base 201 airfield and base support facilities, which included developing the technical requirements and conducting design analysis and calculations. In addition, 823rd RED HORSE, in coordination with the MILCON Program Manager, is responsible for developing the work tasks and construction schedules for the 31st ERHS rotation.

(U) 724th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron

(U) The 724th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron (724th EABS) is the Air Base 201 base operation support integrator and is responsible for providing force protection and life support services to personnel deployed at Air Base 201. The 724th EABS is under the chain of command of the 435th Air Expeditionary Wing and 409th Air Expeditionary Group. Within the 409th Air Expeditionary Group is the Base Defense Squadron, responsible for security at Air Base 201.\(^{13}\)

(U) Senior Advisory Group and Senior Executive Review Group

(U) The Senior Advisory Group (SAG) and Senior Executive Review Group (SERG) for Air Base 201 were forums that provided senior leaders from the DoD organizations described above with situational awareness and participation in the project delivery of Air Base 201. The SAG also served as a forum for stakeholders to coordinate, resolve conflicts, and approve and direct construction requirement changes to execute the project within scope, cost, and schedule. The SERG provided a similar function as the SAG at the Senior Executive Service and general officer level.

\(^{12}\) (U) The designer of record is the entity responsible for establishing construction design

\(^{13}\) (U) In May 2019, the Base Defense Squadron became Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron.
## {U//FOUO} Air Base 201 Planning, Design, and Construction Timeline

(U) Table 2 lists the timeline of key events relevant to this evaluation.

### {U//FOUO} Table 2. Timeline of Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 2013</td>
<td>USAFRICOM tasked AFAFRICA to construct Air Base 201. After the initial tasking, USAFRICOM issued 13 subsequent modification task orders that changed the operational and infrastructure requirements and delivery dates for Air Base 201.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2014</td>
<td>The AFAFRICA site survey team, led by the AFAFRICA pavement engineer, performed the initial site survey at Agadez, Niger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2014 to mid-2015</td>
<td>The 245th Civil Engineer Flight Staff Augmentation Team established a concept of design for Air Base 201 using information contained in the DD Form 1391, project AFAF-14-0005, and engineering data and analysis from the July 2014 site survey.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2015</td>
<td>The Air Force submitted the DD Form 1391 to Congress for project AFAF 14-0005 for MILCON approval to construct Air Base 201.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2015</td>
<td>A site survey team consisting of personnel from USAFRICOM, AFAFRICA, AFCEC/CFED, and 823rd RED HORSE conducted a pre-construction site survey at Agadez, Niger. The purpose of the site survey was to gather additional construction site information, such as materials and equipment requirements; collect additional site survey data; and evaluate support requirements for the initial troop deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2016</td>
<td>AFCEC/CFED acquired services for the construction of the base perimeter fence and security infrastructure through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program.**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2016 to September 2016</td>
<td>The first 31st ERHS deployment occurred. During this period, construction equipment had not arrived at Air Base 201. Consequently, the first 31st ERHS rotation primarily focused on additional site survey and contractor oversight for the base perimeter construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2017</td>
<td>The 823rd RED HORSE completed the airfield design for Air Base 201. Construction activities, such as clearing the runway, excavation, and setting up contracts for materials, commenced shortly after. The 823rd RED HORSE continued to make design modifications to the airfield, as necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2017</td>
<td>The contractor completed construction of the base perimeter infrastructure with the 31st ERHS providing construction oversight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between September 2017 and November 2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
February 2018  The 823rd RED HORSE completed the airfield design document for Air Base 201.

May 2019  The 31st ERHS completed the construction of the airfield. The 435th Contingency Response Group also conducted an airfield survey to certify the suitability of the airfield.

* (U) The 245th Civil Engineer Flight Staff Augmentation Team is an Air National Guard engineering unit tasked with providing support to AFRICA. Concept of design is the initial design drawing document consisting of specification for the runway, taxiway, hangars, and other structures to provide a complete and fully functional airfield.

** (U) The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) is the U.S. Army contracting program that uses established and vetted contractors to provide timely logistical and sustainment services for deployed forces.

Source: USAFRICOM and Air Force records.

(U//FOUO) While USAFRICOM initially tasked AFAFRICA with construction of Air Base 201 to support ISR mission in October 2013, AFAFRICA planned the airfield and base camp with an estimated construction completion date of October 2016 in the DD Form 1391. The Air Force subsequently changed the airfield and base camp estimated construction completion date to December 2017, then to December 2018. According to the AFAFRICA representative, the 31st ERHS commenced construction work on the infrastructure projects to support ISR operations during the first quarter of FY 2020. In June 2019, the Air Force approved temporary waivers to allow ISR operations at Air Base 201. Air Base 201 flight operations commenced in August 2019.
Finding

(U//FOUO) U.S. Africa Command and the Air Force Did Not Effectively Plan, Design, and Construct Air Base 201

(U) USAFRICOM and the Air Force did not effectively plan, design, and construct Air Base 201 in Niger to provide airfield and base support infrastructure in support of USAFRICOM operations. Specifically, we identified the following problems.

- (U//FOUO) The Air Force built runway shoulders without congressional authorization when it submitted a DD Form 1391 to Congress that excluded runway shoulders in the project scope. Furthermore, AF AFRICA significantly underestimated the project cost, which created risk that the Air Force would not complete the MILCON project. As a result, the Air Force took cost saving measures, such as reducing the thickness of pavement in certain areas of the airfield.

- (U//FOUO) The Air Force bypassed congressional notification when it split the construction requirement for ISR operations into six O&M projects totaling $5.4 million, with each O&M project cost ranging from $399,000 to $1.8 million. Because each portion of the project was under $2 million, the Air Force was permitted to use O&M appropriation. AFAFRICA representatives stated that they programmed the six O&M projects to meet USAFRICOM's urgent operational timeline. However, all of the projects were known and each project on its own would not result in a "complete and useable facility" which means the projects should have been combined and reported to Congress.

- (U) The Air Force potentially violated the Antideficiency Act when it acquired 12 permanent guard towers costing approximately $3.7 million, using a Procurement funds instead of MILCON funds that required Air Force approval and congressional notification. In addition, the Air Force constructed foundations meant for temporary guard towers that could potentially be unusable because the permanent guard towers required larger foundations.

- (U) USAFRICOM and the Air Force did not perform complete site surveys to gather information needed for design and construction of the airfield. Specifically, the Air Force did not conduct complete soil sampling and topographic analysis, which created airfield pavement compaction and drainage problems. The Air Force also experienced logistical problems such as material and equipment shortages during construction because the site survey did not identify sources of construction materials.
The Air Force did not construct Air Base 201 infrastructure to meet safety, security, and other technical requirements established in DoD, Air Force, and USAFRICOM directives. Furthermore, the Air Force installed solar airfield lighting that did not conform to the electrical power requirements to provide continuous uninterrupted visual airfield lights.

These problems occurred because USAFRICOM and the Air Force did not effectively oversee and coordinate the delivery of Air Base 201. Specifically, there is no evidence to show that AFAFRICA leadership monitored compliance with required Air Force processes, such as validating the DD Form 1391 and combining known construction projects when required. Furthermore, while USAFRICOM, AFAFRICA, AFCEC/CFED, 823rd RED HORSE, 31st ERHS, and 724th EABS had forums to provide stakeholders situational awareness and participation in the delivery of the airfield and base support facilities, there was a lack of coordination to ensure facilities were in compliance with operational safety and security requirements as identified in DoD, Air Force, and USAFRICOM directives.

As a result of these problems, the airfield and base camp needed to support the USAFRICOM ISR mission was delayed by almost 3 years from the original planned date of completion. In addition, the problems that we identified relating to the aircraft rescue and firefighting facility, and airfield lights could lead to increased risk in safety and security. Furthermore, the construction of the infrastructure necessary to support the ISR mission, such as munitions storage and handling areas, has not been completed. To accept the risk associated with the lack of infrastructure, the Air Force approved temporary waivers in June 2019 to allow operations at Air Base 201. However, operating without the infrastructure increases the safety risk for personnel operating at Air Base 201.

Problems Existed in the Planning, Design, and Construction of Air Base 201

USAFRICOM and the Air Force did not effectively plan, design, and construct Air Base 201 in Niger to provide airfield and base support infrastructure in support of USAFRICOM operations. Specifically, AFAFRICA did not plan the MILCON scope and cost in accordance with applicable standards. For example, the Air Force excluded runway shoulders from the MILCON scope and underestimated MILCON costs for facilities such as relocatable aircraft shelters and base perimeter fence. Also, AFAFRICA programmed six separate O&M projects even though there is
(U) existing guidance on combining the projects. The Air Force also constructed
guard tower foundations that did not meet required specification, in terms of size,
for the permanent guard towers that AFRICA acquired. In addition, AFRICA
acquired the permanent guard towers without congressional notification.
Furthermore, USAFRICOM and AFRICA did not perform thorough site surveys to
design the airfield and plan for sources of construction materials and equipment.
AF/CFED, 823rd RED HORSE, and 31st ERHS also did not design and construct
Air Base 201 infrastructure in accordance with applicable DoD standards to meet
safety and security requirements, including the aircraft rescue and firefighting
station, base perimeter fence, and airfield lighting.

(U//FOUO) Air Force Did Not Accurately Capture Scope
and Cost of Facilities on Approved DD Form 1391

(U//FOUO) The Air Force built runway shoulders without congressional
authorization when it submitted a DD Form 1391 to Congress that excluded runway
shoulders in the project scope. Specifically, AFRICA excluded 28,800 square
meters of runway shoulders from the DD Form 1391 scope and cost estimate.
Furthermore, AFRICA significantly underestimated the project costs, for
elements such as the relocatable aircraft shelter and base perimeter fence, by at
least $11.9 million, which created risk that the Air Force would not have sufficient
funding to complete the MILCON project. To address these underfunded aspects
of the project, the Air Force took cost saving measures such as reducing the thickness of the pavement in certain
aircraft parking areas.

