

# Inspector General

*Department of Defense*

December 23, 2013



**(U) Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Critical ANSF Enablers to Post-2014 Capabilities.**

**(U) Part II – Cross-Cutting Issues of Afghan National Army Enabler Development.**



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DoD OIG (b) (6)

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
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# Results in Brief

*(U) Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Afghan National Army Enablers*

*(U) Part II – Cross-Cutting Issues of Afghan National Army Enabler Development*

**DODIG-2014-027**

**December 23, 2013**

**December 23, 2013**

*Executive Summary of DODIG-2014-027*

## **(U) What We Did**

(U) We reviewed plans and activities in place to mature enabling capabilities (enablers) identified by the Coalition force as being critical to the ability of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to conduct and sustain independent operations. We assessed:

- (U) whether the goals, objectives, plans, guidance, and resources were sufficient to effectively develop, manage, and transition critical enablers to the Afghan National Army (ANA);
- (U) which enablers will require development post-2014; and,
- (U) whether any planned mitigating actions for ANA enablers are expected to still be under development post-2014.

(U) We identified and reviewed the goals, objectives, plans, guidance, and resources for the development and transition of 10 ANA critical enablers. These enablers included Aviation, Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices, Communications (Signal), Engineering, Fires, Intelligence, Medical, Mobile Strike Force, Operations Coordination Centers, and Special Operations Forces.

## **(U) What We Found**

(U) Our first report introduced and defined ANA “enabler” capabilities; provided an overall assessment of enabler development with recommendations; and included a short description of each of the 10 key enabler capabilities.<sup>1</sup>

(U) This report outlines 7 systemic challenges related to Coalition development of the ANA that impact the implementation of all or most of the 10 identified enabler capabilities. The systemic challenges identified were:

- ~~(S)~~ ~~(NLS)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]
- ~~(S)~~ ~~(NLS)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]
- ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]

<sup>1</sup> See report DODIG-2013-129, “Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Critical ANSF Enablers to Post-2014 Capabilities: Part I – Afghan National Army Enabler Description and Development,” September 18, 2013.

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~


- (NIS) PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]
- (~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]
- (NIS) PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]
- (~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]

## (U) What We Recommend

(U) We recommend that the Commander, International Security Assistance Force/United States Forces Afghanistan and subordinate commanders:

- (~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]
- (~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]
- (~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]
- (~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]
- (NIS) PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]
- (NIS) PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]


PER OSD JS. (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)



- (U) Ensure the ISAF campaign plan includes specific emphasis on logistics and maintenance required to field and sustain the ANA enablers, and Coalition resources required to advise, assist, and train ANA enabling force logisticians; and assist the Afghan Ministry of Defense/General Staff to:
  - (U) establish a tracking mechanism that provides visibility, accountability, and timely resolution for ANA enabler's logistics and maintenance requirements, including procedures that establish ANA enabler logistics discrepancy reports and accountability for unresolved supply and maintenance discrepancies,
  - (U) ensure ANA equipment readiness reporting systems include all enabler equipment,
  - (U) develop policy and procedures that prioritizes ANA enabler supply and maintenance requirements, and
  - (U) identify and resolve logistics and maintenance requirements impeding enabler development and effectiveness.

## (U) Management Comments

(U) The Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces Afghanistan did not issue a formal response to the draft report, but discussed the issue during a briefing to the Senior Warfighter Integration Group on November 15, 2013. The Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command formally concurred with our recommendation, having stated specific comments during a briefing of project results in July 2013. PER OSD JS. (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c



The Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan provided comments in response to this report. The Commander concurred with our recommendations directed to the formerly combined command, and the comments were responsive.

**Recommendations Table**

Office of Primary Responsibility	Recommendations Requiring Additional Comment or Information	No Additional Comments Required
Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces Afghanistan	5.b, 5.c, 7.a.1, 7.a.2	1.a, 5.a, 5.d
Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command	1.b	
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan		2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a.1, 4.a.2, 4.b, 6.a.1, 6.a.2, 6.a.3, 6.a.4, 6.b.1, 6.b.2, 7.b.1, 7.b.2, 7.b.3, 7.b.4

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\* Recipient of the Draft Report.



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December 23, 2013

**MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION**


**SUBJECT:** (U) Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Critical ANSF Enablers to Post-2014 Capabilities.  
(U) Part II-Cross-Cutting Issues of Afghan National Army Enabler Development (DODIG-2014-027).

(U) We are providing this report for your information and use. We reviewed Coalition Forces plans and activities in place to mature enabling capabilities (enablers) identified as being critical to the ability of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to conduct and sustain independent operations. These enablers were: Aviation, Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices, Communications (Signal), Engineering, Fires, Intelligence, Medical, Mobile Strike Force, Operations Coordination Centers, and Special Operations Forces.

(U) We considered management comments provided in response to a draft of this report when preparing this final report. Comments from NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3; therefore we do not require additional comments from them. However, we request additional comments no later than January 23, 2014 from:

- Commander, International Security Force (ISAF) on recommendations 5.b, 5.c, 7.a.1, and 7.a.2.
- Commander, ISAF Joint Command on recommendation 1.b.

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to DoD OIG (b) (6) DoD OIG (b) (6). If requested, we will provide a formal briefing on the results.

  
Kenneth P. Moorefield  
Deputy Inspector General  
Special Plans and Operation



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~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~

## (U) Introduction

(U) The purpose of this project was to assess DoD plans and actions to develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) force enablers and to determine their projected post-2014 capabilities sustainability. This report provides information and makes recommendations intended to improve the effectiveness of enabler-related endeavors to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. Central Command, and commands in Afghanistan (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), International Security Assistance Force Command (ISAF), ISAF Joint Command (IJC), and NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A). This project contributes to on-going DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) efforts to assess DoD plans and activities leading to the development of an independent ANSF and the transition of security responsibility for Afghanistan to Afghan lead.

## (U) Objective

(U) The assessment objectives were to determine:

- (U) whether United States and Coalition goals, objectives, plans, guidance, and resources are sufficient to effectively develop, manage, and transition critical ANSF operational enablers to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP),
- (U) what critical enabling task capabilities will require further development beyond the end of 2014, and
- (U) whether mitigating actions are planned and what they consist of for any critical ANA enabling capabilities that are expected to be or could be still under development after 2014.

(U) We reviewed plans and ongoing activities to mature enabling force functions deemed critical for the ANSF to conduct and sustain independent operations. While conducting research and project planning, we chose to focus our field work on ANA enablers. Upon completion of our ANA field work we determined that we would be unable to provide feedback to the command in time to have significant impact prior to December 2014 on ANP enabler capabilities.

## (U) Background

~~(S)~~ The U.S. military has been engaged in operations in Afghanistan for more than a decade, and recruiting, training, fielding, and equipping the ANSF commenced in 2002.

PER OSD JS (b)  
(3), 10 USC § 130c

PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c

(U) Due to the progress made by the ANSF, in January 2013, Presidents Karzai and Obama agreed to complete the transition to Afghan security lead throughout the country during 2013. The transition of the fifth and final tranche of districts took place in June 2013, marking the official assumption of an ANSF-supporting role for ISAF, focused on training, advising, and assisting ANSF continued development.

(U) President Obama announced during his State of the Union address in January 2013 that the United States would redeploy 34,000 of its 68,000 troops in Afghanistan by February 2014, marking a change in mission from stability operations to a train, advise, and assist mission. In anticipation of decreasing force levels, the Commander, ISAF, developed the requirements for specially designed Security Force Assistance Brigades to conduct the primary mission to train, advise, and assist the ANSF in critical and specialized mission areas, including enabling force development.

