

From Power Projection to Power Protection

Revitalizing Conventional Deterrence in NATO

Morgan P. Lohse
Major, USAF



AIR UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES



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Abstract

Russia's actions in Ukraine and Crimea ushered in a return to great power competition. The Eastern European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, especially the Baltics, are at risk of territorial annexation by Russia. This thesis examines deterrence within the broader framework of strategic coercion, and analyzes conventional deterrence before and after the Cold War to build a historical reference. A significant historical finding is a trend towards a decreased reliance on forward presence, in favor of power projection through expeditionary forces. A robust deterrent policy through diplomacy and military forces is critical to deterring Russian aggression. The current reliance on power projection and expeditionary forces is inadequate to provide this deterrence. NATO's power projection capability depends on strategic warning and airpower. Russia's growing military capabilities, including anti-access measures and new precision strike capabilities, may impede the strategic warning and airpower that are essential to power projection. Deterrence in Eastern Europe requires a balanced strategy incorporating permanent forward presence and power projection. Such measures cannot guarantee deterrence, but may make a rapid military victory by Russia much more difficult.

Introduction

The NATO alliance is now facing the difficult task of transitioning its primary focus from expeditionary operations and support to a renewed emphasis on European security.

Gen Philip Breedlove, Commander, US EUCOM

A successful fait accompli action that quickly overruns and occupies a neighboring country (as in the case of Iraq's seizure of Kuwait) is extremely difficult to reverse.

Alexander George and William Simons

Old Rivalries Reborn

On 21 November 2013, the cabinet of Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich halted plans to develop closer ties to the European Union. The cancelled Ukrainian-European Union agreement included economic and political arrangements that would bond Ukraine to the West, and promised to take it further away from Russia's sphere of influence.¹ The agreement's cancellation led to protests against the Yanukovich government. An ensuing \$15 billion agreement with Russia intended to shore up Ukrainian finances through debt purchases and natural gas price reductions provided evidence of Yanukovich's alignment with Russia.² Suppression of protests led to popular backlash, and eventually the fall of the Yanukovich government. The pro-European Union opposition returned to power in Ukraine and instituted a ban on Russian as the official second language. Russian intervention swiftly followed.

On 18 March 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea, sovereign Ukrainian territory, with the stroke of a pen. A Crimean secession referendum conducted on 16 March received a 97 percent vote to secede from Ukraine, although the West denounced the vote as fraudulent. These political acts followed Russian military interventions after the ouster of Yanukovich. The Crimean intervention began on 27 February 2014 with seizure of government buildings and airports by Russian military forces under the pretext of protecting

ethnic Russians.³ Within 20 days, the Russians achieved both a military *fait accompli* and a quick political victory. The territory was under the control of Russian troops before the Ukrainian military could respond, and the referendum provided the façade of legitimacy Putin needed to complete the annexation.

While the annexation of Crimea generated surprise and geopolitical shockwaves, it is an artifact of a long-standing Russian foreign policy to maintain a sphere of influence through diplomacy and force. The 2008 war with Georgia and related support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia independence efforts resulted from this policy. The Eurasian Economic Union, inaugurated on 1 January 2015, is a softer product of Russian efforts to maintain influence in its near abroad, territories historically dominated by Tsarist and Soviet Russia.⁴

NATO's expansionist post-Cold War policy has led to the inclusion of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—the Baltic States which border Russia and were former Soviet republics—and other former Warsaw Pact states into the alliance. An essential element of NATO since its formation is Article 5, which binds the NATO nations together and requires mutual defense in case of external aggression. The combination of this guarantee, new NATO neighbors on Russia's borders, and an assertive Russian foreign policy leads to an acute problem of defense and deterrence.

The annexation of Crimea is a sign that great power competition is back. This annexation was a modern development of the classic formula of a swift advance of conventional forces to win a quick military victory. A quick Russian military victory in a Baltic state is a significant threat to NATO and requires careful consideration and planning to prevent.

Conventional Deterrence

Deterrence is a timeless element of politics. John Mearsheimer writes that, “deterrence, in its broadest sense, means persuading an opponent not to initiate a specific action because the perceived benefits do not justify the estimated costs and risks.”⁵ While deterrence is timeless, the continued evolution of weapons, strategy, tactics, and force posture ensures that deterrent strategies are dynamic.

The advent of nuclear weapons led to nuclear and conventional subcategories of deterrence. The nuclear variant was especially important in the 1950s and 1960s with the development of the ICBM,

although conventional forces received greater attention towards the end of the Cold War as nuclear conflict became less likely. Indeed, conventional deterrence became a topic of increased importance in the 1980s, and major considerations to determine conventional force effectiveness included balance of forces, weapons, and military strategies.

Conventional deterrence is just one component of a field that Lawrence Freedman termed strategic coercion. Freedman defines strategic coercion as “the deliberative and purposive use of overt threats to influence another’s strategic choices.”⁶ Thomas Schelling introduced deterrence and compellence, the two major components of strategic coercion, in his 1966 work, *Arms and Influence*. In broad terms, deterrence seeks to prevent adversary action, while compellence seeks to produce adversary action (or change in action).⁷

Deterrence includes two major categorizations, general and immediate. “General deterrence involves preventing an action,” while “immediate deterrence focuses on preventing a specific, planned event.”⁸ This distinction matters because the strategy required for general deterrence is different from that for immediate deterrence. Due to the specific nature of the threat, immediate deterrence requires more forces and shares many characteristics with counter-coercion (a strategy to raise enforcement costs of coercion) and coercive diplomacy (efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or undo an action).⁹

Deterrence is not mechanical, nor is it an equation of costs and risks, but it does exhibit certain patterns and contours. As a social activity, deterrence emerges from complex interactions between political and military systems. First, some competitors are impossible or very difficult to deter. Second, when deterrence is possible, denial of the *expectation* of a *fait accompli* or rapid military victory is especially important. Third, threats of denial to prevent achievement of political and military objectives are more effective than threats to punish or impose suffering.¹⁰ While it may be possible to analyze patterns and contours, in the end deterrence is not formulaic but is bound to the context at hand, with no guarantees, or sometimes even possibility, of success.

Power Strategies

The emergence of global US interests led the United States to diversify its approach to the use of military force. Until World War II, the United States did not maintain large standing military forces in peacetime. Instead, the pre-Cold War model relied on a build-up and mobilization of forces, which then deployed to distant lands such as the Philippines or Western Europe when crises loomed. The Berlin Crisis in 1948 and further Communist antagonism ushered in a new model of large peacetime military forces coupled with forward basing. These bases enabled the protection of allies that were still broken from World War II and served as a deterrent to Soviet aggression.

The initial NATO Cold War strategy relied on large conventional forces stationed at forward bases to deter and defend against massive Soviet armored formations. As the costs of these large standing forces increased, NATO adopted a deterrence strategy that relied heavily on nuclear weapons, which ameliorated NATO's acknowledged conventional inferiority. Over time, questions arose about the credibility of this nuclear deterrent, and a conventional focus to NATO's force posture returned. This conventional focus merged elements of projecting power from the United States and Western Europe to Central Europe in an expeditionary approach with protecting allies through forward presence that provided a front line and a trip-wire until reserves could arrive.

The end of the Cold War resulted in drastic changes in the global US force posture. The lack of a competitor led to the withdrawal of tens of thousands of military personnel stationed overseas at major operating bases. The emergence of terrorist threats enhanced this dynamic as the US military shifted its focus to counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. The post-9/11 world facilitated a force posture approach that relied on generation of military forces in the United States; these forces rotated abroad for deployments ranging from three to fifteen months. This model of power projection proved stressing in its own right but was a solution to a complex problem that largely precluded the permanent basing of US forces in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

The return of great power competition finds the US military with a force posture that reflects the needs of limited interventions and counterinsurgency. The US military has adapted this model to great

power competition through the rotation of forces to deter and show resolve in both Europe and the Pacific. The drawback of this approach is that it lacks demonstrable commitment and credibility against a peer competitor, especially in that competitor's backyard.

A Balanced Approach

An appropriate strategy for NATO requires permanent forward presence. NATO is in a new era of great power competition within a context of general deterrence. Russia has not specifically threatened the Baltic States or other Eastern European NATO member states, but its foreign policy and military modernization demonstrate that it is reasserting itself on the world stage. Russia's anti-access capabilities complicate the matter, through air and ground based systems that could prevent NATO from delivering additional forces into Eastern Europe. For the Baltics, general deterrence of Russia requires credible military force on a permanent basis. Permanent forward basing of any force is costly financially and politically, but permanently stationed ground forces demonstrate greater commitment, and additional air-power will help mitigate Russia's anti-access capabilities.

To revitalize the deterrent credibility of NATO vis-à-vis Russia, NATO must increase its protection of member states through forward presence rather than relying on power projection from expeditionary or rapid response forces. NATO should take a balanced approach that combines elements of the power projection, expeditionary model with a protective, forward presence model. Only a balanced strategy that includes forward presence will provide an enduring deterrent to Russian aggression at NATO's borders.

Significant increases in forward basing of military personnel and equipment will test the political resolve of NATO and the United States. Politicians must determine the utility of NATO in terms of both the security it offers and its potential as a binding organization of the liberal order. What would happen to NATO if Russia invades a member nation? Would NATO be able to defend or liberate that nation utilizing its current power projection strategy? The Baltics are also European Union (EU) members, and fracturing the EU could have its own implications for the liberal order. In comparison to the political cost of failure, the cost of fielding an increased, permanent

forward presence is small. Only with political will, however, can NATO adjust to an era of renewed competition.

Overview

There are two conventional strategies for deterrence, power projection and power protection. Power projection evolved during the Cold War to the prominent place it holds in current national military strategy. Airpower is critical to power projection. Without air superiority, power projection is ineffective. On the other hand, forward presence is the safest strategy to deter an aggressor from seeking a rapid military victory, but it also requires more resources. Most importantly, the strategies of power projection and power protection require tailoring to the specific security context rather than rote application of the traditional strategy.

The following analysis includes the Cold War and post-Cold War evolution of US military force posture, and Russia's return as a great power to include Russian anti-access capabilities. The deterrence focus is in terms of territorial acquisition as opposed to other objects of deterrence such as use of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, or other actions. Examination is within the framework of general deterrence and the strategy *behind* force postures, to include the evolution, execution, and suitability of these strategies to today's current power competition. Limitations of this short work include a focus restricted to general deterrence rather than on other elements of coercion, and a focus on how force postures generate deterrence, instead of other factors such as doctrine, readiness, and weapons technology.

