



INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

NOVEMBER 21, 2016

(U) Evaluation of U.S. Forces— Afghanistan Intelligence Training for Afghan Ministry of Defense

Classified By: DoD OIG - (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

DoD OIG Team Lead

Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: 20310701

INTEGRITY ★ EFFICIENCY ★ ACCOUNTABILITY ★ EXCELLENCE

INTEGRITY ★ EFFICIENCY ★ ACCOUNTABILITY ★ EXCELLENCE

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Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Intelligence Training for Afghan Ministry of Defense Forces

November 21, 2016

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this project was to assess the effectiveness of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan intelligence Train, Advise, and Assist mission to Afghan Ministry of Defense forces in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Resolute Support mission.

(U) Finding

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan - Operation Freedom's Sentinel:

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

(U) We recommend that Director of Intelligence, U.S. Forces Afghanistan - Operation Freedom's Sentinel:

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)



Results in Brief

*(U) Evaluation of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Intelligence Training
for Afghan Ministry of Defense Forces*

(U) Management Comments

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

DoD OIG, OSD and USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d)
and (g)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

DoD OIG, OSD and USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d),
and (g)

(U) The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred with comments in the Observation section of this report and stated that DoD Instruction 3305.12 was updated and recently signed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. No other comment is requested.

Recommendations Table

Management Comments	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Commander, U.S. Force Afghanistan	A.1	A.2
Director of Intelligence	A.2	A.1

Please provide requested Management Comments in response to the final report by December 30, 2016.



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

November 21, 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
COMMANDER, RESOLUTE SUPPORT

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Intelligence Training for Afghan
Ministry of Defense Forces for Operation Freedom's Sentinel
(Report No. DODIG-2017-025)

(U) We are providing this final report for review and appropriate action. The report relates to the overseas contingency operation, Operation Freedom's Sentinel. We conducted this evaluation from November 2015 to April 2016 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations," published in January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

(U) This is the first DoD OIG Intelligence and Special Program Assessments (ISPA) report to focus on the Intelligence train, advise and assist mission of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The objective of this report was to assess the effectiveness of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan intelligence train, advise, and assist mission to Afghan Ministry of Defense forces in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Resolute Support mission

(U) We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing this final report. We request additional information on the implementation of recommendations as outlined in the Recommendation Table on page iv.


(U) Please provide PDF copies of your comments to DoD OIG, OSD, - (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). Copies of comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official of your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. Classified electronic format comments must be sent over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to DoD OIG, OSD, - (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

(U) Comments provided on this report must be marked and portion marked, as appropriate, in accordance with DoD Manual 5200.01 and should also conform to the requirements found in DoD Directive 7650.3. Your comments should describe what actions you have taken or plan to take to accomplish the recommendations and include the completion dates of your actions.

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at DoD OIG, OSD - (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) or DoD OIG, OSD - (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at DoD OIG, OSD - (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).



Anthony Thomas
Deputy Inspector General for
Intelligence and Special
Program Assessments

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

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(U) Introduction

(U) This report reviews the U.S. train, advise, and assist efforts for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to establish a self-sufficient Intelligence Enterprise. The ANDSF incorporates the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI), and General Staff (GS). This report details the results of our review of the U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) efforts supporting Afghanistan’s MoD. Afghanistan MoD forces are comprised of the Afghan National Army (ANA), ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC), Facility Protection Force, Special Mission Wing, and Afghan Air Force (AAF). For the purpose of this report, we focused exclusively on the ANA and General Staff;¹ we did not evaluate ANASOC or other organizations within the MoD.²

(U) Objective

(U) Our objective was to assess the effectiveness of the U.S. Forces–Afghanistan intelligence Train, Advise, and Assist mission to Afghan Ministry of Defense forces in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Resolute Support mission.

(U) Background

(U) On January 1, 2015, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commenced the Resolute Support (RS) mission, replacing the International Security Assistance Force combat mission in Afghanistan. The RS mission is to train, advise, and assist the Afghan Security Institutions and the ANDSF in order to build the capabilities and long-term sustainability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA).

¹ (U) The Afghan General Staff is a headquarters element task organized similar to the U. S. Army General Staff (i.e., G-1 personnel, G-2 intelligence, G-3 operations, etc.)

² (U) We excluded other MoD organizations due to the preponderance of focus for Intelligence training within the MoD being with the ANA and General Staff. We chose to not evaluate ANASOC forces due to their comparatively small size, remote locations, and specialized mission.

(U) In support of the NATO RS mission, USFOR-A transitioned from Operation Enduring Freedom (combat mission) to Operation Freedom's Sentinel (TAA mission) on January 1, 2015.

