



**USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER**  
**CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL**  
MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

**Issue No. 983, 24 February 2012**

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London Guardian – U.K.

## UN Nuclear Inspectors Declare Iran Mission a Disappointment

*International Atomic Energy Agency team blocked by authorities in Tehran from visiting suspect site*

By Julian Borger, diplomatic editor

Wednesday, 22 February 2012

The diplomatic options for a solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis narrowed on Wednesday after a team of UN nuclear inspectors returned from Tehran without agreement on visiting a suspect site.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is due to issue its latest report on the Iranian nuclear programme on Friday, but took the unusual step of criticising Tehran's approach in a statement issued while the inspectors were still flying back to its headquarters in Vienna.

The main stumbling block was Iran's refusal to allow the IAEA team to visit a military site at Parchin, where the last agency report, issued in November, said there was a steel chamber which could have been used for testing explosives of a type performed in the development of a nuclear warhead.

"It is disappointing that Iran did not accept our request to visit Parchin during the first or second meetings," said the agency's director general, Yukiya Amano. "We engaged in a constructive spirit, but no agreement was reached."

Herman Nackaerts, the IAEA deputy director general and head of the safeguards department, who headed the mission, had made a Parchin visit the main litmus test for its success, according to diplomatic sources, but was rebuffed by the Iranians.

Speaking at Vienna airport on his return, Nackaerts said his team "could not find a way forward".

A Vienna-based diplomat briefed on the visit said Iran had sought to focus the talks on a work-plan circumscribing the conduct of IAEA inspections.

"It was very hard work. The Iranians focused exclusively on process and they tried to get the team to sign a document which governed the ways they would work," the diplomat said. "My reading is, what happened was that the meetings were monopolised by a lot of unproductive discussions on the wording of the agreement and practical questions put forward by the agency were put to the side."

The IAEA said: "Intensive efforts were made to reach agreement on a document facilitating the clarification of unresolved issues in connection with Iran's nuclear programme, particularly those relating to possible military dimensions. Unfortunately, agreement was not reached on this document."

In the wake of the collapse of the mission, Friday's report will almost certainly give a negative assessment of Iranian co-operation while noting the progress of the country's nuclear programme and uranium enrichment, which the UN security council has demanded Tehran suspend.

Iran insists it has a right to enrich uranium and the country's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, put on a show of defiance on Wednesday with a rare meeting with Iranian nuclear scientists, insisting their work was peaceful, that Iran had no intention of building a bomb and vowing the programme would continue in the face of mounting international pressure.

"With God's help, and without paying attention to propaganda, Iran's nuclear course should continue firmly and seriously," Khamenei said on Iranian state television. "Pressures, sanctions and assassinations will bear no fruit. No obstacles can stop Iran's nuclear work."

Doubts have now been cast over tentative plans to hold a new round of talks between Iran and a six-nation group of major powers, including the five permanent members of the UN security council together with Germany. The

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group, known as the P5+1, had been waiting for the new IAEA report before deciding whether to proceed with the talks.

It was also seeking clarification on whether Iran had dropped its earlier preconditions for negotiations, which included an immediate end to sanctions and a guarantee that uranium enrichment was a non-negotiable Iranian right.

There had been hopes that the P5+1 meeting could agree confidence-building measures, possibly including an exchange of Iranian low enriched uranium for French-made fuel rods. Diplomats said the group would now have to reassess if there would be any purpose in a meeting.

Some western capitals are pushing instead for Iran to be referred to the UN security council by the IAEA board of member states, with the aim of imposing further sanctions. An EU oil embargo is already planned for 1 July, at about the same time of US financial sanctions against the Iranian global oil trade.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/22/un-nuclear-inspectors-iran-mission?newsfeed=true>

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Chicago Tribune

## **White House Chides Iran over Failure of IAEA Mission**

Reuters

February 22, 2012

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The White House on Wednesday criticized Iran over the failure of the U.N. nuclear watchdog's latest mission, saying it again showed Tehran's refusal to abide by its international obligations over its nuclear program.

White House spokesman Jay Carney also said the United States was continuing to evaluate Iran's intentions after it sent a letter to EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton last week, raising hopes for the prospects of renewed talks with world powers.

"This particular action by Iran suggest that they have not changed their behavior when it comes to abiding by their international obligations," Carney told reporters, expressing U.S. regret that the IAEA mission had ended in failure.

*Reporting By Matt Spetalnick*

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-iran-nuclear-whitehousetre811qq-20120222,0,754234.story>

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Al Arabiya – U.A.E

## **Iran Will Have U.S.-Range Missile in 2-3 Years: Israel**

Wednesday, 22 February 2012

By Reuters, Occupied Jerusalem

Israel believes that within 2-3 years Iran will have intercontinental missiles able to hit the United States, an Israeli minister said in remarks aimed at raising awareness of the threat it believes a nuclear Iran would pose to the world.

Analysts now estimate the longest range of an Iranian missile to be about 2,400 km (1,500 miles), capable of reaching Tehran's arch-enemy Israel as well as Europe.

But Israel has also been keen to persuade any allies who do not share their view of the risk posed by Iran that an Islamic Republic with atom bombs would also threaten the West.

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Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz's assessment, in an interview with CNBC, was in line with an unclassified U.S. Defense Department report in 2010 that estimated Iran may be able to build a U.S.-range missile by 2015.

"They (the Iranians) are working now and investing a lot of billions of dollars in order to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles," said Steinitz, a former chairman of the Israeli parliament's foreign affairs and defense committee.

"And we estimate that in two to three years they will have the first intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the east coast of America. So their aim is to put a direct nuclear ballistic threat ... to Europe and to the United States of America," he said in English.

Israeli intelligence services keep a close eye on Iran, whose nuclear program Israelis see as a mortal threat, and are widely believed to have been behind a series of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists. Israel also has spy satellites.

Steinitz's remarks coincided with stepped up U.S. efforts to persuade Israeli leaders that there is still time for diplomacy to keep Tehran from building a nuclear weapon and growing concerns Israel might opt to strike Iran pre-emptively.

Three weeks ago, Israeli Vice Prime Minister Moshe Yaalon said Iran had been working on developing a missile capable of striking the United States at a military base rocked by an explosion that killed 17 Iranian troops in November.

Yaalon, who is also minister of strategic affairs, said the base was a research and development facility where Iran was preparing to produce or develop a missile with a range of 10,000 km (6,000 miles).

<http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/22/196362.html>

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Arab News – Saudi Arabia

## **Khamenei: No Obstacles Can Stop Iran's Nuclear Course**

February 22, 2012

By Reuters

TEHRAN: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Wednesday that Iran's nuclear course would not change regardless of international sanctions, assassinations or other pressures.

"With God's help, and without paying attention to propaganda, Iran's nuclear course should continue firmly and seriously ... Pressures, sanctions and assassinations will bear no fruit. No obstacles can stop Iran's nuclear work."

Khamenei was speaking on state television shortly after the UN nuclear watchdog declared a collapse in talks with Iran aimed at getting it to address suspicions that it is covertly seeking nuclear weapons capability.

The Islamic Republic denies this, saying its program to enrich uranium for nuclear fuel is for peaceful energy only.

But Iran's refusal to curb sensitive atomic activities with both civilian and military purposes, and its track record of secrecy and restricting UN inspections, have drawn increasingly harsh UN and separate US and European sanctions, now targeting its economically vital oil exports.

Several Iranian nuclear scientists have been killed in bombings over the past two years, attacks that Tehran has blamed on arch-adversary Israel. The Jewish state has not commented.

The United States and Israel have not ruled out resorting to military action against Iran if they conclude that diplomacy and sanctions will not stop it from developing a nuclear warhead.

<http://arabnews.com/middleeast/article578602.ece>

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Vancouver Sun – Vancouver, Canada

## **Iran Research Centre Had Key Role in Atom Work, Group Says**

By Louis Charbonneau, Reuters

February 22, 2012

UNITED NATIONS — An Iranian research centre that has been investigated by UN nuclear inspectors appears to have played a key role in Tehran's atomic program, which western powers fear is aimed at producing weapons, according to a report released on Wednesday.

The study by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) likely will cast further doubt on Tehran's denials that it is seeking atomic bombs as the UN nuclear agency prepares to publish a report on Iran in the coming days.

Iran's Physics Research Center was established in 1989 "as part of an effort to create an undeclared nuclear program," according to ISIS's president, David Albright, a nuclear expert and former inspector for the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as Andrea Stricker and Paul Brannan.

"Although Iran has admitted that the PHRC was related to the military and had a nuclear purpose in the area of defense preparedness and radiation detection, its actual nuclear role appears much more extensive," the ISIS report said.

The Iranian research centre was established a year after the end of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, in which Saddam Hussein's troops used chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers.

According to the UN nuclear watchdog's November 2011 report on Iran, the Physics Research Center was established at Lavizan, a complex near a military installation in Tehran.

Lavizan was razed in late 2003 and early 2004. Western diplomats and intelligence sources said at the time that they suspected Tehran was conducting undeclared nuclear activities at Lavizan and was determined to cover them up.

ISIS said it has acquired more than 1,600 telexes relating to the nuclear procurement activities of the Physics Research Center and Sharif University, another Iranian institution involved in Tehran's nuclear research, in the 1990s.

"Iran has failed to declare all of PHRC's activities to the (IAEA)," the Albright group's report says. "Iran has stated to the IAEA that the PHRC procurements were not related to a nuclear program. The information assembled in this ISIS report, however, contradicts this claim."

If the allegations are confirmed, they could show that Iran's suspected nuclear coverup is far more extensive than was previously known. This may annoy Iranian allies, such as Russia and China, which have slowed the push for new sanctions on Iran while pressing Tehran to co-operate with the IAEA.

While the exact nature and full scope of the Physics Research Center's nuclear-related activities "remains difficult to fully understand," Albright's report said it is time for the Iranians to come clean about the centre's past work.

"Iran should clarify PHRC's exact purpose and accomplishments and its relationship to the IAEA's broader question of the military dimensions of Iran's nuclear effort," the report said.

UN nuclear officials repeatedly have complained that Iran has not fully co-operated with their attempts to shed light on the full extent of Iran's nuclear program, which it kept hidden from agency inspectors for nearly two decades until 2003.

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The IAEA sent several senior officials to Iran recently to persuade the Tehran government to grant them greater access to the nuclear facilities, but failed to win any pledges to boost co-operation. The setback could raise the risk of confrontation between Iran and the West.

