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Russia Stresses Talks on Iran's Nuclear Issue
Saturday, September 17, 2011

The Russian envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has underpinned negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, describing diplomacy as the sole strategy to settle the issue.

Russia's Ambassador to the IAEA Grigori Berdnikov said Friday that the only way forward is to try to reach a satisfactory diplomatic solution with the government of Iran, IRNA reported.

The senior Russian official made the comments in a speech at the IAEA Board of Governors' September meeting, where he reiterated that dialogue between parties involved in Iran's nuclear issue would serve the interests of the international community.

Berdnikov further pointed out that Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran, developed in partnership with Russia, has given Tehran the chance to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The United States, Israeli and some of their Western allies accuse Tehran, without any evidence, of pursuing military objectives in its nuclear program.

Yet, as a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a member of the IAEA, Iran insists that it has every right to develop and acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

In addition, the IAEA has conducted numerous inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities but has never found any evidence indicating that Iran's civilian nuclear program has been diverted to nuclear weapons production.

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/199588.html
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Iran Says IAEA Should Be Restructured
September 20, 2011

VIENNA – Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Director Fereydoun Abbasi has said that the decision-making and policy-making mechanisms of the International Atomic Energy Agency are inefficient, calling for the restructuring of the agency.

Abbasi made the remarks on Monday in a statement to the 55th Annual Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference in Vienna.

He also said Iran is hopeful that the IAEA would restore its independence in the near future and increase its credibility through taking unbiased and principled decisions.

Following are excerpts of the statement released to the press:

The political stability in the Islamic Republic of Iran paved the way for scientific and industrial growth in all aspects and it is quite logical that a pioneering county tries to diversify its energy sources.

On this path, utilization of nuclear energy is one of the tested ways in the world.

The mastermind in leading Islamic Republic of Iran is well informed of the importance of this issue in the growth and development of the nuclear developments in the country.

These days it is expected from all members of the Agency and honorable DG not to be influenced by some certain countries that own and proliferate nuclear weapons and deprive countries from their inalienable rights.
In an era that independent or less developed countries are in shortage, the Agency should act according to its natural and charter duties to help other countries in maintaining nuclear rights of the countries by fighting the imposed restrained, stopping fabricating dossiers and sharing acquired knowledge.

Today, despite good cooperation and even allowing inspecting beyond safeguard agreements by countries, what has the Agency chosen to do? It calls itself neutral. But is Agency really neutral? If it is so, why it does not say anything or report on clandestine probable activities of some European countries or positioning some hundred nuclear warheads in Europe or occupied countries that jeopardize the health of the people.

Why is the Agency silent when it comes to the lost nuclear material in the United States?

Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran has reached to self-sufficiency in providing necessary experts in many scientific areas. In a new effort, some countries and their intelligent terrorist organizations have focused on assassinating our experts.

We strongly urge the Agency to clear its name in cooperating and preparing the ground in these measures. We consider it necessary that member states and DG of the Agency while condemning these terrorist and hostile activities in order to prove their good will, take brave measures to review the agreed modalities and closing the nuclear case of Iran in the Agency.

Islamic Republic of Iran despite all obstacles caused by some countries has achieved technical knowhow and technology of the fuel cycle and provision of fuel complexes of nuclear research reactors and nuclear power reactors and by documenting them, voices its readiness to share its technology with other countries with the information and supervision of the Agency.

I would like to announce here that we are ready to cooperate with the Agency as before and we are hopeful that in near future the Agency would restore its independent identity and Mr. Amano and his colleagues would earn credits for the Agency as the independent and nondiscriminatory reference by making principled decisions.

If countries want to negotiate with Iran over nuclear issues, we would like to urge them to pay attention to the performance of the recent decades of the Agency. The structure of decision and policy making of the Agency especially in the Board of Governors needs seriously to be reformed.

The composition of the members of the Board of Governors, number of the members and their domain of authorities should changed, because the charter that was formed in the Cold war time is not compatible with today’s situation. This is a key issue in our talks with them in future.

Another issue is finding an appropriate mechanism so that all countries without any discrimination could benefit from nuclear energy for the prosperity of nations and assuring other countries from nonexistence of nuclear material and undeclared equipments in nuclear weapon owned countries.


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Yonhap News – South Korea
September 17, 2011

U.S. Hails Koreas' Nuclear Talks in China

WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 (Yonhap) -- The United States on Friday welcomed a second round of inter-Korean nuclear talks in Beijing next week, a development that may help resume long-stalled broader talks on ending Pyongyang's nuclear programs.

South Korean chief nuclear envoy Wi Sung-lac will meet with his North Korean counterpart in the Chinese capital in the middle of next week, South Korea's Foreign Ministry said Friday.
The two nuclear envoys met on the sidelines of a regional security conference in Indonesia in July for the first time in more than two years.

The meeting paved the way for rare high-level talks between North Korea and the U.S. in New York later that month on nuclear and other issues pending between the two countries.

"We would welcome a dialogue -- further dialogue, rather, between North Korea and South Korea," State Department deputy spokesman Mark Toner said at a press briefing.

North Korea quit the disarmament-for-aid talks in 2009, but it has since repeatedly expressed its desire to return to the talks that involve South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, during a rare summit last month with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, also called for a quick resumption of the nuclear talks without any preconditions.


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Xinhua News – China

**Joint Statement at the Six-Party Talks Serves as a Guideline for Resolving DPRK Nuclear Issue**

September 18, 2011

By Xinhua Writer Zhang Yi and Liu Hua

BEIJING, Sept. 18 (Xinhua) - On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the signing of the joint statement at the fourth round of the Six Party Talks, representatives from the six sides will meet in Beijing Monday at an international seminar to mark the signing.

It is of great significance for the six parties, China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, and the U. S., to take the joint statement as the guideline for resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsular so as to finally realize denuclearization of the Korean Peninsular.

The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing in 2005, and the signing of the joint statement on Sept. 19 that year was the most important result of the talks, as it is a balanced, win-win and constructive document. It has set up the framework for a package solution of the nuclear issue and become a milestone statement since the talks were launched in 2003.

The signing of the document reflected the political will from all six parties to peacefully resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsular while safeguarding the peace and stability of that region. Meanwhile, it proved that the Six-Party Talks are a practical and effective way to settle the problem, as well as providing a direction for further meetings of the six parties.

In the joint statement, the DPRK committed to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons. The ROK reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its territory.

The six parties have also agreed in the context to the following: The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of the unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern. The six parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally. China, Japan, the ROK,
Russia and the U.S. stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK. The six parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum. The six parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Qu Xing, president of the China Institute for International Studies, described the joint statement as a blueprint for resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and for lasting peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.

"Generally speaking, the document contains comprehensive and balanced items. It covers the abandonment of nuclear weapons by the DPRK and its energy demands. The statement considers all relevant countries' concerns and sets up a principle for all parties to handle their relations," he said.

The six parties held another round of talks after the release of the September 19 joint statement and agreed on two joint documents for implementation. According to the two documents, the DPRK would shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications. The DPRK's five negotiating partners agreed to provide economic, energy and humanitarian assistance and one million tonnes of heavy fuel oil, and the DPRK agreed to report its comprehensive nuclear plans.

It was widely believed that the future of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula was optimistic under the September 19 joint statement. However, with complicated and sensitive factors involved in the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the road is bumpy. The last round of the Six Party Talks ended in a stalemate in December 2008, and the talks have not yet restarted.

Qu Xing believes that the major obstacle lies in the mutual distrust among the DPRK, the U.S. and the ROK, with an accumulation of problems and hatred over the past sixty years. The domestic political factors in the U.S. and the ROK hampered consistency in their policies with the DPRK, he said.

As an important platform to discuss the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the Six-Party Talks serve as the only channel for all relevant parties to have a rational negotiation. The talks have achieved concrete results with regular representation since its launching in 2003.

China has always been committed to resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks and played a constructive role in the process of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Whether the process is in favorable or adverse circumstances, China takes every opportunity to create conditions for talks.

Some new signs showed up recently. Kim Jong-II, the top leader of the DPRK, said in August that he was ready to resume the Six-Party Talks without preconditions, saying the DPRK adheres to the goal of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and is ready to fully implement the September 19 joint statement along with all sides. The DPRK promised to stop producing nuclear material and stop nuclear tests during the talks.

In contrast to the DPRK's wish to return to the talks, the U.S. and the ROK have made no positive response and have insisted on stopping DPRK nuclear tests before restarting the talks. Resumption of the talks seems to largely depend on the attitude of the U.S. and the ROK.