(U) Runway Shoulders Were Added to the Scope of the Project
Without Authorization

(U) The Air Force built runway shoulders that it excluded from the DD Form 1391;
therefore, the runway shoulders were built without congressional authorization.
The constructed runway measured approximately 95,000 square meters, including
the runway shoulders. However, the congressionally-approved DD Form 1391 listed
a line item for 68,240 square meters of runway, which excluded approximately
28,800 square meters of shoulder. According to 10 U.S.C. § 2853 (2016), the
MILCON scope of work, in terms of function, size, and quantity, may not be
increased above the amount specified in the DD Form 1391 provided to Congress.
The MILCON Program Manager stated that the 31st ERHS built the runway
shoulders as part of the MILCON because shoulders were essential to the runway,
even though they were excluded from the DD Form 1391.
An AFAFRICA A4C representative stated that the DD Form 1391 submitted to Congress did not individually list all infrastructure, such as the shoulders, because the DD Form 1391 would result in several pages. However, the DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR), which provides instruction for preparing the DD Form 1391, requires that items of construction directly related to and required for the support of the primary facility be listed as supporting facilities with accepted units of measure and quantity. The shoulders should have been listed in the DD Form 1391 because the shoulders were directly related to and required for the support of the runway, which is the primary facility.

Another AFAFRICA A4C representative stated that the shoulders were part of the runway scope of 68,240 square meters, as specified in the DD Form 1391. However, we determined that the constructed runway was approximately 40 percent above the size stated in the DD Form 1391. Scope may not be increased above the amount specified in a MILCON project, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 2853 (2016). An Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) Memorandum provides further clarification that 10 U.S.C. § 2853 (2016) does not authorize increases in scope, and components

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(U) must seek additional authorization if additional scope is required. With an increase in scope of 40 percent, AFAFRICA was required to seek additional authorization from Congress. However, an AFAFRICA A4C representative stated that AFAFRICA did not seek additional authorization from Congress on the scope increase.

{U//FOUO} AFAFRICA Underestimated Air Base 201 Costs on the DD Form 1391

(U) AFAFRICA significantly underestimated the project cost, such as the relocatable aircraft shelter and base perimeter fence, by at least $11.9 million, which created risk that the Air Force would not have sufficient funds to complete the entire MILCON project. Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 3-730-01 states that programming cost estimates must be prepared as accurately as possible to reflect the budgetary cost of providing facilities. Table 3 shows the facilities with significant cost variations based on the difference between the DD Form 1391 cost estimates and current working estimate (CWE) costs as of January 2017 derived from the Air Force financial records. These cost variations demonstrate that AFAFRICA programmers significantly underestimated the costs of Air Base 201 facilities.

\textit{(U) Table 3. DD Form 1391 Facilities Cost Variation}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilities</th>
<th>DD Form 1391 Cost Estimates (in thousands)</th>
<th>CWE Costs as of 2017 (in thousands)</th>
<th>Change in $ (in thousands)</th>
<th>Change in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relocatable aircraft shelters</td>
<td>$2,250</td>
<td>$5,518</td>
<td>$3,267</td>
<td>145%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base roads</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base perimeter fence</td>
<td>6,104</td>
<td>11,623</td>
<td>5,519</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security guard tower pads</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base utilities</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>3,098</td>
<td>2,895</td>
<td>1426%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Air Force financial records.

17 (U) The CWE was the construction cost estimate, derived from the January 2017 SERG minutes. AFAFRICA did not provide more recent cost information. CWE cost generally includes estimated contract cost and construction contingency cost.
The degree to which the project costs were underestimated on the DD Form 1391 created a risk that the Air Force would not have sufficient funds available to complete the airfield and base infrastructure. In accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 2853 (2016), the Air Force may not increase the cost authorized for a MILCON project by more than 25 percent of the amount appropriated for the project or 200 percent of the minor construction project ceiling of $6 million, whichever is less. For Air Base 201, this meant that the Air Force could reprogram up to $12 million in MILCON funding to complete the project. AFAFRICA reprogrammed a total of $11.9 million in July 2017 and December 2018 to cover the underestimated costs on the DD Form 1391. The reprogramming actions were allowable because the total amount was under the $12 million threshold. However, there was a risk that the reprogrammed funds would not be sufficient to cover the full cost of the project because the Air Force significantly underestimated the cost of facilities. According to the Air Force construction records, the Air Force took cost saving measures, such as reducing the pavement design profile of the ISR apron, to mitigate the risk of not completing the MILCON project due to underestimated costs.

AFAFRICA Approved Six O&M Projects That Were Required To Be Combined Into a Single Project

The Air Force bypassed congressional notification when it split the construction requirement for ISR operations into six O&M projects totaling $5.4 million. With each O&M project cost ranging from $399,000 to $1.8 million, congressional notification was not required. However, splitting the project would not result in a “complete and usable facility” to support ISR operations. AFAFRICA representatives stated that they programmed the six O&M projects to meet USAFRICOM’s urgent operational timeline. The AFAFRICA A4C Chief Civil Engineer approved the DD Forms 1391 for the six separate O&M projects. According to an AFAFRICA A4C representative, separately programming the projects as O&M would allow the 31st ERHS to initiate construction of the infrastructure immediately after completion of the MILCON funded runway project to meet USAFRICOM’s urgent operational need. AFAFRICA A4C senior officials

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18 (U) An apron is a paved area provided for aircraft parking, servicing, and loading. The Air Force reduced the depth of the apron sub-layer by 8 inches, resulting in cost savings in equipment rental time and materials of $470,000.

19 (U) There was a rotational change in the AFAFRICA Chief Civil Engineer position during the period from October 2017 to June 2018. Consequently, the former AFAFRICA Chief Civil Engineer signed the DD Form 1391 for project DRZA-18-0003, and the current AFAFRICA Chief Civil Engineer signed the DD Forms 1391 for projects ACNK-18-0001, ACNK-18-0002, ACNK-18-0012, ACNK-18-0013, and ACNK-18-0014.
stated that they were not aware of any intent to bypass the Air Force approval and congressional notification process. However, by separately programming the O&M projects, AFRICA bypassed the Air Force congressional notification process.\footnote{The Air Force congressional notification process applies to Unspecified Minor Military Construction (UMMC) construction projects costing between $2 million and $6 million. The Air Force Facilities Management Division (AF/A4CF) initiates the process by requesting major commands to submit prioritized list of UMMC projects. The AF/A4CF oversees the project prioritization and approval. When a project is approved and there is funding availability, the project is routed to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Environmental, Safety, and Infrastructure) (SAF/IEE) for approval and congressional notification. According to GAO-16-406 report, approvals for MILCON funded projects may take up to 2 years.}


\footnote{We determined that each of the six O&M projects was not a complete and usable facility because the engineering plans contemplated the need for all six O&M projects to fully support USAFRICOM’s ISR mission. In August 2017, the AFRICA Staff Judge Advocate Legal Counsel and Chief Civil Engineer jointly signed the Agadez Basing TASKORD MOD 12 Phase III Legal Review (Legal Review) to document the legal justification that the six O&M projects to construct the munitions storage area, hazardous cargo pad, apron and hangars were separately independent and each deemed complete and usable on its own. The Legal Review also specified that, while the facilities were interrelated, each was independent from the other because one facility is not required for the other one to function. However, the Legal Review also identified that construction of one facility without the others will result in logistical problems and expose Air Base 201 to safety risk when executing ISR missions.}
According to the Air Force A4C policy manager, the Legal Review provided sufficient analysis that each facility was individually complete and usable. However, GAO specifies that the construction of a single “complete and usable facility” may involve the construction of several interrelated buildings and structures. The key factor is that a single building or structure could not satisfy the need that justified carrying out the construction project. The Legal Review reinforced the point that a single O&M project could not satisfy the requirement to support USAFRICOM’s ISR mission. Specifically, AFRICA’s decision to construct all six O&M projects was based on the expected logistical problems and safety risk associated with ISR operations if one project was constructed without the other five.

Additionally, a decision to construct one of the projects without the others would require waivers associated with deviations from safety standards. We found no evidence to show that the AFRICA Chief Civil Engineer and Legal Counsel pursued waivers or coordinated with USAFRICOM to demonstrate whether the USAFRICOM Commander was willing to accept safety risk associated with constructing one facility without the others. An A4C representative also told us in April 2019 that senior officials were not willing to approve waivers and accept safety risk if only one of the projects was constructed. Therefore, construction of all six projects was necessary to produce a complete and usable facility to support the ISR mission and should have been programmed as a single construction project.

Air Force Reprogramming Actions Increased Costs and Lacked Justification

We found that AFRICA’s reprogramming efforts for the infrastructure in September 2019 to be problematic because AFRICA A4C did not have evidence to support its justification for the construction project. Furthermore, the total cost for the infrastructure construction increased from $5.4 million to $9.1 million, which would require AFRICA to seek approval for a MILCON through Congress under the Military Construction Authorization Act.

24 (U) In GAO B-213137, January 30, 1986, the GAO noted that the Army’s construction of separate facilities such as a runway, control tower, and hangar constituted a single project to produce a complete and usable new airfield.
26 (U//FOUO) The 435th AEW Commander approved two temporary waivers in June 2019. The waivers are effective for 2 years to allow ISR operations at Air Base 201 until construction of the projects to support operations is completed.
U) Specifically, AFAFRICA A4C reprogrammed four of the six projects into a single construction project with a total cost of $5.5 million using the Joint Staff Exercise–Related Construction (ERC) Program. Projects DRZA-18-0003 and ACNK-18-0002 were separately programmed as FY 2020 O&M funded projects, each costing $1.7 million. However, AFAFRICA should have programmed the six projects as a single construction project, as previously discussed. Table 5 identifies the modified programming actions.

