



# **USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER**

# **CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL**

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

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Issue No. 878, 4 February 2011

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MSNBC.com

## **Factbox: START Treaty Approval May Bring Inspections by April**

February 1, 2011

By Reuters

The New START nuclear arms treaty between Russia and the United States will formally enter into force on Saturday when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov exchange ratification documents.

The two will exchange instruments of ratification on the sidelines of an annual security conference in Munich, the State Department said on Tuesday.

The exchange will set the clock ticking on a series of steps the two sides must take in the following weeks, leading up to the first on-site inspections of each other's nuclear arsenals in nearly two years, probably sometime in April.

Under the treaty, the two sides must reduce their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 1,550 in seven years and reduce deployed long-range missiles and bombers to no more than 700.

Following are some of the initial steps required by the accord:

\* Once the treaty enters into force, the sides will immediately begin exchanging information about the status of their nuclear forces, a senior U.S. official said on condition of anonymity. For example, they will notify each other whenever nuclear arms are deployed or removed from deployed status. The information is channeled through Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established by both sides in 1988. The U.S. center is at the State Department and the Russian center is at the defense ministry.

\* Within 25 days, the two sides must exchange the names and details of no more than 300 people who may serve as inspectors. The sides also will exchange the names of air crew members who will fly the inspectors. Within 30 days of the list exchange, the sides must issue visas for the inspectors and air crews.

\* Within 45 days, the two sides must carry out an initial exchange of detailed information on each other's nuclear arsenals. "We'll exchange a complete database," the U.S. official said. "We'll give the Russians a complete set of data about our strategic nuclear forces and they'll give us a complete set of data about their strategic nuclear forces."

The data will include detailed information like a missile's classification, number of stages, length without front section, diameter of airframe, total length with launch canister and type of propellant.

The official said U.S. officials have not received fresh data on the Russian nuclear forces since July 2009.

\* Sixty days after the treaty enters into force, the two sides may begin conducting on-site inspections. U.S. officials have been practicing for the first inspection, which will likely be held in mid-April, the U.S. official said.

[http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41371734/ns/world\\_news/](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41371734/ns/world_news/)

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U.S. Department of Defense

## **New START Treaty to Take Effect Feb. 5**

February 2, 2011

By Cheryl Pellerin, American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Feb. 2, 2011 – With President Barack Obama scheduled to sign the new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia today, the stage will be set for the formal exchange of papers later this week that will put the agreement into effect.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov are set to exchange ratification documents Feb. 5 at the Munich Security Conference, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates' representative to the treaty negotiations said here yesterday.

Edward L. "Ted" Warner told the Pentagon Channel and American Forces Press Service that within 60 days of the treaty's entry into force, both nations will have the right to conduct short-notice inspections of each other's nuclear facilities.

"One of the crucial pieces of the more recent arms-reduction treaties, beginning with the START I treaty in the early 1990s, has been the provision for verification" of each other's nuclear claims at operating bases, test ranges and storage sites, he said.

No inspections have taken place in either nation since START I expired in December 2009, he said, noting that the first START treaty represented “an enormous step forward in verification.”

The United States and Russia -- or its predecessor, the Soviet Union -- have signed a variety of strategic arms treaties going back to the early 1970s, Warner said. START I was signed in 1991 and ratified and entered into force in 1994. The Moscow Treaty in 2002 built on START I and lowered critical limits, particularly on deployed warheads, Warner said, noting that it expires in 2012.

“In the original START treaty, the limit was 6,000 warheads. In the Moscow Treaty, the limit was between 1,700 and 2,200 -- 2,200 being the legal limit,” he said. “In the new START treaty, which was concluded last April, the limit is now 1,550 strategic warheads.”

The U.S. Senate ratified the new START treaty Dec. 22, and the Russian parliament’s upper chamber ratified it Jan. 26.

The new treaty also limits strategic delivery vehicles, Warner added, which include intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, such as the B-52H Stratofortress and the B-2 Spirit. The new treaty requires that each ICBM, submarine-launched ballistic missile and heavy bomber have a unique numerical identifier to aid verification, Warner said.

“That unique identifier is in the database,” he explained. “It’s provided during the pre-inspection briefing, and when inspectors go to inspect the individual items they are able to check that number.”

Each nation is allowed 18 short-notice inspections a year over 10 years, he added, “giving both sides the opportunity to confirm that the other side is complying with the provisions of the treaty.”

Both nations’ nuclear arsenals include strategic weapons carried on very long-range systems and nonstrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons that can be delivered by tactical aircraft and used for antisubmarine warfare, Warner said.

No formal treaty ever has limited or reduced the weapons associated with shorter-range tactical delivery systems, Warner said. But during the ratification process for the new START treaty, he added, some senators said the next round of negotiated reductions should include tactical nuclear weapons in addition to long-range, strategic systems.

“This will be very much a challenge,” Warner said, “because virtually all of these weapons are in secure storage areas, and one of our highest priorities has been ... to cooperate with the Russians through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to help finance improved security arrangements.

“So on one hand,” he continued, “we want to make sure they’re safe and secure, and on the other hand, we want to bring them into the negotiating process in order to reduce the overall numbers.”

Future nuclear weapons limitation treaties may expand to include nations besides the United States and Russia, Warner said.

“If you take the numbers down enough on the arsenals of Russia and the United States, then the other declared -- and some undeclared -- nuclear powers are likely to have to come into the equation,” he said.

Declared nuclear powers include the United Kingdom, France and China, Warner said. “Others that are undeclared include India, Pakistan and, it’s widely believed, Israel,” he added.

In the meantime, Warner said, “there’s probably one more major bilateral nuclear arms reduction negotiation, and hopefully, agreement ahead between the United States and Russia.”

Such a future negotiation may be one “in which we try to not only further reduce the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States, but also fold in these nonstrategic weapons, the so-called tactical nuclear weapons,” he said.

“I think it is commonly agreed that they ought to be limited as well,” Warner added, “and people from both sides will be exploring, at official and nonofficial levels, how one might construct a treaty that would limit all nuclear warheads.”

That will be an important new challenge, he said.

“We have never limited the full set of strategic nuclear weapons themselves before,” Warner said, “so this will be virgin territory.”

<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62656>

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# Obama Issues Assurances on New START

Thursday, February 3, 2011

President Obama in a statement to the U.S. Senate yesterday issued several assurances on his administration's plans for implementing a new strategic nuclear arms control treaty with Russia (see *GSN*, Feb. 2).

Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed New START last April. The pact would require Moscow and Washington to each cap their deployed strategic nuclear warheads at 1,550, down from a limit of 2,200 required by 2012 under an earlier treaty. It also would set a ceiling of 700 deployed warhead delivery systems, with another 100 allowed in reserve.

Obama yesterday signed off a nonbinding ratification text in which the Senate placed a number of conditions on its endorsement of New START. Medvedev last week inked a similar document prepared by Russia's legislature.

The U.S. president certified his country was technically capable of implementing the treaty's monitoring terms, and that the pact would not require the United States to share flight data from satellite liftoffs or tests of missile interceptors and target missiles.