Wu Dawei, the Chinese special representative for Korean Peninsula affairs, pointed out that the six parties are in the same boat and none of the countries is able to leave the boat before their arriving at the destination.

"All the parties have to unite and advance the boat together. The task ahead is to sail on the right course and avoid striking a reef," he said.

Observing from current conditions, the restart of the Six-Party Talks needs concerted efforts from all parties to create favorable conditions and avoid further complications.

Yo**nhap News – South Korea  
September 18, 2011

**Nuclear Envoys of Two Koreas to Meet in Beijing on Wednesday**

SEOUL, Sept. 18 (Yonhap) -- The chief nuclear negotiators of South and North Korea will meet in Beijing later this week to hold inter-Korean talks on the North's nuclear weapons programs, a senior government official said Sunday.

Wi Sung-lac of South Korea and Ri Yong-ho of North Korea will hold the talks in the Chinese capital on Wednesday, the second round of bilateral diplomatic meetings this year.

"The South and North agreed to set a date for the nuclear talks on Sept. 21," said the official. "The exact time and frequency will be discussed there (in Beijing)."

The two top nuclear negotiators met in Indonesia for the first time in more than two years in late July, setting the tone for renewed diplomatic efforts to reopen the stalled six-party talks, which also involve the U.S., China, Japan and Russia.

"In the upcoming meeting, they will discuss broader issues like they did in Indonesia to create conditions for resuming the six-way talks," said the official. "Securing the preemptive steps for denuclearization is the goal of this meeting."

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, during a rare summit on Aug. 24 with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, reportedly pledged to consider issuing a moratorium on nuclear testing and missile launches if the six-party talks resume.

South Korea and the U.S., however, have demand that Pyongyang suspend its uranium enrichment programs, accept inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency and announce a moratorium on testing weapons of mass destruction before the multilateral negotiations begin.

"But we can't achieve results through just one or two rounds of denuclearization talks," said the official. "The North did not express its position on the preconditions during the recent talks to fix the date."

The North's uranium program is among the key hurdles to the resumption of the six-party dialogue, which has been stalled since late 2008.

In November last year, North Korea revealed the existence of a uranium enrichment facility, adding urgency to check Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development.

The North claims the uranium enrichment program is for peaceful energy development, but outside experts believe that it will give the country a new source of fission material to make atomic bombs, in addition to its widely known plutonium-based nuclear weapons program.

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/09/18/59/0301000000AEN20110918004300320F.HTML

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Reuters U.S.

**Japan's Defence Industry Hit by Its First Cyber Attack**

* **Mitsubishi Heavy says was target of cyber attack**
* **Says working with outside experts**
* **Some 80 computers infected, data stolen - Yomiuri**
* **Company is Japan's biggest defence contractor**

Issue No. 942, 20 September 2011

United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL  
Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530
Monday, September 19, 2011

TOKYO, Sept 19 (Reuters) - Japan's biggest defence contractor, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd, said on Monday hackers had gained access to its computers, with one newspaper saying its submarine, missile and nuclear power plant component factories had been the target.

The company said in a statement that some information could have been stolen in the first known cyber attack on Japan's defence industry.

"We've found out that some system information such as IP addresses have been leaked and that's creepy enough," said a Mitsubishi Heavy spokesman.

"We can't rule out small possibilities of further information leakage but so far crucial data about our products or technologies have been kept safe," he said, adding the company first noticed the cyberattack on August 11.

A Japanese defence white paper released last month urged vigilance against cyber attacks after a spate of high-profile online assaults this year that included Lockheed Martin and other U.S. defence contractors.

There were suggestions at the time that those attacks had originated in China.

The Yomiuri newspaper said about 80 virus-infected computers were found at the company's Tokyo headquarters as well as manufacturing and research and development sites, including Kobe Shipyard & Machinery Works, Nagasaki Shipyard & Machinery Works and Nagoya Guidance & Propulsion System Works.

Kobe Shipyard currently builds submarines and makes components to build nuclear power stations, while the Nagasaki Shipyard makes escort ships. The Nagoya plant makes guided missiles and rocket engines, the paper said citing unnamed sources.

At least eight different kinds of computer virus including Trojan horse, which steals key information from infected computer hardware, were found at Mitsubishi Heavy's main office or production sites, the Yomiuri said.

It is the country's biggest defense contractor, winning 215 deals worth 260 billion yen ($3.4 billion) from Japan's Ministry of Defense in the year to last March, or nearly a quarter of the ministry's spending that year.

Weapons included surface-to-air Patriot missiles and AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missiles.

Mitsubishi Heavy has also been working closely with Boeing, making wings for its 787 Dreamliner jets.

"It's probably just the first that hacking attacks in Japan have been detected. It's consistent with what we've seen already with big American defence companies," Andrew Davies, a cyber-warfare analyst with the government backed defence think-tank, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, told Reuters.

"The Japanese make large conventional submarines that are among the world's most sophisticated ... (they) have very nicely integrated solutions with their own mechanical, electronic and control systems, so it a pretty attractive hacking proposition, to get the design of a Japanese submarine," he added. ($1 = 76.875 Japanese Yen)

Additional by Rob Taylor in Canberra, Editing by Jonathan Thatcher

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/19/mitsubishiheavy-computer-idUSL3E7KJ0BD20110919

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Global Security Newswire

South Korea Unprepared for Biological Attack, Lawmaker Says

Monday, September 19, 2011
A joint U.S.-South Korean biological weapons defense drill last spring revealed that the South has not done enough to prepare for a potential act of biological warfare from North Korea, the Yonhap News Agency on Sunday quoted a lawmaker in Seoul as saying (see GSN, May 27).

The exercise was staged from May 17-27 and was led by the United States, which wanted to drive concern in the South over North Korea's suspected active biological weapons program, according to ruling party legislator Kim Hak-song.

The South Korean government, though, objected to the drill out of concern it would unsettle the citizenry and strain the economy, Kim said.

"South Korea found that it has been hardly prepared to counter North Korea's biological attacks," Kim said. "The Defense Ministry should come up with measures against biological warfare."

Pyongyang is thought to possess 13 different types of militarized pathogens including typhoid, cholera and anthrax, Yonhap reported.

Drill participants also practiced on how to respond to a radiation emissions incident (Yonhap News Agency/Korea Herald, Sept. 18).

http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110919_6037.php
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China Daily – China

**Calls for Restart of Nuke Talks**

September 20, 2011

By Li Xiaokun and Zheng Yangpeng (China Daily)

BEIJING - The top nuclear negotiator of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) called for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks with no strings attached on Monday, a positive signal on the eve of his meeting with his counterpart from the Republic of Korea (ROK) in Beijing on Wednesday.

"Attaching preconditions ahead of a dialogue will hurt trust and confidence in each other," Ri Yong-ho, the lead nuclear negotiator from the DPRK, was quoted by the Seoul-based Yonhap news agency as telling a closed-door forum in Beijing.

"That's why we call for unconditionally resuming the Six-Party Talks," Ri was quoted as saying.

Qu Xing, president of the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), told media after the forum that Ri "expressed explicitly" in his speech that his country has stopped production of weapon-class plutonium which had been used to produce nuclear weapons since 2005.

A member of the DPRK delegation also revealed that the Yongbyon nuclear power station had stopped operating.

The seminar on the Six-Party Talks came two days before top nuclear envoys from Pyongyang and Seoul are scheduled to meet in Beijing on Wednesday to try to create an environment for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, which also involve China, the United States, Japan and Russia. This is the second round of talks in two months, after one on the Indonesian island of Bali in July.

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said at the opening ceremony of the seminar, part of China's efforts to restart the talks, that Beijing was pleased that positive efforts have recently been made.

"The parties must seize these opportunities," Yang said.
The DPRK quit the Six-Party Talks in April 2009 but in recent months it has repeatedly expressed its willingness to rejoin the talks aimed at dismantling its nuclear weapons program in return for international aid and other concessions.

ROK and US officials, however, said it must first abide by commitments it made in earlier rounds of the talks.

In Seoul on Monday, Yu Woo-ik, the ROK’s new unification minister, said in his inaugural speech that Seoul would work to improve ties with Pyongyang but noted that the DPRK needs to demonstrate it is sincere about disarmament.

Yu added that the DPRK also needs to take responsibility for two attacks last year.

