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Report No. DODIG-2018-046




INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

DECEMBER 21, 2017

(U) DoD Antiterrorism Programs



Classified By: DoD OIG (b) (6)
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: October 12, 2042

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(U) Results in Brief

(U) DoD Antiterrorism Programs

(U) December 21, 2017

(U) Objective

(U) We determined the effectiveness of the antiterrorism programs at DoD installations. Specifically, we determined whether DoD installations were optimizing existing resources to achieve efficiencies to mitigate the risk of injury, death, or damage to DoD infrastructure on installations due to a terrorist incident. We nonstatistically selected antiterrorism programs at Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Lejeune, North Carolina;

DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)

and Peterson Air Force Base (AFB), Colorado to review.

(U) Background

(U) The DoD defines antiterrorism programs as "collective, proactive effort[s] focused on the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks against DoD personnel, their families, facilities, installations, and associated infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment as well as the preparations to defend against and plan for the response to the consequences of terrorist incidents."

(U) Commanders are required to develop an antiterrorism program that integrates force protection programs, including physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management, to prevent or minimize redundant programs and protect against terrorist attacks.

(U) Background (cont'd)

(U) To determine the effectiveness of the antiterrorism programs on these installations, we interviewed antiterrorism, physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management officials and reviewed antiterrorism plans to determine if the installation antiterrorism program included physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management programs in the antiterrorism plan; exercise documentation to determine how the installation antiterrorism program used resources from the physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management programs to conduct installation exercises; and antiterrorism working group meeting minutes and threat working group meeting minutes to determine whether physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management representatives participated in working groups.

(U) Finding

(FOUO) We determined that Peterson AFB and MCB Camp Lejeune had effective antiterrorism programs; DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F); PER OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F)

Specifically, the antiterrorism officers (ATOs) at Peterson AFB and MCB Camp Lejeune included force protection programs, such as physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management, in their antiterrorism programs to achieve efficiencies to mitigate risk. In addition, the ATOs at Peterson AFB and MCB Camp Lejeune implemented the minimum required elements of a DoD antiterrorism program (risk management, planning, training and exercises, resource application, and comprehensive antiterrorism program review). The ATOs at these two installations also tracked the mitigation status of antiterrorism vulnerabilities.

(FOUO) Although we considered the MCB Camp Lejeune antiterrorism program effective, we determined that Marine Corps installations, including MCB Camp Lejeune, PER OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F); PER USMC: (b) (5), (b) (7)(E)



(U) Results in Brief

(U) DoD Antiterrorism Programs

Finding (cont'd)

(FOUO) PER OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F), PER USMC: (b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted text block]

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g), PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted text block]

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g), PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted text block]

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g), PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

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- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g)
- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g), PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)
- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g), PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g), PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted text block]

¹ (U) Installation tenants occupy property supported by the host installation.



(U) Results in Brief

(U) DoD Antiterrorism Programs

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy conduct a review to ensure that the Services are tracking the mitigation status of installation vulnerabilities in the DoD-required assessment database of record.

(U) We recommend that the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps, ^{PER USMC: (b) (5)}

(S) We recommend that the Commanding Officer, ^{PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)}, and the Commanding General, ^{PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)}

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps and the Commanding Officer, ^{DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)} did not respond to the recommendations in the report. Therefore, the recommendations are unresolved. We request that the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps and the Commanding Officer, ^{DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)} provide comments on the final report by January 22, 2018.

(U) The Principal Director for Defense Continuity, Domestic Counterterrorism, and Mission Assurance, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, agreed with the recommendation to review the requirements to track the mitigation status of identified vulnerabilities in the DoD database of record. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved and will be closed once we verify the review has been completed.

(U) The Deputy Provost Marshal General, Headquarters, Department of the Army, responding for the Commanding General, ^{DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)} agreed with the recommendation ^{PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)}

Therefore, the recommendation is resolved. We will close the recommendation when we verify that ^{PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)}

(S) Although the Deputy Provost Marshal General agreed with the recommendation to ^{PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)}

. In addition, the Deputy Provost Marshal General did not address the recommendation to ^{PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)}

² (U) On November 17, 2016, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy issued DoD Instruction O-2000.16, volume 1, "DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation: DoD AT Standards," and canceled DoD Instruction 2000.16, "DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards." We determined that the update did not include any significant changes that would affect our findings and conclusions.