(U/FOUO) Table 4. Modified Infrastructure Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DD Form 1391 Project Number</th>
<th>DD Form 1391 Description</th>
<th>Approval Date</th>
<th>Funding Type</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACNK-18-0003 (FORMERLY DRZA-18-0003)</td>
<td>Construct munitions storage area</td>
<td>NA*</td>
<td>O&amp;M (UMMC)</td>
<td>1,770,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACNK-19-0001 (FORMERLY ACNK-18-0001)</td>
<td>Construct hazardous cargo pad</td>
<td>NA*</td>
<td>O&amp;M (UMMC)</td>
<td>1,790,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$9,092,180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*As of October 2019, the DD Forms 1391 had not been approved.
Source: Air Force records.

(U/FOUO) We found no evidence to support that USAFRICOM changed its requirement for the infrastructure. According to the DD Form 1391, project NG-ERC-2020-00040964 AC 20-10, AFAFRICA A4C requested funding through the Joint Staff ERC Program to provide aircraft parking infrastructure in support of exercise-related operations at Air Base 201. When asked about the supporting evidence for the justification, AFAFRICA A4C representatives did not provide supporting evidence but stated that the exercise-related aircraft parking requirement was not based on a USAFRICOM order. AFAFRICA representatives stated that programming the four original projects into one construction project met the intent of the AFI 32-1032 that prohibited splitting construction projects.

(U/FOUO) According to the Military Construction Authorization Act, AFAFRICA should have combined all projects and sought congressional approval because the primary justification for the construction projects of supporting ISAR mission did not change. By separately programming the projects using the Joint Staff ERC and O&M appropriation, AFAFICA bypassed the required congressional approval process.
The Air Force Acquired Permanent Guard Towers Without Congressional Notification and Constructed Guard Tower Foundations That Were Potentially Unusable

The Air Force potentially violated the Antideficiency Act when it acquired 12 permanent guard towers costing approximately $3.7 million using a Procurement funds instead of MILCON funds that would have required Air Force approval and congressional notification. In addition, the Air Force constructed foundations meant for temporary guard towers that could potentially be unusable because the permanent guard towers required larger foundations.

The AFAFRICA A4C, A4S, and A4P bypassed the Air Force approval and congressional notification process when it programmed the funding for the permanent guard towers costing approximately $3.7 million with Procurement funds instead of MILCON funds. An AFAFRICA A4C representative stated that AFAFRICA considered the guard towers “equipment,” at a cost of approximately $300,000 each, which qualified for Procurement funding. The representative further stated that the AFAFRICA A4C considered the guard towers equipment and not construction because the towers were relocatable, as specified in DoD Instruction (DoDI) 4165.56. DoDI 4165.56 defines relocatable buildings as prefabricated structures that are designed and constructed to be readily moved, erected, disassembled, stored, and reused. In addition, the DoDI 4165.56 identifies the use of relocatable buildings as temporary or interim in nature. DoDI 4165.56 also requires the use of MILCON funding, not Procurement funding, for relocatable buildings if classified as real property and total acquisition and construction costs exceed $2 million under 10 U.S.C. § 2805 (2017).
(U) We determined that the permanent guard towers did not conform to the definition of relocatable buildings, which only applies to temporary or interim structures. We further determined that the acquisition and construction of the permanent guard towers should have been classified as real property.

(U) AFI 32-1032 provided specific guidance on planning and programming guard towers, which states that if a guard tower structure is: (1) permanently installed, (2) not temporary in nature, and (3) not relocatable in practice, it is real property and installation is classified as construction. The term “construction” included the labor to acquire and erect real property installed equipment. The manufacturer’s assembly instructions for the guard towers showed that the guard towers would be bolted to a concrete pad with each component welded together.

Also, relocation could be costly in terms of required labor and equipment. Because the guard towers meet the definition of real property and their total cost of approximately $3.7 million exceeded the $2 million threshold for MILCON funding, AFAFRICA should have accounted for the permanent guard towers as construction and gone through the Air Force approval and congressional notification process.
Furthermore, AFAFRICA potentially violated the Antideficiency Act when it used Procurement appropriation, instead of MILCON appropriation, to acquire the guard towers. Specifically, Procurement appropriation is used to finance equipment, while MILCON appropriation is used for real property construction. According to 31 U.S.C. § 1301(1982), appropriations must be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made. According to the DoD FMR, noncompliance with 31 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982) may result in an Antideficiency Act violation.  

The Air Force Constructed Guard Tower Foundations That Were Potentially Unusable

The Air Force constructed eight foundations for temporary guard towers that were potentially unusable because the 12 permanent guard towers that the Air Force purchased required larger foundations. According to the MILCON Program Manager, he was not aware that AFAFRICA planned the acquisition of the 12 permanent guard towers and that larger foundations were required. The MILCON Program Manager stated that he and the 31st ERHS understood that the AFAFRICA A4C planned the purchase of eight temporary guard towers, as identified in the congressionally-approved DD Form 1391. Because of this, AFCEC/CFED planned and executed contract services through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program to complete the construction of eight guard tower foundations for temporary guard towers in March 2016. The MILCON Program Manager stated that he was not aware that larger foundations were necessary during the time the guard tower foundations were being constructed from April 2016 to February 2017.

(U) When asked, AFAFRICA A4S did not provide records to show how and when AFAFRICA A4S changed the requirement from temporary guard towers to permanent guard towers. AFAFRICA records show that AFAFRICA A4S had planned for the 12 permanent guard tower requirement for FY 2016. However, we did not obtain evidence to show that AFAFRICA A4S or A4C communicated with the MILCON Program Manager and 31st ERHS about the planned acquisition for 12 permanent guard towers. We also found no evidence to show that AFAFRICA A4S and A4C communicated the requirement for foundations necessary to erect the 12 permanent guard towers prior to the completion of the guard tower foundations in February 2017.

(U) During our site visit in April 2019, the temporary guard tower foundations had not been utilized for temporary or permanent guard towers. Air Base 201 also had not received all components of the 12 permanent guard towers as of April 2019. According to the MILCON Program Manager, the temporary guard tower foundations will not be used for permanent guard towers. Consequently, the Air Force spent $91,000 to build eight concrete foundations that were not used and are too small to support the acquired permanent guard towers.
(U) Site Surveys Were Not Sufficient to Prevent Airfield Design and Construction Planning Problems

(U) USAFRICOM and the Air Force did not perform complete site surveys to gather information needed for design and construction. Specifically, the Air Force did not conduct complete soil sampling and topographic analysis, which created airfield pavement compaction and drainage problems. The Air Force also experienced logistical problems such as material and equipment shortages during construction because the site survey did not identify sources of construction materials.

(U) UFC 3-260-02 states that the design of airfield pavement must be based on complete and thorough site surveys, including soil sampling, topographic analysis, and identification of material sources. However, a site survey conducted in July 2014 consisted of limited soil samplings and a limited topographic survey. The AFAFRICA site survey team, led by the AFAFRICA pavement engineer, also did not identify possible sources of materials in the area. At remote locations where engineering data are not readily available, site surveys can take 2 to 3 weeks to gather comprehensive engineering data; however, the Air Base 201 site survey occurred within 12 hours because of security concerns in Niger.

(U) In October 2015, USAFRICOM and the Air Force conducted another pre-construction site survey, which focused on additional soil sampling. Similar to the July 2014 site survey, security concerns limited the October 2015 site survey to 7 hours and prevented the team from collecting necessary testing and topographic data.

(U) Limited Soil Sampling Resulted in Design Modifications

(U) The AFAFRICA site survey team conducted limited soil sampling that did not provide sufficient information on the predominant soil type at the airfield. According to UFC 3-260-02, representative soil samples should be obtained and classified to detect problematic soil types that could compromise pavement compaction and strength. As a result of the limited soil sampling, the AFAFRICA site survey team misclassified the soil as cohesive type, instead of a cohesion-less soil type that requires moisture and compaction at a greater depth. Because of the misclassification, the Air Force had to increase the designed pavement depth by 39 inches after the start of the project, which required additional materials and construction time. Also, the limited soil samples prevented effective planning.

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30 (U) UFC 3-260-02 does not provide standard timeframes for a site survey because site survey duration is dependent on factors such as team size, equipment availability, and local information. The duration of 2 to 3 weeks was based on a site survey conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at another remote location similar to Air Base 201.
(U) for construction equipment. For example, the 31st ERHS did not have the proper equipment for soil compaction and had to resort to using loaded trucks instead of pad foot rollers.  

(U) **Limited Topographic Survey Resulted in Grading and Drainage Problems**

(U) In addition, the site survey team conducted limited topographic analysis to identify slopes, flat terrain, and the floodplain in the area of the planned airfield. Because of the limited topographic analysis, the team did not get adequate information to properly design grading and drainage. This problem became apparent when the June 2016 rainy season revealed large amounts of water accumulation in the east area of the runway, which resulted in the drainage design being adjusted. In addition, during the construction of the life support area, but before the construction of the airfield, the 31st ERHS and the 823rd RED HORSE determined that the original airfield location needed to be shifted 200 feet because the topographic and geotechnical characteristic at the original location was not suitable for the airfield. However, the shift in the airfield location exacerbated the soil identification problem, as previously discussed, because the soil samples collected at the original location were not representative of the area for which the airfield was to be constructed.

(U) **Sources of Materials Not Identified During the Site Survey Resulted in Material Shortage**

(U) The site survey team did not identify sufficient sources of materials as specified in UFC 3-260-02, which states that areas within the airfield site or a reasonable haul distance from the site should be explored for possible sources of materials. The Air Force overestimated the availability of construction materials in the region. Specifically, the 31st ERHS had to search the region for a local vendor to supply an estimated 292,000 metric tons of base material. The 31st ERHS identified a local vendor, but that vendor had the capability to produce only 8,000 metric tons of base material per month; the amount needed would have taken approximately 3 years to produce. The 31st ERHS eventually located another local vendor with the capability to produce 30,000 metric tons of base materials per month, which greatly improved the construction schedule.

