



# **USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER**

# **CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL**

*Maxwell AFB, Alabama*

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Issue No. 881, 15 February 2011

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FARS News Agency – Iran  
February 13, 2011

## **Diplomat Underscores Iran's Opposition to N. Weapons**

TEHRAN (FNA) - A senior Iranian diplomat stressed Iran's strong opposition to nuclear arms, and lashed out at the US and certain western countries for their refusal to dismantle and annihilate their atomic weapons despite having a dark record in using such weapons against the other nations.

"The Islamic Republic of Iran, based on its religious teachings which basically oppose concepts like killing and massacre, has always called for the annihilation of all the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in all forms and types," Iranian Ambassador to Moscow Seyed Mahmoud Reza Sajjadi said in a statement on Sunday.

He also reiterated that Iran's military-defensive doctrine is based on the dismantlement and annihilation of all WMDs from across the globe.

Dismissing certain states' allegations against Iran that the country seeks to develop nuclear weapons, Sajjadi underlined that such issues are raised at a time when the terrible memories of the United States' atomic bombs dropped on the innocent Japanese people are still remembered in the country.

Iran has repeatedly called for global nuclear disarmament, including in the Middle East region where the Zionist regime has stockpiled hundreds of nuclear warheads with open support by the US and its European allies.

Iran, an NPT-signatory, has repeatedly called for the removal of all weapons of mass destruction from across the globe.

The UN General Assembly approved a draft resolution proposed by Iran on nuclear disarmament in October 2009 amid strong opposition by the US, Britain, France, Israel and a number of western countries.

The resolution ratified in the first committee of the UN General Assembly called on all nuclear countries to annihilate their nuclear weapons under the supervision of international bodies.

More than 100 countries, including non-nuclear members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), voted for the resolution.

The resolution also urged Israel to join the NPT and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect its nuclear installations.

Also in pursuit of global nuclear disarmament, Tehran held a conference on nuclear disarmament on April 18-19 with officials from different world countries in attendance.

During the two-day conference, world officials, politicians, envoys and nuclear experts from 60 world countries put their heads together to find ways to remove their concerns with regard to challenges on nuclear disarmament, countries' commitment to nuclear dismantlement and disarmament and aftermaths of inaction in the destruction of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).

<http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8911241199>

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Khaleej Times – U.A.E.

## **Bomb Attack Survivor is New Iran Atom Chief**

Agence France-Presse (AFP)  
13 February 2011

TEHRAN - Iran has appointed nuclear scientist Fereydoon Abbasi Davani, who survived a bomb attack in November, as the country's new atomic chief, state television reported on its website on Sunday.

Abbasi Davani, a target of UN sanctions, replaces Ali Abkar Salehi who was endorsed as foreign minister last month.

The announcement of his appointment was declared in an order issued by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the television website said.

"You are hereby appointed as a vice president and head of Atomic Energy Organisation considering the level of your commitment, piety and fruitful scientific and executive records," Ahmadinejad said in the appointment order carried by the website.

Abbasi Davani, a senior figure in Iran's nuclear programme, was wounded in a bomb attack on November 29 in Tehran which the Islamic republic blamed on the CIA and Mossad.

He survived the attack, but another senior nuclear scientist, Majid Shahriari, was killed in a similar assault on the same day in a separate part of the capital.

Tehran police said that the twin attacks were carried out by men on motorcycles who attached bombs to the scientists' cars as they were driving to work.

Iranian media reports said Abbasi Davani, 52, is the head of the physics department at Tehran's Imam Hossein University, which is close to Iran's elite military force the Revolutionary Guards.

Abbasi Davani was targeted by UN Security Council sanctions under Resolution 1747 adopted in March 2007. He was identified as a senior defence ministry and armed forces logistics scientist.

He is one of the few Iranian specialists who can separate isotopes and has been a member of the Guards since the 1979 Islamic revolution, media reports say.

[http://www.khaleejtimes.com/darticlen.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2011/February/middleeast\\_February471.xml&section=middleeast](http://www.khaleejtimes.com/darticlen.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2011/February/middleeast_February471.xml&section=middleeast)

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The Australian – Australia

## **UN's Nuclear Monitoring Chief Says Iran is "Steadily" Producing Enriched Uranium**

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

February 14, 2011

IRAN is "steadily" producing enriched uranium, the head of the UN nuclear monitoring organisation said in an interview published in The Washington Post today.

Yukia Amano, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, expressed concern it might be pursuing military goals.

"Iran is somehow producing uranium enriched to 3.5 per cent and 20 per cent. They are producing it steadily, constantly," Amano told the newspaper.

Iran is at loggerheads with the West over its nuclear program of uranium enrichment, and the last round of talks between Tehran and the world powers broke down in Istanbul last month.

Western powers led by the US suspect Iran is masking a weapons drive under the guise of a civilian atomic program, a charge strongly denied by the Islamic republic.

Iran is under four sets of UN sanctions and other unilateral punitive measures imposed by several countries, including the US and the European Union.

"We receive information from various countries and collect information from our own sources that give us concern over the possible use of nuclear materials for military purposes - in the past and perhaps now," Amano said.

But the IAEA did not have hard evidence implicating Tehran in nuclear bomb making, he said.

"We are not sure if they are hiding something," Amano noted. "We don't have a smoking gun. We have concerns."

<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/uns-nuclear-monitoring-chief-says-iran-is-steadily-producing-enriched-uranium/story-e6frg6so-1226005831436>

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France24.com – France

15 February 2011

## **Syria Still Stonewalling UN Nuclear Probe: Diplomats**

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

Syria has snubbed a request by UN atomic watchdog chief Yukiya Amano for prompt access to a suspect nuclear site and a number of other locations, diplomats said on Tuesday.

After more than two years of deadlock on the issue, Syria could therefore find itself under intensified scrutiny at a meeting of the 35-member board of governors of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency next month.

A number of countries could start even pushing for a possible resolution against Damascus or perhaps table the idea of a so-called "special inspection", a rarely-used tool that allows UN inspectors to request more intrusive access to sites, the diplomats told AFP, speaking on condition of anonymity.

And if Syria were to block that request, it could face possible referral to the UN Security Council.

The IAEA has been investigating allegations since 2008 that Syria had been building an undeclared reactor at a remote desert site called Dair Alzour until it was bombed by Israeli planes in September 2007.

Damascus granted UN inspectors one-off access to the site in June 2008 but no follow-up visits to either Dair Alzour or other possible related sites since then.

On the basis of that one visit, the IAEA has already said the building bore some of the characteristics of a nuclear facility.

UN inspectors also detected "significant" traces of man-made uranium there, as yet unexplained by Damascus.

In what diplomats saw at the time as a sign of Amano's growing impatience, the watchdog chief sent a letter to Syria's foreign ministry on November 18 asking the government to provide the IAEA with prompt access to relevant information and locations" connected to an alleged nuclear site.

Amano himself described it as the first time that an IAEA director general had contacted the Syrian government directly with regard to the agency's probe.

Nevertheless, Syria "has failed so far to come up with any of the information or access that Amano was looking for," one western diplomat said.

The United States, in particular, could be among those pushing for a special inspection.

On December 2, a number of US lawmakers wrote to President Barack Obama asking him to press the IAEA for such a move.

But some diplomats here caution against using such a tool at this stage.

The last time the IAEA resorted to such a measure was in North Korea in 1993. Pyongyang defied the request and subsequently went on to develop a nuclear weapon capacity.

