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SIGNAL SECURITY AGENCY

Washington, D. C.

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE CIPHER BUREAU (MI-8) DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR: DOCUMENTS BY MAJOR HERBERT O. YARDLEY

Prepared under the Direction of the

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER

25 May 1945

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EDITOR'S FOREWORD

This paper presents verbatim transcripts of a number of historical documents now in the files of the Signal Security Agency. They describe the achievements of the Cipher Bureau (MI-8) maintained by the Military Intelligence Division in Washington from 1917 to 1919, and its successor, the cryptanalytic unit directed in New York City by Mr. Herbert O. Yardley. Though the latter unit continued to exist until 1929, the data here presented are for the most part no later than 1920.

While these documents provide much material of historic interest, they are in no sense regarded as adequate accounts of the work of these units, but are now published primarily to afford an opportunity for comparison with the statements made by Mr. Yardley in The American Black Chamber (1931). Only one of the documents is signed but there can be no doubt that they are all the work of Mr. Yardley.

Footnotes which are unsigned are by the editor. Those marked "W. F. F." are by Mr. William F. Friedman; those marked "H. O. Y." present the contents of remarks on slips of paper inserted by Mr. Yardley.

11 May 1945

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CONTENTS

I. A history of the Code and Cipher Section during the First World War, prepared in 1919 by Major Herbert O. Yardley

II. Memorandum for the Director of Military Intelligence, 5 June 1920, Subject: Number of alien codes and ciphers broken, prepared by Mr. Herbert O. Yardley in New York City

III. Exhibits prepared by Mr. Herbert O. Yardley in 1920 (with later additions), illustrating the work of MI-8 as a necessary function of the War Department

INDEX

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PART I

A HISTORY OF THE CODE AND CIPHER SECTION
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR,
PREPARED IN 1919
BY MAJOR HERBERT O. YARDLEY

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M. I. 8 [1]

Code and Cipher Section [2]

Origins.

When war was declared, neither the War Department nor any other department of the Government possessed even a rudimentary organization for attack on codes and ciphers. Colonel Van Deman[3] (then Major Van Deman) recognized, however, that such an organization was absolutely indispensable and immediately began a search for experts to form it and train the necessary personnel.

The only officers of the Army known as expert in the subject were Colonels Parker Hitt (then a Captain) and Joseph O. Mauborgne and Frank

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1. The document of which this is a verbatim transcription is now filed in the office of the Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency (file no. 277). Though unsigned, proof exists that it was prepared by Major Herbert O. Yardley and completed probably in July 1919. The evidence for this attribution is now filed in IR 4150 and has been transcribed in The Shorthand Subsection of MI-8 in the First World War (1917-1919), a publication of the Historical Unit (IR 5042). On 3 June 1919 Major Yardley wrote Mr. Franklin W. Allen, who had been head of the Shorthand Subsection of MI-8 in New York, that, at the request of the Director of Military Intelligence, he was then preparing an account of the work of MI-8. He enclosed for Mr. Allen's comments and revision a rough draft of the fourth paragraph, dealing with the work of the Shorthand Subsection. This draft is reproduced in appendix A of the publication cited. Appendix B presents Mr. Allen's revisions. As appendix B has been incorporated almost verbatim in the unsigned document, it is clear that Major Yardley was the author.

2. The official title was "The Cipher Bureau".

3. Colonel Ralph H. Van Deman, General Staff Corps.

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Moorman (then Lieutenants)[4]. Colonel Van Deman endeavored to procure the services of these officers but Colonels Hitt[5] and Moorman[6] were sent to France with the American Expeditionary Forces and Colonel Mauborgne[7] was assigned to important administrative duties in the radio service of the Signal Corps. Accordingly it became necessary to find experts in civil life and enlist their services.

On June 10, 1917, a beginning was made by the commissioning as First Lieutenant (later as Major) of Herbert O. Yardley, who had several years' experience in code work in the State Department and had incidentally developed knowledge and skill in the solution of codes. He was put in charge of the code work of Military Intelligence with two

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4. Brigadier General M. M. Macomb, War College Division, wrote on 2 August 1916 (file no. 4131-14, copy now in IR 4241) to the Chiefs of Staff of the Eastern, Central, Southern, Western, Hawaiian and Philippine Departments, that, in response to an earlier request for information, he had been sent by the Army Signal School, Fort Leavenworth, a list of officers known to be cipher experts. This list included Captain Parker Hitt, 19th Infantry, "undoubtedly the best cipher man in our service"; Lieutenant Joseph O. Mauborgne, 8th Infantry, who "has done some excellent work in this line and should be of value to the War College"; Lieutenant Charles A. Lewis, 9th Infantry; Lieutenant Edmund R. Andrews, 13th Infantry; Lieutenant Charles E. Swartz, 22nd Infantry; Lieutenant Clyde L. Eastman, 20th Infantry; Lieutenant Karl Truesdell, 25th Infantry; and Lieutenant Frank Moorman, 18th Infantry, who "is interested and would be glad to undertake work of this kind". The comment on Lieutenant Moorman was written by himself, as he was Acting Director of the Signal School at this time.

5. Colonel Hitt became Assistant Chief Signal Officer for the American Expeditionary Forces in France and was not actively engaged in cryptographic or cryptanalytic duties. (W.F.F.)

6. Lieutenant Colonel Moorman (then Major) was officer in charge of the unit (G-2, A-6) which performed cryptanalysis of German communications at General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, 1917-1918.

7. Major General Joseph O. Mauborgne was Chief Signal Officer from 1 October 1937 to 30 September 1941, when he was retired.

clerks as assistants.[8]

The work of encoding and decoding our own cables and telegrams[9] increased so rapidly, however, that although First Lieutenant James E. McKenna was soon appointed to take charge of this branch of the work, the time of the whole staff was practically consumed by it and Lieutenant Yardley had no opportunity to devote himself to code and cipher attack. Late in September therefore, Col. Van Deman invited to Washington and later commissioned as Captain Mr. John M. Manly,[10] who had offered his services in March, 1917. At first it was Col. Van Deman's idea to divide the code and cipher work and put Lieut. Yardley in charge of the former and Capt. Manly in charge of the latter, but these officers soon saw that such a division would be counter to the best interests of the work and at their suggestion a section was organized to deal with secret communications of all sorts. Furthermore it soon became clear that such a section - to obtain the best possible results - should be located in Washington and should receive information and materials from all departments of the Government and serve all equally.

In pursuance of this plan Col. Van Deman had conferences with representatives of the departments of State and Justice and the Navy, and arrangements for cooperation were completed whereby these departments agreed to send to Military Intelligence all documents suspected of containing secret communications, and Military Intelligence agreed to examine and report upon such documents. Later, similar arrangements were perfected with the Postal Censorship; and even official and semi-official organizations with which no definite plan of cooperation had been arranged gradually adopted the practice of depending upon Military Intelligence for cryptographical work.

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8. This unit worked at the War College, but was later located successively in a building at 15th and M Streets, N.W., 1330 F Street, N.W., and finally at 7th and B Streets, N.W.

9. This purely cryptographic work should have been done by the Adjutant General's Office but on pleas of greater security G-2 set up its own facilities and staff for this purpose. (W.F.F.)

10. Both before and after the war Captain Manly was head of the English Department and Professor of English at the University of Chicago.

The Riverbank Laboratories.

Previous to these plans for cooperation and the organization of this central office, very little cryptographical material of any sort had been recognized as such by any department. A few official Mexican ciphers[11] were picked up from time to time and still fewer personal ciphers - innocent or criminal in character - drifted in from various sources. Most of these had been sent to Geneva, Illinois, where, under the name of The Riverbank Laboratories, Mr. George Fabyan[12] maintained a staff of persons to work upon various fads in which he was interested. Among these fads was the belief in the existence of a biliteral cipher in various works of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which showed that Francis Bacon was the author of works commonly ascribed to William Shakespeare and other writers. The search for this cipher had given Mr. Fabyan's staff no real experience even in the elements of cryptography but had aroused in him an intense interest in the subject. Consequently when war was declared it was natural that Mr. Fabyan as a patriotic citizen should offer the services of his staff to the Government. This was in April, 1917. As no official cryptographic section then existed, Mr. Fabyan's generous offer was accepted and various departments of the Government sent to him such ciphers as came to hand. As has been said above, his staff was without real cryptographic experience, and to remedy this Mr. Fabyan sent two of them - Mr. J. A. Powell[13] and Mr. W. F. Friedman[14] - to the Army Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth to take a course of instruction from Lieut. Mauborgne;[15]

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11. On such systems see IR 5049.

12. An honorary title, conferred by the Governor of Kentucky, some years before 1915, gave him the right to be known as "Colonel Fabyan". (W.F.F.)

13. Dr. Powell had been head of the University of Chicago Press up to the time of his employment in 1917 by Colonel Fabyan. (W.F.F.)

14. At that time Mr. Friedman was in charge of the Department of Genetics at Riverbank Laboratories and took only a mild interest in the Bacon-Shakespeare work being done there. (W.F.F.)

15. An error: Mr. Friedman was not sent but studied Captain Parker Hitt's Manual for the Solution of Military Ciphers, a copy of which Mr. Powell brought back with him. (W.F.F.)

consequently they were thereafter much better equipped to solve such problems as were submitted to them.

In the maintenance of his cipher laboratory and later in instructing a large number of officers in the principles of cipher attack,[16] Mr. Fabyan spent a large sum of money. For the assistance he rendered in these ways he deserved and received the thanks of the departments concerned. After the cryptographic section of Military Intelligence had been organized and designated as a central office serving all departments, however, relations with Mr. Fabyan's laboratory gradually ceased - on the part of the departments, chiefly because of the advantages of dealing with an office centrally located in Washington; on the part of the Military Intelligence because, in spite of repeated admonitions by Colonel Van Deman, Mr. Fabyan was unable or unwilling to suppress his penchant for a publicity which was recognized as detrimental to the best interests of the service.[17]

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16. A memorandum for the Chief of Staff from the Chief, Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, 13 May 1918 (a copy is now filed in IR 4152) stated that the officers sent to Riverbank Laboratories were sent there for training in cryptography but had been trained by error in cryptanalysis. On the other hand, when the student officers were detailed for the course, the War Department set up no guides or limitations, other than that six weeks would be devoted to instruction in cryptography. The word "cryptanalysis", coined by Mr. Friedman in 1921, was unknown at this time. Mr. Friedman recalls (1945) that there was some controversy with Major Yardley at a later time about this point, Yardley claiming that the officers had been sent for instruction purely in cryptography and not in solution. As it turned out, a great many of the students did get assigned to cryptanalytic duties. There were three groups of students, the first consisting of but four officers in October-November 1917; the second consisting of some sixty officers in January-February 1918; the third consisting of seven or eight in March-April 1918. Mr. Friedman prepared the instructional material, gave the lectures, and directed the school, the first of its kind in American history. Beginning in September 1917, Mr. Friedman gave up his work in genetics and became Director of the Department of Ciphers at the Laboratories, until in April or May 1918 he was commissioned first lieutenant and sent immediately to G-2, A-6, General Headquarters, in France. (W.F.F.)

17. No. This was just Yardley's way of getting Fabyan out of the picture. (W.F.F.)

Code and Cipher Attack.

In the cryptographic section itself - which will hereafter for the sake of clearness, be referred to as M. I. 8 - as in the whole organization of Military Intelligence, the increase in personnel was closely dependent upon the pressure of the work itself. During the first year of the war, additions to the staff were not made until they were absolutely necessary. The growth was therefore slow and the time of the staff fully occupied by current routine work. Plans for attack upon large problems or for research into new methods had constantly to be postponed because of the unescapable (sic) demands of the daily work. In fact, it was not until the beginning of August, 1918, that the staff was enlarged sufficiently to permit of serious attacks upon the large numbers of code messages in various codes which had been accumulating in the files.

The results obtained should be judged in the light of these facts. And for the future it should be borne in mind that an adequate personnel of clerks and typists as well as of cryptographers is necessary for satisfactory results in code attack, and that the personnel is not adequate unless it is large enough to release the time of one or more experts for research.

Shorthand Subsection.[18]

The earliest subsection to be organized in M. I. 8 was the Shorthand Subsection. Early in October, 1917, M. I. 8 began to receive letters and other documents supposed by the censors to be in cipher. Some of them upon examination proved to be Yiddish and Arabic and were put into the hands of our language experts, but others proved to be in shorthand systems and languages of enemy countries and neutral European countries and in English shorthand systems unknown to most English shorthand writers.

In these circumstances recourse was had to Mr. F. W. Allen, of the firm of Hulse & Allen, who responded promptly with the desired aid and very soon was doing a large amount of work for M. I. 8 and employing a number of experts and paying for their services connected with this work, until May, 1918, when he was requested to organize the work as a subsection of M. I. 8, which he consented to do, without remuneration.