Obama also reaffirmed his intention to revamp the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

"I intend to ... modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems" -- including land-, sea- and air-based platforms -- and to "maintain the United States rocket motor industrial base," he said in the statement.

He vowed to "accelerate, to the extent possible, the design and engineering phase" for two new nuclear-weapon facilities -- the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement building at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee -- and to "request full funding, including on a multiyear basis as appropriate, for the CMRR building and the UPF upon completion of the design and engineering phase" (see *GSN*, Jan. 20).

The president formalized his pledge to "not more than one year" after New START's entry into force pursue discussions with Russia on curbing battlefield nuclear-weapon deployments. Russia is believed to hold roughly 2,000 deployed tactical nuclear weapons within its borders, whereas the United States maintains a fraction of that number in Europe, according to previous reports (see *GSN*, Jan. 18).

Obama reaffirmed U.S. missile defense plans and questioned Russian threats to withdraw from New START if it deems future U.S. antimissile deployments to pose an unacceptable strategic risk.

"While the United States cannot circumscribe the sovereign rights of the Russian Federation" under New START, "the United States believes continued improvement and deployment of United States missile defense systems do not constitute a basis for questioning the effectiveness and viability of the treaty, and therefore would not give rise to circumstances justifying the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the treaty," he said in the statement (White House release, Feb. 2).

Within 60 days of the treaty's anticipated entry into force on Saturday, the United States and Russia would each be entitled to conduct snap audits of nuclear sites belonging to the other signatory nation, said Edward Warner, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates's representative to talks on the pact.

"One of the crucial pieces of the more recent arms reduction treaties, beginning with the START I treaty in the early 1990s, has been the provision for verification," Warner said in a Pentagon press release. Previous monitoring of nuclear facilities ended following the original START's expiration in late 2009, he noted.

Washington and Moscow could each conduct 18 snap audits annually for one decade, "giving both sides the opportunity to confirm that the other side is complying with the provisions of the treaty," Warner said.

New START mandates that each U.S. and Russian strategic delivery system receive a unique identification tag to aid in monitoring. Warner said.

"That unique identifier is in the database," he said. "It's provided during the preinspection briefing, and when inspectors go to inspect the individual items they are able to check that number" (U.S. Defense Department release, Feb. 2).

Moscow has identified 35 facilities that would be open to U.S. monitoring under the treaty, ITAR-Tass quoted U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller as saying late last year (ITAR-Tass, Feb. 3).

Negotiating limitations on nonstrategic nuclear weapons "will be very much a challenge," Warner said in the Pentagon release, "because virtually all of these weapons are in secure storage areas, and one of our highest priorities has been ... to cooperate with the Russians through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to help finance improved security arrangements."

“So on one hand,” Warner said, “we want to make sure they’re safe and secure, and on the other hand, we want to bring them into the negotiating process in order to reduce the overall numbers.”

“I think it is commonly agreed that [tactical nuclear weapons] ought to be limited as well,” he said, “and people from both sides will be exploring, at official and nonofficial levels, how one might construct a treaty that would limit all nuclear warheads.”

“We have never limited the full set of strategic nuclear weapons themselves before,” Warner said, “so this will be virgin territory.”

Future arms control could also encompass other nuclear-armed states, Warner said. China, France and the United Kingdom are recognized as nuclear powers, while India, Israel and Pakistan are also known or widely assumed to hold such weapons.

“If you take the numbers down enough on the arsenals of Russia and the United States, then the other declared -- and some undeclared -- nuclear powers are likely to have to come into the equation,” according to Warner. “There’s probably one more major bilateral nuclear arms reduction negotiation, and hopefully, agreement ahead between the United States and Russia” (U.S. Defense Department release).

[http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\\_20110203\\_2210.php](http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110203_2210.php)

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Wall Street Journal  
February 2, 2011

## **Iran Faces Nuclear Smuggling Charges**

By EVAN PEREZ

WASHINGTON—U.S. authorities disclosed charges and sanctions against operators of an alleged smuggling network that was accused of purchasing millions of dollars in equipment for Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

U.S. and Turkish intelligence agencies have spent years probing what U.S. officials say are sanctions-busting front companies for Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization, which oversees that nation's missile program.

The companies imported materials and equipment to Turkey from Europe and the U.S., taking advantage of more lenient export rules that apply to Turkey as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, according to U.S. officials.

David Kris, assistant attorney general for national security, said Tuesday that the years-long probe showed "the reach of Iran's illegal procurement networks," which obtained materials and equipment from multiple U.S. companies and from sources in Italy, Hungary and elsewhere.

The imports included specialized steel welding wire that has aerospace uses from a Nevada company, fiber-optic equipment from Pennsylvania, and high-grade alloys from a California manufacturer, according to an indictment filed by U.S. prosecutors. The U.S. companies weren't named in the indictment.

Turkish investigators previously said an Istanbul company in the network imported aluminum containers from Italy that could be used in uranium enrichment.

International sanctions prohibit the export of many types of dual-use equipment to Iran, for fear that they would be used to advance nuclear enrichment or ballistic missile programs. Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.

On Tuesday, Justice Department prosecutors announced charges against Milad Jafari, an Iranian national who they allege led the Iranian procurement network.

The Treasury Department separately announced sanctions aimed at freezing assets belonging to Mr. Jafari, several family members and associates and companies they operated. The action accuses members of the network of being proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.

"The Jafari network has established itself as a lifeline for Iran's missile program," said Stuart Levey, Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence.

Turkish prosecutors previously have filed charges against Mr. Jafari and members of his family who helped to operate his companies, accusing them of smuggling violations.

Mr. Jafari is believed to be in Iran and beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement. He couldn't be located to comment.

According to an indictment filed in U.S. District Court in Washington, the companies acted as middlemen, matching orders from Iranian missile agencies with sources of high-grade equipment.

The indictment was filed in July 2010 and was unsealed by a federal judge on Tuesday after the U.S. Treasury announced sanctions.

The U.S. actions against the Jafari network come as U.S. officials express concern that Turkey, which has sought to increase trade with Iran, could be used as a waystation for illicit imports.

A U.S. official cited Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's call in September for trade with Iran to increase fivefold.

The Jafari case came partly as a result of cooperation between U.S. and Turkish officials. The Turkish customs agency in 2005 reported seizing specialized equipment at a border crossing with Iran.

The Central Intelligence Agency and Turkey's National Intelligence Organization investigated and uncovered a bigger network, according to U.S. officials. At least some of the equipment made it to Iran, while other shipments were stopped, U.S. officials said.

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703445904576118441900348246.html>

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Khaleej Times – U.A.E

## **Iran Two Years from Building Nuclear Weapon**

Agence France-Presse (AFP)

3 February 2011

Iran would need at least two years to produce its first nuclear weapon but is not involved in an all-out 'crash effort' to build a bomb, a respected think tank said Thursday.

In a new report analysing the available evidence, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) said it believed the timescale should give more time to international efforts to negotiate a solution.

The report by the London-based body said Iran's nuclear capability had been growing 'inexorably' for 25 years and its claim to be pursuing the programme purely for civilian energy purposes was 'not credible'.