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31 (U) A pad foot roller is used to compact soil in the construction of pavements.
32 (U) Grading is the process of making a base for different construction works, such as foundation for a building, base course for railways and roads, or sloping for surface drainage.
33 (U) According to the location report generated by the Defense Travel Management Office’s Travel Explorer, Niger has a primary rainfall season from June to September.
34 (U) Base materials may consist of naturally occurring course-grained soil or blended and processed soil that provides a structural underlayment support for the top layer, such as asphalt. Estimated and actual quantity of base material used during construction differed.
(U) Based on financial and site survey records and interviews with AFAFRICA representatives and the MILCON Program Manager, we determined that the security risk during the period when the site surveys were conducted at Air Base 201 outweighed the project risk associated with the lack of geotechnical data to effectively plan and design the airfield. However, AFAFRICA A4C did not provide evidence to show that USAFRICOM and the Air Force conducted a risk analysis to support the decision to limit the site surveys due to security concerns. With limited geotechnical data and analysis, the Air Force made incorrect assumptions about the airfield design specifications that eventually delayed the capability to support the USAFRICOM mission. USAFRICOM and AFAFRICA may not be able to determine root causes for why the construction was delayed and implement lessons learned without adequate documentation of its risk analysis to support critical decisions.

**{U//FOUO} Infrastructure Did Not Meet Construction, Operations, and Security Criteria**

(U) The Air Force did not construct Air Base 201 infrastructure to meet safety, security, and other technical requirements established in DoD and USAFRICOM directives. Specifically, facilities such as the aircraft rescue and firefighting station, base perimeter security, and airfield lighting did not meet safety and security requirements.

**{U//FOUO} Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting Facility and Had Design Problems**

(U//FOUO) Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting Facility and Had Design Problems

Initial operations for the airfield commenced in August 2019;

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35 (U) DoD Instruction 6055.06, “DoD Fire and Emergency Services Program,” Incorporating Change 1, August 31, 2018.
The 724th EABS fire department response time analysis revealed that the 823rd RED HORSE did not effectively design the initial ARFF placement in the airfield to provide a timely emergency response for the entire airfield. Specifically, the response time analysis supports, and the Base Fire Chief agreed, the conclusion that original ARFF location, as designed, would not allow the fire department to meet required fire response times when responding to announced and unannounced emergencies.

According to Air Force Manual 32-1084 and UFC 3-260-01, ARFF facilities must be located strategically to allow firefighting vehicles to meet response time requirements to all areas of the airfield; a site centrally located, close to the midpoint of the runway, is preferred. Therefore, 823rd RED HORSE should have designed the location of the ARFF close to the midpoint of the runway to meet required emergency response time absent a justification supporting another location.

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36 (U) The aggregate response time for an announced emergency assumes firefighting units are pre-positioned and capable of responding to any incident on the runway, while the aggregate response time for an unannounced emergency includes dispatch time, turnout time, and travel time.

37 (U) Memorandum for 724 EABS/CC, Subject: Aggregate Response Time Analysis, dated May 31, 2019, provided by the 724th EABS Fire Department.

(U) According to DoDI 6055.06, temporary deviations in fire and emergency services require a documented “get-well” plan. At a minimum, the plan should contain an assessment of the risk, measures to minimize the risk, detailed steps to meet the requirements, a communication strategy for informing those affected by the deviation, formal approval and acceptance of the risk from the base commander, and formal review by an authority at least one level higher than the base commander, such as the major command. While the 724th EABS fire department has taken initial steps to address the deviation in ARFF services, such as conducting a response time analysis and taking measures to minimize risk, more work is needed to address the increased risk.

(U) Specifically, we found no evidence of the 724th EABS Base Commander’s approval and risk acceptance or a higher authority’s formal review. In addition, we found no evidence showing that the 724th EABS fire department communicated the risk of the ARFF services gap. Particularly, the airfield survey conducted on May 15, 2019, identified the ARFF capabilities at Air Base 201 at an optimum level of service. AFI 32-2001 defines optimum level of service as all authorized resources are available for emergency response within response time standards. However, we found the information in the airfield survey to be inaccurate because the 724th EABS fire department aggregate response time analysis, conducted 2 weeks after the airfield survey, showed they did not meet the required response time. Without accurate information, U.S. forces operating at Air Base 201 may not be able to make informed decisions to mitigate safety risks associated with the gap in ARFF services.

40 (U) Effective October 3, 2019, the DoD updated DoDI 6055.06, which specified that DoD Components must develop policy and procedures for deviations.
41 (U) An airfield survey is used to update the Air Mobility Command’s Global Decision Support System, which contains key aspects such as weather and airfield details used to quickly and effectively plan and monitor all phases of air mobility operations.
(U//FOUO) Base Perimeter Fence Was Not Constructed to USAFRICOM Antiterrorism Standards

(U//FOUO) The 724th EABS accepted the base perimeter fence constructed by a contractor even though the infrastructure did not meet USAFRICOM antiterrorism standards.

However, the 724th EABS Commander and the MILCON Program Manager did not have the authority to accept the risk, as specified in ACI 3203.04A, which states USAFRICOM representatives stated that they did not receive any security waiver requests Thus, USAFRICOM personnel were not fully aware of the security risks at Air Base 201.

(U//FOUO) Solar Airfield Lighting Did Not Meet Operational and Safety Requirements

(U) Air Base 201 did not have the appropriate airfield lighting to provide standardized visual guidance to pilots when operating aircraft on the ground and in the air. Specifically, AFCEC/CFED and the 31st ERHS purchased and installed solar airfield lights that did not conform to the electrical power requirements for a cooperative security location to provide continuous uninterrupted visual

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44 (U) Standardization means that the configuration and color of the lights at each airfield are identical and have the same meaning. Standardization enables pilots to readily interpret the guidance information.
(U) airfield lights. 45 According to Air Force Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 11-27, solar-powered fixtures are approved for use in contingency locations and only for certain applications, such as runway and taxiway edge lights.46 Lighting applications such as the precision approach path indicating lights that provide visual glide path guidance for landing an aircraft cannot be solar-powered, even for contingency locations, as specified in ETL 11-27.

(U//FOUO) In September 2015, the Air Base 201 classification changed triggering a re-evaluation of facility requirements, including the airfield lighting. However, in October 2017, AFCEC/CFED proceeded with the purchase of solar lights more appropriate for a contingency location, not a cooperative security location. The MILCON Program Manager stated that AFCEC/CFED purchased the solar airfield lights because the DD Form 1391 identified the use of solar airfield lights.

(U) The MILCON Program Manager stated that AFCEC/CFED obtained waivers for the use of solar lights. According to UFC 3-535-01, the major command vice commander may waive airfield lighting requirements if compliance is not practical or feasible.47 The base is responsible for coordinating the waiver requests, including submitting the base commander-approved waiver requests to the Air Force Installation Management Support Center, Engineering Support Division, and the AFCEC Operations Directorate for technical review. However, we did not identify evidence of official waivers, including a waiver signed by the AFAFRICA Vice Commander.

(U) The MILCON Program Manager stated that a 31st ERHS representative reached out to the AFCEC subject matter expert for waivers. However, the AFCEC subject matter expert stated that AFCEC was not responsible for authorizing a waiver on the use of solar airfield lights at Air Base 201. The AFCEC subject matter expert also stated that the use of solar airfield lights was not optimal in an environment characterized by sand storms and a heavy rainy season, such as Niger, because the solar panels may not charge during inclement weather, thereby affecting the functionality of the airfield lights. Thus, there is operational safety risk associated with the use of solar airfield lights.

45 (U) Cooperative security location is an enduring base characterized by more robust infrastructure lasting up to 10 years.
(U//FOUO) USAFRICOM and the Air Force Lacked Oversight and Coordination in the Planning, Design, and Construction of Air Base 201

(U) The planning, design, and construction problems at Air Base 201 occurred because USAFRICOM and the Air Force did not effectively oversee and coordinate the planning, design, and construction of Air Base 201. Specifically, we did not find any evidence to demonstrate that AFAFRICA leadership reviewed, validated, and approved the MILCON planning and programming of Air Base 201. According to AFI 32-1021, the major command validates each MILCON project and confirms by a signed letter that the DD Form 1391 data are accurate and complete. However, an AFAFRICA A4C representative stated that there was no signed letter from AFAFRICA leadership validating the accuracy and completeness of the DD Form 1391. Furthermore, AFAFRICA leadership did not ensure that responsible individuals maintained records to support actions throughout the planning process of Air Base 201. For example, there were no decision memorandums to show that AFAFRICA leadership and USAFRICOM were engaged in and oversaw the decisions to limit the site surveys because of security concerns in Niger.

(U) The Air Force also conducted limited oversight of AFAFRICA planning and programming processes. Specifically, AFI 32-1021 identified the required process for MILCON planning and programming initiated at the installation level, which is then validated at the major command level—such as AFAFRICA—and then submitted to Air Force Headquarters for approval. However, AFI 32-1021 did not identify oversight responsibilities when the major command initiates MILCON planning and programming. Accordingly, Air Base 201 planning and programming may not have received the level of review and scrutiny intended by AFI 32-1021.

(U) Additionally, while USAFRICOM, AFAFRICA, AFCEC/CFED, 823rd RED HORSE, and 724th EABS had forums to provide stakeholders situational awareness and participation in the delivery of the airfield and base support facilities, there was a lack of coordination to ensure constructed facilities were in compliance with DoD, Air Force, and USAFRICOM guidance. Specifically, USAFRICOM communicated the change of Air Base 201 from a contingency location to a cooperative security location to AFAFRICA through task orders; however, AFAFRICA did not coordinate the change with AFCEC/CFED to determine whether changes were needed to the MILCON requirements or whether waivers were necessary, such as with the use of solar airfield lights. USAFRICOM personnel also stated that AFAFRICA communicated MILCON issues strictly through the official flag officer channel; as a result, communication was limited in scope. Similarly, AFCEC/CFED, 31st ERHS,
(U) and 724th EABS personnel stated that interaction with USAFRICOM personnel was limited and that they often received information on new USAFRICOM requirements, but the requirements were not always based on official taskings.