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18. This section is almost a verbatim copy of an earlier draft of these paragraphs, as revised by Mr. F. W. Allen. See the remarks in the Editor's Foreword. For a fuller account of the work of Mr. Allen's unit, see IR 5042.

He was then appointed Chief of the Subsection, with the status of civilian volunteer and with headquarters at his office in New York. Under Mr. Allen's direction three important results were accomplished:-

(1) Decipherment of Shorthand Systems. - A bibliography of works in public and private libraries in the United States on rare and foreign shorthand systems was compiled and a library was built up, for use in which all volumes that were needed were secured. Altogether fifty-four systems were studied and analyzed and the leading characteristics of each system were charted, so that in a short time experts could determine the system used in practically every document submitted and transcribe the stenographic notes into the language used.

(2) German Shorthand Experts for the A.E.F. - On June 17, 1918, M. I. 8 was instructed to locate, appoint and send to France fifteen expert stenographers who could take down verbatim examination of German prisoners of war. The Committee on Classification of Personnel in the Army having failed to locate a single person so qualified, Mr. Allen was requested to organize the search; and after writing several thousand letters to individuals, shorthand schools and stenographic societies, he was able to recommend the required personnel and assure a steady, though not a large, supply of men qualified as desired.

(3) Census of Foreign Stenographers. - In connection with the work described in the previous paragraphs, a census was made of shorthand writers throughout the United States writing foreign language systems, each of whom was carefully investigated and a record made of his history, citizenship, employment, connections and qualifications. This proved of great value in all phases of the work done by the Shorthand Subsection.

(4) Expert Linguists for M. I. 8 and the A.E.F. - About July 1, 1918, as a result of the increasing pressure of work in M. I. 8 and frequent calls from the American Expeditionary Forces, France, for officers with a thinking knowledge of German for codes and cipher work, Mr. Allen was requested to find, investigate and recommend six cryptographers and twelve candidates for commissions.

The persons whom he selected and recommended have been among the best qualified for our work, several having occupied executive positions in our own office and all of these officers who were sent to France having proved thoroughly efficient. Moreover, several of the officers whom he chose, in turn recommended strong, well-equipped men and women for various positions in France and the United States.

About August 15, a sudden call was made on M. I. 8 for Army Field Clerks, with an intimate knowledge of the Russian people and language, to accompany the Intelligence Section of the American Expeditionary Forces to Siberia, and Mr. Allen, on three days' notice, furnished two qualified candidates.

Secret Inks.

That the enemy was using secret inks for some of his communications was known in a general way from a very early date. The first actual case that came to attention, however, seems to have been that of a letter written with invisible ink in Modern Greek and brought across the Mexican border in the shoe of an illiterate woman. This was developed by simple processes in M. I. 8 but many suspicious documents did not yield to treatment. Information of a general nature was obtained from the British and the French concerning German technique in this field, and after much correspondence M. I. 8 was put in possession of all the knowledge of our allies in these three ways:

(a) By a voluminous report transmitted through Captain J. A. Powell, who was sent abroad in December 1917 to establish liaison with our allies in all matters of this general nature.

(b) By the visit to America at the expense of M. I. D. of Mr. S. W. Collins, one of the best of the British experts in the detection of secret inks.

(c) By the visit of Captain Emmett K. Carver of M. I. 8 to Great Britain and France for study in the laboratories there.

Correspondence and other preliminaries delayed for a painfully long time the establishment of a laboratory in M. I. 8. This did not actually take place until the removal to 1330 F Street in July, 1918. The laboratory was, however, at this date able to function immediately in highest efficiency. Its record under Captain Carver - and in his absence, under Lt. A. J. McGrail[19] - is one of thorough equipment for

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19. Lieutenant Colonel A. J. McGrail was the only member of MI-8 in Washington who later also was a member of the Signal Security Agency in the Second World War. From 1941 until his death on 30 April 1945 Colonel McGrail was in charge of all work involving secret ink and photography.

any problem in its field and of great usefulness. On an average over 2000 letters per week were examined from July 1, 1918 to February 1, 1919.

Instruction in Code and Cipher Work.

Besides instructing Military Attaches and their assistants in the proper use of our own codes, M. I. 8 was obliged to conduct courses of instruction for several groups of persons;

(a) Officers and field clerks for M. I. 8, for G-2, A-6, A.E.F., and for the corresponding section of the expedition to Vladivostok.

(b) Intelligence Officers for duty at home and abroad.

One of the most interesting by-products of this instructional work was a treatise on the organization of the German Army, more accurate and comprehensive, it is believed, than any similar treatise in the possession of the Allies. This was prepared by a member of M. I. 8 for use in instructing code-attack officers for the work at the front.

Code Compilation.

Shortly after the organization of M. I. 8 it was learned that the Germans were reading confidential messages passing between Generals Pershing and Bliss and the Washington office. This was known to be due to the possession by the Germans of copies of the Army Code Book[20] of 1915, the only book available for our use, and to the inadequacy of this book to resist attack under such conditions. Preparations were made for the compilation of a new and better book and a special subsection was organized under the leadership of Captain A. E. Prince for this purpose. This book[21] was completed on July 1, 1918, and would have served its purpose well for a long time but for the fact that other organizations of the Army which had been permitted to use the book misused it in such a way as to destroy its security. Work upon another book[22] -

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20. War Department Telegraph Code 1915, a one-part code. It was used for unenciphered nonsecret communication, and with cipher tables for secret communication. The code itself had been printed by a commercial firm in Cleveland!! (W.F.F.)

21. Its designation was "Military Intelligence Code No. 5" but, so far as is known, there never were any similar codes numbered 1-4. (W.F.F.)

22. This two-part code was designated "Military Intelligence Code No. 9" and was little used. It was later revived with a new title-page as "War Department Staff Code No. 2", and held in reserve. It was probably never used.

with certain improvements in plan - was begun immediately and under pressure of necessity was hastened to such a degree that the volume was ready for use when the Director of M. I. D. went to France, December 2, 1918.

Other notable achievements of this subsection were the following:

(A) Two Geographical Codes. - In July, 1918, a cable from General Tasker H. Bliss requested that a "list of code words be gotten out for the geographical names of all that section of France in which operations are now taking place, or are likely to take place in the future, based on the French map having a scale of 1: 100,000 feet". This cable was referred to the Director of Military Intelligence for action; work was immediately begun on the FRENCH GEOGRAPHICAL CODE, and the book of 360 pages, containing the names of approximately 9750 places in France within twenty-five miles of each side of the then battle front, was finished October 1.

By that time, since the theatre of military operations had materially shifted, it was considered desirable to issue a new code, incorporating the former, and also covering all of Belgium, the lower part of Holland, Germany to a distance of twenty-five miles beyond the Rhine, and that portion of Northern France not embraced in the former code. Work was begun October 17, and the book came from the printer about November 15, 1918. This code, FRENCH GEOGRAPHICAL CODE No. 2, contained approximately 26,500 names of cities, towns, forests, hills and streams.

(b) A casualty code. - THE CASUALTY CODE, begun September 16, 1918, was in no sense of the word to be a secret code, but was designed purely to promote facility and economy in the transmission of casualty reports. In this work the War Department Telegraph Code of 1915 had been in use, but as it never had been designed for such a task, from five to seven or eight code groups were required to report a single casualty.

THE CASUALTY CODE was planned to comprise a long list of names, necessary numbers and dates, the name of every individual organization in the Army, including all branches, together with a number of provisional organizations contemplated at that time, and a vocabulary sufficient for the purpose for which the code was intended. The names, dates, numbers and vocabulary were not especially difficult to compile, but when an effort was made to secure a complete list of organizations, it developed that no department in Washington had such a list. Considerable difficulty was therefore experienced in obtaining the information necessary,

but it was obtained. Probably this section had in its possession on November 15 data with regard to the various branches of our Army, which, had it been properly tabulated, would have formed the most complete and comprehensive catalogue of our military resources in existence.

The work on this book was nearly completed, when the signing of the armistice, and the necessity for the immediate compilation and production of Code No. 9, rendered further work undesirable. The material gathered at that time, however, is still in the possession of M. I. 8, and would be available if the publication of such a code ever became necessary.

(c) Pocket code. - On the second of December, 1918, instructions were given to the Compilation Section to prepare a "pocket code", [23] for the use of Military Attaches when on duty away from their posts, and other special military agents in the field, particularly those agents who would go into enemy territory with the army of occupation or in other capacities in which the use of code communications was desirable. Within two weeks of the time when work was started the volumes were ready for distribution. The force had previously worked on the manuscript at odd times, and the devising of a new method of preparing the "copy" for the printer made possible this record speed. Fifty copies of the book were immediately sent to Europe for distribution, and those who have had occasion to use the book have been highly pleased. The book contains 13,000 code groups, words and phrases.

In addition to code compilation, this subsection furnished new encipherment tables every two weeks to all users of our own codes and to such of our officers as were obliged by circumstances to continue the use of the Army Code Book of 1915.

Communications.

For two years the Communications Subsection has maintained cable and telegraphic communication with about forty Military Attaches and Intelligence Officers in Foreign countries, and with hundreds of Intelligence Officers stationed in all camps and important cities within the United States. The section has been open twenty-four hours a day. By

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23. The Ideal Correspondence Code, ostensibly a publication of the Ideal Code Company, New York, 1918, but actually printed at the Government Printing Office on paper and in a format unlike other government publications. (W.F.F.)

means of special wire connections exceptionally fast service was provided, particularly with the most important center, Paris, whence cable messages were often received within less than one-half hour from the time of sending.

Practically half of the enormous amount of cable correspondence handled by this office was in the form of code messages. Since the principles of security required that the code words of each message be enciphered to prevent the possibility of the messages being read by the enemy, it was necessary to subject each code message to two complete translations. The obvious impossibility of distributing the work evenly according to clock or calendar resulted in intermittently overloading the section, but because of the splendid spirit shown by the entire commissioned and civilian personnel in subordinating their personal convenience to the needs of the work, and their willingness to "carry on", often for double the regular number of working hours, the work was kept up to the minute at all times and was always performed with exceptional efficiency.

From September, 1918 to May, 1919, this subsection sent and received 25,000 messages, about half plain text and half code, containing 1,300,000 words.

It is perhaps not generally recognized that our use of codes has resulted in great economy. Wherever they have been used, - and they have been used by the Military Intelligence Division, The Adjutant General's Office, the A. E. F., France, and other War Department offices,- the cost to the Government of cable and telegraphic communication has been reduced at least fifty per cent. The use of the Geographical Codes resulted in even greater economy by eliminating the necessity for spelling out foreign place names.

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PART II

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
5 JUNE 1920, SUBJECT: NUMBER OF ALIEN CODES AND CIPHERS BROKEN,
PREPARED BY MR. HERBERT O. YARDLEY IN NEW YORK CITY

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~~S E C R E T~~[24]

3 East 38th Street,
New York, June 5, 1920.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

Subject: Number of alien codes and ciphers broken.

1. The principle codes and ciphers than (sic) can be read at present are as follows:

A. Argentine diplomatic code	1
B. Brazilian diplomatic code	1
" " cipher	1
C. Chilean diplomatic codes	
Code "A"	1
Code "B"	1
D. Costa Rican diplomatic codes	
Code "A"	1
Code # 246	1
Code # 51015	1
Code # 10	1
E. Cuban diplomatic code	1
F. German diplomatic & consular codes	
Code # 13040	1
" # 26040-9	1
" # 5950	1
" # 18470-9	1
" # 12444	1
" # 1777	1
" # 50874	1
" # 84668	1
" # 83204	1
" # 2815	1
" # 2310	1
" # 3009	1
" # 3090	1
" # 3900	1
" # 0039	1

24. The original of this memorandum is now filed in IR 4158.

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	" # 0390	1
	" # 5030	1
	" # 5300	1
	" # 0053	1
	" # 0530	1
G.	German Intelligence Ciphers	5
H.	Japanese diplomatic codes	
	Ja	1
	Jb	1
	Jc	1
	Je	1
I.	Mexican diplomatic & consular codes (The various kinds and designations are too numerous to show graphically).	647 [25]
J.	Panaman diplomatic code	1
K.	Peruvian diplomatic codes	
	Code "A"	1
	Code "B"	1
	Code "C"	1
	Code "D"	1
L.	Spanish diplomatic & consular codes	
	AB # 301	1
	C # 101	1
	D # 229	1
	E # 249	1
	F # 131	1
	GH # 132-3	1
	I # 129	1
	J # 141	1
	K # 143	1
	L # 111	1
	M # 9	1
	N # 32	1
	O # 187	1
	P # 181	1
	Q # 303	1
	R # 155	1
	S # 167	1
	T # 215	1
	V # 159	1

25. This impressive total was reached by counting each solution of a cipher key as one. Actually, no Mexican codes had ever been solved by MI-8 at this date.

