



USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

Issue No. 1034, 21 November 2012

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Press TV – Iran

Russia Calls for P5+1's Efforts to Hold Fresh Talks with Iran

Saturday, November 17, 2012

Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has called for more concerted efforts by world powers to resume talks with Iran over Tehran's nuclear energy program.

Speaking to reporters on Friday, Ryabkov expressed regret over the slow progress of the negotiations between the P5+1 - the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany - and Iran.

"It is necessary to find the 'windows' in the working schedules of leaders and political directors and to coordinate them," Ryabkov said.

"The talks cannot be held through giving interviews to mass media. We need to gather and study the documents," he added.

At a Wednesday meeting between Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Saeed Jalili and Ryabkov in Tehran, the Iranian chief negotiator reaffirmed the Islamic Republic's constant readiness to hold talks with the P5+1, expressing hope the group will resume negotiations "at the earliest."

Iran and the P5+1 have held several rounds of multifaceted talks mainly over the Iranian nuclear energy program.

Tehran has repeatedly voiced its readiness for negotiations based on mutual respect while maintaining that it will not give up its inalienable rights under any circumstances.

The United States, Israel and some of their allies have repeatedly accused Iran of pursuing non-civilian objectives in its nuclear energy program.

Iran argues that as a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it is entitled to develop and acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

<http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/11/17/272826/russia-urges-renewed-iranp51-talks/>

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Xinhua News – China

Iran's Underground Nuclear Capacity Keeps Expanding: IAEA Report

November 17, 2012

VIENNA, Nov. 16 (Xinhua) -- Iran is further expanding its nuclear capacity by installing more centrifuges at an underground enrichment plant, a UN nuclear watchdog's latest report said on Friday.

Nearly 2,800 centrifuges have been installed at the Fordow fuel enrichment plant, buried deep inside a mountainous region, near the city of Qom, an increase of about 644 centrifuges compared to previous report released in August.

The report, however, noted that there was no increase in the number of the centrifuges being operating, which was reported to be 700 in August.

Iran has obtained about 233 kg of 20 percent-enriched uranium, an increase of 43 kg since August this year. The uranium at this level can be turned into weapons grade relatively fast and easily.

The report also show concerns about the activities at Parchin site, a military base, where the UN investigations were banned by Iran, stressing that the ongoing activities at the site would seriously undermined IAEA's verification.

Diplomats feared that the increasing number of the centrifuges installed at Fordow enrichment site might lead to a sharp increase of monthly production of 20 percent enriched uranium in the next few months, which increases the West suspicion on Iran's nuclear plan.



Western nations have imposed severe sanctions on Iran to force the Islamic Republic to make a concession on the negotiating table.

The Iranian government denies the accusation of alleged nuclear ambitions, saying Tehran's nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-11/17/c_131979933.htm

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Bloomberg News

Israel's Iron Dome Defense System Battles Hamas Rockets

By Tony Capaccio

November 17, 2012

Israel's U.S.-funded anti-missile system, known as Iron Dome, appears to be effective against short-range, unguided rockets used by Hamas, according to U.S.-based analysts who follow missile defense issues.

Israeli officials including Ambassador to the U.S. Michael Oren said the system has been about 90 percent effective this week against the Hamas rockets fired from Gaza against Israel. That figure is seen as credible by analysts such as Steve Zaloga, who's with the Fairfax, Virginia-based Teal Group.

"What they mean is, of the rockets that they are actually shooting at, they are hitting 90 percent," Zaloga said in a telephone interview yesterday. The military has been "tweaking" the system for improvements since its first combat intercept in April 2011 because "early on they weren't scoring at that rate," he said.

Ninety percent "is an extremely high level," Zaloga said. "Air defense systems are typically not in that range."

The Israeli military action known as Operation Pillar of Defense is proving to be the biggest test of the U.S.-funded Iron Dome. The Israeli Defense Forces reported today that a total of 737 rockets have been fired at Israel from Gaza, and that the Iron Dome system intercepted 245 of them. Another 492 landed in Israeli territory, the IDF said in a message posted today on Twitter, Inc.