But 'the endeavour has not been a crash effort akin to America's Manhattan Project, which produced two kinds of nuclear weapons in three and a half years, or Pakistan's nuclear bomb project, which reached the nuclear-weapons threshold about 11 years after launching an enrichment programme,' it said.

The report added: 'If Iran wanted to produce the fissile material for a weapon as soon as possible, it could have moved more quickly.'

However, it notes that: 'Overall, Iran's leaders have tried to keep their presumed weapons intentions ambiguous.'

IISS director general and chief executive John Chipman said the analysis, conducted by former US State Department official and non-proliferation expert Mark Fitzpatrick, backed up 'the more relaxed timelines' voiced recently in the United States and Israel.

And he stressed: 'The timescale is significant because the likelihood of detection allows time for a negotiated solution.'

The report added: 'If it (Iran) does decide to build nuclear weapons, this would likely be detected before it assembled a single weapon, much less the small arsenal that would be needed to make the risk worthwhile.'

'An Iranian nuclear weapon is therefore not inevitable.'

Last month, Israel's military intelligence chief, Brigadier General Aviv Kochavi, said Iran was not currently working on producing a nuclear weapon but could make one within 'a year or two' of taking such a decision.

Recently, several senior Israeli officials, including the former head of the Mossad intelligence agency, Meir Dagan, have said Iran is unlikely to acquire nuclear weapons before 2015.

Last June, CIA director Leon Panetta warned Iran had enough low-enriched uranium for two weapons, but would need a year to enrich it fully to produce a bomb and another year to develop the weapons system needed to make it viable.

[http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle09.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2011/February/middleeast\\_February88.xml&section=middleeast](http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle09.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2011/February/middleeast_February88.xml&section=middleeast)

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Gulf Daily News – Bahrain

## **Think-Tank Alert on Nuclear Threat...**

By Tom Hanratty

Friday, February 04, 2011

IRAN has the potential to produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear bomb in little over a year and a half, according to one of the world's leading think- tanks.

But the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) latest publication, Iran's Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment, did point out that if Tehran wanted to produce the fissile material for a weapon as soon as possible, it could have moved more quickly.

The strategic dossier was officially launched yesterday afternoon at the IISS headquarters in Arundel House, London, but a special video-link connected a special gathering of diplomats, IISS officials and media representatives in the IISS Middle East office at the Bahrain Financial Harbour.

Speaking during the launch, IISS Non-proliferation and Disarmament Programme director Mark Fitzpatrick alleged there was sufficient evidence that Iran seeks a capability to produce nuclear weapons.

"Notwithstanding the civilian nuclear energy purpose of projects such as the Bushehr reactor, the totality of the evidence indicates beyond reasonable doubt that Iran also seeks a capability to produce nuclear weapons should its leaders choose to take this momentous step," he said.

In questioning recent projected timelines for Iran's potential nuclear weapons capabilities, he claimed Iran had the potential to produce enough uranium for a nuclear bomb in as little as just over 19 months.

### Scenario

"If Iran uses for weapons purposes the 4,000 or so centrifuges that appear to be working well at Natanz (Nuclear Facility) and if these centrifuges can continue to perform at their maximum output to date, then a little over a year and seven months would be required for the first bomb's worth of HEU."

Mr Fitzpatrick went on to claim that this scenario assumes that Iran would use a four-stage production method developed by Pakistan and sold by Pakistani nuclear physicist A Q Khan on the black market.

He then identified the Bushehr nuclear power reactor as another potential source of weapons-usable plutonium, but said this would be dependent on a number of factors.

"The Bushehr nuclear power reactor, which is finally due to go online soon, is also a potential source of weapons-usable plutonium," Mr Fitzpatrick said.

"Its annual discharge rate of about 25 tonnes of spent fuel will, in theory, contain enough plutonium for a few dozen nuclear weapons," he added.

"However, the 'reactor-grade' plutonium produced as a by-product of electricity generation is unsuitable for weapons.

"Although Iran could operate the Bushehr reactor in a way that would produce 'weapons-grade' plutonium, doing this would tip off inspectors.

"The credibility of this scenario also depends on Iran's ability to build and conceal a reprocessing plant for spent fuel for this kind of reactor, which is technically challenging."

Instead, Mr Fitzpatrick cited the development of uranium-enrichment technology as being the biggest threat from Iran.

He said that, for now, Iran's enrichment programme was still dependent on foreign supplies of certain materials and components, but admitted it may be able to overcome these constraints in the future.

<http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=298486>

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Yonhap News \_ South Korea

February 2, 2011

## **N. Korea Says Russia Does Not Officially Support U.N. Security Council Referral of N.K.'s Uranium Program**

SEOUL, Feb. 2 (Yonhap) -- Recent reports that Russia does not oppose referring North Korea's uranium enrichment program (UEP) to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) have been confirmed to be untrue, Pyongyang's official media said Wednesday.

During a visit to Seoul last week, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin told reporters that "Russia is not opposed to discussing this UEP issue at the Security Council." He also said the program is a violation of Security Council resolutions.

North Korea claimed the remarks were proven to be untrue when the minister counselor of the country's embassy in Moscow met with the vice-director of the Russian foreign ministry's First Asian Department on Tuesday to discuss the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the issue of resuming stalled six-party talks.

"The Russian side recognized the DPRK's right to nuclear activities for peaceful purposes and confirmed that the reports of some media that Russia is not opposed to the discussion on the issue of the DPRK's production of enriched uranium at the UNSC are not the official stand of Russia," the North's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said. DPRK is the acronym for the North's official name, Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

North Korea revealed in November that it is running a facility to enrich uranium, adding to international concern about its nuclear capabilities. Officials in Seoul say that the issue should be taken to the Security Council to clearly define the illegitimate nature of the program so as to preempt the North from claiming that the facility is designed to produce fuel for power generation.

"The DPRK side re-clarified its invariable stand and will to realize the denuclearization of the whole Korean Peninsula and fully implement the Sept. 19 joint statement in the spirit of equality and on the principle of simultaneous action," the KCNA said.

Under the joint statement signed by the six-party nations in 2005, Pyongyang agreed to abandon its nuclear programs in exchange for economic aid and security guarantees from the other negotiating partners, made up of South Korea, the United States, China, Japan and Russia.

It abandoned the talks in early 2009 in protest over international sanctions that were imposed on the regime for its nuclear and missile tests.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2011/02/02/37/0401000000AEN20110202004900315F.HTML>

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Korea Times – South Korea  
February 4, 2011

### **'S. Korea, US to Expand Anti-WMD Program in Joint Drills'**

South Korea and the United States plan to expand a program that simulates removing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in this year's joint military drills to deter threats from North Korea, military sources here said Friday.

Forces of the two countries have annually carried out joint war games, with last year's 11-day Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercise involving some 18,000 American troops and about 20,000 South Korean soldiers. Seoul and Washington claim the drill is a routine exercise to improve their combined military power, while North Korea insists it is a precursor to invasion.

