

Issue 1356
8 March 2019

Feature Report

"*CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: Progress and Challenges in DHS's Management of Its Chemical Facility Security Program*". Published by U.S. Government Accountability Office; Feb. 27, 2019

https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-402T

Thousands of U.S. facilities handle hazardous chemicals and could be targets for terrorists—e.g., the chemicals could be stolen and used to build explosive devices.

The Department of Homeland Security identifies and assesses the security risk of these facilities. We've made a number of recommendations in the past to help DHS address challenges it faces in doing so.

We testified that DHS has made progress on our recommendations. For example, DHS began to calculate the risk of toxic chemical release rather than relying on individual facilities to do it. Additionally, DHS eliminated its backlog of facility security plan reviews.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Breaking Defense (Washington, D.C.)

Navy Stands Up Columbia Submarine Office, Key to Nuclear Triad

By Paul McLeary

March 6, 2019

PENTAGON: The Navy's top acquisition official said Wednesday he is standing up a new office to oversee the strategic aspects of the Columbia-class submarine, the service's largest acquisition program and a critical piece of the nation's nuclear triad through the 2080s.

James Geurts, assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition, told reporters at the Pentagon the new Program Executive Office-Columbia will ensure a singular focus on the program, while keeping distractions from other submarine modernization programs at bay.

The first of the 12 Columbia submarines is scheduled to begin construction in 2021 and enter service in 2031, and once completed will carry a staggering 70 percent of the country's nuclear arsenal within their hulls.

That kind of firepower makes the Columbia the key to the nation's nuclear triad, and absolutely critical to the Pentagon's overall nuclear and national security strategy for decades to come.

"As we look at how important submarines are to the National Defense Strategy," Geurts said, in addition to the ongoing modernization of Virginia-class subs and the SSN(X) program slated to kick off in the early 2030s, "my concern was with Columbia being the number one acquisition program, do we have enough leadership bandwidth available to oversee and run all those programs simultaneously?"

The new PEO office, to be run by Rear Adm. Scott Pappano, will not replace the current program manager shop overseeing the design and build of the Columbia. Instead, Pappano will be responsible for working with the UK on commonality between the Columbia and the nascent Dreadnought submarine program, while focusing on the "strategic systems portfolio, planning for tests, building facilities, all the things besides managing the day to day design and construction," of the subs, Geurts said.

Though the first hull won't begin taking shape until 2021, Geurts explained that he wanted to get ahead of the game. "I did not want to wait for crisis, I wanted to ensure we were proactively working the program."

Wrapping up the design and build on a set schedule with strict budget lines means the Columbia-class has "a lot of challenges ahead," he added, but with a full PEO shop managing them, any bumps or hiccups should be easier to manage according to his thinking.

One incident that reverberated throughout the Pentagon occurred last year after a subcontractor for boat builder, General Dynamics' Electric Boat made errors in welding missile tubes, leading to tens of millions of dollars in fixes that were absorbed by the contractors.

Navy officials have said that the issues have been resolved, but wariness remains.

Last week, Strategic Command chief Gen. John Hyten told a Senate panel he was "very concerned" about how much time the welding fixes might take.

"I've gone with Adm. Caldwell, head of navy nuclear reactors, up to the shipyard at Electric Boat and done a deep dive," Hyten told the Senate Armed Services Committee. "I have to be honest…I was

very concerned because there was so little margin in the overall schedule, [and if] you're eating margin and not putting margin in, that causes me concern."

Speaking last week at the Heritage Foundation, Rear Adm. John Tammen, who directs the Navy's Undersea Warfare Division, agreed the Columbia program has very little wiggle room. But he said he's working with Electric Boat to pull some work into the "gap years" built into the program's schedule, and the missile tube fixes will not consume the "many months of margin left in that program."

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/navy-stands-up-columbia-submarine-office-key-to-nuclear-triad/

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Wilson Center (Washington, D.C.)

Leaked Cables: Allende, Kissinger, Moynihan, and the Indian Nuclear Bomb

By Debak Das

March 4, 2019

What did the overthrow of the Chilean President Salvador Allende have to do with Indian nuclear weapons?

At first glance, perhaps not a lot. However, archival documents from the Nehru Memorial and Museum Library in New Delhi reveal that there was indeed a connection made between the two in 1974.

In September 1974, details of the CIA's operations in Chile became public when CIA director William E. Colby's secret House Armed Services subcommittee testimony was leaked – thus confirming the role of the United States in the bloody removal of President Allende. This was reported widely in the Indian press, and India's Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, commented on the event several times.

Notably, Gandhi even referred to the foreign hand in the affair. In a speech in Madras on September 9, 1974, she reportedly said that "reactionary forces, helped from outside, were using the current difficulties to whip up the people against the government and in this context it had become necessary to make India strong…"

The reactions to Allende's fate in India prompted Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then the US Ambassador to New Delhi (and later a Senator from New York), to pen a strongly worded cable to the State Department titled, "The United States as a Counter-Revolutionary power – The Case of India and Chile."