Seoul also on Monday approved plans by religious leaders to make a rare joint visit to the DPRK, as part of efforts to ease strained ties.

Liu Youfa, vice-president of CIIS, said: "Usually it's the DPRK that proposes preconditions, but now it is the other parties that are raising issues."

"This is a new scenario we have to address. Preconditions are not serving any outcomes."

He said the DPRK is serious about resuming the talks, which can help the country hit by both sanctions and famine.

Though all six nations sent officials and scholars to Monday’s seminar in Beijing, only the DPRK and China sent their top negotiators.

Dalchoong Kim, president of the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, told China Daily he thought both sides "can come out with something" after Wednesday's talks.

"What China is doing now as the host of the talk is of vital importance. I personally support it very much. I wish that China can show more leadership," he said.

Reuters said on Monday the seminar "marked a high point for China as a broker on the world diplomatic stage".

 AFP, AP and Ouyang Yuanhua contributed to this story.


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Yonhap News – South Korea
September 20, 2011

S. Korea Seeks 'Fruitful' Nuclear Talks with N. Korea

BEIJING/SEOUL, Sept. 20 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's chief nuclear envoy arrived in Beijing on Tuesday to meet again with his North Korean counterpart, hoping to achieve a "fruitful result" in the meeting aimed at reviving the stalled six-nation talks on ending the North's nuclear weapons programs.

Wi Sung-ilac of South Korea and Ri Yong-ho of North Korea will meet on Wednesday in Beijing for their second meeting since late July. The July contact in Indonesia and a subsequent meeting between senior U.S. and North Korean officials have raised prospects for resuming the six-party talks, but no major progress has been made.

"I will go into the negotiations to achieve a fruitful result since it is the second dialogue," Wi said of the Wednesday meeting as he arrived at the Beijing airport.

Wednesday's talks will span "a wide range of issues regarding the denuclearization" of North Korea, but Wi declined to go into specifics.
The question now is whether North Korea will accept "pre-steps" demanded by South Korea and the U.S. before the resumption of the six-party talks, which also involve China, Russia and Japan.

Seoul and Washington have insisted that Pyongyang halt all nuclear activities, including its uranium enrichment program, and allow U.N. inspectors to monitor the suspension before the six-party talks reopen.

Still, chances for progress at the Wednesday talks appeared to be low as the North's chief envoy Ri on Monday repeated calls for an "unconditional" resumption of the six-party forum.

Before heading to Beijing on Tuesday, Wi told Yonhap News Agency that, "(My) basic position is that I will handle the talks in line with our principles, but I will approach them with an open and flexible mind."

The envoy said he plans to focus on North Korea's steps toward denuclearization and listen to any points the North may raise concerning the issue.

"Rather than discussing a specific (nuclear weapons) program, I plan to talk about making overall progress toward denuclearization," Wi said.

The Beijing talks come two months after the envoys met in Indonesia for the first time in more than two years, setting the tone for renewed diplomatic efforts to reopen the stalled six-party denuclearization talks. The multilateral forum, aimed at ending the North's nuclear weapons programs in return for economic aid, has been dormant since late 2008 due to the North's nuclear and missile tests and its military attacks on the South last year.

Washington also recently held preliminary discussions with Pyongyang to gauge the possibility of restarting the talks.

"We are currently in the process of denuclearization. In that process, the six-party talks are important, but bilateral talks are also a very important factor," Wi said. "From that perspective, inter-Korean denuclearization talks are an essential part of the negotiation process for denuclearization."

North Korea has a track record of using provocations and dialogue with South Korea, the U.S. and other regional powers to try to wrest concessions before backtracking on agreements and abandoning talks.

In November last year, North Korea also revealed the existence of a uranium enrichment facility, adding urgency to international efforts to check Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development.

The North claims the uranium enrichment program is for the development of peaceful energy, but outside experts believe it will give the country a new source of fissile material to make atomic bombs, in addition to its widely known plutonium-based weapons program.

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Yonhap News – South Korea
September 20, 2011

N. Korea’s Cyber Attacks on S. Korean Government Offices on Steep Rise: Lawmaker

SEOUL, Sept. 20 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's attempts to hack the Web sites of South Korea's health ministry and its related organizations are on a steep increase as the information obtained from such organizations could greatly benefit the communist state, a lawmaker said Tuesday.

The number of hacking attempts against the Ministry of Health and Welfare and organizations under its wings jumped over six-fold from 3,349 in 2009 to 17,091 last year, according to Rep. Yoon Seok-yong of the ruling Grand National Party.
The number has already reached 14,669 in the first half of this year, said the lawmaker, citing data provided by the ministry, which is currently undergoing an annual parliamentary audit along with the rest of the government offices.

"Once the network of the health and welfare ministry is breached, the hackers will have all the personal information of each and every one of our citizens," Yoon said in a news release.

Along with increased cyber attacks against all government offices, the North's hacking attempts against the National Pension Service and the National Health Insurance Corp. (NHIC) also increased sharply from 11 cases last year to 41 cases already this year.

An infiltration into the network of the two state organizations could provide North Korea with the vital information of how they manage their large funds, which would allow the communist state to follow their steps and make large profits in South Korea, the lawmaker claimed.

The National Pension Service currently is South Korea's largest investor with an estimated 340 trillion won (US$297 billion) worth of assets under its management.

Yoon also claimed a breach of information on the people's health through a successful hacking attempt at NHIC could assist North Korea in chemical warfare by allowing it to know what diseases and chemicals South Koreans are most vulnerable to.


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The Hindu – India

India to Develop Torpedo Testing Centre in Kyrgyzstan

Press Trust of India (PTI)
September 18, 2011

NEW DELHI: India is planning to develop a facility in Kyrgyzstan to produce state of the art torpedoes in order to strengthen its under water attack capabilities.

The Torpedo Testing Centre located at Issyk Kul lake in Karakul province, 250 kms away from the capital Bishkek, is considered one of the best locations to launch and recover torpedoes fired during test trials.

"The facility was visited by Defence Minister A K Antony a few months ago. An Indian delegation would be visiting Kyrgyzstan soon to make an assessment of investment needed for the project and the terms and conditions for co-developing it," DRDO Chief Controller William Selvamurthy told PTI.

To develop existing infrastructure at the centre, India has proposed to engage local companies with available know how in torpedo technology to co-develop the facility.

"India is willing to develop the Centre to test all kinds of torpedoes such as heavy weight torpedoes and those having thermal navigation system," Selvamurthy said.

The centre has a network of sensors which can monitor the speed, velocity, homing in and direction of the torpedo once it is fired. This enables scientists to make necessary modifications in the navigation system to make the missiles more accurate and fool proof.

The torpedoes fired in the lake are also recoverable enabling the scientists to make physical verification of its structure for further study.

A torpedo is a self-propelled explosive projectile weapons, launched above or below the water surface, propelled under water towards a target.
India is also planning to use the facility to test the Autonomous Underwater Vehicle Developed by Naval Scientific and Technological Laboratory (NSTL).

Developed during the Soviet era, the facility was used by the Russian military as a testing site for torpedo propulsion and guidance systems, and Karakol was home to a sizable population of military personnel and their families.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2464999.ece

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The Nation – Pakistan

‘Pakistan Cashed in on N-Technology’

September 18, 2011

WASHINGTON (Online) - Pakistan spread nuclear weapon technology around the globe in exchange for cash, political influence and help with its own atomic bomb programme, suggest documents obtained by a US news channel.

Among those on the other side of the deals with Pakistan are China, Iran, North Korea and Libya, Fox News said in an exclusive report.

The charges are contained in two documents written by disgraced Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan - long thought to be the mastermind behind an elaborate global supply and procurement network.

The documents obtained by the news channel include the 13-pages confession, the letter to his wife, and a Pakistani intelligence service report on Khan, while the exclusive photographs show the Khans in a variety of intimate settings, including under house arrest.

In early 2004, the Pakistan’s Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) brought Khan in for questioning. Khan’s written confession is a result of those sessions, the news report said. In February 2004, Khan appeared on Pakistan television and put the blame on himself, saying that “proliferation activities...over the last two decades were inevitably initiated at my behest,” following which the then President Pervez Musharraf pardoned Khan and sentenced him to house arrest.

The new AQ Khan documents, however, suggest a different story. On China, Khan writes in the letter to his wife: “We had cooperation with China for 15 years. We put up a centrifuge plant at Hanzhong. We sent 135 C-130 plane loads of machines, inverters, valves, flow meters, pressure gauges.” From China, Pakistan received “drawings of nuclear weapons” and 50 kg of “enriched uranium” - a key component for a nuclear bomb.”