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

(U) The command had explored solutions and mitigation strategies to close the pending shortfall in assistance to ANSF development. More specifically, they looked for opportunities to accelerate, and expand enabler-related material and training to mitigate gaps. The Commander, ISAF, reserved \$1 billion for the development of ANSF enablers, and selected 23 initiatives to consider for acceleration or enhancement. However, development of enabler capabilities was constrained by Afghan human capital and technical limitations.

(U) Finally, as the December 2014 deadline for the completion of the ISAF mission and associated withdrawal of Coalition forces approached, we identified additional issues that impacted ANSF enabler development.

- (S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

- (S) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)
- (S) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)
- (U) As of June 2013, the U.S. Government had not completed a post-December 2014 bilateral security or Status of Forces agreement with GIRoA, or officially announced proposed troop levels for the post-ISAF mission (RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION).

(U) As the Afghans assumed the security lead and ISAF stepped back into a supporting role, it still remained important to ensure that Coalition plans for transition and resource allocation achieved the goals of the campaign plan and U.S. national interests in Afghanistan.

## (U) Criteria

(U) We reviewed ISAF and subordinate command plans addressing ANA enabling force development and defined end states as published through March 2013. These plans included:

- (U) Commander, ISAF Operations Plan (OPLAN) 38302 (Revision 6 Amendment 2) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operations in Afghanistan, October 27, 2012. This plan is classified NATO ISAF SECRET.
- (U) Headquarters, ISAF Point Paper, Assessment on Post-2014 Enabler Gaps, October 22, 2012. This plan is classified NATO ISAF SECRET.
- (U) ISAF Joint Command Unified Implementation Plan, November 24, 2012. This plan is classified NATO ISAF SECRET.
- (U) NATO Training Mission Afghanistan Base Order, December 12, 2011, and Fragmentary Order 12-734, September 21, 2012. This plan is classified NATO ISAF SECRET.
- (U) Afghan National Security Forces Plan of Record, November 16, 2012. This plan is classified NATO ISAF SECRET.

(U) In these plans, ISAF acknowledged that the development of the following six enabler capabilities would require support for continued development beyond December 2014:

- (U) Aviation,
- (U) Casualty Evacuation (Medical),
- (U) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device,
- (U) Intelligence,
- (U) Engineering, and
- (U) Signal (Communications).

## (U) Scope and Methodology

(U) The objective of this OIG project was to assess ANSF enabler development and capacity to transition to Afghan lead. The scope initially comprised both ANA and ANP enabler development. As a result of research, we limited our assessment to ANA enabler capabilities in order to ensure sufficient analysis of a broad objective.

(U) We reviewed plans and activities conducted by DoD, U.S. Central Command, Coalition forces in Afghanistan, the Afghan Ministry of Defense, and the ANA General Staff. We also evaluated missions, goals, and progress relating directly to United States efforts to develop and transition ANA enabler capability through the end of the ISAF mission in December 2014 and beyond. See Appendix A for additional information on Scope and Methodology.

(U) Beginning in January 2013, IG personnel assigned in Afghanistan researched and assembled relevant data from ISAF and conducted interviews with representatives from ISAF and subordinate commands in Afghanistan. Team members from headquarters conducted a field visit from March 1-24, 2013. While deployed, the combined team conducted over 250 interviews with senior U.S., Coalition, and Afghan officials serving in the Central, East, South, and Southwest Regional Command areas of responsibility. More detail at Appendix A.

## (U) Reporting Plan

(U) We published the results of this assessment in two separate products. Our first report introduced and defined ANA "enabler" capabilities; provided an overall assessment of enabler development with recommendations; and included a short description of each of the 10 key enabler capabilities.

(U) This second product outlines 7 systemic challenges related to Coalition development of the ANA that impact the implementation of all or most of the 10 identified enabler capabilities. This report contains 26 recommendations for program improvement to responsible officials.

(NLS) The seven identified topics are:

- (NLS) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- (NLS) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- (NLS) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- (NLS) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- (NLS) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- (NLS) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- (NLS) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~



## (U) Part I: Enabler Overview

### (U) Enabler Initiatives

(NIS) PER OSD JS. (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

(U) The command managed requirements generation, validation, and approval using the Afghan Security Forces Fund Requirement and Resource Validation Process (AR2VP). In addition, the War-fighter Senior Integration Group, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense monitored and provided assistance as needed to ensure timely approval of command priorities.

### (U) Enabler Capabilities Defined

(U) By mid-2012, the goal of generating, equipping, and fielding the bulk of ANA combat forces was nearly complete and the focus of Coalition efforts shifted to supporting the fielded forces. As planned, units that would conduct ANA combat unit support or enabling force functions were built at the end of the force generation cycle.

(U) PER OSD JS. (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c

(U) The functions that support and enhance fielded forces are commonly referred to as enabler forces or enabling capabilities ("Enablers"). We reviewed 10 ANA capabilities under development defined as Enablers within ISAF command analysis for the purpose of this assessment.

- (U) Afghan Air Force (Aviation) PER OSD JS. (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c

- (U) Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) PER OSD JS. (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c

- (U) Communications (Signal) PER OSD JS. (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c

PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c<sup>2</sup>

- (U) Engineering PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c  
[REDACTED]
- (U) Fires PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c  
[REDACTED]
- (U) Intelligence PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- (U) Medical PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- (U) Mobile Strike Force PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c  
[REDACTED]
- (U) Operational Coordination Centers PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c  
[REDACTED]
- (U) Special Operations Forces PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c  
[REDACTED]

(U) See Appendix C for more details concerning specific Enabler-related initiatives, ANA requirements approval process, and DoD and command oversight mechanisms. See Report DoDIG No. 2013-129 for further enabler descriptions and recommendations relating to enabler initiatives.

<sup>2</sup> (U) This is the ANA equivalent of a US Army Battalion.

## (U) Part II: Observations

### (U) Observation 1: Synchronization of Enabler Fielding, Training, and Facility Completion

(NIC) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(NIC) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

- (S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

- (S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

- (S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

### (U) Discussion

(NIC) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

PER OSD/  
JS (b) (1).

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

[REDACTED]

(U) PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c

[REDACTED]

Many of these facilities were intended to provide supporting infrastructure for enabling capabilities. The scope of the construction effort was such that it was not possible to accelerate facilities construction to match the acceleration of enabler unit fielding and equipment purchases.

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

[REDACTED]

(NLC) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

[REDACTED]

<sup>3</sup> (U) Fighting season has traditionally run from approximately late April (when the snow melts in the mountain passes) until late October (when snow blocks the passes).

<sup>4</sup> (U) The Afghan National Security Forces Program of Record was established in October 2011, and then revised in November 2012 and represented the programs and equipment for a post 2014 ANSF enduring force.

<sup>5</sup> (U) USACE planned to complete over one third of the \$6.22 billion total allocated to projects through 2014 during FY 2014.

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

***(U) Recommendations Enabler Capabilities Across the Commands has been Created.***

- 1.a. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Commander, International Security Assistance Force/United States Forces Afghanistan, PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

- 1.b. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

***(U) Management Comments***

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Commander, ISAF/USFOR-A did not provide written comments to the draft report. However, he concurred with Recommendation 1.a. informally.

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ The Commander, IJC concurred with Recommendation 1.b.

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

***(U) Our Response***


(U) We consider the changes resulting from the ISAF/USFOR-A command realignment responsive to Recommendation 1.a. The "disaggregation," which we were able to verify, met the intent of the Recommendation. No further action is required for Recommendation 1.a.

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ International Security Assistance Force Joint Command informal comments to Recommendation 1.b were responsive. PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

However, we request a formal response to Recommendation 1.b in this final report.

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~



## (U) Observation 2: Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army Contract Management

(U) The ANA had insufficient contract management capacity to effectively sustain the implementation of logistics contracts post-transition.