Four Batteries

Iron Dome, made by Israel's Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd, is designed to intercept and destroy rockets capable of flying as far as 70 kilometers (44 miles). Israel has fielded its first four batteries consisting of launchers and interceptors costing as much as \$90,000 apiece, according to the nonpartisan U.S. Congressional Research Service.

Iron Dome's effectiveness depends on a battle management system that determines a rocket's trajectory within seconds of launch, based on radar and electro-optical sensors. In the same instant, the system determines whether the rocket is headed toward a populated area, making an intercept necessary.

"They didn't design a system that would shoot down everything," Jeff White, a military analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said in a telephone interview. "They designed a system that would shoot down threat rockets and it works pretty good."

The system is effective "because the concept behind it is not to engage all the rockets, because a lot of these are poor quality rockets that aren't going to hit anything," Zaloga said.

Discriminating Defense

"You will see reports where a rocket hit near Tel Aviv and someone will say Iron Dome is not doing its job," Zaloga said. "Iron Dome is not supposed to shoot at all the rockets coming out because you just can't afford to do it. There's too many of them, so they use radar to discriminate."



A challenge Israel faces is that many of the Hamas rockets are low-quality and fail to follow a normal ballistic trajectory, throwing off the Iron Dome radar, he said.

“It’s going after rockets that threaten a defended area --people, industries,” Michaela Bendikova, a Heritage Foundation research associate who follows the system, said in a telephone interview. “That happens only about 20 percent of the time.”

Israel will activate a fifth Iron Dome system two months before schedule “following recent events,” and it will be delivered to active air defense units from a testing area today the Ministry of Defense said by e-mail.

More Batteries

The Israeli military plans to field nine batteries across the country by 2013, the CRS said in a March report.

One shortcoming is that Israel is using the \$90,000 interceptors against crude, inaccurate Hamas rockets that may cost a few hundred dollars each. So Israel sought a system that would hold down that cost while providing a defense for civilian areas, said Zaloga.

It “remains to be seen” whether the Iron Dome will have a strategic impact on Hamas and deny them an effective capability, Bendikova said. “I’m not sure if the Iron Dome has the potential to do that because there are other classes of threats with different launch points,” she said.

The Iron Dome instead may prompt Hamas to attempt to acquire more powerful rockets, such as the Russian-made BM-21, to overwhelm the system’s batteries, analysts said.

Iron Dome “definitely improved morale, especially in southern Israel, but it hasn’t totally relieved the issue,” White said. “Israel’s got like a million people within range of Hamas rockets.”

Air Strikes

Israeli leaders say the air strikes against Gaza are intended to remove that threat by destroying the launch sites and storage areas for Hamas rockets. Israel’s strikes have eliminated most of the long-range missiles in Gaza, and the remaining threat is mostly from missiles with a range of as much as 50 kilometers (31 miles), Oren told reporters on a conference call yesterday.

Iron Dome is one of four legs of an eventual multi-layered system designed to defend against a variety of weapons fired at Israel. The other legs include the current Arrow missile, an upgraded Arrow model in testing and another system called David’s Sling.

Since 2010, the Obama administration has requested about \$650 million for these defense systems, including \$205 million for Iron Dome. The administration said in May it’s seeking an additional \$70 million for Iron Dome.

‘Deep Appreciation’

In a telephone call yesterday with President Barack Obama, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed “deep appreciation” for the U.S. financial support for Iron Dome, “which has saved countless Israeli lives,” according to a statement from the White House.

The missile threats to Israelis range from salvos of low-altitude, short-flight rockets fired from the Gaza Strip to more powerful, medium-range models from Lebanon and long-range missiles from Iran.

“The Iron Dome system has proven itself to be remarkably effective,” said U.S. Army Major Ryan Donald, a spokesman for the U.S. European Command, which works with the Israeli military.

Its success may spur international sales to nations such as South Korea that face short-range missile or artillery threats.



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Raytheon Co. (RTN), based in Waltham, Massachusetts, announced a partnership agreement with Rafael in August 2011 to market the Iron Dome system overseas. No sales have been announced to date. When asked yesterday about the status of that pact, Raytheon spokesman Jon Kasle said “we have nothing further at this time.”