Y # 74	1
Z # 253	1
M. Uruguay diplomatic code	1
G R A N D T O T A L ---	713

2. The greatest accomplishment during the fiscal year of 1920 was the breaking of four Japanese diplomatic codes.

3. Plans for the fiscal year 1920-1921 call for;
(a) The breaking of the unsolved Japanese diplomatic, Military and naval codes.
(b) The breaking of English diplomatic codes.

/s/ H. O. Yardley

H. O. YARDLEY

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PART III

EXHIBITS PREPARED BY MR. HERBERT O. YARDLEY
IN 1920 (WITH LATER ADDITIONS),
ILLUSTRATING THE WORK OF MI-8
AS A NECESSARY FUNCTION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT

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EXHIBITS [26]

EXHIBIT No. I. [27]

Order for disabling of German Ships in American Ports. Sent Jan. 21st, 1917. Broken August 1st, 1918.

Had we in January 1917 had a trained personnel capable of handling this kind of messages the information would have been in proper hands before the declaration of war. The saving in actual cash would have been sufficient for maintaining a code and cipher section for many years.

GERMAN CODE 26,040 - I

This message passed through our cable office on January 21, 1917, from the German Embassy here to the German Consul at Manila. The files of the American cable offices contain copies of all messages sent and received. Being given a large number of the same kind, M. I. 8 can reconstruct the book used and so read messages as rapidly as the owners of that particular book.

To: Germania, Manila.

Date: January 21, 1917.

547 16092 3319 7342 17460 2514 3659 19935 19900 6962 21414

4584 10317 22421 13832 8657 10910 18675 16452 23422 1848

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26. In the year 1920 H. O. Yardley prepared a series of exhibits of messages of high importance which had been intercepted and solved by MI-8. The purpose of the exhibits was to demonstrate for the benefit of Congressional committees the usefulness of MI-8. Exhibits I - VII are now filed in documents hereafter specified. Exhibit VIII consists of two notebooks now in the files of the Director of Communications Research.

27. IR 4607

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11306 4202 16129 14987 5913 4584 10317 11377 11269 4625

10352 14552 8455 22714 9947 4907 10995 22124 10910 4202

10034 16940 19951 1167 18778 20074 23527 13597 12256 12297

11400 9947 12750 21386 10567 16756 2597 10604 10610 11306

18040 18987 5913 13945 15007 11710 22599 14851 20760 2597

15956 7129 18474 47392

BERNSTORFF

SECRET! Remember that making public a single code message deciphered by M. I. 8 may lead to discontinuance of the code and thereby nullify the labor of months.

G E R M A N C O D E 26,040 - II

The clear text meanings of these number groups follow. The reading was done on August 1, 1918. To read a similar message in this code would now require only a half hour.

To: Germania, Manila.

Date: January 21, 1917.

Nr. 4. Ganz geheim selbst dechiffrieren Dargelegt Im Anschluss an Telegramm 3. Falls Schiffsmaschinen nicht wieder auseinander genommen Kapitaene anweisen sofort Verzeichnungen fuer Unbrauchbarmachung Maschinen vornehmen. Massnahme muss unbedingt geheim bleiben bei mindervertrauenswuerdigen Kapitaenen anheimgeben bevorstehende Ankunft eines Revisors oder sonst plausible Gruende vorschuetzen. Bei welchen Schiffen ist .... in jetziger Jahreszeit Vorbereitung zur Unbrauchbarmachung ausgeschlossen und kommt nur eventuell Versenkung in Frage. Drahtantwort .—

BERNSTORFF [28]

---

28. At this point paragraph marked SECRET is repeated.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

To: Germania, Manila

Date: January 21, 1917.

No. 4. Absolutely confidential: decipher personally. Explanation in connection with telegram 3. In case ships' machinery has not again been taken apart, instruct captains to take up at once instructions for making machinery useless. Measure must absolutely remain secret; in case of captains not entirely worthy of confidence, impress them with approaching visit of inspector or allege some other plausible reasons. With what ships is .... preparation for making useless impossible at this time of year and is sinking perhaps the only (means) to be considered? Answer by wire.

BERNSTORFF

~~S E C R E T~~! If enemies learn that we can decipher their present codes, they will try to devise more difficult forms. Let's keep them ignorant of our success.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

E X H I B I T No. II. [29]

Waberski Cipher.

A good example of a message read in time to be useful.

On the evidence of this message Waberski was convicted and sentenced to be shot.

President commuted sentence to life imprisonment.

W A B E R S K I C I P H E R - I

Original cipher letter found on Pablo Waberski
when arrested on February 1, 1918, at
Nogales, Arizona.

15 - I - 18.

SEOPNATUPK	ASIHEIMBBN	UERSDAUSNN	LRSEOGIESN	NKLEZNSIMN
EHNESHMPPB	ASUEASRIHT	HTEURMVNSM	EAINCOUASI	INSNRNVEGD
ESNBTNNRCH	DTDRZBEMUK	KOLSELZDNN	AUEBFKBPSA	TASECISDGT
IHUKTNAEIE	TIEBAEUERA	THNOIEAEEN	HSDAEAIAKN	ETHNNNEECD
CKDKONESDU	ESZADEHPEA	BBILSESOOE	ETNOUZKDML	NEUIIURMRN
ZNHNEEGVCR	EODHICSIAC	NIUSNRDNSO	DRGSURRIEC	EGRCSUASSP
EATGRSHEHO	ETRUSEELCA	UMTPAATLEE	CICXRNPRGA	AWSUTEMAIR
NASNUTEDEA	ERRREOHEIM	EAHKTMUHDT	COKDTGCEIO	KEFIGHIHRE
LITFIUEUNL	EELSERUNMA	ZNAI		

29. IR 4608

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

W A B E R S K I C I P H E R - II

Message with letters grouped in 108 panels. After four operations the German text appears along the diagonals. Read from left to right in the order of figures in the left hand column.

	2	9	8	1	4	3	6	5	7
5	ENPA	PESC	UBLI	SCHA	FTAL	ODET	ARBE	NDBE	TZIC
3	AUSR	BLOW	HENA	KMEX	IKOP	SKON	ELEG	NOER	ISTA
8	NDZU	UFUN	ABER	BZUS	ENDE	UNKT	SULA	RAMM	DENI
9	NBIS	GEWA	GSZE	SKIA	LSRU	NPUN	STRE	RAMT	EAND
4	EINR	ZUEI	EHRE	ICHE	NDER	SSER	KTVO	NGGE	LICH
6	STDE	EICH	NTAU	NKOM	MAIH	INHA	EIST	NECK	HEIM
7	HBIT	UTSC	SANG	SEND	PESO	MAUC	BERD	PUNK	ARDT
1	ANDI	TNIH	HENG	EHOE	RIGE	SORO	HAUF	IESE	TERI
10	USCH	EKAI	MAUF	EHEI	MAGE	RDER	NACI	VERL	SIST
11	IESE	IESS	SERL	ANSU	CHEN	NTPU	UNTE	OWAL	ANGE
2	NDER	GESA	ENUN	ICHE	NKON	SCHU	NKTA	RDEM	VORZ
12	EDE	REP	NDT	DSEI	NEC	SUL	TZU	BSA	NAM

WABERSKI CIPHER - III

GERMAN TEXT

January 15, 1918.

An Die Kaiserlichen Konsular-Behoerden In Der Republik Mexiko Punkt.

Strenggeheim Ausrufungszeichen !

Inhaber dieses ist ein reichsangehoeriger der unter dem namen

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

pablo waberski als russe reist punkt. Er ist deutscher geheimagent punkt absatz ich bitte ihm auf ansuchen schutz und beistand zu gewaehren komma ihmauch auf verlangen bis zu ein tausend pesos oro nacional vorzuschiessen und seine codetelegramme an diese gesandtschaft als konsularamtlich depeschen abzusenden punkt.

Von Eckardt.

* * *

ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

January 15, 1918.

To The Imperial German Authorities In The Republic of Mexico.

Strictly Secret !

The bearer of this is a subject of the Empire who travels as a Russian under the name of Pablo Waberski. He is a German secret agent.

Please furnish him, on request, protection and assistance; also advance him, on demand, up to one thousand pesos of Mexican gold, and send his code telegrams to this embassy as official consular despatches.

Von Eckardt.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

EXHIBIT No. III. 30

Order for destruction of German War Records.
Transmitted Jan. 16th, 1919.
Sent by mail from Mexico City.
Decoded and read April 22nd, 1919.
In 1917 such a message would have been regarded as practically impossible of solution.

VON MAGNUS CIPHER, "PQR" - I

Photostat of the original cipher message sent in by the Military Attache of this Division on duty in Mexico City; solved on April 22, 1919.

DEUTSCHE GESANDTSCHAFT. Mexiko, den 16. Januar 1919.

Tgb. Nr. 143/19.

nogaaaimue	saeesntraa	seienewwei	heuamaoeid	zodkeftedt	edgeigunri
eoeutnninb	mhbebanais	iteaarukss	tdscmoereb	aeuoermotd	hzzzdibgtt
fceumlreri	eeoemffcea	iqeirenuef	drisrrbnle	ensnuhbtpf	kgtineenel
anvescalrr	sdngdceoeu	tiailluiorl	bkrnnoeeqe	hhananvsdf	niemineiee
eetreegdmp	eilsbihlmu	hodciageef	sttheetdbe	ugmuaudnuu	dnsfnenenn
umtralgtnu	rehncmenbe	mntngefsae	kltzedrkii	rhfienvaks	onbtguhewn
thitzmsrmd	lghireicsc	enpneiette	nhvdnvhbvn	nrsneonemn	ngepniceuh
ecrtsgesie	eneenfiend	wnpkecvemd	isrhwlften	emucnosaar	ahelnehiln
crseamilnb	eutceszrth	rsaeoszclx	mneouhsleu	nmenenefae	eckerglnra
bgfireubli	reznnseeuz	esthpusica	ufohnnnbdn	betfmmcirt	unfrnsrbna
dsukouiust	bmgdreninu	lusneadash	scecfaonen	ehsmnrgoot	eraruierne
ineneinfee	etkstnbika	zeugdednkr	lbhideerec	aeuneinzot	dendaoerea
ighueuoanu	uzasruoddi	eeemcutiee	teanchchdd	igrrrrrnso	esiereerde
emiehdeade	nhdthmnosm	elolmccnnd	rhktendead	uockehaste	eresfjhouk
fhbmkttemn	lcdsetuehl	enimliaern	ehzeuesesg	snmeuhaimd	rrenshikh
rahdhennjh	osesedfhin	meerneaseh	udzsgifmri	uoisoehsna	deitfeebsa

30. IR 4606

~~SECRET~~

ekamhceant	esoabeuneu	flrnneizua	nfpbhmnfen	gusdiperth	fhremdndrl
tmaurrwini	ulnezsknts	hdrsdbbnip	osedlsuctb	etidafsaue	ttunwirhbr
ngnedumiis	veurakklne	enrcmtdtea	nsinleimgr	iehnlesnlg	gkhegdatee
eaasegtero	srusrelari	graenuinbi	eeikdnspni	ribhhpkuze	tkfseshdne
haravntsee	ipreicseuu	emozusmudh	ipitnndark	nalcessgle	urettrleop
irbdnsaend	recosteian	mdtnnheamt	ntzecmtier	nukwmtteke	ucebdihtnf
eswgewgeen	notsreasnu	caahnbgeil	eearnsnrta	lgghcue	

An die Konsularbehorden in

Chihuahua K.Nr.6	Colima K.Nr.1	Guadalajara K.Nr.2	Mazatlan K.Nr.2
Merida K.Nr.1	Monterrey K.Nr.1	San Luis Potosi K.Nr.1	Tampico K.Nr.1
Veracruz K.Nr.1	Ciudad Juarez K.Nr.2	Durango K.Nr.2	Guaymas K.Nr.5
Oaxaca K.Nr.1	Orizaba K.Nr.3	Puebla K.Nr.1	Torreon K.Nr.2
Manzanillo K.Nr.1	Parral K.Nr.1	Zacatecas K.Nr.1	

Der Deutsche Geschaftstrager . 31

V O N M A G N U S C I P H E R "P Q R" - III

G E R M A N T E X T

Deutsche Gesandtschaft Mexiko, den 16, Januar, 1919.

Bitte saemtliche mit dem Kriege zusammenhaengenden Komma vor allem also die auf den Geheimdienst und den Dienst der Vertreter unseres General und Admiralstabes Klammer auf ueber die Existenz und das Wirken

---

31. At this point two large worksheets showing the steps by which the transposition was solved have been omitted owing to the difficulty of reproducing them by means other than photography.