(U) Results in Brief

(U) DoD Antiterrorism Programs

Comments (cont'd)

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

Therefore, the recommendations are unresolved. The Commanding General, PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) should provide comments to the final report. PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

The Commanding General, PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) should provide comments on the final report by January 22, 2018.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page.

(U) Recommendations Table

(U)			
Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy	None	1	None
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps	2	None	None
Commanding Officer, DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)	3.a, 3.b, 3.c	None	None
Commanding General, DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)	3.a, 3.c	3.b	None
(U)			

(U) Please provide Management Comments by January 22, 2018.

(U) The following categories are used to describe an agency management's comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed-upon corrective actions were implemented.

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**INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500**

December 21, 2017

(U) MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

(U) DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

(U) NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

(U) AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

(U) SUBJECT: DoD Antiterrorism Programs (Report No. DODIG-2018-046)

(S) We are providing this report for review and comment. Peterson Air Force Base and Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune had effective antiterrorism programs;

PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

Although we considered the Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune antiterrorism program effective, we determined that Marine Corps installations, including Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, were

PER OSD/JS, AND USMC: (b) (1), 1.4(g)

We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

(U) We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments from the Principal Director for Defense Continuity, Domestic Counterterrorism, and Mission Assurance, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, addressed the specifics of Recommendation 1 and conformed to the requirements of DoD Instruction 7650.03; therefore, we do not require additional comments. Comments from the Deputy Provost Marshal General, Headquarters, Department of the Army, responding for the Commanding General, DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F), addressed Recommendation 3.b and conformed to the requirements of DoD Instruction 7650.03; therefore, we do not require additional comments. Comments from the Deputy Provost Marshal General, Headquarters, Department of the Army, responding for the Commanding General, DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F), for Recommendation 3.a did not conform to the requirements of DoD Instruction 7650.03; the Deputy Provost Marshal General

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(U) did not address Recommendation 3.c; therefore, we require additional comments. The Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps; and the Commanding Officer, DoD OIG (b) (7)(F) did not respond to the recommendations in the report. Therefore, we request that the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps, provide comments on Recommendation 2; the Commanding Officer, DoD OIG (b) (7)(F), provide comments on Recommendations 3.a, 3.b, and 3.c; and the Commanding General, DoD OIG (b) (7)(F), provide comments on Recommendations 3.a, and 3.c by January 22, 2018.

(U) Please send a PDF file containing your unclassified and FOUO responses to audrco@dodig.mil. Please indicate whether any classified or FOUO information is included in your response, and if so, please portion mark that information as appropriate. Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. For classified responses, please send to DoD OIG (b) (6) and DoD OIG (b) (6). Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature.

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at DoD OIG (b) (6). If you desire, we will provide a formal briefing on the results.



Carol N. Gorman
Assistant Inspector General
Readiness and Cyber Operations

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) We determined the effectiveness of antiterrorism programs at DoD installations. Specifically, we determined whether DoD installations were optimizing existing resources to achieve efficiencies to mitigate the risk of injury, death, or damage to DoD infrastructure on installations due to a terrorist incident. We nonstatistically selected the antiterrorism programs at Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; DoD OIG (b) (7)(F); DoD OIG (b) (7)(F); and Peterson Air Force Base (AFB), Colorado to review.

(U) Background

(U) According to DoD Instruction (DoDI) O-2000.16, volume 1, "DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation: DoD AT Standards," November 17, 2016, the antiterrorism program is one of the security-related programs under the DoD's overarching Combating Terrorism and Force Protection program.³ The DoD defines antiterrorism programs as "collective, proactive effort[s] focused on the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks against DoD personnel, their families, facilities, installations, and associated infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment as well as the preparations to defend against and plan for the response to the consequences of terrorist incidents."⁴

(U) Minimum Antiterrorism Elements

(U) According to DoDI O-2000.16, the five minimum required elements of a DoD Component antiterrorism program are risk management, planning, training and exercises, resource application, and comprehensive antiterrorism program review.

- (U) **Risk management** is the process of systematically identifying, assessing, and managing risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. The end product of the antiterrorism risk management process is the identification of areas and assets that are vulnerable to attack. From the assessment of risk, based upon the three critical components of antiterrorism risk management (threat assessment, criticality assessment, and vulnerability assessment), a commander determines which assets require the most protection and where future expenditures are required

³ (U) On November 17, 2016, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy reissued DoDI O-2000.16, volume 1, "DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation: DoD AT Standards," and canceled DoDI 2000.16, "DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards." We determined that the update did not include any significant changes that would affect our findings and conclusions.