Chapter 1 analyzes conventional deterrence within the larger structure of strategic coercion and focuses the scope of this thesis on general deterrence and the prevention of a *fait accompli* or rapid military victory. It includes analysis of two distinct deterrent strategies, power projection and power protection, but also highlights the limitations of any deterrent policy and warns of the consequences of deterrent failure. Chapter 2 explains the evolution of NATO's force posture during the Cold War, tracing the rise of power projection strategies utilizing expeditionary forces from US bases, and highlights the importance of airpower to such a strategy. Chapter 3 analyzes the change to an almost exclusive reliance on power projection after the

Cold War as US attention shifted from great power competition to a variety of security threats, and underscores the importance of diplomacy, strategic warning, and airpower.

Chapter 4 describes the challenges of adapting the power projection strategy to great power competition in an anti-access, area-denial (A2AD) environment, and investigates the evolution of the current deterrent strategy. This chapter recommends a NATO strategy that balances power projection with increased protective forward presence. Finally, the conclusion underscores key recommendations, and frames other security challenges within an appropriate category of strategic coercion to provide a foundation for further analysis.

Russia's annexation of Crimea and continuing actions in Ukraine demonstrate that NATO's Eastern European countries require stronger deterrence. A quick Russian military victory in a Baltic state would be difficult to reverse and could fragment NATO and the European Union. While power projection has served the United States well since the end of the Cold War, deterrence in Europe requires protective forward presence.

Notes

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Chapter 1

Deterrence Theory and Strategies

The key to effective conventional deterrence appears to lie in the ability to deny potential aggressors the belief that they have an option that will yield a quick victory and will prevent events from slipping out of their control.

Edward Rhodes

The Soviets have no intention of engaging in a lengthy war of attrition.

John Mearsheimer

This chapter examines the existing theories on deterrence and the place of deterrence amid the broader framework of strategic coercion. It analyzes the efficacy of various strategies and military doctrines utilized to achieve deterrence, providing the foundation upon which the subsequent historical analysis, conclusions, and recommendations rest.

Coercion and Deterrence

In his classic work *Arms and Influence*, Thomas Schelling first codified what statesmen have been doing for centuries—using coercion, “the power to hurt,” in order to achieve national objectives. Schelling defined two primary categories, compellence and deterrence. Schelling argues that the objective of deterrence is to prevent the adversary from doing something on an indefinite timeframe. For compellence, the objective is to make the adversary do something, and this typically requires a specific time component.¹

Patrick Morgan provided further categorization of deterrence in his 1977 work, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*. For Morgan, “immediate deterrence concerns the relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it. General deterrence relates to opponents who maintain armed forces

2 | Deterrence Theory and Strategies

to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack.”² Morgan detailed four criteria required to classify a threat as immediate.³ In practice, however, such distinctions are not so easy, and there is actually a spectrum between general deterrence and immediate deterrence. As the situation grows closer to immediate deterrence, it takes on forms that resemble other types of coercion.

Alexander George and William Simons described blackmail and coercive diplomacy as the two types of compellence. George and Simons defined coercive diplomacy as a defensive strategy for preventing adversaries from altering the status quo in their favor. Coercive diplomacy has three potential objectives: stop an action; reverse previous adversary accomplishments; and adversary regime change. Additionally, George and Simons defined blackmail as an offensive strategy that uses coercive threats to convince an adversary to give up something of value.⁴

The concepts of general deterrence, immediate deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and blackmail all fit within Lawrence Freedman’s umbrella concept of strategic coercion (see Figure 1). The term *strategic coercion* provides an elegant overall concept but does so at the risk of oversimplification. Each situation has distinct dynamics, yet some characteristics are shared. According to Byman, Waxman, and Larson, “reversing a completed action versus deterring a future, planned action (immediate deterrence) is rarely a clear-cut division, and both ultimately boil down to inducing the adversary to choose a policy other than that planned. Classifying a case as compellence as opposed to immediate deterrence is always speculative to some degree, given the inherent opacity of enemy intentions. Indeed, even general deterrence and compellence are co-dependent, because the success or failure of coercion affects the coercing power’s general reputation, and thus its overall ability to deter.”⁵ While there are similarities and linkages, general deterrence is unique in the spectrum of coercion due to its lack of a specified threat.




Figure 1: Theoretical Structure of Coercion. (Adapted from Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice* [New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1998], 12.)

On the spectrum of strategic coercion, which includes deterrence and compellence, general deterrence is at one end, while blackmail is at the other end. These forms bound the spectrum not only in the aims they seek to achieve but also in the difficulty of accomplishing those aims. Blackmail is often very difficult because it forces losses upon the adversary. Additionally, threatened aggression to gain concessions is likely to induce an international response. On the other hand, general deterrence is germane to politics. The simple possession of military force provides a form of general deterrence to a potential aggressor.

In general, the force required to achieve objectives increases as the coercion spectrum goes from the extreme of general deterrence to blackmail (see Figure 2). General deterrence requires the least force because there is not a specific threat to deter. Immediate deterrence requires more force because a potential aggressor has made specific threats that require a response. Coercive diplomacy and blackmail require even greater force than deterrence because these forms of compellence seek concessions rather than inaction. To gain these concessions, the aggressor typically coerces from a position of great strength.




Figure 2: Force Required by Type of Coercion. (Source: Author's Original Work)

General deterrence may be explicit through overt political communications or it may be implicit through force movements and weapons acquisitions. The challenge is to tailor the political and military actions to the specific context. Deterring a state from territorial aggression is not the same as deterring a non-state actor from acts of terrorism. Thus, each situation requires a strategy tailored to the particular threat.

Appropriate characterization of the type of coercion is no guarantee of successful deterrence due to reliance on the opponent for the ultimate outcome. Richard Betts writes, "Deterrence depends not on the intentions of the deterrer, but on the beliefs of the deterree."⁶ Colin Gray asserts, "The most intractable problem is that there must always be an enemy who is free to decide, possibly unreasonably and unwisely, that he is not deterred."⁷ While successful deterrence is the goal, any deterrent strategy must include the significant possibility that deterrence will fail, requiring a defense.

One of the most important elements of successful deterrence is to eliminate the expectation of a quick military victory. Edward Rhodes argues that the deterrence focus should be "on convincing a potential aggressor that it cannot achieve a quick *fait accompli* and cannot be sure a war can be wrapped up quickly."⁸ Designing such deterrence requires countering the adversary's strategy and doctrine.⁹ If the aggressor values ground forces or is concerned about tactical air power, then these elements must be a robust part of a deterrent strategy.

It is possible to estimate the likelihood of deterrence success based upon the context of the situation. Edward Rhodes differentiates

between aggressors who forecast future losses if they fail to act and those who are seeking opportunistic gains. He argues that those who believe they face losses are much harder to deter than those who seek gains.¹⁰ If an adversary anticipates future losses, calculated threats to prevent those losses may lead to successful immediate deterrence. The case of opportunistic gains fits with general deterrence; the conditions that constitute the opportunistic gains often result from an overall weakness in political or military strength on the side of the victim state.

Prospect Theory, as explained by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, provides a framework for understanding decision-making under conditions of risk that include potential gains and losses. A detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the overall findings demonstrate that risks of losses are typically more appealing to decision-makers than a guaranteed smaller loss. Conversely, guaranteed gains are more appealing than a chance at achieving a greater gain.¹¹ Chapter 4 applies Prospect Theory into recommendations to improve the US deterrent posture.

Foundations of Deterrence

To develop deterrence the state should first assess if there is an asymmetry of interest or motivation. Peter Jakobsen notes that, “the willingness of states to threaten and, if need be, use force increases as the importance of the interest perceived to be at stake goes up.”¹² George and Simon highlight the importance of interest and motivation to coercion and argue that demonstrating a greater interest is an essential element of coercive diplomacy.¹³ Indeed, any form of strategic coercion requires demonstrated interest.

Effective deterrence relies on credible threats. Paul Huth broadly describes deterrent credibility as deriving from the military capabilities and necessary political will.¹⁴ Peter Jakobsen focuses on the military and writes, “For credibility to be high the coercer must be able to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost.”¹⁵ Unfortunately, many times budgetary and political constraints preclude creating a military that presents a clear ability to defeat an aggressor. Deterrence typically requires an analysis of the potential aggressor’s military capabilities and a tailored approach to counter these capabilities.

Actions to build a credible deterrent may risk pre-emption by the potential aggressor. Deterrence requires threats that are both credible and stable. If a deterrent action provokes pre-emption or preventive measures that lead to further escalation, the situation lacks stability.¹⁶ Maintaining stability is complex, but in a case of general deterrence, avoiding political rhetoric and threats while building military capabilities supports stability.

Denial and Punishment Strategies

Deterrent strategies require a mechanism to generate their effect. This mechanism convinces the potential aggressor not to undertake a specific action. The two most common mechanisms are denial and punishment.

Denial uses military forces to prevent the adversary from accomplishing its goals. A denial strategy decreases the potential for gains by making it less likely that a potential aggressor will achieve its objectives.¹⁷ If an adversary uses threats of force while seeking opportunistic gains, a strategy of denial that prevents a quick military victory is especially important.¹⁸ The strategy of denial requires a force posture that can directly counter adversary actions. Thus, a denial strategy is often costly because it requires forward based standing forces to provide a continual deterrent.

Punishment focuses not on preventing the potential aggressor from achieving his objectives but on inflicting pain and suffering so that the aggressor determines that an action would be too costly. Punishment strategies try to “increase direct costs by threatening to inflict pain on an adversary’s population or economy.”¹⁹ Instead of denying the military its objectives, punishment imposes costs that may be tangential or lateral to the aggressor’s actual action. These tangential costs may be greater than the value of the actual objective, or they may be smaller. Punishment forces also do not require nearby basing or even immediate utilization.

Punishment confronts several hurdles to effective implementation. First, the political will required for a strategy of punishment is different from that required for a strategy of denial. In the context of the 1980s, where superpower nuclear war was more conceivable, punishment was still popular. In today’s context, however, especially where the popular and international support of a democratic state is concerned, a punishment strategy is particularly perilous. Will a

democratic nation impose suffering on a general populace? Would such suffering change the behavior of an autocratic regime? The answer to both these questions is likely negative. Second, a strategy of punishment does not directly prevent a rapid military victory. If deterrence fails, the punishment strategy is not useful for an actual military defense. Third, a punishment strategy relies on an extended calculation of adversary costs and benefits. A calculation for denial must only look at the respective forces for that particular situation, whereas punishment must incorporate a broad assessment of economic, social, and political conditions.