SECRET

dieser Vertreter ist jetzt und fuer alle Zukunft Komma auch nach Friedensschluss Komma strengstes Stillschweigen zu bewahren Klammer zu bezueglichen Komma in Ihren Haenden befindlichen und in Zukunft noch an Sie gelangenden Papiere Komma deren Aufbewahrung nicht unbedingt erforderlich ist und deren Kenntnisnahme durch unsere noch immer nach dem Besitze solcher Papiere strebenden Feinde fuer uns kompromittierend oder auch nur unangenehm sein koennte Komma sofort sorgfaeltig und restlos verbrennen und die Asche zerschlagen Punkt Absatz Es gehoeren hierzu besonders Listen Register Abrechnungen Quittungen Kontobuecher und so weiter sowie auch die betreffende briefliche und telegraphische Korrespondenz mit dieser Gesandtschaft Punkt Absatz Ausgenommen bleiben vorlaeufig noch die jetzt noch in Benutzung befindlichen Chiffrebuecher Komma Codes und Geheimschriftstichwoerter und Anweisungen Komma deren durchaus sicherer Aufbewahrung ganz besondere Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken ist Punkt Absatz Bitte die hinsichtlich der schon vorhandenen Papiere erfolgt Ausfuehrung dieses Auftrages schriftlich offen melden und sodann auch den vorliegenden sogenannten Verbrennungserlass verbrennen Komma den ich im Hinblick auf kuenftige Bezugnahmen hiermit als PQR bezeichne und dessen Inhalt zusammen mit dieser Bezeichnung Sie bitte im Gedaechtnis behalten wollen Punkt Schluss.

Der Deutsche Geschaftstrager

Four complicated operations beyond the stage shown in Figure II were necessary in order to bring out the plain German text shown above.

V O N M A G N U S C I P H E R "P Q R" - IV.

E N G L I S H T R A N S L A T I O N

The German Embassy Mexico City, January 16, 1919.

Please carefully and immediately burn without remainder, and destroy the ashes of, all papers connected with the war the preservation of which is not absolutely necessary, especially papers now in your hands or reaching you hereafter which have to do with the Secret Service and the service of the representatives of our General Staff and Admiralty Staff (strictest silence concerning the existence and activity of these representatives is to be observed now and for all future time, even after the conclusion of peace) which might be compromising or even unpleasant for us if they came to the knowledge of our enemies who are still endeavoring to obtain possession of such papers.

SECRET

Lists, registers, accounts, receipts, account-books, etc., are especially included in these papers, as well as correspondence with this Embassy by letter and telegraph on the subjects mentioned.

Cipher-books, codes and cipher-keys and directions that are still in use are excepted for the present, and most particular attention must be paid to keeping them in absolute safety.

Please report in writing en claire the execution of this order so far as it relates to papers now on hand and then burn this so-called order for burning, which, for further reference, I herewith designate as PQR, and the contents of which together with this designation you will please retain in memory.

The German Consul-General.

~~S E C R E T~~ ! The continued usefulness of our service depends on keeping absolutely secret the fact that we can decipher such messages.

SECRET

E X H I B I T No. IV. [32]

Instructions, probably for German Minister in Mexico.

Address would have indicated relations between Berlin and Mexico. This no doubt explains its omission.

Frequent repetitions probably due to Mexicos (sic) inability to acknowledge.

An efficient code and cipher section having been developed this message was probably known by the proper persons in the United States as soon as by the German agents who possessed the key.

G E R M A N C O D E ____ - I.

(This message and the following message were decoded within a half day after work was begun.)

MESSAGE I

Message from Nauen to Unknown.

Intercepted more than sixty times by different radio stations between January 13 and February 2, 1918; repeatedly, every day January 13-19 (inclusive) and 29-31; and finally, on February 2.

49138	27141	45023	02062	49140	41345	42635	02306	12201	15726
27918	30348	53825	46020	40429	37112	48001	38219	50015	43827
50015	04628	01315	55331	20514	37803	19707	33104	33951	29240
02062	42749	33951	40252	38608	14913	33446	16329	55936	24909

32. IR 4611

SECRET

SECRET

27143	01158	42635	04306	09501	49713	55927	50112	13747	24255
27143	02803	24909	15742	49513	22810	16733	41362	24909	17256
19707	49419	39408	19801	34011	06336	15726	47239	29901	37013
42635	19707	42022	30334	06733	04156	39501	03237	14521	37320
13503	42635	33951	29901	49117	46633	02062	16636	19707	01426
11511	42635	11239	04156	02914	12201	23145	55331	49423	03455
12201	30205	33951	38319	50015	04156	43827	06420	23309	19707
33104	42635	00308	29240	05732	54628	01355	39338	02914	12201
06420	11511	24909	27142	33951	49223	49618	42022	42635	17212
55320	15726	12201	06420	38219	21060	46633	37406	43644	33558
22527	27141	49538	ar						

~~S E C R E T~~ ! Remember that making public a single code message deciphered by M. I. 8 may lead to discontinuance of the code and thereby nullify the labor of months.

G E R M A N C O D E ____ - II

MESSAGE I
DECODE

Message from Nauen to Unknown.

Intercepted more than sixty times by different radio stations between January 13 and February 2, 1918.

Telegram January 6 and telegraphic report S. Anthony Delmar via Spain received. Please suggest President to send to Berlin, agent with fuller power for negotiation of loan and sale of raw product. Do not embroil yourself in Japanese affair because communication through you too difficult. If Japanese are in earnest, they have enough representatives in Europe for that purpose Foreign Office Bushe (stop).

SECRET

Machinery plans for rifle manufactory can be put at disposal (point). Details of machinery, technical staff, and engineer for aircraft could be arranged here with the authorized man of President to be sen(t) by him for negotiations about loan (break). We agree purchase arranged by Craft (Kraft) in Japan of ten thousand Rifles, etc., wished by President General Staff Political Section Number - 7 January 13.

- - - - - -

[redacted]! Making known a single message in a foreign code will destroy all our work covering many months. To make known that a code book is being reconstructed at all, leads to absolute discontinuance of its use.

~~SECRET~~

EXHIBIT No. V [33]

Bribery of Mexican Government.

The usefullness (sic) of this message is obvious.
It was decoded promptly and in ample time to be of service.
In the early part of the war its solution would have been regarded as practically impossible.

GERMAN CODE ____ - III

MESSAGE II

Message in the same code as the preceding message. Intercepted from Nauen on February 26, 1918.

LUXOR	SSSGZ	YGWKN	ZJZVK	TCNON	OJTMH	DSBUU	HAAZI	MNFUM	OVXZG
FCQKH	SMXII	VJPXK	QBZMI	OYZKU	HNCII	OJSTY	DJLMI	QMBUS	HMGII
OLCPN	NMJEF	IYNXV	NRXFY	INFKH	OYXAY	RBUFM	AKVIF	DVNXN	QMZMV
WMGRV	HBHRQ	GJDDJ	ASGOC	MNZXF	HEAAS	GJUTM	LFH		
19707	21206	31511	31259	37320	05101	33045	28223	28709	24211
06738	28223	51336	28709	42635	42235	13301	33045	28223	51336
28709	42635	02408	49853	40324	19707	29240	33104	42635	47239
03237	38203	41137	20344	21209	24735	47239	30809	19003	36932
42635	49223	31416	46027	35749	33045	28223	28709	44049	02957
02237	03237	55934	14521	21206	34842	03886	29913	42008	38320

33. IR 4610

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

55927	02803	03455	12200	50015	34004	49542	38055	01936	50015
31258	21737	24909	32831	33951	05101	06738	28223	28709	24211
33045	28223	51336	28709	42635	42235	13301	06738	28223	51336
28709	42635	19707	49633	55841	42635	26424	45023	26424	45023
09415	22436	36050	06738	28223	40633	28709	42635	34128	48234
49419	31259	55142	41111	33158	15636	54403	47239	01602	20630
02915	42635	28539	50015	55934	14210	37320	37112	41345	47239
19801	34011	06336	15726	47239	21160	46633	37406	43644	04628
33558	23934	37320	18507	51316	49633	ar.			

S E C R E T ! If enemies learn that we can decipher their present codes, they will try to devise more difficult forms. Let's keep them ignorant of our success.

G E R M A N C O D E ____ - IV

MESSAGE II

DECODE

Message from Nauen, intercepted February 26, 1918.

For German minister Mexico. Bleichroeder any time ready for loan negotiations. At present remittance from Germany impossible. Meantime firm places ten million Spanish pesetas at your disposal German Oversea Bank Madrid. You are authorized to offer this preliminary amount to Mexican Government in name of Bleichroeder for three years, interest six, commission half per cent, on supposition that Mexico will remain neutral during War. All good arrangements left to your discretion. Please reply. Foreign Office Bushe. General Staff Political Section Berlin Number Hundred. February twenty-three.

SECRET! Remember that making public a single code message deciphered by M. I. 8 may lead to discontinuance of the code and thereby nullify the labor of months.

~~SECRET~~

EXHIBIT No. VI.[34]

PROCESS OF STENCIL WRITING

Each correspondent has a 3 x 3 card with holes cut as shown in this "checker-board." The squares cut out are one-fourth of the total.

The writer began work with A at the top; he then put one syllable of his message into every open space. By turning his card so as to put B, C, and D successibely at the top of his card, he filled in all the squares. Note that the open spaces shown on second sheet are so arranged in each of the four positions the open spaces cover places not covered in any of the other three positions.

The addressee used his card in the same manner and so reconstructed the message. It was necessary for us to determine the pattern used by these particular correspondents before the message could be read.

The third sheet shows the message ready for transmission. If sent by wire or radio it must first be copied on the appropriate 3" x 3" card before reading is attempted.[35]

STENCIL CIPHER WRITING - I

This is an enlargement of a 3 x 3 piece of paper having bits of Spanish words arranged in this manner. The message was wrapped in a large roll of newspapers.

TRANSLATION.

(?) without improvement. Sometimes stronger and days when I feel weaker. When I have more strength, but at another time, nothing (?).

---

34. IR 4609

35. At this point the original exhibit contains an enlargement of a grille having 12 x 12 cells, of which from 2 to 5 in each row and column were cut out. Following this is an enlargement of a sheet of paper upon which this grille had been placed and the plain text written in the cells which were cut out. These two photostats have not been transcribed owing to the difficulty of reproduction.

SECRET

SECRET

When are you going to come? Your brother may enter your house any day, turn all upside down and investigate and no one need investigate (?) Careful to leave all locked.

Have you already bought the book? We need it to inform ourselves about something that we do not know but if you wish you may leave it.

2 a

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
pre	pa	sin	ve	ya	ra	Todo	me	cu	com	y	pras
an	jo	se	ria	do	algu	te	en	el	tu	libro	tero
nas	ese	va	y	veces	nos	mas	ha	yas	no	fuer	ce
fal	te	ta	a	pa	que	ra	dias	tiene	qui	en	sien
na	ve	to	die	mas	ne	nir	te	por	var	cisi	que
delo	de	dad	bil	nos	con	de	cuan	de	tra	algo	en
que	te	do	rar	rio	no	me	se	cual	sa	qui	viene
con	he	de	mas	nir	fuer	mos	er	pero	dia	za	pue
entra	es	tu	des	her	tras	ma	co	pero	sas	no	ten
cui	en	si	en	da	tu	do	ha	quie	otra	de	bi
res	dejar	tem	boto	pue	do	ta	po	cion	des	te	rada
con	de	lla	me	lo	jur	rep--	ve	lo	re	go	vual 36

36. This is a transcription of handwriting not always legible.

SECRET

SECRET

EXHIBIT No. VII. [37]

AN OPEN-CODE LETTER.

"Open-code" is made by an agreement between correspondents whereby harmless expressions stand for enemy messages that they wish to send through a censorship station.

This letter, intended for Madame Victorica, has the following open-code meanings:

"our mutual friend Hudson" - another German agent
"your writing was far better" - I could develop your secret ink very well
"Kalium Sodatum" - name of a new secret ink; always referred to as a medicine
"far better than his medicine" - have "Hudson" use this new ink
"Cousin Oscar" - A German agent

This is submitted merely to show another form which may be taken by secret messages.

AJMcG 1/19/18 [38]
HJJ 1/19/18

My dear friend,

Have many thanks for your kind letters, dated 2. and 3. ult. which I received at the same time with a letter from your uncle. Everything was very interesting for me, but specially the details you have written about our mutual friend Hudson. I am pleased to hear that you agree with him. In the meantime I received your first letter, dated 25th of January, and I found that your writing was far better than in those dated 2.and 3. ult. How do you like my speciality "Kalium Sodatum", are you

---

37. IR 4612

38. AJMcG are the initials of the late Lt. Colonel A. J. McGrail, who was a member of the staff of MI-8 and of the SSA. The identity of HJJ is not now known. The letter is in handwriting.