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

### (U) Discussion

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

The oversight community has published multiple reports addressing contracting in Afghanistan.<sup>6</sup>

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

<sup>6</sup> (U) See Appendix B for a list of related reports. While not a comprehensive list, review: Government Accountability Office reports GAO-12-290, GAO-12-854R, and GAO-13-212; DoD Office of the Inspector General reports DoDIG-2010-049, DoDIG-2013-037, and DoDIG-2013-052; and Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction reports Audit 12-7 and Audit 13-6.

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

- (S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- (S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

<sup>7</sup> (U) Federal Acquisition Regulation applies to contracts issued in Afghanistan using U.S. funds. See Federal Acquisition Regulation 1.104 and 2.101. Also Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 201.104 which states that Federal Acquisition Regulations apply to purchases in support of foreign military sales or NATO cooperative projects. In addition, FAR Part 46, "Quality Assurance," prescribes policies and procedures to ensure that services acquired under a government contract conform to the contract's quality and quantity requirements.

- (~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

### **(U) Recommendations**

2. (U) Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command:

- a. (~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

- b. (~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

c. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

**(U) Management Comments**

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ The Commander, CSTC-A concurred with Recommendations 2.a, 2.b, and 2c. PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

(U) International Security Assistance Force Joint Command concurred with Recommendations 2.a, 2.b, and 2c but did not provide additional comments.

**(U) Our Response**

(U) CSTC-A comments to Recommendations 2.a, 2.b, and 2c were responsive. DoD OIG (b) (5)

We will request an update in six months.

### (U) Observation 3: Roles and Mission of Afghan National Army Organizations

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

### (U) Discussion

(U) Coalition forces created ANA functional headquarters and specialized units that addressed identified ANA requirements, but often reflected Coalition experience. Coalition force expectations of complete Afghan acceptance and a common ANA operating framework created command and control challenges.<sup>8</sup>

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

<sup>8</sup> (U) This was consistent with observations and recommendations to help clarify overall ANA command and control made in Report DoDIG-213-058, "Assessment of U.S Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan National Army Command, Control, and Coordination System," March 22, 2013.

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

(NIS) PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

- (NIS) PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)
- (NIS) PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)
- (NIS) PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(NIS) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(NIS) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d) [REDACTED]

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

(U) ANA officials reported they were reviewing the issues raised in the discussion above as part of a Command Plan Review for SY1392 that was ongoing during our site visit in March 2013. This was a positive step in the transition to ANA independence.

PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c

[REDACTED]

### **(U) Recommendations**

3. (U) Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, conduct key leader engagements to:

a. ~~(NIC)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

### **(U) Management Comments**

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ CSTC-A concurred with Recommendations 3.a, and 3.b.

PER OSD

[REDACTED]



PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b),  
1.4(d)


### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) CSTC-A comments to Recommendations 3.a, and 3.b were responsive. Proposed and ongoing command actions meet the intent of our recommendations for

DoD OIG (b) (1), 1.7(c)

We will request an update in six months.

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~

## (U) Observation 4: Ministerial Support to Afghan National Army Enabling Forces

(U) <sup>PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c</sup> [REDACTED]

(S//NF) <sup>PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)</sup> [REDACTED]

(U) <sup>PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c</sup> [REDACTED]

### (U) Discussion

(U) The Afghan Ministry of Defense was responsible for developing policies and oversight mechanisms to support ANA operational capabilities. ANA-wide systems requiring Ministry capability included logistics, personnel management, and leadership development. Nearly every office within the Ministry of Defense affected the development of ANA enablers. As of early 2013, NTM-A was assigned the mission to develop the Afghan Ministry of Defense. As Coalition forces transitioned security responsibilities to the ANA, <sup>PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c</sup> [REDACTED]

(S//NF) <sup>PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)</sup> [REDACTED]

(S//NF) <sup>PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)</sup> [REDACTED]

<sup>9</sup>(U) Coalition Forces classified Ministry of Defense capabilities necessary to support the ANA into three groups: force generation, force development, and force management. Force development referred to a portion of the process concerned with equipping the ANA with the right equipment, skills, and necessary levels of modernization to be successful. It was distinct from force generation (recruiting, training, equipping, and fielding soldiers) and force management (adjusting existing force levels against requirements and available resources).

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)



(S)

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)



(S)

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)



(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)



<sup>10</sup> (U) NTM-A reported receiving support from the U.S. Defense Acquisition University and the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School of International Defense Acquisition Resource Management for this effort.

<sup>11</sup> (U) The Ministerial Development Plan was the campaign plan designed to connect strategic guidance from the ISAF Commander to the daily work done by NTM-A advisors.

<sup>12</sup> (U) The Ministry of Defense Advisor program was designed to create a pool of civilians capable of building ministerial capacity in Afghanistan. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict had responsibility for the program. Program responsibility was expected to transfer to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency during FY 2013.

<sup>13</sup> (U) For more information on challenges concerning the Ministry of Defense Advisor program, see DoDIG-2013-05, "Performance Framework and Better Management of Resources Needed for the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program," October 23, 2012.

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

- PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

- PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

- PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(N//S)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(N//S)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

<sup>14</sup> (U) "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," November 2012, Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008.

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~

PER OSD JS. (b) (1), 1-3(a), 1-3(b), 1-3(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~

PER OSD JS. (b) (1), 1-3(a), 1-3(b), 1-3(d)

[REDACTED]

**(U) Recommendations**

4.a. (U) Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Commander, International Security Assistance Forces:

1. (S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

2. (U) Accelerate the development of enabler-related Assistant Ministry of Defense Offices and establish Assistant Ministry of Defense enabler proponents.

4.b. (U) Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, prescribe a date when the advising objectives must be completed, then shift effort from advising Afghan counterparts to mentoring them with appropriate rank and experienced personnel.

**(U) Management Comments**

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) CSTC-A concurred with Recommendations 4.a.1, 4.a.2 and

4.b. PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

(U) International Security Assistance Force Joint Command concurred with Recommendations 4.a and 4b. without additional comment.

**(U) Our Response**

(U) CSTC-A comments to Recommendations 4.a.1, 4.a.2, and 4.b were responsive. The

DoD OIG (b) (1), (7)(e)

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]. Finally, while management did not prescribe a completion date, their comments demonstrated awareness and understanding of the issue presented and satisfied the intent of our recommendation. We will request an update in six months.



## (U) Observation 5: Coalition Advisor Rank and Skill Sets

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

~~(NIC)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

## (U) Discussion

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)
- ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)
- ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

(U) Most advisor billets were filled by uniformed service members, sourced through the Global Force Management Allocation Plan process controlled by the U.S. Joint Staff. Standard DoD business rules of this process allowed the Military Services to provide individual one rank higher or lower than listed in the requirement.

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

- (S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

- (S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

- (S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) U.S. Central Command officials stated that while the Military Services generally supported requests from the Command, certain aspects of the Global Force Management Allocation Plan process increased the difficulty with achieving rank and experience matches for advisors. PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) Part II: Observations

PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c

[REDACTED]

(NIS) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

[REDACTED]

**(U) Recommendations**

5. (U) Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces Afghanistan:

a. (S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

[REDACTED]

b. (U) Develop guidance formalizing the command prioritization of the advising mission and enabler capabilities.

c. (NIS) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

[REDACTED]

d. (S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

[REDACTED]

**(U) Management Comments**

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Commander ISAF/USFOR-A did not provide written comments to the draft report. However, he provided informal concurrence with Recommendations 5.a, 5.b, 5.c, and 5.d. PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

[REDACTED]

**(U) Our Response**

(U) We consider the informal comments by the Commander ISAF/USFOR-A to be responsive to Recommendations 5.a, 5.b, and 5.d. No further action is required for Recommendation 5.a and 5.d. However, we request a formal response to Recommendation 5.b and 5.c. in this final report.