<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-11-16/israel-s-iron-dome-defense-system-battles-hamas-rockets>

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Saudi Gazette – Saudi Arabia

Iran Delays Start-Up of Arak Nuke Reactor

Sunday, November 18, 2012

By Reuters

VIENNA – Iran has postponed until 2014 the planned start-up of a research reactor which Western experts say could potentially offer it a second route to produce material for a nuclear bomb, a UN report showed.

Tehran has continued to install cooling and moderator circuit piping in the heavy water plant near the town of Arak. Nuclear analysts say this type of reactor could yield plutonium for nuclear arms if the spent fuel is reprocessed, something Iran has said it has no intention of doing.

But the country has now delayed the planned timetable for bringing Arak on line by about half a year from the third quarter of 2013, according to the latest UN information in a confidential report submitted to member states late Friday.

“Iran stated that the operation of the IR-40 reactor was now expected to commence in the first quarter of 2014,” the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report said. It gave no reason for the postponement.

The Arms Control Association, a Washington-based research and advocacy group, said it was questionable whether Iran would be able to meet this new target date as well, in view of “significant delays and impeded access to necessary materials.”

The West’s worries about Iran are focused largely on underground uranium enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow, but experts say Arak is also a possible proliferation concern.

Iran, rejecting Western allegations it seeks to develop a capability to assemble atomic arms, says its nuclear program is entirely peaceful and that the reactor will produce isotopes for medical and agricultural use.

Israel, believed to be the Middle East’s only nuclear-armed state, sees Iran’s nuclear program as a serious danger and has threatened to attack its atomic sites if diplomacy fails to resolve the decade-old dispute.

If it does, the nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordow and Arak in central Iran are likely to be among the targets.

Friday’s quarterly IAEA report showed Iran pressing ahead with expanding its uranium enrichment program in defiance of tightening Western sanctions.

Enriched uranium can be used to fuel nuclear power plants, Iran’s stated aim, but also provide the explosive core of a nuclear weapon if refined much further. Making plutonium from spent fuel is a second way of obtaining potential bomb material.

In August, German prosecutors said police had arrested four men suspected of delivering valves for the heavy-water reactor, breaking an embargo on such exports to Iran.

If operated optimally, the heavy-water plant would produce about 9 kilograms of plutonium annually, or enough for about two nuclear bombs each year, according to the Institute for Science and International Security, a US-based think-tank.

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“Before it could use any of the plutonium in a nuclear weapon, however, it would first have to separate the plutonium from the irradiated fuel,” it added on its web site.

Iran has announced it has no plans to reprocess the spent fuel, the International Institute for Strategic Studies think-tank said in a report last year.

But Mark Fitzpatrick, director of its non-proliferation and disarmament programme, has said that “similarly sized reactors ostensibly built for research” have been used by India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan to make plutonium for weapons.

<http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20121118143244>

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Gulf Today – U.A.E.

Iran Standoff Worrying, Says UN Nuclear Chief

November 20, 2012

By Agencies

PARIS: The standoff on Iran’s nuclear programme is worrying, the head of the UN atomic watchdog said on Monday, but stressed that work for a diplomatic solution should continue.

Yakio Amano’s comments came as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) warned that Tehran was on the cusp of being able to triple output of nuclear material that, if further treated, could be used in the core of a bomb.

“The situation is worrying but it is important to continue to seek a diplomatic solution,” Amano told reporters after talks with French President Francois Hollande.

Amano said the “current situation is worrying but the declared material and installation facilities are under the IAEA safeguard and we can verify that they stay in a peaceful purpose.”

“We are going to have a high-level dialogue with Iran on the 13th of December in Tehran. The way to solve this issue is by diplomatic means and we will continue our efforts,” he said.

Meanwhile, Tehran’s ambassador to Russia said on Monday that Iran is ready for new talks with global powers on its nuclear programme but the United States and others seeking to rein in its uranium enrichment activities need to be more constructive.

US President Barack Obama’s re-election has increased the chances of a revival of talks with Iran involving six world powers, but the envoy said the US president should “change the conduct of the United States as regards Iran and choose a more logical approach.”

Ambassador Reza Sajjadi said senior Iranian officials had conveyed Tehran’s readiness for new negotiations to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov last week, but his remarks appeared to set a firm tone for any talks.