"So, the question here is what action could the IAEA could take if Syria similarly refused," one diplomat said.

The IAEA board of governors is scheduled to convene for its traditional spring meeting from March 7-11, where, alongside the Syrian issue, the long-running probe into Iran's controversial nuclear programme will once again dominate discussions.

<http://www.france24.com/en/20110215-syria-still-stonewalling-un-nuclear-probe-diplomats>

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

## **Russia Can No Longer Support Future Sanctions against Iran - Lavrov**

15 February 2011

Russia will not support future sanctions against Iran, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in London on Tuesday.

"With the approval of Resolution 1929 in [June] last year, practical possibilities to impose sanctions on those related - even indirectly - to the Iranian nuclear program have been exhausted," Lavrov said at a news conference with his British counterpart William Hague.

The Iran Six, which comprises Russia, the United States, China, Britain, France and Germany, has been trying since 2003 to convince Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program.

The UN Security Council passed a resolution imposing sanctions on Iran on June 9, 2010, after Tehran announced its plans to enrich uranium to 20 percent.

"Further sanctions would mean the suppression of the Iranian economy and creation of social problems for the population," Lavrov said. "We cannot support this."

Russia, which had long opposed new sanctions, supported the UN resolution after admitting that Tehran had failed to prove that its nuclear activities had a peaceful nature.

The latest round of talks between six international mediators and Iran over its nuclear program, which took place in Istanbul, yielded no significant results. Both Russia and the EU said they were disappointed with the talks.

LONDON, February 15 (RIA Novosti)

<http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110215/162616657.html>

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The West Australian – Australia

## **Diplomacy Stalemate over North Korea's Nuclear Programme**

By Ju-min Park, Reuters

February 12, 2011

SEOUL (Reuters) - China does not back efforts by Washington and Seoul to punish North Korea at the United Nations for its uranium enrichment programme and wants six-party talks to deal with the issue, a top South Korean envoy said on Saturday.

International disagreement over how to deal with the North's growing nuclear capability comes just days after inter-Korean talks collapsed, as diplomatic efforts to defuse simmering tensions on the divided peninsula faltered.

The six-party talks, which offer Pyongyang aid and diplomatic recognition in return for disabling its nuclear weapons programme, were last held two years ago. They collapsed when the North quit in protest against U.N. sanctions for its nuclear and missile tests.

The six-way talks started in 2003 and are chaired by China, and also involve the United States, Japan and Russia.

"Both sides were concerned about it (the North's uranium enrichment programme) and will work closely," the South's nuclear envoy Wi Sung-lac told Reuters after a two-day visit to Beijing to discuss the issue with his Chinese counterpart.

But Wi said China disagreed that the United Nations should be involved, and said the six-sided forum should deal with it.

The North and its main ally and benefactor China have called for the six-party talks to be restarted, but Washington, Seoul and Tokyo have questioned the North's sincerity about denuclearizing, pointing to its uranium enrichment as proof.

Tensions spiked on the peninsula last year after the sinking of South Korean warship and the North's shelling of a remote South Korean island. The North denies it was responsible for sinking the ship and says it was provoked into shelling the island.

In November, the North raised international security concerns when it revealed big advances in its uranium enrichment programme, giving it a second route to make an atomic bomb along with its plutonium programme.

The North says the uranium programme is for peaceful energy means, but Washington and Seoul says it contravenes a 2005 agreement and Security Council resolutions, and that Pyongyang should be reprimanded by the United Nations.

Both Beijing and Washington have said that before the six-party nuclear talks can reconvene, the two Koreas, still technically at war after signing only a truce to end the 1950-53 Korean War, must iron out their differences at bilateral talks.

This week, military officers from the two Koreas met for the first time since last November's attack on Yeonpyeong island, but discussions collapsed when they failed to agree on an agenda and rank of participants for a higher-level meeting.

Analysts say the two Koreas will likely return to the negotiating table again, under pressure from Beijing and Washington. However, they say six-party talks are a long way off as both the South and the United States doubt the North's sincerity.

*Writing by Jeremy Laurence; Editing by Ron Popeski*

<http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/-/world/8823889/diplomacy-stalemate-over-north-koreas-nuclear-programme/>

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The Malaysian Insider – Malaysia

## **China Openly Backs North Korea Succession Plan**

Reuters

February 15, 2011

SEOUL, Feb 15 — A top Chinese official has backed ailing North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's plans to hand power to his son, the North's state media said on Tuesday, hailing the "successful solution" to allow continued socialist rule.

Meng Jianzhu, China's public security minister, congratulated Kim's youngest son Jong-un on his appointment as vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission last year, "hailing the successful solution of the issue of succession to the Korean revolution," KCNA news agency reported.

Experts said the term "succession" did not refer directly to family rule, but was a commonly used expression referring to a continuation of the North's current political system.

"(But) we can interpret that as a sign of acceptance on the part of China's political and power elite with regards to North Korea's succession," said Park Young-ho, of the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul.

Meng gave gifts to both Kim Jong-il, who celebrates his 69th birthday on Wednesday (tomorrow), and his son, KCNA reported.

Kim Jong-un was last year named as a four-star general and given high ranking political positions, signalling the start of the third-generation power transition in the secretive state.

Until the younger Kim's appointments, state media had never even reported the existence of Kim's children. Little is known about Jong-un other than that he is in his late twenties, and was educated in Switzerland.

China is the North's main ally and benefactor, and has stood by Pyongyang despite international criticism over the North's revelations last year of big advances in its nuclear programme, as well as two deadly attacks on the peninsula.

China provides more than 80 per cent of the North's food and oil and has invested heavily in the isolated state in recent year, when Pyongyang has been under international sanctions for nuclear and missile tests.

The North's reclusive leader, suspected of having suffered a stroke in 2008, visited China twice last year, trips analysts and officials say were mainly aimed at winning Beijing's support for his hereditary succession process.

Beijing has nudged Pyongyang to change its ways and follow China's path of economic reform, but its paramount concern is stability and it sees a continuation of family rule as the best guarantee of this.

China worries that any regime change in the North could cause a flood of refugees to cross its border, precipitate reunification of the peninsula on the South's terms and bring American influence right up to its border.

Kim Jong-un was appointed in September as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the ruling Workers' Party, which oversees the North's 1.2 million-strong military headed by his father.

Meng is in the North Korean capital on the first leg of a tour that will also take him to Laos, Singapore and Malaysia.

<http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/world/article/china-openly-backs-north-korea-succession-plan/>

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Bloomberg News.com

## **South African Threatened to Spread Foot-And-Mouth Disease in U.S. and U.K**

By Nicky Smith

February 14, 2011

Brian Patrick Roach, who faces terrorism charges in South Africa over alleged threats to release foot-and-mouth disease in the U.K. and U.S., said he was demanding \$4 million to pay white farmers who suffered losses in Zimbabwe.

Roach, 64, who appeared briefly before Magistrate Renier Boshoff in a Wynberg, Johannesburg court today, was charged with “threatening acts of terrorism” and money laundering,” National Prosecuting Authority spokesman Mthunzi Mhaga told reporters outside the court.

A stooped, grey-haired man with an unkempt mustache, Roach was arrested on Feb. 11 in a sting operation while picking up containers he believed held the payment.

Roach, according to his charge sheet, started sending letters and e-mails in July to the U.K.’s Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs that threatened “to use a foot and mouth disease contaminated product to infect a large portion of the beef and swine livestock throughout the U.K.”