A strategy of denial is sensible because it directly affects the potential aggressor's ability to achieve a quick military victory. Forces designed to counter the aggressor's military strategy and capability signal a credible means to prevent the adversary from achieving his objectives. Robert Pape convincingly argues the efficacy of denial in cases of conventional coercion.²⁰ For those who believe in punishment, Lawrence Freedman writes, "a strategy of denial is potentially more reliable than a strategy of punishment because its quality can be measured in more physical terms."²¹ Methods of physical measurement include balance of forces and quality of weapons. Applied to a deterrent situation, these measures provide tangible evidence of commitment and credibility, a power that a threat to punish lacks.

Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence

The advent of nuclear weapons and the Cold War led to a significant focus on nuclear deterrence. Theorists grappled with the ramifications of nuclear weapons, especially ICBMs, and integration of these weapons into politics. Nuclear deterrence theory included the targeting strategies of countervalue and counterforce. The countervalue strategy aligns with punishment and holds cities and economic targets at risk. The counterforce strategy placed greater emphasis on military targets, although the collateral damage of thermonuclear war was widely acknowledged.

Nuclear deterrence was a critical element during much of the Cold War, but over time, its importance waned. In the late 1980s, Mearsheimer wrote, "with the emergence of strategic parity and the Allies' manifest lack of enthusiasm for tactical nuclear weapons, the importance of the conventional element in the overall deterrence equation has increased significantly within the past decade."²² Nuclear

deterrence is especially important between nuclear powers, but its efficacy became questionable as the taboo against nuclear employment grew.

The taboo against nuclear use requires that a robust conventional force is ready to defend the state, even in conflict between nuclear powers. In 1983, Michael Howard qualified this taboo, contrasting nuclear war with conventional war. “But terrible as conventional war would be in Europe, nuclear war would be unimaginably, unendurably worse. Modern societies recover from conventional war within a generation. Whether humanity would ever recover from nuclear war is a matter for legitimate doubt.”²³ While not all might share this taboo, in the 1980s it was robust enough to require greater emphasis on conventional forces. Today, more than 70 years since the use of atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, conventional deterrence is even more important and is foundational to deterrent policy.

Measuring Deterrence

Classic means of “measuring” deterrence include assessing the balance of forces and weapons technology. The balance of forces method compares the number of various units between states. The method adjusts for the peculiarities of each state’s military force, where one army division might include more tanks or fighting men. The weapons technology method focuses on the quality of weapons systems that each side fields. The side that fields systems with a comparative advantage in this framework gains more credit.

John Mearsheimer was the first to focus on the importance of military doctrine in conventional deterrence with his 1983 work, *Conventional Deterrence*. Dissatisfied with the traditional balance of forces and weapons quality approaches, he has a ground-centric focus and describes three different doctrines. “With the attrition strategy, the attacker seeks to defeat his opponent by engaging in numerous battles of annihilation, or set-piece battles. Ultimate success depends on wearing the defense down until resistance is no longer possible. The blitzkrieg, on the other hand, relies on the mobility and speed inherent in an armored force to defeat an opponent decisively without a series of bloody battles.”²⁴ Huth broadens the blitzkrieg into a “rapid offensive attack” doctrine, which includes more than just armor and is more suitable to modern combined arms warfare.²⁵ A limited aims doctrine seeks to capture a portion of territory, rather than defeat

the enemy army.²⁶ While this distinction is imprecise, especially in the context of a NATO country under attack, the broad delineation between territorial acquisition and defeating a military force is an important distinction. Against a NATO country all that is required is territorial acquisition, not destruction of all NATO forces. The limited aims and rapid offensive attack doctrines are more difficult to deter, because the potential for a quick victory makes them more attractive to the potential aggressor.

Stephen Biddle further developed the importance of doctrine in his 2004 work, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, arguing the importance of a “modern system” of force employment. This modern system includes the ability to reduce exposure to enemy fire while enabling maneuver.²⁷ Biddle argues that a modern system military typically defeats a non-modern system military, and that the latest weapons technology merely exaggerates the primary effects of the modern system. The balance of forces only matters in a case of a belligerent at war with an opponent who is similarly modern or non-modern.²⁸ Offensively, the modern system allows local massing of force to create a breakthrough for exploiting. Defensively, to counter a modern system requires depth and reserves to execute a counterattack.²⁹ Overall, Biddle’s arguments underscore the need for modern doctrine and high readiness above large forces and the latest technology.

It is important to note that for such a doctrine to have an impact there must be a minimum threshold in the balance of forces. Mearsheimer writes, “Generally when one side has an overwhelming advantage in forces, deterrence is very likely to fail—regardless of the chosen strategy.”³⁰ Additionally, with or without a modern system as defined by Biddle, a significant lack of forces does not create deterrence. Thus, deterrence requires an initial ante to play the game. In the context of a potential aggressor at a border, this ante is a standing peacetime force posture that includes significant forward presence.

Each of the three measures has utility. For deterrence, the measure used by a potential aggressor is the most important because his calculation is the one that matters. If an aggressor places particular emphasis on a specific method, a deterrence strategy should address this method.

Force Posture Strategies

As a country bordered by two large oceans, the United States has distinctive security advantages. These advantages enable unique global ambitions, such as the maintenance of a liberal order and promotion of democracy. The distinct geographic situation has led to two broad strategies of force posture—power projection, and power protection—which are combined to achieve national military objectives.

Power Projection

A power projection strategy relies on rapid deployment of home-based military forces during crises. Power projection ranges from a demonstration of strength by a carrier task force to a forward deployment of an infantry company. A significant benefit of power projection is that it allows husbanding of resources at home or at major operating bases. This reduces operational and logistical costs. Power projection gives a unit based in the United States the flexibility to deploy to any hot spot on the globe. The strategy requires significant mobility capabilities, however, to deploy forces when needed.

Power projection is particularly relevant to the historical maintenance of military force in the United States. The United States has generated forces to raise armies as contingencies developed. The standing armies of the United States have paled in comparison to those utilized by European powers. The expansion of standing military forces in peacetime has coincided with the expansion of US global interests and the emergence of the USSR as a peer competitor after World War II.³¹ In response to crises, the United States has long traditions of both power projection and force generation.

Power projection is the strategy behind an expeditionary force posture. In the 2007 report, *A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era*, Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Work define an expeditionary posture as one that utilizes US territory for the primary basing of military forces. For Krepinevich and Work, force posture includes employment of forward-based forces; forward-deployed forces; global attack forces; strategic mobility and logistics infrastructure; forcible entry and rapid base construction forces; a global command, control, and communications and intelligence (C3I) network; and supporting security relationships and legal arrangements.³² The

expeditionary posture relies upon logistics and forward deployments to project power.

Power projection relies on demonstrated combat and logistics capabilities for deterrence. A proven record of quick deployments and expeditionary operations is critical to the effectiveness of power projection for deterrence. Power projection may not be particularly effective in all situations, however. While projection of air and naval power is relatively rapid, the deployment of an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) is a time-consuming process. Power projection is especially suited to air power, naval power, and special operations forces.

To augment the power projection strategy, states may use prepositioned stocks to reduce the time from deployment order to combat readiness, especially for units that utilize heavy equipment. Prepositioning uses warehouses at forward locations or large ships that add an element of mobility. This method ameliorates some of the limitations of power projection, but the prepositioning of massive war materiel is still financially expensive and has diplomatic costs as well. Prepositioned stocks allow flexibility for small crises, but cannot substitute for a massive movement that would be necessary in the case of major contingency operations.

Power projection is of greater utility for coercive diplomacy and for immediate deterrence. A state that utilizes coercive diplomacy can project power at a time and place of its choosing in order to achieve its objectives. In the case of immediate deterrence once a potential aggressor triggers a crisis through threats, the rapid deployment of forces provides a credible threat.

Power projection is not as useful for general deterrence. The deployment of expeditionary forces takes time, especially the deployment of heavy ground maneuver forces. Due to the time required to project power, an adversary may achieve a rapid military victory or a *fait accompli* before the deployment of sufficient forces to stop such an action. While certain global strike assets may be responsive, they do not demonstrate commitment and cannot occupy territory. Reluctance to commit ground troops shows that the US will only use high-tech, low-risk instruments unless vital interests are at stake.³³ Especially in contingencies where armored ground formations will play a central part, deterrence from a force posture based on power projection lacks credibility.

Power Protection

A strategy of power protection relies on military forces that are permanently forward or rotationally forward, or a combination of the two. Permanently based forces are especially important to power protection. Instead of the crisis response of power projection, power protection provides force for an indefinite period and demonstrates enduring commitment to a specific region. Overseas basing is costly financially and politically and requires cooperation from host nations that may stipulate their own constraints concerning the use of these forces. The durable nature of these forces, however, provides significant deterrent advantages.

A force posture strategy of power protection reduces the probability of success of a rapid offensive attack. Huth writes, “In a confrontation where the attacker is considering a rapid offensive attack, the outcome of large-scale battlefield engagements is critical. Deterrence success depends in part on the strength of the standing armed forces that each side can mobilize and deploy on the battlefield in the initial weeks and months of combat.”³⁴ A combination of tactical aircraft, attack aviation, ground-based air defense, armor, and infantry provides a comprehensive deterrent force. The forward forces of a power protection strategy facilitate deterrence because of greater immediately available battlefield strength.

Permanently based forces have several important advantages. These forces develop relationships with coalition partners that expeditionary forces cannot. By training with host nation forces, they improve interoperability and learn the terrain. Since these forces are already near fighting positions, they can mitigate some anti-access threats. Permanent forces require accommodation from the host nation, but also assure the host nation of the allied commitment. Additionally, compared to rotational and expeditionary forces, permanently stationed forces produce the benefit of presence without the strain of deployment away from family that detracts from retention.

Power protection is more useful for general and immediate deterrence. The provision of permanently based forces may suffice to prevent specific threats from a potential aggressor in the first place. In response to specific threats, a case of immediate deterrence, permanent forces demonstrate an enduring commitment. Overseas forces may be more expensive due to moving and support costs, but

host nation subsidies may offset some of these costs. Permanent forward forces are available for expeditionary operations elsewhere, but such use obviously detracts from their deterrent role at their home location. Table 1 summarizes the differences between power projection and power protection.