The IAEA has been looking into the Physics Research Center, which acted as an umbrella organization under Iran's defence ministry and co-ordinated various nuclear activities.

According to the IAEA, by the early 2000s, the Physics Research Center's activities had been folded into the so-called AMAD Plan, which was responsible for what the IAEA refers to as "alleged studies" into research and development relevant to building nuclear weapons.

<http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Iran+research+centre+role+atom+work+group+says/6190813/story.html>

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Tehran Times – Iran

## **Iran Will Shatter Delusions of Grandeur of Nuclear Weapons States: Leader**

Political Desk

Thursday, February 23, 2012

TEHRAN - Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei has said that the Iranian nation will shatter the delusions of grandeur of the hegemonistic powers that are reliant on nuclear weapons.

The Leader made the remarks in an address to a gathering of officials of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and a number of the country's nuclear scientists during a meeting in Tehran on Wednesday.

"The Iranian nation has never sought and will never seek nuclear weapons and will prove to the world that a nuclear weapon is not a source of power and that a nation has the ability to shatter the might arising from nuclear weapons through reliance on their talents and great human and natural potential, and the Iranian nation will do it," Ayatollah Khamenei stated.

"There is no doubt that the decision-making bodies in the countries that have aligned themselves against us are well aware of the fact that Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons because the Islamic Republic of Iran regards the possession of nuclear weapons as a great sin in terms of thought, theory, and jurisprudence and believes that stockpiling such weapons is useless, very harmful, and very dangerous," he added.

He also said, "Although the progress of young (Iranian) scientists in the area of nuclear technology has various aspects, the most important aspect of it is the creation of a sense of national dignity and self-esteem among the Iranian people."

"A number of countries that have established domination over the world and have chosen the name 'international community' for themselves are fearful about the breakup of (their) scientific monopoly by nations, and some of their commotion about the Iranian nation is due to this very reason," Ayatollah Khamenei noted.

If the world's nations can independently make progress in various fields of science and industry, including nuclear technology and aerospace, "no room would be left for the unfair domination of the global powers," he observed.

Elsewhere in his remarks, Ayatollah Khamenei commented on the sanctions imposed on Iran under the allegation that it is seeking to produce nuclear weapons, saying, "The pressure and sanctions show the weakness of the hegemonistic powers and will make the Iranian nation stronger.

"Sanctions have existed since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, while the nuclear issue dates back to a few years ago. Therefore, their main problem is the nation that has decided to be independent, fight against oppression, and reveal who the oppressors are."

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Prior to Ayatollah Khamenei's address, AEOI Director Fereydoun Abbasi delivered a speech in which he enumerated Iran's latest nuclear achievements.

<http://tehrantimes.com/politics/95742-iran-will-shatter-delusions-of-grandeur-of-nuclear-weapons-states-leader>

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The Hindu Business Line – India

February 23, 2012

## **Iran Urges IAEA Not to 'Perturb Climate of Cooperation'**

Press Trust of India (PTI)

Tehran, Feb 23: Iran's envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency has urged the UN watchdog to "avoid perturbing the climate of cooperation", saying talks over Tehran's controversial nuclear programme would continue.

Mr Ali Asghar Soltanieh was speaking after two days of fruitless visit to Iran by IAEA inspectors raised tensions, with Russia warning of "catastrophic" consequences if it leads to a military attack on the country.

"During the past two days, we raised technical and legal matters. Technical answers were provided to the agency's questions," Mr Soltanieh was quoted yesterday by state television's website as saying.

"This posture of cooperation and dialogue will continue, and we advise (the IAEA) to avoid perturbing the climate of cooperation."

"Proposals were made" to advance cooperation between Iran and the IAEA, "but to reach a final accord, we need more time.

And we have agreed to continue discussions."

The IAEA said it had gone into the two-day visit to Tehran, and another inconclusive one last month, in a "constructive spirit", but that no agreement had been reached on efforts to elucidate Iran's nuclear activities.

The UN watchdog said there was no agreement with Iran "at this point in time" on holding further talks.

Despite requests, "we could not get access" to a military site in Parchin where suspected nuclear warhead design experiments were conducted, team leader and chief inspector, Mr Herman Nackaerts, said on returning to Vienna.

Referring to Parchin, Mr Soltanieh said: "For every visit, it is necessary to fix a framework and rules taking into consideration both parties."

Talk of possible military action against Iran by Israel, with or without US help, had lent urgency to diplomatic efforts to lower tensions.

The United States and Europe have been ramping up economic sanctions on Iran since November, when the IAEA published a report crystallising — though not entirely validating — Western suspicions it was pursuing nuclear weapons research in Parchin and elsewhere.

Iran has repeatedly said the sanctions will not deter it from its nuclear ambitions, and it has threatened to strike back at any military action, possibly by closing the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

<http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/economy/article2922906.ece>

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Global Security Newswire

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## Major Ground Force Likely Needed to Guard Syrian Chemical Arms: Pentagon

February 23, 2012

The U.S. Defense Department has projected that in excess of 75,000 military personnel might be needed to guard Syria's chemical weapons stocks against theft, CNN reported on Wednesday (see *GSN*, Feb. 16).

The U.S. Central Command developed the estimate as part of efforts to produce a number of alternatives for President Obama to consider in addressing the growing security situation in Syria.

The Assad regime has come under increasing international recrimination for its use of massive deadly force against civilian opposition forces and army defectors. The death toll after nearly a year of protests is presently estimated at between 5,400 and 7,000.

Protecting Syria's chemical weapons depots and production plants would be "extraordinarily difficult," an anonymous Pentagon official said to CNN. The Defense Department estimates Syria has 50 chemical arsenal and manufacturing facilities, which are supplemented by additional research institutions and storage depots.

"Syria probably has one of the largest programs in the world," said Leonard Spector, deputy director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "It has multiple types of chemical agents," he said, including nerve agents, chlorine and phosgene.

Open source information going back to the 1980s indicates Syria has four chemical agent manufacturing plants at al-Safira, Hama, Homs and Latakia. Two chemical munition storage sites are also believed to be located at Khan Abu Shamat and Furqlus, according to previous reporting.

Were the United States to actually send military personnel to Syria, the number of troops is not likely to be close to 75,000, CNN said. Obama officials maintain the administration is not presently considering a military intervention in the Arab state.

"In terms of a military action to secure a part of the country, that is not currently a policy we are pursuing," White House spokesman Jay Carney said on Wednesday.

The United States has assessed that Syria's chemical weapon-related states are still being guarded by Syrian soldiers loyal to the regime.

A high-ranking U.S. official said a "nightmare scenario" would involve the abrupt collapse of the Assad government or escalation in the conflict that requires other nations to send in troops to protect the chemical warfare materials.

Washington is particularly concerned about militants acquiring chemical arms following a partial or complete collapse of the Assad regime, a defense official said.

Though the United States "continues to monitor the overall situation in Syria," there are "ongoing discussions specific to the location of, and security around, the various components of their chemical weapons program," the official told CNN in an interview last week (Barbara Starr, CNN, Feb. 22).

<http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-calculates-big-military-footprint-may-be-needed-guard-syrian-chemical-arms/>

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Washington Times

### Retired General: U.S. Can't Stop Iran from Making Nukes

By Kristina Wong, *The Washington Times*

Friday, February 24, 2012

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A former high-ranking military official says the U.S. does not have the ability to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

"If they [Iranians] have the intent, all the weapons in the world are not going to change that," retired Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said late Thursday.

Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., Gen. Cartwright also said that Israel will not be able to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons, even if the Jewish state attacks the Islamic republic's atomic sites.

"They can slow it down. They can delay it, some estimate two to five years. But that does not take away the intellectual capital," he said.

Gen. Cartwright's assessment differs markedly from that of Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, who has said the U.S. will not allow Iran to develop atomic weapons.

The U.S.' "red line to Iran is: Do not develop a nuclear weapon. That's a red line for us," Mr. Panetta said last month on CBS' "Face the Nation."

The U.S., Israel and the European Union suspect that Iran is trying develop nuclear weapons, but the Islamic republic repeatedly has said its atomic research is geared only toward peaceful, civilian uses.

Israeli leaders reportedly have been considering a military strike on Iranian facilities to disrupt the country's nuclear program.

Gen. Cartwright and retired Navy Adm. William Fallon, also speaking Thursday at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said they would not advise the Obama administration to take military action against Iran.

"I don't see a lot of value in going in," said Gen. Cartwright.

"It's certainly not a preferred option," said Adm. Fallon, former commander of U.S. Central Command. "No one that I'm aware of thinks there's a real positive outcome of a military strike."

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/24/retired-general-us-cant-stop-iran-making-nukes/>

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Oregon Herald – Portland, OR

## **Iran Wants More UN Nuclear Talks after Tehran Stalemate**

Friday February 24, 2012

The relatively upbeat comments by Iran's ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were in stark contrast to a terse statement issued by the U.N. agency on Wednesday after the two days of discussions in Tehran.

"Our position is that we are going to continue the talks for cooperation with the agency and we hope that this process will be successfully going on," said Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh.

"We need a quiet environment, a calm environment to continue our professional work with the agency," he told Reuters late on Thursday.

The IAEA, a Vienna-based U.N. agency, said no further meetings with Iran are planned, signaling frustration at the lack of progress in two rounds of talks this year.

The setback increased worries about a downward spiral towards conflict between Iran and the West, and sent oil prices higher.

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Western diplomats suspect Iran is merely seeking "talks about talks" in an attempt to ease outside pressure on the Islamic state while it presses ahead with nuclear work which the United States and its allies believe has military links.

Iran says allegations of nuclear weapons aims are baseless.

"We try to be cooperative," said Soltanieh. "We are dealing with the questions and we are trying to remove ambiguities."

The IAEA said Iranian officials refused to grant it access to a military site crucial for its investigations and also that there was no agreement on a way forward to clarify concerns that the Islamic Republic may be developing nuclear arms capability.

"TWO VERY LONG AND FRUITLESS MEETINGS"

Western diplomats said Iran had continued to stonewall the senior IAEA team during the talks, in which the agency sought answers to intelligence pointing to nuclear weapons research and development in the country.

"Essentially they had two very long and fruitless meetings," one Western envoy in Vienna said.

The Iranian side "systematically just claimed they have no clandestine program and therefore any questions raised (about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program) were either incorrect or invalid," the diplomat added.

Iran rejects accusations that its nuclear program is a covert attempt to develop a nuclear weapons capability, saying it is seeking to produce only electricity.