On North Korea, he wrote: “Gen Jehangir Karamat took $3 million through me from the N Koreans and asked me to give them some drawing and machines” related to uranium enrichment. General Karamat was Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff from 1996 to 1998 and ambassador to the United States from 2004 to 2006.”

In an email to the news channel, General Karamat said he categorically denied “this baseless allegation,” adding the claim that he accepted money from Khan was “preposterous, false and a malicious fabrication.”

On supplying Iran with nuclear material, Khan wrote that he gave “a set of drawings and some components to the Iranians,” as well as “the names and addresses of suppliers,” and that he was directed to do so by the then Pakistan prime minister Benazir Bhutto’s defense adviser, General Imtiaz Ali, “probably with the blessing of BB.” General Imtiaz died in 2003. In a note on the letter’s margin, Khan said the documents and parts were delivered to Iran by a Bhutto family confidant.
On Libya, the immediate source of his 2004 downfall, Khan remained evasive, saying, “If the Libyans have any papers/drawings bearing our name or signatures, they must have obtained them from Farooq [a Sri Lankan working with Khan], Tahir or our old suppliers.”

At one time, Khan feared his own government might kill him.

“Darling,” he wrote to his wife in December 2003, “if the government plays any mischief with me, take a tough stand.”

Khan warned his wife that “they might try to get rid of me to cover up all the things (dirty) they got done by me in connection with Iran, Libya & N Korea.”

Economic Times – India

**India Plans to Test-Fire 3,000 km Range 'Agni-2 Prime' by Next Month**

Press Trust of India (PTI)
September 18, 2011

NEW DELHI: India is planning to test fire by next month 'Agni-2 Prime', an advanced nuclear-capable ballistic missile with a strike range of around 3,000 km.

"We are planning to test fire an advanced nuclear capable Agni-2 Prime missile by next month,” Defence Ministry officials said here.

The new missile will be an advancement over the existing Agni-2, which has a strike range of 2,000 km.

The 'Agni-2 Prime' has been developed by making some changes in the Agni 2 missile and will have the same size of boosters which are there in the existing missile but will have an extended range of 1,000 km, they said.

Powered by solid fuel propellants, the 'Prime' will also have a better navigational system and greater accuracy in comparison to the Agni-2 missile.

Newer technologies have also been incorporated in the missile to make it lighter and the weapon system has also been provided with greater thrust.

India has developed a number of variants of the Agni missile series under the Integrated Missile Development Programme (IMDP) with different striking ranges since the 80s.

It is also planning to carry out the first test firing of the Agni-5 ballistic missile by the end of this year, the sources said.

Agni-5 will be able to strike targets in range of 5,000 km and will make India join the league of select nations with such capabilities.

Dawn.com – India

**India, US Urged to Prepare for ‘Worst Case Pakistan Scenarios’**

By Anwar Iqbal
WASHINGTON, Sept 18: The United States and India should begin classified exchanges on multiple Pakistan contingencies, including the collapse of the Pakistan state and the spectre of the Pakistani military losing control of its nuclear arsenal, says a joint US-India study.

The 53-page report, co-sponsored by the US Council on Foreign Relations and the Aspen Institute India, urges New Delhi to open channels of communication with the Pakistan military while advising the United States to do everything possible to assist Pakistan in protecting its nuclear arsenal.

The study group, which aims to promote America’s relations with India, includes key US and Indian scholars and former officials such as Dennis C. Blair, former director of the US national intelligence; Richard Haas, CFR president and former director of policy planning at the State Department; Robert Blackwill, former US Ambassador to India; Brajesh Mishra, India’s former national security adviser; and principal secretary to Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee and former Indian Ambassador to the US Naresh Chandra.

The report released this weekend, stresses the need for cooperation between the US and India on Pakistan and Afghanistan and underlines their concerns on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

“We developed ... possible contingencies regarding developments in Pakistan,” the group’s co-chair, Ambassador Blackwill told the Foreign Policy magazine. “The report says the US strategy (of) using military and civilian assistance to try to persuade the Pakistan military to cease its support for terrorist groups that kill Indians and kill Americans in Afghanistan has failed.”

The report recommends that the United States “heavily condition, from now forward, military aid to Pakistan on the basis of Pakistan moving against these terrorist groups that target Americans and Indians.”

The study claims that Pakistan faces a systemic decline and that makes it very hard for either the United States or India to have an effective policy.

The report says that while the Pakistani military assures the world that its nuclear weapons are in safe hand, there are concerns that cannot be ignored.

“If the society at large becomes more chaotic, more violent, if Islamic extremists have more influence inside the country, then one has to worry whether at some point in which the Pakistan nuclear complex has been penetrated by terrorists or Islamic extremists of other persuasion,” says Mr Blackwill.

“The United States and India should be talking in a contingency way about what one country or the other might try to do in those circumstances. And what the two of them could try to do to prevent that from happening.”

Such discussions would be at a very high level between the United States and India and it would be absolutely crucial that they remained secret, Mr Blackwill adds.

On Afghanistan, the report recommends: “The United States and India should discuss whether large-scale Indian training of Afghan security forces, whether in Afghanistan or in India, would be beneficial.”

The study stresses that the United States should not permit Pakistan to have a de facto veto over the Indian relationship with Afghanistan. “We shouldn’t excite the Pakistani concerns unnecessarily, but we shouldn’t allow those concerns to veto Indian involvement in Afghanistan,” Mr Blackwill says. The report advises both the US and India to “assess very carefully” Pakistan’s possible reaction to India’s involvement in training Afghan security forces but it should not be ruled out prima facie simply because Pakistan wouldn’t like it.

The report suggests that “India’s leadership should develop channels, including military-to-military, to talk with the Pakistani military”.

Ambassador Chandra, the group’s other co-chair, backs the suggestion, noting that India is already dealing with the military in Myanmar while China too has a ‘heavy dose of military’ in the communist leadership. Another
Indian member of the group, Raja Mohan, says that wisdom demands India’s engagement with the Pakistani military as the country’s civilian leadership is not in a position to deliver.


Montgomery Advertiser – Montgomery, AL

**Anniston Facility Set to Burn Last of Chem Weapons**

Monday, September 19, 2011

ANNISTON — An incinerator in Anniston will reach a major milestone this week when it destroys the last of the remaining stockpile of chemical weapons held at an Army depot, The Anniston Star reported Sunday.

Workers delivered the last of the weapons containing mustard agent to the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility on Sept. 8. It's the last batch of some 660,000 chemical weapons including rockets, artillery shells, land mines and mortar rounds that had been stored for decades inside earthen bunkers at the Anniston Army Depot.

"I am relieved," project manager Tim Garrett told the newspaper. "And I'd say I’m proud."

The disposal project began in 2003 when the facility started burning weapons that had been housed nearby since 1963. On Dec. 24, 2008, it destroyed the last of the site's VX nerve agent stockpile — an achievement that Garrett described as a good Christmas present. Now only a few trays of mustard-filled projectiles remain. The weapon — infamously used on troops during World War I — blisters the skin and mucous membranes on contact. In some cases, it can kill.

Calhoun County Commissioner Eli Henderson was once employed as a depot worker tasked with finding leaking nerve agents. Those leaky weapons would be removed from their bunkers, called igloos, fortified, then stored in specially marked bunkers.

"There could have been a bad accident or incident. back then," Henderson said. "I think it's tremendous what the workforce out there has accomplished."

Under federal law, workers at the disposal project must decontaminate, dismantle and raze the facilities that once housed the weapons.

http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/article/20110919/NEWS02/110919005/1009

New York Times

**OPINION/Editorial**

September 16, 2011

**Tehran’s Ambitions**

Five years after the United Nations Security Council ordered it to halt, Iran is still enriching uranium and refusing to come clean about its nuclear program. Tehran is clearly hoping the world will either forget or acquiesce. That would be very dangerous.

The latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency is a chilling reminder of both the scale of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the lengths it will go to cover up the truth. The agency expressed strong concern about Iran’s “past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities” with “possible military dimensions.”

It also said Iran had greatly increased production of uranium to 20 percent purity instead of the 3.5 percent purity normally used to fuel nuclear power plants. That is a significant step closer to the 90 percent threshold required to
make nuclear weapons fuel. Tehran says it wants the stockpile for its medical research reactor but the amount is far more than needed and another reason to be suspicious. Meanwhile, Tehran announced that it is moving its production of higher-grade uranium to a heavily defended underground military site outside the city of Qum.