	Power Projection	Power Protection
Types of forces	-Expeditionary	-Permanent
Special Requirements	-Strategic warning -Logistics	-Host nation accommodation
Optimal coercive domain	-Coercive diplomacy -Immediate deterrence	-General deterrence -Immediate deterrence
Advantages	-Flexible -Less Expensive	-Improved access and readiness -Stronger relationships/ assurance
Disadvantages	-Hard to move heavy forces -Requires access	-More expensive

Table 1: Force Posture Strategies. (Source: Author's original work)

Power protection is the strategy behind a permanent garrison force posture. Work and Krepinevich define a garrison posture as one that bases significant numbers of troops on foreign soil, primarily with main operating bases. Work and Krepinevich highlight the employment of a garrison posture during the Cold War and describe its use as a historical anomaly.³⁵ The Cold War required the use of power protection to deter a great power; in today's security environment, perhaps the strategic value of power protection is not so anomalous.

General deterrence is hard because it requires commitment of forces despite a lack of specific threats. Denial of military victory is an important part of deterrence, and forward presence aids denial when strategic warning is scarce. Forces with appropriate doctrine, training, technology, and numbers aid deterrence. How to achieve the right battlefield numbers, through a strategy of power projection or power protection, is the focus of the following chapters.

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Chapter 2

Cold War Deterrence and Power Strategies

To take account of the probability of a period of political tension preceding a possible aggression or to take advantage of forewarning provided by any other indications, NATO requires a capability for rapid augmentation of its forward posture.

NATO MC 14/3

During the first days of any NATO contingency, airlift will be the primary method available for rapid reinforcement to fill the M-day shortfall.

Gen Larry Welch, former CSAF

This chapter traces the evolution of Cold War deterrence, ranging from an initial force buildup in Europe followed by reliance on nuclear weapons and power projection. The initial buildup in 1950 was part of a power protection strategy that relied on conventional military forces stationed in Europe. After this buildup, the strategy shifted in 1952 from conventional deterrence through permanent forward presence to nuclear deterrence. The 1960s saw another shift back to a utilization of both conventional and nuclear deterrence. The same decade saw the rise of power projection strategies to use expeditionary forces in addition to those based in Europe. By the end of the Cold War, NATO's deterrence posture utilized conventional and nuclear elements. The conventional element included a balanced approach between power projection and power protection strategies. Forward basing in Europe was an important part of the strategy, while many other forces were ready to deploy in case of crisis.

From Massive Buildup to Massive Retaliation

The end of World War II led to the reconstruction of Europe and a massive drawdown of US forces. The Marshall Plan was part of a strategy to strengthen Europe and keep it in the fledgling liberal international order. Security concerns including the 1948 Berlin Crisis,

due to an increasingly belligerent USSR, led to the formation of NATO in 1949 to protect Western Europe from the communist threat. At its inception, however, NATO lacked the necessary forces to provide the appropriate defense and deterrence. US security concerns crystallized with North Korea's invasion of South Korea in June 1950, as communism appeared to be gaining globally. The Korean War generated increased resolve to maintain large standing forces in Europe.

In April 1950, even before the invasion of South Korea, National Security Council (NSC) Report 68 clarified the strategic situation, highlighting the inadequacy of the current force structure. "The United States and other free countries do not now have the forces in being and readily available to defeat local Soviet moves with local action, but must accept reverses or make these local moves the occasion for war—for which we are not prepared."¹ At the time, Soviet Army forces numbered just under 3 million men, while the entire DOD included only 1.5 million personnel. Additionally, the US Army in Europe had only approximately 79,000 troops, many of whom were accustomed to occupation duty and were not first rate combat units.² The NSC recognized the weaknesses in the United States and NATO's deterrence posture and tried to address them.

NSC-68 sought to improve the strategic situation in Europe through a significant increase in military forces. The Soviets had not made a specific threat against a particular NATO country. Rather, NSC-68 provided a general deterrent to potential Soviet aggression. The policy called for a buildup of military strength to defend the free world and protect US interests.³ This buildup resulted from a strategy of power protection, and led to an increased Army troop strength of 257,000 by mid-1952.⁴ The European economic recovery was slow, and NATO relied heavily on US military forces.

In 1952, the realization that basing conventional forces of sufficient numbers in Europe was politically impossible led to a change in strategy. US forces were committed in Korea, and the US military simply lacked the capacity to continue its buildup. In December 1952, NATO MC 14/1 shifted the basis of NATO's defense and deterrence from conventional forces to nuclear forces. The objective was to hold Soviet forces as far to the east in Germany as possible, and MC 14/1 recognized that the available conventional forces could not do this. "The most efficient offensive means likely to be available at the outbreak of the war for the achievement of this concept is the employment

of airpower, both Tactical and Strategic.”⁵ This shift in emphasis signaled a halt in the buildup of forces in Europe and foreshadowed further reliance on nuclear weapons for both general and immediate deterrence.

In 1953, President Eisenhower took office and continued the policy shift towards increased reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence. The buildup of DOD forces crested at 3.3 million personnel.⁶ NSC 162/2 countered the Soviet threat through “a strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power.” The “New Look” included a “massive atomic capability” and was a policy shift due to security concerns and the economic costs of maintaining significant conventional forces.⁷ This policy relied on airpower to provide nuclear deterrence and arrested the buildup of conventional forces.

Tensions in Europe increased in the 1950s, as did NATO reliance on nuclear weapons. A hoped for thaw in relations following Stalin’s death never materialized. In 1955, the Soviet Union created the Warsaw Pact, joining Eastern European nations in formal alliance to the USSR. In 1956, the Soviet military intervened in Hungary to stop a revolution and keep the Hungarian government aligned with the USSR. In 1957, NATO adopted a strategy of massive retaliation with the strategic guidance set forth in MC 14/2. This document superseded MC 14/1, and the evolution in NATO strategy followed changes in US policy set forth in NSC 162/2. MC 14/2 described the defensive concept of NATO as one that would provide peace and security to the NATO members: “Our chief objective is to prevent war by creating an effective deterrent to aggression. The principal elements of the deterrent are adequate nuclear and other ready forces and the manifest determination to retaliate against any aggressor with all the forces at our disposal, including nuclear weapons, which the defense of NATO would require.” Of the tasks outlined in the strategy, the first was the “ability to carry out an instant and devastating nuclear counter-offensive by all available means.”⁸ Conventional forces could counter some aspects of Soviet aggression, but massive retaliation became the cornerstone of deterrence.

Power Projection and Conventional Deterrence

In 1961, the third Berlin crisis resulted in the construction of the Berlin Wall and deployments of US forces to Europe. The partitioning of the city by barbed wire, brick, and concrete led to the US mobilization of 148,000 national guardsmen and reservists to counter Soviet coercion and provide an immediate deterrent. These forces reinforced the military personnel already stationed in Europe.⁹ Although this projection of power did not prevent the construction of the Berlin Wall, it maintained the viability of West Berlin when many doubted West Berlin's endurance as part of the West.

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara favored power projection as an efficient way to meet US security needs. The rapid movement of stateside forces meant they would be available for any worldwide contingency. In October 1963, the 2nd Armored Division and four Air Force squadrons deployed to Germany in a trial of power projection capabilities. The 2nd Armored Division utilized prepositioned stocks of equipment left after the Berlin crisis in 1961. McNamara wanted to demonstrate a rapid deployment of forces to NATO as an economical means of defense that did not require stationing as many troops overseas.¹⁰ This form of power projection would enable a smaller force to provide a general deterrent, with rapid reinforcements providing an immediate deterrent if required. The operation was a technical success, but political factors prevented major reductions in forces in Europe at the time.

By the late 1960s, significant changes in security policy led to a move away from reliance on nuclear weapons. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson shifted policy away from massive retaliation. NATO manifested this shift with the adoption of MC 14/3, and the strategy of "flexible response." MC 14/3 retained nuclear forces but also highlighted that "the ground, sea and air forces of the Alliance should be capable of rapid, flexible and effective reaction against the various forms of limited aggression."¹¹ This strategic guidance was a significant change and increased the importance of conventional deterrence.

MC 14/3 described the force concept as forward defense. Forward defense relied on front-line forces with high readiness and anticipated little strategic warning. The overall aim was to protect the territorial integrity of NATO to the maximum extent possible.¹² It was essentially a concept for perimeter defense since the loss of significant territory or a NATO member state was politically untenable.

The increased reliance on rapid reinforcement was another significant innovation of MC 14/3. In describing the forward defense concept, MC 14/3 highlights “the timely deployment of any active forces not located near their emergency defense positions” and “supplementing local forces-in-being on the flanks through an improved NATO capability for rapid reinforcement.”¹³ Rapid reinforcement is a critical element of power projection, and mobility enabled forces to respond quickly in times of crisis.

The inclusion of rapid reinforcement in MC 14/3 balanced NATO’s strategy between power projection and power protection for immediate and general deterrence. Concurrent with the change in strategy, in 1967 the United States announced that 28,000 servicemen would be withdrawn from Europe over the next year. The Vietnam War stretched the military thin and power projection would have to provide forces on demand. To demonstrate resolve despite the force cuts, 1969 saw the first REFORGER (return of forces to Germany) exercise. This exercise sent three brigades back to Europe for training and utilized prepositioned equipment.¹⁴ REFORGER continued annually until 1993 and became a part of the power projection strategy that relied on expeditionary deployments and rapid reinforcement to demonstrate resolve and credibility.

Rapid reinforcement affected the balance between power projection and power protection during the remainder of the Cold War. The permanently based forces provided general deterrence while the evolving capabilities for power projection enabled the United States and NATO to deploy forces to provide immediate deterrence. The shift to rapid reinforcement thus increased the role for power projection in deterrence.

Airpower: The Key to Power Projection

The Yom Kippur War of 1973 was an opportunity for the USAF to fine-tune its rapid reinforcement capabilities. The unexpected initial battlefield success of the Arab armies meant that Israel lacked sufficient war materiel, ranging from artillery ammunition to spare parts for tanks and planes. Operation Nickel Grass moved 22,000 tons from the United States to Israel over 30 days. It was a sustained airlift of unprecedented range with C-5s and C-141s travelling to Israel from the United States via Lajes Air Base in the Azores. The Soviets

conducted their own airlift to Middle Eastern allies, delivering 5,000 tons between 10 and 16 October alone, but with a much shorter supply route.¹⁵ The US airlift highlighted the professionalization of power projection capabilities, kept Israel supplied at a critical time, and enabled Israel's eventual victory.

In the 1970s, détente and changes in the military balance led to an increased deterrent emphasis on conventional forces. "A CIA memorandum on Soviet defense policy from 1962 through 1972 concluded that 'the Soviet view of war in Europe had undergone a significant change,' and now reflected a belief 'that the initial period of a war with NATO could be fought without the use of nuclear weapons.' As then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had earlier proclaimed in his Fiscal Year 1978 Posture Statement to Congress, 'the primary burden of deterrence now falls increasingly on conventional forces, although their effectiveness is enhanced by the nuclear capabilities that underlie them.'"¹⁶ The increased emphasis on conventional deterrence required appropriate resourcing of those forces. Forward basing all of the required forces was too expensive, so power projection would quickly reinforce the front.