But an IAEA report in November suggested Iran had pursued military nuclear technology. This helped to precipitate the latest sanctions by the European Union and United States.

One finding was information that Iran had built a large containment chamber at the Parchin military site near Tehran to conduct high-explosives tests. The U.N. agency said there were "strong indicators of possible weapon development."

Asked why Iran had not allowed the U.N. inspectors to visit Parchin, Soltanieh said: "For any visit and access there should be some sort of modality and agreement."

He added: "It was assumed that after we agreed on the modality then access would be given. Since the modality was not concluded due to time constraints ... this was not possible."

*Editing by David Stamp*

<http://www.oregonherald.com/news/show-story.cfm?id=339623> &World-News Iran-wants-more-UN-nuclear-talks-after-Tehran-stalemate.htm

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Korea Times – South Korea  
February 22, 2012

## **Odds of NK Missile Interception Doubtful**

By Lee Tae-hoon

Experts raised questions Wednesday about South Korea's move to counter North Korean ballistic missiles capable of carrying chemical and nuclear warheads by pushing the envisioned development of advanced interceptors.

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Seoul successfully developed an indigenous mid-range surface-to-air missile, the Chun Koong, with a maximum range of 40 kilometers in December last year and is planning to inject 135.4 billion won (\$120.2 million) to upgrade it to make a longer range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM).

“The country should put more emphasis on proactive deterrence in order to discourage North Korea from provoking the South,” said Kim Tae-woo, a nuclear specialist currently serving as the president of the Korean Institute for National Unification.

“Beefing up defensive measures is necessary but cannot be an effective method of stopping North Korean attacks.”

He said that the country’s limited defense budget should be dedicated to bolstering capabilities to retaliate against the Stalinist regime, which is believed to possess more than 1,000 missiles at over 20 bases throughout the country, if it undertakes a military attack.

The former researcher at the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses argued that the best defense for the South is the ability to undertake an effective offense and that no matter how much money is poured into the missile defense system, the country will remain vulnerable.

“No matter how great the nation’s defense posture is, it cannot stop the North’s motive to undertake an attack against the South, nor completely prevent damage,” he said.

Kim suggested the Ministry of National Defense to increase its outnumbered stockpile of missiles and other conventional arms early last year to a level equivalent or superior to that of the North while serving as a head of a presidential panel on defense advancement.

A senior defense official admitted that the South will remain susceptible to North Korean missile threats, even it successfully develops L-SAMs without a hitch by 2020.

“There is no solution to defending Seoul from North Korean missile attacks,” the official said.

“The odds of intercepting all of the multiple missiles flying toward the South are very slim, no matter how great our missile defense system would be.”

He said the South’s missile defense system is dedicated to defend some of the most valuable military assets, rather than civilians.

Dan Lin, an official of Lockheed Martin specialized in advanced interceptors, concurred, saying the South will suffer a certain degree of damage no matter how early advanced missile interceptors block enemy targets.

“The current technology only allows interceptors to shoot down enemy missiles after the latter reaches an apogee (peak altitude),” he said.

He added that it would be inevitable for the military to shoot down enemy missiles carrying nuclear or chemical warheads when they fly above South Korean territory as many North Korean launch pads are situated near the border.

Lin said his company is consulting with the Defense Acquisition Program Administration over a possible transfer of technology or sales of its most advanced interceptors that employ hit-to-kill technology.

[http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/02/113\\_105439.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/02/113_105439.html)

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Korea Herald – South Korea

## **U.S. Envoy Says Resumption of Six-Party Talks Depends on N. Korea**

February 22, 2012

**Issue No. 983, 24 February 2012**

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Beijing--A U.S. special envoy said Wednesday the resumption of stalled six-party talks on ending North Korea's nuclear weapons program depends on the North.

Glyn Davies, the U.S. special envoy for North Korea policy, made the remarks in a meeting with reporters after arriving earlier in Beijing, where he is to have a high-level meeting with his North Korean counterpart on Thursday.

Davies added that he wants to talk about the future, not about the past.

The Thursday meeting in Beijing would mark the first bilateral contact between the two sides since the December death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.

Experts are paying close attention to the meeting, as it is expected to provide a glimpse into whether Kim's youngest son and new leader Kim Jong-un will abandon his country's nuclear programs.

The six-party talks had been used as a main negotiation channel to persuade the North to give up its nuclear ambitions. However, the talks, which involve the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia, have not been held since late 2008. (Yonhap News)

<http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20120222001419>

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Washington Times

## **Inside the Ring: China's Nuke Force to Double**

By Bill Gertz, *The Washington Times*

Wednesday, February 22, 2012

China's strategic nuclear missile forces are expected to double in size by 2025, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency director.

Army Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess Jr., said in recent Senate testimony the current long-range missile arsenal that could deliver a nuclear warhead to the United States is "fewer than 50 ICBMs."

Gen. Burgess said the strategic missile force "will probably double that number by 2025."

Estimating China's strategic nuclear warhead stockpile has been difficult, but most analysts place the number of nuclear warheads in the Chinese arsenal from 300 to 400.

A recent Georgetown University project that examined China's underground nuclear forces, including some 3,000 miles of tunnels, estimated that based on the size of the facilities, China could have as many as 3,000 warheads. The study based its estimate on fissile material production within what the project called "The Great Underground Wall."

Gen. Burgess also said China is modernizing its nuclear missiles forces by adding harder-to-hit road-mobile missiles and enhancing silo-based missiles. It is also building up nuclear-missile submarines.

The disclosure of China's nuclear modernization comes as the Obama administration has directed the Pentagon to consider cutting U.S. strategic nuclear warheads to as low as 300.

[http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/22/inside-the-ring-52480650/?page=3&utm\\_medium=RSS&utm\\_source=RSS\\_Feed](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/22/inside-the-ring-52480650/?page=3&utm_medium=RSS&utm_source=RSS_Feed)

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Chosun Ilbo – South Korea

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## Who Has His Finger on the Nuclear Button in N.Korea?

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's official visit on Tuesday to Army Unit 841, which handles the North's missile systems, suggests he has gained full control of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons, experts say. Baek Seung-joo at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses said on Wednesday, "Last month, U.S. officials started saying that the regime has regained stability, which is based on the view that Kim Jong-un has gained control of the North's nuclear weapons."

### N.Korea's Missile Man

North Korea's highest-ranking military officer has control over the country's nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. State media referred to Kim Jong-un as the supreme commander soon after his father Kim Jong-il's death. An order from the supreme commander to deploy nuclear weapons would then be carried by the chief of General Staff, Gen. Ri Yong-ho, to the commander of the unit. In the process, Gen. Kim Myong-guk, a four-star general and in charge of military operations at the General Staff, apparently advises Ri on strategy.

The unit controls all of North Korea's missile facilities, including the nuclear test site in Punggye-ri and missile launch pad in Musudan-ri. The officer with his finger directly on the button is its commander, Gen. Choe Sang-ryo.

He was promoted from two-star to three-star general in April of 2010, when a new generation of officers were given more responsibility in preparation for the dynastic succession. Choe was appointed to the Workers Party's Central Military Commission at a party congress in September that year which marked Kim Jong-un's official debut. Until then he had been an obscure figure.

### Safe Pairs of Hands

Chung Young-tae at the Korea Institute for National Unification said, "The final decision on the use of nuclear weapons is made by the top military commander, but since the party wields tremendous power, an additional decision-making process is necessary at the party level." According to Workers Party regulations, the Central Military Commission, which oversees the armed forces, handles that decision process.

The chairmanship of the Central Military Commission has been vacant since the death of Kim Jong-il, but Kim Jong-un seems to be the acting chairman, said Ryu Dong-ryeol at the Police Science Institute. "Ri Yong-ho, Kim Myong-guk and Choe Sang-ryo are all either members or vice chairmen of the commission, which shows how important it is," he added.

One researcher at a state-run think tank said, "To prevent a possible provocation by a rogue unit officer or prevent mistakes in the chain of command to launch missiles, a two and three-tiered safety system is also in place." There is also the authentication code, which remains a secret to everyone except the supreme commander, chief of General Staff and unit commander.

State security agents and military intelligence constantly monitor the unit commander.

[http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2012/02/23/2012022301441.html](http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/02/23/2012022301441.html)

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Yonhap News – South Korea

February 24, 2012

## U.S. Envoy Reports 'Progress' in Nuclear Talks with N. Korea

BEIJING, Feb. 24 (Yonhap) -- The United States and North Korea "made a little bit progress" in talks aimed at finding ways to resume broader six-nation negotiations over the North's nuclear weapons program, Washington's chief envoy to the talks said Friday.



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Glyn Davies, the U.S. special representative for North Korea policy, however, told reporters in Beijing that there was no breakthrough, saying "the word goes too far."

The two sides discussed North Korea's nuclear program and humanitarian issues, he said. The Beijing talks, the first since the December death of the North's longtime leader Kim Jong-il, were widely seen as a chance to gauge whether Pyongyang's new regime under young leader Kim Jong-un is open to negotiations to give up its nuclear ambition.

Ending the first day of talks on Thursday, neither side gave any details of what progress had been made, but both sounded a positive note.

Davies said the talks were "substantive and serious," while the North's long-serving nuclear envoy Kim Kye-gwan termed the discussions "positive."

The six-party talks, which involve the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia, were last held in Beijing in late 2008.

Shortly before Kim's death, North Korea and the U.S. appeared to be ready to announce a breakthrough that could have led to a resumption of the six-nation talks.

North Korea and the U.S. had been poised to reach a deal in which Pyongyang would halt its uranium enrichment program in return for a resumption of Washington's food assistance.

In Washington Thursday, U.S. State Department spokesman Mark Toner reiterated that Washington is holding to its demand that Pyongyang honor a 2005 agreement at the six-party talks to give up its nuclear weapons.

Asked about the Beijing talks, Toner replied, "I think that we are cognizant of the challenges that we are facing in these talks."

"But we are also steadfast in what we're asking for North Korea to do, which is live up its prior commitments, and we're going to continue to talk with them," the spokesman said.

Last year, diplomatic efforts to get North Korea back to the negotiating table gained some momentum, but the unexpected demise of Kim put a brake on those efforts.

North Korea has not shown any signs of giving up its nuclear programs. The North recently praised its late leader for elevating the country to a nuclear state. North Korea conducted two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, drawing international condemnation and tightened U.N. sanctions.