“We hope that in the next talks, the six nations — instead of (applying) a double standard would approach these talks more constructively,” Sajjadi told a news conference, speaking through an interpreter.

Three rounds of talks since April have failed to resolve the long dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme, which Western powers say is aimed at developing a nuclear weapons capability. Iran denies this, saying its programme is entirely peaceful.

But neither side has been willing to abandon talks, in part because of concerns that Israeli could attack Iranian nuclear facilities, potentially igniting a new war in the Middle East.

<http://gulftoday.ae/portal/819a677d-4613-4ca0-b538-aa36d3d3f02a.aspx>

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The News International – Pakistan

Iran Shrugs Off UN Chief's Comments

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

November 20, 2012

TEHRAN: Iran on Tuesday shrugged off comments by the UN atomic watchdog chief that Tehran's controversial nuclear drive is "worrying," insisting that such concerns can be resolved in "technical-legal" talks.

"If the (International Atomic Energy) Agency takes a rational approach in the talks an agreement is reachable ... (even) quickly," Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said in his weekly press briefing.

"If there are worries they can be resolved in technical-legal talks," he added.

IAEA chief Yukio Amano's comments came after the agency said last Friday it remained "unable" to say all Iranian activities were peaceful and that Tehran had completed installation at its Fordo site, allowing it to significantly ramp up production.

"The situation is worrying but it is important to continue to seek a diplomatic solution," Amano told reporters after talks with French President Francois Hollande on Monday.

The IAEA and Iran have agreed to hold another round of talks on 13 December in Tehran.

Mehmanparast also repeated Iran's denial it is sanitising a suspect military base where the UN atomic watchdog wants to probe evidence of possible weapons research.

Amano said in Baghdad earlier this month that efforts to dismantle traces of possible weapons research at the Parchin site near Tehran were "ongoing."

"It is not possible to clean up nuclear activities and (nuclear) traces will remain," Mehmanparast said. "It is not appropriate for the director of the Agency to make remarks which the experts consider non-technical and not legal."

The IAEA wants Iran to grant it access to Parchin, which it visited twice in 2005 but wants to examine again.

Since the summer, some buildings at the base have been covered in massive tarpaulins to prevent surveillance by Western satellites.

The UN Security Council has passed four rounds of sanctions against Iran's disputed nuclear drive, and the IAEA's board of governors passed a resolution in September again calling on Iran to prove its programme has no military dimension.

<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-76307-Iran-shrugs-off-UN-chiefs-comments>

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France 24 – France

World Powers to Mull Improving Iran Offer: Diplomats

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

20 November 2012

AFP - Six world powers will discuss on Wednesday in Brussels making a "more creative" and sweetened offer to persuade Iran to scale back its controversial nuclear programme, diplomats said.

The gathering of the P5+1 -- Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States, and Germany -- will "see if there are ways on which we can improve on the offer (rejected in June in talks in Moscow) to Iran", one senior Western envoy said Tuesday.



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"We want to try to give Iran incentives to meet its obligations, but Iran will also have to take steps as well. We will see what they are willing to do," the diplomat said on condition of anonymity.

"It is looking to see what we can do to help bring Iran back to the negotiating table to negotiate seriously ... There is the pressure side of it, but we also want to see what it is we can do to bring them back to the negotiating table."

In high-level talks in May in Baghdad the P5+1 made an offer to Iran, calling on it to suspend some activities, close its most controversial nuclear facility and ship abroad fissile material.

Many in the international community suspect that Iran's growing civilian nuclear programme masks a covert attempt to develop nuclear weapons, something vehemently denied by Iran.

Iran rejected the proposals in June since the six powers stopped short of offering significant and immediate enough relief from sanctions that have started to hit the Iranian economy hard in recent months.

Diplomatic efforts were then put on hold during campaigning for the US presidential election, won on November 6 by Barack Obama, and diplomats and experts say they expect a new round of talks with Iran early next year or perhaps sooner.

"I think most parties are coming to the table with the realisation that we have to consider what is on offer ? I think we have realised that with what was on offer, and what Iran was prepared to accept, there was no meaningful middle ground," a second Western envoy told AFP.