Iran selectively cooperates with the atomic agency’s inspectors — usually when it is eager to deflect international heat — and last month gave a senior official access to many facilities. But the agency says many questions remain unanswered and it still cannot verify that the program is peaceful. The only good news is that Iran’s program is not advancing as fast as many feared, as a result of the Stuxnet computer worm and sanctions that make it harder for Tehran to import needed materials.

Moscow — Tehran’s longtime trading partner and enabler — now seems determined to let up on the pressure. Russian officials have proposed a “step by step” negotiating approach under which Iran would address outstanding questions and be rewarded with a lifting of sanctions. We do not know all the details but experts say the emphasis seems to be more on lifting sanctions and less on persuading Iran to curtail its nuclear efforts. The atomic agency, under Mohamed ElBaradei, tried a similar approach and got too little from Tehran, while Iran got more time to crank out more enriched uranium.

We’re not sure any mix of sanctions and inducements can work. We are sure that less pressure will guarantee that Iran will keep pushing its nuclear program ahead. The United States and its allies should go back to the Security Council and argue for even tougher punishments — it has been 15 months since the last round of sanctions. That is the only chance of getting Tehran’s attention.


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Korea Times – South Korea
OPINION
September 18, 2011

Conditions to Six-Party Talks
By Tong Kim

A second inter-Korean nuclear contact between South Korean nuclear envoy Wi Sung-lac and North Korean vice foreign minister Lee Young-ho is scheduled for this week in Beijing.

If this meeting finds ways to meet the preconditions to resume the six-party talks as set by Washington, it would turn back the clock to Sept. 19, 2005, when the multilateral talks adopted a landmark joint statement, which is still unanimously supported by the six participants — the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia.

Washington is known to have made it clear during the Bosworth-Kim Gye-kwan meeting at the end of last July in New York that Pyongyang should meet three conditions for the resumption of the six-party talks — suspension of all nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment, a moratorium on missile tests, and improvement of inter-Korean relations.

The U.S. demand for these pre-steps is understandable in terms of its basic position that Washington would not return to the nuclear talks unless Pyongyang shows its serious intent by action. It is also understandable in terms of Washington politics at the Republican Congress, many of whose members simply oppose engagement with the North.

Perhaps the negative image of North Korea on the part of the Republicans in particular and the American people in general is very much a self-inflicted consequence by the North’s own provocative behavior and its repressive system of rule. Pyongyang’s defense of its actions is not understood, except by a few sympathetic ears or some objective realists of international relations.
Pyongyang’s position on Washington’s demand is simply, “Let’s return to the talks without preconditions and negotiate all issues related to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The North Koreans want to keep engaging the United States in search for improved relations.

It is unlikely that the North will fully accept Washington’s conditions, other than by a verbal commitment with some conditions. The North is more likely to negotiate away these steps for some sort of reward or a promise of reward, political or economic, without giving anything away just for resuming the talks, as there is no evidence that the North has not changed its negotiating strategy.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il reportedly told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev last month that the North “could temporarily put a hold on fissile material production and nuclear tests, if the six-party talks are resumed.”

Kim made no mention of the uranium enrichment or missile development program. “Production of fissile material” may exclude the uranium enrichment program (UEP), because the North claims it is for producing energy not nuclear weapons. However, the North knows darn well that its uranium program is a serious concern to Washington and its allies. For Pyongyang, the UEP is one of the best cards it has for negotiation.

The North Korean leader, like any other shrewd politician, only makes a broad general statement of principle. He has been consistent in maintaining his support for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. His subordinates postulate and maneuver Pyongyang’s strategy toward Washington or Seoul. The North Korean foreign ministry said in May 2010 that it would never return to the six-party talks. One reason Pyongyang has reversed its previous positions is probably attributable to the fact that the old stance had not been announced by Kim himself. In other words, Chairman Kim can reverse the positions or strategy determined by his subordinates, even though he approved them.

It should be noted that this week’s North-South meeting in Beijing is not because the North is ready to improve relations with the South, but such dialogue is required by Washington, which closely coordinates its strategy with Seoul. The initial inter-Korea meetings during the ARF last July, while they met the formality of the first step for the resumption of the talks, did not satisfy Seoul in substance.

However, the second nuclear inter-Korean meeting has some significance because first, the North has learned that it cannot go directly to Washington bypassing Seoul, and second, the North is still not responding to the South’s proposals regarding humanitarian aid or the property issue of the Mt. Geumgang tourist complex.

The prospect of improved inter-Korean relations is not clear, despite the appointment of Yu Woo-ik as the new unification minister. During his confirmation hearing last week the nominee made ambiguous statements with respect to what he wants to do except that he would be flexible on humanitarian programs and limited economic projects.

Inter-Korean relations are an internal issue between the North and the South, and it is unlikely they will improve via the six-party talks, whereas improved inter-Korean relations would likely contribute to the multilateral talks. Three conditions should be considered for the improvement of inter-Korean relations — positive North Korean attitude to the South and vice versa, as well as domestic support in the South. At present, these three conditions are unpromising.

In the North, Kim can make a positive decision to move forward, but for the South, it would take democratic presidential leadership with a vision for the future of the Korean Peninsula. As tension continues in Korea, the neighboring countries are engaged in an arms race, especially between China and Japan, each spending increasing resources.

Japan will reportedly soon undertake the construction of a supersize helicopter carrier and purchase stealth fighter-bombers. China has tested a stealth bomber and launched an aircraft carrier and plans to build two more aircraft carriers by 2020. Russia will deploy a nuclear-power submarine in the East Sea and will conduct a joint military exercise with North Korea this year.
South Korea plans to import Apache attack helicopters and unmanned Global Hawk drones for billions of dollars from the United States. Given an assured rise of China and a possible decline of the United States, and the increasing military roles by Japan and Russia, the Korean people should think hard about their security interest. In a rapidly shifting security environment, the two Koreas should improve their relations first, if they want a peaceful peninsula. What’s your take?

**Tong Kim is a visiting research professor at Korea University and at the University of North Korean Studies. He is also adjunct professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.**


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**Analysis: West Fears Possible Iran-North Korea Nuclear Links**

Fredrik Dahl, Reuters

September 18, 2011

VIENNA (Reuters) - It is one of the West's biggest nuclear proliferation nightmares -- that increasingly isolated Iran and North Korea might covertly trade know-how, material or technology that could be put to developing atomic bombs.

"Such a relationship would be logical and beneficial to both North Korea and Iran," said Mark Hibbs, an expert of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Last year, a U.N. report suggested that impoverished, reclusive North Korea might have supplied Iran as well as Syria and Myanmar with banned atomic technology.

In what could be a sign of this, a German newspaper last month reported that North Korea had provided Iran with a computer program as part of intensified cooperation that could help the Islamic state build nuclear weapons.

"There are reports and rumors, which governments and the IAEA (the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency) have not denied, indicating that there may be a track record of bilateral nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Iran," Hibbs said.

But while this could make sense for two states facing tightening sanctions -- and potentially earn Pyongyang some badly needed funds -- the extent and nature of any such dealings, if they take place at all, remain shrouded in mystery.

"It seems to be very difficult to sort out what the relationship in the nuclear world between DPRK (North Korea) and Iran is. We just simply do not know," prominent nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker said.

This was in contrast to missile cooperation between the two countries, where North Korea has helped Iran both with the weapons and in building related factories, he said.

Hecker, who has often visited the east Asian state, said possible Tehran-Pyongyang atomic technology transfers would be a major concern for everyone dedicated to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Iran's nuclear program is based on uranium enrichment, activity which can have both civilian and military purposes.

North Korea has twice tested plutonium-based nuclear devices, drawing international condemnation, although it last year revealed the existence also of a uranium enrichment site, potentially giving it a second pathway to bombs.
"They complement each other so well (in terms of their expertise). There is just a lot of synergy in how they would be able to exchange capabilities," Hecker said at a seminar for diplomats in Vienna, the IAEA's headquarters, this month.

Citing Western intelligence sources, the Munich newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung said in August that North Korea had this year delivered software, originally developed in the United States, that could simulate neutron flows.

Such calculations, which can help scientists identify self-sustaining chain reactions, are vital in the construction of reactors and also in the development of nuclear explosives.

With the help of the program, Iran could gain important knowledge of how to assemble nuclear weapons, the paper said.