(U) After a review of the state of the Afghan security ministries, NATO developed the Master Ministerial Development Plan (MDP), which provides recommendations on what ANDSF must achieve over the 2015 and 2016 calendar year. Although this plan was created by NATO, it was supported by the Afghan government. The MDP establishes eight Essential Functions (EFs) focused on critical areas that, when achieved, should enable Afghanistan to sustain an autonomous security force after coalition forces depart. These eight EFs shifted NATO emphasis from unit-based combat advising to advising focused on sustainment.

(U) Eight Essential Functions³

(U) The eight EFs focus on measurable outcomes and are closely related. Each EF consists of numerous critical processes that focus on enabling Afghans to improve systems at the Corps level and higher. Essential Function seven (EF-7) focuses on building an enduring Afghan Intelligence Enterprise.

(U) EF-1 Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution: Generating requirements, developing a resource-informed budget, and then responsibly executing spending plans.

(U) EF-2 Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight: Countering corruption and ensuring third-party oversight of financial and non-financial processes. This must happen to ensure continued Intelligence Community funding.

(U) EF-3 Civilian Governance and Rule of Law: Establishing effective and transparent criminal and disciplinary systems, and preventing extra-judicial killings and gross violations of human rights.

³ (U) Excerpt from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan/ NATO Resolute Support, Afghan Ministry of Defense, Afghan Ministry of Interior, and Afghan National Army General Staff Master Ministerial Development Plan.

(U) EF-4 Force Generation: Recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional ANDSF.

(U) EF-5 Sustain the Force: Developing effective communications, maintenance, medical, and logistics systems.

(U) EF-6 Plan, Resource and Execute Effective Security Campaigns and Operations: Translating strategic guidance into operational plans with effective C2 and resourcing, employing ground, air and special operations forces.

(U) EF-7 Intelligence: Developing the ability to collect, process, and analyze as well as plan, integrate, produce, and disseminate intelligence.

(U) EF-8 Strategic Communication: Communicating with and informing the Afghan people and external audiences.

(U) Essential Function Seven

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d)

[REDACTED]

(U) Plan of Action and Milestones

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) The PoAM Synchronization (Synch) Matrix below illustrates NATO's projected status of ANDSF forces for each of EF-7's nine milestones. The milestones are sub-categorized under the Line of Effort (LOE) listed in the MDP. Milestones A-C are under LOE 7.1 (Intelligence Integration), milestones D-F under LOE 7.2 (Intelligence Cycle Development), Milestone G under LOE 7.3 (Training), and milestones H and I under LOE 7.4 (Sustainment).

Introduction

~~(S//REL TO USA, RSMA, AFG)~~

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)



(U) Source: RS/USFOR-A Advisors, February 2016

(U) U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Intelligence Training Units

(U) On January 1, 2015, the United States Army Contracting Command awarded DynCorp International, LLC the contract to advise, teach, and mentor the Afghan MoD in support of the NATO RS mission. DynCorp International subcontracted the EF-7 TAA mission to New Century, United States (NCUS). In addition to the NCUS contracted trainers, ISR CIC Field Service Representatives conduct all training and sustainment of equipment for MoD personnel on ISR platform operations and maintenance.

(U) Other Factors Impacting Afghanistan Training Mission

(U) U.S. Forces-Afghanistan are faced with numerous challenges that must also be considered when evaluating the overall effectiveness of the CJ2 intelligence TAA mission.

(U) The Afghan Condition

(U) The CJ2 staff conducts routine engagements with Afghan GS G-2 and ANA intelligence personnel to reinforce the importance of a robust intelligence enterprise for the defense and sustainment of the GIRoA. During these engagements, the staff noted that Afghan environmental and cultural conditions significantly challenge the Afghan's ability to develop processes and institutions common to modern westernized military and security enterprises. These challenges were not specific to the development of the Afghan Intelligence Enterprise or limited to the ANDSF. The CJ2, Major General Quantock, used the term "Afghan Condition" to describe circumstances in Afghanistan culture that restrict or limit their progress. The Afghan condition includes high illiteracy rates, internal language barriers, gender inequality, tribal or family influences, corruption, and security concerns.

(U) U.S. Force Structure and the Afghan Security Situation

(U) In December 2015, the President issued his decision on the U.S. post-2016 presence and support in Afghanistan. The President called for a force reduction to 5,500 military personnel by the end of 2016.⁴ This was a change from the President's 2014 plan to have U.S. forces out of Afghanistan by the end of the 2016 calendar year.⁵ This plan called for a reduction in the U.S. TAA component. EF-7 contract intelligence trainers were to be reduced from 114 personnel in October 2014 to 71 in February 2016. As of March 2016, CJ2 leadership planned to reduce EF-7 TAA staff an additional 15 percent by the end of 2016 to comply with USCENTCOM Operations Order (OPORD) 25.⁶

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

⁴ (U) In October 2015, President Obama announced his plan to maintain 5500 troops in Afghanistan beyond 2016 in a White House speech.