"We need to find that middle ground ? I think that everyone is coming in with their eyes open, I think the (six powers) are realising that they have to do something more creative."

Wednesday's talks, hosted by EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, are due to start around 9:00 am (0800 GMT) and last several hours, officials said.

<http://www.france24.com/en/20121120-world-powers-mull-improving-iran-offer-diplomats>

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Channel News Asia – Singapore

Myanmar to Sign New Nuclear Safeguards

19 November 2012

Agence France-Presse (AFP)

YANGON: Myanmar said on Sunday it would agree to new atomic safeguards that allow inspections of suspected clandestine nuclear sites, ahead of a milestone visit by US President Barack Obama.

The news comes hours after the White House said Myanmar has taken "positive steps" to reduce its military relationship with North Korea.

Myanmar was suspected of pursuing military and nuclear cooperation with Pyongyang during long years of junta rule which ended last year.

A Myanmar government statement said that the country would sign the International Atomic Energy Agency's "additional protocol", which grants the UN nuclear agency right of access to possible undeclared activities.

President Thein Sein has approved the measure which will now be forwarded to parliament for approval, the statement said.

Allegations of nuclear cooperation between Myanmar and North Korea have been a top concern for Washington.

Thein Sein's government has denied any covert effort to obtain nuclear weapons technology from North Korea, which is locked in a prolonged atomic showdown with the United States.

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The White House said ahead of Obama's visit to Yangon on Monday that the former junta-ruled nation was taking steps to reduce ties with Pyongyang.

"We've had a dialogue with the Burmese government about the need to reduce their relationship with North Korea," Ben Rhodes, a US deputy national security advisor said on Air Force One as Obama flew to Asia.

"We've seen them take some positive steps in that direction. And what we'd like to see, again, is an end to the relationship that has existed between Burma and North Korea."

A 2010 United Nations report accused Pyongyang of supplying banned nuclear and ballistic equipment to Myanmar, Iran and Syria.

Myanmar has maintained that it is too poor to acquire nuclear weapons and that it has always abided by UN resolutions.

Obama will become the first sitting US president to travel to the country, after a first stop in Thailand.

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1238051/1/.html

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China Daily – China

'We Are Ready to Build More Carriers'

November 20, 2012

By ZHAO HUANXIN (China Daily)

The company that played a key role in equipping China's first aircraft carrier is ready to build more "seagoing airbases", its chairman said.

"China is the only one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council not to have an aircraft carrier wholly developed by itself," said Hu Wenming, chairman of China State Shipbuilding Corp.

The company is a major designer and maker of the aeronautical support system for the Liaoning, China's first aircraft carrier, which was refitted from the Soviet Union's Varyag warship.

The Liaoning was commissioned on Sept 25.

"We must enhance our independent weapons and equipment research and production capacity to match the country's clout, and independently build our own aircraft carriers," Hu told China Daily during the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China this month.

In his political report to the congress, President Hu Jintao said that it was a key strategy to build a strong national defense commensurate with China's international standing and to meet the needs of its security and development interests.

Hu Wenming, a congress delegate, took the helm of the world's second-largest shipbuilder in July. Hyundai Heavy Industries is the world's largest shipbuilder. He said his company had the responsibility and the capability to provide modern weaponry and equipment to the navy.

The 55-year-old declined to say when and how many carriers his company will build. "That hinges on the central authorities," he said.

But he suggested the country develop carriers using what he called catapult stroke technology on the flight deck. Planes on the Liaoning utilize a ski-jump takeoff, according to earlier reports by the Liberation Army Daily.

"It is very difficult for fixed-wing Air Early Warning aircraft to use a ski-jump takeoff, and on such a carrier you can only use helicopters for early warning, which actually compromises early warning," he said.

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The Liaoning is more than 300 meters long and over 70 meters wide. Flight coordination at sea obviously differs fundamentally from land-based runways, Hu said.

He declined to say how many people were involved in the project to equip the carrier, but said a whole research and development institute under his company was engaged in it, and its workforce had doubled in the process.

It took about six years for researchers to develop and install sophisticated technology and key infrastructure needed for the flight deck, such as those to command the launch and recovery operations of carrier-borne aircraft, he added.