South Korea and the U.S. have insisted the North accept a monitored shutdown of its uranium enrichment program to show sincerity toward denuclearization before reviving the disarmament-for-aid talks.

In 2010, North Korea revealed it was running a uranium enrichment facility. Highly enriched uranium can be used to make weapons, providing Pyongyang with a second way to build nuclear bombs in addition to its existing plutonium program.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2012/02/24/71/0401000000AEN20120224006700315F.HTML>

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

## **Russia to Revamp Ballistic Missile Arsenal by 2020**

22 February 2012

The share of new weaponry in the arsenal of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) will reach 97% by 2020, SMF Commander Lt. Gen. Sergei Karakayev said.

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The current share is about 30%, which includes Topol-M and RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).

"We hope that this share will increase to 60 percent by 2016 and reach 97 percent by 2020," Karakayev said on Tuesday during a meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

At present, three strategic missile divisions are being rearmed with new missiles, two of them will have this process completed in 2012, the general said.

The Tatischevo Missile Division near Saratov in southwestern Russia put a sixth regiment of Topol-M silo-based missile systems on combat duty on Tuesday.

The Topol-M missile, with a range of about 7,000 miles (11,000 km), is said to be immune to any current and planned U.S. anti-ballistic missile defense. It is capable of making evasive maneuvers to avoid a kill using terminal phase interceptors, and carries targeting countermeasures and decoys.

It is also shielded against radiation, electromagnetic pulse, nuclear blasts, and is designed to survive a hit from any form of laser technology.

In 2020, the SMF are likely to be equipped with over 170 Topol-Ms (mobile and silo-based), as well as 30 SS-19 and 108 RS-24 missile defense systems in nine divisions.

TATISHCHEVO (Russia), February 22 (RIA Novosti)

[http://en.ria.ru/military\\_news/20120222/171460243.html](http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20120222/171460243.html)

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The Moscow Times – Russia

## **Putin Praises Cold War Moles for Stealing U.S. Nuclear Secrets**

23 February 2012

Reuters

Vladimir Putin praised Cold War-era scientists Thursday for stealing U.S. nuclear secrets so that the United States would not be the world's sole atomic power.

His comments reflected his vision of Russia as a counterweight to U.S. power.

Spies with suitcases full of data helped the Soviet Union build its atomic bomb, he told military commanders.

"You know, when the States already had nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union was only building them, we got a significant amount of information through Soviet foreign intelligence channels," Putin said, according to the state-run Itar-Tass news agency.

"They were carrying the information away not on microfilm but literally in suitcases. Suitcases!"

Putin's remarks referred to the dawn of the Cold War more than half a century ago, but they echoed a message he has made loud and clear more recently — that the United States needs to be restrained, and Russia is the country to do it.

It has been known for decades that there were spies among the scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project, the U.S. atomic bomb design operation.

Putin, a former Soviet spy himself, suggested that those who helped Moscow build its bomb acted out of concern for humanity.

"It was the cream of the scientific world that was gathered in America, and I personally have gotten the impression that they consciously gave us information on the atom bomb," Putin was quoted as saying. "They did this

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consciously because the atomic bomb had been used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and scientists from mankind's intellectual elite at the time understood what unilateral possession of such a weapon might lead to."

A need for Russia to act as a counterweight to U.S. power has been a continuous theme of Putin's time in office since he became president in 2000.

He stepped down in 2008 to become prime minister but is poised to reclaim the presidency in an election on March 4.

Last year, he criticized the United States for helping Libyan rebels oust Moammar Gadhafi.

Lately, he has suggested that Washington has similar designs on Syria, where Russia has vetoed UN action.

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-praises-cold-war-moles-for-stealing-us-nuclear-secrets/453523.html>

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Barents Observer – Norway

## **Northern Fleet: The Burning Submarine Was Armed**

February 24, 2012

By Trude Pettersen

Russia's Northern Fleet admits that the nuclear submarine "Yekaterinburg" that was seriously damaged in a fire outside Murmansk on December 29, 2011 had missiles and torpedoes on board.

Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet Vice Admiral Aleksander Vitko says that the submarine was brought into dock outside Murmansk without having the weapons removed first.

- I returned from duty [note: as Commander of Northern Fleet's mission to the Mediterranean] on the 16 of February, but I know for sure that the "Yekaterinburg" had weapons on board", Vitko said to Lifenews. "I don't know what politics the Command has right now, so I will not comment any further".

Immediately after the fire broke out Defense Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov said that all weapons had been unloaded from the submarine before she was taken into the dry dock for repair. Earlier this month Kommersant reported that the fire could have developed into the worst anthropogenic catastrophe since Chernobyl, as the submarine had up to 16 intercontinental "Sineva" missiles, each carrying four nuclear warheads, and 12 torpedoes on board when the fire broke out, as BarentsObserver wrote.

Norway's Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre last week instructed the Norwegian Embassy in Moscow to hand over a inquiry to Russian authorities to get an answer on whether or not the submarine did have nuclear weapons. "It is a clear obligation in the warning agreement between Norway and Russia from 1993, to have full openness about such events when they happen," Støre said.

According to the first official reports from the accident the fire only harmed the outer rubber coating of the submarine. Soon pictures and videos began appearing on blogs and social media that showed the fire was far more severe than the officials said.

According to Lifenews the firefighters that were sent in to put out the fire were not even informed that the submarine had torpedoes on board. Torpedo fuel is highly flammable and extremely toxic.

<http://www.barentsobserver.com/northern-fleet-the-burning-submarine-was-armed.5024915-116320.html>

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London Telegraph – U.K.

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## Britain at Risk from 'GoldenEye' Electromagnetic Pulse Attack from Space, MPs Warn

*Britain's critical national infrastructure could be crippled in a high-altitude space attack by a rogue state or terrorists, MPs have warned.*

By Matthew Holehouse  
22 February 2012

A nuclear device detonated up to 500 miles above the earth's surface could generate an electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) with a "devastating" effect on power supplies, telecommunications and other vital systems, the Commons Defence Committee said.

It warned that countries such as Iran - which is resisting international pressure to end its nuclear programme - and even eventually some "non-state actors" could acquire the technology to mount such an attack, in a scenario akin to the plot of the 1995 James Bond film 'GoldenEye'.

Terrorists could also build a "crude" non-nuclear EMP weapon, with the power to cause disruption over a more limited area.

But despite the vulnerability of the UK to such an attack, the committee accused the Ministry of Defence of appearing "complacent" and "unwilling to take these threats seriously".

It said ministers should start work on "hardening" the infrastructure to protect against an EMP attack "as a matter of urgency".

"It is time that the Government began to approach this matter with the seriousness it deserves," it said.

The committee said the Government currently rated the probability of a high-altitude EMP attack as "low", although it acknowledged that the impact would be severe.

However, an official EMP commission in the United States found "rogue states" such as Iran and nuclear-armed North Korea were well aware of the potential for such an attack.

The Iranians in particular were reported to have conducted missile tests which appeared to simulate the effects of an EMP nuclear strike.

The Americans concluded that in the event of such an attack, the widespread collapse of the electrical power system was "virtually inevitable".

"Certain states such as Iran could potentially pose a realistic threat in the future, even if it does not currently do so, if nuclear non-proliferation efforts are not successful. Non-state actors could also pose a threat," the committee said.

"While the risk may at present be low, the potential impact of such a weapon could be devastating and long-lasting for UK infrastructure. The Government cannot therefore be complacent about this threat and must keep its assessment of the risk under review.

"It is therefore vitally important that the work of hardening UK infrastructure is begun now and carried out as a matter of urgency."

James Arbuthnot, chairman of the defence select committee, called on key infrastructure to fit 'hardened' microchips resistant to EMP attack.

"I personally believe that it is quite likely to happen, because it is a comparatively easy way of using a small number of nuclear weapons to cause devastating damage.

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"The consequences if it did happen would be so devastating that we really ought to start protecting against it now. Our vulnerabilities are huge.

He told BBC Radio 4's Today programme: "It would have a far more devastating impact to use a nuclear weapon in this way than to explode a bomb in or on a city. It would, over a much wider area, take out things like the National Grid on which we all rely for almost everything. It would take out the water system and the sewage system. Rapidly it would become very difficult to live in cities - within a matter of days."

"The defence is to build up the resilience of the electronic infrastructure by gradually replacing the incredibly delicate and vulnerable systems and chips and connections with the more hardened systems that are available at a not very expensive price during your routine maintenance.

"I wish the Government would address this with rather more energy, cohesion and focus."

It is not only EMP weapons that have the power to wreak havoc. The committee said a naturally occurring "space weather event" caused by changing conditions in the sun's atmosphere could have a similar effect.

The most severe example - known as the Carrington event after the astronomer who observed it - occurred in 1859 when a massive solar flare sent enormous electrical currents surging through telegraph systems causing shocks to telegraph operators and setting fire to papers.

In 1989 the entire power grid in the Canadian province of Quebec collapsed in a matter of just 90 seconds after stabilising equipment failed to cope with the effects of a geomagnetic storm.

The likelihood a severe space weather event occurring over the next five years is currently assessed by the Government as being "moderate to high", the committee said.

The National Grid has estimated that if there was another Carrington-sized event, there was a 91% chance that an area of the UK would be left without power for two months or more while essential satellite systems could also be damaged

The committee said it was now vital the Government ensured back-up procedures and equipment were in place to meet the "reasonable worst-case scenario" for a severe space weather event.

It said ministers should also consider the practicability and cost of establishing resilience against a widespread loss of transformers, as could occur in an EMP attack.

"The potential threats of a Carrington-size space weather event or a high-altitude nuclear EMP weapon would have specific and potentially devastating impacts upon the electrical grid and other aspects of electronic infrastructure, which play an absolutely critical role in UK society," it said.

"It is therefore vital that the electrical grid is resilient as possible to potential threats such as these."

A Government spokesman said: "We take these threats seriously, and proportionately, and are considering the Defence Committee report carefully. We shall respond fully in due course.

"Many of the points it raises are already coordinated across government and will be covered by the National Space Security Policy expected later this year."

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9097558/Britain-at-risk-from-GoldenEye-electromagnetic-pulse-attack-from-space-MPs-warn.html>

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Defense News

## **Obama Administration Renews Case for Nuclear Test Ban Treaty**

February 21, 2012

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By KATE BRANNEN

A lot has changed since 1999.

That is the case the Obama administration is making as it pushes for reconsideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which the U.S. Congress voted not to ratify in 1999.