Moynihan condemned the CIA's covert operations in Chile, believing that such actions would lead Indira Gandhi to "proceed to develop nuclear weapons…preaching nonviolence all the way." Ambassador Moynihan stated that:

"…She [Gandhi] knows full well that we have done our share and more of bloody and dishonorable deeds. This as such is not her concern. She knows all too much of such matters. It is precisely because she is not innocent, not squeamish and not a moralizer that her concern about American intentions is real and immediate…"

Moynihan continued:

"…Do not think, fellow Americans, of beguiling Indira Gandhi with talk of cultural exchange, joint industrial undertakings or a few shiploads of cheap food. Her concern is not economic. It is political. Nothing will change here till she is satisfied that the United States accepts her India. She does not now think we do. She thinks we are a profoundly selfish and cynical counterrevolutionary power. She will accordingly proceed to develop nuclear weapons and a missile delivery system, preaching non-violence all the way."

Moynihan's cable was subsequently leaked to the press, possibly by the Ambassador himself. Unsurprisingly, the missive did not endear Moynihan to any party, and neither the United States government (especially then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger) nor the Indian government took kindly to the cable.

On the US side, a serving ambassador publicly criticizing US foreign policy and the State Department was extremely poor form. And in India, the government was considerably displeased with the link made between Indira Gandhi's speeches and nuclear weapons.

India had been strongly advocating its position that the May 1974 nuclear explosion was for peaceful purposes only and that there were no plans for weaponization. The United States Ambassador to India stating that this was not true, in an internal State Department document that was then leaked to the press, posed a problem for Indian foreign policy.

On September 20, 1974, the Indian Ambassador to the United States, T.N. Kaul (who was also a former Foreign Secretary) wrote to Prof. P.N. Dhar, the then Secretary to the Prime Minister of India, with a press clipping of Moynihan's leaked cable and associated reportage. Discussing Moynihan's cable, Kaul wrote:

"…he has linked CIA activities in Chile with our determination to go in for nuclear weapons and means of delivery! I really do not see how he linked the two and this has definitely cast doubts on our various declarations that we are using nuclear technology exclusively for peaceful purposes. Such statements coming from a man like Moynihan naturally decrease our credibility and distort our image in the USA."

Ambassador Kaul subsequently went to meet Kissinger to discuss the matter – what Kissinger called "Moynihan's hysterical cable" – and reported the contents of the meeting in a personal note to the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Moynihan had suggested to Kissinger that during the latter's visit to India, he should give Indira Gandhi some assurance about non-interference in Indian affairs. Kissinger tactfully told Kaul that he would not venture to presume that Prime Minister Gandhi needed any such assurance, while assuring Kaul that the United States was not conducting any "political or subversive anti-government work in India." Furthermore, Kissinger added, "I know that it will take India 10 or 15 years to develop means of delivery and it is presumptuous of Moynihan to have said that India is going for means of delivery in nuclear weapons."

When asked how such cables were leaked to the press in the United States, Kissinger reportedly replied, "That is always my headache…" and went on to assure Ambassador Kaul that America accepted Indira Gandhi as the leader of India and was "anxious to strengthen understanding and friendly relations."

This curious and brief episode relating Moynihan's leaked cable and the link between Allende's overthrow and Indian nuclear weapons and subsequent interaction between T.N. Kaul and Henry Kissinger can be found in the personal papers of Ambassador T.N. Kaul at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/leaked-cables-allende-kissinger-moynihan-and-the-indian-nuclear-bomb

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Washington Examiner (Washington, D.C.)

America's Nuclear Commander Defends Deterrence

By Jamie McIntyre

March 1, 2019

The following is a condensed and edited version of testimony that Air Force Gen. John Hyten, the U.S. strategic commander in charge of America's nuclear forces, gave the Senate Armed Services Committee last Tuesday. The questions asked by senators have been paraphrased while Hyten's answers are verbatim, edited only for clarity and length.

Q: Can you explain the threat from hypersonic glide weapons, which can change course midflight and are currently under development by Russia and China?

Hyten: If you look at the way a hypersonic missile works, the first phase is ballistic, but it's a fairly short phase. That phase we will see. We will see the launch. We'll be able to characterize and understand if it came from Russia or it came from China. But then it basically disappears, and we don't see it until the effect is delivered.

Q: How fast would a hypersonic missile reach the U.S. from a potential adversary?

Hyten: It's a shorter period of time. A ballistic missile takes roughly 30 minutes. A hypersonic weapon, depending on the design, could be half that, depending on where it's launched from. It could be even less than that.

Q: How to you defeat that kind of threat?