"During the Key Resolve joint drill to be held in March, the two nations' forces will jointly conduct exercises to remove North Korea's nuclear weapons and WMDs," a military source said, asking not to be identified. "Although this exercise first began in 2009, (the military) will strengthen the program this year."

The move came after the North last November revealed its uranium enrichment facility, adding to international concerns about the communist nation's nuclear capabilities. Uranium, if highly enriched, can be used to make weapons, providing Pyongyang with a second way of building atomic bombs after its existing plutonium-based program.

In support of South Korea-U.S. joint military drills, a group of specialized agents from the 20th support command of Maryland will be deployed to the nation, the source said, without giving the exact number of staff members.

The joint anti-WMD program involved 150 American professionals in 2009 and had 350 last year, the official noted, adding the number is expected to rise this year as well.



The support team was activated in October 2004 to provide specialized anti-WMD response to support military both at home and abroad. (Yonhap)

[http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/02/113\\_80811.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/02/113_80811.html)

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People's Daily – China

## **Pakistan Rejects New York Times' Nuclear Arms Report**

February 2, 2011

Pakistan Tuesday dismissed a New York Times report that Pakistan has steadily "expanded its nuclear arsenal" since President Obama came to office.

The report said that it is building the capability to surge ahead in the production of nuclear-weapons material, putting it on a path to overtake Britain as the world's fifth largest nuclear weapons power.

The NYT reported that Pakistan's determination to add considerably to its arsenal -- mostly to deter India -- has also become yet another irritant in its often testy relationship with Washington, particularly as Pakistan seeks to block Obama's renewed efforts to negotiate a global treaty that would ban the production of new nuclear material.

Commenting on the report titled "Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to U.S. Policy" published by New York Times on 31 Jan. 2011, the Foreign Office Spokesman said that unnecessary alarmist reporting about Pakistan's nuclear program continues to surface occasionally.

"In the nuclearized environment of South Asia, Pakistan continues to follow a responsible policy of maintaining credible minimum deterrence. Pakistan is mindful of the need to avoid arms race with India but would never compromise on its national security," the Pakistani spokesman said.

Pakistan attaches importance to ensuring peace, security and stability in South Asia and is mindful of the adverse implications of "selectivity" and "exceptionalism" in evidence on issues of nuclear non-proliferation, he said.

The spokesman said that Pakistan has consistently advocated to India the need to resume the stalled Pakistan-India Dialogue, including on issues of peace and security. "In this context, Pakistan's proposal for strategic restraint regime in South Asia, including nuclear and conventional forces as well as resolution of all issues and dispute is of extreme importance."

*Source: Xinhua*

<http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90851/7279000.html>

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Pak Tribune – Pakistan

## **Pakistan Sticks to Credible Minimum Deterrence: FO**

Wednesday, February 2, 2011

ISLAMABAD: Dismissing an "unnecessary alarmist reporting" about Pakistan's nuclear programme, The Foreign Office on Tuesday said that it would continue to follow a responsible policy of maintaining credible minimum deterrence.

"Pakistan is mindful of the need to avoid arms race with India but would never compromise on its national security," a foreign office spokesman said while responding to an article in New York Times by David E Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to US Policy."

The spokesman in a statement said, "In the nuclearised environment of South Asia, Pakistan continues to attach importance to ensuring peace, security and stability in South Asia and was mindful of the adverse implications of "selectivity" and "exceptionalism" in evidence on issues of nuclear non-proliferation.

The spokesman said Pakistan had consistently advocated to India the need to resume stalled bilateral dialogue, including on issues of peace and security. "In this context, Pakistan's proposal for strategic restraint regime in South Asia, including nuclear and conventional forces as well as resolution of all issues and dispute is of extreme importance," the statement said.

<http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?236035>

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Sify News – India

## **Pakistan Calls Its Nuke Arms Expansion Claim "Unnecessary Alarmist Reporting"**

February 2, 2011

Asian News International (ANI)

Pakistan has dismissed as "unnecessary alarmist reporting" that it has steadily expanded its nuclear arsenal, and the number of its deployed weapons now ranges from the mid-90s to over 110.

Responding to reports that Pakistan was increasing its nuclear stockpiles, the Foreign Office said it would continue to follow a responsible policy of maintaining credible minimum deterrence.

"Pakistan is mindful of the need to avoid arms race with India but would never compromise on its national security," The Express Tribune quoted a Foreign Office spokesman, as saying, while responding to an article in The New York Times titled "Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to US Policy."

The Washington Post had also reported that according to estimates by nongovernmental analysts, Pakistan had significantly accelerated the production of uranium and plutonium for bombs and developed new weapons to deliver them.

It also said that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal had "now edged ahead of India, its nuclear-armed rival."

However, a statement by Pakistan's Foreign Office said: "In the nuclearized environment of South Asia, Pakistan continues to attach importance to ensuring peace, security and stability in South Asia and was mindful of the adverse implications of 'selectivity and exceptionalism in evidence on issues of nuclear non-proliferation'."

It also said Pakistan had consistently advocated the need to resume the stalled Pakistan-India dialogue, including talks on issues of peace and security.

"In this context, Pakistan's proposal for strategic restraint regime in South Asia, including nuclear and conventional forces as well as resolution of all issues and disputes, is of extreme importance," the statement added.

<http://www.sify.com/news/pakistan-calls-its-nuke-arms-expansion-claim-unnecessary-alarmist-reporting-news-international-lccmkdabhbh.html>

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Express Tribune – Pakistan

## **Nuclear Materials: Transshipment to be Banned**

February 4, 2011

In a bid to allay fears of nuclear proliferation, Pakistan will further tighten the rules on the movement of nuclear materials, missile parts and biological weapons.

A proposal to be submitted to the cabinet calls for closing a loophole in the existing law which allows for the transshipment of such materials from Pakistani ports. The current law prohibits all exports of nuclear materials, missile equipment and biological agents from the country unless authorised by the ministry of defence.

Sources familiar with the matter say that the prime minister has already agreed to the changes in the law and will approve it formally at the next meeting of the economic coordination committee of the federal cabinet.

<http://tribune.com.pk/story/114003/nuclear-materials-transshipment-to-be-banned/>

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The Australian – Australia

## **'Boost Military' to Take on China: Adviser**

EXCLUSIVE Greg Sheridan, Foreign editor

February 05, 2011

AUSTRALIA will need nuclear-powered attack submarines among a range of highly potent weapons systems, and must revolutionise its strategic culture to answer the security dangers posed by China's massive military build-up, according to one of the federal government's chief military advisers.

Ross Babbage, who served on the government's advisory panel for the 2009 Defence white paper, believes Australia should acquire a fleet of 12 nuclear-powered attack submarines.

He also favours developing a conventionally armed cruise and ballistic missile capability to be carried on new "arsenal ships", as well as a massive increase in Australia's cyber-warfare investment.

In a report to be published on Monday, Australia's Strategic Edge 2030, Professor Babbage calls for Australia to host a range of American military bases. This would help disperse US military assets and make them harder to hit in the event of military conflict with China.

It would also emphasise the strength and intimacy of the US-Australia alliance and discourage any aggression against Australia, as any hostile power would fear that this would automatically involve the Americans.