The treaty, which was negotiated between 1994 and 1996, would ban all nuclear explosions for military and civilian purposes, including the testing of nuclear weapons.

The United States, along with China, Iran, Israel and Egypt, have signed the treaty, but have yet to ratify it. India, North Korea and Pakistan have not signed it.

In April 2009, in a speech he delivered in Prague, President Barack Obama called for U.S. ratification of the CTBT.

Now, his administration is working hard to convince Congress and the American public why the case for ratifying the treaty has grown stronger since its defeat in 1999, Rose Gottemoeller, acting undersecretary of state for arms control, told reporters.

“A lot has changed since 1999, and people have not had a chance to really look at the CTBT and understand what it can accomplish for U.S. national security,” Gottemoeller said.

One stumbling block in 1999 was the concern that it would be too difficult to verify whether countries were playing by the rules of the treaty.

“The International Monitoring System was barely getting off the ground back then,” Gottemoeller said. “Now, the international monitoring system is over 80 percent complete in its deployment and we can see its effectiveness.”

She cited its responsiveness to the accident last year at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, where the system was able to detect radioactive particles in the atmosphere.

The Department of Energy’s Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program has also improved in capability since 1999, according to Gottemoeller.

The program was developed to test U.S. nuclear capabilities without relying on nuclear explosions. The United States has had a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing since 1992. The program relies on simulation and other methods to ensure U.S. nuclear weapons remain reliable as they age.

“It has come a long way and it is developing quite a bit of capability,” Gottemoeller said.

She said she has been explaining these changes to members of Congress and their staff.

“I expect to be doing a lot more of that in 2012.

“We’re not going to set a deadline for ratification; we want to make sure the time is right,” she said. “Believe me, I was at the [Department of Energy] in 1999 and watched the treaty go down in flames. I don’t want to see that happen again.”

Gottemoeller said she was encouraged by the debate that surrounded ratification of the New START Treaty, which the Senate ratified in December 2010.

Congressional members were serious about learning the technical details, she said.

“I’m hoping that the same thing will happen with the CTBT and we won’t have people rushing to judgment, because truly a lot has changed in this time period.”

<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120221/DEFREG02/302210006/Obama-Administration-Renews-Case-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty?odyssey=tab%7Ctopnews%7Ctext%7CFRONTPAGE>

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Washington Times

## Inside the Ring: Chinese Cyberwarfare Prep

By Bill Gertz - Special to *The Washington Times*

Wednesday, February 22, 2012

Chinese cyberattacks and electronic intrusions into U.S. computer networks in peacetime are part of the preparations for a future high-technology war against the United States, according to the U.S. Pacific Command's new commander.

China's military also plans to disrupt U.S. military and civilian computer networks by attacking satellites in space, as well as ground-based networks, according to Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III, who was confirmed by the Senate last week to be the next commander of the U.S. Pacific Command.

Adm. Locklear wrote in answers to questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee that cyberwarfare preparations by China's People's Liberation Army include "building capability to target U.S. military space-based assets and computer networks using network and electronic warfare."

"The development of these wartime capabilities are the motivation for China's efforts at peacetime penetration of U.S. government and industry computer systems," the four-star admiral said.

"The theft of U.S. information and intellectual property is attractive as a low-cost research and development tool for China's defense industry, and provides insight into potential U.S. vulnerabilities."

It was the first time a senior military officer revealed China's military would conduct cyberattacks to disrupt or disable space systems used by the U.S. for strategic warfighting. Satellites are used by the military for numerous functions, from communicating with forces to guiding missiles and gathering intelligence.

"Overall, China's development in the cyber realm, combined with its other anti-access/area denial capabilities, imposes significant potential risk on U.S. military activities," Adm. Locklear said.

Adm. Locklear's comments Feb. 9 were a rare public admission of what U.S. security officials have been saying privately for years. That is, China is engaged in pervasive warfare preparation against the United States through a combination of cyber and traditional military development.

Security officials said the Chinese goal for cyberoperations is twofold. The intrusions for more than a decade were successful in stealing valuable information useful for intelligence and economic benefit.

A more nefarious objective for the Chinese military's cyberwarriors is the planting of electronic "sleeper agents" - difficult to detect software that rarely communicates with China but can be activated to sabotage the U.S. military during a crisis.

"China fully understands the critical importance of cyber as an element of modern warfare," Adm. Locklear stated.

"Chinese military writing clearly shows that China views itself at a disadvantage in any potential conflict with a modern high-tech military, such as that of the United States."

[http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/22/inside-the-ring-52480650/?page=1&utm\\_medium=RSS&utm\\_source=RSS\\_Feed](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/22/inside-the-ring-52480650/?page=1&utm_medium=RSS&utm_source=RSS_Feed)

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Korea Times – South Korea

OPINION/Analysis

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## What Challenges Does Kim Jong-un Face?

By Ko Seung-kyun

Kim Jong-un has emerged a new leader of North Korea upon his father Kim Jong-il's death in December 2011. Why does this hereditary succession occur in North Korea?

The answer lies in the North's political system — a blend of fascistic, socialistic, and semblance of monarchical practices. It is fascistic in the way the power and authority is monopolized by the dictator and his close associates, socialistic due to the state ownership and monarchical in the succession of the leadership.

Since 1948, the founding father and late leader Kim Il-sung engineered in personifying the country as his. The country belonged to him; Kim and the state were and are identical. The pervasive image of Kim is so imposing that no one can escape his presence in North Korea. He was equated with the liberator of the country from the Japanese occupation, the benefactor of people's livelihood, and the defender of the country.

Kim Il-sung, even after his death in 1994, remains the "eternal president." His successor had to be his son, Kim Jong-il. The junior Kim alone could fit in the mantle of his father, as North Korea claims. Further, he was the only one who understood Kim Il-sung's vision well and was capable of carrying on his father's unfinished tasks.

A similar justification is attributed to Kim Jong-un's succession of his father. Could he manage the enormous tasks of the dictator? He is still young around 28 and looks so young that the U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta referred to him as a "boy." Unlike his father who had almost two decades of training, he has had only two years of stewardship.

He has to provide the country with refreshed hope and inspiration amid economic problems such as food shortages and the breakdown of the economic infrastructure. He has to deal with critical external affairs, including the nuclear issue, the six-party talks for denuclearization, and relations with neighboring countries.

To deal with these tasks, his primary personnel resources will be his relatives — his aunt Kim Kyung-hui and her husband Jang Song-thaek. They will play key roles of protectors and guiders of Kim Jong-un.

Both have established a formidable power basis in the ruling North Korean Workers' Party and the military, and are familiar with the country's governance. His secondary personnel resources include his alumni, particularly from Kim Il-sung Military University.

Ri Yong-ho, a graduate of the university, who holds key posts in the military and the party, will play a vital role in bringing military support for Kim Jong-un. North Korea's intense hierarchical system in the communist party and government as well as the military will help prevent challenges to him.

Challenges by his two brothers, Kim Jong-nam and Kim Jong-chul, are possible, but unlikely. Kim Jong-nam, over 10 years older than the half-brother, appears to be more knowledgeable, but he has been discredited so severely in the North's leadership circle that his return to Pyongyang as a possible leader is slim. Nevertheless, he will continuously be problematic to Kim Jong-un.

His other older brother, Kim Jong-chul is neither capable nor ambitious. The possibility of the North Korean populace rising up against Kim Jong-un is also slim. The people are thoroughly atomized to the extent that they are powerless. They are indoctrinated and disciplined to pledge their loyalty to Kim. North Korea is a theatrical state in which each plays a role to follow the script written for it.

*Ko Seung-kyun is professor of political science and international relations, Hawaii Pacific University. He is the author of "Questions Foreigners Ask About America."*

[http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2012/02/160\\_105466.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2012/02/160_105466.html)

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Wall Street Journal  
OPINION/Commentary  
February 22, 2012

## What Counts as Progress in NK-US Talks?

By Evan Ramstad

With the U.S. and North Korea about to hold their first official meeting since the death of Kim Jong Il, the key question is what would constitute progress in diplomatic dealings that have been stalemated since 2009?

For the U.S., the meeting in Beijing on Thursday is the first chance to engage with and assess the government of the new North Korean leader, Kim Jong Eun.

Outwardly, the U.S. is looking to determine North Korea's sincerity about returning to the six-party process, the aid-for-disarmament talks that began in 2003 and produced agreements in 2005 and 2007 that later fell apart with finger-pointing all around.

During meetings between the U.S. and North Korea last year, the measuring stick for such seriousness has been whether Kim Kye Gwan, the North Korean first vice foreign minister who has long been charged with dealing with the U.S., had anything to say about the North's uranium enrichment program or, more specifically, whether he had the authority to say anything about it.

One meeting between the two countries broke down after one day when it became clear Mr. Kim had no authority to respond at all to U.S. inquiries about the program, which the North's government in late 2010 had publicly disclosed to an American scientist, who later revealed it to the world via the media.

Thursday's meeting isn't just a one-way test. The U.S. has a new representative to North Korea, Glyn Davies, a veteran diplomat but unfamiliar to the North Koreans. And that's one reason U.S. officials have tried to keep expectations low for this meeting.

"I think the North Koreans are going to want to take the measure of the new U.S. team," says Evans Revere of Albright Stonebridge Group, a Washington consulting firm. "And of course, we need to determine whether the transition in Pyongyang has changed the fundamental position there."

On a separate but not altogether disconnected track, the U.S. and North Korea before Kim Jong Il's death were believed to be nearing terms for the U.S. to provide food aid to the North.

In early January, in the first public statement by Kim Jong Eun's government directed at Washington, North Korea strongly criticized the terms and amount of aid the U.S. was offering.

Analysts said it may have been a negotiating maneuver. But it also provided a new way for the U.S. and outside world to measure what's different between the Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Eun regimes.

If North Korea quickly agrees to the conditions the U.S. has set for providing food aid, even as quickly as at Thursday's meeting, it will be a sign that Kim Jong Eun is confident enough to do something different from his father.

"It means someone in Pyongyang can compromise and has enough power to go and change the stance," says Marcus Noland, deputy director and senior fellow at the Petersen Institute for International Economics and a North Korea watcher.

If the food issue remains stalemated, it's unlikely the U.S. or anyone else is going to come to the view that Pyongyang is really willing to move forward and discuss the thornier issues of nuclear weapons, proliferation and disarmament.

