

**Primary Recommendation B3
ATO Reciprocity**

<i>Line of Effort</i>	Create and maintain cross-program/cross-service digital infrastructure.		
<i>Recommendation</i>	Create a mechanism for Authorization to Operate (ATO) reciprocity within and between programs, Services, and other DoD agencies to enable sharing of software platforms, components, and infrastructure and rapid integration of capabilities across (hardware) platforms, (weapon) systems, and Services.		
<i>Stakeholders</i>	DoD CIO, A&S, Service CIOs, DISA		
<i>Background</i>	Current software acquisition practice emphasizes the differences among programs: perceptions around different missions, different threats, and different levels of risk tolerance mean that components, tools, and infrastructure that have been given permission to be used in one context are rarely accepted for use in another. The lack of ATO reciprocity drives each program to create their own infrastructure, repeating time- and effort-intensive activities needed to certify elements as secure for their own specific context.		
<i>Desired State</i>	Modern software components, tools, and infrastructure, once accredited as secure within DoD, can be used appropriately and cost-effectively by multiple programs. Programs can spend a greater percentage of their budgets on developing software that adds value to the mission rather than spending time and effort on basic software infrastructure. Accreditation of COTS components is done once and then made available for use in other programs, as appropriate.		
<i>Role of Congress</i>	N/A		
Draft Implementation Plan		Lead Stakeholder	Target Date
B3.1	Issue guidance making reciprocity the default practice in DoD with limited exceptions and update DoDI 8510.01 to reflect updated risk management framework. Exceptions should require signoff by the DoD CIO to discourage their use.	DoD CIO, with Service CIOs	Q3 FY19
B3.2	Establish DoD-wide repository for ATO artifacts with tools and access rules that enable Services to identify existing ATOs and utilize them when possible.	DoD CIO, with Service CIOs, DISA	Q4 FY19
B3.3	Implement procedures and access controls so that Authorizing Officials have visibility over other programs that are using compatible ATOs.	DoD CIO, with Service CIOs, DISA	Q2 FY20
B3.4	Implement mechanisms to allow FedRAMP and other non-DoD security certifications to be used for DoD ATO when appropriate based on intended use and environment.	DoD CIO, with FedRAMP	Q4 FY20

SWAP working group inputs (reflected in Appendix F) related to this recommendation

Sec	As security is “baked in” to software during the development process, people must be educated about what that means as different tools look at different security aspects.
Sec	People must learn to appreciate that speed helps increase security. Security is improved when changes and updates can be made quickly to an application. Using automation, software can be reviewed quickly.
Sec	The AO must also be able to review documentation and make a risk decision quickly and make that decision on the process and not the product.

Related recommendations from previous studies

SE112	Define criteria for reaccreditation early in the project.
SE112	Leverage long accreditation approval wait time with frequent community previews.
SE112	Don't apply all the information assurance controls blindly.