(U//FOUO) We also found that the MILCON Program Manager and 823rd RED HORSE coordinated with AFAFRICA personnel and operators to ensure that the initial design of Air Base 201 met USAFRICOM requirements. However, there were instances when design and construction changes were not coordinated with appropriate personnel or subject matter experts. For example, AFAFRICA A4S personnel did not coordinate the change in guard tower requirements with the MILCON Program Manager. The MILCON Program Manager also approved the facilities based on a request from the 724th EABS. However, there was no evidence to show that AFAFRICA personnel endorsed the requested change, as required in the AFCEC Change Order Management Plan. Additionally, the MILCON Program Manager did not coordinate with the AFCEC/CFTP subject matter experts prior to purchasing the solar airfield lights. Although there were e-mail communications showing that MILCON Program Manager and the 31st ERHS personnel requested clarifying guidance on the installation of solar airfield lights and navigation aids, the AFCEC/CFTP subject matter experts did not provide clear guidance that solar airfield lights were not appropriate for airfields such as the one at Air Base 201, nor did they provide guidance on correcting the deficiency.

(U//FOUO) Air Base 201 Infrastructure Was Delayed in Supporting USAFRICOM Operations by 3 Years

(U//FOUO) As a result, the Air Force was delayed in supporting the USAFRICOM ISR mission by almost 3 years from the planned construction completion date of October 2016 identified on the DD Form 1391. In addition, the problems that we identified relating to the aircraft rescue and firefighting facility, and airfield lights could lead to increased risk in safety and security. Furthermore, the construction of the infrastructure necessary to support ISR missions, such as munitions storage and handling areas, has not been completed. To accept the risk associated with the lack of infrastructure, the Air Force approved temporary waivers in June 2019 to allow ISR operations at Air Base 201. However, operating without the infrastructure to support increases the safety risk for personnel operating at Air Base 201.

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Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

**USAFRICOM Comments on Problems in Planning, Design, and Construction of Air Base 201**

(U) The USAFRICOM Chief of Staff, responding for the USAFRICOM Commander, disagreed with the report as written. Specifically, the USAFRICOM Chief of Staff stated that the report lacked the context that USAFRICOM and the Air Force accomplished the delivery of Air Base 201, one of the largest engineering projects in Air Force history, despite the operationally challenging environment in the middle of the Sahara Desert. Furthermore, the Chief of Staff stated that the report did not consider the changing operational requirements under which Air Base 201 was built. According to the Chief of Staff, USAFRICOM and the Air Force remained tightly aligned throughout the construction project and all decisions to move forward on project work were based on legal reviews that found no objections.

**Our Response**

(U) We acknowledge the efforts of USAFRICOM and the Air Force in the construction of Air Base 201 in an austere location. We further acknowledge the changing operational requirements during the time that Air Force constructed Air Base 201. However, changing requirements did not negate the responsibility for ensuring that construction projects were programmed in accordance with appropriation laws and regulations and construction, operations, and security standards. If achieving such standards were not feasible in the operational environment, the appropriate waivers should have been coordinated and approved by the appropriate authorities.

**AFAFRICA Comments on Problems in Planning, Design, and Construction of Air Base 201**

(U) The AFAFRICA Commander disagreed with the overall findings in the report, stating that the DoD OIG considered only 21 of 60 critical comments that AFAFRICA submitted for inclusion in the report. The AFAFRICA Commander also disagreed with the finding that USAFRICOM and the Air Force did not effectively plan, design, and construct Air Base 201, citing that an ISR and C-17 capable airfield was constructed in a little over 3 years in the middle of the Sahara Desert, despite the necessity to meet emerging requirements and overcome environmental factors. According to the AFAFRICA Commander, such undertaking would not be possible without senior level oversight and effective planning and design.
The AFAFRICA Commander also disagreed with the finding related to splitting the construction requirement for ISR operations. Specifically, the AFAFRICA Commander stated that the projects fall under the category of “concurrent projects,” as defined in AFI 32-1032, paragraphs 4.2.7.2 and 4.2.7.3, which do not need to be consolidated into a single project. The Commander further stated that each project have a separate Category Code and that the AFAFRICA Judge Advocate determined each project to be independently complete and usable.

Finally, the AFAFRICA Commander disagreed with the finding that AFAFRICA acquired permanent guard towers without congressional notification and stated that the reasoning of cost, weight, time to erect and foundation requirements can be applied to relocatable assets that the DoD currently uses. The Commander provided the example that light area maintenance shelters can be procured as equipment and have the same fundamental reasoning as the permanent guard towers but are considered relocatable equipment.

Our Response

In response to the comment that the findings in the report did not consider 60 critical comments that AFAFRICA provided for inclusion in the report, we reviewed and considered all of the comments. We modified the report as a result of new evidence provided that supported 36 of 60 comments. For example, we revised the report finding on the guard towers based on the evidence that AFAFRICA A4S provided. We also revised the report to reflect modified programming actions. Furthermore, we revised the report to clarify information such as Air Base 201 timeline of events, aircraft rescue and firefighting emergency response time gaps, and standards on airfield solar lights. For the remaining 24 critical comments, we did not revise the report because the comments were either subjective, or there were no supporting evidence provided during the evaluation or as part of the comments submitted for consideration.

In response to the disagreement with the finding related to splitting construction projects for ISR operations, we reviewed AFI 32-1032, paragraphs 4.2.7.2 and 4.2.7.3. We found that the section on “concurrent projects” was specifically related to maintenance and repair projects. The four programmed construction projects to support operations were not maintenance or repair projects. Therefore, we concluded that the reference to AFI 32-1032 that AFAFRICA provided did not apply to the finding.
As outlined in the report, our analysis on project splitting was based on the U.S. Comptroller General’s case decisions. The GAO case decisions state that construction of a single “complete and usable facility” may involve the construction of several interrelated buildings and structures. The key factor is that a single building or structure could not satisfy the need that justified carrying out the construction project. The Air Force maintains that each project is a “complete and usable facility,” but did not provide additional information to address the reasoning that a single project could not satisfy the USAFRICOM infrastructure requirement for ISR operations, as referenced in GAO guidance. Thus, we did not change the finding that AFRICA split multiple projects that were required to be combined into a single project.

In response to the AFRICA Commander’s disagreement with the finding that AFRICA acquired permanent guard towers without congressional notification, we did not evaluate the DoD’s use of relocatable assets as part of this evaluation. However, a prior DoD OIG audit found that the DoD did not properly account for relocatable assets, including classifying assets as relocatable even though there was no intent to relocate the assets.

As outlined in the report, AFI 32-1032 states that if a guard tower structure is: (1) permanently installed, (2) not temporary in nature, and (3) not relocatable in practice, it is real property and installation is classified as construction. Based on the description in AFI 32-1032, we considered cost, weight, time to erect, and foundation requirements as critical factors in concluding that the guard towers were permanent structures and cannot be readily relocated. Thus, AFRICA did not provide any evidence to show that they acquired permanent guard towers with congressional notification.

AFRICA Comments on Lack of Oversight and Coordination

Finally, the AFRICA Commander disagreed with the finding that there was lack of oversight and coordination in the planning, design, and construction of Air Base 201. The Commander stated that stakeholders held 23 SAG and 7 SERG meetings. There were also quarterly meetings held between AFRICA and USAFRICOM, and weekly Project Delivery Team meetings since the beginning of

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49 According to the GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, 4th ed., 2016 rev., ch. 1, the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, the U.S. Comptroller General’s function includes issuance of legal decisions to agency officials concerning the availability and use of appropriated funds. Thus, the decisions GAO issues today reflects the body of administrative law on Federal fiscal matters. While the Comptroller General has no power to enforce decisions, agency officials who act contrary to Comptroller General decisions may have to respond to congressional appropriations and program oversight committees.


51 In accordance with the Office Management and Budget Memorandum M_11-15, Final Guidance on Implementing the Plain Writing Act of 2010, dated April 13, 2011, agencies shall use plain writing in agency instructions. Agencies should communicate in a way that is clear, simple, meaningful, and jargon-free.
(U) the project. The Commander stated that, through these meetings, oversight of planning, design, and construction solutions were discussed and approved at the appropriate levels.

(U) Our Response

(U) In response to the AFRICA Commander’s disagreement with the finding that there was lack of oversight and coordination in the planning, design, and construction of Air Base 201, the Commander provided the number and frequency of stakeholder meetings, which are not necessarily indicative of oversight and coordination effectiveness because the number and frequency of meetings does not correlate to timely communication of information with appropriate personnel. Furthermore, the Commander did not provide additional facts to explain the specific oversight and coordination problems outlined in the report.

(U//FOUO) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Air Force Director of Civil Engineers update Air Force Instruction 32-1021 to identify oversight responsibilities when troop labor construction projects are planned and programmed at the major command level.

(U) Air Force Director of Civil Engineers Comments

(U) The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Financial Management and Comptroller), responding for the Air Force Director of Civil Engineers, agreed with the recommendation and stated that the current Air Force Instruction 32-1020, Planning and Programming Built Infrastructure Projects, will be updated to include revised language regarding oversight responsibilities for contingency troop labor projects. The Air Force rescinded Air Force Instruction 32-1021 on December 18, 2019. The Air Force Director of Civil Engineers plans to develop and publish the updated directive, with an estimated completion date of August 30, 2020.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Financial Management and Comptroller) addressed the recommendation. The recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation after we verify that the updated Air Force Instruction 32-1021 identifies oversight responsibilities for troop labor construction projects.
**Recommendation 2**

(U) We recommend that the Commander of U.S. Africa Command establish a coordination and decision-making process with key stakeholders for troop labor construction projects, including a forum to directly communicate with the military construction program manager, designer of record, construction provider, and base support integrator, as applicable.

**U.S. Africa Command Comments**

(U) The USAFRICOM Chief of Staff, responding for the USAFRICOM Commander, disagreed with the recommendation and stated that effective methods exist with the command for communication with its service components, as outlined in Joint Publication 3.34. Specifically, the USAFRICOM J4 held a monthly coordination meeting on Air Base 201 with updates from all stakeholders, including the military construction program manager, designer of record, construction provider, and base support integration. The Chief of Staff further stated that avenues for deliberate discussion and decision-making as the project and operational requirements evolved have always existed.