Hyten: Our defense against hypersonic is our nuclear deterrent. If somebody attacks us with a nuclear hypersonic capability, we have the ability to respond. We also need to build sensors to be able to understand exactly where those things are going so we can better defend ourselves. You can't defend yourself if you can't see it. We have to go to space. And we can go to space now in an affordable way, with distributed constellations [of satellites] that can look down and characterize that threat in a global perspective, so we can see them wherever they come from. That's the direction we need to go.

Q: Do you agree with President Trump's decision to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty?

Hyten: Russia has violated the INF Treaty for five years now, and despite our best efforts, we have not been able to bring them into compliance. We all want Russia in that treaty, we want them to participate, but if they won't, we're tying our own hands to deal with adversaries in the world, including China, who is not part of that treaty.

Q: Should the U.S. stay in the New START treaty, which expires in February of 2021?

Hyten: I want Russia in every treaty. I want Russia in the INF Treaty, I want Russia in the New START Treaty. I support those treaties, but they have to be parties to those treaties. It takes two to participate in a treaty, at least.

Q: What is the value of arms control treaties in a world of multipolar threats?

Hyten: No treaty is perfect and New START is certainly not perfect. But what it gives me at STRATCOM is two very important things. No. 1, it puts a limit on the basics of their strategic force so I understand what their limits are and I can position my force accordingly so I can always be ready to respond. And maybe as important, it also gives me insight through the verification process of exactly what they're doing and what those pieces are. Having that insight is unbelievably important for me to understand what Russia is doing.

Q: The latest estimate from the Congressional Budget Office is that it will cost $1.2 trillion over the next 30 years to modernize all three legs of the triad. Why spend so much money on weapons that hopefully will never be used?

Hyten: We use them every day. When people that say that, I actually find that a little bit insulting, because the men and women who go to work every day, underneath the water, underneath the ground, in the air, that provide that strategic deterrent, they are doing the mission every day. When you send a nuclear submarine out with 160 sailors on board, do you think they're thinking of themselves as a passive functional mission? No, they are an active war-fighting mission.

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/americas-nuclear-commander-defends-deterrence

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US COUNTER-WMD

UPI (Washington, D.C.)

Raytheon Awarded $92M Contract for RAM Ship Missile Defense Systems

By Allen Cone

March 7, 2019

March 7 (UPI) -- Raytheon was awarded a $91.1 million contract to supply the U.S. Navy with parts and spares for the Rolling Airframe Missile, which protects ships from planes, helicopters, missiles and small surface vessels.

The contract is for the Block 2 guided missile round pack, the Defense Department announced Wednesday.

The Block 2, which was deployed in 2015, is among three RIM-116 configurations, which are part of a system developed through an international cooperative program between the United States and Germany.

The RIM-116 RAM is fully operational in the United States and German, as well as other allied navies that include South Korea, Greece, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Japan, with more than 5,000 missiles produced, according to the U.S. Navy. They are aboard more than 165 ships ranging from fast patrol boats to aircraft carriers, and are being installed on a majority of new ship classes.

Together, the MK 44 guided missile round pack and the MK 49 guided missile launching system contain 21 missiles, according to Raytheon. Each missile weighs 194.4 pounds and travels at supersonic speed.

In addition to Raytheon, German defense contractors MBDA Missile Systems, Diehl BGT Defence and RAM-System GmbH also share in costs and efforts for development, production and maintenance of the weapon.

Forty-four percent of work on the contract will be performed in Ottobrunn, Germany. In the United States, 35 percent will be done in Tucson, Ariz., and 9 percent in Rocket Center, W.Va. The remaining 12 percent will be done in other cities across the United States, as well as in Scotland.

Work on the contract is expected to be completed by November 2021. Naval fiscal 2019 weapons procurement funding in the full amount has been obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

https://www.upi.com/Raytheon-awarded-92M-contract-for-RAM-ship-defense-missile-systems/3291551963744/

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The Hill (Washington, D.C.)

US Deploys THAAD Missile Defense System to Israel

By Ellen Mitchell

March 4, 2019

The U.S. military for the first time has moved an advanced missile defense system to Israel as part of a monthlong joint air defense exercise between the two countries.

U.S. European Command is currently conducting a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system exercise deployment in Israel, “which is part of U.S. efforts to implement its operational concept & mission to assist in Israel’s aerial defense,” Israeli Defense Forces tweeted on Monday.

The forces added that the deployment “emphasizes the U.S.’s commitment to the defense and security of Israel,” but adds that “this is a defensive deployment that is not related to any specific current event.”

U.S. European Command said the THAAD system was deployed "in early March as a demonstration of the United States’ continued commitment to Israel's regional security."

"THAAD is the most advanced integrated air and missile defense system in the world, and this deployment readiness exercise demonstrates that U.S. forces are agile, and can respond quickly and unpredictably to any threat, anywhere, at any time," the statement adds.