Investigation of the threats began “soon after they were made,” Mhaga said. The South African Police Service collaborated with the London Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The police have evidence Roach never had the ability to carry out his threats, Mhaga said. Roach is being held in custody at the Bramley police station in Johannesburg until he appears in court on Feb. 18 to apply for bail, which the state will oppose, Mhaga said.

Kruggerands

Roach wanted the money to be paid in Krugerrands because they were “untraceable,” according to the charge sheet. The gold coins had to be placed in 20-kilogram (44-pound) packages and “ideally disguised as something of no or low value,” and left in a locked garage, with the keys to be placed in the toilet of a designated restaurant, it said.

Roach also threatened the U.S. beef industry, according to excerpts of a letter contained in the charge sheet.

“In the event of payment not being made, the farms in the United Kingdom would be devastated and a higher amount demanded from the Government of the United States of America,” Roach allegedly wrote in a letter contained in the charge sheet.

Roach justified his threats by claiming that the money was to help farmers in neighboring Zimbabwe who allegedly suffered losses as a result of the U.K.-brokered peace deal at Lancaster House that ended Zimbabwe’s independence war and brought Robert Mugabe into office as the elected prime minister in 1980. He referred to now President Mugabe as “the tyrant from hell.”

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-14/south-african-threatened-to-spread-foot-and-mouth-disease-in-u-s-and-u-k.html>

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SpaceWar.com

## **Russian Military Border Moves Worry Allies: US Official**

By Staff Writers

Warsaw, Agence France-Presse (AFP)

February 11, 2011

NATO members behind the former Iron Curtain are concerned by Russia's military moves in its Baltic territory of Kaliningrad, a senior US arms-control official said Friday.

"Clearly there are concerns, and I've heard them expressed not only here in Poland but in other countries in the region," said Rose Gottemoeller, US assistant secretary of state.

"There is a generalised concern about Kaliningrad, and the Russian propensity, every time a concern is aroused in Moscow, to say 'Time to bring something else to Kaliningrad'," she told reporters.

Gottemoeller Friday wrapped up a visit to ex-communist Poland, which joined NATO in 1999, and former Soviet-ruled Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which entered the Western military alliance in 2004.

Kaliningrad, sandwiched between the Baltic Sea, Poland and Lithuania, is a military hub.

On Tuesday Lithuania's Defence Minister Rasa Jukneviene told the media Russia had deployed short-range nuclear missiles there.

They are not covered by the freshly-updated US-Russia START arms reduction treaty on long-range warheads.

Gottemoeller declined to comment on Lithuania's claim.

"I officially will not confirm or deny the deployment of nuclear weapons anywhere, neither within NATO countries nor anywhere else in the region," she said.

Rumours about a missile deployment -- and concerns over bolstered Russian forces in Kaliningrad -- have surfaced regularly.

In November Russia dismissed US media reports that it had moved short-range missiles to Kaliningrad earlier in 2010 despite pledges made as long ago as 1991.

Moscow had first threatened to deploy Iskander missiles -- which have a range of around 400 kilometres (250 miles) -- there in November 2008.

In September 2009, however, it said it had scrapped the idea after US President Barack Obama shelved an anti-missile plan for Europe pushed by his predecessor George W. Bush.

But in February 2010 it revived the spectre. The Obama administration has produced new plans to base anti-missile facilities in Moscow's Cold War-era stamping ground.

Washington has insisted it aims to counter potential Iranian attacks, but Moscow has countered that such facilities would undermine Russian security.

[http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Russian\\_military\\_border\\_moves\\_worry\\_allies\\_US\\_official\\_999.html](http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Russian_military_border_moves_worry_allies_US_official_999.html)

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

## **Russia to Deploy Modern Missile Defense Systems on Disputed Kuril Islands**

15 February 2011

Moscow will deploy reinforcements to include short- and long-range air defense missile systems including the latest S-400 Triumf system to the southern Kuril Islands to protect Russia's sovereignty in the Far East, a high-ranking official in the General Staff of the armed forces said on Tuesday.

Military support with modern weaponry is a must for the security of the islands, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said in a meeting last week with Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and Regional Development Minister Viktor Basargin.

Four sparsely populated islands (Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and Habomai) in the Kuril chain between Japan's northern island of Hokkaido and Russia's Far Eastern Kamchatka Peninsula were annexed by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II but are still claimed by Japan.

The dispute over the islands, called the Northern Territories in Japan, has prevented Russia and Japan from signing a formal peace treaty.

The General Staff official said S-400 missile defense systems could be deployed to the islands to protect them from possible attacks.

Prior to Medvedev's visit to one of the disputed islands in November, Japan voiced its concerns saying the arrival of the Russian leader could complicate bilateral relations, but Russia's Foreign Ministry rejected Tokyo's attempts to change Medvedev's plans saying he "defines the routes of trips across his country on his own."

The visit was the first trip by a head of state of Russia or the former Soviet Union to the South Kuril Islands.

Soon after landing on Kunashir Island, Medvedev uploaded on his Twitter account a photograph of Kunashir's landscape made by him with the note: "There are so many picturesque places in Russia. Kunashir."

Speaking during a rally in Tokyo on February 8, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan called Medvedev's visit to the islands last November an "inexcusable rudeness," sparking an angry response from Moscow.

MOSCOW, February 15 (RIA Novosti)

[http://en.rian.ru/military\\_news/20110215/162608640.html](http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20110215/162608640.html)

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The Guardian – U.K.

## **Coalition Split on Post-Trident Nuclear Deterrent**



*Lib Dem armed forces minister criticises defence secretary Liam Fox's assumption of like-for-like replacement*

By Richard Norton-Taylor

Monday 14 February 2011

Deep fissures are opening up among the coalition's senior defence policymakers over the future of Britain's nuclear deterrent, the Guardian can disclose.

The splits are being exposed as it emerges that senior officials have not drawn up assessments for ministers about alternatives to replacing the existing Trident fleet of nuclear missile submarines.

Despite this, Liam Fox, the defence secretary, insists the fleet must be replaced by a "like for like" system.

At the centre of the dispute is whether Britain should persist with a continuous at-sea deterrent (CASD) – that is, having one nuclear-armed submarine on patrol every day of the year.

Nick Harvey, the Liberal Democrat armed forces minister and Fox's deputy at the MoD, is now openly challenging the defence secretary's assumptions.

"Alternatives didn't seem to have been given detailed or objective assessments," he said.

"The debate has been very much 'yes' or 'no' to this single notion [CASD] of how a credible deterrent can be provided."

He added: "Supporters of this policy come at it in a very single-minded way and anyone who does not agree is [regarded as being] implacably opposed to a deterrent of any kind."

Referring to the agreement to delay until after the next general election a decision on how to replace the existing Trident fleet, Harvey said: "We now have a period of time for a mature debate about alternatives and approaches and the necessary work to be commissioned."

Fox and his supporters believe a post-2015 decision would only consider the number of submarines needed for CASD – whether it can be guaranteed by three boats or by four, as at present – and the number of warheads and missiles on each one.

Under the terms of the coalition agreement, the Lib Dems can continue arguing for alternative – and cheaper – ways of maintaining and delivering nuclear weapons.

However, Fox appeared to have bounced the Lib Dems into agreeing with the CASD posture when he told the Commons on 1 February: "It is clear from the coalition agreement that we are committed to maintaining a continuous at-sea minimum credible nuclear deterrent that will protect this country from nuclear blackmail and ensure that we make our role apparent in reductions in total nuclear armaments."