SECRET

satisfied? Please recommend it also to our mutual friend Hudson, it will be very usefull (sic) to him; under all circumstances I write to him by the same mail, but as you will see him before my letter is in his hands, please give him all details you receives (sic) here about using Malium Sodatum, it is far better than his medicine.

I hope that Hudson received my last remittance by wireless. Did you get my wireless regarding your reports? You will be pleased to hear that my cousin Oscar will call upon you on his trip to the South. Give him every assistance you can, and I hope he will meet our mutual friend Hudson, too. By same mail I send the wanted documents to Hudson.

With kindest regards

I am yours truly

~~SECRET~~

EXHIBIT No. VIII [39]

These are samples of what has actually been done and can continue to be done provided funds are made available for the continuance of the code and cipher section.

Although of actual value at the time of their solution their real significance lies in the fact that they can be read and that in the event of war we will be prepared to continue reading them so long as we keep in touch with the ever changing methods of encipherment.

To stop, even for a short time would mean months of effort before we could make a new start.

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39. This exhibit consists of two black spring-back notebooks now in the files of the Director of Communications Research. In the text of the messages many words are typed in red: the red letters have been underscored in this reproduction. Between certain pages slips of paper bearing handwritten comments have been attached: these are reproduced as footnotes signed with the initials of Yardley (H.O.Y.).

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

EXHIBITS OF CODE WORK DONE BY THE

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [40]

- - oOo - -

Foreword

This pamphlet contains only a few of the thousands of code telegrams deciphered by this bureau.

Those to whom this pamphlet is shown should remember that if it becomes known that we can successfully decode messages of foreign governments, the codes will be changed and thousands of dollars and years of labor will be lost.

It is not only highly important to avoid speaking of the contents of any particular message, but also to refrain from indicating in any way the fact that any messages of foreign powers have been deciphered.

- - oOo - -

I N D E X

Part One - - - Japanese Code Telegrams - - - pp. 2-31

Part Two - - - Mexican Code Telegrams - - - pp. 32-41

Part Three - - German Secret Service Code & Secret Ink Documents - - pp. 42-46

Part Four - - German Code Telegrams, intercepted on Western Front - - pp. 47-50

Part Five - - Bolshevik Code Telegrams - - pp. 51-53

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40. Codes and ciphers are constantly developing. Even a temporary stop in the work means losing touch with current changes. Such loss can only be made good by much new work otherwise unnecessary. It is like the loss of a link in a chain or a cog in a machine. (M.O.Y.)

SECRET

Doc ID: 6651287 Doc Ref ID: A6651286

~~SECRET~~

Refer to Jc 515
From: Japanese Embassy
Washington, D.C.

Sept. 10, 1920.
To: Japanese Consul
Portland

Subject: Bribery for favorable Japanese legislation.

Code Message

WEUWOKOKZY XIFUMAUWZY EJXILESAPU UNGYECEJEC BAEWOKEJIZ MAZYCUEMAF IKAHATHEXE IPLEVAPUWE ZYAMUPUNUX IKAFHEMUIJ KYZELEZYJU etc. etc.

Translation of Japanese Decoded Text

The permanent employment at regular salaries of individual Americans to oppose anti-Japanese legislation or for other general propaganda undertakings, especially when it is made to apply to this movement, involves extremely delicate points in regard to relations with Wheelwright and other Americans who have been pro-Japanese for many years. Not only is there a doubt whether or not it will really be carried out smoothly, but schemes of this sort easily come to the notice of the anti-Japanese faction, and it is to be feared that what is done against the anti-Japanese movement will turn about and work to our disadvantage. (From the inquiry of the Mayor it appears that Piper's mission may already be known. I think that we must investigate beforehand the political relations of Piper and the Mayor.)

As to how far to use Piper, I think we should do no more than simply have him from time to time, as may be necessary, publish pro-Japanese views, and for this we should give him suitable remuneration as the occasion may demand.

In cablegram No. 441 (Note.JC 510) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which will be forwarded to you from San Francisco, I have recommended to the Ministry an immediate remittance to you as a general expense fund for the propaganda movement. 41

In the matter of hiring Piper, please give further consideration to the points made above, and answer, giving me your further views.

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41. Proof of official Japanese propaganda in this country. (H.O.Y.)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

BRIEF EXCERPTS FROM VARIOUS JAPANESE CODE MESSAGES

- - oOo - -

The Consul at San Francisco states he would need $2,000 for this, and the Consul in Seattle $1,000, which estimates have my approval.

To carry out the work on the Coast, estimates have promptly come as follows: From the Consul at San Francisco $5,000 for lecture expenses; $20,000 for carrying an English column in the venacular papers; from the Consul at Seattle $3,000 for help with respect to "Rufuisu"; from the Consul at Honolulu $6,000. I consider these fair estimates. (See Jc 533)

- oOo -

Referring to your cablegram No. 362. I have investigated through "I"[42] and find from the Foreign Office that ALSTON has made two secret reports recommending close relations between Great Britain and America on the questions of loans to China. I suppose this may have been the principal purpose of the interview about which you inquire between the Secretary of State, the British Ambassador, MORRIS and ALSTON. (see Jc 579)

- oOo -

Japan having taken the mandate for the former German islands north of the equator should properly succeed to all the local rights which Germany had possessed in connection with these islands.

You will maintain that for these two reasons the cables should revert to Japan. You should beforehand confer secretly with the British and French delegates on this basis, and arrange in advance for the three Powers to work together as far as possible. (See Jc 613)

- oOo -

He [43] said that France demanded three cables, the Brest-New York, the Brest-Casa Blanca-Dagasuru, and the Pernambuco-Monrovia cables, and said that he hoped for the support of Japan in regard to this. I asked

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42. "I" is either Japanese Ambassador or member of Japanese Delegation to Communication Conference. (H.O.Y.)

43. "He" refers to M. Lanel, Chief of French Delegation to Communication Conference. (H.O.Y.)

SECRET

whether an understanding had been reached between Great Britain and France, to which he replied in the affirmative. I said that when an understand (sic) had been reached between Great Britain and France, we would naturally support the demands of France. I went on to say that we hoped for the support of France for the demands which Japan intended to make with regard to the cables centering at Yap, and received his assent. (see Jc 644) [44]

- ooo -

I said that I had received instructions to demand the three Yap cables. It was the intention to make an agreement with Holland as to the Dutch rights and interests, and with America in regard to the future use of the Yap-Guam cable. (see Jc 651)

- ooo -

In view of the fact that America has hitherto advocated the internationalization of Yap in connection with the question of the Yap-Shanghai, Yap-Guam and Yap-Menado cables, in order to avoid such a solution, it is desired to have an understanding with British support of our position that Yap is a Japanese mandate by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Council of May 7, 1920, in case by any chance America should wish to dispute our claims to the Yap mandate. (Jc 671)

- ooo -

The British Under Secretary replied that he himself believed that it was desired to place absolutely all the islands north of the equator under Japanese mandate. He asked me to hand him a note embodying my foregoing remarks as a matter of record. I agreed to do this. (see Jc 687)

- ooo -

Replying to your cablegram No. 487 (Note: Jc 658), I am cabling $3,000 American money as MIRETT'S subsidy for one-half year. (see Jc 694) [45]

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44. Proof of collusion between Great Britain, France and Japan against United States in matter of Yap Island. (H.O.Y.)

45. Japanese send money for "subsidy". (H.O.Y.)

I said that I had received instructions from my Government to demand the German rights in the three Yap cables. I was firmly convinced that it would be entirely impossible to budge the Japanese Government on this point. If the discussion between Japan and America did not arrive at a conclusion, there was nothing for Japan to do but maintain the status quo.

I said that in case a solution is not attained, there is no other recourse than the maintainence (sic) of the status quo. I added banterlingly (sic) that I supposed that America did not intend to dislodge Japan from Yap by force. (Jc 750) [46]

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46. Japan thinks America will not use force to dislodge her from Yap. (H.O.Y.)

SECRET

Refer to Jc 485
From: Japanese Embassy
Washington, D.C.

August 26, 1920.
To: Japanese Foreign Office
Tokio

Subject: Shanghai-Yap cable.

Code Message

WOIKARAVUM TYBOSYEXIL HEERUNZOIZ KEHEYIJEOR TAUFKEHEYI JEJUUYJIEW MUNUMUXILE NUEJBOWYZO CYMYKAZUAJ ZYCUTAXAWY INPUTYCUEM etc. etc.

Translation of Japanese Decoded Text

Communications Congress cablegram No. 8.

Referring to your cablegram No. 365 (Note. See JC 475), at the end of the answer given to the American Embassy is a statement that the Yap-Guam and Yap-Menado cables were diverted to war purposes. All the personnel of both the Communications and Navy Ministries who are at Washington understand that these two cables were simply "earthed" on Yap Island.

If there is any discrepancy from the truth in the statement that the cables were diverted to military purposes after they had been cut, the real facts would immediately by exposed in case there should be any .... (Note. Word garbled) on our part, or an examination by the other party, or conversation with the other party. Of course there is no limit to the other methods by which the Americans could detect the truth.

The Americans of course from the first have naturally made no point of the purposes of the seizure of the cables. They hold that the cutting of cables cannot be considered in the same light as the capture of ships, and it is therefore to be expected that they will inevitably propose to the Communications Congress that the disposition to be made of the former German cables be treated with entire disregard of the fact that they were cut by a beligerent (sic) nation, or of the facts in regard to what actual use was made of them.

There is room for debate whether this American argument is right or wrong, but, leaving this aside for the time being, in case such a proposition is once brought forward, we might be unpleasantly involved

SECRET

in an investigation of the question of fact as to whether or not the Yap-Guam and Yap-Menado cables were actually cut, and whether or not they were used for war purposes. We cannot but feel anxiety lest in those circumstances we should fall into a predicament as a result of the recent reply to the American Embassy. Will you therefore kindly cable at once for our information whether the answer gives the facts in regard to the two cables, or whether it is at variance with the facts. [47]

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47. Japanese Embassy is afraid they may be caught in a false statement. (H.O.Y.)

~~SECRET~~

Refer to Jc 557 Sept. 22, 1920.

From: Japanese Embassy
Washington, D.C.

To: Japanese Ambassador
London

Subject: Shanghai-Yap cable.

Code Message

YAHEIPFAGE VOUHFKIPFA AMEFASIPKE MEIYIJENUT TAISIHKEHE YIJEYUVYJI ISEWMUIZIK USAJNUIHKE HEYIISEXCO ATEJTYRIFI ZOKAHEUHEJ etc. etc.

Translation of Japanese Decoded Text

Transmitting cablegram No. 402 from Tokio.

Referring to your Communications Congress cablegrams Nos. 9 and 15 (Note. JC 485 and 498), the Yap-Guam and Yap-Menado cables were cut near the landing-office on the Island of Yap and the ends were earthed. These cables were not especially diverted to any other use, but having made them incapable of use, we held them in our control in condition to be diverted at any time to other uses. Not only may this be considered a diversion to war purposes, but the three cables centering at Yap may be considered one system, and therefore the landing of the Shanghai-Yap cable at Okinawa, and its use for communication was a diversion of the three cables to war purposes.

It was on this principle of the three cables constituting a single system that our delegates at the Peace Conference based their claims, and that the answer given in our cablegram No. 365 (Note. See JC 474) was made to the American Embassy.

In case there is any question about these two cables at the Preliminary Communications Congress, you may if necessary make a suitable explanation on this basis, and there is no objection to the publication of the fact that the Yap-Shanghai cable was landed at Okinawa and is in use. You will keep to yourself the fact that it is absolutely not a fact that we used these two cables either for private or war purposes nor for war communications.[48]

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48. Shows attempted concealment by Japan of facts in regard to Yap cables. (H.O.Y.)

~~SECRET~~

Since our cablegram No. 365, the American Embassy has again asked for a detailed report on the Yap-Menado and Yap-Guam cables. Our answer is under discussion with the Ministry concerned.

You will cable this to the Ambassador at London, and have him forward it to France, Italy, Germany and Holland.

~~SECRET~~

Refer to Jc 322

June 21, 1920.

From: Japanese Embassy
Washington, D.C.

To: Japanese Ambassador
Tokio.

Subject: Nixon, Japanese secret service agent.

Code Message

ZYYEEXUMDI DOOWFYBABI PITYCUOPKI GAUTLUKIOZ AGLEDOJIXU MYWYZORORO ATYOIPROSU KAIKMYKYEW LECEHEMTTY CUEMKUZOUN IZTIZUIKEC etc. etc.