## (U) Observation 6: Afghan National Army Personnel Management System

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

### (U) Discussion

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

<sup>15</sup> (U) The CIA Fact Book estimated that in 2009, 28 percent of Afghans over the age of 15 could read and write. An estimate of numeracy was unavailable.

<sup>16</sup> (U) The CIA estimated in 2009, that for men over the age of 15, the literacy rate was 43 percent. The ANA was primarily an all male force.

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

Table 1. ~~(S)~~ Selected Enabler Capabilities and Proposed Equipment

Enabler Title	Capabilities	Equipment
C-IED	PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)	
Communication		
Engineering		
Intelligence		
Mobile Strike Force		
Operational Control Centers		

Source: DoD OIG generated

~~(S)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(U) However, we previously reported that the ANA was unable to maintain accurate personnel records or achieve personnel accountability using this paper-based manual ledger system.<sup>17</sup> The manual ledger system only accounted for a portion of all personnel records, did not facilitate branch-wide assignment management procedures, and could not capture school, training, literacy scores, or performance data.

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~

PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

~~(NIC)~~

PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~

PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

<sup>17</sup>(U) Report number DoDIG-2013-094, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army," June 24, 2013.

<sup>18</sup>(U) The DIRI program was a global institutional capacity-building program supporting partner nation Ministries of Defense and related institutions to address capacity gaps in key functions including: policy and strategy, ministerial organization, force development, budgets, human resources, logistics, civil-military relationships, and interagency coordination. See Report No. DODIG-2013-019, "Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program Elements Need to Be Defined," November 9, 2012.

PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~

PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(U//FOUO)~~

PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c

[REDACTED]

~~(NIC)~~

PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(NIC)~~

PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

<sup>19</sup> (U) Report number DoDIG-2013-058, "Assessment of U.S. Efforts to Develop the Afghan National Security Forces, Command, Control, and Coordination System," March 22, 2013.



(NIC) ~~PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)~~  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

### **(U) Recommendations**

6.a. (U) Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with Afghan National Army and Ministry of Defense officials:

1. (~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) ~~PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)~~  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
2. (~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) ~~PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)~~  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
3. (NIC) ~~PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)~~  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
4. (NIC) ~~PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)~~  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

6.b. (U) Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, coordinate with International Security Force Assistance Joint Command to:

1. (U/~~FOUO~~) Systematically assess which enabler equipment the Afghan National Army can successfully assimilate and integrate within the timeframes established, and be sustained post-2014.
2. (U/~~FOUO~~) Ensure the comprehensive technology integration strategy the command is developing with the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior includes a strategy to deal with the implementation of enabler technologies.

### **(U) Management Comments**

(~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) The Commander, CSTC-A concurred with Recommendations

6.a.1, 6.a.2, 6.a.3, 6.a.4, and 6.b.1 and 6.b.2. ~~PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)~~  
[REDACTED]

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

(U) International Security Assistance Forces Joint Command concurred with Recommendations 6.b.1 and 6.b.2, without further comment.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) CSTC-A comments to Recommendations 6.a.1, 6.a.2, 6.a.3, 6.a.4, 6.b.1 and 6.b.2 were responsive. Ongoing and planned command initiatives will meet the intent of our recommendations. No further action is required for Recommendation 6.b.1. We will request an update in six months for the remaining Recommendations.

## (U) Observation 7: Afghan National Army Logistics System

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

## (U) Discussion

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

PER OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

<sup>20</sup> (U) This observation is consistent with observations and recommendations we made in Report No. DODIG-2012-028, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army," December 9, 2011.

<sup>21</sup> (U) See Appendix B, "Summary of Prior Coverage."

PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(U) PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c

• (U) PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c

• (U) PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c

• (U) PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c

(NLS) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF) PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

(U) In March 2013, the 215th Corps Engineering Kandak Operations Officer stated that it had been over 1 month since the unit submitted requests for vehicle parts, fuel, and supplies. They had not received any of their requisitioned items or updated status. The lack of re-supply resulted in a degraded ability to support ANA operations. The 215th Corps Engineering Kandak

PER OSD/JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c

(U) Maintenance and repair of some engineering equipment was too complex. Advisors for one Corps Engineering Kandak stated that the ANA could not perform higher echelon maintenance on computerized engineer equipment and therefore the Afghans were dependent on contracted maintenance.

DoD OIG (b) (5)

In addition, higher echelon maintenance was centralized, with the requirement to transport vehicles to the central site adding cost, time, and risk. For example, one Corps Engineer Kandak sent a backhoe to Kandahar for maintenance in late 2012, and, as of March 2013, was still waiting its return.

### ***(U) Fires Equipment, Supplies, Maintenance, and Repair***

Representatives from three ANA Corps related issues with logistic support of Fires enabler weapons systems.

- (S) PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)
- (U/~~FOUO~~) The 205<sup>th</sup> Corps stated that they had reported a lack of basic issue items for several months with no action.
- (U) The 215th Corps reported that 64 pieces of authorized equipment for weapons systems had never been issued.

(S) PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

(NIS) PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

(U/~~FOUO~~) In addition, the NTM-A G-5 reported the ANA had difficulties coordinating refurbishment for ANA weapons systems. He reported that some ANA units actually lost track of the equipment in the maintenance cycle and received no feedback regarding status of repair or location of the equipment.

(NIS) PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

(NIS) PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

(NIS) PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

### **Recommendations**

7. a. (U) Commander, International Security and Assistance Force/U.S. Forces Afghanistan:

1. (U) Ensure the International Security and Assistance Force campaign plan includes specific emphasis on logistics and maintenance required to field and sustain the Afghan National Army enablers.
2. (U) Ensure the International Security and Assistance Force campaign plan specifically includes Coalition resources required to advise, assist, and train Afghan National Army enabling force logisticians.

7.b. (U) Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, International Security and Assistance Force Joint Command:

1. (U) Assist the Ministry of Defense/General Staff to establish a tracking mechanism that provides visibility, accountability, and timely resolution of logistics and maintenance requirements for Afghan National Army enablers, including procedures that establish Afghan National Army enabler logistics discrepancy reports and accountability for unresolved supply and maintenance discrepancies.
2. (U) Mentor the Ministry of Defense/General Staff to ensure Afghan National Army equipment readiness reporting systems include all enabler equipment.
3. (U) Assist the Ministry of Defense/General Staff to develop policy and procedures that prioritizes Afghan National Army enabler supply and maintenance requirements.
4. (U) Assist the Ministry of Defense/General Staff to identify and resolve logistics and maintenance requirements impeding enabler development and effectiveness.

### **(U) Management Comments**

~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ The Commander, ISAF/USFOR-A did not formally respond to the draft report. However, he provided informal concurrence with Recommendations 7.a. and 7.b.

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~) The Commander, CSTC-A concurred with Recommendations 7.b.1, 7.b.2, 7.b.3, and 7.b.4.,

PER OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(U) International Security Assistance Forces Joint Command concurred with Recommendations 7.b.1, 7.b.2, 7.b.3, and 7.b.4. without further comment.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) We consider the informal comments by the Commander ISAF/USFOR-A to Recommendations 7.a.1, and 7.a.2. to be responsive. However, we request a formal response to the Recommendations in this final report.

(U) CSTC-A comments to Recommendation 7.a.1, 7.b.2, 7.b.3, and 7.b.4 were responsive. The Readiness Reporting System / Logistics Reporting Assessment Tool planning teams, Logistics Synchronization Working Group, and Maintenance Working Group should address enabler associated logistics, maintenance, and sustainment requirements for all ANA units.

DoD OIG (b) (5)

. We will request an update in six months.