⁴ (U) Joint Publication 3-07.2, "Antiterrorism," March 14, 2014.

(U) to minimize risk of attack or lessen the severity of an attack.

DoDI O-2000.16 requires threat assessments, criticality assessments, and vulnerability assessments to be conducted or updated at least annually. Threat assessments focus on the full range of known or estimated terrorist capabilities in the commander's area of responsibility. Criticality assessments provide commanders a prioritized list of assets based on the necessity for mission completion. Vulnerability assessments determine the susceptibility to attack by the broad range of terrorist threats against personnel and assets. The results of the vulnerability assessment provide a basis for determining options to eliminate or mitigate vulnerabilities.

- (U) **Antiterrorism plans** contain command-specific guidance for the establishment of an antiterrorism program and the implementation of the antiterrorism standards.
- (U) **Training and exercises** include developing individual, leader, and collective skills, and conducting comprehensive exercises to validate antiterrorism plans for the continuity of essential military operations.
- (U) **Resource application** is the process of applying risk management to vulnerabilities. If the resultant risk is not acceptable after applying mitigation measures, the vulnerability is elevated with a funding request. Central to the success of resource application is tracking and managing vulnerabilities, and ensuring sufficient funding for identified antiterrorism program lifecycle costs and assessed shortfalls to mitigate risk associated with terrorist capabilities.
- (U) **Comprehensive antiterrorism program reviews** evaluate the effectiveness of the antiterrorism program. DoDI O-2000.16 requires comprehensive antiterrorism program reviews to be conducted by all commanders who are required to establish antiterrorism programs. Antiterrorism officers (ATOs) and higher headquarters personnel conduct reviews to evaluate all mandatory antiterrorism program elements and assess the viability of antiterrorism plans in view of local operational environment constraints and conditions that may be exploited by terrorists. A comprehensive antiterrorism program review may be conducted as a Higher Headquarters Assessment, Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment, or Joint Mission Assurance Assessment. A Higher Headquarters Assessment is an overall evaluation of how an organization is managing its antiterrorism program. A Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment is a "vulnerability-based" evaluation of an installation's ability to deter or respond to a terrorist incident. A Joint Mission Assurance Assessment is conducted to help identify vulnerabilities and recommend options to reduce risk and improve mission assurance.

(U) Antiterrorism Roles and Responsibilities

(U) DoDI 2000.12 states that geographic combatant commanders have tactical control⁵ for force protection over all DoD personnel within their geographic areas of responsibility.⁶ U.S. Northern Command is the geographical combatant command with tactical control for force protection for the four installations included in the audit.

(U) DoDI O-2000.16 states that the ATO is the principal military or civilian advisor responsible for managing the antiterrorism program for an installation commander. The ATOs are required to ensure installation tenants fully participate in antiterrorism programs. Additionally, ATOs are required to enter vulnerability assessment and antiterrorism program review results into the DoD-required assessment database of record (the Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (CVAMP) is the assessment database of record).

(U) Joint Publication 3-07.2 requires commanders to develop an antiterrorism program integrating force protection programs, including physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management, to prevent or minimize redundant programs and protect against terrorist attacks.

(U) Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program

(FOUO) According to the Joint Staff, ^{PER OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F)}

[REDACTED]

.7

⁵ (U) According to Joint Publication 1-02, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," November 8, 2010, tactical control is "the authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned."

⁶ (U) DoDI 2000.12, "DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program," September 9, 2013.

⁷ (U) Joint Staff, "Official CVAMP User Reference Guide," June 10, 2015.

(U) Review of Internal Controls

(U) DoDI 5010.40 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls.⁸ We identified internal control weaknesses related to the antiterrorism programs at [DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)], and MCB Camp Lejeune. Specifically, [DoD OIG: (b) (1), 1 7(e), (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)]

[REDACTED]. Additionally, Marine Corps installations, including MCB Camp Lejeune, [DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)]

[REDACTED]. We will provide a copy of the report to the senior Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officials responsible for internal controls.

⁸ (U) DoDI 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013.