Heightened tensions in the 1980s continued the increased emphasis on conventional forces and led to a balance between power projection and power protection strategies. The 1980s saw a significant increase in opposition to nuclear weapons and nuclear war, resulting in further reliance on conventional forces.¹⁷ Krepinevich and Work characterize the Cold War as using a garrison posture, analogous to a strategy of power protection.¹⁸ This characterization is incorrect and does not reflect the balanced approach employed by the end of the Cold War. In 1987, General Larry Welch, the USAF Chief of Staff, wrote "in a crisis, NATO is highly dependent on the rapid reinforcement of its forces deployed in Europe."¹⁹ NATO's use of a forward defense prevented ground forces from trading space for time. Airpower served an important role augmenting the firepower of ground forces and rapidly reinforcing front line troops. The US Army utilized prepositioned stocks and planned for the deployment of three divisions during the first week of a conflict. The USAF had 700 tactical aircraft in theater and planned to move an additional 1,600 aircraft to Europe in just ten days.²⁰ Airpower was a key element of power projection, providing the firepower and mobility necessary to win the Cold War should it turn hot.

The power projection of the 1980s relied on qualitative advantages in allied airpower. “Loss of allied airpower was viewed as a recipe for disaster.”²¹ NATO believed that its mix of aircraft and ground-based air defense systems would allow it to gain control of the air. Air superiority enabled mobility aircraft to deliver reinforcements close to the front, and enabled close air support and interdiction operations that would offset the lack of NATO combat ground forces. It was much easier to move 30 fighter wings than it was to move ten armored divisions. Airpower was a foundational element of NATO’s Cold War power projection strategy.

In summary, the Cold War led to significant shifts in military employment; a massive buildup gave way to massive retaliation with nuclear weapons. The desire for flexible response options led to an increased reliance on conventional forces but budgetary constraints precluded further buildup. Instead, allied airpower became a crucial enabler of power projection, quickly providing mobility and fires in response to crises.

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Chapter 3

Post-Cold War Deterrence and Power Projection

The ability to project power at long ranges helps to deter threats to the United States and, when necessary, to disrupt, deny, or destroy hostile entities at a distance.

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review

The unraveling of the Soviet Union led to significant changes in the international security environment and increased US reliance on power projection. In August 1990, soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Saddam Hussein presented a significant security concern with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The invasion was a deterrence failure due to ineffective diplomacy and a lack of forward military forces, but it provided a watershed moment for the coercive use of power projection. Airpower enabled the coalition buildup during Operation Desert Shield, a buildup that tested and developed the US ability to project power.

After the Gulf War, the US military transformed to a force designed for rapid response and power projection with few permanently forward based forces. Many expected a peace dividend following the Cold War; instead, the lack of competition led to military employment for a variety of interests. Expeditionary forces responding to crises characterized the 1990s. The 11 September 2001 attacks and the resulting war on terror continued the trend towards power projection as US forces responded to threats across the globe. Today, the United States continues its efforts to eradicate terrorism but also contends with great power politics. This security environment shift has not caused a commensurate strategy shift. Power projection, which reached ascendancy in the post-Cold War era, remains the strategy of choice for deterrence.

Iraq: Deterrence Failure and Power Projection

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. With little strategic warning, Iraq achieved a rapid military victory. “Although there had been indications toward the end of July of suspicious Iraqi troop movements, the August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait came as a surprise to almost everyone. The invasion was swift as the Kuwaiti military was able to offer only token resistance.”¹ Strategic warning is a critical element of deterrence through power projection, as it allows for deploying forces in time to present a credible deterrent. The United States failed to deter Iraq, a failure that is notable due to the lack of strategic warning and ineffective diplomacy.

US diplomacy failed to deliver a clear deterrent message to Saddam Hussein. April Glaspie, the US ambassador to Iraq, told Hussein that “[W]e have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.” Mearsheimer and Walt argued that through this messaging, the United States effectively gave tacit consent for the invasion of Kuwait.² Additionally, military forces were not available in theater to deter Saddam’s threat. Kuwaiti and Saudi military forces in the region were clearly inferior and presented no serious obstacle to Iraqi forces. In the immediate aftermath of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, there were concerns that Iraqi ground forces could easily invade Saudi Arabia.³ Deterrence failed due to improper diplomatic communications and a lack of military forward presence. This deterrence failure led to the projection of power to force Iraqi withdrawal.

Operation Desert Storm ejected the Iraqis and generated important lessons about power projection. It took nearly six months to move over half a million men and their equipment into theater.⁴ The war highlighted the US Army’s inability to deploy heavy equipment to distant lands in a quick manner, and the US Army’s postwar lessons learned effort focused on executing faster deployments with lighter equipment.⁵ While it is possible to move small forces rapidly, without the use of prepositioned stocks, heavy forces require significant time to deploy in large quantities. Without significant strategic warning, power projection capabilities cannot move heavy ground forces into theater and provide little deterrence.

Other countries learned lessons from the Gulf War about countering power projection through anti-access capabilities. The Gulf War power projection strategy relied on permissive staging areas to move

forces into theater. “Chinese analysts criticize Iraq for: Not making surprise attacks on US airbases and the US rear; permitting the US time to build up its logistics and conduct special training for several months before the war; not employing ‘special measures,’ such as harassing attacks.”⁶ The United States demonstrated its conventional warfare prowess, but potential adversaries also drew lessons about modern combat and preventing access to US forces.

The Gulf War led to increased Soviet emphasis on technology and airpower. Soviet military experts such as General-Major Slipchenko saw the war as a prototype of a technical operation, a future war employing technology with long range and precision.⁷ Major Soviet lessons included the importance of Electronic Warfare and advanced systems to gain air superiority. The Soviets saw a need to improve and automate their air defense systems and re-equip their forces with high-technology weapons. They believed that precision guided munitions facilitated surprise and technology would enable blitzkrieg maneuver warfare.⁸ Finally, the Soviets saw surprise as decisive and believed that technology would make future wars short. Chapter 4 applies these Soviet lessons to the current context through a series of recommendations. In Iraq, a lack of surprise three years later led to deterrence of further aggression against Kuwait.

A deployment of Iraqi Revolutionary Guards to the Kuwaiti border in 1994 allowed the United States to apply its Gulf War lessons about power projection, using rapid reinforcement to deter Iraq. Two Iraqi Republican Guard divisions deployed to augment the considerable forces already in southern Iraq. To deter another invasion of Kuwait, the United States deployed an aircraft carrier, air force fighter aircraft, and marines and soldiers to meet up with prepositioned equipment in theater. This US deployment led to the withdrawal of the Republican Guard divisions, and represented a remarkable projection of power in a timely manner.⁹ This successful deterrence via power projection was due to adequate strategic warning and assured access through permissive staging areas. After the Gulf War, Iraq was under intense scrutiny. Intelligence assets already focused on Iraq quickly noticed the mobilization of the Iraqi Republican Guard divisions, providing the necessary strategic warning. Previous policy decisions and diplomacy had already established secure staging areas, enabling a political and military response that was rapid and clear. To deter an aggressor, a strategy of power projection requires sufficient strategic

warning to deploy forces, access to secure staging areas, and resolute policy decisions.

Projecting Power without Competition

The end of the Cold War enabled the United States to reduce the role of power protection and increase the role of power projection. Power protection was useful in the era of competition that existed between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Permanently based, forward forces were required to deter Soviet aggression. The fall of the Soviet Union led to a drastically changed security landscape that did not require significant forces stationed permanently in Europe. Instead, with the Cold War over, the United States and NATO could project power to extinguish crises throughout the world.

The United States and NATO used power projection throughout the 1990s to coerce various actors. Deterrence, which had been a staple of defense strategy throughout the Cold War, gave way to coercive diplomacy. Instead of the expected peace dividend, the United States expanded its role in world affairs as the only superpower. In the 1990s, politicians had to decide how to coerce once crises erupted. This new framework led to efforts in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. The outcomes of each conflict vary, but all relied on expeditionary forces employed within a strategy of power projection.

The new international security landscape led the USAF to a new force deployment construct. Since the Korean War, the USAF was dissatisfied with its ability to deploy quickly to theater.¹⁰ The USAF made improvements throughout the Cold War, but the post-Gulf War closure of over two-thirds of overseas bases forced a more efficient use of resources. To make up for the lack of permanently stationed overseas units the USAF developed the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF), which normalized deployments of US based forces through three month unit rotations providing continual force presence. This method offered a composite force while providing personnel stability through routinely scheduled deployments.¹¹ The EAF concept received its first test in Kosovo, and evolved to become the mechanism by which the USAF presents forces to the theater commander during normal conditions.

Operation Allied Force (OAF) in 1999 highlighted both the effectiveness and shortcomings of power projection. NATO's war to

coerce the Serbs to stop brutality against Kosovar Albanians benefitted greatly from the power projection capabilities of airpower. NATO quickly established air superiority, and although it took 78 days to coerce the Serbs, the effort achieved NATO's objectives without requiring a large ground force.¹² For the USAF, Kosovo tested the EAF model, and helped define when the planned overseas rotations were no longer sufficient.¹³ In such cases, the USAF would have to pull additional US based forces to provide forward presence. The political will to utilize ground forces in Kosovo was lacking, and insertion of ground forces into the challenging terrain of Kosovo would have been difficult. The reception and staging facilities were inadequate, and onward movement of armored forces would have been nearly impossible due to road and terrain conditions. The US Army realized that effective ground power projection required a lighter force.¹⁴ The Serbs lacked anti-access capabilities, but access to Kosovo was difficult enough simply due to terrain. The US military took this lesson to heart with a renewed focus on light, quickly deployable forces to project power.

Released just after the September 11 attacks, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) highlighted the transformation to an almost singular reliance on power projection. The report outlined four goals for the development of US forces and capabilities. The third goal was "Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary's military capability and supporting infrastructure."¹⁵ The 2001 QDR also noted the objective of transformation efforts in order to redistribute forces for a smaller forward footprint, facilitating a more responsive army.¹⁶ The next fifteen years completed this shift to power projection, as forces formerly based permanently overseas returned to the United States and contingencies in the Middle East and Southwest Asia utilized temporary deployments, including the EAF construct, to meet overseas force requirements.

The War on Terror and the fall of Power Protection

The utility of a power protection strategy declined further after the September 11 attacks. The lack of a peer competitor and the proliferation of irregular threats required nimble expeditionary forces prepared to deploy anywhere.