Professor Babbage, the founder of the influential Kokoda Foundation security think tank, believes all this is necessary because China's extremely aggressive military build-up has transformed Australia's strategic environment, making it much more dangerous.

"Australia cannot overlook the way that the scale, pattern and speed of (Chinese) People's Liberation Army's development is altering security in the Western Pacific," Professor Babbage argues in the new paper, which has been obtained by The Weekend Australian.

Professor Babbage believes that China's massive military expansion is focused on "striking United States and allied forces in the Western Pacific" and that this has been accompanied by much more aggressive military and diplomatic behaviour by Beijing.

"Australia has to develop an effective response," he argues.

"The challenge posed by the rising PLA is arguably one of the most serious that has confronted Australia's national security planners since World War II," he says.

"China is for the first time close to achieving a military capability to deny United States and allied forces access to much of the Western Pacific rim."

Professor Babbage argues that this is not a question of distant threats to Australia's region but of direct threat to Australia itself, as it is within range of many existing Chinese weapons systems.

He identifies a vast range of Chinese military capabilities that are on a massive growth path. These include cruise and ballistic missiles, which can attack US and Australian ships and fixed targets; a massive investment in cyber-warfare capabilities, with reports of tens of thousands of Chinese cyber intrusions daily; new classes of both nuclear and conventionally powered submarines, including more than 40 new Chinese subs since 1995; a massive increase in Chinese nuclear weapons that will double or triple in number by 2030; a huge investment in space warfare so that China could destroy the communications satellites which are central to the Western way of war; and a massive increase in fighter bomber and other airborne strike capabilities.

Professor Babbage does not believe Australia can match these Chinese capabilities.

Rather, his strategic response consists of two elements.

One is Australia taking action to strengthen the US military position in Asia, such as by hosting more US military facilities.

The other is for Australia to do to China what China is doing to the US, which is to develop an "asymmetric" ability to use a smaller force to impose massive costs on China in the event of any conflict.

This would help to deter Chinese military adventurism and avoid conflict.

<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/boost-military-to-take-on-china-adviser/story-fn59niix-1226000485738>

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

## **Russia's 2nd Graney Class Nuclear Sub to Enter Service in 2015**

2 February 2011

The Russian Navy will receive a second Graney class nuclear-powered multipurpose attack submarine in 2015, a spokesman for the Malakhit design bureau said.

The construction of the Kazan submarine at the Sevmas Shipyard in the northern Russian city of Severodvinsk began in 2010. The first vessel of the Graney class, the Severodvinsk submarine, will enter service by the end of 2011.

"The hull of the Kazan sub has been built, but we still have to make many upgrades compared with the first vessel in the series. We are planning to deliver the submarine to the Navy in 2015," the official told RIA Novosti on Tuesday.

The Kazan will feature more advanced equipment and weaponry than the Severodvinsk, which has been under construction since 1993.

Graney class nuclear submarines are designed to launch a variety of long-range cruise missiles (up to 3,100 miles or 5,000 km), with conventional or nuclear warheads, and effectively engage submarines, surface warships and land-based targets.

The submarine's armament includes 24 cruise missiles and eight torpedo launchers, as well as mines and anti-ship missiles.

MOSCOW, February 2 (RIA Novosti)

[http://en.rian.ru/military\\_news/20110202/162413963.html](http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20110202/162413963.html)

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

## **Russia Rules Out Being NATO's Patsy on Missile Defense**

3 February 2011

Russia will do whatever is necessary to ensure its security if NATO attempts to give Moscow a raw deal in building a joint European missile defense system, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said.

Russia and NATO agreed to discuss the creation of the European missile defense system in Lisbon in November last year, but as yet the talks have not brought any positive results.

"If negotiations between NATO and Russia will only be used as a cover for a NATO-American missile defense system that ignores the Russian interests then of course we will have no choice but to take adequate measures to protect ourselves," Lavrov said in an interview with Russia Today international TV channel to be aired on Saturday.

Moscow insists on setting up a joint European missile defense network with NATO to make sure that the planned placement of elements of a U.S. missile defense system in a number of European countries will not threaten Russia's national security.

NATO, however, proposes creating two separate systems that would exchange information

Lavrov reiterated that the future missile defense system "must be equal" and "must not create any risks for the strategic arsenals of the Russian Federation."

"If these two [issues] are resolved positively, I believe we will achieve huge success," the minister said.

The missile defense issue will be on the agenda of the upcoming global security conference in Munich on February 4-6.

MOSCOW, February 3 (RIA Novosti)

<http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110203/162437100.html>

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Voice of Russia – Russia

## **Global Security: Declaration of Intentions or Real Project?**

By Chupina Maria

February 3, 2011

Creating a joint European missile defense system between Russia and NATO is a tricky task for the Euro-Atlantic region, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in an interview with the Russia Today news TV channel on Thursday. If fulfilled, the project will reflect both sides' drive to bid farewell to the Cold War-era legacy, Lavrov pointed out.

The top Russian diplomat warned against paying lip-service to the implementation of the project, which he said will add significantly to a Russian-NATO strategic partnership. The topic topped the agenda of a recent NATO summit in Lisbon, where the sides agreed to jointly grapple with the creation of a European missile shield, but remained at odds over a pertinent partnership format.

While signaling its readiness to cooperate on the issue, NATO is, in fact, pushing for its own concept of missile defense system. Brussels believes that at least two independent missile shields are needed in what certainly rides

roughshod over global security. Moscow, in turn, calls for the creation of a global missile shield with a unified decision-making and early warning center. When in Lisbon, President Dmitry Medvedev, for his part, urged the creation of the so-called sectoral missile defense system, which he said would add substantially to national security of Russia and NATO countries. Such a sophisticated system can only be created if the sides continue to strengthen mutual trust, which Medvedev said has yet to be resolved.

In Moscow, political analyst Vladimir Yevseyev points to the New START Treaty, which specifically cautions against using rocket silos for the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles and vice versa.

At the same time, Yevseyev says, Washington made it plain that it will continue to develop its national missile defense system, including the so-called third position area in Europe. With Moscow still in the dark on the matter, it may well respond in kind to the US' muscle-flexing, Yevseyev adds, citing a possible deployment of the Iskander missile systems in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, as well as the modernization of the Russian Baltic Fleet. In any case, Washington should think twice before creating its European missile shield without consulting Russia, Yevseyev concludes.

Speculation is rife that Brussels' foot-dragging on the joint missile defense system is little more than a red herring for NATO's plans to expand its global political footprint. The step is fraught with serious implications, not least because Russia will have to maintain their national security all by itself. Earlier, President Dmitry Medvedev did not exclude a possibility of creating Russia's own missile defense system if NATO continues to display its reluctance to interact on the issue. He did not elaborate...

<http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/02/03/42711994.html>

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

## **United States to Hold Talks on Tactical Nuclear Weapons with Russia**

3 February 2011

United States expects to hold talks with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) within a year after the New START arms reduction treaty comes into force, President Barack Obama said in a message to the Senate on Wednesday.