(U) Finding

~~(FOUO)~~ Peterson AFB and MCB Camp Lejeune Had Effective Antiterrorism Programs;

DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F), PER
OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F)

~~(FOUO)~~ Peterson AFB and MCB Camp Lejeune had effective antiterrorism programs; DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F), PER OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F) Specifically, the ATOs at Peterson AFB and MCB Camp Lejeune included force protection programs, such as physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management, in their antiterrorism programs to achieve efficiencies to mitigate risk. In addition, the ATOs implemented the minimum required elements of a DoD antiterrorism program (risk management, planning, training and exercises, resource application, and comprehensive antiterrorism program review). The ATOs also tracked the mitigation status of antiterrorism vulnerabilities.

~~(FOUO)~~ Although we considered the MCB Camp Lejeune antiterrorism program effective, we verified that Marine Corps installations, including MCB Camp Lejeune,

PER OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F), PER USMC: (b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g), PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g)

- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g)

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

(U) Peterson AFB and MCB Camp Lejeune Had Effective Antiterrorism Programs

(U) Peterson AFB and MCB Camp Lejeune had effective antiterrorism programs. Specifically, the ATOs at those installations included force protection programs, such as physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management in their antiterrorism programs to achieve efficiencies to mitigate risk. In addition, the ATOs implemented the minimum required elements of a DoD antiterrorism program (risk management, planning, training and exercises, resource application, and comprehensive antiterrorism program review). The ATOs also tracked the mitigation status for antiterrorism vulnerabilities.

(FOUO) Although we considered the MCB Camp Lejeune antiterrorism program effective because the ATO implemented the minimum required elements of a DoD antiterrorism program, we determined that Marine Corps installations, including MCB Camp Lejeune, PER USMC: (b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

(U) Force Protection Programs Were Included in Antiterrorism Programs

(U) Peterson AFB and MCB Camp Lejeune ATOs included force protection programs, such as physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management, in their antiterrorism programs to achieve efficiencies to mitigate risk.

(S) PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(g)



(U) At MCB Camp Lejeune, the ATO included force protection program representatives in the Mission Assurance Program Council.¹⁰ In addition, force protection program representatives participated in the antiterrorism exercise planning meetings. For example, physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management representatives attended the 2016 planning meeting for the installation's annual exercise "Urgent Response." Representatives were responsible for providing evaluators and collecting after action comments. Figure 1 shows a MCB Camp Lejeune law enforcement official conducting a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device exercise.

(U) Figure 1. MCB Camp Lejeune Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device Exercise

DoD OIG: (b) (6)



(U) Source: MCB Camp Lejeune Mission Assurance Office.

⁹ (U) RAMs are random security measures that are implemented to complicate a terrorist group's operational planning and targeting.


¹⁰ (U) The Mission Assurance Program Council oversees the ATWG and threat working group to maximize force protection and minimize risk to the terrorist threats.

(U) Minimum Antiterrorism Elements Were Implemented

~~(FOUO)~~ Peterson AFB and MCB Camp Lejeune ATOs implemented the minimum required elements of an antiterrorism program. Specifically, the ATOs conducted annual criticality and vulnerability assessments; prepared an antiterrorism plan; exercised the antiterrorism plan; tracked and documented mitigation decisions for the antiterrorism vulnerabilities reviewed; and conducted the antiterrorism program reviews. See Appendix A for our methodology to determine whether installations implemented the minimum antiterrorism elements. Figure 2 shows Peterson AFB personnel conducting an active shooter exercise.

(U) Figure 2. Peterson AFB Active Shooter Exercise

DoD OIG: (b) (6)



(U) Source: Peterson AFB ATO.

(U) Tracking Mitigation Status of Vulnerabilities

(U) Peterson AFB and MCB Camp Lejeune ATOs tracked the status of mitigation decisions for the antiterrorism vulnerabilities identified in higher headquarters or vulnerability assessments.

~~(FOUO)~~

PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g)

[Redacted text block]

(S) PER OSD/JS, AND USMC: (b) (1), 1-4(g) [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

(U) Installation Tenants Were Included in the Antiterrorism Program

(U) Peterson AFB and MCB Camp Lejeune ATOs maintained up to date listings of installation tenant antiterrorism representatives to ensure tenants were included in the installation antiterrorism program. Our review of six tenants at MCB Camp Lejeune and nine tenants at Peterson AFB showed that tenants were included in the antiterrorism program reviews or higher headquarters assessments. In addition, these tenants also performed antiterrorism level I training, RAMs, participated in the ATWGs or threat working groups (TWGs), and antiterrorism exercises.^{12, 13}

~~(FOUO)~~ **MCB Camp Lejeune**

PER OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F)

~~(FOUO)~~ Although we considered the MCB Camp Lejeune antiterrorism program effective, we determined that Marine Corps installations, including MCB Camp Lejeune,

PER OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F); PER USMC: (b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]
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¹¹ (U) Marine Corps Order 3058.1, "Marine Corps Mission Assurance," October 23, 2014, states a Marine Corps Mission Assurance Assessment is an all threats and hazards risk assessment that provides base and installation commanders with a clear understanding of risk exposure. The assessment is conducted by subject matter experts.