Airpower enabled the transition to power projection by ensuring air superiority and providing essential mobility and fires. In many

conflicts, the United States and its allies possessed air superiority from the beginning. Within such permissive environments, the United States and its allies could freely move men and material close to the front lines. Without air superiority, forces required reception sites far from the front, and would endure long ground transit times. Improvements in precision strike continued, providing ground forces with additional firepower.¹⁷ Airpower facilitated power projection, leading to significant changes in basing and force posture.

The US military force posture changed significantly to reflect the importance of power projection in US strategy. The lack of competition has enabled a shift described by Krepinevich and Work.

Since 1989, the United States has dramatically reduced the number of combat forces based overseas (not counting the forces engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq). At the same time, the US global basing network has been both dramatically reduced and changed in character. Washington is shifting emphasis away from exterior main operating bases (MOBs) on foreign territory and toward exterior MOBs on US territory. In foreign countries, it is emphasizing less intrusive forward operating sites (FOSs) and cooperative security locations (CSLs) with smaller caretaker forces that support expeditionary forces on rotational tours.¹⁸

The lack of peer competition diminished the requirement to defend other nations, and facilitated increased consolidation of forces on US territories. America's updated way of getting to war has institutionalized the strategy of power projection.

The 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS) reflected the preeminent role power projection now has in terms of deterrence. The 2011 NMS clearly emphasized deterrence through power projection, stating, "We must also maintain a robust conventional deterrent. Deterrence and assurance requires the ability to rapidly and globally project power in all domains."¹⁹ The 2011 NMS highlighted the evolution previously described by Krepinevich and Work. Within a permissive environment, power projection became the principal strategy of the United States to achieve deterrence.

The Return of Competition

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the weak Russian economy and military forces led the Russian leadership to pursue a conservative foreign policy. The Russians dealt with domestic unrest in places like Chechnya as they adjusted to the new international security

environment. The security situation in Russia's backyard changed significantly with the integration of seven Eastern European countries into NATO in March 2004, including the Baltic states. NATO's expansion threatened Russia's power, but NATO commitments elsewhere around the globe allowed Russia to maintain influence. In 2004, Russia was still suffering from economic depression, but a subsequent economic recovery fueled by Russia's natural resources enabled a gradual reconstitution of Russian military power. Joshua Spero writes, "the US military force structure decline in Europe, and its post-9/11 focus on the Middle East and Southwest Asia enable Russia's military to reassert itself in Europe."²⁰ The first significant assertion came in Georgia in 2008.

Although political struggles in former Soviet Republics were common after the Cold War, the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia briefly caught the attention of the international community. Georgia asserted authority in the autonomous region of South Ossetia, and the Russians repulsed the Georgians. Charles King wrote, "the true significance of the latest crisis in the Caucasus is that Russia has embarked on a new era of muscular intervention, showing little faith in multilateral institutions, such as the UN Security Council or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in which it exerts considerable influence."²¹ Although the Russian intervention was alarming at the time, only regular Russian observers claimed that Russia was back.

Militarily, the conflict in Georgia led to significant reforms. Military transformations included slashing the officer corps, recapitalization of major weapons systems, battling corruption, and increasing readiness.²² While the ultimate effectiveness of these reforms is unknown, these improvements made Russia's military into a more effective force than it was before the Russo-Georgian conflict.

Russian intervention in Ukraine and Crimea revived memories of the war in Georgia, and substantiated Russia's return as a great power for everyone. Crimea was a shrewd land grab, which took advantage of Ukrainian weakness as Ukraine considered alignment with the European Union. Russia's unilateral intervention shocked many, but for others it was not surprising. Hannes Hanso, the Estonian Minister of Defense notes, "the aftermath of the war in Georgia in 2008 actually encouraged Russia. It got away with it. We took events much more seriously than other countries in Europe and in NATO. When events started to happen in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, we recognized a

pattern that Crimea and Ukraine were not one-off events.”²³ Russian intervention in Ukraine and Crimea lacked any legitimacy. Instead, Russia blatantly reasserted its self-interest; great power competition was back.

Despite the return of competition in 2014, the 2015 NMS described deterrence using a post-Cold War framework that focuses on power projection.

The U.S. military deters aggression by maintaining a credible nuclear capability that is safe, secure, and effective; conducting forward engagement and operations; and maintaining Active, National Guard, and Reserve forces prepared to deploy and conduct operations of sufficient scale and duration to accomplish their missions. Forward deployed, rotational, and globally responsive forces regularly demonstrate the capability and will to act. Should deterrence fail to prevent aggression, the US military stands ready to project power to deny an adversary's objectives and decisively defeat any actor that threatens the U.S. homeland, our national interests, or our allies and partners.²⁴

With wars ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan and global counter-terrorism efforts, the 2015 NMS did not reorient to the new competitive environment. Russia is not the only competitor, as China established itself with land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea. The conception of deterrence in the 2015 NMS remains a reflection of the post-Cold War paradigm of power projection. As Russia and China grow stronger and assert their interests, they will likely test this strategy.

The end of the Cold War facilitated a shift away from deterrence and power protection to coercive diplomacy and power projection. The United States projected power to the Middle East that led to military victory in the Gulf War. The new security environment included various interventions in the 1990s and led to overseas base closures. The September 11 attacks continued this trend. After years of economic and military decline, Russia reasserted its interests in 2008 and again in 2014. To deter the Russian threat, NATO now relies on rapid response forces; the Cold War force posture that included permanent forward presence is gone.

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Chapter 4

Power Protection for the Russian Anti-Access Environment

Increased readiness and increased forward presence of forces is a response and something which underlines that NATO is ready to defend all allies against any threat, regardless of where it comes from.

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General

It has been our goal to increase the allied presence here. It is needed for reassurance, and clearly also as a deterrent.

Hannes Hanso, Estonia Minister of Defense

The emergence of Russia as a peer competitor requires reinvigorated general deterrence. While Russia has not specifically threatened the Baltic States, its actions in Ukraine created significant tension. Russia's modern A2AD capabilities compound the deterrence problem. Russia retains an improved nuclear arsenal, and now it possesses significant anti-access and precision strike capabilities it previously lacked. This chapter describes the strategic environment, NATO's current approach to this problem, and the role of power protection and power projection in such an environment. This chapter concludes by suggesting that a balanced approach, which includes elements of power protection and power projection, will best serve NATO's deterrent efforts.

Political Concern and the Anti-Access Environment

Russia's annexation of Crimea demonstrated that it remains a major player in international relations. Russia used a rapid offensive attack and limited aims doctrine to secure a quick military victory. It followed the military victory with a referendum on Crimean annexation to provide a veneer of legitimacy. Although tensions with Ukraine were high before the annexation, there was not a specific threat that Russia would invade Crimea. This paucity of strategic warning enabled Russia's

fait accompli. The annexation represents a Ukrainian failure of general deterrence.

The current security situation in Eastern Europe is broadly similar to that of Ukraine in 2014. There is not a specific military threat against the Baltic States or Poland, but there are significant reasons for concern. Thus, NATO is working within a framework of general deterrence. The lack of specific threats should not lead to political complacency. In 2014, Putin announced a Russian responsibility to “protect” Russian speakers throughout former Soviet states, providing a pretext for aggression in Crimea and potential aggression elsewhere. The Kaliningrad Oblast, an exclave on the Baltic Sea separated from contiguous Russian territory, presents another pretext for potential Russian intervention because of potential allegations of Western interference. NATO must improve its general deterrence capability to ward off any future Russian aggression.

Russia’s impressive anti-access capabilities enable such future aggression. Russia has recently developed a layered air defense system in both Kaliningrad and Crimea. The USAFE commander, General Gorenc, expressed “very serious” concern over this buildup and notes that the A2AD systems threaten NATO access to airspace in Eastern Europe.¹ These anti-access forces threaten NATO’s ability to control the air and reinforce troops at the front lines.

The Russians possess a sophisticated array of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. Some of these, such as the SA-15 GAUNTLET include the capability to destroy precision-guided munitions.² The SA-21 GROWLER can target airborne threats at up to 400 km, and allegedly includes capabilities against stealth targets. Russia bases four SA-21 regiments in the Baltic Sea region, including Kaliningrad.³ Figure 3 shows a notional SA-21 threat laydown based on the four regiments near the Baltics, including Kaliningrad, which illustrates the significant range the SA-21 has to deny NATO access.




Figure 3: Notional SA-21 Threat Envelope. (Source: Author's Original Work)

In addition to Russia's air defense system, the Russian airpower portfolio contains a diverse array of assets. The Russian Western Military District (MD) has 27 squadrons, including nine SU-27 air superiority squadrons; two SU-34 multirole fighter squadrons; five SU-24 fighter-bomber squadrons, and four TU-22 bomber squadrons.⁴ Russia currently lacks stealth capabilities, but they remedy this problem with capable electronic attack (EA) systems, including the new SAP-518 self-protection and SAP-14 escort systems fitted to the SU-34.⁵ Future anti-access capabilities include the PAK FA stealth fighter, expected to reach an initial operational capability in 2016, and anti-satellite weapons.⁶ Russia has also recently demonstrated its precision strike capabilities in Syria, using cruise missiles from ships and precision munitions from bomber aircraft to strike a variety of targets. Many of these capabilities are the result of investments the Russians made since the 2008 war with Georgia.⁷ Russian military capabilities threaten the power projection of forces from the air, land, and sea. Further discussion of Russia's military capabilities is beyond the scope of this paper, but the anti-access capabilities would be difficult for NATO airpower to breach.

The Current Approach

Deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe requires diplomacy and declaratory strategy. Fortunately, unlike the opaque diplomacy prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, deterrent diplomacy towards Russia is clear. During a 2014 speech in Estonia, President Obama explicitly stated, "we will defend our NATO allies, and that means every Ally."⁸ Additionally, in US European Command's (EUCOM) 2015 theater strategy, deterring Russian aggression is the top theater priority.⁹ Thus, the right words are being spoken and written; however, deterrence also requires credible military forces.

NATO's current approach in Eastern Europe relies primarily on indigenous forces augmented with power projection from a NATO quick reaction force. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg highlighted that Estonia and Poland have increased their defense spending to NATO's desired 2% GDP threshold, but greater effort to bolster deterrence is required. NATO has established small headquarters in a variety of Eastern European countries, including the Baltics, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Additionally, Slovakia and Hungary are planning to establish new headquarters.¹⁰ Stoltenberg writes, "we have more than doubled the size of the NATO Response Force to more than 40,000 troops. At its core is the new high-readiness Spearhead Force, ready to deploy within days to wherever needed."¹¹ Secretary Stoltenberg described these efforts as NATO's greatest strengthening of collective defense since the Cold War. Unfortunately, these measures are largely symbolic and lack appropriate heavy forces to present a truly credible deterrent. Increases in defense spending and high-readiness forces are initial steps, but NATO's efforts must reflect the strategic context in the region.