"The United States will seek to initiate, following consultation with NATO Allies but not later than 1 year after the entry into force of the New START Treaty, negotiations with the Russian Federation on an agreement to address the disparity between the non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of the United States," the message reads.

Earlier on Wednesday, Obama signed ratification papers for the New START - a keystone of his painstaking effort to reset relations with Russia.

When ratifying the New START deal in December, the United States Senate adopted a resolution obligating the government to start bilateral talks on cutting the TNW stockpiles - landmines, artillery shells and short-range missiles. Washington says Moscow has a larger number of these systems.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said January 29 that it is too early to discuss limiting TNW with the United States because Russia needs to see the way the U.S. fulfills the undertaken commitments.

The new deal, replacing START 1, which expired in December 2009, was signed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Obama in Prague in April 2010. The document slashes the Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear arsenals to a maximum of 1,550 warheads, down from the current ceiling of 2,200.

The U.S. Senate ratified the deal on December 22, 2010, but added several amendments to the resolution on ratification, including a demand to build up U.S. global missile defenses.

Medvedev signed the ratification documents January 28 after both houses of the Russian parliament ratified the new treaty adding some provisions to the ratification document and issuing two supplementary statements to the resolution on the treaty ratification.

The deal will formally come into force when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exchange the instruments of ratification at a security conference in Munich on February 5.

In his message to senators, Obama officially notified them that he signed the ratification papers and will implement the decisions of legislators that the ratification resolution contains.

WASHINGTON, February 3 (RIA Novosti)

<http://en.rian.ru/world/20110203/162430188.html>

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Global Security Newswire

## **U.S. Intelligence Fears Al-Qaeda Plotting to Strike Wall Street**

Friday, February 4, 2011

U.S. intelligence officials are informing the heads of some of the country's most powerful financial entities that Yemeni-based al-Qaeda operatives could be plotting terrorist strikes against Wall Street banks or their top managers, NBC News reported on Tuesday (see *GSN*, Dec. 21, 2010).

Security sources are emphasizing the danger is not specific and that there "is no indication of a targeted assassination plot" toward any banking leaders. Officials, though, worry that foreign-based extremists have talked about targeting specific individuals.

Intelligence researchers said there is a nonspecific but increasing fear that extremists in Yemen could make another attempt at shipping hidden explosive devices or chemical and biological weapons materials to New York financial institutions. U.S. authorities think extremists operating from Yemen were responsible for the packaged bombs addressed to Chicago-based synagogues in late October. The explosive devices -- hidden inside printer cartridges -- were intercepted in the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom but officials think they could have been designed to detonate in midflight (see *GSN*, Nov. 3, 2010).

Al-Qaeda's official magazine, "Inspire," in its most recent issue included a mention of attempting to deploy the biological pathogen anthrax in a terror strike, officials said.

Al-Qaeda member Abu Suleiman al-Nasser in a recent blog post exhorted, "Rush my Muslim brothers to targeting financial sites and the program sites of financial institutions, stock markets and money markets."

Law enforcement officials are advising Wall Street banking firms to improve security protocols inside and surrounding their mail departments and for the handling of packages, particularly those intended for senior firm officials.

Following the September 11 attacks, the New York Police Department significantly enhanced Wall Street security measures. Suspected extremists have been found in the past conducting surveillance of sites including the New York Stock Exchange and the Citicorp Center (Jonathan Dienst, NBC News, Feb. 1).

[http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\\_20110204\\_6714.php](http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110204_6714.php)

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RIA Novoista – Russian Information Agency

OPINION

Valdai Discussion Club

## **Balance of Strategic Capabilities may Change to Russia's Disadvantage**

3 February 2011

By Alexei Fenenko

*There is little chance that the talks on missile defense in Europe will succeed. The Russian plan for sectoral missile defense provides for joint participation on an equal footing in developing theater missile defense. This is not acceptable to the United States and does not jibe with the structure of relations within NATO.*

*Valdaiclub.com interview with Alexei Fenenko, Leading Research Fellow, Institute of International Security Studies of RAS, Russian Academy of Sciences.*

**What do you think about Russia and NATO's approach to the future development of sectoral missile defense and European missile defense? What are the chances that a mutually acceptable solution will be found?**

There is little chance that the talks on missile defense in Europe will succeed, in my opinion. Nuclear deterrence is the foundation on which Russia and the United States construct their relations. Should the U.S. deploy a missile defense system, this will undermine bilateral relations. Since 1999, Washington has made no secret of the fact that its strategic goal is to make the territory of the United States and its allies invulnerable to attack. Washington wants to move beyond the logic of mutually assured destruction. NATO's new strategic concept views the deployment of

American missile defense systems as a new foundation for guaranteeing the security of America's allies in Europe. Russia, for its part, has serious concerns that the United States is trying to undermine its strategic capabilities with this missile defense system. This is particularly alarming given the reduction of strategic offensive arms under New START and the impending withdrawal of the nuclear systems built in the 1980s over the next 15 years.

The talks on missile defense have unfolded according to this logic. In the spring of 2000, then president Vladimir Putin proposed to British prime minister Tony Blair that Russia and the EU create a joint missile defense system. The administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush saw the Russian proposal as an attempt to torpedo the U.S. missile defense system and drive a wedge between NATO allies on this issue. At a summit in Rome in May 2002, NATO put forward its own compromise – Russian participation in the development of theater missile defense but not in command and control. Judging by the reaction to Medvedev's speech in Lisbon, this is the only compromise the West is prepared to accept. The Russian plan for sectoral missile defense, on the other hand, provides for joint participation on an equal footing in developing theater missile defense. This is not acceptable to the United States and does not jibe with the structure of relations within NATO.

But this is not the main issue. In Lisbon, Medvedev said with good reason that we still have 10 years to reach an agreement on missile defense – otherwise, a new arms race will be unavoidable. However, in 10 years the balance of strategic capabilities may change to Russia's disadvantage because of cuts in its nuclear arsenal and the deployment (albeit in a limited scope) of an American missile defense system. Meanwhile, New START, which contains a provision linking strategic defensive and offensive arms, expires in 2020. Before that time, Moscow would like to conclude an agreement with Washington on missile defense that preserves the logic of mutually assured destruction. It became clear at U.S. and Russian presidents' summit in Washington on June 24, 2010 that the White House is not prepared to accept mutually binding limitations on strategic missile defense. This is why Russia, in the fall of 2010, added sectoral defense in Europe to the agenda of missile defense talks.

**What is preventing Russia and NATO from stepping up cooperation on international issues, for instance, on the current situation in Afghanistan (establishing a viable state, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics)?**

The situation in Afghanistan is creating a complex set of issues in Russia-NATO relations. Until recently, experts said that their positions on Afghanistan coincide. But the events of the past two to three years suggest otherwise.