The defence secretary is supported by Tory backbenchers and navy chiefs. However, there is growing concern within the MoD and among army commanders about the cost and need for a like-for-like Trident replacement, especially in light of the chancellor's insistence that the capital cost – estimated initially to be £20bn – as well as the running costs should come out of the core defence budget.

Concerns are now also spreading to senior Labour ranks. Lord Browne of Ladyton, defence secretary when the Blair government made its case for replacing Trident in 2007 – when it had to rely on Conservative votes – says he was not presented with sufficient facts and figures about the choices open to the government.

He is co-chair of a new cross-party Trident commission sponsored by the British American Security Information Council (Basic) a defence thinktank.

He attacked the government for excluding nuclear weapons from its recent strategic defence review.

Ian Kearns, Basic's research director, said he recently asked a government official what studies had been made into how long it would take and what it would cost to reconstitute the Trident deterrent if it were withdrawn from active deployment.

The answer was none. Harvey called the omission "extraordinary".

Lord Guthrie, former chief of defence staff and a member of the commission, said he wanted to look into the "opportunity costs" of replacing the system.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/feb/14/coalition-split-on-trident-replacement>

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# U.S. to Stop Funding NATO Missile Defense Program

February 14, 2011

Reuters

WASHINGTON — The United States on Monday said it would stop funding a multibillion-dollar U.S.-European missile defense program known as MEADS after fiscal year 2013, calling it unaffordable in the current budget climate.

"Our partners may go forward with some MEADS, but it is not our plan to do so," the Pentagon's comptroller Robert Hale told a budget briefing. He was referring to Italy and Germany.

Lockheed Martin Corp leads an international consortium developing the Medium Extended Air Defense System, or MEADS, in partnership with Italy and Germany.

The Pentagon said it remained concerned about the overall track record of the program and might ordinarily have canceled it. But Hale noted that continuing development of the program until 2013 would avoid costly termination fees and benefit the partner nations on the program.

A Pentagon fact sheet said the program had experienced a number of technical and management challenges since its start in the mid-1990s. It said that although the program had shown marked improvement in recent years, it had been unable to meet schedule and cost targets.

It said a recent restructuring proposal would have extended the design and development phase by some 30 months, requiring at least \$974 million in additional U.S. investment from fiscal year 2012 through 2017, and possibly as much as \$1.6 billion.

Washington said it had decided to continue the program's development up to a cost ceiling of \$4 billion to ensure development of a meaningful capability for Germany and Italy, and possible future option for the United States.

The department said it had already spent \$1.5 billion on the program to date, and was already committed to funding an additional \$804 million.

Continuing the program would cost nearly \$1 billion, or more, but the Army could not use MEADS to replace its Patriot missiles given delays in the MEADS program.

Lockheed insisted the program had met all major milestones since it officially began in September 2004, completing a critical design review and system program review.

The first MEADS battle manager and launcher had moved to a test range in Italy for system tests, Lockheed spokeswoman Cheryl Amerine said in a statement.

She said MEADS could defend up to 8 times the area of current systems with fewer system elements at a cost lower than upgrading existing systems.

<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41585389/ns/business/>

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Bloomberg News.com

## U.S. Air Force Seeks \$3.74 Billion for New Bomber Program

By Tony Capaccio and Gopal Ratnam

February 14, 2011

The U.S. Air Force is requesting \$3.74 billion in its five-year budget for research and development of a new class of long-range strike systems that may include a new bomber, missiles and drones.

The Air Force is seeking an initial \$197 million in fiscal 2012, which begins Oct. 1, to begin developing a new bomber, the military service said in an e-mail. Nearly three-fourths of the total funding will be spent in fiscal years 2015 and 2016, with the goal of "strike capability across the spectrum of conflict in the 2020-2030 timeframe," it said.

The development of a new bomber will be the first such aircraft in almost three decades since Northrop Grumman Corp.'s B-2 was designed. Lockheed Martin Corp. and Boeing Co. said in 2008 they would form a partnership to compete against Northrop.

The new "bomber will be long-range nuclear capable, able to penetrate hostile airspace, and have the option of being piloted remotely," according to a Pentagon document accompanying the 2012 budget released today.

General Norton Schwartz, chief of staff for the Air Force, has said it will develop the new bomber fleet while continuing to use the Pentagon's B-2, B-1, and B-52 bombers.

'Optionally Manned Planes'

As a first step toward a new family of bombers, the U.S. ought to develop a fleet of at least 100 "optionally manned planes" that can carry a payload of 20,000 pounds (9,072 kilograms) and fly as far as 5,000 nautical miles, Mark Gunzinger, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, an independent Washington-based defense research group, wrote in a report last year.

Such a plane may cost as much as \$500 million each and take about 15 years to develop, according to Gunzinger, the author of the study "Sustaining America's Strategic Advantage in Long-Range Strike," which was published in September.

Gunzinger said that plane should be supplemented by an unmanned bomber that can fly off of U.S. aircraft carriers and go 1,500 nautical miles; a long-range cruise missile; non-nuclear ballistic missiles that can strike targets within hours; and planes that can disable enemy radar.

These elements would be a new "family of systems" that enables the U.S. military to strike targets deep in countries like Iran and China, Gunzinger said.

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-14/u-s-air-force-seeks-3-74-billion-for-new-bomber-program.html>

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Global Security Newswire

## **Obama Seeks More Money for NNSA, Less for Key Nonproliferation Efforts**

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

By Martin Matishak, *Global Security Newswire*

WASHINGTON -- The Obama administration yesterday put forth a spending plan that would boost funding for the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration to nearly \$12 billion in the next fiscal year (see *GSN*, Feb. 9).

It marks the second year in row that the nuclear agency has been selected for a cash infusion.

The agency, a semiautonomous branch of the Energy Department, would receive roughly \$11.8 billion in fiscal 2012, to maintain the country's nuclear stockpile and conduct nonproliferation activities around the globe, according to the White House funding request.

That figure is a nearly \$2 billion increase over the enacted level for the 2010 budget cycle and represents a more than 5 percent hike from the \$11.2 billion the administration sought for this budget year.

In December, lawmakers approved a short-term continuing budget resolution that keeps most NNSA funding at fiscal 2010 levels, leaving out a requested \$320 million funding boost for the agency's nonproliferation initiatives. The resolution is set to expire on March 4. Congress can pass another resolution or a full budget by that date or risk seeing the federal government close its doors.

Arms control has been near the top of the administration's policy agenda since the president gave a speech in Prague in April 2009 that called for a world free of nuclear weapons. Last year he convened a two-day summit in Washington in which top officials from almost 50 nations made plans to secure the global stores of loose nuclear material within four years.

"The fact that the president's budget does show strong support for these activities is the beginning of the message from the administration that there is an urgency to these activities, even as the administration is cognizant of the need to address the deficit," NNSA Deputy Administrator Anne Harrington told reporters yesterday.

Agency officials "feel pretty good that we have a strong case to be made for all the activities for which we are requesting funding," she added during a late afternoon conference call.

The newly minted appeal seeks \$7.6 billion for NNSA "weapons activities," which ensure the safety and performance of the nation's atomic arsenal. That amount is an 8.9 percent, or \$621 million, bump from the fiscal 2011 request.

Most of those new funds would go toward stockpile maintenance, according to NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino

Another \$2.5 billion would be funneled into the agency's "defense nuclear nonproliferation" program, a more than 5 percent decrease from the present budget cycle request. The program has oversight of the agency's assorted efforts for halting the spread of nuclear material.