<http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2012/02/22/what-counts-as-progress-in-nk-us-talks/>

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The Atlantic  
OPINION/Analysis

## What Will Iran Do if it Gets a Nuclear Bomb?

*Five experts predict how a nuclear bomb would or wouldn't change Tehran's behavior.*

February 22, 2012

By Micah Zenko

In 1995, Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan coauthored the book, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate*, which sought to address the question: what are the likely consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons?

In a self-help international system, Waltz contended, "states must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves." He argued that a second-strike nuclear capability is the most reliable means for a state to assure its survival by dissuading other states from attacking. Due to fears of escalation, "new nuclear states will feel the constraints that present nuclear states have experienced."

Sagan, meanwhile, countered Waltz's optimism with two arguments based in organizational theory. First, "professional military organizations--because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests--display organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war." Second, "future nuclear-armed states will lack the positive mechanisms of civilian control." Sagan therefore called for a U.S. nonproliferation policy that includes reaffirming to nascent nuclear states that the bomb "will make their states targets for preventive attacks by their potential adversaries, will not easily lead to survivable arsenals, and will raise the specter of accidental or unauthorized uses of nuclear weapons."

This academic discussion has direct relevance to the ongoing policy debate over Iran, and whether Israel, the United States, or some combination of states should use preemptive military force against the regime's suspected nuclear weapons program. We cannot ask the Iranian government directly what they would do with a bomb, because it continues to maintain that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful for the purposes of producing nuclear power and medical diagnostic isotopes. Nevertheless, as President Obama stated recently, it is U.S. policy "to do everything we can to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and creating an arms race, a nuclear arms race, in a volatile region."

To explore this issue further, I asked several international relations and security studies scholars who have extensively researched and written on the topic of nuclear proliferation to contribute their thoughts on the impact of a potential Iranian nuclear weapon. Specifically, I asked:

**"If the international community believed--through testing or intelligence estimates--that Iran possessed a nuclear weapon, what impact would the bomb have on Iranian foreign policy?"**

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*Kyle Beardsley is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Emory University and is the author of *The Mediation Dilemma*.*

A nuclear-armed Iran is not likely to act much differently. Most importantly, Iran will have no incentive to use its nuclear weapons in aggression; doing so against Israeli or American targets would gain Iran little and cost it much. On a more practical level, an Iranian bomb also will not substantially change the general strategic dynamics. In a series of articles, Victor Asal and I have shown that states with nuclear weapons tend to face less hostility from opponents, be in shorter crises, and prevail more often in their crises against non-nuclear states.

The logic is that nuclear weapons are an effective deterrent that temper aggression. According to this logic, the main benefit to Iran of acquiring nuclear weapons is to deter military threats by its primary adversaries, Israel and the United States. Given that Iran already has a strong deterrent--via its importance to hydrocarbon supplies,



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robust conventional forces, ability to disrupt fragile situations in Lebanon and Iraq, and Western war weariness--it is doubtful that Iran will notice much immediate advantage from obtaining nuclear weapons. Its main incentive for proliferating apparently is to lock in the regime's security in the long run. Victor Asal and I also find that proliferators are sources of instability prior to attaining weapons, so a modest upside to successful proliferation would be movement away from the current alarming exchanges.

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To answer this question, we should distinguish between Iran's bark and bite.

Having a nuclear weapon would give Iran a bigger bark. Armed with the bomb, Iran could make threats that might win it economic aid and political concessions. Influence, as Schelling noted, comes from "the power to hurt," and nuclear weapons provide the ultimate power to hurt. Having such "latent violence" in the form of nuclear weapons can translate into considerable bargaining influence. The North Korea model is instructive here. The Kim Jong-il regime used its nuclear program as a bargaining chip, promising to dismantle its Yongbyon reactor in exchange for political concessions and economic aid. Often they gained concessions, however, while only temporarily or incompletely complying with their end of the bargain.

On the other hand, it seems doubtful that having the bomb would give Iran a bigger bite. Rather, there's every reason to believe that deterrence theory should hold. How much influence Iran's weapons can confer, again drawing on Schelling, "will indeed depend on how much the adversary can hurt in return." Iran's primary rivals are Israel and the United States, each with arsenals that are far more lethal than what Iran could assemble even over the next decade. That each has enough weapons to hurt Iran quite badly should be enough to keep Iran's bite in check.

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**Matthew Kroenig** is Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of *Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons*.

A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a grave threat to international peace and security. It would lead to further nuclear proliferation as other countries in the region sought nuclear weapons in response. As I discuss in *Exporting the Bomb*, a nuclear Iran would likely become a nuclear supplier and transfer uranium enrichment technology--the basis for dangerous nuclear programs--to U.S. enemies in regions around the world.

Iran currently restrains its foreign policy for fear of U.S. military retaliation, but with a nuclear counter-deterrent it would be emboldened to push harder, stepping up support for terrorist groups, brandishing nuclear weapons for coercive purposes, and adopting a more aggressive foreign policy. A nuclear Iran could constrain U.S. freedom of action in the Middle East by threatening nuclear war in response to major U.S. initiatives in the region.

A more aggressive Iran would lead to an even more crisis-prone region, and any crisis involving a nuclear-armed Iran could spiral out of control and result in a nuclear war against Israel or even, once Iran has developed the requisite delivery vehicles, the U.S. homeland.

In sum, a nuclear-armed Iran would pose a severe threat that Washington would have to live with as long as Iran exists as a state and has nuclear weapons, which could be decades or even longer.

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Aviv University. Her research focuses on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Iran-Iraq war, and Iranian security and foreign policy.

Iran's possession of a nuclear weapon would be a troubling and disturbing development, especially for the future of the nonproliferation regime and for stability in the Middle East. However, there is reason to believe that Iran's theoretical possession of a nuclear weapon would not profoundly alter the essence of its foreign policy.

Iran's foreign policy, both before and after the 1979 revolution, has been largely pragmatic, particularly in action if not always in rhetoric. Though it has miscalculated the effects of and reactions to its policies, as well as adopted violence as a tool to achieve its strategic goals, Iran's policies have generally been conceived with rational security objectives in mind. The hypothetical development of a nuclear weapons capability would not fundamentally alter Iran's overriding foreign policy objective--regime security.

Iran's leaders, like those in other states, want to remain in power. They want the regime in which they have invested and which serves their interests to endure. Foreign policy, in addition to safeguarding Iran's borders and national integrity, is a means for safeguarding the regime. Possession of a nuclear weapon will likely make Iran more impervious to attack and may make Iran bolder in its support for armed groups. However, possessing a nuclear weapon will not likely to alter Iran's paramount foreign policy goals of national and regime security.

Further, possession of a nuclear weapon is likely to cause Iran's isolation from the international community, an outcome Iran does not want. Iran would therefore be likely to use any advantages of possessing a nuclear weapon in a way that would not significantly increase its international isolation even further.

The Islamic Republic is not an irrational or suicidal regime. A nuclear weapon will not make it one.

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**Todd S. Sechser** is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. For further information, read his op-ed coauthored with Matthew Fuhrmann, "Would a nuclear-armed Iran really be so dangerous?"

What could Iran achieve with a few nuclear weapons? The historical record offers a clear answer: very little.

Pessimists worry that a nuclear Iran would be able to blackmail Israel, seize major oil fields, or force the United States out of the Middle East. But they ignore a key lesson of the nuclear age: nuclear weapons are not very useful for coercion. Israel, for example, did not suddenly acquire the ability to push around its neighbors when it obtained nuclear weapons. (If it had, it might have dissuaded Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons today.) Nor did China, North Korea, South Africa, or any other state that has ever built nuclear weapons. The reality is that nuclear weapons have never been very useful tools of blackmail.

The reason is that nuclear threats lack credibility. If Iran ever used nuclear weapons against one of its neighbors, it would suffer unprecedented international isolation, unify the region against it, and even trigger nuclear retaliation from the United States or Israel. Given these prospects, Iran's neighbors are likely to doubt whether its nuclear threats are actually sincere.

At best, nuclear weapons are credible tools of self-defense. But we need not worry that a nuclear Iran will wield vast new coercive leverage in the Middle East. In 1983, Robert McNamara observed that nuclear weapons "are totally useless - except only to deter one's opponent from using them." This lesson is worth remembering today.

*This article originally appeared at CFR.org, an Atlantic partner site.*

<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/what-will-iran-do-if-it-gets-a-nuclear-bomb/253430/>

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OPINION/Analysis

## India-Pakistan: Missing NCBMs

By Ali Ahmed

February 22, 2012

An Indian think tank reports (*'Indo-Pak Nuclear CBMs: The Road to Nowhere'*) on one reason why India and Pakistan do not pursue nuclear confidence building measures (NCBMs) with any sense of purpose or a degree of urgency as being "the threat of a nuclear showdown is primarily an invention of the West, especially the US."

Is such a belief warranted? Does precedence of the nuclear level not having figured in the Kargil War and the 'twin peaks crisis' episodes suggest that the two states are rational enough to keep the nuclear overhang become a sword of Damocles?

The two states are working overtime to ensure mutual deterrence. Both are at the three figure mark in warhead numbers. Indians are additionally looking for a ballistic missile shield, having successfully conducted its fourth interceptor missile test, and a nuclear submarine anchored 'triad'. Pakistanis have reinforced their intention of going first by unveiling the Nasr, advertised as a tactical nuclear weapon. Will deterrence hold if conventional push comes to nuclear shove?

Admittedly, the two states are wisely lengthening the nuclear fuse. India's commerce minister's three day visit to Pakistan is set to open up mutual investment. He inspected the integrated check post completed at Wagah border along with his Pakistani counterpart. The two states are into their second round of talks, indicating that even terror incidents of the order of 26/11 can at best dent the relationship, not set it back irretrievably. They have conventional CBMs and CBMs over Kashmir in place. On the NCBMs front they have extended the life of their agreement on interaction in case of nuclear accidents by five years.

However, if all these welcome features are taken as substituting for the missing, and more consequential NCBMs, there is need for 'selling' the idea aggressively. Not emplacing NCBMs while the going's good, such as now, may be regretted later.

The fact is that India, believing that Pakistan exploited the nuclearisation of May 1998 more proactively, has drawn a page from Pakistan's book. At the conventional level, imitating Pakistan's observation of space for conventional operations below the nuclear threshold, it has gone in for a 'proactive' offensive conventional doctrine. At the nuclear level, it has attempted to increase this space by assuring 'massive' punitive retaliation in case of Pakistani first use, even if provoked by India's conventional pincers.