First, Russia is alarmed by the phased withdrawal plan for NATO troops announced at the Lisbon summit. The Karzai government is not in control of a considerable part of Afghan territory. The situation in neighboring nuclear Pakistan has been unstable for seven years because of its internal war with radical Islamists in Waziristan. Washington has not proposed any plans for stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moscow is worried that Washington will leave a heritage in the form of a regional war involving Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Russia has obligations toward Tajikistan under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

Second, NATO refuses to talk with CSTO concerning the cooperation on the Afghan issue because it hasn't yet recognized this organization. President Barack Obama said in May 2010 that the United States is opposed to foreign interference in the Kyrgyz crisis. Apparently, Washington reserves the right to build military and political relations with Central Asia, bypassing CSTO. Washington applied for membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as observer in the summer of 2002, which was met with a nervous reaction both in Beijing and Moscow, who saw it as an attempt to foster military ties with Central Asian states.

Third, there are unresolved disputes over counter-narcotics operations in the region. Russian officials are heard reproaching NATO more and more often for condoning the growing of opium poppies in Afghanistan. In October 2010, Russia tried to discuss this issue with Karzai, irritating both Washington and Brussels.

These problems are not yet fatal. But as they accumulate, they can create a conflict potential over Afghanistan.

**Global cyber security is a new challenge for the entire international community. What forms of cooperation between Russia and NATO could this lead to?**

Cyber security and information security are being broadly discussed in Russia and the United States, and even more so following the controversy generated by WikiLeaks. But this issue is still at the stage of discussion. For now, the Internet is being mostly used to publish leaks, gather information and monitoring – that is, rather as a means of achieving political goals than an independent space.

There is another more important trend: the demand of China and a number of developing countries to change the system of administering the web, putting it under the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The United States and the EU have rejected these proposals. Russia is more likely to support China than America on this.

**What are the chances that the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty will be signed soon as the natural next step after the success with New START?**

There is little chance that the conventional forces treaty will be signed in the near future. Not a single NATO country has ratified the old, Istanbul version of the treaty. The pretext for this was Russia's refusal to pull its military commitments out of Moldova and Georgia. But such excuses cannot lead to a big conflict, and it's not worth risking a serious treaty like this for such weak excuses.

But the real issue lies elsewhere. The balance of conventional forces has changed in NATO's favor in the last 15 years. NATO does not see what concessions it would gain from Russia for reviving the treaty. And Moscow, for its part, is feeling the growing disparity in conventional forces. Now that the entire system based on the Stockholm and Vienna accords on the rules of war in Europe is falling apart, Russia is trying to keep its options open in this sphere.

I think it would make more sense to restore the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna. It was set up in 1989 but is lying dormant right now. Reviving it could help us resume talks on confidence-building measures in Europe – a kind of code of conduct for Russia and NATO in Europe, which also applies to third countries.

[http://en.rian.ru/valdai\\_op/20110203/162433726.html](http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110203/162433726.html)

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The Guardian – U.K.

OPINION/Editorial

## Storing Up Trouble: Pakistan's Nuclear Bombs

*Internal difficulties as well as the Afghan war mean that fears over the country's weapon stockpile cannot be dismissed*

Thursday, 3 February 2011

Why does Pakistan keep heaping up nuclear weapons like a woodcutter piling logs? American intelligence assessments now estimate that Pakistan has over 100 weapons, more than India, and at least twice as many as it had only four years ago. It is even suggested that Pakistan could quite soon overtake Britain as the world's fifth largest nuclear power. Pakistan has come a long and dismal way since Zulfikar Ali Bhutto reportedly vowed in 1972 that "even if we have to eat grass we will make nuclear bombs".

Mr Bhutto went to the scaffold before Pakistan got its first bomb in 1987. But the programme, for a long time under the direction of Dr AQ Khan, later notorious for his role in the proliferation of nuclear technology, has forged inexorably on, under leader after leader, including Mr Bhutto's daughter, Benazir. The fate of many of these leaders – Mr Bhutto hanged, President Zia-ul-Haq and Benazir assassinated, President Pervez Musharraf pushed out of power – constitutes in itself a commentary on why Pakistan would be better off without such weapons. In a country so volatile, where the principle of civilian and even of military control of nuclear weapons must be an issue, why take these risks? Or, if a sense that they are vital to Pakistan's prestige and necessary to deter India prevents a reversal of policy, why not stop at a much lower number?

Those living in "established" nuclear states need to watch themselves when they embark on criticism of those who came later. Yet it is surely permissible to point out that nuclear weapons are not in any way a store of value. They are a store of trouble, as the established nuclear powers have recognised, admittedly tardily and incompletely, by reducing their inventories in recent years. Since the conflict between India and Pakistan acquired a full nuclear dimension in 1998, it can be argued that strategic stability in the subcontinent has weakened. War between India and Pakistan nevertheless remains a very remote prospect.

The Indians, like others, see the greater dangers as the security of the weapons themselves and of the facilities producing nuclear materials. The Americans are particularly anxious about the latter. What is called "slow theft", the squirrelling away of small amounts of nuclear material by insiders to pass to terrorists, is said to be a cause of deep anxiety among officials who monitor the situation.

The internal difficulties of Pakistan, with the Afghan war on its doorstep, a serious insurgency on its own soil, and extremist movements of various kinds barely under control, mean that such fears cannot be dismissed. Cocking a nuclear snook at India seems worse than irresponsible under the circumstances.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/feb/03/pakistan-nuclear-bombs-editorial>

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The National – U.A.E.

OPINION

## Tehran's Breakneck Nuclear Drive Risks Self-Inflicted Pain

By Mark Fitzpatrick



February 4, 2011

Global concerns about Iran's nuclear programme rightly focus on the proliferation threat it poses. Notwithstanding the civilian nuclear energy purpose of projects such as the Russian-built Bushehr power reactor, the evidence indicates beyond reasonable doubt that Iran also seeks a capability to produce nuclear weapons.

Iran's neighbours and, even more so, its own citizens, also have reason to fear the safety risks associated with the nuclear programme. So far, these safety concerns have been tied to Bushehr. The environmental price that Iran's Gulf neighbours would have to pay in the event of a reactor accident there has been well described by Dr Sami al Faraj, the president of the Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies.

A smaller Iranian reactor that has been in the news - the Tehran research reactor, supplied by the United States in the 1960s - also poses health and safety concerns. Iran wants to use the reactor to produce medical isotopes, but the reactor is running out of fuel, which is formed from uranium enriched to 19.75 per cent. Failed negotiations in late 2009 over a trade for replacement fuel gave Iran an excuse to produce 19.75 per cent enriched uranium on its own.

A dossier published yesterday on Iran's nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) argues that the military implications of such enrichment are significant. It puts Iran on the threshold of having weapons-usable fissile material.

In addition to the proliferation threat posed by the 20 per cent enriched uranium, Iran's justification is dubious and presents safety risks in two ways. Firstly, it is reasonable to ask if the Tehran research reactor should continue to be used at all. Almost eight years ago Iran said the reactor was nearing the safety limits for which it was designed. This safety risk is compounded by the reactor's proximity to residential areas. It was on the outskirts of the city when its construction started in 1960, but Tehran's expansion since then means the reactor is now surrounded by houses.

Secondly, Iran cannot safely produce enriched uranium fuel on its own. Even if Iran is eventually able to fabricate fuel from the 19.75 per cent enriched uranium, standard safety practices would require the fuel to be tested for an extended period of time in a reactor before it could be safely used. By the time any fuel is produced, the Tehran research reactor may not have sufficient power to allow this testing to take place. One way or another, Iran would probably have to turn to outside help to test the fuel or else use it in an unsafe way.