THAAD, a system made by Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, is meant to intercept short- to medium-range ballistic missiles and works with Israeli early-warning radars.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Washington’s deployment of THAAD is evidence of the United States’ “commitment to Israel’s security,” and would help in handling threats “from across the Middle East,” according to his office.

The THAAD deployment follows a separate weeklong drill between the two countries called Juniper Falcon, which tests coordination in the event of a ballistic missile launch against Israel.

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/432448-us-deploys-thaad-missile-defense-system-to-israel

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BBC News (London, United Kingdom)

Syria War: Chlorine Likely to Have Been Used in Douma Attack - OCPW

Author Not Attributed

March 1, 2019

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) said data gave "reasonable grounds that the use of a toxic chemical as a weapon took place".

"This toxic chemical contained reactive chlorine," it added, without assigning blame.

Medics said more than 40 people died in the attack on the then rebel-held area.

The US, UK and France accused Syrian government forces, who were besieging Douma, of using chemical weapons in the 7 April attack, and carried out air strikes in retaliation.

The Syrian government has denied ever using chemical weapons. Its ally Russia has said the attack was "staged" by rescue workers.

The OPCW's conclusions were based on environmental samples, witness interviews and other data gathered by members of a fact-finding mission that visited a number of sites in Douma two weeks after the attack.

The watchdog also said it found no evidence of the use of nerve agents in Douma, as some initial reports suggested, nor any evidence to support the government's claim that a local facility was being used by rebel fighters to produce chemical weapons.

In June, the OPCW was given new powers to assign blame for chemical attacks. However, it was not the mandate of the fact-finding team sent to Douma to do so.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47424266

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US ARMS CONTROL

VOA (Washington, D.C.)

US General Calls for Firepower, Focus to Counter Russia

By Jeff Seldin

March 5, 2019

WASHINGTON — The United States needs more firepower and focus to push back against ever-increasing Russian aggression across Europe and beyond, according to the top U.S. commander in Europe.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee Tuesday, European Command's Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti called Russia the primary threat to stability in Europe and recommended the U.S. boost the number of troops it deploys to the continent on both a permanent and rotational basis.

Scaparrotti said he was particularly concerned about insufficient intelligence and surveillance capabilities, as well as a shrinking advantage on the high seas.

“I’ve asked for two more [naval] destroyers,” Scaparrotti told lawmakers, saying the need for additional ships was critical “if we want to remain dominant in the maritime domain."

"We do need greater capacity, particularly given the modernization and the growth of the Russian fleets in Europe,” he said, noting growing concern about the presence of Russian submarines in European and international waters.

Countering Russian Influence

Scaparrotti, who also serves as the supreme allied commander for NATO, is not the first high ranking U.S. military official to raise concerns about what many in the U.S. see as Russia’s increasingly aggressive posture.

Last month, a report by the U.S. military’s Defense Intelligence Agency warned of the threat posed by Russia’s action is space, while the commander of U.S. forces in Africa cautioned Moscow was playing on perceived U.S. weakness to gain influence there.

In his prepared testimony Tuesday, Scaparrotti said Europe, however, was still the lynchpin to Moscow’s overall approach.

"Moscow seeks to assert its influence over nations along its periphery, undermine NATO solidarity, and fracture the rules-based international order,” he wrote, adding from there, Russia is looking to “increase its influence and expand its presence in Afghanistan, Syria, and Asia.”

Scaparrotti told lawmakers that the U.S. military has been working closely with European allies, including Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic nations to develop the right capabilities to counter Russian aggression.

US support for Ukraine

He also said strong consideration is being given to find more ways to support Ukraine.

Since 2014, when Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea, the U.S. has given Kyiv more than $1 billion worth of military assistance, though the vast majority of it has been non-lethal.

To date, the lone exception has been shipments of javelin missiles which started last April (2018), following authorizations by U.S. President Donald Trump and Congress.

Scaparrotti said the additional lethal aid could include sniper systems, ammunition and even naval warfare systems, citing Russia’s seizure of Ukrainian naval vessels last November, as part of an effort to block off Ukrainian access to the Kerch Strait.

Disinformation, cyberattacks and arms race

But like top U.S. intelligence officials, the commander of U.S. forces in Europe cautioned that while Russia is strengthening its military might, the biggest threat comes from the Kremlin’s devotion to information warfare. And he raised concerns Washington’s response in that arena is lacking.

“We need to probably get greater focus and energy into a strategy, a multifaceted strategy to counter Russia,” Scaparrotti said, "specifically within information operations, challenging their disinformation in cyber.”

U.S. lawmakers Tuesday also raised concerns about a possible nuclear arms race with Russia, with both President trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin announcing last month they are withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

The U.S. and its European allies accuse Moscow of violating the terms of the treaty, which prohibited ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, since at least 2014.