Pakistan for its part has reportedly firmed up its conventional counter, apparently termed 'early strategic offensive'. Even though its troops are involved in counter insurgency on the western front, it intends to beat India's integrated battle groups to the draw. Given that it is a military dominant state, it does not have democratic and bureaucratic encumbrances. It would need to use the time profitably while India debates whether and to what degree the Pakistani state is complicit and whether to go in for firepower-centric, air force led reprisals or go for Cold Start.

Secondly, even if Nasr is a deterrence-gimmick for the moment, when the balloon goes up, it would be hazardous to think, as revealed by the Indian think tank, that: "Though Pakistan threatens to use the nuclear weapons and has convinced the rest of the world that its nuclear threshold is low, there is a larger understanding between the two countries that the threat is only a posture and not an actual position."

Given this as 'dry tinder' piled up high, all that is needed is the proverbial spark. This is not unlikely, given the onrush of the magic year, 2014. Imagine a situation in case of the West disengaging progressively from 'AfPak' in which uncertainty reigns. With both states in election mode over the interim, there would be less maneuver space for governments. It bears recall that the parliament attack and 26/11 both were in some measure a spillover of the

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turn of events in 'AfPak'. Since the end game there is set to culminate in 2014, and if Leon Panetta is to be believed, may even be advanced to 2013, the 'spark' could well be round the corner.

The catastrophic terror threat by autonomous non-state actors in Pakistan not having receded, more needs doing to manage the fallout. Under the circumstance, getting NCBMs into place appears sensible. It is self-evidently so in India's case since it has made arrangements over the past decade to leverage its conventional military advantage.

Superficially, this may not be in Pakistan's interest since its nuclear deterrence is also meant to cover the conventional level. However, the Pakistan's Establishment would not want the extremist fringe gaining space, more than a happenstance in case an India-Pak crisis turns into conflict.

In the December round of talks in Islamabad, India asked Pakistan to come clean on its nuclear doctrine. This bespeaks of maneuvering and validates the revelation in the think tank report of down grading nuclear dangers. The reason is perhaps that keeping such dangers off the radar screen enables the state to quietly work on nuclear preparedness unhindered by the self-interested scrutiny of an aroused attentive public. No wonder the mechanics of engagement are in place.

The logic from a state point of view should instead be that the more the nuclear preparations, the more the need to manage the environment. NCBMs provide the necessary cover and a back stop. What needs setting up instead is a strategic dialogue mechanism for across-the-spectrum engagement. Because it would be in continuous session, it can also serve, if needed, as an 'NCBM plus' or an NRRC (Nuclear Risk Reduction Center) by the backdoor.

India has recently committed to a working mechanism with China for consultation and coordination over their border issues composed of diplomatic and military officials of the two sides. This is a useful model for managing its relations with Pakistan. The timing of such an initiative from India is just right in that this would ease pressure on Pakistan and its Army, thereby making the idea easier to materialize and the state and its minder more amenable to peace overtures.

Both states have strategic dialogues with their mutual friend, the US. It makes more sense to have such a dialogue mechanism in place with the perceived adversary, i.e. with each other.

*Ali Ahmed is a research fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.*

<http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/02/22/india-pakistan-missing-ncbms/>

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The Hill  
OPINION/Congress Blog

## **Reason over Relics: Restructuring Our Nuclear Force**

By Retired Lt. Gen. Robert Gard, chairman, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation  
February 22, 2012

In *To End All Wars*, his excellent history of World War I, author Adam Hochschild recounts how passionately some strategists defended the perceived essential role of the horse cavalry. In an era that war was to be dominated by the machine gun, artillery bombardments and the emergence of the tank, these strategists resisted any re-evaluation of the role of cavalry as heresy itself. In the face of all the evidence, they stubbornly resisted change, and their blind devotion to the status quo cost their nation dearly.

You don't have to look far to see a modern day example of this type of thinking.

Last week, the Associated Press reported that President Obama, as Commander in Chief, has asked our military leadership to present him with a range of options for re-structuring our nuclear forces. The AP further reported

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that the range of options runs from maintaining "the status quo" to making significant changes that modernize our strategy and force structure to reflect current realities.

The AP story is likely to send the most ardent defenders of nuclear arms into a tizzy. They will no doubt trot out all of the usual, cliché language about appeasement and unilateral disarmament.

Before proceeding, however, it is appropriate to ask "what is wrong with evaluating the potential for nuclear arms reductions?" Weighing the relevant options and making informed decisions is responsible leadership.

The most important duty of the president is to ensure America's national security. That means making informed and intelligent decisions about which investments produce the greatest benefit to our security. At a time when our most serious threats are terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and cyber attack, and when our troops require the most advanced equipment, it is increasingly clear that pouring billions of dollars year after year into maintaining a nuclear arsenal far larger than needed for deterrence and security has expensive opportunity costs, especially in a time of fiscal austerity.

With the end of the cold war, the world has changed, and those who ardently defend massive spending on nuclear weapons are either unaware of, or unwilling to consider, the changed strategic landscape. Our current nuclear force structure is a holdover from an era where the overarching goal was deterring a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States or an invasion of Europe. Every submarine in our fleet today can single-handedly destroy every major city in either China or Russia and completely obliterate smaller nations. If the essence of deterrence is a credible threat, then it's safe to say we can make significant reductions with no impact whatsoever on our deterrent or security capacity.

While it seems likely that the pending review will be portrayed by some as evidence of the president's alleged idealism, a 2010 study by three Air Force analysts in Strategic Studies Quarterly concluded that the United States could "draw down its nuclear arsenal to a relatively small number of survivable, reliable weapons dispersed among missile silos, submarines, and airplanes." They argue that such a force might number only 311 nuclear weapons. Given that no country other than Russia deploys more than 300 nuclear weapons, and given that China mounts no more than 40 to 50 warheads on intercontinental-range missiles, the justification for our deploying more than 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons with another 3,500 in reserve appears flimsy.

In a time of limited budgets and scarce resources, it would be irresponsible not to consider reductions in weapons that most national security experts see as of marginal strategic value. Those scarce funds certainly can be better directed toward addressing 21st century national security threats, not those of the 20th century. The mere consideration of that possibility, however, will mean overcoming the passionate objections of the defenders of the last century's Cold War thinking.

The Associated Press story appears to be the result of a leak aimed at embarrassing the president and preemptively limiting the range of possible actions he may consider, but that kind of approach to policy making is profoundly irresponsible. What should be embarrassing is attempting to block the president and the Pentagon from considering all options. Seeking to derail deliberative policy-making and play national security for political points is hardly the stuff of responsible leadership.

Many things happen in Washington because of an entrenched status quo. Maintaining a hugely expensive and colossally redundant nuclear force of declining strategic significance shouldn't be one of them. History is rich with examples of nations that failed to adapt to changing times: they fought for the status quo instead of meeting the needs of their people. America cannot afford to become that example.

*Lt. Gen. Gard (USA, Ret.) is currently the chairman and senior military fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.*

<http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/211987-reason-over-relics-restructuring-our-nuclear-force>

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China Daily – China  
OPINION/Op-Ed

## **Military Spending a Necessity**

February 23, 2012  
By Li Hong (China Daily)  
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The Western media have already played up China's defense budget growth even before the convening of the annual sessions of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Jane's Defence Weekly has reportedly claimed that China will spend \$120 billion on defense this year and predicts it will soar to \$238 billion in 2015, indicating a combined annual increase of 18.75 percent. The report, which says "China's defense spending to double" has drawn worldwide attention amid the changing global balance of power. However, the reports have not mentioned the sources of the data, which downgrades their credibility.

China put its 2011 defense budget at about 601 billion yuan (\$95 billion). Were the latest reports right about military spending this year, then the defense budget for 2012 would have increased by more than 26 percent. However, according to China Statistical Yearbook, military spending growth has slowed down in recent years and the growth rate dropped to 7.5 percent in 2010, the smallest rise over the past two decades. The nation may register double-digit annual growth, but the increase is unlikely to exceed the reported combined annual growth of 18.5 percent in the years ahead.

The United States has ushered in a new round of strategic contractions and is rebalancing toward Asia. Some US scholars are so eager to carve out a niche for the US' return to Asia that they accuse China of understating its defense spending, stir up tensions with neighboring countries and drum up the "China threat". They intend to justify the US' return, lobby other countries in the region and draw China into an arms race.

The approach also seeks to find excuses for the Pentagon to maintain high defense spending and help US arms dealers enter the Asian market, since the Pentagon is facing budget cuts as wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the global financial crisis have sapped national strength.

Despite its economic boom, Asia remains sluggish in building up a solid regional security mechanism, and an effective mediation system to resolve the complex territorial, border and maritime disputes. External forces have stepped in and stoked up an arms buying spree in Asia, and India's planned purchase of 126 French-made combat aircraft is a case in point. The escalation of the arms race will jeopardize unity, mutual trust and the interests of Asian countries.

China, as the region's largest economy, has seen its military development attract regional and international attention.

As the world's third largest country in terms of area, covering 9.6 million square kilometers, 22,000 kilometers of land borders and 18,000 kilometers of continental coastlines, China has plenty of reasons to develop its defense capabilities.

The improved livelihoods of soldiers, diversified military operations at home and abroad and regeneration of equipment are key factors for military spending growth.

Chinese people can share the fruit of economic development and its 2.3 million soldiers should be no exception. The defense budget should cover expenses such as pay increases and training and the army would benefit from a fast-developing social security system.

Besides with more international responsibilities, the army should conduct diversified military operations, including joint military drills aimed at anti-terrorism and other non-war military operations such as rescues during natural





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disasters and escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. All missions at home and abroad come at a high cost.

Weaponry regeneration also inflates military spending. The Chinese army is advancing military modernization, along with research and development of heavy weapons such as the fifth-generation fighter and aircraft carrier, which is time-consuming and expensive.

However, the Western media focus on weaponry developments, while ignoring two other factors. China has many soldiers that even a slight pay increase will cause bulging defense spending. The West should stop over-painting defense budget increases and making a fuss over "China's military expansion".

China has shown restraint in not developing tactical nuclear weapons and pursuing a doctrine of minimal nuclear deterrence. The country issued a white paper, China's National Defense in 2010, pledging that, "China pursues a national defense policy which is defensive in nature" and "will never seek hegemony, nor will it adopt the approach of military expansion now or in the future, no matter how its economy develops". The nation will never follow the path of Soviet Unions and the US to involve itself in any kind of arms race.