¹² (U) The purpose of antiterrorism level I training is to increase awareness of terrorism and to improve an individual's ability to provide personal protective measures.

¹³ (U) Antiterrorism representatives either stated or provided documentation supporting participation in antiterrorism program reviews or higher headquarter assessments, antiterrorism level I training, RAMs, ATWGs, and the antiterrorism exercises.

¹⁴ (U) Marine Administrative Message 618/12, "Implementation of Marine Corps Critical Asset Management System Next-Generation (MC-CAMS NG)," October 23, 2012.

¹⁵ (U) Joint Staff Memorandum, "Designation of the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program Database for Storage of Task Critical Assets and Associated Baseline Elements of Information," December 5, 2016.

(FOUO) PER OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F); PER USMC: (b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should conduct a review to ensure the Services are tracking the mitigation status of installation vulnerabilities in the DoD-required assessment database of record.

(U) The Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps, PER USMC: (b) (5)

(FOUO) PER OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

(U) Force Protection Programs Were Included In Antiterrorism Programs

(U) The DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F) ATOs included force protection programs, such as physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management, in their antiterrorism programs to achieve efficiencies to mitigate risk.

(U) During our site visit to DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F), the ATO was notified of a security threat to the installation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. As a result, the DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F) ATO convened a special TWG that included representatives from physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management. We observed the special TWG develop multiple risk mitigation strategies and prepare recommendations for the DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F) Commanding Officer concerning enhanced security measures to address the threat to the installation.

(U) The ^{(b) (7)(F)} DoD OIG (b) (7)(F) ATO included representatives from force protection programs in installation exercises. In addition, the ^{(b) (7)(F)} DoD OIG (b) (7)(F) ATO utilized resources from force protection programs in working group meetings. For example, on September 19, 2016, representatives from physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management participated in ^{(b) (7)(F)} DoD OIG (b) (7)(F) Protection Executive Committee meeting. During the Protection Executive Committee meeting representatives discussed the full scale exercise for 2017 and the current threat assessment.¹⁶

(U) Minimum Antiterrorism Elements Were Not Fully Implemented

(S) ^{(b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)} [REDACTED]

- (S) ^{(b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)} [REDACTED]
- (S) ^{(b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)} [REDACTED]
- (S) ^{(b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)} [REDACTED]

(U) ^{(b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)} [REDACTED]

(S) ^{(b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)} [REDACTED]

(U) ^{(b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)} [REDACTED]

(S) ^{(b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)} [REDACTED]

¹⁶ (U) The Protection Executive Committee provides oversight for the overall antiterrorism plan and program execution.

¹⁷ (U) The three critical components of antiterrorism risk management are threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments.

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(FOUO) PER OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g) [REDACTED]
- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g) [REDACTED]

(U) During our site visit, the DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F) ATO stated that DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [REDACTED].

(U) DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [REDACTED]

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g), PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [REDACTED]

(U) DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [REDACTED]

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g), PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [REDACTED]

¹⁸ (U) Although the ATO stated the DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [REDACTED]

(FOUO) DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g) [Redacted]

- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g) [Redacted]
- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g) [Redacted]
- (S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g) [Redacted]

(U) The Commanding Officer, DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted], should require the ATO to [Redacted]

(FOUO) PER OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F), PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]

(S) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g), PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]

(U) The Commanding General, DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F) [Redacted] should require the ATO to [Redacted]

(FOUO) PER OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)
[Redacted]

(E) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)
[Redacted]

(E) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g)
[Redacted]

(E) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)
[Redacted]

(U) The Commanding Officer, DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F) and the Commanding General, DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)
[Redacted], should require their ATOs to DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)
[Redacted].

(U) The Commanding Officer, DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F) and the Commanding General, DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)
[Redacted], should require their ATOs to DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)
[Redacted].