Translation of Japanese Decoded Text

Nixon, who for many years has rendered great service to this Embassy as a secret service man, is now ill and in need of rest and recuperation for a few months. There is no one like him who in the future could do what he has done for this office, and heretofore his remuneration has been very small, in view of which I wish now to make him a present of $1,000.00. Please give this special consideration and wire me an immediate reply.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Refer to: JC 212 May 4, 1920.

From: Japanese Embassy
Berlin

To: Japanese Emb.
Washington

Subject: Shantung

Code Message

RAEZDEVOXO YAAMEFIDESU AXPEBYAKHA HEEXJIIKHE LILEIKLAIZ YAIHAXISLE UWSYOWEJKU ATETYCUEMKU LICOROROCU HUDOOKUYPU etc. etc.

Translation of Japanese Decoded Text.

Cablegram No. 74 from Berlin to Tokio.

I received your cablegram No. 15 on April 23. It appears that the German Government had thought it clever to dispute the plain meaning of the words of the peace treaty and to delay a decision which would hurt the feelings of another party, by pretending to misunderstand your telegram No. 2 and by affecting scruples about China.

I have given much thought to the method of negotiating. With treaty disputes and the general situation, Under-Secretary RANIEL has been involved in other important questions to the exclusion of Far Eastern problem. I decided that I would explain the matter to the authorities in a conciliatory way before sending a formal note.

On the evening of April 24, I gave a small dinner party which ZOLF attended. After dinner we discussed the matter. I told him that there was no room for dispute on the plain facts. I had received yesterday, strong instructions from Tokio in regard to the reservations made by the German Government. When I arrived here on the restoration of relations between Japan and Germany, you expressed the hope of soon visiting my country. It was very regrettable that this question should arouse suspicion as to the good faith of the German Government. I myself hoped that, in view of the general situation of international relations, a quick favorable decision could be reached. It was to be desired that the Japanese Government should harbor no ill-feeling when you arrive at Tokio. [49]

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49. This shows collusion between Japanese and German officials in Shantung question. (H.O.Y.)

SECRET

ZOLF said that he himself was not familiar with the details of the matter, but that he would inquire into the special reasons for the German attitude. He thought there was nothing else to do but to yield to my representations.

Following this interview, I arranged for a formal interview with "TIRU" on the 26th. I told him that I had received strong instructions from my Government to avoid argument, but to secure a favorable decision. As there was no reason of any kind for German reservations nor any actual advantage to be obtained by them, it would be bad policy to arouse Japanese resentment. From his standpoint and that of ZOLF, it would be hard to say what kind of welcome on the part of the Japanese authorities would be given, or what unfavorable impression would be produced if this question were not settled before leaving for one's post in Japan.

"TIRU" replied that in the first place the German Government had no desire to take an attitude of opposition to the Japanese Government, but it had felt it necessary in accordance with diplomatic precedence to secure the assent of the Chinese Government before delivering the correspondence and documents on the Shantung question. Now that Japan was demanding in positive terms the immediate delivery of the documents, he thought the German Government in the end had no other recourse than to yield, and after a formal statement of reasons to the Chinese Government, he would immediately instruct the competent bureau to deliver the documents.

On the 27th I called on KNIPPING, the Chief of the East Asia Bureau. (Note. Details obscure here.)

On the 28th I sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs a note, stating that I had received instructions from the Imperial Japanese Government to press negotiations for the immediate delivery of the documents contemplated in the peace treaty. Besides formally presenting these instructions, I wished in my own individual capacity to warmly urge the desirability of immediately delivering the documents without debate, in order to avoid a useless misunderstanding when the facts were so clear. The main points had already been determined and it had been clear that the German Government would consent, and not take an attitude of opposition to Japan. (An obscure sentence mentioning " March ... Denmark ... Minister at ... came to Berlin".) The Shantung question was extremely important to China. The German Government did not wish to hurt the feelings of China nor to disturb the relations of the two countries. But to withhold the documents in the interest of China would be to the prejudice of Japan which had succeeded to the German rights and interests. Frankly speaking, Japan could not seriously consider the revision of the treaty, nor the withholding of the documents until the consent of the Chinese Government was assured.

SECRET

The Japanese Government was sincerely anxious to proceed at once with the systematic settlement of the Shantung question, to ascertain from the documents the actual state and limits of Japan's rights, and in all haste to begin preparations to execute those rights. Now that I had made it sufficiently clear in a written communication that the Japanese Government stood on its treaty rights and did not consent to the reservations of the German Government, it should be clear that the documents should be at once assembled and delivered to the Japanese Minister.

On May.1, I received the following answer: "The German Government had doubted whether it would not be proper and in consonance with diplomatic usage to secure the assent of China before delivering the documents in question, and whether the settlement of the Shantung question so earnestly desired both by Germany and the other countries concerned, might not be prejudiced by ignoring diplomatic usage in this respect, but the German Government wished faithfully to execute the provisions of the peace treaty, and to avoid the slightest ground for misunderstanding, and had therefore, in response to the friendly representations of the Japanese Government, reconsidered its position, and will deliver all the documents, etc etc.".

This note was accompanied with the delivery of all the documents. As they are very long, I will forward them by mail at the earliest opportunity.

With regard to the expression of the displeasure of the Japanese Government in the end of cablegram No. 15 at the attempted reservations of the German Government to clause 1 of Article 158 in regard to the surrender of documents, it does not appear that there was any special deep German design, but a wish to delay the matter. In regard to this point, I beg to call my cablegram No. 53 to your especial attention. Believing that I must of course take some action on this point, in my answer of May 2 to the German Government, I said that the documents will be sent to the Japanese Government for examination, thus leaving enough room for future representations. Copies of this telegram have been telegraphed to all Ambassadors.

SECRET

SECRET

Refer to: JC 198

May 1, 1920.

From: Japanese Embassy
Washington D.C.

To: Japanese Consul
London

Subject: Shantung

Code Message.

leugpuckak puujrawic pwsaxidifa atzosyvupu axpeepahus uxtisyleuy ikmyokogni kahejuikpu zycuipmaew arxiuwleat etc. etc.,

Translation of Japanese Decoded Text.

Transmitting cablegram No. 195 from Tokio. Pekin-Tokio cablegram No. 385.

At an interview with the acting-Chancellor I discussed the substance of your telegram No. 230, and amplified on, and explained our communication of April 26, concluding with the suggestion that an early conclusion of this matter would be in the best interest of both countries.

The acting-Chancellor said that the matter had been discussed in a Council of State held on April 29. The Chinese Government had the same desire as the Japanese Government for an early solution of the Shantung question, but in view of present conditions it was impossible to do anything about it, and there was no other recourse than to delay the matter for some time. This must be taken into consideration.

I asked what he meant by "present conditions". He replied that the Minister could observe what these conditions were from the newspapers. I said that the newspaper discussion of the Shantung question takes many and varied forms, but, glancing over them, we may say that there are two trends of opinion adverse to us, one simply opposing direct negotiations, and the other advocating that the question be brought before the League of Nations. I asked him whether, in case there was opposition to the proposal for direct negotiations, but a solution must be reached in some way, he thought it should be submitted to the League of Nations.

SECRET

He said that if he spoke unreservedly in the name of China without regard to Chinese-Japanese relations, the Chinese people do not recognize the so-called rights obtained from Germany when China had refused to sign the treaty made at the Paris Conference, and they do not think that an agreement to exchange documents is a reason for direct negotiations with Japan. This would be the attitude were no attention paid to Chinese-Japanese relations, but this attitude is not being taken, and he was anxiously seeking an expedient for solving the question. He wished the Japanese Government to be assured of the whole-hearted devotion of the Chinese Government.

I replied that the whole-hearted devotion of the Chinese Government in solving this question was perfectly understood on our part, but for Japan this was an important question which could hardly be left forever vague, I requested an early written answer to our proposals.

He replied that the matter would be discussed in detail in further meetings of the Council, and a written answer would be made.

SECRET

Refer to Jc 306
From: Japanese Embassy
Washington, D.C.

June 12, 1920.
To: Japanese Ambassador
London

Subject: Japanese activities in Russia.

Code Message

NWEJCEJEPU WOATKEFEJU UNAFUULEBO IKARWUUNAK AMADBOHIAK RCZYTGNNSY XUMYUBNXHE BOIKPUZYCU EMNEMYCWWO HEIJVOFAAM ACDEVOMONI etc. etc.

Translation of Japanese Decoded Text

Transmitting circular cablegram No. 103 from Tokio.

Very secret. A cabinet council has decided on a partial evacuation of the Japanese army from districts of Siberia. The substance of the decisions reached is given in circular No. 104 (Note. See JC 309).

In the withdrawal from the respective districts serious thought must be given to the future of the Semenoff administration which has had special relations with the Japanese army. If the policy of withdrawal is carried out heedlessly and hastily the Semenoff administration may be reduced to desperation and extreme dissatisfaction and engage in a course of action which would cause anxiety for the safety of our troops. In view of this the possibility of establishing a provisional buffer nation of the far eastern provinces has been advocated as a temporary expedient on the part of our army alone. 50

An endeavor is also being made to secure a neutral zone by negotiation with the Verkhneudinsk council. In addition to representatives of the army, Matusdaira, the chief of the administrative section, has been sent to negotiate this.

A partial leakage to foreign governments about these proceedings might produce complications for the whole plan, and you will keep this information extremely confidential to yourself alone.

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50. Secret conference on Japanese withdrawal from Siberia and their future program. (H.O.Y.)

SECRET

SECRET

Refer to JK 89

June 2, 1920.

From: Japanese Embassy
Washington, D.C.

To: Japanese War Dept.
Tokyo, Japan

Subject: Japanese Propaganda

Code message

CAJIKUZOMU VAFEROORXI DUHAINRODU TAONZOVOZO YOQOUSFEFE MADULOSOIT INYOOKELON ZOVOZOMUXA ANUDFELOXE OJKUVAANXI etc. etc.

Translation of Japanese Decoded Text

KOIKIN is now at Paris doing propaganda work. Could he be used for propaganda work here, or is he necessary at Paris?

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

Refer to: JM 116
From:
Chief of
General Staff
Tokio

Dec. 3, 1920,
To:
Military Attache
Washington No. 163

The following orders are for Major Yamada:-

1. You will observe the condition of the Panama Canal.[51] You will as promptly as possible observe the fortresses in Mexico. While inspecting the relation of the general attitude of that country toward foreigners, especially toward Americans, you will obtain secret military information.[52] In reference to influence in Central America and the West Indies, ascertain if Military men (?) should be employed in those places.

2. You should particularly investigate the following points:- (A) The expansion of the rights and interests of the American Government and people in Mexico. (B) In case of an emergency of what use and assistance would Mexico be. (C) In the development of Military and Economic relations with Japan, how can she assist the expansion of Japan.

3. Can business connections be maintained with the Japanese residing in the United States and can the Japanese in Mexico cooperate?

4. In the true performance of your duties, use every opportunity to observe the attitude of the Japanese toward Americans, but be prudent in using your opportunities.

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51. Japan wants data on Panama Canal. (H.O.Y.)

52. Calls for secret military information. (H.O.Y.)

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Refer to: JM 121
From:
Military Attache
Washington

Dec. 18, 1920.
To:
Assistant Chief
of Staff
Tokio No. 140.

Referring further to Major YAMADA's tour of inspection in Mexico, Ambassador Shidehara desires that it should be managed so that he can obtain information under the title of "Military Attache to the Legation" thus avoiding a misunderstanding with the powers and particularly America.

If the War Department does this, he believes the opportunities for study will still be large and desires to be permitted to make this change.

I urgently await your reply.

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SECRET

SECRET

Refer to: JM 123
From:
2nd Section
General Staff
Tokio

Dec. 21, 1920.
To:
Military Attache
Washington No. 173.

(Note. This message is badly garbled. It is a brief answer to JM 121. The interpretation appears to be:-)

If there is any hinderance to relations in the method of naming Major YAMADA, it is desired that appropriate means be taken in order to avoid misunderstanding.

SECRET

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~~S E C R E T~~

Refer to: JM 126
From:
Military Attache
Washington

Dec. 23, 1920.
To:
Chief of
General Affairs Sec.
General Staff
Tokio No. 143.

I have directed Major YAMADA to bear in mind during his inspection, that matters relating to essential questions between Japan and America today, have a future consideration in case of outbreak of War. [53]

53. Japan considers possible war with America. (H.O.Y.)

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Refer to: Plain
From:
General Staff
Tokio.

Dec. 21, 1920.
To:
Military Attache
Washington
Not Numbered

We have purchased a telegraphic order for Yen 1687.50 to cover Major Yamada's traveling expenses from January to March inclusive.

Muto.