A research reactor under construction at Arak also poses safety as well as proliferation risks. The 40MW Arak reactor has civilian purposes, to be sure. But notably, it is similar in size and kind to reactors used by India, Israel and Pakistan to produce plutonium for weapons. The proliferation threat from Arak is at least several years away, in part because Iran has not been able to produce or to procure the large metal components such as the pressure vessel that, in order to withstand the intense heat and radiation inside the reactor, need to be forged without welds. If Iran uses inferior domestic components for the Arak reactor, this will pose a safety risk.

Potentially worse than all the above safety risks associated with current projects are the dangers posed to the environment and human health if Iran proceeds with plans to build on its own a power reactor at Darkhovin, near the head of the Gulf. This reactor is to be one-third the size of Bushehr, but it will still be much larger than the research reactors in Tehran and Arak. Iran has never built a reactor independently and yet now plans to design and build one at Darkhovin entirely on its own. Because of Iran's long record of violating IAEA safeguards and UN Security Council mandates, it is unable to contract with international partners in the construction of Darkhovin or in the supply of its components. If Iran tries to build a reactor vessel on its own, it will be in serious danger of leaking or even exploding.

Iran's refusal to provide the IAEA with advance design information for Darkhovin or any other new or redesigned nuclear facility is another reason for concern. The Darkhovin reactor was expected to become operational by 2015, but, luckily for Iran's neighbours, this schedule will not be met.

Meanwhile, with foreign assistance the United Arab Emirates is proceeding with the construction of four large nuclear reactors, with cutting-edge technology, full transparency and utmost attention to international norms on safety, security and safeguards. The contrast with Iran's nuclear programme could not be more stark. Iran could similarly benefit from international cooperation in nuclear technology - if only it would come in from the cold and give up its weapons intentions.

*Mark Fitzpatrick is the director of the non-proliferation and disarmament programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies*

<http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/tehrans-breakneck-nuclear-drive-risks-self-inflicted-pain?pageCount=0>

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Reuters.com  
ANALYSIS

## **Analysis: Deeper Cuts Daunting After U.S.-Russia Nuclear Pact**

By Steve Gutterman

Friday, February 4, 2011

MOSCOW (Reuters) - It took a year of tortuous talks and painful compromise for Russia and the United States to forge their strategic nuclear arms cut treaty. That may prove child's play compared with the next step toward nuclear disarmament.

The New START treaty, signed by presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev last April and set to be put into force at a ceremony in Munich on Saturday, is the centerpiece of a "reset" in long-strained bilateral relations as well as a crucial springboard toward a world without nuclear weapons.

But that finish line lies beyond a minefield of obstacles -- from lingering fears of nuclear domination to domestic politics and the devilish complexities of doing away with weapons that have never before been the subject of negotiations.

"Moving to the next round will not be easy at all," said Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of the journal *Russia in Global Affairs*.

New START, which lowers the ceilings on stocks of long-range weapons, will enter force when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exchange ratification documents during a security conference in Munich.

The former Cold War foes have already signaled differences over further cuts in the world's largest nuclear arsenals.

The first hurdle looms this year over an armament that is not restricted by New START: tactical nuclear weapons.

The towering Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that are restricted by the treaty are icons of the Cold War -- the stuff of public displays of military might and private nightmares of nuclear armageddon.

But cutting tactical nuclear weapons, with ranges up to 500 km (300 miles) -- a fraction of the 5,500 km (3,400 miles) and more that strategic missiles can travel -- could be a stiffer challenge for two countries that have not even revealed the numbers in their possession.

### **NOT SO FAST**

When the U.S. Senate ratified New START, it ordered Obama to seek negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons within a year after it enters into force.

Not so fast, says Russia, whose stockpile is several times larger than that of the United States -- compensation, in Moscow's view, for the relative weakness of its conventional forces.

Moscow says talks should not be held until each country confines its tactical nuclear weapons to its own territory.

Translation: Russia can keep warheads on European territory -- its own -- while the United States must withdraw the few hundred tactical nuclear weapons it is estimated to maintain in allied NATO countries on the continent.

That's not necessarily a deal-killer. The United States has already removed most of the more than 7,000 tactical nuclear warheads it deployed in Europe at the height of the Cold War, and some Europeans are urging a complete withdrawal.

The United States, meanwhile, has something that could sweeten a deal for the Kremlin to cut tactical nuclear weapons: a couple thousand strategic nuclear warheads that are not restricted by New START as long as they are not deployed.

Arms control experts say a solution could be an umbrella treaty that would set ceilings on all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons -- tactical and strategic, deployed and undeployed.

"This will be a completely new kind of negotiation, if it does take place," Lukyanov said.

There is a welter of other factors that could hinder progress toward a new treaty.

One major complication comes from concerns about other nuclear-armed nations -- chiefly Britain, France and China -- whose smaller arsenals will become increasingly significant as Russia and the United States make deeper cuts.

These smaller arsenals must be included sooner or later for a nuclear-free world, which would mark a milestone for disarmament but likely make agreements even more elusive.

In Moscow and Washington, New START may have sated appetites for cuts for some time. With presidential elections approaching in 2012, political leaders in both countries will be wary about any perception they could be compromising national security.

For Russia, nuclear arms are both a key source of protection and an emotive symbol of its Cold War superpower status.

One selling point for Russia on New START was a return to the prestige of arms control summitry with Washington.

Another is that its arsenal is likely to be at or below the pact's limits within the seven-year deadline anyway.

Further treaties, Medvedev said when he signed the law to ratify New START, are "a different story."

#### WEAPONS WORRIES

Russia has warned it could withdraw from New START if the West develops or deploys weapons that seriously threaten its security -- a blanket warning meant to encompass anything from a missile shield to conventionally armed long-range weapons it fears could upset the strategic balance.

Russia could seek to limit such weapons in any new treaty -- an extremely tough sell for the United States, whose plans for a system to counter missile attacks have been a source of tension with Moscow since President Ronald Reagan dreamed of a "Star Wars" shield against Soviet ICBMs in the 1980s.

Obama pleased Moscow by scrapping a Bush-era plan for a European missile shield that Russia said would have weakened its offensive nuclear arsenal and upset the strategic balance.

Working with NATO, the United States is trying to avert future confrontation over the issue by inviting Russia to cooperate on a European missile shield.

Russia has embraced the offer but warned of a new arms race if it is not given a strong enough role in a missile shield. That suggests that to secure deeper nuclear arms cuts, the United States will have to satisfy Moscow without alienating European allies or scuttling the chances of support at home.

"One of the problems the (U.S.) administration faces in the next negotiating round is being trapped between the Russians insisting on some missile defense limits and a Senate which will accept none," said Steven Pifer, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

"The way out of that box is missile defense cooperation."

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/04/us-russia-usa-arms-idUSTRE71327O20110204?feedType=RSS&feedName=vcCandidateFeed2&virtualBrandChannel=10102>

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