Both the software and hardware the company provided have passed simulation tests, and Hu said he is confident they will work in tandem with the aircraft and the carrier.

Hu also said his company is ready to build the vessels for the carrier formation "at any time". Such a formation is generally made up of the carrier itself, destroyers, escorts, supply vessels and submarines, he said.

He revealed that China has recently embarked on its 13th patrol mission in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters. His company has built 95 percent of the vessels used for such missions over the past few years. The CEO said he believed the purpose of weapons and equipment development is to preserve international peace so that the country can secure economic and social growth.

China has developed satellites, nuclear and hydrogen bombs to safeguard national security, Hu said.

"Likewise, developing aircraft carriers and other new-generation armament for the navy is tailored for the country's defense and the need to protect marine rights and interests."

In building vessels for civilian use, amid a global downturn in shipbuilding, Hu said his company is changing course, focusing on the higher-end, value-added vessels and marine engineering facilities.

This currently accounts for only 35 percent of the company's turnover, while those of lower-end contribute to 65 percent.

Hu pledged to complete structural optimization and reverse the proportions by 2015, when his company is expected to become the world's largest shipbuilder.

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-11/20/content_15942819.htm

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The Asahi Shimbun – Japan

Ishihara: Non-Nuclear States Lack International Clout

November 21, 2012

THE ASAHI SHIMBUN

Japan Restoration Party leader Shintaro Ishihara said Japan should "simulate" the possession of nuclear weapons as a deterrent but stopped short of calling for the nation to become a nuclear power.

"I think simulations about (owning) nuclear arms are something worth doing," Ishihara, a former Tokyo governor, said at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan on Nov. 20. "That would serve as one deterrent, although it's not for us to decide immediately if we will possess (nuclear weapons) or not."

Japan, the only country to be hit by atomic bombs, has long opposed nuclear weapons and has repeatedly called for nuclear non-proliferation.

But Ishihara said non-nuclear powers in today's world are at an overwhelming disadvantage diplomatically.

"Your words staggeringly lack clout unless you own nuclear weapons," the outspoken nationalist said.

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He elaborated: "Russia took our land, and it has nuclear weapons. China also has nuclear arms, and it is trying to grab Japan's land. But Japan is in a sort of illusion of peace. When it comes to the Senkaku Islands, (the United States) will not come to help us unless we have the resolve to defend them even at the cost of our blood."

The Senkaku Islands, a group of five uninhabited islets and reefs in the East China Sea, are administered by Japan but claimed by China and Taiwan.

Japan is also involved in a long-running dispute over the Northern Territories, four islands off Hokkaido that were seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II.

Ishihara recently became head of the Japan Restoration Party after it merged with his Sunrise Party ahead of the Dec. 16 Lower House election.

As expected, his news conference on Nov. 20 was filled with harsh words against China.

"I do believe that friendship between China and Japan is desirable for both countries," he said. "But I absolutely do not want Japan to become prey to (China's) hegemonism and turn into another Tibet."

He continued: "We should form some sort of alliance with the Philippines and Vietnam, whose territorial waters are being encroached upon. That's what solid and tough diplomacy means, isn't it?"

Ishihara said he would never back down on his hard-line stance toward China.

"The consensus among an overwhelming majority of the general public, when it comes to the Japan-China frictions triggered by the Senkaku Islands issue, is 'Face it both level-headedly and resolutely,'" he said. "I will continue to act in line with that position."

He also denied news reports that he told Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda that he would not hesitate to wage war against China.

"I never said a word of that sort during my conversations with Noda," Ishihara said. "I never said anything like 'don't hesitate waging a war' or 'station troops.'"

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201211210025

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DAWN.com – Pakistan

Pakistan Racing to Develop Armed Drones: Experts

November 18, 2012

By Associated Press

KARACHI: Pakistan is secretly racing to develop its own armed drones, industry experts say, but is struggling in its initial tests with a lack of precision munitions and advanced targeting technology.

One of Islamabad's closest allies, China, has offered to help by selling Pakistan armed drones it developed. But industry experts say there is still uncertainty about the capabilities of the Chinese aircraft.