WESTERN INTELLIGENCE HUNT

There has been no public confirmation or denial of the report in the West. But Hecker did not rule it out, saying Pyongyang had demonstrated experience in this field.

He said North Korea must have some "nuclear code capabilities" which they would have been able to assess in comparison with the result of an atomic test.

"So to some extent they have had an opportunity to verify or check their codes," Hecker said. "Iran has not had a chance to do that. So exchanging that type of information ... you could see as being very useful."

North Korea tested nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009, but still has not shown it has a working nuclear bomb.

Proliferation experts have said the country has enough fissile material for up to 10 nuclear weapons. But they don't believe Pyongyang is yet capable of miniaturizing the material to fit into the cone of a missile.

While North Korea has made no secret of its nuclear weapons ambitions, Iran denies Western allegations that it is covertly seeking to develop an atomic arms capability.

The Islamic Republic says its nuclear program is for purposes of electricity generation, but its refusal to halt uranium enrichment and its stonewalling of a U.N. nuclear watchdog probe have stoked suspicions abroad.

The Vienna-based U.N. nuclear watchdog said this month in a report that it was "increasingly concerned" about possible work in Iran to develop a nuclear missile.

For several years, the IAEA has been investigating Western intelligence reports indicating Iran has coordinated efforts to process uranium, test high explosives and revamp a ballistic missile cone to accommodate a nuclear warhead.

Iran says the allegations are baseless and forged.

In a separate report on North Korea, from which its inspectors were expelled in 2009, the IAEA suggested past nuclear-related ties with Syria and Libya, but it made no mention of Iran.

Proliferation expert Mark Fitzpatrick said it would not be hard for Tehran and Pyongyang to put "well-practiced trade deals and transfer routes" from their ballistic missile cooperation to use also in the nuclear field. Still, there were few signs of any nuclear cooperation between the two countries.

"It is not for lack of looking. Western intelligence agencies are intensively targeting nuclear acquisition efforts by Iran and North Korea," Fitzpatrick, a former senior U.S. State Department official, said.

"Yet finding nuclear weapons-related trade is akin to the proverbial needle in a haystack. In the vastness of ocean and sky routes, most forms of nuclear-related cargo are so minute as to be almost undetectable."

Hibbs said any nuclear dealings with North Korea would pose risks for Iran: "Were this traffic to be confirmed, that would deepen the suspicion that Iran is involved in nuclear activities which are clandestine and military in nature."
India Cannot Become a Global Power via Arms Buildup

By Hu Zhiyong (Jiefang Daily)
September 19, 2011

India’s military has used China’s rising comprehensive strength as a cover for its non-stop military buildup in the recent years. India has sought to be a “military power” through active military buildup and budget increases in an attempt to continue to cement its leading position in South Asia and around the Indian Ocean, and develop from a regional power to an influential “global power”.

India has already become the world’s largest arms importing country. India will spend 30 billion U.S. dollars purchasing advanced arms by 2012, including 126 advanced fighters for its air force, Russian-made aircraft carriers and ship-borne weapons for the navy, and main battle tanks and anti-tank missiles for its land force.

India has so far refused to sign the “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” and its strategic missile capacity has markedly improved. India has developed “Agni” strategic missiles that have three ranges of 700 kilometers, 2,500 kilometers and 3,500 kilometers and can cover all of its neighboring regions. India also started building its 25th nuclear power reactor in July 2011 and Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. plans to put the new nuclear power reactor into commercial operations by June 2016.

India decided at the end of 2010 to spend up to 5 billion U.S. dollars buying four long-range patrol aircraft and four amphibious warships, and purchase 250 to 300 fifth-generation jet fighters from Russia. India’s second independently developed stealth frigate “INS Satpura” commenced service on Aug. 20, 2011, marking a substantial improvement in the combat capacity of India’s navy. The third stealth frigate “INS Sahyadri” is expected to be put into service in 2012 and will be equipped with domestically made and imported weapon systems and sensors. The development and service of Shivalik-class frigates have marked that India has been among a few countries that can build stealth frigates.

In addition, the navy of India is also planning to cope with future emergencies by building two aircraft carrier battle groups and equipping itself with several stealth battleships, submarines and long-range reconnaissance planes. Currently, India has mastered the technology of producing high-quality ship-body steel and therefore do not depend on foreign resources as much as before.

The navy of India already possesses an aircraft named “Virat” bought from the United Kingdom, and is rebuilding and upgrading another named “Vikramaditya”, which will be completed and launched in December of 2012. In August of 2011, the Defense Minister of India A.K. Anthony said that, in addition to the six submarines being built, the navy of India would purchase another six “seventy-five plan” submarines to strengthen the battle effectiveness of its submarine force. Recently, Russia said that it would deliver the Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine named “Cheetah” to India at the end of 2012. According to the contract, India will rent the submarine for 10 years.

Now, India is still a big regional power and its political influence and military strength are limited in the world. Taking the so-called “China Threat” as an excuse, India is expanding its military strength, but it is still uncertain
that whether India will realize its dream of being a leading power, because India's weak economy is severely unmatched with the image of a leading military power.

In addition, international communities and India's surrounding countries are all suspecting and even being on guard against this kind of unbalanced development mode. Considering it in the viewpoint of geopolitical strategy and regional security, international communities do not want to see a severe military imbalance in South Asia. International communities generally believe that a relatively balanced military situation in the South Asia and the normalization of the India-Pakistan relations are helpful for the stability and development of the Asia-Pacific Region.


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The Tennessean
OPINION

U.S. Should Ratify Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
By Susan Shaer and Kathy Crandall Robinson
September 20, 2011

On Sept. 24, 1996, after intense international negotiations, a verifiable global ban on nuclear test explosions — the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) — was presented for countries to sign.

Because the CTBT clearly benefits U.S. national security by constraining other countries’ nuclear weapons capabilities, the United States played a galvanizing role in test ban negotiations, and was the first in line to sign the treaty. It seemed the over 50 years of nuclear weapons testing that harmed the environment, public health and fueled a dangerous arms race was coming to an end.

For the CTBT to go into effect, however, it must be ratified by the United States and eight other holdout countries. Fifteen years after leading the way for the treaty, the United States has yet to ratify the CTBT. This failure means that we are not reaping the full security advantage of the treaty that the United States worked to achieve. It is time to move from the role of treaty holdout and reassert U.S. leadership to bring the CTBT into effect.

In 1999, the U.S. Senate missed a step on the path to securing this vital test ban when it failed to approve the treaty after a rushed and partisan debate. By now, we’ve seen enough of those. Since 1999, the case for the CTBT has grown stronger. Now it is time for this Senate to take a sober and nonpartisan look at the merits and need for the treaty. As former Secretary of State George Shultz said, “(My) fellow U.S. Republicans may have been right to vote down the nuclear test-ban treaty a decade ago, but they’d be wrong to scuttle it again.”

For two decades, the United States has certified its stockpile without explosive nuclear tests. The knowledge of more than 1,000 U.S. nuclear tests conducted prior to 1992 combined with today’s stellar science-based surveillance methods, leads nuclear weapons scientists to testify that they have more confidence in U.S. nuclear weapons than when they were routinely blowing up tests in Nevada. Without question, the United States has the most sophisticated nuclear arsenal in the world. Put simply, we don’t need to test nuclear weapons — we need to prevent other countries from testing.

The CTBT’s thorough global monitoring system was just being developed when the Senate first considered ratification in 1999. Today, this network is more than 80 percent complete. Many of its capabilities were recently demonstrated in detecting and monitoring the earthquake, aftershocks and radionuclide releases in Fukushima, Japan. The CTBT monitoring, paired with national technical measures, provides a thorough and effective detection system. Bringing the CTBT into effect is essential to making short-notice, on-site inspections possible. No would-be cheater could be confident that a test would go undetected.
The need remains urgent. While the CTBT won’t by itself stop the spread of nuclear threats, it is an essential tool. Banning all tests hinders established nuclear-weapon states like Russia, China and Pakistan from proof-testing new, more sophisticated warhead designs. And without nuclear test explosions, potential nuclear-armed states like Iran would have a far more difficult time developing deliverable nuclear warheads. The possible consequences in failing to do everything we can to detect, deter and confront nuclear testing and nuclear proliferators should unite us all: hawks, doves, Democrats and Republicans. The holdout stance on the CTBT is an ineffectual “lead from behind” position. It’s time for nonpartisan Senate leadership to finish the journey and lock in the security advantage of the CTBT.