**Our Response**

(U) Although the USAFRICOM Chief of Staff disagreed with the recommendation and cited that USAFRICOM J4 has effective methods in place to communicate with all stakeholders, we found that the coordination among stakeholders was not effective and key decisions were not documented. Specifically, multiple personnel, including the MILCON Program Manager, 31st ERHS, and 724th EABS officials, stated that their interaction with USAFRICOM personnel was limited and they often received new USAFRICOM requirements; however, the requirements were not always based on USAFRICOM official taskings.

(U) Furthermore, we found the lack of documentation on key decisions to be problematic, considering the continuity challenges associated with military deployment rotations. Specifically, we did not find evidence that USAFRICOM engineering staff was involved in the decision to use airfield solar lights and provided recommendation on construction standards for the base perimeter fence. We also did not find evidence that USAFRICOM engineering staff was involved in the decision to procure permanent guard towers. As specified in Joint Publication 3.34, USAFRICOM engineering staff’s responsibilities include recommending policies and priorities for construction and procurement of construction materials. These examples demonstrate the need to improve

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(U) coordination, decision-making process, and communication among stakeholders. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We request that the Commander of USAFRICOM provide comments in response to the final report on what actions he plans to take to improve coordination and communication in the decision-making process with key stakeholders for troop labor construction projects.

**Recommendation 3**

(U/FOUO) We recommend that the Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa:

a. (U) Submit congressional notification on scope changes for the runway on the DD Form 1391 for Air Base 201.

(U) **Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa Comments**

(U) The AAFRICA Commander agreed with the recommendation and is working with AFCEC to submit an update to Headquarters Air Force for consideration in notifying Congress. AAFRICA planned to submit an update to Headquarters Air Force no later than March 15, 2020.

(U) **Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) Comments**

(U) Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Financial Management and Comptroller), responding for the Air Force Director of Civil Engineers, also agreed and stated that AAFRICA will work with AFCEC and the Air Force Director of Civil Engineers to submit appropriate congressional notification. The estimated completion date is April 30, 2020.

(U) **Our Response**

(U) Comments from the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Financial Management and Comptroller) and AAFRICA Commander addressed the intent of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation after we verify that the AAFRICA, through the Headquarters Air Force, submits congressional notification on scope changes for the Air Base 201 runway.
b. (U) Develop procedures to review, validate, and certify DD Forms 1391 at appropriate levels.

(U) Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa Comments

(U) The AFAFRICA Commander partially agreed with the recommendation and stated that AFAFRICA followed existing guidance that included AFI policy and the Air Force Review Board process in the development, verification, and certification of the DD Form 1391. However, AFAFRICA will conduct a review of all existing procedures and current business rules. AFAFRICA estimates the completion of this review no later than April 15, 2020.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the AFAFRICA Commander addressed the intent of the recommendation. While the AFAFRICA Commander stated that they followed existing AFI policy and Review Board process, there were no supporting evidence during the evaluation to show such actions. AFAFRICA did agree to review all existing procedures and procedures for reviewing, validating, and certifying DD Forms 1391. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation after we verify that AFAFRICA conducted a review of their procedures for reviewing DD Forms 1391.

c. (U) Conduct a review of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa records management to improve internal controls and maintenance of critical records on troop labor construction planning, programming, and implementation.

(U) Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa Comments

(U) The AFAFRICA Commander agreed with the recommendation and will perform a review of its construction project development records management process. AFAFRICA estimates the completion of this review no later than April 15, 2020.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the AFAFRICA Commander addressed the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation after we verify that the review of construction project development records management process was conducted.
d. (U) Conduct a review of the use of airfield solar lights, in coordination with the Air Force Installation Management Support Center, Engineering Support Division and the Air Force Civil Engineer Center, Operations Directorate, to determine whether airfield solar lights meet the intent of ETL 11-27 and are adequate for operational safety at Air Base 201.

(U) Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa Comments

(U) The AFAFRICA Commander partially agreed with the recommendation and stated that the solar lights met the intent of ETL 11-27 and are adequate for operational safety at Air Base 201. However, AFAFRICA will work with the required agencies and Air Force Safety to conduct a review for validation. AFAFRICA estimates the review to be completed no later than April 30, 2020.

(U) Additionally, AFAFRICA is in the processing of developing a waiver request to the Combined Forces Air Component Commander for all of locations that use solar lights in the AFRICOM area of operations, in compliance with AFMAN 32-1040, Civil Engineer Airfield Infrastructure Systems, released on August 23, 2019.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the AFAFRICA Commander addressed the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation after we verify that a review of the use of airfield solar lights and actions that AFAFRICA take have fully addressed the recommendation.

e. (U) Develop a plan with the 724th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron to address the deviation on aircraft rescue and firefighting services.

(U//FOUO) Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa Comments

(U//FOUO) The AFAFRICA Commander disagreed with the recommendation and stated that there is an existing plan, “Standards of Coverage”, dated November 11, 2019, that ensures all standards for response are met.

The AFAFRICA Commander further stated that the airfield suitability assessment dated May 15, 2019, the record for assessing the airfield, determined that the aircraft rescue and firefighting services were within standard.
(U//FOUO) Our Response

(U//FOUO) As outlined in the report, the airfield suitability assessment conducted in May 15, 2019, did not identify the emergency response gaps that the 724th EABS fire department found during the aggregate response time analysis conducted in May 30, 2019. Although the comments from the AFRICA Commander states disagreement with the recommendation, AFRICA and 724th EABS had taken actions to address the deviation on aircraft rescue and firefighting services. Specifically, after our field work ended in 2019, we obtained and reviewed the Standards of Coverage in February 2020 and found that [black out]. Therefore, the recommendation is closed.

f. (U//FOUO) Submit a waiver request to USAFRICOM Commander [redacted], as required.

(U) Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa Comments

(U) The AFRICA Commander partially agreed with the recommendation and stated that AFRICA requested the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Joint Mission Assurance Assessment team to assess the installation perimeter for compliance with published standards and make recommendations for corrective actions, as required. The assessment is scheduled for June 1-20, 2020. AFRICA anticipates the submission of a waiver, if required, to be accomplished no later than 45 days after the results of the assessment are made available.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the AFRICA Commander addressed the intent of the recommendation that AFRICA will submit waivers based on the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Joint Mission Assurance Assessment team assessment of the Air Base 201 perimeter fence. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation after we verify the assessment conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Joint Mission Assurance Assessment team and actions that AFRICA take have fully addressed the recommendation.
**Recommendation 4**

(U) We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) initiate a preliminary review to determine whether the use of Procurement funds for the acquisition of the guard towers resulted in a potential Antideficiency Act violation and, if so, conduct a formal investigation and provide the results of the review to the DoD Office of Inspector General.

**(U) Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) Comments**

(U) The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Financial Management and Comptroller), responding for Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller), agreed with recommendation and stated that a preliminary Antideficiency Act review has been initiated with an estimated completion date of July 31, 2020.

**(U) Our Response**

(U) Comments from the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Financial Management and Comptroller) addressed the recommendation. The recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation after we verify that the information provided in the preliminary Antideficiency Act review and actions that the Air Force take have fully addressed the recommendation.

**Recommendation 5**

**(U/FOUO) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD, conduct a review of the Air Force programming actions to determine whether the programming actions for Air Base 201 are in accordance with applicable appropriation laws and regulation.**

**(U) Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD, Comments**

(U) The DoD Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget), responding for the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD, agreed with the recommendation and stated that a combined review of the programming actions will be conducted with the Secretary of the Air Force–Financial Management, the Joint Staff, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment. The projected completion date is fourth quarter of FY 2020.
**Finding**

**Finding**

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(U) Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) Comments

(U) Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Financial Management and Comptroller), providing comments for the Air Force Director of Civil Engineers, disagreed with the recommendation and stated that the Air Force programming subject matter expert concurred that the projects are complete and usable and were in compliance with Air Force programming policy.

Our Response

(U) Comments from the DoD Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) addressed the intent of the recommendation that a review of the programming actions will be conducted. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation after we verify that the results of the combined review of the programming actions have fully addressed the recommendation.

(U) Although the Air Force Director of Civil Engineers disagreed with the recommendation because the Air Force programming subject matter expert concurred with AFAFRICA that the projects were programmed in accordance with Air Force policy, the programming actions were not consistent with GAO case decisions. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD, agreed with the recommendation and will conduct a review of the programming actions with the Secretary of the Air Force–Financial Management, the Joint Staff, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment.
Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from February 2019 through January 2020 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) We gained an understanding of the Military Construction process, including that specific to the Air Force and the roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders. Specifically, we reviewed the following criteria and policies.