## **(U) Appendix A**

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### **(U) Scope and Methodology**

(U) We announced this assessment on December 18, 2012 and conducted an entrance conference with U.S. Central Command on January 9, 2013. We conducted this assessment from January through June 2013 in accordance with the standards established by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency and published in the Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations, January 2012. The evidence we obtained provides a reasonable basis for our observations and conclusions in concert with our objectives.

#### **(U) Scope**

(U) This assessment reviewed operational plans and activities regarding the development and transition of ANSF enablers to Afghan-led independent and sustainable operations through December 2014 and beyond. These included:

- (U) plans, policies, and other guidance promulgated by DoD, U.S. Central Command, ISAF Commands, the Afghan Ministry of Defense, and the ANA General Staff;
- (U) ongoing and programmed actions such as providing equipment, training and other partnering activities, and advising and mentoring; and
- (U) assessments by U.S. and Coalition forces of ANSF organizations and their progress.

(U) As with all assessments of operations in Afghanistan, time in country and access to locations and personnel were limited due to the hazards associated with ongoing counter-insurgency operations. In addition, the reduction of Coalition forces increased the difficulty visiting locations outside Kabul and the requirement for interpreters affected the quality of some information obtained. Finally, increasing Afghan sovereignty and independence had minor impacts on access to information, a challenge that will become more difficult in the future.

(U) As a result of research, we limited our assessment to ANA enabler capabilities in order to ensure sufficient analysis of a broad objective. Upon completion of our field work we determined that review of ANP operational enablers was not warranted. We would be unable to provide feedback to the Command in time to have significant impact prior to December 2014 with a follow-on assessment.

#### **(U) Methodology**

(U) Beginning in January 2013, Office of the Inspector General personnel assigned in Afghanistan assembled relevant data from ISAF and subordinate commands. They provided plans, assessments, briefings, and other command-generated documents to the team. This allowed the team to

complete a fairly comprehensive review and focus assessment efforts on 10 enabler capabilities: Aviation, Counter – Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED), Engineers, Intelligence, Fires, Operations Coordination Centers, Signals/Communication, Mobile Strike Force, Medical patient movement, and Special Operations Forces.

(U) We conducted field work in two phases. During the first phase, Office of the Inspector General personnel assigned in Afghanistan conducted interviews with International Security Assistance Force, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, and NATO Training Mission Afghanistan officials. The interviews provided insight into then current ANA enabler capabilities and command plans to address and mitigate gaps. This allowed the rest of the team to be as informed as possible of the situation in Afghanistan prior to travel.

(U) Prior to in-country travel, the team in Washington, D.C. interviewed the Joint Staff, J-5 Pakistan Afghanistan Coordination Cell, and the Director Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics. Team members also attended the Deputy Secretary of Defense chaired Warfighter Senior Integration Group, responsible for oversight of the fielding of ANA enablers.<sup>22</sup>

(U) Phase two of our field work was the deployment of team members from our Washington, D.C. headquarters to Afghanistan for a site visit from March 1-24, 2013. While in country, Office of the Inspector General personnel assigned in Afghanistan augmented the group from headquarters. The combined team conducted over 250 interviews with U.S., Coalition, and Afghan officials serving the Central, East, South and Southwest Regional Commands. The ANA Corps associated with Regional Commands South, Southwest, and East were to receive enabler related units and equipment first and, therefore, presented the assessment team the most thorough coverage.

(U) In Regional Command and Regional Support Command-South, the team interviewed advisors and ANA officials of the IJC Afghan National Security Forces Development Cell, ANA 205th Corps, Regional Operational Coordination Center, and ANA Regional Logistics Support Command in vicinity of Kandahar. We also interviewed advisors and ANA officials with the ANA 2nd Brigade, 205th Corps, to include the Mobile Strike Force Security Force Assistance Team and other available personnel supporting enablers at Forward Operating Bases Apache and Eagle in Zabul Province.

(U) In Regional Command and Regional Support Command-Southwest, the team interviewed commanders, advisors, and ANA officials associated with the development of the ANA 215th Corps, Regional Operational Coordination Center, Regional Logistics Support Command, Regional Military Training Center and medical clinic near Camp Bastion and Camp Shorbak.<sup>23</sup> In addition, the team

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<sup>22</sup> (U) Please reference Appendix C. Enabler Overview for more detailed discussion regarding the role of the Warfighter Senior Integration Group in fielding of ANSF enablers.

<sup>23</sup> (U) Most of the commanders, advisors, and staff in Regional Command-Southwest had arrived in theater less than two weeks prior to our site

interviewed advisors and ANA officials of the 1st Brigade, 215th Corps at Camp Dwyer, the southern-most advised ANA brigade, located near the Pakistan border in Helmand province.

(U) In Regional Command and Regional Support Command-East, the team interviewed commanders, advisors, and ANA officials associated with the development of the ANA 203rd Corps, Regional Operational Coordination Center, and Regional Logistics Support Command. In addition, the team interviewed advisors and ANA officials of the 4th Brigade, 203rd Corps at Camps Shank, Lightning, and Thunder.

(U) Finally, the team interviewed Coalition force and Afghan officials in commands in Kabul. Coalition commands included ISAF, IJC, NTM-A, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Afghan organizations included enabler-related ANA officials at the Afghan Ministry of Defense, ANA General Staff Headquarters, Ground Forces Command, Afghan Air Force, Afghan National Army Special Operations Command, and Army Support Command.

(U) We did not use computer-processed data or require external technical assistance to perform this assessment.

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visit. However, the team conducted interviews with selected individuals from the previous advisor group prior to their departure.



## **(U) Appendix B**

### **(U) Summary of Prior Coverage**

(U) During the last 4 years, DoD OIG, the DoD, the Congressional Research Service, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) have issued a number of reports discussing the development of the ANSF.

(U) Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.index.cfm>.

(U) Unrestricted DoD reports can be accessed at <http://www.defense.gov/pubs>.

(U) Unrestricted Congressional Research Service Reports can be accessed at <http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/research>.

(U) Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>.

(U) Unrestricted SIGAR reports can be accessed at <http://www.sigar.mil>.

(U) Some of the prior coverage we used in researching this report included:

### **(U) Department of Defense Inspector General**

~~(FOUO)~~ DoDIG-2013-095, "Award and Administration of Radio Contracts for the Afghan National Security Forces Need Improvement," June 24, 2013.

(U) DoDIG-2013-094, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army," June 26, 2013.

(U) DoDIG-2013-081, "Assessment of the U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise the Afghan Border Police," May 24, 2013.

(U) DoDIG-2013-058, "Assessment of U.S. Efforts to Develop the Afghan National Security Forces Command, Control, and Coordination System," March 22, 2013.

(U) DoDIG-2013-052, "Inadequate Contract Oversight of Military Construction Projects in Afghanistan Resulted in Increased Hazards to Life and Safety of Coalition Forces," March 8, 2013.

(U) DoDIG-2012-34.4, "Assessment of Afghan National Security Forces Metrics, Afghan National Army (ANA) Mar 2012- Aug 2012 (CLASSIFIED REPORT)," February 20, 2013.

(U) DoDIG-2013-037, "Quality Controls for the Rotary Wing Transport Contracts Performed in Afghanistan Need Improvement," January 15, 2013.

(U) DoDIG-2013-024, "U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Needs to Improve Contract Oversight of Military Construction Projects at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan," November 26, 2012.

(U) DoDIG-2013-005, "Performance Framework and Better Management of Resources Needed for the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program," October 23, 2012.

(U) DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2012-141, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan Air Force," [FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY] September 28, 2012.

~~(FOUO)~~ DoDIG-2012-135, "Mi-17 Overhauls Had Significant Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays," September 24, 2012.

(U) DoDIG-2012-109, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Local Police," July 9, 2012.