"We simply cannot tolerate this kind of abuse of arms control and expect for arms control to continue to be viable," a senior U.S. administration official said at the time. "Let's be clear: If there's an arms race, it is Russia that is starting it."

Pressed on how the U.S. would proceed in a post-treaty environment, Scaparrotti said planning was underway.

“I don't know that we have a plan today," he said. “We're still in a 6-month period here where we are looking at what our options are."

https://www.voanews.com/a/us-general-scaparrotti-calls-for-firepower-focus-to-counter-russia/4814695.html

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The Hill (Washington, D.C.)

GOP Chairman Eyes Move to Lock in Trump’s Iran Deal Withdrawal

By Rebecca Kheel

March 5, 2019

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.) said Tuesday he’d like to include language in the annual defense policy bill that codifies President Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal.

Inhofe was speaking to reporters in his office about a congressional delegation trip last month that included stops in Germany, Israel, Kosovo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Algeria.

Throughout the trip, Inhofe, a Trump supporter, said he found that countries such as Iran were “waiting Trump out."

“They think he’s going to be defeated,” Inhofe said. “The Iranians are waiting to reestablish the deal that [former Secretary of State] John Kerry made, and they’re all assuming that he’ll be out of office.”

To address that, Inhofe argued, Congress needs to codify what it can of actions Trump has taken, particularly support for Israel’s military and the withdrawal from the Iran deal.

“Both of those thing we can pass in the Senate,” Inhofe said. “It’s not going to be quite as easy to pass in the House. … I’ll be doing that, and we’ll be addressing that.”

Pressed further on whether there will be something in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to make Trump’s Iran deal withdrawal permanent, Inhofe said, “mhm.”

Asked for elaboration by The Hill, a spokeswoman for Inhofe said putting language in the NDAA codifying the Iran deal withdrawal is a goal of his, but that he’s flexible on the exact form since his priority is ultimately getting the NDAA passed.

Such language would likely be a nonstarter in the Democratic-controlled House, with which the Senate will have to negotiate to get the NDAA to the president’s desk.

Trump announced last year he was withdrawing the United States from the 2015 nuclear deal and reimposed all the sanctions that had been lifted as part of the deal.

The agreement, reached by the Obama administration with Iran, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia, gave Iran billions of dollars in sanctions relief in exchange for curbs on its nuclear program.

Regional experts have said Iran continues to abide by the terms in the nuclear deal in part because they are hoping Trump is a one-term president and that his successor will return to the accord.

International inspectors said last month Iran remains within the key limits of its nuclear activities imposed by the deal.

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/432757-gop-chairman-eyes-defense-bill-language-to-lock-in-trumps-iran-deal-withdrawal

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Defense News (Washington, D.C.)

US Lawmakers Back Tough Stance on North Korea after Trump-Kim Summit

By Joe Gould

March 6, 2019

WASHINGTON — U.S. senators from both parties said Tuesday they back a tough American negotiating stance toward Pyongyang after the breakdown of nuclear talks between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un last week.

"The president is not going to make a deal until we have a concrete plan forward, on the table and agreed to before anything is signed," Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch, R-Idaho, told reporters Tuesday.

"It's clear Congress' position is there is to be no normalization [of the relationship] without denuclearization," said Sen. Cory Gardner, R-Colo., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy. "The president was right to walk away from a deal that would have given everything the U.S. has put in place from a maximum pressure standpoint."

"If [Kim] is true to his supposed words about denuclearization, and we get an agreed-upon commitment, and it's verifiable and it's enforceable, we have a pathway forward," said Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Robert Menendez, D-N.J. "If not, we have to understand the options available to us are a lot more challenging."

The lawmakers spoke to reporters after a closed-door briefing led by the U.S. State Department's special representative for North Korea, Stephen Biegun. Lawmakers declined to discuss specifics but said they were reassured by the clear picture presented to them of what happened in Hanoi, and that the Trump administration has a strategy — even if they did not believe it would work.

The Trump-Kim summit fell apart because of differences over how much sanction relief North Korea could win in return for closing its aging main nuclear complex. The U.S. and North Korea accused each other of causing the summit breakdown, but both sides left the door open for future negotiations.

Trump said Kim told him that North Korea would continue to suspend nuclear and missile tests while negotiations are underway, and South Korea and the U.S. announced Sunday that they are eliminating massive springtime military drills and replacing them with smaller exercises in an effort to support the talks.

Multiple outlets reported Wednesday that North Korea has begun rebuilding a satellite rocket launchpad and engine test site, in an ominous sign about its attitude toward negotiations on denuclearization. Satellite imagery suggests it started either just before or immediately after the breakdown of the summit meeting.

On Tuesday, Risch said Beigun provided lawmakers a "step-by-step, hour-by-hour" account of the Hanoi summit, placing the blame for the impasse on Pyongyang. Nonetheless, he said the two sides' differences had been narrowed in Hanoi, and he expressed cautious optimism.