Susan Shaer is executive director and Kathy Crandall Robinson is the public policy director of Women’s Action for New Directions (WAND), a national organization empowering women to act politically for sensible budget priorities and sound security measures such as reducing the threats of nuclear weapons.


(End of Article)

New York Times
OPINION/Opinion Page
International Herald Tribune (I.H.T.) Op-Ed Contributor

The Delusion of Missile Defense

By YOUSAF BUTT
September 20, 2011

Last week marked the two-year anniversary of President Obama’s announcement of what was to be a radical new approach to missile defense — the Phased Adaptive Approach. According to this plan, the United States, working with NATO, would ramp up the deployment of a mix of increasingly sophisticated sea- and land-based missile interceptors around Europe in an attempt to guard against future Iranian missiles.

If there’s one issue that still enjoys bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress these days, it’s that cooperating with Russia on this defensive system would be a swell idea. Contain Iran and strengthen ties with Russia: surely a win-win. Unfortunately, missile defense will neither contain Iran nor strengthen ties with Russia. To the contrary, it will lead to more nuclear weapons and a more dangerous world.

The main problem is that the type of missile defense the United States and NATO are planning is particularly easy to defeat. The simplest countermeasures are cheap inflatable balloon decoys. Because the missile defense interceptors try to strike the missile warheads in the vacuum of space, these balloons and any warheads would travel together, making it impossible to tell them apart. An enemy bent on delivering a nuclear payload to the United States could inflate many such balloons near the warhead and overwhelm the defense system by swamping it with fake signals.

The missile defense system depends on radio-frequency and infrared sensors. The simple scientific reason the system will never be able to reliably function in real combat conditions is because the infrared emissions and reflected radio waves from targets can be modified by an attacker to disguise, remove, deny, or simply overwhelm critical information needed by the defense to find attacking warheads.

The latest tests of both the ground-based and sea-based missile defense systems have failed — and these were essentially rigged tests, where the intercept team knew the precise timing and trajectory of the incoming missile.

We Americans would have no such luxury in the real world, where our adversaries will surely also use countermeasures and decoys. And on the few occasions that the Missile Defense Agency has actually tested countermeasures, even these carefully rigged tests have never succeeded. Neither has the sea-based missile-defense system been tested in really rough sea conditions, and it is known to be unreliable beyond a certain sea
state. We could always pray for pleasant weather if and when we are attacked, but should we pin our national security on that?

If missile defense is so simple to outfox, why are our competitors and adversaries so concerned? The answer is simple: Their military planners are properly hyper-cautious, just like the Pentagon, and they must assume a worst-case scenario in which the system is effective, even when it isn’t.

Missile defense strengthens the hands of over-cautious, misinformed, opportunistic or hawkish elements within the Iranian and North Korean — as well as Russian and Chinese — political and military establishments. The interplay between unknowable future circumstances and pressures from internal constituencies demanding a reaction to NATO missile defenses will create pressures on their leaderships to increase deployed nuclear stockpiles and military expenditures.

Since the link between strategic defense and strategic offense is explicitly recognized in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia, it is highly improbable that Russia will ever accept NATO missile defense. Russia is more concerned with capabilities than with intentions. Any system that could raise uncertainties about the strict balance of arms agreed upon in New START would be a natural concern to both parties.

So the central conundrum of midcourse missile defense remains that while it creates incentives for adversaries and competitors of the United States to increase their missile stockpiles, it offers no credible combat capability to protect the United States or its allies from this — increased — weaponry.

Even if we finally got the Russians to agree to it, China’s concerns surely would not evaporate. Indeed, the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission has pointed out that “China may already be increasing the size of its ICBM force in response to its assessment of the U.S. missile defense program.” Such stockpile increases will compel India, and, in turn, Pakistan to also ramp up their nuclear weapon numbers. It may also prod Iran to restart its nuclear weapons work, which it halted in 2003.

Chinese concerns about U.S. missile defense systems are a source of great uncertainty, reducing Chinese support for promoting negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). China’s leaders may wish to maintain the option of future military plutonium production in response to U.S. missile defense plans.

It makes no sense to cooperate with Russia on something so counterproductive to our security just for the sake of cooperation. People who say we need cooperation on missile defense to improve ties with Russia have the logic exactly backward: In large part, the renewed tension between Russia and the United States is about missile defense. Were we to abandon this flawed and expensive idea, our ties with Russia — and China — would naturally improve.

Yousaf Butt, a nuclear physicist, serves as a scientific consultant to the Federation of American Scientists.

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People’s Daily – China

OPINION

Six-Party Talks Should Be Resumed Unconditionally

By Zhong Sheng (People’s Daily)
September 20, 2011

Edited and Translated by People’s Daily Online

The 9/19 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks released six years ago remains the most substantive outcome of the nuclear talks. The statement is not outdated and still has practical guiding significance.
All members of the six-party talks — China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Russia and the United States — made clear commitments on nuclear non-proliferation in the statement, which was aimed at resolving disputes through peaceful means. The relevant parties have been implementing the commitments made in the statement for some time.

Mohamed El Baradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, confirmed that North Korea had shut down its main nuclear reactors, and South Korea temporarily resumed assistance to North Korea. Furthermore, the United States removed North Korea from a list of state sponsors of terrorism.

However, the negotiations later reached a deadlock as North Korea demanded that the sanctions be lifted before it would dismantle its nuclear program, while the United States and South Korea demanded denuclearization before lifting sanctions on North Korea. Both sides have used military drills to press the other side to give way.

The grave situation of the Korean Peninsula has been caused partly by changes in the foreign policies of relevant countries. On one hand, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has reached a crucial stage, and any imprudent action may create an adverse impact on the situation. On the other hand, the foreign policies of South Korea and the United States have changed due to the change of leaders of the two countries.

A case in point of this is South Korea’s shift from the "Sunshine Policy" to the "Denuclearization, Opening and Reunification" policy. Denuclearization has become a precondition for the normalization of relations between South and North Korea. North Korea has maintained a relatively stable foreign policy on nuclear issues in recent years: It will abandon its nuclear weapons program only on condition that it receives practical assistance and retains the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy as well as other development rights. Furthermore, given the military exercises in its surrounding seawaters, North Korea is also worried that it may be “bullied” if without nuclear deterrence.

The challenges concerning the Korean Peninsula situation has become increasingly tough since the six-party talks stalled three years ago, the root cause of which lies in a crisis in confidence and subsequent practical crisis. It is a must now to create an environment that will help restore and rebuild the confidence. If the situation is not properly handled with a big-picture view, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea will fight with each other, jeopardizing the security of the entire region. This is just a backward thrust to resume the six-party talks.

There is also a forward thrust that the Chinese side has always been active in pushing for the talks to resume and other parties concerned are also communicating with each other through different channels in order to produce a solution. Facts have proven that the six-party talks are still the best option because they not only have a fixed mechanism and members but also have achieved some landmark results during previous talks. What is most important is that the six-party talks are an open and multilateral platform that can remove the limitations in bilateral talks, which is that it appears one side is always seeking security at the expense of the other side's security.

Resuming the six-party talks appears to require many preconditions. In fact, "being unconditional" is the greatest precondition. If all of the parties put their several decades of grievances on the table, they can never hold talks together. All preconditions can virtually become the topics of the six-party talks. All parties can only produce results by putting their "conditions" aside and returning to the talks "without conditions."

Addressing issues requires compromises. Although negotiators cannot at first make the compromises that other parties seek, they can resolve the issues step by step through successive contacts and collisions. For the negotiators in the six-party talks, the process will perhaps be painful yet wonderful. Entering into the door to quarrel is far better than being indifferent to each other outside of the door. The parties concerned can only bring the Korean Peninsula the hope of peace and stability by reaching out, listening to each other and increasing interactivity.

Security and FMCT

By Zahir Kazmi
September 20, 2011

THE Cold War showed that an increased number of arms can also help in stabilising relations. So can Pakistan reduce the possibility of war and increase crisis stability with India if it builds an assured second-strike capability?

Second-strike capability — absorbing a pre-emptive or decapitating strike — also means credible deterrence. Continued production of fissile material, especially plutonium, is necessary till enough bombs are made for a credible deterrence.

Once Pakistan has developed assured second-strike capability — which may not be too far away — the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) may possibly be negotiated. Thereafter, it’s irrelevant if India has a triad — air, land and sea-based nuclear capability — of 400 or 4,000 weapons.