(U) Laws and Regulations

- (U) Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 169, "Military Construction and Military Family Housing"
- (U) OMB Circular No. A-11, Section 31, “Policies, Laws, and Other General Requirements for Budget Estimates”

(U) DoD Directives and Instructions

- (U) DoD Instruction 3000.10, “Contingency Basing Outside the United States,” January 10, 2013, Incorporating Change 2, August 31, 2018
- (U) OUSD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Memorandum, “Authorized Scope of Work for Military Construction Projects,” June 24, 2013
- (U) DOD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 2b, Chapter 6, "Military Construction/Family Housing Appropriations," June 2013
- (U) OUSD Comptroller Memorandum, "Guidance on the Use of Operations and Maintenance Funds Under Contingency Construction Authority for Construction Projects Inside the US CENTCOM AOR or Certain Countries in the US AFRICOM AOR,” February 7, 2018
- (U) DoD Instruction 6055.06, “DoD Fire and Emergency Services Program,” December 21, 2006, Incorporating Change 1, August 31, 2018
- (U) DoD Instruction 4165.56, “Relocatable Buildings,” January 7, 2013, Incorporating Change 2, August 31, 2018


(U) USAFRICOM and Air Force Standards and Instructions

• (U) U.S. Africa Command Manual 4700.05, “Engineering and Construction Standards in the USAFRICOM Area of Responsibility” (Rhino Book), August 24, 2017


• (U) Air Force Guidance Memorandum to Air Force Instruction 32-1032, “Planning and Programming Appropriated Fund Maintenance, Repair, and Construction Projects,” May 23, 2018


• (U) Air Force Guidance Memorandum to Air Force Instruction 32-1021, “Planning and Programming Military Construction (MILCON) Projects,” April 24, 2018


• (U) Air Force Instruction 32-1020, “Planning and Programming Built Infrastructure Projects,” December 18, 2019

(U) We reviewed and analyzed documentation related to the USAFRICOM Task Orders, DD Forms 1391, financial records, and other supporting documents to understand the planning and programming of Air Base 201. In addition, we reviewed facilities planning, design guides, drawings, quality assurance testing, and other related documents to evaluate the design and construction of Air Base 201.
(U) To obtain additional information, we conducted interviews with organizational staff to determine the processes, timeline of events, contributing and mitigating factors related to the planning, design, and construction of Air Base 201. We conducted a site visit to Air Base 201 in Niger in March 2019 to observe the airfield, base perimeter fence, and other infrastructure. We interviewed and obtained information from personnel at the following organizations.

- (U) USAFRICOM
- (U) USAFE AFAFRICA
- (U) AFCEC/CFED
- (U) 31 ERHS
- (U) 823 RED HORSE
- (U) 435 AEW
- (U) 409 AEG
- (U) 724 EABS
- (U) DoD Explosive Safety Board

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data
(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this assessment.

(U) Use of Technical Assistance
(U) We used subject matter experts from the United States Army Corps of Engineers to assist in the evaluation of the airfield pavement, airfield lighting, and base perimeter design.

(U) Prior Coverage
(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued six reports discussing the planning, design, and construction of military infrastructure projects.


(U) GAO

The DoD did not track the universe and cost of all U.S. Central Command contingency construction projects. The DoD has routinely used O&M funding to more quickly meet requirements because the MILCON review process can
(U) take up to 2 years. However, the DoD’s use of O&M funding has posed risks. For example, the DoD reported in 2015 that it should have used MILCON funds for shelters, determining that the obligations incurred had exceeded the statutory maximum for O&M-funded unspecified minor military construction projects, resulting in an Antideficiency Act violation.


(U) The DoD’s guidance does not fully incorporate the steps needed for developing reliable estimates and the estimates for three projects that GAO reviewed were not reliable. Specifically, two of the three high-value projects that GAO examined experienced a more than 30-percent increase from the initial cost estimates submitted to Congress.

**DoD OIG**


(U) The DoD Office of Inspector General and Air Force Audit Agency issued 11 reports that identified weaknesses with contingency construction contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq, including inadequate quality assurance and contract oversight, inadequate requirements, acceptance of substandard construction, unclear guidance, lack of coordination between commands, lack of contract files, and funding approval process.


(U) The DoD OIG issued six reports from July 2013 to July 2016 related to health and safety inspections of DoD facilities at various locations around the world, documenting 3,783 deficiencies in electrical system safety, fire protection systems, and environmental health and safety. In addition, the DoD OIG issued eight audit reports from June 2011 through March 2016 that identified systemic contracting and oversight problem areas.

(U) AFSOC officials did not fully justify the need for the Special Operations Forces 21st Special Tactics Squadron operations project, valued at $16.9 million. AFSOC officials also did not support scope calculations and cost estimates for the operations facility.


(U) Navy and Marine Corps personnel are not properly managing and using relocatable buildings in accordance with appropriate Federal and DoD policies.
Management Comments

(U//FOUO) Department of the Air Force

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: SAF/FM  
1130 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1130


1. This is the Department of the Air Force response to the DoDIG Draft Report, “Evaluation of Niger Air Base 201 Military Construction” (Project No. D2019-D000PT-0112.000). I concur with Recommendations 1 and 4; I have also provided inputs on Recommendations 3a and 5.

2. The Air Force will correct the issue identified in Recommendation 1 through implementation of a corrective action plan. The Air Force response is summarized below:

RECOMMENDATION 1: The DoDIG recommends that the AF/A4C Director of Civil Engineers update Air Force Instruction 32-1021 to identify oversight responsibilities when troop labor construction projects are planned and programmed at the major command level.

AIR FORCE RESPONSE: Concur. Revised language regarding oversight responsibilities for contingency Troop Labor Projects will be added to AFI 32-1020, Planning and Programming Built Infrastructure Projects. AFI 32-1021 was rescinded as part of a publications reduction initiative and updates cannot be made to that document. AF/A4C will develop updated directive guidance and submit for publication with an anticipated completion date of 30 Aug 20.

3. The Air Force will address the issue identified in Recommendation 4 through initiation of a preliminary Antideficiency Act (ADA) review. The Air Force response is summarized below:

RECOMMENDATION 4: The DoDIG recommends that the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) initiate a preliminary review to determine whether the use of Procurement funds for the acquisition of the guard towers resulted in a potential ADA violation and, if so, conduct a formal investigation and provide the results of the review to the DoD Office of Inspector General.

AIR FORCE RESPONSE: Concur. SAF/FM has initiated a preliminary ADA review with an estimated completion date of 31 July 2020.

4. The Air Force also has equity in recommendations that were designated with other offices of primary responsibility. AF/A4C responses to these recommendations are outlined as follows:

Financing the Fight
RECOMMENDATION 3a: The DoDIG recommends that the AFRICA Commander submit congressional notification on scope changes for the runway on the DD Form 1391 for Air Base 201.

Input with regard to AF/A4 equity for consideration: Concur. USAF-AFRICA will work with the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) and AF/A4C to submit appropriate congressional notification for the scope change. This request will be submitted to AF/A4C with an anticipated completion date of 30 April 20.

RECOMMENDATION 5: The DoDIG recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD review the Air Force programming actions on the infrastructure to determine whether the programming actions are in accordance with applicable appropriation laws and regulations.

Input with regard to AF/A4 equity for consideration: Non-Concur. Six Operations and Maintenance projects were originally programmed to support USAF-AFRICA/9A determined these six projects to be independently complete and useable. Upon identification of additional funded costs, the original six projects were cancelled without expenditure of funds, and reprogrammed as one Exercise-Related Construction project (UMMC funding), along with two of the original six O&M projects. The AF/A4C programming subject matter expert concurred that the projects are complete and useable and were in compliance with Air Force programming policy.

5. SAF/FM point of contact is Mr. [Redacted]

Richard K. Hartley
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Financial Management and Comptroller)
(U) U.S. Africa Command

UNCLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
UNIT 20051
APO AE 60975-0051

11 February 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL


1. This is the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) response to the DoD IG Draft Report, “Evaluation of Niger Air Base 201” (AB201), Military Construction (Project No. D2019-D000PT-0112.000). USAFRICOM non-concurs with the report as written and welcomes the opportunity to further examine the findings and recommendations outlined in the draft with the DoD IG’s investigating staff.

Despite noted shortcomings with the overall management of this project, the mere construction of such a facility in the middle of the Sahara Desert was a Herculean effort by all stakeholders involved. This report lacks that key context and seems to imply that the construction of AB201 was akin to building such a facility in much more hospitable surroundings. This does a disservice to the American service members and our partners who worked tirelessly on the largest engineering project in U.S. Air Force history.

Throughout the design and construction, USAFRICOM and Air Force Africa (AFAF) remained tightly aligned in the management and oversight of this military construction project. USAFRICOM continued to negotiate agreements with the Government of Niger while simultaneously communicating its intent to AFAF as they managed detailed Title 10 aspects.

It is also important to highlight that all decisions to move forward on project work were based on legal reviews that found no objections. The Combatant Commander pushes back on the broad notion that USAFRICOM or AFAF could have foreseen the totality of the project when initially conceived; in his view, the IG report fails to consider the changing operational context under which AB 201 was built over time.

2. USAFRICOM, in coordination with AFAF, will work to address issues identified in this report. The DoD IG provided recommendations as it relates to USAFRICOM:

RECOMMENDATION 2: We recommend that the USAFRICOM Commander establish a coordination and decision-making process with key stakeholders for troop labor construction projects, including a forum to directly communicate with the military construction program manager, designer of record, construction provider, and base support integrator as applicable.

USAFRICOM RESPONSE: USAFRICOM non-concurs with the recommendation from the DoD IG directed to the USAFRICOM Commander. USAFRICOM believes effective methods exist within the Command for communication with its Service Components that satisfy all GCC
(U) U.S. Africa Command (cont’d)

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Engineering requirements outlined in Joint Publication 3-34. In the case of “Military Construction of Niger Air Base 201”, upon tasking the project to its Component Command, AAF, USAFRICOM under the lead of the J4 held monthly coordination meetings with updates from all the stakeholders listed in the recommendation.

USAFCOM clearly communicated its requirements to AAF and advocated for funding. Avenues for deliberate discussion and decision-making on these matters--as the project and operational requirements evolved--have always existed. There is no evidence USAFRICOM or AAF made any legally-significant decisions outside their jurisdiction, and there is no evidence USAFRICOM refused to make a decision when presented a question that fell within its jurisdiction.

3. Point of contact is [redacted]

MCCAFFREY, TODD B
ULLARE

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MCCAFFREY, TODD B. ULLARE
Date: 2020/02/11 16:58:30 -08'00'

Todd B. McCaffrey
Major General, U.S. Army

UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: USAFE-AF AFRICA/CC
Unit 3281
APO AE 09094-3281


1. This memorandum sets forth the United States Air Forces in Europe – Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AF AFRICA) response to the DODIG Draft Report “Evaluation of Niger Air Base 201 Military Construction” (Project No. D2019-D000PT-0112.000). USAFE-AF AFRICA non-concurs with the overall findings of this evaluation and welcomes the opportunity to respond to recommendations 3a through 3f as we assess that the DODIG did not effectively acknowledge and incorporate the documentation and factual data provided during this evaluation. USAFE-AF AFRICA previously submitted 60 critical comments and only 21 were considered for inclusion in the draft report.