"They laid out strategy, they laid out clearly for us steps they gave as opportunities for the North Koreans," Risch said of the briefing. "The North Koreans, of course, did not respond appropriately — and the president simply said he could not accept the counter[offer]."

As working level talks continue, Risch predicted they would take time but ultimately conclude in a grand bargain that yields a treaty for Congress to consider. "This is decades in the making, it's going to be a long time as it unwinds," Risch said, adding that Trump committed to him that any such deal would be presented as a treaty.

There is partisan division over Trump's approach, as Democrats have criticized Trump as gambling on direct talks without the diplomatic prep work that typically undergirds them. Menendez said he was "never a fan," arguing the first summit in Singapore last year turned Kim from "an international pariah" into someone more internationally acceptable.

"He did the right thing" to walk away from a bad deal, Menendez said of Trump. "He shouldn't have gone there if the preparation wasn't laid for the possibility of success."

"I see what the strategy is," Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., told reporters. "The odds of success on the strategy are not high, but I think everybody's realistic about that."

Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., said there are not "a lot of other plays right now, so I think we got to all get behind this one no matter our deep reservations about the president's ineptitude."

Nonetheless, Risch said he expects another Trump-Kim meeting at some point.

"These two people have a special relationship, and it is that special relationship [that] is moving this forward," Risch said. "This is not something that is bubbling up from the bottom. Kim Jong Un can sit at that table, look across at President Trump and make a deal. That's where this is going to eventually wind up."

In the meantime, Gardner said, the U.S. would maintain its "maximum pressure" stance toward North Korea, and lawmakers would fight for new sanctions targeting ship-to-ship transfers to North Korea that violate the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act as well as a variety of United Nations Security Council resolutions.

"The discussions will continue, but North Korea must come much closer than they are on concrete steps toward denuclearization before any movement is made by the United States," Gardner said.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/03/06/us-lawmakers-back-tough-stand-on-north-korea-after-trump-kim-summit/

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COMMENTARY

Bloomberg (New York)

Nukes Aren't the Only Terrifying Threat from North Korea

By James Stavradis

Feb. 27, 2019

As Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un hold their summit in Vietnam, there is a major danger that the narrow focus on nuclear weapons obscures: Kim holds the whip in a three-ring circus of weapons of mass destruction. The other two rings, adjacent and in many ways more frightening, feature chemical weapons and – above all – biological threats.

The North Koreans are suspected by U.S. and South Korean intelligence agencies of holding substantial amounts of a variety of biological agents including smallpox, botulism, typhoid and anthrax. In 2015, the North Korean media showed Kim touring a biological plant. A former Pentagon official in charge of countering such programs told reporters that North Korean bioweapons are "advanced, underestimated, and highly lethal."

I remember that as the U.S. military prepared for the Gulf War in the early 1990s, most of us in uniform took a series of a dozen shots we were informed might reduce the effect of anthrax should Saddam Hussein launch a bio-attack. Bioweapons have some advantages over nuclear weapons in terms of spreading terror: They can easily be smuggled across borders, and their use can be very hard to attribute, unlike a nuclear weapon with an obvious origin.

The final ring of the WMD circus – chemical weapons - is equally disturbing. In 2017, two North Korean agents allegedly killed Kim's half-brother at a Malaysian airport using the nerve agent VX. The North Korean military routinely uses simulated chemical weapons in drills and exercises, and could easily incorporate nerve agents into artillery barrages of Seoul from just over the border. South Korean intelligence agencies say the North may have as much as 5,000 tons of chemical agents, possibly including ricin, mustard gas, hydrogen cyanide and the nerve agent tabun. North Korea is one of just three nations that has refused to sign the international Chemical Weapons Convention.

Would Kim dare such an attack? There might be some strategic sense. He knows that deploying a nuclear weapon would be signing his own death warrant. But he might be able to create a far more ambiguous situation in which he could consider using some biological or chemical element. And while U.S. and South Korean forces are trained to operate after such an attack, the civilians on the peninsula are essentially undefended – including the families of 28,000 U.S. servicemen stationed there.

In preparing for this threat, Washington has considerable work to do. It should start by increasing intelligence collection specifically regarding chemical and bio-threats, working in concert with the South Korean allies. At home, there needs to be more research and development of technological counters to known agents. This will require a far higher level of interagency cooperation between the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security and Health and Human Services, and the Center for Disease Control. American troops need more exercises that simulate operating in the lethal environment of a chemical or biological attack.

Above all, the U.S. must bring greater global attention to the threat. This means international pressure on North Korea to sign global agreements banning such weapons; making those weapons

part of the agenda alongside nukes in summit negotiations; and pressuring Russia and China to persuade Kim to rid himself of any stockpiles before sanctions can be fully lifted.