If these assertions are too strong, consider why the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union built nuclear forces leading to mutually assured destruction (MAD). Their perilous relations lasted for several decades and eased only after 1991. Yet Russia and the US are still a few thousand nuclear warheads and a lifetime away from disarmament.

The lesson is that states build trust but verify. Hence, South Asians will need to go through a cycle of learning and growth before arms control or disarmament. Taking heed from the Cold War, South Asians could first sit for confidence-building measures. However CBMs don’t always achieve anything tangible because many conflicts remain unresolved. Also, there is a less talked-about issue. Realpolitik breeds selective western policies in South Asia and thus less patience with Pakistan. The bitterness over the FMCT is a case in point.

The US may take up the matter at the UN General Assembly’s session because it secured the permanent five’s (P5) support in July, especially China. It wants to jumpstart negotiations on the FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Other P5 members may not support setting up a ‘new kitchen’ outside the CD.

The FMCT has been in limbo for a long time. Pakistan has taken a principled position for the last three years because of differences on the scope of the treaty; it also wants regional security issues addressed. Prevention of the arms race in outer space, negative security assurances and nuclear disarmament also remain unresolved at the CD. The FMCT gained focus because it is high on President Obama’s Prague Agenda, which seeks a nuclear weapons-free world. A breakthrough may help re-election. Frustrated, the US sees using the UNGA platform as an alternative to break the impasse. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a precedent.

The CTBT was introduced after the big powers tested thousands of weapons. The US conveniently became a strong proponent of the CTBT after testing 1,054 weapons and launching two nuclear attacks. It still mulls over ratifying the treaty. Similarly, the big powers wanted an FMCT only after building large stockpiles of fissile material and negotiating a treaty that takes their reserves into account is not in their interest.

South Asians may appear to be caught in an arms race but they are building credible power. Islamabad aims to deter India, while New Delhi calls both Islamabad and Beijing adversaries and has ambitions beyond the Indian Ocean. With a smaller wallet, Pakistan offers no market for conventional arms or big-buck nuclear energy commerce. Conversely, India has a $100bn budget for conventional arms acquisition alone and is quickly building up a nuclear force triad.
Since New Delhi can pay its bills, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) gravitates towards it. The NSG was created following the ‘peaceful’ explosion in 1974 by a state that misused technology transferred for peaceful purposes. Now the NSG considers that state’s proliferation record excellent.

Pakistan is not allowed that dispensation for a poor proliferation record. Islamabad has taken measures to prevent proliferation by non-state actors, yet there is no deal. Interestingly, inter-state proliferation continues in defiance of the NPT and domestic laws of proliferating states.

The fundamental question is how much fissile material would Pakistan need before negotiating the FMCT? A comparative assessment of current plutonium stocks and production capacities will be helpful. Fourteen Indian reactors are under the IAEA’s watch. After the Indo-US nuclear deal, eight Indian reactors were free for fissile material production.

India currently holds over 1,000 warheads’ worth of plutonium stocks approximately. It can potentially make 500 warheads a year. Conversely, Pakistan reportedly has plutonium stocks for 30 warheads and can produce up to five plutonium warheads per year.

Uranium ore needed for fissile material is not inexhaustible and Pakistan may halt fissile material production sooner than India. Even then, the combined South Asian arsenals will be a very small fraction compared to those of the Russians or the US. Hence, the haste to begin FMCT negotiations has other motives.

Jumpstarting FMCT negotiations without Pakistan will be meaningless. If the purpose is to see a stable South Asia, Pakistan’s efforts to avoid war with India and enhance crisis stability by building assured second-strike capability should be appreciated.

The sooner it is done the better.

India will be deterred once it perceives that Pakistan has a credible second-strike capability. A fully operational Indian nuclear triad and gigantic conventional military capability will deter Pakistan too. MAD will provide an incentive for CBMs instead of dillydallying.

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China Daily – China
OPINION

Defense Policy Still Defensive

September 20, 2011
By Meng Xiangqing (China Daily)

The Information Office of the State Council, China’s Cabinet, published a white paper on the country’s peaceful development on Sept 6 to make it clear that the goal of China’s peaceful development is to achieve modernization and prosperity for its people.

China’s defensive defense policy for peaceful development is manifested in three factors.

First, it combines safeguarding national interests with opposition to military expansionism, focusing on resisting aggression, safeguarding national unity and opposing separatism. A peaceful and stable security environment is a prerequisite for China’s sustainable development. China is fully aware that military plunder and abuse of power are against the trend of the times. That’s why it emphasizes mutual benefit, which helps achieve and maintain
national security. It firmly opposes hegemony, abuse of military power, aggression and expansionism, and seeks no control beyond its territory.

Second, it combines peaceful settlement of disputes with maintenance of its core interests. Since the beginning of reform and opening-up, China has endeavored to create a peaceful international environment and favorable external conditions, and believes in resolving international disputes through dialogue or non-military means to prevent individual issues from intensifying and disturbing peace and the overall situation. This has been China's policy to maintain fast economic growth and peaceful development.

Third, China's defensive defense policy combines its endeavor to modernize its national defense by promoting regional security cooperation. That China has made economic construction the core of its basic national policy shows that there is coordinated development between its economic growth and military buildup, and no possibility of unjust military aggressions.

This is the first time that a government proclamation, in the form of a white paper, has defined China's core interests, which include sovereignty, territorial integrity, national reunification and national security, by maintaining its political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and ensuring sustainable economic and social development.

China's policy of developing good-neighborly relations ensures that to avoid being caught in a "security dilemma", it considers neighboring countries' security concerns, promotes common regional and cooperative security, values the enhancement of military mutual trust and cooperation with other countries, and does not engage in regional arms race or try to impose regional hegemony.

History has proved (and will continue to prove) that China's defensive national defense policy is not temporary but a determined choice for peaceful development and a firm foreign policy, which conforms to its historical and cultural traditions.

The white paper makes it clear that China is justified in modernizing its defense capabilities for its national security and to protect its peaceful development. China's overall security situation may be stable, but it faces multiple traditional and non-traditional security challenges, including the threat of separatism and terrorism.

China is one of the few countries facing a complicated geopolitical environment. It has a vast land and sea area with a land border of more than 22,000 kilometers and a coastline of over 18,000 km. Therefore, China's fundamental purpose of modernizing its armed forces is to safeguard the country's sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and national development. China is a responsible member of the international community, and it needs to modernize its military to fulfill its international responsibilities and obligations.

China's defense expenditures are moderate and in keeping with the need to safeguard its national security, and its military spending has increased in recent times because of a number of objective reasons.

First, from the 1980s to the mid-1990s, China tightened its military spending because it had to divert its financial resources toward economic construction. That resulted in many practical problems that need to be solved now. The low pay for military personnel is one such prominent problem. So the rising military spending in recent years is partly to compensate the military personnel.

Second, there is a new round of military innovations across the world. In contrast, China's defense modernization is still in the mechanization and semi-mechanization stages. If China doesn't put in more effort to promote information technology (IT) in its military, its defense capabilities will become less effective and its peaceful development will suffer. Promoting IT in its defense setup is a costly affair for China, a developing country starting from a relatively low level of defense modernization, and this has increased its military spending.

Third, China has not formed an alliance with any other country or group of countries, which means it cannot and does not get low-cost high-tech equipment from developed countries, unlike their allies. China can only rely on its own efforts, which naturally increases the cost of its defense modernization.
Fourth, the threat of separatist forces has prompted China to be prepared, which requires huge expenses.

Fifth, China needs funds to carry out non-military operations. The Chinese military needs to take on more non-military missions, including providing domestic and international disaster relief, and escorting ships in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast.

Sixth, because of rising oil prices in the international market and commodity prices at home, China's military spending cannot but go up. Although China's defense spending in recent years has increased, it is still relatively low as a percentage of its GDP when compared with that of the United States and Japan and some other countries.

As for so-called military transparency, no country in the world can be absolutely transparent. But China's military has become more transparent over the past 20 years, and its strategic intention is better known than many other major powers'. For example, China is the only nuclear power to have declared that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and it will never use or threaten to use them against non-nuclear-weapon states or in nuclear-weapons-free zones. If other countries follow its policy, they would be contributing greatly to world peace, stability and development.

The anxiety of the international community that China will turn its growing economic strength into military might and thus dominate the world is unwarranted. The fundamental purpose of modernizing the Chinese military is to safeguard China's sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and people's peaceful life and development, rather than entering an arms race or pursuing hegemony and external expansion.

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