(U) DoD IG-2012-104, "DoD Needs to Improve Vocational Training Efforts to Develop the Afghan National Security Forces Infrastructure Maintenance Capabilities," June 18, 2012.

(U) DoD IG Report No. DoD IG-2012-028, "Assessment of US Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army," December 9, 2011.

### ***(U) Department of Defense***

(U) Report to Congress In Accordance with Section 1230 of the "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181)" as amended, and Section 1221 of the "National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81)". "Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan," December 2012.

### ***(U) Congressional Research Service***

(U) CRS-R40156, "War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress," June 8, 2010.

(U) CRS-RS21048, "U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress," January 3, 2013.

(U) CRS-RS21922, "Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance," December 11, 2011.

(U) CRS-RL30588, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," April 4, 2012.

### ***(U) Government Accountability Office***

(U) GAO-13-381, "Security Force Assistance: More Detailed Planning and Improved Access to Information Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in Afghanistan," April, 30, 2013.

(U) GAO-13-335T, "Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage Department of

Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation," February 14, 2013.

(U) GAO-13-218SP, "Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues," February 11, 2013.

(U) GAO-13-212, "Warfighter Support: DoD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate Operational Contract Support into Contingency Planning," February 8, 2013.

(U) GAO-13-81, "Defense Acquisitions: Future Aerostat and Airship Investment Decisions Drive Oversight and Coordination Needs," October 23, 2012.

(U) GAO-12-951T, "Afghanistan Security: Long Standing Challenges May Affect the Progress and Sustainment of the Afghan National Security Forces," July 24, 2012.

(U) GAO-12-861R, "Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices: Multiple DoD Organizations are Developing Numerous Initiatives," August 1, 2012.

(U) GAO-12-854R, "Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan," August 1, 2012.

(U) GAO-12-290, "Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements Needed in Afghanistan," March 29, 2012.

(U) GAO-12-293R, "Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train the Afghan Police Relies on Contractor Personnel to Fill Skill and Resource Gaps," February 23, 2012.

(U) GAO-12-285, "Afghanistan: Improvements Needed to Strengthen Management of U.S. Civilian Presence," February 27, 2012.

(U) GAO-11-760, "Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to Support the Advising Mission," August 2, 2011.

(U) GAO-11-710, "Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan Government," July 2011.

(U) GAO 11-66, "Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long Term costs Not Determined," January 27, 2011.

(U) GAO-10-842T, "Preliminary Observations on DoD's Progress and Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan," June 25, 2010.

(U) GAO-10-655R, "The Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan," June 15, 2010.

**(U) Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)**

(U) SIGAR-Audit 13-13, "Afghan Special Mission Wing: DoD Moving Forward with \$771.8 Million Purchase of Aircraft that the Afghans Cannot Operate and Maintain," June 28, 2013.

(U) SIGAR-Audit 13-6, "Contracting with the Enemy: DoD Has Limited Assurance that Contractors with Links to Enemy Groups Are Identified and their Contracts Terminated," April 11, 2013.

(U) SIGAR-Inspection 13-3, "Gamberi Afghan National Army Garrison: Site Grading and Infrastructure Maintenance Problems Put Facilities at Risk," October 30, 2012.

(U) SIGAR-Audit 13-1, "Afghan National Security Forces Facilities: Concerns with Funding, Oversight, and Sustainability for Operations and Maintenance," October 25, 2012.

(U) SIGAR-Inspection 13-1, "Kunduz ANA Garrison: Army Corps of Engineers Released DynCorp of All Contractual Obligations Despite Poor Performance and Structural Failures," October 25, 2012.

(U) SIGAR-Audit 12-12, "Fiscal Year 2011 Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund Projects Are behind Schedule and Lack Adequate Sustainment Plans," July 30, 2012.

(U) SIGAR-Audit 12-7, "C-JTSCC Has Taken Steps to Improve the Accuracy of Its Contract Data, but It Should Assess the Feasibility of Correcting Data for Fiscal Year 2009 and Earlier," April 20, 2012.

(U) SIGAR-Audit 12-4, "DoD Improved Its Accountability for Vehicles Provided to the Afghan National Security Forces, but Should Follow Up on End-Use Monitoring Findings," January 12, 2012.

(U) SIGAR-Audit 12-2, "Better Planning and Oversight Could Have Reduced Construction Delays and Costs at the Kabul Military Training Center," October 26, 2011.

(U) SIGAR-Audit 11-9, "ANA Facilities at Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat Generally Met Construction Requirements, but Contractor Oversight Should Be Strengthened," April 25, 2011.

(U) SIGAR-Audit 11-6, "Inadequate Planning for ANSF Facilities Increases Risks for \$11.4 Billion Program," January 26, 2011.

(U) SIGAR-Audit-10-11, "Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments," June 29, 2010.



## (U) Appendix C

### Afghan National Army Enabler Background

(U) The functions that support and enhance fielded forces are commonly referred to as enabler forces or enabling capabilities ("Enablers"). As of May, 2013, ANSF operational success and sustainment remained dependent on many Coalition enabling capabilities. In addition, the development of ANA enabler capabilities in many cases was constrained by Afghan human capital and technical capacity.

(U) Based on ISAF Command analysis, we defined ten capabilities as enablers for the purpose of this assessment, including Operational Coordination Centers, which provided a critical function of aiding in the development and access to other enablers.

- (U) Aviation (Afghan Air Force) – PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c [REDACTED]
- (U) Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices – PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c [REDACTED]
- (U) Communications (Signal) – PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c [REDACTED]
- (U) Engineering – PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c [REDACTED]
- (U) Fires – PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c [REDACTED]
- (U) Intelligence – PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c [REDACTED]
- (U) Medical – PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c [REDACTED]
- (U) Mobile Strike Force – PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c [REDACTED]
- (U) Operational Coordination Centers – PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c [REDACTED]

- (U) Special Operations Forces – ~~PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c~~

(U) The Coalition built and fielded the majority of ANA enabling capabilities at the end of the force generation cycle, and planning assumptions included a significant Coalition enabling and advising force for up to 10 years after 2014, although numbers were not specified. However, U.S. troop levels were programmed to reduce to 34,000 by February 2014, and as of April 2013, the U.S. Government and GIRoA had not completed a post-December 2014 basing agreement (bi-lateral security or Status of Forces) or officially announced proposed troop levels for the 2015 post-ISAF mission (RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION).

(U) In addition to anticipated reductions in Coalition force levels, United States funding was diminishing. The FY 2012 authorization for the Afghan Security Forces Fund was reduced from the \$11.2 billion initially programmed to \$8.2 billion. The 2013 appropriation was reduced to \$5.1 billion from a \$5.7 billion request.

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ ~~PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)~~

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ ~~PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)~~


### ***(U) Afghan Security Forces Fund Requirement and Resource Validation Process***

(U) The AR2VP provided the command with a systematic method for analyzing and vetting proposed requirements. The NTM-A Deputy Commanding General for Operations explained that the AR2VP was the method used to program ASFF funds against identified requirements. Process owners identified emerging requirements or capability gaps. They coordinated with an NTM-A sponsor to review potential internal solutions with appropriate command elements. Requirements needing additional resources were then checked for feasibility of implementation, Afghan support for the equipment or capability, and ANSF ability to sustain it once delivered.

(U) NTM-A led the validation process, in coordination with IJC. New initiatives required an ANA sponsor to help ensure Afghan acceptance. Requirements were vetted by Coalition command representatives and validated by the NTM-A Deputy Commanding General Operations. Once validated, the Command analyzed a variety of solutions to fill the requirement. The solution selected (initiative) required joint ANSF General Officer and Coalition General Officer agreement. As of June 2013, this process resulted in over 77 approved enabler related initiatives integral to enabler functions.