The chances of Kim quickly surrendering his entire nuclear arsenal are roughly the same as that of Mexico paying for Trump's beautiful wall. Still, pursuing a diplomatic conclusion – not Trump's loose talk of "fire and fury" - to the standoff on the Korean peninsula is the path forward. But the U.S. shouldn't forget to put other weapons of mass destruction on the table as well.

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https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-27/north-korea-nukes-kim-has-other-wmd-threats

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Nature (London, United Kingdom)

Scientists Can Strengthen Nuclear Agreements

Author Not Attributed

March 6, 2019

Just days ago, it looked as if India and Pakistan were ready to go to war. Ambulance drivers and trauma surgeons were told to cancel leave; airports were shuttered and the skies cleared of commercial flights. The world held its breath as the two nuclear-armed nations shot down each other's fighter jets. Thankfully, both sides have stepped back.

By coincidence, US–North Korea nuclear talks in the same week ended prematurely with no deal. North Korea will, however, continue its moratorium on nuclear tests for now, while the United States continues to suspend major joint military activities with South Korea.

The United States and North Korea are at least beginning to climb the ladder towards disarmament, however shakily. The South Asian countries, by contrast, are not even on the first rung. The big lesson from these most recent events is the need for an urgent global, or at a minimum bilateral, effort — one that includes researchers — to address the risks of undeclared nuclear arsenals. Stockpiles, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, are expanding.

Scientists have been at the heart of the most successful nuclear agreements, from the Soviet–US talks that laid the foundations for the global Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996 to negotiations in 2015 on what is known as the Iran nuclear deal.

Researchers are central because they have advanced knowledge of the science and technology of nuclear-weapons development, testing, dismantling and verification. Indeed, it is often researchers such as Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and former US energy secretary Ernest Moniz — who both worked at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge — who negotiate and write the words.

Historically, nuclear diplomacy has focused on global agreements; the latest is the troubled Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which opened for signature on 20 September 2017. But India and Pakistan — along with Israel — will not sign until the five permanent nuclear-weapons states (the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) agree to do so, and that is even less likely. A more effective approach would be to build on existing agreements, starting with a

30-year-old bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan, in which scientists and engineers from each side swap lists of facilities, with their governments pledging not to attack.

This accord could be broadened to include a pledge that lists are accurate and that neither side will attack essential infrastructure, especially large dams, says Toby Dalton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC. He adds that the countries could also agree to exchange information on the ability of domestic extremist groups to acquire nuclear technology.

This could be instigated by each country's scientists, or through membership of the InterAcademy Partnership of scientific academies that work together on global problems. They have a duty to use these links, and their influence with the media and politicians, to take this step.

One of the biggest hurdles to all such undertakings, bilateral or multilateral, is an understanding that the greater threat is doing nothing towards disarmament. In that respect, the US–North Korea talks are at least in play. Eventually, India and Pakistan also need to begin a formal process. The people of South Asia were genuinely shaken by last week's military action. The world can no longer afford to live with the risk that this action could have led to all-out war.

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War on the Rocks (Washington, D.C.)

What's in a Name? North Korea and the Contested Politics of 'Nuclear Weapons States'

By Sidra Hamidi

March 6, 2019

The second nuclear summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ended abruptly last week with no deal and no plan for North Korean denuclearization. When asked how he had discussed the matter with Kim, Trump responded by noting, "denuclearization is a very important word, has become a very well-used word. A lot of people don't know what it means but to me it's pretty obvious we have to get rid of the nukes."

Trump's odd response is in part correct — "denuclearization" is an important word and its meaning is anything but clear. The term seems to be doing a lot of diplomatic work for both parties with very little consensus on what it means. But while the focus has been on the contested meaning of denuclearization, scholars and policymakers have largely taken for granted what it means to "nuclearize" in the first place.

The United States continues to define denuclearization as the dismantling of North Korea's nuclear arsenal. North Korea sees denuclearization as the dismantling of its nuclear weapons as well as the threat of U.S. nuclear weapons in the region. Denuclearization is unclear precisely because "nuclearization" is often unclear. Is a state "nuclear" after a successful nuclear weapons test? Or does the technical ability to develop nuclear weapons already signify nuclearization? And, perhaps most importantly, at what point does nuclearization pose a threat?

The disagreement over denuclearization represents a broader trend in nuclear diplomacy where seemingly self-evident language becomes a matter of negotiation and conflict. Often, what is at stake is not necessarily what nuclear capabilities states have but how those capabilities are recognized and represented in global politics. This is in part why Japan's possession of highly

enriched uranium, or uranium enriched at 20 percent and above, is not considered as threatening as, say, Iran's.