2. USAFE-AF AFRICA does not fully concur with all of the recommendations specifically directed to us in this report, but will develop and implement corrective action plans outlined below for those portions we concur with.

FINDING: The DODIG contends that U.S. Africa Command and the Air Force did not effectively plan, design and construct Air Base 201.

USAFE-AF AFRICA RESPONSE: USAFE-AF AFRICA non-concurs with this finding. While USAFE-AF AFRICA did make tradeoffs during the execution of this project and acknowledges that there are paperwork and file maintenance items to clean up, the successful construction of an installation in the middle of the Sahara Desert was a colossal undertaking. The DODIG report suggests that a lack of oversight and coordination resulted in a 3-year delay in construction completion. Instead, this construction was accomplished through constant informed decision making by USAFE-AF AFRICA, AFRICOM and all other stakeholders, while under the advisement of both Subject Matter Experts and legal counsel. This resulted in the successful construction of an ISR and C-17 capable airfield in a little over 3-years. This execution would not
have been possible without senior level oversight, effective planning and design, to include urgent and expedient re-designs as new requirements or environmental factors emerged. The generalization that the entire process was ineffective is inaccurate.

**FINDING:** The DODIG found that USAF-AFRAFRICA programmed and approved multiple projects that were required to be combined into a single project.

**USAF-AFRAFRICA RESPONSE:** USAF-AFRAFRICA non-concurs with this finding. While USAF-AFRAFRICA did discover that some costs were initially missing from the DD Form 1391s, prior to any funding being provided or execution taking place, corrections were made to ensure that these projects followed all applicable AFIIs and guidance. Per AFI 32-1032, paragraph 4.2.7.2 and 4.2.7.3 these projects do not need to be consolidated into one single project. Each of these projects have separate CATCODEs and were also determined to be independently complete and usable by USAF-AFRAFRICA JA. Rather, these projects fall under the category of 'concurrent projects' which according to AFI must be programmed separately.

**FINDING:** The DODIG found that USAF-AFRAFRICA acquired permanent guard towers without congressional notification.

**USAF-AFRAFRICA RESPONSE:** USAF-AFRAFRICA non-concurs with this finding. The DODIG's reasoning of cost, weight, time to erect and foundation requirements can be applied to other relocatable assets the DOD currently uses. Light Area Maintenance Shelters, for example, can be procured as equipment and have the same fundamental reasoning, but are considered relocatable equipment, not facilities. The towers are expensive (greater than $250K each), heavy, require a foundation for to be bolted to, and take time to erect but can be disassembled and relocated.

**FINDING:** The DODIG found that USAFRICOM and USAF-AFRAFRICA lacked oversight and coordination in the planning, design and construction of Air Base 201.

**USAF-AFRAFRICA RESPONSE:** USAF-AFRAFRICA non-concurs with this finding. Oversight and communication clearly existed throughout the entirety of this project. Starting in Nov 2015, USAF-AFRAFRICA and the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) held twenty-three O-6 chaired Senior Advisory Group meetings and seven O-7 chaired Senior Executive Review Group meetings. Additionally, on a quarterly basis, USAF-AFRAFRICA and USAFRICOM held a Deputy Commander update. Finally, a weekly Project Delivery Team meeting has been held since the beginning of this project. Through the combination of these governance meetings, USAF-AFRAFRICA, USAFRICOM, AFCEC, HAF and other stakeholders coordinated and documented (by meeting minutes and other records previously provided to DODIG) oversight of planning, design, and construction solutions that were discussed and approved at the appropriate level.
RECOMMENDATION 3a: The DODIG recommends that USAFE-AFRAFRICA submit congressional notification on scope changes for the runway on the DD Form 1391 for AB 201.

USAFe-AFRAFRICA RESPONSE: USAFE-AFRAFRICA concurs with this recommendation. USAFE-AFRAFRICA is working, in conjunction with the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC), to submit an update to HAF, for their consideration in notifying Congress. The notification to Congress occurs through a Division B submittal for Scope Increase. Our update will be submitted to HAF NLT 15 Mar 2020.

RECOMMENDATION 3b: The DODIG recommends that USAFE-AFRAFRICA develop procedures to review, validate, and certify DD Form 1391s at appropriate levels.

USAFe-AFRAFRICA RESPONSE: USAFE-AFRAFRICA partially concurs with this recommendation. USAFE-AFRAFRICA followed existing guidance at the time that included AFI policy as well as the USAF MILCON Review Board process, in the development, verification and certification of the project DD Form 1391s. However, HAF/A4C has recently updated its Business Rules and USAFE-AFRAFRICA will perform a review of all existing procedures and these new business rules to ensure new guidance is being implemented. We estimate completion of this review NLT 15 Apr 2020.

RECOMMENDATION 3c: The DODIG recommends that USAFE-AFRAFRICA conduct a review of the USAFE-AFRAFRICA records management to improve internal controls and maintenance of critical records on troop labor construction planning, programming, and implementation.

USAFe-AFRAFRICA RESPONSE: USAFE-AFRAFRICA concurs with this recommendation and will perform a review of its construction project development records management process through each phase of project lifecycle. We estimate completion of this review NLT 15 Apr 2020.

RECOMMENDATION 3d: The DODIG recommends that USAFE-AFRAFRICA conduct a review of the use of airfield solar lights, in coordination with the Air Force Installation Management Support Center, Engineering Support Division and the Air Force Civil Engineer Center, Operation Directorate, to determine whether airfield solar lights meet the intent of ETL 11-27 and are adequate for operational safety at Air Base 201.

USAFe-AFRAFRICA RESPONSE: USAFE-AFRAFRICA partially concurs with this recommendation. USAFE-AFRAFRICA believes solar lights do meet the intent of the Engineering Technical Letter and are adequate for operational safety at Air Base 201. However, in line with the DODIG’s recommendation, USAFE-AFRAFRICA will work with the required agencies and Air Force Safety to conduct a review for validation. We estimate this review to be completed NLT 30 Apr 2020.

Additionally, as a result of the release of AFI 32-1040 (published on 23 Aug 19) after the DODIG’s
research project, USAFE-AFAFRICA is in the process of developing a waiver request to the CJFACC for all of our locations that use solar lights within the AFRICOM AOR. This new API supersedes 32-1042, 32-1043 and 32-1044.

RECOMMENDATION 3e: The DODIG recommends that USAFE-AFAFRICA develop a plan with the 724th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron to address the deviation on aircraft rescue and firefighting services.

USAFE-AFAFRICA RESPONSE: USAFE-AFAFRICA non-concurs with the recommendation from the DODIG, as there is already an existing plan (most recently updated 11 Nov 2019) that ensures all standards for response are met. The Military Construction provided an Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting Facility with adequate response times to the airfield that meet published standards. At no time was Air Base 201 unable to meet required response times. This is supported by the airfield suitability assessment dated 15 May 2019, the USAF record for assessing the airfield, which determined that Crash Fire Rescue capabilities on the airfield were within standard. Attached is a copy of the current AB201 Standards of Coverage plan indicating all standards are met.

RECOMMENDATION 3f: The DODIG recommends that USAFE-AFAFRICA submit a waiver request to USAFRICOM Commander for the, as required.

USAFE-AFAFRICA RESPONSE: USAFE-AFAFRICA partially concurs with this recommendation and is specifically asking Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Joint Mission Assurance Assessment (JMAA) team to assess the installation perimeter for compliance with published standards and to make recommendations for corrective actions or mitigations necessary for full compliance. The JMAA is scheduled for 1-20 Jun 2020. USAFE-AFAFRICA will take the necessary steps to immediately initiate the appropriate corrective actions, mitigations or waiver required by U.S. Africa Command Instruction (ACI) 3203.04A once the JMAA is complete. We anticipate the submission of this waiver, if required, to be accomplished NLT 45 days after the results of the JMAA are available.

3. The USAFE-AFAFRICA point of contact is ,

JEFFREY L. HARRIGIAN
General, USAF
Commander
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL


This is the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)) response to the recommendation in the subject draft report, dated January 2020. The OUSD(C) appreciates the DoDIG’s work on this engagement, as well as the opportunity to review and comment on the draft report.

The OUSD(C) acknowledges receipt of the draft report and notes that DoDIG requests OUSD(C) to provide comments in response to recommendation 5. We reviewed your recommendation and our response is attached. My point of contact is [REDACTED] who can be reached at [REDACTED].

Anne J. McAndrew
DoD Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)

Attachment:
As Stated
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) (OUSD(C))
RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATION 5

DOD OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL DRAFT REPORT, “EVALUATION OF NIGER
AIR BASE 201 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION”
(Project No. D2019-D000PT-0112.00)

**Recommendation 5:** (U//FOOU) The DoDIG recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD conduct a review of the Air Force programming actions on the infrastructure to determine whether the programming actions for Air Base 201 are in accordance with applicable appropriation laws and regulation.

**OUSD(C) Response:** Concur with comment. Comptroller recommends a combined review of programming actions on the infrastructure in conjunction with Secretary of the Air Force – Financial Management, the Joint Staff and OASD (Sustainment), as these entities have authorities under 10 U.S.C. § 2805 and oversight on infrastructure. This review will be completed in the fourth quarter of FY 2020.
## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>31st ERHS</td>
<td>31st Expeditionary Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron</td>
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<td>724th EABS</td>
<td>724th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron</td>
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<td>U.S. Africa Command Instruction</td>
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<td>Air Force Facilities Management Division</td>
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<td>Air Force Instruction</td>
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<td>Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (lowercase in text)</td>
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<td>JA</td>
<td>Judge Advocate</td>
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<td>MILCON</td>
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<td>Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers</td>
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<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Environmental, Safety, and Infrastructure)</td>
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U.S. Department of Defense

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For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

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