The amount represents a down payment on \$14.2 billion over the next five years to reduce the global threat posed by unsecured nuclear and radiological materials, the NNSA chief said during the same conference call.

Taken together, the fiscal 2012 budget blueprint marks the first step in administration's commitment to invest \$85 billion over the next decade to build new nuclear research and production facilities and overhaul aging warheads, according to D'Agostino. The Obama administration pledged to beef up spending on the nuclear complex during its ultimately successful effort to draw sufficient GOP support for ratification of the New START nuclear arms control pact with Russia.

The remaining dollars would be steered to other agency efforts, including its national laboratory network and the naval nuclear reactor program.

### ***Weapons Activities***

A bulk of the \$7.6 billion for NNSA weapons activities, nearly \$2 billion, would be devoted to directed stockpile work at the agency's network of facilities. The new figure is an increase of less than \$100 million from the request for this budget year.

The operations encompass all activities that directly support weapons in the nuclear arsenal, including maintenance and day-to-day care as well as planned refurbishments.

Funding would support ongoing life-extension programs for the W-76 warhead, which is deployed on the Navy's Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile, and the refurbishment of the B-61 gravity bomb, according to the text of the spending request.

Those dollars would also bankroll an ongoing study to evaluate future options for maintaining the W-78 warhead carried by Minuteman 3 ICBMs.

Another \$1.65 billion from the weapons activities account would go toward science, technology and engineering "campaigns," budget documents show. Those programs consist of multiyear efforts to develop and maintain the capabilities needed to assess the safety and reliability of the nuclear arsenal without underground testing.

The combined appeal for the campaigns is a roughly \$50 million increase over the fiscal 2011 request.

Meanwhile, \$2.7 billion would be spent on agency infrastructure, including final design and construction work on the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement site at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee.

Both projects are set to achieve 90 percent "design maturity" late in the next budget cycle, which is when the nuclear agency will finalize the baseline construction cost and schedule for each.

### ***Nuclear Nonproliferation***

As the nuclear agency's weapons activities would experience a boost from the last fiscal year, its nonproliferation work would drop from \$2.7 billion sought for the 2011 budget to \$2.5 billion for the funding year beginning Oct. 1.

The program most affected by the new spending plan would be the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which would see its funding drop from a proposed \$559 million in fiscal 2011 to slightly more than \$508 million.

The initiative aims to secure and remove "high-priority" vulnerable nuclear material, such as highly enriched uranium, at overseas sites. It also converts HEU-fueled research reactors to use proliferation-resistant low-enriched uranium fuel.

The threat reduction program will see a drop off because it was "front-loaded" in the last budget request to meet the president's goal of securing the world's loose nuclear materials within four years, according to D'Agostino. The program was to have ramped up by \$225 million from the \$334 actually appropriated in fiscal 2010. That, though, has yet to occur amid the continued budget standoff.

In addition, several projects under the initiative were completed or nearly wrapped up last year, added Harrington. She cited HEU-removal operations in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus.

"There was a real significant increase in our operational tempo in the latter half of the year," Harrington told reporters.

The agency also did not request funding for the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement that calls for Russia and the United States to each eliminate no less than 34 metric tons of excess nuclear-weapon material beginning in 2018 (see *GSN*, April 14, 2010).

Another effort that would see less money in fiscal 2012 is the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program, which is responsible for enhancing the security of vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear weapons

and weapon-usable nuclear material in other countries and improving states' ability to detect the illicit trafficking of those materials. The program, which was to receive \$590 million in fiscal 2011, would receive \$571 million in the new budget cycle, roughly the same amount as 2010.

Yesterday, the NNSA chief dismissed any suggestion the White House was backing off its pledge to lock down all nuclear materials around 2013. His statement came after a coalition of nuclear security organizations and specialists last week called for Congress to approve all requested fiscal 2011 funds for programs aimed at safeguarding sensitive materials around the world.

"We are highly committed to the president's goal of securing material in four years. Period. Bar none," D'Agostino told reporters. He noted the initiative has successfully removed highly enriched uranium from 19 nations and is working with 16 additional countries to remove the last of their materials.

[http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\\_20110215\\_2284.php](http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110215_2284.php)

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The Malaysian Insider – Malaysia

## **UN: Better Security Curbing Nuclear Terrorism**

February 14, 2011

By Reuters

VIENNA, Feb 14 — It has become harder for al Qaeda-style groups to obtain components for an atomic weapon since world leaders agreed last year to improve security of potential bomb material, the UN nuclear agency believes.

“The amount of material which is better controlled is larger,” Anita Birgitta Nilsson, nuclear safety and security director at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said in a weekend interview.

The Vienna-based body is helping countries prevent smuggling of uranium, plutonium or other items that could be used to make a nuclear device or a dirty bomb, which combines conventional explosives such as dynamite with radioactive material.

Its work to improve security includes training for border control, equipment and other support with an annual budget of at least €20 million (RM82.35 million).

Asked whether she believed the world was becoming safer in this regard, Nilsson told Reuters: “I think that there is progress ... the fact that it’s a positive development I think we have to recognise.”

However “one cannot be complacent on the threat situation, that is very clear ... the effort is to tighten the system so that it is more difficult” for militants to obtain nuclear bomb components.

Analysts say radical groups could theoretically build a crude but deadly nuclear device if they have the money, technical know-how and required amount of fissile material.

They say groups such as al Qaeda have been trying to get the components for a nuclear bomb. Obtaining weapons-grade material is the biggest challenge and keeping it secure is vital.

At talks in Washington last April, the United States and 46 other countries agreed on a voluntary action plan to secure all vulnerable nuclear material over the next four years.

Since then, 2,500 kg of highly radioactive spent atomic fuel — some of it potential bomb material — has been shipped under heavy security from Serbia to Russia.

### **SMUGGLING IN EX-SOVIET UNION**

The month-long operation was the largest single shipment made under a multinational programme to return nuclear material to the countries from where it originally came.

In December, Ukraine said it sent a “significant portion” of its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stock to Russia under a deal with the United States aimed at preventing nuclear terrorism.

Both Nilsson and the head of the IAEA, Director General Yukiya Amano, said more needed to be done.

“Terrorist groups have financial resources, technology, they have Internet access, they have educated people ... it is not impossible to develop nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices,” Amano told Reuters earlier this month.

“We should do more and we can do more.”

He said the IAEA, which set up a database on illicit nuclear trafficking in nuclear or radioactive materials in the mid-1990s, received on average a report of an incident about every other day and this could be the “tip of the iceberg”.

Nilsson said some concerned innocent materials but there were cases of attempted smuggling involving enriched uranium, which can be used for bombs if refined to a high level.

In Georgia in March last year, two Armenian men were arrested on suspicion of smuggling 18 grams of HEU from Armenia into Georgia, both former Soviet republics.

It illustrated the risks posed by smuggling of unsecured nuclear material across porous borders and potentially falling into the hands of radical groups.

“Throughout the years there have been a number of (trafficking) cases with nuclear material,” Nilsson said, although they had declined since the late 1990s. “There is material moving which is not supposed to move around.”

<http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/world/article/un-better-security-curbing-nuclear-terrorism/>

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Georgian Daily – New York

## **A Long Way to Zero: Moscow Remains Reluctant to Take the Next Step**

OPINION

February 12, 2011

By Jacob W. Kipp

With the ratification of the START III agreement by the Russian Duma and Federation Council in addition to its signing by President, Dmitry Medvedev, the treaty reached the final stage of becoming a binding agreement for the two major nuclear powers involved.