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Refer to: JM 133
From:
Washington

Jan. 12, 1921.
To:
Tokio No. 3.

The Ambassador has informed the United States and Mexico that Major YAMADA is leaving on the 17th to go first to Mexico and then to Panama on a tour of inspection. This information has also been communicated to Great Britain, France and Italy in order to prevent misunderstanding. Please make sure that the Minister to Mexico is made to understand everything without exception.

I have advanced Major YAMADA $1,000 for railway and other expenses. Please refund this to me.

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~~SECRET~~

Refer to: JM 129
From:
Military Attache
Washington

Dec. 28, 1920.
To:
Asst. Chief
General Staff
Tokio

MARTENS who has recently been in America as a delegate for the provisional Russian Government, declared on the 28th of December that he came to make an economic agreement between America and the provisional Russian Government. He has telegraphed that he will soon refer this to his home government.

Probably this did not touch upon the ability to be recognized by America and was not a promise to commence commercial relations.

The facts are that America fears the other parties of Russia and has decided on the expulsion of MARTENS. She has not changed her special attitude in her original intentions toward the former Russian Government. The result is America will not recognize the Russian Government. Commerce depends upon the freedom of the people. The question of a Siberian lease will naturally fizzle out.[54]

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54. Japan estimates attitude of U. S. toward Russia. (H.O.Y.)

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Refer to Ma 189 Nov. 4, 1920.

From: Mexican Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

To: Mexican Foreign Office
Mexico City.

Subject: Mexican attempt to mislead the State Department.

Code Message

FAVOR RPTQS SSOAL ORNMO RNLEN NLGNL POEUI DGRVA NEUAI OESSE EAEEC UPIRC YAMPE ERIST PRCQO DCEEA EASOI etc. etc.

Translation of Mexican Decoded Text

Please do not be surprised at some telegrams I am sending you without encipherment and which might appear indiscreet but which purposely are sent in plain text in order to have the State Department learn their contents. [55]

R. V. PESQUEIRA

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55. Mexican Embassy tries to deceive State Dept. (H.O.Y.)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Refer to Ma 177 Oct. 22, 1920.

From: Mexican Embassy
Washington, D.C.

To: Foreign Office
Mexico City

Subject: Recognition of Mexico

Code Message

GOACA SESDI LMEAN LARMO NDPLD URPOC TUAAI EEMRU IMTOC ENEON DFUEL OVAES IIEDE FRAAU NLIIN EADIQ etc. etc.

Excerpt of translation of Mexican decoded text: for entire message, see Ma 177.

I will interview COLBY personally at 11 A M tomorrow and expect to receive during that interview a definite decisión, this memorandum being the basis for the negotiations. My signature at the foot of the aforesaid memorandum signifies immediate recognition and the same memorandum is to serve as a protocol. Please take note that Mexico appears as if imposing her own conditions. Please bear well in mind that the commission for the claims has no power whatsoever to oblige the (Mexican) Government to pay a claim, nor yet can it fix the term in which claims are to be paid.[56] The general outline of the studies by KING and GOMEZ MORIN regarding article 27 avoids (frees us of) the necessity of immediate action and leaves us in perfect liberty to settle the matter according to the decision of the Supreme Court which in any event would be after recognition. Recognition must be obtained now or it will be impossible during the present administration.

DON FERNANDO (IGLESIAS CALDERON) is entirely in accord in regard to the mixed commission which is in keeping with International Law and Practice. COLBY is enthusiastic and we can count on him. I beg you to give this message your immediate attention, because time is the most important factor in these negotiations.

ROBERTO V. PESQUEIRA

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56. Mexico tries a little diplomatic rascality. (H.O.Y.)

SECRET

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Monclava 10-5-20

Capt 1o A Fol
Juan Manuel Fraire
P Negras

No. 674. Clave Circulo A. 26-49-56-91- sirvase decir al 15-26 17 08 04 13 19 04 alistar dos 04 12 01 17 26 18 de las 12 64 09 14 17 04 18 hoy llegare esa

Gral

A Pruneda R

Spanish text

Sirvase decir al pariente alistar dos hembras de las mijores hoy llegare esa

Translation

Please tell "Aunt" to have two women of the best ready. I will arrive today in your city.

General

A PRUNEDA R [57]

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57. Mexican military needs! (H.O.Y.)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

From: German Minister
Mexico City

To: All German Consuls
in Mexico

Subject: Waberski - German Secret Agent

Code Message

SEOFNATUPK ASIHEINBBN UERSDAUSNN LRSEGGIESN NNLEZNSIMN EHNESHMPPB ASUEASRIHT HTEURMVNSM KAINCOUASI INSNRNVEGD etc. etc.

Translation of German Decoded Text

Strictly Secret !

The bearer of this is a subject of the Empire who travels as a Russian under the name of PABLO WABERSKI. He is a German secret agent.[58]

Please furnish him, on request, protection and assistance; also advance him, on demand, up to one thousand pesos of Mexican gold, and send his code telegrams to this embassy as official consular despatches.

VON ECKARDT

Note: This code message was found on Waberski, and deciphered after two weeks' effort. On the evidence he was tried and sentenced to be shot. His sentence was later commuted by the President to life imprisonment.

58. A German spy convicted. (H.O.Y.)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

From: German Agent,
The Hague

To: Madame Victorica,
confessed German
Agent in New York

Subject: German Secret Service Activities
In the United States

(The letter containing the following appeared to be an innocent letter written in English. When submitted to severe chemical tests, a German spy message written in secret ink appeared. The following is a translation.

Translation of the German Text

Advise immediately where U-boat or sailing boat material sacks can be sunk on American coast - perhaps between New York and Cape Hatteras. Position must be free of currents, so that sacks will not move. Water depth not more than 20 meters. Can boats be placed on land there? The marking of sinking positions with buoys is successfully done in Spain.

Wire agreement and where material is to be sunk. Take as few persons as possible into confidence. Indicate in writing at once how plan is to be carried out.

Order as soon as possible through a trustworthy clergyman by wire from Atlantic export, Berne, by the following telegram: 'Altar containing three holy figures, four columns about two meters high, to match six meters wide and three meters high.' Also receivers' addresses.

Yours, etc.

NOTE: The holy figures were to contain a new chemical for the manufacture of explosive sticks for use in blowing up transports, etc.

Madame Victorica died in prison early in 1920.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

January 16, 1919

From: German Consul General
Mexico City

To: All German Consuls
In Mexico

Subject: German Secret Service Activities
In Mexico

Code Message

NOGAALMUE SAEESNTRAA SEIENEWWEI HEUAMAOEID ZCDKEFTEDT EDGEIGUNRI EOEUTNNINB MHBEBANAIS ITEAARUKSS TDSCMOEREB etc. etc.

Translation of German Decoded Text

Please carefully and immediately burn without remainder, and destroy the ashes of, all papers connected with the war the preservation of which is not absolutely necessary, especially papers now in your hands or reaching you hereafter which have to do with the Secret Service and the service of the representatives of our General Staff and Admiralty Staff (strictest silence concerning the existence and activity of these representatives is to be observed now and for all future time, even after the conclusion of peace) which might be compromising or even unpleasant for us if they came to the knowledge of our enemies who are still endeavoring to obtain possession of such papers.[59]

Lists, registers, accounts, receipts, account-books, etc., are especially included in these papers, as well as correspondence with this Embassy by letter and telegraph on the subjects mentioned.

Cipher-books, codes and cipher-keys and directions that are still in use are excepted for the present, and most particular attention must be paid to keeping them in absolute safety.

Please report in writing en claire the execution of this order so far as it relates to papers now on hand and then burn this so-called order for burning, which, for further reference, I herewith designate as PQR, and the contents of which together with this designation you will please retain in memory.

THE GERMAN CONSUL-GENERAL

---

59. German Secret Service. (H.O.Y.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Nov. 2, 1918.

From: GENERAL MACKENSEN
Eastern Balkans

To: German General Staff
Berlin

Subject: German retreat in Eastern Balkans

Code Message

DVDVF DVFAG XVXFF FVGGG AGGXA XDXGF XVVDD GPGFD FAVGV DAFGF GXDFD XVVDG DGVFF GDXDG AXAXV GVGAA AVFVG VFDGD, etc. etc.

Translation of German Decoded Text

Review of the situation: Up to date it has had to be reckoned with that the enemy will attempt a crossing of the Danube with the forces assembling at Lompalanka and vicinity of Rustchuk, with the object of cutting the railroad communication between Orsova and Craiova, and to strike forward on Bucharest. Since November 1st, 1918, however, it appears that the Serbian armies, together with three French divisions, are engaged in an advance toward Belgrade-Semendria, and the intended attack at Vidin and Lompalanka seems to have been abandoned. (3rd part missing)

It is therefore extremely probable that the Serbian armies, reinforced by the French, intend to cross the Danube at Belgrade-Semendria and march into Southern Hungary, while the French army marching up south Svistov and Rustchuk retains the task of directing an offensive towards Bucharest. In conjunction with this operation it is not impossible that Roumanian forces from Moldavia will enter Transylvania through the Tolgyes, Gyimes, and Oitos passes, thereby threatening the lines of communication in the rear of the army of occupation which have up to now as a result of - - - - - (9th part missing)

- - - - - is threatened with attack, and the further occupation of Wallachia, as laid down in order of Headquarters Staff 2 IA. N.R. 11161 OP, is useless, and in view of the stocks on hand of munitions, provisions and coal cannot be carried out. In case a general armistice cannot be expected in the immediate future, it is proposed that the army of occupation be withdrawn from Roumania at once and to start the march to Upper Silesia through Hungary, together with the German units of the 1-Army. Approval is requested. (signed) K. M. 1 a GR - OP. [60]

NOTE: This message was deciphered and translated and was in the hands of the Supreme War Council at Versaille within 48 hours after it had been received in Berlin.

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60. Samples of war messages. (H.O.Y.)

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TRANSLATIONS OF DECODED GERMAN BATTLE MESSAGES

ON WESTERN FRONT, 1918

- - oOo - -

Lieut. Colonel Baron von der GOLTZ and Major Count Graf JOLFSMEEL with staff, will arrive in Braila (Roumania) on July 28th; they will then continue their journey to Tiflis. General Staff, Political Section, Berlin.

- - oOo - -

After artillery preparation at 6 a m extend attack together with 7th Army Corps.

- - oOo - -

14th Infantry Division Corps Headquarters; wishes wire entanglements placed in front line at once. Corps Headquarters 7.

- - oOo - -

Where is position? Our position Beaugies. Departure undetermined.

- - oOo - -

Schmettow. Position on right flank 52, 14 D, resumed. Enemy is yielding over south slope of heights.

- - oOo - -

According to report of the 50th Inf. Division, the 52d Inf. Division has been thrown from Bois Daetrotte. 50th Inf. Division is making counterattack.

- - oOo - -

Corps Headquarters: Enemy is going back. The whole divisional front is moving forward. ___ Infantry Division.

SECRET

Doc ID: 6651287 Doc Ref ID: A6651286

SECRET

From: Germany To: Russia

December 23, 1919.

Subject: Russian Soviet Activities

Code Message

LMENA OLFSU SEESB GGAEW EIENV TSHNV DAHER IRSMS NSRIC FEMHU CIPSE 296 NTDRS FAFOI EHRAO RGTHI RSINC etc. etc.

Translation of German Decoded Text

Send money. Italy and France are urgently in need. Large pearls sell well here; sapphires in England. The Secretariat asks urgently for material. Money should be distributed through this Zentrale before the conference. In November, Secretariat elected PAUL LEVI, BRONSKI, ZETKINICH. Secretary is in touch with Holland. The Communistic is issued here and I am also publishing the Russian Correspondence.

A branch has been installed in Vienna. At present no news from Carlo; he works extremely well. ABRAMOVITCH, Paris, was there. Contact already established from here with all countries. Good progress is being made. Congress will meet surely January, February. RADEK will make detailed report to you. RADEK or BUCHARIN is absolutely needed here. Please send larger sum, as soon as ready. KOPP is really not able at present. My name now is TOMAS. Regards, JAMES.