Not all nuclear countries are "nuclear" in the same way. Some possess the latent ability to develop nuclear weapons but, for a number of reasons, have chosen not to do so. For example, around the same time that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered Iran's secret enrichment activities in 2002, South Korea's past illicit enrichment activities were also made public. South Korea admitted to conducting uranium enrichment and separating small quantities of plutonium in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These activities were not declared to the IAEA and so were in potential violation of international law. Other countries have specific security guarantees or are under the nuclear umbrellas of either the United States or Russia — should we think of NATO countries as "nuclear states"? And then there is the complex interaction between nuclear statehood and international law in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which legally recognizes the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China as "nuclear weapon states." But because the NPT only recognizes countries that exploded a nuclear device prior to 1967, it leaves India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea in a sort of legal limbo because they have nuclear weapons but are technically not "nuclear weapon states" according to the treaty. Finally, the United States made a whole new category of state when it recognized India as a "responsible state with advanced nuclear technology" instead of a nuclear weapons state when it negotiated the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement.

And of course, in some cases, recognition is not desirable. Israel's nuclearization has never been recognized, by itself or by the United States, yet many historical accounts demonstrate that the Middle Eastern country has indeed developed nuclear weapons. The United States has bolstered Israel's ambiguity by providing it with the language to downplay its possession of nuclear weapons. Recently declassified documents reveal that former Israeli politician Yigal Allon noted in 1969, "I am constantly using a phrase agreed with Kissinger — that Israel is not a nuclear state." Iran, meanwhile, inverts Israel's strategy by vying to be seen as "nuclear" despite the fact that it does not possess nuclear weapons.

Given the many ways in which states may be seen — and see themselves — as "nuclear," what are the implications for North Korea's nuclear statehood? North Korea, of course, is not a legally recognized "nuclear weapon state" under the NPT, and at any rate it withdrew from the treaty in 2003. But the politics of recognition are still relevant for understanding North Korea's unique status. The country actually declared itself a nuclear power in 2005 — before it conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. Despite conducting numerous tests since then, however, international recognition of North Korea's nuclear status is not a product of its capabilities alone. When it conducted its most recent missile tests in 2017, North Korea yet again asserted that it was a "nuclear state." But the technical reality of North Korea's capability clashed with the political implications — recognizing its status as a nuclear state would also come with change in U.S. policy and the admission that perhaps the goals of nonproliferation had failed in North Korea. This is why, though it may seem obvious on paper, observers have had to argue that North Korea should in fact be seen as a "nuclear power." Others have characterized North Korea's nuclearization as a matter of "acceptance."

Some observers argue that what North Korea really wants is formal recognition of its "nuclear weapon state" status. But perhaps the country has learned from India's experience negotiating with the United States — in his 2018 New Year's Day speech, Kim noted that North Korea is a "responsible, peace-loving nuclear power." Seeking de facto recognition outside of the NPT may be as important, if not more so, than seeking legal recognition because it may allow North Korea, like India, to eventually shift away from its rogue status.

In focusing on denuclearization, analysts largely ignore the contentious and messy processes by which nuclear status gets recognized, processes that involve questions of legal and social recognition. The dispute is not necessarily whether North Korea is a nuclear state, but rather whether it should be seen as one — suggesting a social recognition process rather than a self-evident status that stems objectively from capabilities. And when North Korea declares itself to be a nuclear state, it in part does this in order to gain the status, and perhaps the legitimacy, that comes with being a nuclear state on the global stage.

Conflict over the phrase "denuclearization" follows a broad trend of linguistic contestation in nuclear politics. It is not simply a matter of determining the correct definition of these terms but rather of exploring what the language does for the different actors involved. Denuclearization will likely continue to mean different things for both the United States and North Korea because, for the United States, "denuclearization" is an attempt to deny recognition to North Korea as a "nuclear" state. Denuclearization is not simply the denial of capabilities but also the denial of status.

In a recent piece for the New York Times, David Sanger pointed out that the first Trump-Kim summit in Singapore last June changed the "optics of the relationship more than the reality." But the reality of nuclear weapons, and undoubtedly of international politics more broadly, is very much a matter of optics — that is, of the ways in which states can manipulate reality to suit their political purposes.

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https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/whats-in-a-name-north-korea-and-the-contested-politics-of-nuclear-weapons-states/

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ABOUT THE USAF CSDS

The USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University — while extending its reach far beyond — and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff's Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON) and Air War College commandant established the initial personnel and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation.

In 2008, the Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." This led to the addition of three teaching positions to the CPC in 2011 to enhance nuclear PME efforts. At the same time, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide professional continuing education (PCE) through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the CPC in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research on not just countering WMD but also nuclear operations issues. In April 2016, the nuclear PCE courses were transferred from the Air War College to the U.S. Air Force Institute for Technology.

In February 2014, the Center's name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term "unconventional weapons," currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. In May 2018, the name changed again to the Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies (CSDS) in recognition of senior Air Force interest in focusing on this vital national security topic.

The Center's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation — counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management. The Latin inscription "Armis Bella Venenis Geri" stands for "weapons of war involving poisons."