The formal exchange of the signed documents by Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, and US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, marked the culmination of that process. The treaty is the most evident success in the Obama administration’s “reset” policy with Russia and the first step toward the goal of “Global Zero” in nuclear disarmament, which President Obama endorsed in his speech in Prague in April 2009. At that time Obama warned that such a process would take generations. The successful negotiation and ratification of the US-Russian treaty marks the end of the era when the central question of nuclear armaments was the bilateral strategic balance between these two powers. Nuclear proliferation over the last two decades has added new states possessing nuclear arsenals and raised the prospect of rogue states and terrorist movements being armed with nuclear weapons. Multilateral cooperation between the US, Russia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of Korea and Japan has not led to success through the Six Party Talks to preclude the development of a nuclear arsenal in North Korea. Nor does Iran seem to be moving towards the termination of its uranium enrichment program in response to similar international pressure.

The ratification processes in both the US and Russia raised new challenges to further nuclear arms reductions. On the one hand, both the US Senate and the Russian Parliament emphasized the need for further modernization of the respective strategic nuclear arsenals. In the Russian case, Duma Deputy, Andrei Kokoshin, former First-Deputy Minister of Defense and a recognized expert on strategic issues, asserted that the enabling laws affirm the intent of the Russian government to engage in the modernization of its strategic nuclear forces so that they would maintain their capacity to penetrate any possible deployed anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system deployed. The amendments proposed by Kokoshin advocated that the Russian president would not only deploy a new strategic system, but also give priority funding to research and development of more advanced strategic nuclear systems: “The Russian government guarantees priority funding for the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation” (Interfax-AVN, January 14).

In *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Evgeniy Podzorov described the proposed amendments as an effort to ensure that the ratification of START III did not impose any disadvantages upon Russia. Citing Kokoshin, Podzorov emphasized the need to maintain strategic stability in both its military-political and military-technical aspects, taking into account the development of strategic offensive weapons and various means of ballistic missile defense. On the issue of Russia’s right to withdraw from START III, Kokoshin outlined the possible reasons more broadly than the development of ABM defense to include advanced offensive strategic weapons and threats to Russian command and control and early warning systems. On ballistic missile defense, Kokoshin continued to assert that qualitative advantage still lies with offensive system modernization (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, January 19). In September 2010, in an article devoted to the problem of strategic stability and ballistic missile defense, Kokoshin recommended that Russia

continues to follow a policy of preparing an “asymmetric response” in case the US reverted to an effort to build a strategic ABM system or achieved strategic defense capabilities via an ABM system deployed in theaters of military operations (TVD) (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, September 5, 2010).

As part of the US ratification process, the Senate passed a resolution charging the president to begin bilateral talks with Russia regarding the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons. The Russian responded to this proposed initiative, however, as the Duma began the ratification process. Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that Moscow had no intention of entering new nuclear arms talks with the United States. Such talks would have to wait for the implementation of START III, and Lavrov laid out a much more complex agenda for any future talks about non-strategic nuclear weapons by including as topics for discussion “potential weaponization of space, strategic missiles equipped with conventional explosives and other non-nuclear conventional weapons.” Lavrov also added the need to include in such negotiations other nuclear powers (Interfax, January 13).

Following the signing of START III, the Russian press began to refer to the treaty as a political test for Presidents Obama and Medvedev and detailed serious challenges which would determine whether START III deepened the “reset” and moved the world towards nuclear disarmament. The authors spoke of the risks associated with a renewed race between offensive and defense strategic systems, pointed to the investment in nuclear force modernization, speculated on the impact of US deployment of non-nuclear strategic systems, and considered the impact of Russia’s refusal to enter into immediate talks on the limitation of tactical nuclear weapons on a bilateral basis (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 25).

The test on this latter point seems to be on the agenda, since Russian news sources announced that the Obama administration has declared that following consultations with NATO Allies, the US would seek to begin talks on tactical nuclear weapons with Russia no later than one year after ratification of START III (RIA Novosti, February 3).

To understand the likely Russian response to this announcement, one could look at an interview by Kokoshin in November 2010 on the 55th anniversary of the detonation of RDS-37, the Soviet Union’s first two-stage thermonuclear bomb tested at Semipalatinsk test range. The bomb, dropped from a Tu-16 Bison bomber had a yield of 1.6 megatons. According to Kokoshin the test of the RDS-37 was the real beginning of the Soviet Union’s ability to deter a potential aggressor. While discussing the technical development of the weapons, Kokoshin stressed the continued importance of nuclear deterrence for Russia: “Systems and means of nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future will remain one of the keystones of our security.” Kokoshin went on to state that “an alternative to nuclear deterrence does not appear possible even in the distant future.” Therefore, Russia must continue to modernize its triad of air, ground, and sea-based strategic nuclear weapons and do the same with “tactical and operational-tactical nuclear weapons systems.” In addition, Kokoshin called for the development of “a system of non-nuclear (pre-nuclear) deterrence” based upon precision-strike conventional weapons (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, November 26, 2010).

The modernization of tactical and operational-tactical nuclear weapons, of which Kokoshin spoke, may be more than a response to the commonly cited reason of NATO’s expansion, but also reflect Russia’s need to rely on such systems in the face of the military modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which has itself developed a formidable arsenal of advanced weaponry. At the same time, the Asian nuclear equation has its own complications with regard to North Korea’s emerging arsenal, nuclear rivalry between Pakistan and India, and the distinct possibility of China and India entering into nuclear competition.

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/>

[http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=21028&Itemid=132](http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=21028&Itemid=132)

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Heritage Newspapers

OPINION/Editorial

## **Editorial: Washington Should Keep a Close eye on Iran**

Saturday, February 12, 2011

News reports have stated that a recent attempt at diplomatically reaching out to Iran in hopes that it would curtail its nuclear weapons desires has failed.

We're not surprised. The nation, led by ruthless and immovable Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, does not want to negotiate. It wants to develop and use nuclear weapons. That goal must be halted.

The effort involved in trying to persuade Tehran to reconsider its refusal to stop activities that could be harnessed to make nuclear weapons is a waste of time.

Uranium enrichment lies at the heart of the dispute. Low-enriched uranium - around 3.5 percent - can be used to fuel a reactor to generate electricity, which Iran says is the intention of its program. But if uranium is further enriched to about 90 percent purity, it can be used to develop a nuclear warhead.

It's time to get tougher with Iran. The nation reportedly is suffering from the wide range of financial and trade sanctions, travel bans and other penalties imposed by the United Nations, the United States, the European Union and others, but it has not been enough.

More pressure needs to be placed on the Islamic Republic, as well as nations that might be tempted to break the U.N. sanctions.

Two outside forces supposedly account for any Iranian problems in enriching uranium - the increasing weight of U.N. and other sanctions meant to choke off raw materials needed to make and maintain the program, and the apparent havoc caused by the mysterious Stuxnet computer malware. Officially it's not known who planted the computer virus that has delayed Iran's progress toward developing nuclear weapons. But whatever country and whomever the individuals are that were involved deserve high praise and a medal.

Unfortunately, the nuclear effort only has been delayed, not stopped. Israeli officials now talk of a three-year window - until 2014 - before Iran can make a bomb. That compares with projections of 2011 just a few years ago.

To use an analogy, if the world has its foot on the throat of Iran, then it's time to step down harder, not let up. The little extra breathing room is good to have, but it needs to be used to increase the pressure on Iran, not promote more fruitless diplomatic efforts.