Pakistan has demanded the US provide it with armed drones, claiming it could more effectively carry out attacks against militants. Washington has refused because of the sensitive nature of the technology and doubts that Pakistan would reliably target US enemies. The US has held talks with Pakistan about providing unarmed surveillance drones, but Islamabad already has several types of these aircraft in operation, and the discussions have gone nowhere.

Inaugurating a defense exhibition in the southern city of Karachi last week, Pakistani Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf indicated Islamabad would look for help from Beijing in response to US intransigence.

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“Pakistan can also benefit from China in defense collaboration, offsetting the undeclared technological apartheid,” said Ashraf.

Pakistan has also been working to develop armed drones on its own, said Pakistani military officials and civilians involved in the domestic drone industry, all of whom spoke on condition of anonymity because of the classified nature of the work.

Pakistan first began weapons tests seven or eight months ago with the Falco, an Italian drone used by the Pakistani air force for surveillance that has been modified to carry rockets, said a civilian with knowledge of the secret program. The military is also conducting similar tests with the country’s newest drone, the Shahpur, he said. An unarmed version of the Shahpur was unveiled for the first time at the Karachi exhibition.

The weapons tests have been limited to a handful of aircraft, and no strikes have been carried out in combat, said the civilian.

Lack of precision, targeting technology

Pakistan lacks laser-guided missiles like the Hellfire used on US Predator and Reaper drones and the advanced targeting system that goes with it, so the military has been using unguided rockets that are much less accurate.

While Hellfire missiles are said to have pinpoint accuracy, the rockets used by Pakistan have a margin of error of about 30 meters at best, and an unexpected gust of wind could take them 300 meters from their intended target, said the civilian. Even if Pakistan possessed Hellfires and the guidance system to use them, the missile’s weight and drag would be a challenge for the small drones produced by the country.

Pakistan’s largest drone, the Shahpur, has a wingspan of about seven meters and can carry 50 kilograms. The US Predator, which can be equipped with two Hellfire missiles, has a wingspan more than twice that and a payload capacity over four times as great.

Pakistani drones also have much more limited range than those produced in the US because they are operated based on “line of sight” using radio waves, rather than military satellites. The Shahpur has a maximum range of 250 kilometers, while the Predator can fly over five times that distance.

The British newspaper The Guardian reported Tuesday that Pakistan was working on an armed drone but did not provide details.

The market for drones has exploded in Pakistan and other countries around the world in recent years, as shown by the array of aircraft on display at the defense exhibition in Karachi. Hoping to tap into a worldwide market worth billions of dollars a year, public and private companies wheeled out over a dozen drones that ranged in size from hand-held models meant to be carried in a backpack to larger aircraft like the Shahpur.

All the Pakistani drones on display were advertised as unarmed and meant for surveillance only. One private company, Integrated Dynamics, even promotes its aircraft under the slogan “Drones for Peace.” But several models developed by the Chinese government were marketed as capable of carrying precision missiles and bombs.

China offering drones

The Chinese government has offered to sell Pakistan an armed drone it has produced, the CH-3, which can carry two laser-guided missiles or bombs, industry insiders said.

Also being offered to Pakistan is a more advanced drone, the CH-4, which closely resembles a US Reaper and can carry four laser-guided missiles or bombs, according to Li Xiaoli, a representative of the Chinese state-owned company that produces both the CH-3 and CH-4, Aerospace Long-march International Trade Co., Ltd.

Pakistan has yet to purchase any armed Chinese drones because their capabilities have yet to be proven, but is likely to do so in the future, said the civilian with knowledge of the Pakistani military’s drone program.



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Only a few countries, including the US, Britain and Israel, are known to have actually used armed drones in military operations.

“China is a bit of a tough nut to crack as you’d expect,” said Huw Williams, a drone expert at Jane’s International Defence Review. “They frequently wheel out exciting looking aircraft but are yet to really demonstrate anything earth shattering.”

<http://dawn.com/2012/11/18/pakistan-racing-to-develop-armed-drones-experts/>

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Pakistan Tribune – Pakistan

India's Ambitions to Encircle Pakistan

19 November, 2012

By Asif Haroon Raja

India is largest in size and population and militarily and economically the strongest country in South Asia. Indian Army of 1.4 million with 34 combat divisions is the third largest in the world and Indian air force and navy too are formidable. India has made its standing in the world because of its geo-strategic importance and huge economic market.