⁵ (U) On July 6, 2016, the President announced an amended force reduction number – 8,400 instead of 5,500. The effects of this latest announcement were unknown as of the time of this reports publishing.

⁶ ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ DoD OIG, OSD - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c); USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(c)

(U) Finding

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(c), (d), (g)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

⁷

(U) This condition exists because:

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

⁷ (U) EF-7 established the Afghan MoD Intelligence Enterprise as a component capable of collecting, processing, and analyzing as well as planning, integrating, producing, and disseminating intelligence.

(U) Emphasis on Intelligence at the Corps level

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

A detailed map of Afghanistan with various military units and their locations marked. The map includes labels for neighboring countries: TURKMENISTAN, TAJIKISTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, CHINA, and IRAN. Major cities like Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul are labeled. Military units are indicated by boxes with arrows pointing to their locations: 209th Corps (2nd, 1st, 3rd Brigades), 207th Corps (1st, 2nd Brigades), 201st Corps (3rd, 2nd, 1st, 4th Brigades), 111st Division, Special Operations Command, 203rd Corps (1st, 4th, 3rd, 2nd Brigades), 205th Corps (2nd, 4th, 1st, 3rd Brigades), and 215th Corps (2nd, 3rd, 1st Brigades). A legend in the bottom right corner explains symbols for international borders, provincial boundaries, disputed boundaries, lines of control, capital cities, provincial capitals, main roads, other roads, rivers, railways, international drainage, seasonal drainage, airports, and forests. A scale bar at the bottom right shows distances in kilometers and miles.

(U) Release of Soldiers to Attend Intelligence Training

DoD OIG, OSD - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g); USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(c), (d)

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Finding

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d); USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(c), (d)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Trained Personnel Assigned to Non-intelligence Duties

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d); USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(c), (d)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d); USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(c), (d)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Finding

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d); USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(c), (d)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Figure 3: ANA Students at ITC-Sia Sang learning FalconView



(U) Source: RS/USFOR-A Advisors, February 2016

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

Finding

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM -
(b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Figure 4. F3EAD Process – Operations and Intelligence Cycles Combined



(U) Source: Defense Technology Information Center (<http://www.dtic.mil>)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

(U) Meeting Agreed Upon Training and Maintenance Goals and Standards

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO, AFG)~~

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

(U) Source: USFOR-A/RS Advisors, February 2016

(U) The Command Integration Cell Sustains All Afghan National Army Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Assets

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

(U) No Consequences for Noncompliance

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

Finding

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]
DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]
DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Figure 6. Excerpt from 1395 Financial Commitment Letter Showing Penalty Clause

The MoD will sign the Control Plan for the 'Physical Security and Accountability of Night Vision Devices (NVD) and Platform Mounted NVDs by January 1, 2016, which will be reviewed and updated on an annual basis, or as required. The MoD will follow all Enhanced End Use Monitoring (EEUM) accountability requirements as stipulated in the Control Plan, to include providing quarterly accountability reports to the CSTC-A/SAO-A EUM Section. Furthermore, the MoD will distribute NVDs only to units that are authorized by Tashkil to possess these devices. Requests to modify the Tashkil in order to adjust NVD distribution must be sent to and authorized by CSTC-A CDD.

وزارت دفاع ملی پلان کنترولی را برای امنیت فیزیکی و حسابداری آله های دیدشب با پایه نصب آله الی 1 جنوری 2016 به امضاء خواهد رسانید که نظر به ضرورت بطور سالانه تجدید و بررسی خواهد گردید. وزارت دفاع ملی تمام نیازمندی های حسابداری نظارت بهتر استفاده نهایی آله دید شب را قسمیکه در پلان کنترولی آمده است و شامل تهیه گزارش های حسابداری ربعوار برای بخش همکاری های امنیتی سیستمکا میگرددد، تعقیب خواهد نمود. بیشتر از این، وزارت دفاع ملی آله های دید شب را تنها برای قطعات ایکه در تشکیل اجازه دارند توزیع خواهد نمود. سیستمکا ارسال گردد. درخواست بخاطر تغییر در تشکیل بمنظور تنظیم توزیع آله های دیدشب باید به بخش

PENALTY: If the MoD fails to abide by the signed Control Plan requirements, CSTC-A may withhold maintenance and repair support for all EEUM items currently fielded and may freeze any future deliveries of EEUM items.