When you're facing a threat from a venomous snake, you don't try to pet it. Somehow you have to grab it by the neck and cut off its head, figuratively speaking. You have to eliminate the threat.

We're not advocating military action, although that could be a last resort. We're talking about tightening the economic vise around Iran and doing whatever possible to nullify the nuclear threat.

Yes, the top priority of the president and Congress is to promote the creation of jobs and to improve America's economy. But Washington needs to keep a very close eye on Iran, and stopping its nuclear drive must be near the top of the priority list.

As the sarcastic, tongue-in-cheek comment goes, "One nuclear bomb can ruin your whole day."

And, unfortunately, if that bomb is exploded by Iran, you know that country isn't going to stop at one.

--*Courtesy of The Oakland Press*

<http://www.heritage.com/articles/2011/02/12/opinion/doc4d55842631980516697360.txt?viewmode=fullstory>

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The Diplomat – Japan

OPINION

## Mapping Asia's Nuclear Future

*The New START has entered into force. It's now time for Asian nations to step up and help tackle the nuclear threat, says Richard Weitz.*

February 13, 2011

By Richard Weitz

With the New START arms reduction agreement between Russia and the United States having entered into force on February 5, the nuclear arms control spotlight is now very likely to shift to Asia.

It's true that US officials have expressed interest in making one more round of bilateral reductions. However, Russian government representatives have indicated that they want to break with tradition and include constraints on other nuclear weapons states in the next strategic arms control treaty. Either way, both governments are eager to take a close look at how to restrict the nuclear activities of other countries—particularly in Asia.

North Korea aside, China is likely to be chief among the countries of interest. Although it's never officially stated, Russian strategic analysts have openly acknowledged that China's rising military strength has made Russian policymakers reluctant to negotiate further deep cuts in their nuclear forces. Russia's military is still more powerful than China's, but the disparity in population and economic growth rates is closing the gap. Indeed, the United States will also likely find it hard to reduce nuclear arms further without some indication that China will accept more explicit constraints on its own nuclear potential.



China isn't the only Asian nuclear state that has remained aloof from strategic arms reduction treaties. But the fact is that while Chinese officials have hinted that they may at some point join nuclear arms control talks, they've also made it clear that this would only happen after Russian and US nuclear forces decline to Beijing's levels.

This would be a missed opportunity. China could help realize deeper cuts in Russian and US nuclear forces if it was itself contributing more directly to the reductions process. But even setting aside the question of its own nuclear arsenal, there are other areas where Washington feels it could benefit from greater co-operation from Beijing. Last month, for example, US President Barack Obama increased pressure on China to do more over neighbouring North Korea, warning visiting Chinese President Hu Jintao that the United States would expand its military power in East Asia unless international efforts to constrain Pyongyang's nuclear and missile activities proved more successful.

It's true that Chinese and Russian diplomats have complained about North Korea's past missile tests and have tried to persuade Pyongyang to roll back its nuclear and missile activities. Yet both have still refused to apply sanctions against North Korea, in part over fears that they could lead to the collapse of the nuclear-armed country.

Another looming issue is South Asia. While there has been some pointed criticism of North Korea's nuclear ambitions, to date much less has been said about constraining India and Pakistan. Like North Korea, India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons and are strengthening their nuclear arsenals. In addition, their nuclear forces are illegal under international law since they weren't recognized as one of the five states possessing nuclear weapons at the time the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which New Delhi and Islamabad have refused to sign, entered into force in 1970. India and Pakistan have also refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or adopt the comprehensive full-scope safeguards supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

But there are some signs of a shift. Since ratifying New START, the United States and other countries have renewed their efforts to secure a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) that would indirectly constrain the number of nuclear weapons Pakistan and India might develop. It's true that the multilateral negotiations on a verifiable FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva remain deadlocked, not least because the Pakistani government sees nuclear weapons as an essential equalizer to India's superior conventional forces. But at a February 1 plenary meeting, other Asian governments identified securing such a treaty as one of their four priorities in the coming years, along with pursuing general nuclear disarmament, expanding negative security assurances, and preventing an arms race in outer space.

The recent unrest in Egypt may also prompt a rethink on the subcontinent as concerns are reignited about nuclear weapons proliferation in unstable regions like the Middle East and South Asia. Pakistan particularly may need to reassure others that its nuclear arsenal is safe and secure from terrorists. In return, the international community, including the United States, could consider offering limited support for Pakistan's civil nuclear energy aspirations.

Pakistan is right to complain that India has been receiving more favourable treatment in this area from most foreign governments. (China, which continues to transfer nuclear technology to Pakistan, is a notable exception.) In particular, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, whose guidelines generally prohibit members from engaging in nuclear commerce with states that haven't applied full-scope IAEA safeguards to their nuclear facilities, has granted India a limited waiver from these rules. As a result, France, Russia, and the United States have entered into civil nuclear cooperation agreements with India, while declining to offer Pakistan similar treatment.

But those hoping to rid the region of the threat of nuclear weapons have other means at their disposal, aside from negotiations focused on individual countries. For example, Asia already has a number of regional nuclear weapons free zones—the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), and the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Treaty of Semipalatinsk) all apply to Asia. Under the agreements, members agree not to test, develop, or contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons within their geographic areas. These treaties include at least one protocol that allows the existing nuclear weapons countries to pledge not to test nuclear weapons within the zones as well as to offer legally binding negative security assurances in which they commit not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against the treaty parties.

The United States among others has so far declined to sign the protocols to the treaties for Southeast Asia and Central Asia. But these governments could still provide indirect diplomatic, technical, and assistance to bolster enforcement of the treaties.

The widespread (if not universal) support among Asian countries for the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative against Nuclear Terrorism, and other non-proliferation tools has provided additional mechanisms to limit the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities in Asia.

## **A Nuclear First**

Last April, Washington hosted the first ever nuclear security summit, which was attended by numerous Asian leaders. Next year's meeting will be hosted by Seoul, which will give South Korea and other Asian governments a chance to address issues generally overlooked at last year's summit, such as the danger of nuclear proliferation to additional countries and the need to prevent terrorists from gaining access to less dangerous radiological materials that they can use to construct nuclear terrorist devices such as 'dirty bombs.'

In the meantime, though, there have been some other positive steps. China, Japan, India, and other Asian countries with advanced civil nuclear energy programmes have been establishing nuclear security centres where foreign nationals can join their own citizens in researching proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies, as well as training nuclear personnel in safety and security techniques. These nuclear security centres are typically funded by their host government, but receive technical assistance from the IAEA and foreign governments, especially the United States.

Indeed, US support for China's new nuclear centre, formalized in a recent bilateral agreement, highlights how, even in the absence of an official China-US nuclear arms control agreement—and despite years of strained military relations—nuclear security has emerged as a core area of Sino-American cooperation in recent years. Chinese and US representatives at both the governmental and nongovernmental level have entered into regular bilateral dialogues on strategic stability to discuss these and other nuclear concerns. The fear exists, for example, that the two nuclear establishments might misperceive nuclear signalling. What would this mean? In an extreme case, it could mean that although one side may be raising its alert level for its nuclear forces as a deterrent, the other might misunderstand such a move as foreshadowing an imminent attack—and launch a pre-emptive strike in response.

All this said, Asian nations could well benefit from a more focused discussion among the region's official and unofficial nuclear weapons powers, which would include India and Pakistan as well as China, Russia, and the United States. (North Korea, despite its nuclear capabilities, should probably be excluded from such dialogue since it presents unique problems for regional stability and because its representatives have anyway displayed unique skill in disrupting other multilateral negotiations).