A significant weakness of the power projection strategy based on a quick reaction force is that it relies on strategic warning for force deployment. Stoltenberg writes, "NATO must be able to monitor, assess, react and respond in real time. So we are improving our intelligence and early warning, speeding up our decision-making and enhancing our cyber defenses."¹² If strategic warning is not available, the forward defense forces must be strong enough to stall an initial attack.

NATO members have taken positive steps, such as equipment purchases and increases in defense spending. Several NATO countries are acquiring or have plans to acquire ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems.¹³ These systems are important to protect critical assets such

as air bases, ports, and headquarters, but many of the proposed BMD systems lack capabilities against air and cruise missile threats. Lithuania is establishing an additional infantry brigade and recently agreed to the purchase of 220 Javelin anti-tank missiles.¹⁴ Armored warfare would be an integral part of a Russian war plan, making anti-tank weaponry a worthwhile purchase. Latvia recently increased its defense budget by nearly 40% and Lithuania recently increased its defense budget by 30%.¹⁵ The military budgets of NATO's eastern members pale in comparison, however, to that of Russia. A true change in the security situation and deterrent credibility requires more than just budget increases and equipment purchases.

The Baltic States lack credible military forces to prevent a swift Russian military victory. Each Baltic state only fields the equivalent of a light infantry brigade. These forces lack armor, firepower, and maneuverability. In a series of tabletop wargames which take a balance of forces approach to measure deterrence, RAND analysts determined that it would take Russia 36 to 60 hours to reach the Baltic capitals of Tallinn or Riga, even with an assumption of a week of strategic warning, during which time additional forces are deployed to the region.¹⁶ Such an outcome presents Russia with an unacceptable opportunity and requires remedy through improved force structure.

The Baltics recognized their lack of troops and asked NATO for permanently based forces, but the United States has sent only small rotational contingents.¹⁷ In 1989, the US Army strength in Europe was 216,700 soldiers; currently, the force is 28,450, with no armored brigade combat teams in theater.¹⁸ In May 2015, the Baltics requested the permanent basing of a US brigade, with a battalion located in each country. This request drew swift condemnation from Moscow. The US military continues its rotations of 150 troops in each of the Baltic States and Poland since April 2014 but did not satisfy the request for a brigade in the Baltics.¹⁹ The rotational forces are symbolic and lack the firepower to defeat a concentrated attack. The Baltic States recognize the threat that Russia presents, and they recognize their current weakness.

The Defense Department is updating its European war plans and increasing its rotational presence. "The updated contingency plans focus on Russian incursion into the Baltics, a scenario seen as the most likely front for new Russian aggression."²⁰ EUCOM is improving its prepositioned stocks and various headquarters command and control capabilities.²¹ President Obama requested \$3.4 billion for

additional forces, including an armored brigade, but the budget request is not recurring.²² The extra funds will primarily add rotational ground forces in Germany, a long distance from the potential front lines in the Baltic States.²³ This funding is helpful, but Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, the US Army in Europe Commander, noted that, “we would all rather have the brigades living over here.”²⁴ Additionally, any updated plans should factor in the anti-access environment that forces would face in a Baltic defense scenario.

Power Projection in an Anti-Access Environment

In the 1980s, NATO relied heavily on airpower to provide both firepower and mobility; today, the efficacy of airpower in the A2AD environment of the Baltics is uncertain. NATO lacks the airpower advantage that it had in the 1980s. Modern Russian SAM systems are excellent, and provide a significant counter to the latest NATO fighter aircraft. Coupled with Russian fighter aircraft, the Russians would likely prevent NATO from gaining air superiority for some time.²⁵ NATO’s potential inability to control the air has significant implications for reinforcement and firepower augmentation of ground forces.

First, without air superiority, rapid reinforcement becomes difficult, if not impossible. Strategies that utilize prepositioned stocks rely on airlift to bring operators to theater. The airlift of forces to any prepositioned stocks in the Baltics may not be possible under the anti-access umbrella Russia has created. The prepositioned European Activity Set (a brigade equivalent located in Germany) would take 10 days to move to the Baltics.²⁶ Prepositioned stocks reduce the time required for heavy units to deploy, but reception, staging, and onward integration into forward forces may still not be possible without adequate time. Forces may have to stage hundreds of miles from the front. Their travel to the front would delay them significantly and make them vulnerable to enemy attack.

Second, in an anti-access environment, close air support and interdiction to augment the firepower of ground forces is very difficult. Russian SAM systems would prevent effective coordination with ground forces to strike targets, and these SAM systems protect enemy lines of communication from allied interdiction. Forward based

ground forces would have to rely on their own organic fires and other capabilities.

Third, an anti-access environment makes intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) very difficult. A2AD systems prevent the establishment of a common operating picture and identification of targets. Without ISR, NATO lacks the information to prosecute an effective campaign. Russia's A2AD capabilities significantly degrade the capabilities of the United States and NATO, complicating the projection of power to the region.

An anti-access environment challenges the DOD model of power projection. By preventing access, forces on the ground have to fight without the advantages that joint capabilities provide. A potential lack of joint capabilities requires significant ground forces that can support extended operations on their own.

Power Protection in an Anti-Access Environment

The difficulty of projecting force into an anti-access environment requires forward basing of forces. Forward based forces are less subject to attack during transit to their fighting positions in theater. The simple presence of forces is not enough; to counter Russian precision strike capabilities forward positioned forces require a variety of active and passive capabilities to provide a credible deterrent.

Active defensive measures include weapon systems designed to counter Russia's projection of power into the region. Through active measures, NATO can deploy its own anti-access environment. These measures include air and missile defense systems designed to search, identify, track, and engage a variety of systems including cruise missiles, aircraft, and ballistic missiles. Ground-based weapons systems such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and anti-tank weapons also play a role as active defense systems to thwart a mechanized advance. Active defense measures will improve NATO's defense and deterrence.

Passive defense measures are different in nature from their active counterparts and require investments in infrastructure and changes in employment concepts. Air base resiliency, through concrete aircraft shelters and rapid runway repair capabilities, make air bases difficult targets. Hardening and redundancy of command and control systems facilitate communications despite attack. Camouflage, concealment,

and deception (CCD) creates chance and uncertainty.²⁷ Dispersal of aircraft and tanks complicates targeting, as does regular movement of critical defense systems such as SAMs. Passive defense measures can yield significant benefits at a fraction of the cost of active measures, which tend to require the latest technology and expensive research and development.

Beyond just passive measures, an anti-access environment requires significant supplies for extended operations. In an era of lean logistics, this represents a significant shift. An anti-access conflict can quickly take on attributes of attritional warfare, requiring significant amounts of materiel.²⁸ With little ability to airlift critical supplies and spares, front-line units are reliant on local stockpiles of munitions, spare parts, and fuel for their operations. The lean logistics model that has enabled considerable cost savings is a liability for forward based forces in an anti-access scenario. The Russian A2AD environment requires significant forward supplies due to the difficulties of resupply.

A Balanced Approach

The United States and NATO have proven power projection capabilities in permissive environments. With adequate strategic warning, permissive staging areas, and air superiority, NATO can rapidly reinforce its forces and airpower can augment ground force fires. In permissive environments, the use of prepositioned stocks allows for power projection of heavy ground forces. After 26 years of continuous expeditionary operations, the US military is proficient at projecting power under the right conditions.

In Eastern Europe, NATO must be ready to confront little or no strategic warning, contested staging areas, and contested air superiority. The Crimean invasion demonstrated that strategic warning might not be available. Such a situation requires forces that are in place and empowered with appropriate command structures and authorities to react in a dynamic situation. Even with strategic warning, the Russian A2AD umbrella may prevent permissive staging of forces close to the front, pushing staging areas hundreds of miles away. The United States and NATO have relied on airpower as an asymmetric advantage for decades. In Eastern Europe, Russia will contest NATO air superiority. NATO cannot count on power projection to provide

an immediate deterrent in Eastern Europe. Instead, NATO must also rely on power protection through a robust forward presence to provide a general deterrent to Russian aggression.

Recent reports underscore the need for armored ground forces in Europe. The National Commission on the Future of the Army recently highlighted the risks and challenges of the current policy of rotating forces and recommended the permanent forward basing of an ABCT in Europe to deter Russia.²⁹ The Russians do not want these forces because they know that additional ground forces would complicate a Russian offensive. Additionally, in a 2016 report, RAND analysts David Shlapak and Michael Johnson recommend the additional provisioning of three armored brigade teams in the Baltics to improve NATO's deterrence. This recommendation assumes one week of strategic warning to surge additional forces and highlights the importance of airpower in supporting ground forces. The RAND report suggests that the NATO could base the three ABCTs permanently, using prepositioned stocks, or on a rotational basis, with each method carrying different political and military risks. The report authors also note that this is possible for \$2.7 billion a year, a cost they argue is small when compared to NATO GDP and the strategic effect these units would have.³⁰

Based upon the RAND war-gaming results, the forward presence should include three ABCTs. At a minimum, the Baltics require permanent stationing of two of these ABCTs, one of which could come from the US Army while another could utilize multinational NATO forces. A potential lack of strategic warning and difficulty in staffing and moving prepositioned stocks to the front lines under Russia's anti-access umbrella make prepositioned stocks a less attractive option, limiting this method to only the third armored brigade. Two permanently stationed brigades and one prepositioned brigade lack the capability to threaten offensive operations against Russia but provide deterrence for relatively little money. Permanent presence also provides greater reassurance to allies, and facilitates combined training opportunities to improve combat effectiveness.

Instead of the forward defense of the Cold War, NATO should pursue a defense-in-depth that places reserves in depth in an effort to protect the Baltic capitals. A forward defense like NATO used in West Germany will unnecessarily antagonize Russia and do less to prevent a Russian breakthrough. To minimize provocation, NATO forces should form the majority of the reserves with local forces providing

security on the borders with Russia. A defense-in-depth offers the best chance to prevent a Russian breakthrough; sending additional forces makes such depth possible.

Other immediate measures in addition to the fielding of armored forces are necessary. NATO should augment these ground forces with rotations of Patriot missile batteries, which are capable of defending against both air and missile threats, to the Baltic States. Additionally, the Gulf War led the Soviets to fear and appreciate Western airpower technology. NATO should capitalize on this through continued rotations of F-22 stealth aircraft to conduct Baltic Air Policing missions. NATO can implement these measures quickly and at relatively low cost to improve its ability to maintain air superiority.