The conference in Holland turned out a fiasco owing to the carelessness of the fellows there. KLARA AND SYLVIA were arrested. The Dutch Press speaks of the sale of diamonds and of the executive decision of twenty millions. Increased activities by the police against the Secretariat is also noticeable. BRONSKI'S photos have fallen into their hands in an inexplicable manner. We suspect through Poles who are with you. LEVI and ALEXANDER have been arrested recently. Advise if you have the shorthand system of Stolze Schrei or Gabelsberger; in that case I would send shorthand notes. I have prospects of seeing you as a member of a medical mission or as a member of an emigrants' delegation. Please advise if satisfactory to you. Radio station finally finished. Expert engaged. Next week we start in receiving. We need sums of money urgently for Bulgaria, Serbia and France. The delegates are waiting here. The fellow from Triest arrived with money from Italy. He had been arrested in Vienna. Money will shortly be sent from here to Italy. GURALSKI arrived here with money on his way to America. German Government permits exchange of journalists from here. The "Frankfurter Zeitung" is taking advantage of the opportunity. Urgently needed capable talent.[61]

SECRET

61. Bolshevik activity in foreign countries, German connivance. (H.O.Y.)

EDITOR'S NOTE

Originally Exhibit VIII ended with the material already transcribed, but in 1922 Yardley added summaries of twenty-two Japanese messages and carbon copies of the full translations. As these messages represent solution at a later period, they have not been transcribed. This completes the contents of the first notebook.

The second notebook contains a preface and excerpts of Japanese messages showing the ramifications of the Japanese secret service in the United States and elsewhere. These excerpts have been omitted, but the preface and the table of contents are as follows:

SECRET

PREFACE

Caution: The ramifications of the Japanese Secret Service encompass the globe, penetrate our Congress, and even cross the portals of the White House (see pp. 12). The reader of this pamphlet is therefore earnestly warned that it is vital to the interests of this country that he avoid speaking of the contents or even hinting that such information exists lest Japan learn of it and forever close our sources of information.

Contents: This pamphlet contains only a few of the thousands of secret Japanese communications passing between their representatives. The entire file treats of every subject of interest to the Japanese Empire, but for want of space only a few of the communications are given here and only those that concern secret service activities, propaganda, activities in Far Eastern Russia, the settlement of the Naval Ratio, Fortifications in the Pacific, Shantung, and Yap.

Importance: The communications cited here, though small in number, are of interest and of extreme importance for several reasons; they demonstrate that as long as our sources of information remain open, this government will be informed in detail of what the Japanese are thinking, their aggressive ambitions, their propaganda, their secret service, their paid American and English agents; and during the course of negotiations such as the Armament Conference, they show how this government receives, in advance of a settlement, the exact limits of concessions the Japanese are willing to make.

Arrangement: At the top of each message is a brief summary of its contents written in red, and in many of the messages the pertinent words are also in red. In order that the reader may first have an outline of the contents, the summaries of the messages are also grouped under their subjects. To the reader who has but a few moments the reading of the summaries will give a fair estimate of the interest and importance of the communications contained in this pamphlet.

SECRET

Index

--- oOo ---

Japanese Secret Service	Pp. 9 to 23
Summaries	P. 3
Japanese Activities in Far East	Pp. 24 to 30
Summaries	P. 4
Naval Ratio	Pp. 31 to 43
Summaries	P. 5
Limitation of Pacific Defenses	Pp. 44 to 54
Summaries	P. 6
The Shantung Question	Pp. 55 to 65
Summaries	P. 7
The Yap Question	Pp. 66 to 79
Summaries	P. 8

---- oOo ----

Doc ID: 6651287 Doc Ref ID: A6651286

SECRET

Summaries of Communications Concerning

Japanese Secret Service

	Pages
Funds for secret informants. No. 5229, October 3, 1921.	10
$30,000 for secret service funds during Armament Conference. No. 6207, November 28, 1921.	11
Japan's secret sources of information at the White House. No. 5324, October 10, 1921.	12
Japan's secret sources of information in Congress. No. 5252, October 4, 1921.	13
Japan's secret sources of information in Rome. No. 5355, October 13, 1921.	14-15
Japan's secret sources of information. No. 5104, September 23, 1921.	16
Japan secretly employs foreigners to mold American opinion. No. 5008, September 15, 1921	17
McGraw, secretly in the pay of Japan. No. 4975, September 10, 1921	18
Bland, secretly in the pay of Japan. No. 4817, August 26, 1921.	19
Bland, secretly in the pay of Japan. No. 4890, September 1, 1921.	20
Secret Japanese influence on English press. No. 5088, September 21, 1921.	21-22
Japan plans to manipulate Steed for propaganda purposes. No. 7274, January 12, 1922.	23

SECRET

Doc ID: 6651287 Doc Ref ID: A6651286

~~SECRET~~

Summaries of Communications Concerning Japanese Activities in Far Eastern Russia

	Pages
Japan secretly plans to establish a buffer state in Far Eastern Russia. No. 306, June 12, 1920.	25
Japan refuses to withdraw her army from Far Eastern Russia. No. 5917, November 16, 1921.	26-29
Tokio attempts to censor news reports regarding Japanese activities in Far Eastern Russia. No. 7167, January 10, 1922.	30

~~SECRET~~

Doc ID: 6651287 Doc Ref ID: A6651286

SECRET

Summaries of Communications Concerning

Naval Ratio

	Pages
Tokio instructs KATO to work for 10 to 7 Naval ratio. No. 6057, November 22, 1921.	32
Evidence that if America presses Japan vigorously, Japan will give up Proposal 1, then Proposal 2, and that provided the status quo of the Pacific defences is maintained, she will even accept a 10 to 6 naval ratio. No. 6204, Nov. 28, 1921.	33
A report of a highly interesting and important discussion between BALFOUR and KATO; Kato sends his personal views to Tokio; he is afraid to hold out for a 10 to 7 naval ratio lest the whole Armament Conference break up. No. 6268, Dec. 2, 1921.	34-40
Tokio capitulates; instructs KATO to agree to 10 to 6 naval ratio provided status quo of Pacific defenses is maintained.	41-43

SECRET

Doc ID: 6651287 Doc Ref ID: A6651286

~~SECRET~~

Summaries of Communications Concerning

Limitation of Pacific Defenses

	Pages
KATO hopes to maintain status quo of American defenses in Guam and Philippines; English in Hong Kong and Singapore; and French in unnamed Pacific territory. No. 6439, December 10, 1921.	45-47
Tokio sends secret instructions on question of Pacific fortifications. No. 6508, December 10, 1921.	48-49
KATO discusses the proposed three-power agreement concerning Pacific defenses. No. 6647, December 16, 1921.	50-51
KATO secretly discusses with Tokio the proposed three-power treaty limiting naval armaments and fortifications in the Pacific; he outlines three courses to follow; he thinks it impossible to carry Japan's contentions. No. 7225, Jan. 12, 1922	52-54

~~SECRET~~

Doc ID: 6651287 Doc Ref ID: A6651286

SECRET

Summaries of Communications Concerning

The Shantung Question.

	Pages
In the settlement of the Shantung question the Japanese delegates at Washington recommend to Tokio that "it is advisable to adopt the policy of throwing away the name and keeping the fact"; they also outline tentative proposals. No. 6367, December 6, 1921.	56-58
Japanese request instructions for settlement of Shantung Railway; they are afraid that public opinion in America will force them to give up idea of joint administration. No. 6421, Dec. 8, 1921.	59
Tokio outlines several proposals for settlement of the Shantung question. No. 6456, December 10, 1921.	60-63
Tokio refuses to accept a cash payment for Shantung Railway. No. 6857, December 25, 1921.	64-65

SECRET

Doc ID: 6651287 Doc Ref ID: A6651286

Summaries of Communications Concerning

The Yap Question.

	Pages
Tokio sends secret instructions for settling the Yap question. No. 4855, Sept. 2, 1921.	67-71
Tokio sends further secret instructions for settling the Yap question. No. 5193, September 30, 1921.	72-77
Tokio sends further secret instructions for settling the Yap question. No. 6455, December 10, 1921.	78-79

~~SECRET~~

INDEX

Abramovitch 73
Adjutant-General's Office, The 6
Alexander 73
alien codes and ciphers broken 17
Allen, F. W. 4,9-11
Alston 43
Andrews, Lt. Edmund R. 5
anti-Japanese legislation ... 42
Argentine diplomatic code ... 17
Army Code Book 12,14
Army Field Clerks 11
Army Service Schools 7
Army Signal School 5
Bacon, Francis 7
Bernstorff 22-23
bilateral cipher 7
Bland 77
Bleichroeder 35
Bliss, General Tasker H... 12-13
Brazilian diplomatic cipher.. 17
Brazilian diplomatic code ... 17
bribery by Japanese 42
bribery of Mexican Government 34-35
Bronski 73
Bucharin 73
Bushe 35
Carver, Captain Emmett K. ... 11
Casualty Code 13
Census of Foreign Stenographers 10
Chilean diplomatic codes 17
Cipher Bureau, The 4
code compilation 12-14
Colby 66
Collins, S. W. 11
collusion between Great Britain, France and Japan.. 44
collusion between Japanese and German officials 51
Communications Congress.. 43,46,48
Communications Subsection .. 14-15
Costa Rican diplomatic codes .. 17
"Cousin Oscar" 38-39
Cuban diplomatic code 17
decipherment of shorthand systems 10
Department of Justice 6
Department of State 6
destruction of secret papers in Mexican consulates 70
Dutch rights 44
Eastman, Lt. Clyde L. 5
Exhibit I 21-23
Exhibit II 24-26
Exhibit III 27-30
Exhibit IV 31-33
Exhibit V 34-35
Exhibit VI 36-37
Exhibit VII 38-39
Exhibit VIII 40
Expert linguists 10
Fabyan, George 7,8
first attack on codes 9
fortresses in Mexico 58
French cables 43
French Geographical Code 13
Friedman, W. F. 7,8
German diplomatic consular codes 17
German Intelligence Ciphers ... 18
German Military ciphers 72
German retreat in Eastern Balkans 71
German secret agent 26,68,69
German Shorthand experts for the A.E.F. 10
Gomez, Morin 66
grille 36-37
Haniel 51
Hitt, Col. Parker 4,5,7
"Hudson" 38-39

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Ideal Correspondence Code ... 14
Iglesias Calderon 66
instruction in code and
cipher work 12
instructions for German
minister in Mexico 31-33
Japanese activities in
Far East 75
Japanese activities in
Russia 56
Japanese bribery 43
Japanese diplomatic codes ... 18
Japanese false statement 47
Japanese mandates 43,44
Japanese military and
naval codes 19
Japanese military spies in
America 58
Japanese propaganda in
France 58
Japanese secret agent 50
Japanese secret service .. 74-77
jewels 73
Jolfsmeel, Major Count 72
Kalium sodatum 38-39
Kato 79,80
King 66
Klara 73
Knipping 52
Koikin 57
Kopp 73
Lanel 43
Levi, Paul 73
Lewis, Lt. Charles A. 5
Macomb, Brigadier General
M. M. 5
Madame Victorica 38-39
Manly, Captain John M. 6
Martens 64
Mauborgne, General J. O. ... 4,5
McGrail, Lt. A. J. 11,38
McGraw 77
McKenna, Lt. James E. 6
message in ADFGVX cipher 71
message intercepted more
than 60 times 31
Mexican ciphers 7
Mexican deception 65
Mexican diplomatic &
consular codes 18
Mexican military needs 67
Mexican rascality 66
M.I.D. 41
M. I. 8 9
Military Intelligence Code
No. 5 12
Military Intelligence Code
No. 9 12
Mirett 44
Moorman, Major Frank 4-5
Morris 43
Nauen message 31
Naval ratio 75,76,79
need for code and cipher
solution 4
need for funds 40
Nixon 50
open code 38-39
order for destruction of German
war records 27-30
order for disabling German
ships in American ports .. 21-23
Pacific defenses 76,80
Panama Canal 58
Panaman diplomatic code 18
Pershing, General John J. 12
Peruvian diplomatic codes 18
Pesqueira, R. V. 65
Piper 42
Pocket Code 14
Postal Censorship 6
Powell, J. A. 7,11
POR 70
Prince, Captain A. E. 12
process of stencil writing.. 36-37
Pruneda, General A. 67
Radek 73
Riverbank Laboratories, The ... 7
Russia 64
Secret Inks 11-12
Semenoff 56
Shantung 51-54,75,76,81

SECRET

SECRET

Shidehara 58
Shorthand Subsection 4,9-11
Soviet activities 73
Spanish diplomatic consular
codes 18
Swartz, Lt. Charles E. 5
Sylvia 73
Tiru 52
Tomas 73
training at Riverbank
Laboratories 8
Truesdell, Lt. Karl 5
U-boat 69
Uruguay diplomatic code 19
Van Deman, Col. R. H. 4-6,8
Victorica, Madame 69
von der Goltz, Lt. Col. Baron.72
von Eckardt 68
von Mackensen, General 71
von Magnus cipher 27-30
Waberski cipher 24-26
Waberski, Pablo 24-26,28
War between Japan and America.. 61
War College 6
War Department Staff Code
No. 2 12
War Department Telegraph
Code 1915 12
Wheelwright 42
Yamada, Major 58-63
Yap 44-46,49,75,76,82
Yardley, H. O. 4,5
Zetkinich 73
Zolf 51,52

SECRET