In contrast, Japan should actually be included in any Asian nuclear stability talks, even if only as an observer. This is in part because of Tokyo's reliance on US nuclear security guarantees, but also because of Japan's latent capacity to develop nuclear weapons. The country has also established itself as a responsible player, with an admirable past and present role in countering nuclear proliferation. It's a welcome bright spot in an unpredictable part of the world.

*Richard Weitz writes a weekly column on Asia-Pacific strategic and security issues. He is director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. His commentaries have appeared in the International Herald Tribune, The Guardian and Wall Street Journal (Europe), among other publications.*

<http://the-diplomat.com/2011/02/13/mapping-asia%E2%80%99s-nuclear-future/>

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News International – Pakistan

OPINION

## **Nuclear Fallout**

*Dr Maleeha Lodhi*

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

*The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK.*

“Strategic petulance” roared the headline of a story in a Western newspaper claiming that Pakistan had almost doubled its nuclear arsenal in the past two years.

Another paper portrayed the expanding arsenal as a challenge to US national security strategy and cast Pakistan as the “lone holdout”. The Washington Post reported that Pakistan was now the world's ‘fifth largest nuclear power’ and working on a fourth plutonium reactor at Khushab to modernize its arsenal.

Almost identical reports in the Western media seemed to rely on unnamed “non-official sources” to make these claims. Few cared to place the issue in a broader context or consider the chain of developments, including the 2008 Indo-US civilian nuclear deal and President Obama's support for India's membership of multilateral nuclear regimes, that have affected the regional strategic equilibrium and aggravated Islamabad's insecurity. Nor did they refer to Pakistan's repeated warnings that these actions would be consequential for the subcontinent and oblige Islamabad to act to preserve the credibility of nuclear deterrence.

The publication of these leaked reports was no coincidence. They surfaced in the immediate wake of the position taken by Pakistan's envoy on January 25 at the opening session of the 2011 Conference on Disarmament (CD) on negotiations for a treaty banning the production of bomb-making fissile material.

Speaking on the Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT) Ambassador Zamir Akram recalled the grounds on which the treaty was being opposed by Pakistan and cited “serious recent developments” that had strengthened this position. The “discriminatory waiver” provided to India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group will “further accentuate the asymmetry in fissile material stockpiles in the region to the detriment of Pakistan’s security interests”. Further, US support for India’s membership of four multilateral export control regimes had reinforced a pattern of “selective and irresponsible behavior” that undermined the international non-proliferation regime.

All of last year, and since talks on an FMCT resumed in 2009, Pakistan made its reservations clear about the proposed treaty aimed only at prohibiting future fissile material production. Without the treaty taking into account the existing asymmetry in stocks, the imbalance between Pakistan and India would be frozen, placing Pakistan at a permanent strategic disadvantage. This call for a flawed treaty to also promote disarmament objectives by accounting for prior fissile stocks found support from the G-21 group of developing nations at the CD.

As defined at present, the scope of the treaty - covering weapons-grade uranium or plutonium - offers India the opportunity to build strategic reserves of stockpiles, and widen the disparity with Pakistan. India’s fuel agreements with many countries - following the NSG waiver - will assure supply and enable it to process reactor-grade material. This is only a small step away to its conversion to weapons-grade material.

As currently envisioned the FMCT obliges Pakistan to accept a limit on its deterrent capability, which does not apply to India because of the preferential treatment it has received.

The National Command Authority in its meeting on 14 December 2010 voiced concern over what it called trends of “exceptionalism and discrimination” and vowed not to accept any undermining of the country’s strategic deterrence or an approach “prejudicial to its legitimate security interests”. This defined Pakistan’s negotiating position at Geneva ably articulated by Ambassador Akram.

Apart from an orchestrated media campaign, a number of diplomatic efforts by Western countries have been underway to isolate Pakistan on the FMCT issue. One effort was launched last month in Geneva by the UN Secretary General’s representative to the CD aimed at convening an exclusive meeting between Ban Ki-moon and envoys of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) and countries heading regional groups. The purpose was to evolve a common P-5 position in the absence of Pakistan and other concerned nations.

But Pakistan was able to mobilise support from the G-21 group and press the point that an exclusive gathering of select representatives was contrary to the UN principle of sovereign equality. As a result, the Secretary General decided to call off the meeting and instead address a plenary of the CD.

A second diplomatic salvo fired this year to sideline Pakistan on the issue is an initiative launched by Australia and Japan on 3 February 2011 to convene a side event on the FMCT. Ostensibly designed to assemble delegates and experts to clarify definitions in the proposed treaty - “fissile material”, and “production” among them - its intent is two-fold. One, to underscore that the FMCT is the only issue “ripe” for negotiations in the CD, and two, to start a process to pre-cook critical treaty elements to serve as “building blocks” for negotiations in the CD.

The authors of this initiative have disclaimed that this ‘expert event’ will be any pre-negotiation. But they have failed to dispel the impression that convening a meeting outside the CD is an opening effort to test the ground whether in the face of the continuing stalemate in the CD, talks can be taken to an alternative forum.

Calls to explore such venues have previously taken several forms on the basis of spurious arguments about the “inadequacy” of the CD’s rules of procedure (by consensus) and working methods. Those calls have in the past been thwarted by the majority view that stressed the centrality and validity of the CD as the world’s sole multilateral arms control negotiating body and the need to respect the unanimity principle.

That is why attempts to shift treaty negotiations to ‘parallel’ venues have always fizzled out. A rare case was the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was ‘transmitted’ in 1996 from a deadlocked CD to the UN General Assembly in New York for adoption and signing. But the treaty had already been negotiated over many years in the CD itself.

The latest Australian-Japanese move has already faced a setback with China’s decision not to attend - the first sign of fissure in the P-5. Non-participation by others including Pakistan would denude this ‘side event’ of any legitimacy. It would again underline that attempts to by-pass the 65-nation CD would be an exercise in futility that will delay and complicate, not accelerate the process of building consensus.

The answer to the present impasse is not to circumvent the established disarmament machinery but ensure that the FMCT negotiations take into account the security concerns of all states and not just the priorities of the powerful few.

Three key facts are essential to keep in view when considering the present state of play in the CD.

One, holding Pakistan responsible for the impasse in negotiations by the high priests of disarmament ignores the track record of the very nations making this accusation. Since 1993 the multilateral quest for an FMCT has seen a prolonged stalemate. A principal reason for this was the decade-long US refusal to accept international mechanisms for verification. Only when the Obama Administration changed this position on verification did Washington unblock the talks.

Moreover, progress in the CD on three of the four core issues on its agenda - nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances for non-nuclear states and prevention of an arms race in outer space - is at present being blocked by the US and its Western allies. So singling out Pakistan as the only country impeding the CD's work is incorrect.

Two, the present stalemate on the FMCT is the consequence of actions taken by the US and its Western allies to promote nuclear exceptionalism for India. It is this discriminatory conduct that has undermined the negotiations. This selective nuclear policy has not only exacerbated Pakistan's security anxieties but also driven the region on to a potentially new arms race.

And three, unless talks on the treaty accommodate the legitimate security concerns of all states progress is unlikely, regardless of diplomatic pressure or assurances that Islamabad recently received from Washington that the FMCT is not a vehicle to secure Pakistan's de-nuclearization.

The work of the CD has to proceed on the principle of equal and undiminished security of all states.

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