(U) Increased Risk Due to Terrorist Incidents

(S)

PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

(U) Recommendations

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy conduct a review to ensure the Services are tracking the mitigation status of installation vulnerabilities in the DoD-required assessment database of record.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

(U) The Principal Director for Defense Continuity, Domestic Counterterrorism, and Mission Assurance, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, agreed to track the mitigation status of identified vulnerabilities in the DoD database of record. The Principal Director also stated that the issue will be tracked through the Antiterrorism/Protection Working Group, under the Mission Assurance Senior Steering Group, until satisfactorily completed.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Principal Director for Defense Continuity, Domestic Counterterrorism, and Mission Assurance addressed all specifics of the recommendation; therefore the recommendation is resolved. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the review is completed and the DoD Components are tracking the mitigation status of installation vulnerabilities in the database of record.

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps,

PER USMC: (b) (5)

(U) Management Comments Required

(U) The Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps, did not provide comments to the draft report. As a result, the recommendation remains unresolved. We request that the Deputy Commandant provide comments to the final report. We will close this recommendation after we verify that the information provided and the actions the Deputy Commandant takes fully address the recommendation.

(U) Recommendation 3

(U) We recommend that the Commanding Officer, [DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)], and the Commanding General, [DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)], require their antiterrorism officers to develop and implement procedures to:

- a. (U) [DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)]
- b. (U) [DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)]
- c. (U) [DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)]

(U) Department of the Army Comments

(U) The Deputy Provost Marshal General, Headquarters, Department of the Army, responding for the Commanding General, [DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)], agreed with Recommendations 3.a, 3.b, and 3.c, stating that [DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)] had been [DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)].

[DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)] The Deputy Provost Marshal General also stated that the [DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)] team, with senior leader engagement, [DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)].

(U) Our Response

(S) The Deputy Provost Marshal General, Headquarters, Department of the Army, responding for the Commanding General, [PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)], addressed all specifics for Recommendation 3.b; therefore the recommendation is resolved. [PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)]

(U) The Deputy Provost Marshal General, Headquarters, Department of the Army, responding for the Commanding General, [DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)], did not address all specifics for Recommendation 3.a, and did not address Recommendation 3.c; therefore, the recommendations are unresolved. For Recommendation 3.a, the planned

(S) [REDACTED] PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

[REDACTED] Although the Deputy Provost Marshal General agreed with Recommendation 3.c, [REDACTED] PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

[REDACTED] Therefore, the Commanding General, [REDACTED] PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) should provide comments to the final report addressing [REDACTED] PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1-4(g); PER ARMY: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

(U) Management Comments Required

(U) The Commanding Officer, [REDACTED] DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F) did not provide comments to the draft report. As a result, the recommendation remains unresolved. We request that the Commanding Officer, [REDACTED] DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F), provide comments to the final report. We will close this recommendation after we verify that the information provided and the actions the Commanding Officer, [REDACTED] DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F), takes fully address the recommendation.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from May 2016 through October 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our finding and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

(U) We reviewed installation antiterrorism programs at the following locations.

- (U) DoD OIG (b) (7)(F) (U.S. Army)
- (U) DoD OIG (b) (7)(F) (U.S. Navy)
- (U) Peterson AFB, Colorado (U.S. Air Force)
- (U) MCB Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (U.S. Marine Corps)

(U) We interviewed officials responsible for policy and oversight at the following locations.

- (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
- (U) Joint Staff
- (U) Defense Threat Reduction Agency
- (U) U.S. Northern Command

(U) We also reviewed DoD, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps antiterrorism program guidance.

(U) Method to Determine the Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Programs

(U) To determine whether installations had effective antiterrorism programs we reviewed installation implementation of the five minimum antiterrorism elements and whether force protection programs were included in installation antiterrorism programs. The five minimum elements are risk management, planning, training and exercise, resource application, and comprehensive antiterrorism program review. For implementation of the five minimum elements, we reviewed:

- (U) the most recent threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments to determine whether they had been updated or conducted at least annually;
- (U) antiterrorism plans to determine whether they included the five minimum elements of an antiterrorism program and were updated and signed;
- (U) antiterrorism exercise documentation to determine whether antiterrorism exercises were conducted, tenants were included in antiterrorism exercises, the installation maintained lessons learned from antiterrorism exercises, the ATO was antiterrorism level II certified, and antiterrorism level I training was tracked;
- (U) CVAMP and MC-CAMS NG to determine whether the ATOs were tracking the mitigation status of antiterrorism vulnerabilities identified in assessments;¹⁹ and
- (U) antiterrorism program reviews, higher headquarters assessments, and Joint Mission Assurance Assessments to determine whether they were conducted.