Nevertheless, we should admit that published figures concerning the defense budget is not detailed enough. The country is pressing on with a campaign to make public san gong expenses, namely money spent on overseas trips, receptions and vehicle purchases and maintenance by government officials. It is an irreversible trend that the country will tighten supervision over military spending, too.

The international community should keep patient and realize that progress takes time and China should phase in bolder measures to ensure military transparency to crush rumors circulating about its defense spending.

*The author is secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association.*

[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-02/23/content\\_14672643.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-02/23/content_14672643.htm)

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Korea Times – South Korea

OPINION/Op-Ed

February 23, 2012

## **Al-Qaida's Big Fat Iranian Wedding**

By Clifford D. May

The George W. Bush administration waged what it called a Global War on Terrorism. Yet against Iran, the world's leading sponsor of terrorism, no serious actions were ever taken. President Barack Obama is waging what he calls a "war against al-Qaida and its affiliates." Yet he and his advisers are reluctant to articulate what has become indisputable: Iran and al-Qaida are affiliated.

Senior Obama officials have come closer to calling a spade a spade: Last week, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper described the relationship between Iran and al-Qaida as a "longstanding ... marriage." But you had to listen carefully to hear him say that.

"Iran has harbored al-Qaida leaders, facilitators," Clapper told a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. They have been "under house arrest conditions. (Iran's rulers) have had this sort of standoff arrangement with al-Qaida, allowing (al-Qaida) to exist (inside Iran), but not to foment any operations directly from Iran, because they're very sensitive about, 'Hey, we might come after them there as well.' ... So there has been this longstanding, as I say, kind of, shotgun marriage, or marriage of convenience."

Also last week: The U.S. Treasury Department designated the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) for its sponsorship of terrorism. Among the terrorist groups Treasury said MOIS supports: al-Qaida.

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Thomas Joscelyn, my colleague at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, has extensively researched the Iran-al-Qaida relationship. Back in 2007, he wrote: "No fallacy today is more misguided or more dangerous than the widespread belief that Iran, the world's premier state sponsor of terrorism, and al-Qaida are not allies in the terrorists' war against the West."

The terrorist attack that killed 19 Americans at Khobar Towers in 1996 was almost certainly an Iranian/al-Qaida joint venture. But the Clinton administration chose to shut down FBI investigators in the belief — misguided but widespread at the time — that more moderate Iranians were coming to power in Tehran and that publicly revealing the Iranian role would impede diplomatic efforts.

Iran also was implicated in al-Qaida's 1998 bombing of America's embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. When federal prosecutors indicted al-Qaida members, they specifically noted that al-Qaida had forged alliances with "representatives of the government of Iran, and its associated terrorist group Hezbollah, for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies in the West, particularly the United States." And in November of last year, a Washington, D.C., court found that Iran had provided training for the al-Qaida terrorists at Hezbollah camps in southern Lebanon.

What about the attacks on the U.S. homeland three years later? The 9/11 commissioners "found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the planning for what later became the 9/11 attack." However, intelligence obtained by 9/11 commission staffers just before the release of their report — too late for serious examination — prompted the commissioners to add: "We believe this topic requires further investigation by the U.S. government." Such investigations have not been conducted — or, if they were, their conclusions have never been made public.

In the years since 2001, Iran has continued to cooperate with al-Qaida. In January 2009, Treasury designated four senior al-Qaeda members who had received Iran's assistance. Last July, Treasury designated six al-Qaida operatives noting that they used Iran as "a critical transit point for funding to support al-Qaida's activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan." And in September 2011, the State Department designated a Hamas operative, linking him to both Iran and al-Qaida.

In recent days, Britain's Sky News has reported on a "secret intelligence memo" describing "intensive cooperation over recent months between Iran and al-Qaida." Sky News adds: "We do know that an operation is under way. We assess that the most likely target is to be European."

In light of all this, why has there been so little public discussion of the Iranian-al-Qaida relationship? Two reasons suggest themselves: (1) Scholars, journalists and intelligence analysts who denied this association in the past are reluctant to admit they were wrong. (2) Knowledge conveys responsibility: If Iran is — and long has been — married to al-Qaida, and if Iran is now just a few spins of a centrifuge away from acquiring nuclear weapons, it follows that strong measures must be taken against this growing threat.

That's a message many Americans do not want to hear. It's certainly a message many American leaders do not want to tell them.

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[http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2012/02/160\\_105558.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2012/02/160_105558.html)

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Wired

OPINION/Danger Room Blog

## **Calm Down. Iran's Missiles Can't (and Won't) Hit the East Coast.**

By Spencer Ackerman

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February 24, 2012

Israel is claiming that Iran is *thisclose* to developing a missile that can hit American soil. But missile and intelligence experts say Tehran has a long, technically complex road to travel before it can threaten Manhattan.

From getting all the rocket thrusters to work properly to developing heat shields that can withstand the stresses of rapid atmospheric reentry, Iran is probably many years away from getting an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The American spy apparatus, which once hyped the Iranian missile threat, has quietly stopping saying when Iran can hit the east coast. And the irony is that it's taking Iran so long precisely because its missile efforts really are sophisticated.

"The bottom line," says Paul Pillar, a veteran CIA Mideast analyst, "is that the intelligence community does not believe [the Iranians] are anywhere close to having an ICBM."

That, however, isn't the message out of Jerusalem. Israeli Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz told CNBC on Wednesday Iran was "two to three years" away from slamming a missile into New York, Boston or Washington. Its strategic-affairs minister, Moshe "Bogie" Yaalon, issued that same warning earlier this month, but declined to say when Iran's mega-missile would be ready.

Chances are, the Israelis are hyping the Iranian missile threat so their American friends will consider the Iranian threat more acute. They're not happy with Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for saying on Sunday that an Israeli attack on Iran was "not prudent." But few missile or intelligence experts believe the new claim of an imminent Iranian ICBM is going to change Dempsey's mind, or anyone else's, because it's far-fetched.

It's true that Tehran has a robust missile program. Its stockpiles of Shahab-3 ballistic missiles, which top out at 800 miles, strike fear into the hearts of Arab Gulf states. Israel has real reason to fear the development of its Sejil medium-range ballistic missile, a more sophisticated weapon, that could maybe reach Israel in a few years. And unlike rogue-state missile flameouts like North Korea, Iran is able to launch satellites into space, which is a key ICBM step (since any intercontinental missile is going to have to fly through space in order to attack a foe so far away).

But none of that adds up to Iran getting a missile that can travel the 6,000 miles necessary for striking America any time soon.

For one thing, Iran needs to master what's called "clustering" of the engines needed to power its missile. Picture a box with an engine — probably from a North Korean Nodong-2, the paterfamilias of Iran's missiles — on each corner. Iran in fact unveiled precisely such a design in 2010.

There's a long way between design and a working set of thrusters, however. Basically, in order to keep the missile on track as it streaks through the heavens, each engine has to provide precisely the same amount of thrust. If not, the pulses of acoustic energy from one engine might destroy another. "That's not an easy thing, to make sure they fire simultaneously and don't shake themselves to death in process," says Greg Thielmann, a former missile analyst at the State Department's intelligence wing.

Then there are additional technical obstacles Iran isn't believed to have overcome. Guidance systems need to be able to withstand the pressures of atmospheric reentry to keep the missile on course. "Then the warhead itself has to function at such extreme physical conditions," says Hans Kristensen, director of the nuclear studies program at the Federation of American Scientists. "There are several really complicated steps they have to go through to do this."

As well as mundane ones. Iran will have to balance durability and weight, most likely leading it to want aluminum alloys for any early long-range missile rather than heavy steel, says David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and Tehran may not have the aluminum stocks for it. It may not even have the machine tools necessary for boring out an ICBM's diameter. And ICBMs are *big*, meaning if they stay in one place for too long, they'll be



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vulnerable to detection — and an Israeli or American bombing campaign. That’s why Wright thinks they’ll have to be rugged enough to survive being moved along the roads, which can *also* create convoys ripe for the schwacking.

Even Iran’s seriousness about its missiles is a potential time-suck. Unlike North Korea, which rushes to claim military glory even when its missile tests fail, Iran tends to test its missile stockpile thoroughly. Long-range missile tests will likely mean Iranian ships heading out into the Indian Ocean to collect data and telemetry. Which are also vulnerable to detection, giving the U.S. and Israel some early warning.

“You’re gonna know whether this happens. You’re gonna see at least one flight test of this bigger stage,” Wright says. “We haven’t seen them develop reentry vehicles on something this long-range.”

Bottom line? Iran is probably “five to ten years away” from an ICBM, Wright thinks. That seems plausible to other experts interviewed for this story, though most demurred from making an actual prediction.

That’s similar to what U.S. spy agencies used to estimate. Emphasis on the *used to*.

In 1993, the CIA told Congress Iran was “10 to 15 years” away from an ICBM. An assessment of the missile threat in 1995 drawn from across the 16 intelligence agencies, called a National Intelligence Estimate, pegged the date for doomsday at 2010.

That actually caused a freakout from Republicans in Congress, who accused the CIA of understating the urgency of the Iranian missile threat to help the Clinton administration stall on missile defense. They in turn asked Donald Rumsfeld to chair a commission on ballistic missiles. Rumsfeld’s conclusion, in 1998, was that it would take Iran at most five years to build a long-range missile; and he warned the Iranians may have already decided to do so.

All of those estimates were ultimately proven to be unrealistic. The Iranians didn’t have an ICBM in 2003, they didn’t have one in 2010, and they don’t have one now.

Lately, the spy agencies have sung a different tune. When James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, briefed Congress on the Iranian missile threat this month, he notably declined to predict when Iran would get an ICBM. Same with his predecessor, Dennis Blair.

“That’s probably a tacit acknowledgement that they really don’t have much to say,” says Pillar, who was the top Mideast analyst for the entire constellation of intelligence agencies during much of the last decade. “It’s far enough away to say ‘they’re so many years away,’ or you don’t say anything at all.”

Israel has lots of reasonable fears about Iran, a country whose president denies the Holocaust while implying that he’d love a second one, and which appears to be building a nuclear weapon. It doesn’t have to make all kinds of extra concerns up.

*Additional research assistance provided by Robert Beckhusen.*

*Spencer Ackerman is Danger Room's senior reporter, based out of Washington, D.C., covering weapons of doom and the strategies they're used to implement.*

<http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/02/iran-icbm/#more-73505>

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