جریمه: اگر وزارت دفاع ملی نتواند نیازمندی های پلان کنترولی امضاء شده را رعایت نماید، سیستمکا حمایت

(U) Source: RS/USFOR-A Advisors, February 2016

(U) U.S. Force Reduction

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)


~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

Finding

~~(S//REL TO NATO/RS)~~

DoD OIG, OSD - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d); USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(c), (d)



~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)



(U) Conclusion

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation A.1

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Train, Advise, and Assist

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d); USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(c), (d)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Finding

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendation A.2

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Train, Advise, and Assist

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Observation

(U) Intelligence Training to Non-US Persons

(U) During our visit with RS/USFOR-A senior leaders and trainers/advisors, we discussed the creation of Programs of Instruction (POI) and general intelligence materials used to train and advise Afghan MoD personnel. DoD Instruction 3305.12, "Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-US Persons," October 25, 2007, Incorporate Change 2, October 15, 2013, states that there are responsibilities involving coordination and reporting of POIs and general circumstances (training requirements) with various combat support agencies (CSA) and ultimately, the Human Capital Management Office within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Although policy issues associated with Intelligence Training to Non-US Persons was outside of our objective we did observe the following:

~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g); NGA - (b)(1), 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]

(U) One possible explanation is that Afghan GSG2 instructors began providing intelligence training directly to ANA troops at the ITC in early 2015 while, RS/USFOR-A contract trainers shifted to advising and assisting. The contractor trainers said they largely relied on materials provided by CSA LNOs, unclassified training material from the internet and their own experience.

Observation

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) In an effort to examine intelligence training to Afghan MoD forces in a more holistic way, we reviewed Department of Defense policy and conducted interviews at senior levels within the DoD.⁹ We felt this observation warranted mentioning as it dealt directly with the training of intelligence to non-U.S. persons.

⁹ (U) Senior DoD levels included the Human Capital Management Office within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Joint Staff J2/7.

(U) Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from November 24, 2015 through July 2016 in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation. Those standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objective.

(U) We conducted site visits and interviews with representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence/Human Capital Management Office, United States Central Command, United States Special Operations Command, Joint Staff/Directorate of Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and Resolute Support/United States Forces-Afghanistan/Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Directorate.

(U) We reviewed DoD and Joint Staff policy and Combatant Command Instructions to identify guidance and policy pertaining to intelligence training of Afghan MoD forces. Specifically we reviewed:

- DODI 3305.12, Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-U.S. Persons, USD(I), October 15, 2013
- USCENTCOM OPORD 25, September 3, 2015
- White House Memorandum, December 2, 2015
- ACC Contract W560MY-15-C-0005, December 29, 2014
- Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan, May 2014
- AMOD-I Organizational Functional Manual, 2011

- Afghan Master Ministerial Development Plan, 2015-2016
- Afghan MoD Commitment Letter, January 15, 2016
- RS/USFOR-A, DCOS-INT TAA Daily and Weekly Updates and EF-7 Monthly summaries (Monthly)

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) No prior coverage of RS/USFOR-A's intelligence training of Afghan MoD Forces has been conducted.

(U) Management Comments

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Train, Advise, and Assist

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)



**(U) Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Train, Advise,
and Assist (cont'd)**

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g)



**(U) Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Train, Advise,
and Assist (cont'd)**

DoD OIG, OSD, USCENTCOM - (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c), (d), (g); and (b)(6)



(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

ANA	Afghan National Army
ANASOC	Afghan National Army Special Operations Command
ANDSF	Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
CIC	Command Integration Cell
CJ2	Director of Intelligence
CSA	Combat Support Agencies
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DI	DynCorp International
EEUM	Enhanced End Use Monitoring
EF	Essential Functions
EUM	End Use Monitoring
F3EAD	Find Fix Finish Exploit Analyze Disseminate
FSR	Field Service Representative
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GS	General Staff
GSG2	General Staff Director Intelligence
HPSCI	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
I&CI	Intelligence & Counterintelligence
ISPA	Intelligence Special Program Assessments
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
ITC	Intelligence Training Center
LNO	Liaison Officer
LOE	Lines of Effort
MDP	Ministerial Development Plan
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoI	Ministry of Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCUS	New Century, United States contracting company
NIMS	National Information Management System
NMIC	National Military Intelligence Center
OFS	Operation Freedom's Sentinel
OPORD	Operations Order
PoAM	Plan of Action and Milestones
RFI	Request for Information

Acronyms and Abbreviations

RS	Resolute Support
SME	Subject Matter Expert
TAA	Train Advise Assist
TAAC-E	Train Advise Assist Command-East
TAAC-S	Train Advise Assist Command-South
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USFOR-A	United States Forces-Afghanistan
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command

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

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