(U) NTM-A, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency grouped acquisition and fielding enabler-related equipment and capabilities into enabler initiatives into four "version" (1.0 to 4.0) based on their authorizing document and planned timing of procurement.

(U//FOUO) Figure 1. Enabler 1.0 (Blue) and 2.0 (Green) ANA and AAF Synch Matrix



Source: NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan

## (U) Enabler 1.0 – Original Afghan National Security Forces Program of Record

(U) Enabler version 1.0 consisted of ANA units and equipment included in the original ANSF Program of Record force structure codified in October 2011. Of the 33 initiatives comprising

version 1.0, 29 were scheduled to complete by December 2014.<sup>24</sup> As of March 2013, these initiatives were fully funded from ASFF appropriations approved in 2012 or earlier.

(U) Figure X shows in blue the ongoing generation of significant enabling capability units: Signal and Mobile Strike Force Kandaks, Special Operations Brigade and Division headquarters, and the National Engineer Brigade. Programmed completion of enabler force generation coincided with the end of the ISAF mission in December 2014. As of March 2013, virtually all of the enabler version 1.0 equipment was on track for fielding, with the exception of two procurements for the Special Mission Wing: 30 Mi-17 helicopters which were delayed by Congressional concerns and 20 Light Attack Aircraft which were delayed by contract challenges until finally cleared in June 2013.

### ***(U) Enabler 2.0 – Accelerated and Enhanced Afghan National Security Forces Program of Record***

(U) Enabler version 2.0 was the acceleration of 23 validated ANA requirements to fiscal year 2013 at an estimated total value of about \$538 million. The 23 initiatives shown in Figure X in green were a combination of 19 requirements included in the original ANSF program of record and 4 emerging initiatives. They included a mix of capabilities: 13 equipment, 8 training, 1 contractor force protection, and construction of 1 facility.

(U) The four emerging initiatives filled capability gaps. Force Protection for Contracted Trainers responded to uncertainty over Coalition troop levels post December 2014. Medium Lift Fixed Wing Aircraft replaced the C-27A/G222 aircraft that proved unsuitable. English Language Training for the AAF filled a medium-term need for English proficient aircrews and aircraft maintainers. Finally, Deployable Medical Facilities attempted to replace Coalition air evacuation of ANA casualties with medical care closer to the point of injury, thereby increasing ANA acceptance of ground evacuation.

(U) The remaining 19 version 2.0 initiatives were part of the ANSF program of record. The Coalition and ANA were aware of the need to field this equipment, train soldiers on proper use, and incorporate capabilities into operations. However, acceleration of the process taxed the ability of the ANA to effectively absorb provided enabler capabilities.

(U) On the other hand, even with acceleration the command estimated that nine initiatives would continue through or complete just prior to December 2014, including fielding of two intelligence systems, deployable medical facilities, and 60mm mortars. Delivery of three version 2.0 (and four version 1.0) airpower initiatives continue past December 2014, with the associated uncertainty.

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<sup>24</sup> (U) Four enabler 1.0 initiatives were scheduled to continue past December 2014: including four aircraft procurements (for the Afghan Air Force and the Special Mission Wing) and development of forward air support teams.

**(U) Enabler 3.0 – Expanded Afghan National Security Forces  
Program of Record**

~~(S//REL to USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Figure 2.  
Enabler 3.0 Initiatives

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

ANSF Enabler Version 3.0 Initiatives
PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)
[REDACTED]

**(U) Enabler 4.0 – Potential Excess Defense Items**

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ PER OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

PER OSD JS: (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(d)

***(U) Warfighter Senior Integration Group***

(U) Department of Defense Directive 5000.71, "Rapid Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs," August 24, 2012, established the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell to provide a DoD-wide forum to respond in a timely manner to U.S. war-fighter needs and other validated requirements. This forum, titled the War-fighter Senior Integration Group, met monthly and was chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In late 2012, the Commander, ISAF, prioritized items deemed critical for success in the 2013 fighting season and the War-fighter Senior Integration Group helped ensure timely fielding of Command priorities. In the fall of 2012, the War-fighter Senior Integration Group added ANSF enabler fielding as a priority focus area.

(U) As of April 2013, the War-fighter Senior Integration Group had provided significant assistance with the fielding of ANA enablers. They were monitoring approval and procurement of six ANA enabler-related initiatives, including:

- (U) C-130H medium lift replacement,
- (U) Mi-17 helicopters for Special Operations Forces,
- (U) engineering mobile training teams,
- (U) delivery of 60mm mortars,
- (U) equipment for Special Operations Forces, and
- (U) English language training for the AAF.

***(U) Afghan National Security Forces Program of Record Semi-Annual Program Management Review***

(U) Since 2009, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency hosted a semi-annual program management review to oversee the application of Afghan Security Forces Funds to ANSF equipment and capacity building training efforts. The week-long conference provided the opportunity for all interested parties to brief progress and address concerns, and included Afghan participation. The March 2013 program management review focused on fielding of ANA enablers and addressed future funding considerations.





## (U) Appendix D

### (U) List of Classified Sources

1. (U) Afghanistan National Security Forces Plan of Record 2012 -2017. Draft Pre-Decisional. NATO ISAF SECRET

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: October 2011.

2. (U) Afghanistan National Security Forces Plan of Record Semi-Annual Analysis. //No Classification Markings. COMISAF OPLAN 38302 however labels the title (NATO ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 16 November 2012.

3. (U) COMISAF Operations Plan (OPLAN) 38302 (Revision 6 Amendment 2) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operations in Afghanistan.. NATO/ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 27 October 2012.

4. (U) HQ ISAF POINT PAPER: Assessment on post-2014 enabler gaps. Headquarters International Security Assistance Force Kabul, Afghanistan. NATO/ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 22 October 2012

5. (U) NTM-A/CSTC-A Quarterly Strategic Assessment Report Submission to ISAF (April - June 2013). Version 1. Headquarters, ISAF Joint Command Kabul, Afghanistan. SECRET REL NATO/ISAF.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 10 July 2013

6. (U) ISAF Joint Command Unified Implementation Plan. NATO ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 24 November 2012

7. (U) NATO Training Mission (NTM-A)/Combined Security Assistance Command (CSTC-A) – Afghanistan Base order 2012-2014. NATO ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 12 December 2011

8. (U) DoD OIG Enabler Brief, Assessment of Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Critical Afghanistan National Security Forces Enablers to Post-2014 Capabilities (D2013-D00SPO-0087.000). Product II Cross-Enabler Observations. NATO ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 21 June 2013

9. (U) LTG Bolger interview workpaper – Secret REL USA, ISAF/NATO.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 14 March 2013.

10. (U) Enablers in Afghanistan Briefing Slides, SECRET REL/USA, AFG, ISAF, NATO.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 17 February 2013.

11. (U) NTM-A / CSTC-A Base Paper, SUBJECT: Enabler Acceleration Examination STAFF LEAD: CJ5, PURPOSE: Inform COMISAF on the feasibility and acceptability of ANSF Enabler Acceleration. NATO/ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 10 July 2013

12. (U) Mobile Strike Force update slides. SECRET REL ISAF NATO LIMDIS.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 05 February 2013

13. (U) Warfighter Senior Integration Group meeting workpaper. SECRET REL ISAF/NATO.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 15 February 2013

14. (U) LTG Terry outbrief workpaper. SECRET REL USA, ISAF, NATO.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 20 March 2013

15. (U) ISAF Quarterly Strategic Assessment Report (January - March 2013). NATO/ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: April 2013

16. (U) Persistent Stare and Raven program update e-mail from DoD OIG (b) (6). SECRET REL ISAF/NATO.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 02 May 2013, 03 June 2013

17. (U) ISAF Joint Command Unit Implementation Plan. //NATO ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date.