(U) To determine whether the ATOs integrated their antiterrorism program with tenants, we nonstatistically selected DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

[REDACTED]. Specifically, we selected tenants that support combat or base operations, have a headquarters off the installation, or are outside the installation Commander's chain of command. We obtained and reviewed:

- (U) tenant antiterrorism plans,
- (U) ATWG or TWG meeting minutes,

¹⁹ (U) We nonstatistically selected vulnerabilities from higher headquarters assessments, Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments, Joint Mission Assurance Assessments, and vulnerability assessments.

²⁰ (U) The DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E) ATO provided conflicting tenant listings, therefore we could not determine the universe of tenants.

- (U) exercise documentation,
- (U) RAM completion results forwarded to the ATO, and
- (U) antiterrorism program reviews and higher headquarters assessments.

(U) To determine whether installations were optimizing existing resources to achieve efficiencies we interviewed antiterrorism, physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management officials and reviewed antiterrorism plans to determine if the installation antiterrorism program includes physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management programs in the antiterrorism plan; exercise documentation to determine how the installation antiterrorism program used resources from the physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management programs to conduct installation exercises; and ATWG meeting minutes and the TWG meeting minutes to determine whether physical security, law enforcement, and emergency management representatives participated in working groups.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We relied on computer-processed data from CVAMP at ^{DoD OIG (b) (7)(F)} and Peterson AFB to determine whether installation ATOs were tracking the status of risk mitigation decisions for the antiterrorism deficiencies identified in the higher headquarters assessments. ^{DoD OIG (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)}

. We then compared higher headquarters assessment data with the respective CVAMP entries. We did not find any discrepancies between the data and determined that CVAMP data, where available, was sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our audit.

(U) We relied on computer-processed data from MC-CAMS NG at MCB Camp Lejeune to determine whether installation ATOs were tracking the status of risk mitigation decisions for the antiterrorism deficiencies identified in the higher headquarters assessments. We compared higher headquarters assessment data to their respective MC-CAMS NG entries. We did not find any discrepancies between the data and determined that MC-CAMS NG data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. We also relied on MC-CAMS NG to determine whether Camp Lejeune conducted a 2016 risk assessment. We verified the information in MC-CAMS NG about the 2016 risk assessment through interviews with Marine Corps officials. The data, in conjunction with the interviews, were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this audit.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) No prior coverage has been conducted on the DoD's antiterrorism programs during the last 5 years.

(U) Appendix B

(U) Summary of Tenant Participation in

DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)

DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)

Antiterrorism Programs

(U) The following tables list the tenants participating in ATWGs or TWGs, antiterrorism exercises, and submitting RAM results.²¹

(U) Table 1. DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F) Tenant Participants

(U) Tenant	Included in ATWGS or TWGS	Participated in Antiterrorism Exercises	Submitted RAM Results to ATO
DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)	Y	Y	N
	Y	N	N
	Y	Y	N
	Y	Y	N
	N	N	N
	Y	Y	N
	Y	Y	Y
	Y	Y	N

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

²¹ (U) Antiterrorism representatives either stated or provided documentation supporting participation in RAMs, ATWGs, and antiterrorism exercises.

(U) Table 2. ^{DoD OIG (b) (7)(F)} Tenant Participants

(U) Tenant	Included in ATWGS or TWGS	Participated in Antiterrorism Exercises	Submitted RAM Results to ATO
DoD OIG (b) (7)(F)	Y	Y	Y
	Y	Y	N
	Y	Y	Y
	Y	Y	Y
	Y	Y	Y
	N	Y	Y
	Y	Y	Y
	Y	Y	Y
	Y	Y	Y
	Y	Y	Y
	N	Y	N
	Y	Y	Y

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) Management Comments

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

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HOMELAND DEFENSE &
GLOBAL SECURITY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2600

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE (ATTN: DoD OIG (b) (6))

SUBJECT: (U) DoD Antiterrorism Programs (Project No. D2016-D000RF-0151.000)

(U) We concur with Recommendation I and will review with the DoD Components the requirement to track the mitigation status of identified vulnerabilities in the DoD database of record. The issue will be tracked through the Antiterrorism/Protection Working Group, under the Mission Assurance Senior Steering Group, until satisfactorily completed. (ECD: 1 June 2018)

(U) We reviewed the sections of the report for appropriate classification markings where OUSD Policy was the original source of information, and determined that the paragraphs are marked correctly. The completed security review form is included in our response.