Long-term efforts should include a broad program of active, passive, and administrative measures. Russian concern about US fifth-generation fighters means that the USAF should accelerate the basing of two F-35 squadrons in England currently planned for 2020, along with the basing of other F-35 squadrons in Europe.³¹ Additionally, NATO should strengthen its ground-based air defense systems. The purchase of BMD systems is important, but many of these systems cannot also defend against aircraft and cruise missiles. Air defense procurement should include an array of systems that can manage multiple threat types. Passive measures as described earlier should complement active measures at key locations such as air and army bases. Although these active and passive measures seem extreme, they pale in comparison to the Cold War efforts that deployed eight Allied Corps and a host of passive measures.³² NATO should ensure that adequate supplies of fuel and ammunition are available to support extended operations where resupply is difficult. Additionally, NATO should accelerate programs to develop small headquarters and include a complement of public affairs officials that can further assist with assurance and deterrence. Overall, integration of fifth generation fighters, improved ground-based air defense systems, and passive and administrative measures will improve NATO's defense and deterrence.

Finally, all of these measures will be hollow if the forces lack readiness. Western success in combat operations relies on tactics and training, not just technology. For the USAF, budget sequestration in 2013 cut the readiness of many frontline units and still impacts readiness. Many young operators stopped training for four months during critical early operational assignments, and units have struggled to

make up for this loss of experience. Any additional forces sent to Europe require ranges and money to practice combat maneuvers. It is critical to provide not just equipment and people, but also training opportunities that build a ready force.

Critics might claim that further buildup of NATO forces in Eastern Europe will be destabilizing. Although the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act pledges against large force buildups along respective borders, Eastern European nations see Russian actions in Ukraine as violations of the agreement and White House officials see room to work within the framework.³³ Rather, NATO's continued weakness is destabilizing. In October 2015, NATO conducted its largest exercise in over 10 years, with over 36,000 troops participating. This does not compare to multiple Russian snap exercises of over 100,000 troops within the last two years. These Russian exercises are truly destabilizing, due to their similarities to an actual operational campaign.³⁴ NATO should increase its forward presence in Eastern Europe to deter Russian aggression.

Immediate Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Permanently station two ABCTs in Eastern Europe -Deploy Patriot missile batteries to key locations -Regularly utilize F-22 fighters for Baltic air policing missions -Employ a defense-in-depth where possible to defend the Baltic capitals
Long-term Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Accelerate basing of US F-35s in Europe -Passive measures such as hardening, CCD, and redundant C2 -European countries field integrated air and missile defense systems -Provision supplies and ammunition to cope with limited resupply -Maintain high readiness of units in Europe

Table 2: Recommendations to Deter Russian Aggression. (Source: Author's original work)

Another critique of expanding the permanent presence in Europe is that the US Army is overextended. The Army's ABCTs are busy with the planned European rotations and existing commitments in Kuwait and South Korea, fulfilled through 9-month rotations.³⁵ The current strain on armored units requires a reexamination of priorities between Europe, Kuwait, and South Korea; with only nine active duty ABCTs full-time rotations to three theaters are unsustainable.

Permanent stationing will decrease the strain of rotations while fulfilling critical European security requirements.

Prospect theory suggests that the diplomatic and financial costs of increased permanent forces will make Western policymakers more accepting of the status quo. Prospect theory shows that in the case of guaranteed losses—in this case, financial costs and strained diplomatic ties with Russia due to the buildup of forces—decision-makers are more likely to accept risk of higher losses than accept guaranteed losses. Policymakers should confront this impediment to deterrence, and accept the financial and diplomatic costs in order to mitigate the risk of a territorial breach. Conversely, in terms of gains from the Russian perspective, the current situation that presents less risk is more appealing than a future security environment with more NATO forces that jeopardize the chances of a quick Russian military victory.

The status quo in Eastern Europe provides an inadequate deterrent based on a paradigm of power projection that is not possible. A lack of strategic warning and the Russian anti-access environment require forward based forces. If, as Admiral J.C. Wylie stated, “the ultimate determinant in war is the man at the scene with the gun,” the man has to be at the scene.³⁶ Russia’s anti-access capabilities in the Baltics can certainly slow if not prevent the projection of NATO forces responding to a crisis. The geopolitical and military situation requires a change from the strategy of power projection to a strategy that also includes power protection in a balanced approach.

Russian aggression is a real possibility. Stephen Blank and Richard Weitz state, “an integrated Europe under any provenance (European Union (EU), NATO, democracy, Bonapartism, Nazism, and everything in between) has historically been regarded as the greatest security threat to Russia. It is still seen this way by many Russians.”³⁷ Russia may be tempted to address this traditional security challenge by fragmenting NATO and potentially the EU through an invasion of the Baltics.

NATO should include power protection within its deterrence strategy to ensure such fragmenting never happens. The permanent forward basing of two ABCTs and the repositioning of a third provide a credible ground force, ready to respond even if strategic warning is lacking. Fifth generation fighters and advanced ground-based air defenses will help break Russia’s anti-access wall, and enable the flow of follow on forces. Permanently basing these forces in Europe will help deter Russian aggression, and makes them immediately available in case deterrence fails.

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Chapter 5

Conclusion

The temporary presence of rotational forces complements, but does not substitute for an enduring forward deployed presence that is tangible and real. Virtual presence means actual absence.

Gen Philip Breedlove, Commander, US EUCOM

We have to make it clear to our potential adversaries that there can be no easy military solution to their political problems, no “quick fix.” And this is best done by showing that any attack would be met by lethally efficient armed forces, backed up and where necessary assisted by a resolute and prepared population; with the distinct possibility that the conflict might escalate to nuclear war and the certainty that, even if it did not, their armed forces would suffer casualties out of all proportion to any likely gains.

Michael Howard

This thesis traces the evolution of conventional deterrence since the start of the Cold War, and gives special attention to the strategies behind deterrence. In the broad context of strategic coercion, power projection is most useful in situations of immediate deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Specific threats characterize immediate deterrence. These specific threats provide the strategic warning necessary for a strategy of power projection to move expeditionary forces into theater. Interventions that employ coercive diplomacy typically use power projection due to the lack of available forces in the theater of conflict.

The strategy of power protection is most useful for general and immediate deterrence. Permanently forward based and rotational forces deliver continual presence and deterrence. Importantly, a strategy of power protection provides deterrence even in situations where an adversary can minimize the strategic warning available. Permanent forward forces understand local conditions and terrain, and can achieve readiness at combat positions faster than expeditionary

forces. A strategy of power protection may be expensive, but it is the most effective deterrent.

Security Environment Parallels and Future Requirements

This thesis has examined the narrow case of NATO's deterrence of potential Russian territorial aggression in Eastern Europe. The recommendations are particular to NATO's specific context. One could attempt to draw parallels between deterring Russia in Eastern Europe and deterring Chinese territorial expansion, especially considering China's anti-access capabilities. A careful examination of the context is important, however. Russia has not made territorial claims or made explicit statements of aggression against Eastern European NATO nations. At this time, the Eastern European case is one of general deterrence. Conversely, China has claimed islands and territory in the South China Sea and other areas. China's island reclamation efforts and deployments of aircraft and air defense systems show that China is actively changing the facts at sea to reflect these claims. This means that the Chinese case is one of coercive diplomacy, not deterrence. While both general deterrence and coercive diplomacy fit within the framework of strategic coercion, coercive diplomacy requires a much different strategy and approach than general deterrence, with perhaps even greater force commitments. It is critical to analyze the particular context before applying coercive or deterrent strategies.

The prior recommendations draw from technologies and forces already in existence, but long-term solutions through new technologies can also help address the situation in Eastern Europe. US Army investment in air defense is especially critical, as short-range and medium-range ground-based air defenses have atrophied since the Cold War. Recapitalizing these capabilities requires fresh investment. There is potential to adapt the Navy's railgun projectile, which includes a guided round, to use on Army howitzers. Such an adaptation would provide a low cost air defense capability that would be very useful in Eastern Europe. In NATO's context, such systems could provide defense from Russian precision strikes if air-based air superiority platforms cannot do so.

Power Protection in Eastern Europe

A robust deterrent policy through diplomacy and military forces is critical for deterrent success. First, diplomacy that signals intentions and resolve is essential, and fortunately President Obama and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg have provided such diplomacy. Second, the mere possession of military forces is not enough; where military forces are located and how they get to fighting positions in theater matters too. A strategy of power protection with significant forward presence is foundational to deterrence because forward forces have access. Deterrence requires a balanced strategy incorporating both power projection and power protection. A strategy of power projection is flexible and less costly but does not assure access.

A strategy of power projection that moves expeditionary forces in response to crises relies on airpower and strategic warning. First, air mobility can move light ground forces but requires time; air mobility can also move soldiers to prepositioned stocks, but this still takes time and these stocks are not always at ideal locations. If anti-access threats can deny NATO air superiority, however, NATO cannot guarantee the air mobility that underpins power projection. Second, close air support and air interdiction can offset the lack of firepower of light ground forces, but once again, air superiority is a prerequisite for such fires. Third, strategic warning is required so that expeditionary forces have time to mobilize; without strategic warning forces cannot deploy in time. Airpower and strategic warning are critical to a strategy of power projection.

Russia's anti-access environment precludes typical NATO assumptions of effective airpower and strategic warning. The layered air defense system in Kaliningrad and nearby Russian territory will preclude NATO from quickly gaining control of the air. Additionally, through snap exercises and other measures, Russia may desensitize NATO to large troop movements and can limit the strategic warning that is vital to NATO's power projection.

NATO security in Eastern Europe requires a return to power protection through forward presence. The United States should reexamine its global priorities and ensure that Eastern Europe has sufficient forces to deter Russian aggression. To present Russia with a credible deterrent, NATO should permanently station the equivalent of two ABCTs in the Baltics and preposition an additional ABCT activity set. Ground forces should also include collocated air defense units

and passive measures to complicate Russian targeting. NATO airpower should include greater integration of fifth-generation fighters. While these improvements do not guarantee deterrence, they change Russia's calculations and make a rapid military victory much more difficult.

Is NATO worth protecting? A territorial breach would have significant repercussions for European security and peace. Hope that Russia will not invade the Baltics is not a plan. EUCOM's theater strategy underscores the situation: "Reduced US forward presence and degraded readiness across the Services are inhibiting the United States' ability to favorably shape the environment."¹ Instead of hoping that Russia behaves, NATO should strengthen its deterrent by reacquainting itself with a strategy of power protection.

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