Generated On: 24 November 2012.

18. (U) Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT), Cycle 16 (1 SEP - 15 OCT). NATO ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date

Generated On: 1 January 2013.

19. (U) SVTC with LTG Terry, IJC Cdr, Open Discussion. SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date

Generated On: 4 January 2013.

20. (U) Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT), Cycle 15 (August 2012). NATO ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date

Generated On: 8 August 2012.

21. ~~(//NIS)~~ OP NAWEED 1391, Annex F - Security Force Assistance. NATO ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date

Generated On: 10 April 2012.

22. (U) NTM-A/CSCTC-A/C-IED Memorandum for Record, Endorsement of Enablers. NATO ISAF SECRET

Declassify Date: No Date  
Generated On: 17 September 2012.

23. (U) Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT), Cycle 16 (1 SEP - 15 OCT). NATO ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date  
Generated On: 1 January 2013.

24. (U) Unified Implementation Plan Concept D NTM-A Source Document metrics. NATO ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date  
Generated On: 15 January 2013.

25. (U) Corps Engineer Kandak Enabler Update and Way Ahead. NATO ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date  
Generated On: 19 March 2013

26. (U) Appendix 1, Concept C HQ IJC UIP Concept 2012, Appendix 1 (Security Force Assistance 2013 Structures). NATO ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date  
Generated On: 24 November 2012

27. (U) ANSF Development Deskside Fires Information Brief. NATO ISAF SECRET.

Declassify Date: No Date  
Generated On: 29 January 2013

28. (U) Briefing to the Warfighter Senior Integration Group. SECRET REL USA, ACGU.

Declassify Date: 6 September 2023  
Generated On: 5 September 2013



## (U) Management Comments

### ~~(SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan Comments



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~  
HEADQUARTERS  
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN  
MINISTERIAL ADVISORY GROUP  
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF  
CSTC-A

3 NOV 2013

MEMORANDUM THRU United States Forces - Afghanistan (CJIG), APO AE 09356  
United States Central Command (CCIG), MacDill AFB, FL 33621

FOR: (U) Office of the Department of Defense-Inspector General, Special Plans and Operations, 4800  
Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: (U) CSTC-A MAG Draft Response to DoD IG SPO Report (Part II): "Planning for the  
Effective Development and Transition of Critical Afghan National Security Force Enablers to Post-2014  
Capabilities" (DoD IG SPO Draft Report 2013-0087).

REFERENCE: (U) Draft Report, dated 15 OCT 2013, Office of the Department of Defense-Inspector  
General, Special Plans and Operations (DoD IG SPO).

1. (U) The purpose of this memorandum is to provide draft responses on the Draft Report.
2. (U) Combined Security Transition Command -Afghanistan (CSTC-A) appreciates the time and effort  
DODIG SPO put into producing this report. CSTC-A concurs with the recommendation within the report  
and is providing actions being taken on the following pages.
3. (U) For clarification purposes, although the recommendations in the report were directed to NATO  
Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), due to the ongoing reorganization, the recommendations fall  
under the responsibility of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.

4. ~~(S)~~ PER OSD/JS. (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

5. (U) Point of contact for this action is [REDACTED]

KEVIN R. WENDEL  
Major General, US Army  
Commanding General

Enclosures:  
1 (U) CSTC-A Draft Report Response  
2 ~~(S)~~ ANSF Enabler Revisions

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~

~~(SECRET//REL to USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Combined Security  
Transition Command Afghanistan Comments (cont'd)

~~SECRET//REL to USA, NATO, ISAF~~

**CSTC-A MAG DRAFT REPORT RESPONSE**

"Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Critical Afghan National Security Force  
Enablers to Post-2014 Capabilities"  
(DoD IG SPO Draft Report 2013-0087)

PER OSD/JS, (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c, DoD OIG (b) (1), 17(e)



~~(SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Combined Security  
Transition Command Afghanistan Comments (cont'd)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~

**CSTC-A MAG DRAFT REPORT RESPONSE**

"Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Critical Afghan National Security Force  
Enablers to Post-2014 Capabilities"  
(DoD IG SPO Draft Report 2013-0087)

PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c, DoD OIG (b) (1), 1.7(e)



~~(SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Combined Security  
Transition Command Afghanistan Comments (cont'd)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~

**CSTC-A MAG DRAFT REPORT RESPONSE**

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PER OSD/JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c, DoD OIG: (b) (1), 1.7(e)



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~



~~(SECRET//REL to USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Combined Security  
Transition Command Afghanistan Comments (cont'd)

~~SECRET//REL to USA, NATO, ISAF~~

**CSTC-A MAG DRAFT REPORT RESPONSE**

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(DoD IG SPO Draft Report 2013-0087)

PER OSD JS: (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c; DoD OIG (b) (1), 17(c)



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~~(SECRET//REL to USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Combined Security  
Transition Command Afghanistan Comments (cont'd)

~~SECRET//REL to USA, NATO, ISAF~~

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PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c, DoD OIG (b) (1), 1.7(c)



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~~(SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Combined Security  
Transition Command Afghanistan Comments (cont'd)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~

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(DoD IG SPO Draft Report 2013-0087)

PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c, DoD OIG (b) (1), 1.7(e)



~~(SECRET//REL to USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Combined Security  
Transition Command Afghanistan Comments (cont'd)

~~SECRET//REL to USA, NATO, ISAF~~

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(DoD IG SPO Draft Report 2013-0087)

PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c, DoD OIG (b) (1), 17(c)



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~~(SECRET//REL to USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Combined Security  
Transition Command Afghanistan Comments (cont'd)

~~SECRET//REL to USA, NATO, ISAF~~

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"Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Critical Afghan National Security Force  
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(DoD IG SPO Draft Report 2013-0087)

PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c, DoD OIG (b) (1), 17(e)



Page 7 of 9

~~SECRET//REL to USA, NATO, ISAF~~

~~(SECRET//REL to USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Combined Security  
Transition Command Afghanistan Comments (cont'd)

~~SECRET//REL to USA, NATO, ISAF~~

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(DoD IG SPO Draft Report 2013-0087)

PER OSD/JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c, DoD OIG (b) (1), 1.7(e)



~~(SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF)~~ Combined Security  
Transition Command Afghanistan Comments (cont'd)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~

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(DoD IG SPO Draft Report 2013-0087)

PER OSD JS (b) (3), 10 USC § 130c, DoD OIG (b) (1), 1.7(e)



APPROVED BY:

PREPARED BY:

DoD OIG (b) (6)



## (U) International Security Assistance Force—Afghanistan Comments



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF)  
Joint Command (IJC)  
Kabul, Afghanistan  
APO, AE 09320



ISAF-IJC-IG

29 October 2013

### MEMORANDUM FOR USFOR-A

SUBJECT: IJC Response to Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) Draft Report -  
ANSF Enablers Part II - D2013-D00SPO-0087.000

1. IJC has reviewed the draft of the DOD IG report, ANSF Enablers Part II - D2013-D00SPO-0087.000 and concurs with the recommendations addressed to this headquarters.
2. Point of contact for this response is [REDACTED]

DoD OIG: (b) (6)






## **(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations**

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<b>ANA</b>	Afghan National Army
<b>ANP</b>	Afghan National Police
<b>ANSF</b>	Afghan National Security Forces
<b>C-IED</b>	Counter Improvised Explosive Devices
<b>GIROA</b>	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
<b>IJC</b>	ISAF Joint Command
<b>ISAF/USFOR-A</b>	International Security Assistance Force Command / U.S. Forces - Afghanistan
<b>NATO</b>	Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NTM-A/CSTC-A</b>	NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
<b>OIG</b>	Office of the Inspector General

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ISAF~~




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## **Whistleblower Protection**

### **U.S. Department of Defense**

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
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