(U) My POC for this response is DoD OIG (b) (6)
DoD OIG (b) (6)

Pauline M. Kusiak
Principal Director
Defense Continuity, Domestic
Counterterrorism, & Mission Assurance

Attachments:
As stated

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(U) Department of the Army Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
2800 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-2800

DAPM-MPO-AT

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL (DoDIG)

SUBJECT: Army Response to DoDIG Report, Project No. D2016-D000RF-0151.000,
DoD Antiterrorism Programs

1. The Office of the Provost Marshal General, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Installation Management Command, and DoD OIG (b) (7)(F), PER ARMY (b) (7)(F) officials conducted a review of the subject DoDIG Report and concurs with comment to Recommendation three (3) of the report as specified below:

a. Recommendation 3.a "(U)" PER ARMY (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

Response: PER ARMY (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

b. Recommendation 3.b & 3.c "(U)" PER ARMY (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

3. "(U)" PER ARMY (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

Response: PER ARMY (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

2. Point of contact is DoD OIG (b) (6)
email: DoD OIG (b) (6)

DoD OIG (b) (6)

(U) Classified Information Used in the Preparation of This Report

(U) **Source 1:** Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Security Classification Guidance (SCG) for Vulnerability Assessment (VA)
(Document Classified FOUO)
Type: SCG
Issued by: DTRA
Issued: March 1, 2012

(U) **Source 2:** Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment
DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F) 17 – 22 August 2014
(Document Classified SECRET)
Derived from: DTRA SCG VA
Dated: March 1, 2012
Declassify on: 20390821
Date of Source: October 2, 2014

(U) **Source 3:** Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment
DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F) 17 – 21 June 2013
(Document Classified CONFIDENTIAL)
Derived from: DTRA SCG VA
Dated: March 1 2012
Declassify on: 20230622
Date of Source: July 29, 2013

(U) **Source 4:** Marine Corps Mission Assurance Assessment
MCB Camp Lejeune, 14 – 18 July 2014
(Document Classified SECRET)
Derived From: DoDM 3020.45-M-V3, "Defense Critical Infrastructure Program: Security Classification Manual," 15 Feb 2011 and
DTRA SCG VA, February 1, 2010
Declassify on: 20241001
Date of Source: October 16, 2014

(U) **Source 5:** Self-Assessment MCB Camp Lejeune
(Document Classified SECRET)
Declassify on: 20410515
Date of Source: June 22, 2016

- (U) **Source 6:** Local Vulnerability/Mission Assurance Assessment
21st Space Wing, Peterson AFB, Colorado, 18 – 22 July 2016
(Document Classified SECRET)
Derived from: DoDM 3020.45-M-V3
Dated: Feb 15, 2011
Declassify on: 20260719
Date of Source: December 5, 2016
- (U) **Source 7:** Joint Mission Assurance Assessment
Peterson AFB/Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, Colorado
3 – 14 August 2015
(Document Classified SECRET//NOFORN)
Derived from: DoDM 3020.45-M-V3
Dated: 01 March 2012
Declassify on: 20251019
Date of Source: October 19, 2015
- (U) **Source 8:** Commander, Naval Region Southwest Region Mobile Training Team
Summary Report for ^{DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)} [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], 22 – 26 February 2016
(Document UNCLASSIFIED)
Issued by: Commander, Naval Region Southwest
Issued: May 2, 2016
- (U) **Source 9:** ^{DoD OIG: (b) (7)(F)} [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] 17 – 21 August 2015
(Document Classified CONFIDENTIAL)
Issued by: Commander, Naval Region Southwest
Issued: February 10, 2016
- (U) **Source 10:** FY 2016 Master Integrated Joint Assessments Schedule, Q1 Update
(Document Classified SECRET)
Issued by: Joint Staff J33 Protection Division
Issued: via email June 28, 2016
- (U) **Source 11:** DoD Critical Infrastructure Protection (DCIP) SCG
(Document Classified FOUO)
Type: SCG
Issued by: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Issued: January 2003

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFB	Air Force Base
ATO	Antiterrorism Officer
ATWG	Antiterrorism Working Group
CVAMP	Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
MCB	Marine Corps Base
MC-CAMS NG	Marine Corps Critical Asset Management System Next-Generation
DoD OIG (b) (7)(F)	
RAM	Random Antiterrorism Measures
TWG	Threat Working Group

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Whistleblower Protection

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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For more information about DoD IG reports or activities, please contact us:

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