Diplomatically it is well placed in the world comity of nations and enjoys best of relations with world powers as well as with the Muslim world. Till 1990 it was strategic partner of former Soviet Union. After latter's demise India snuggled into the lap of USA and became its strategic partner but without damaging its relations with Russia. It also developed close ties with Israel which has over a period of time become India's biggest arms supplier. India then mended fences with China by pushing border dispute in Himalayan region to the back-burner and promoted trade. India got closer to Iran when Afghanistan was under the rule of Taliban and Afghan Northern Alliance (NA) leadership had taken refuge in Tehran. However, Afghanistan under anti-India and pro-Pakistan Taliban rule was a huge loss for India. In anticipation of a regime change in Kabul, it started providing full support to NA leaders during their period of exile. India is now a strategic partner of Afghanistan where Pakistan's influence has diminished considerably.

In marked contrast to its high standing across the globe where it shows a humane face and claims to be the champion of democracy and secularism, India doesn't enjoy good reputation within South Asia where its interests clash with neighboring countries. It has used Chankyan tactics to deceive, beguile or blackmail its adversaries or has used force to browbeat the smaller states and make them submit to its wishes. Among its neighbors, Pakistan is its arch rival since it refuses to accept India's supremacy and wants relationship on equal basis. India has still not reconciled with the existence of Pakistan and keeps hatching conspiracies and even going to war to undo Pakistan.

Out of 13 Corps, seven Indian Corps are deployed against Pakistan. Majority of its airbases are also poised against Pakistan and its Navy is geared toward blocking Karachi in the event of war. Besides equipping its forces with latest weaponry and technology, India is refurbishing the obsolete military equipment with US-Israel efforts. Indian defence budget is increasing annually at an alarming rate. India has since long been aspiring to turn Pakistan into a captive Indian market and to encircle Pakistan. It has partially encircled Pakistan after occupying two-thirds Kashmir, which overlooks AJK, and Siachen Glacier which dominates Gilgit-Baltistan, and substantially enhancing its naval presence in the Indian Ocean to turn Arabian Sea as its exclusive domain so as to quarantine Pakistan. After opening Pakistan specific consulates in Afghanistan and in Iranian provinces bordering Pakistan for the purposes of sabotage and subversion, and helping Iran in building Chahbahar Port and linking it with Indian constructed Highway Delaram-Zaranj in Afghanistan, its strategic encirclement plan is near completion.

Creation of Pakistan from within the womb of Indian Union on August 14, 1947 was the biggest shock inflicted upon the Brahman elites of India. Pakistan's survival and progress traumatized them further and to lessen their anguish they keep hatching conspiracies to impede and possibly block all avenues of progress and at an opportune time deliver a knockout blow. India supported Pakhtunistan stunt espoused by Afghanistan. It was essentially its quest for security

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against the vastly superior India harboring hegemonic ambitions, unfriendly Afghanistan and not so friendly USSR which motivated Pakistan to join western pacts and seek US military assistance.

Pakistan has on number of occasions gone out of the way to throw away the baggage of animosity with India and to make a fresh start. Ignoring the wrongs of India, Quaid-e-Azam had made an offer to forget the past and live as peaceful neighbors and to jointly work towards improving the quality of life of common people. His offer was spurned by Nehru and Indian forces forcibly occupied two-thirds Kashmir in October 1947. Kashmir thus became a bone of contention and a major cause of never-ending antagonism. FM Ayub Khan made an offer of joint defence which was also brushed aside by Nehru. ZA Bhutto agreed to Indira Gandhi's suggestion of bilateral-ism in the 1972 Simla Conference but India exploited it by preventing third party mediation/facilitation and putting Kashmir issue in a cold storage.

Gen Ziaul Haq offered umpteen proposals to make South Asia nuclear free zone but India paid no heed to any. Benazir Bhutto went to the extent of providing list of Sikh leaders engaged in Khalistan movement but she failed to appease Rajiv Gandhi. Nawaz Sharif too tried hard to find an amicable solution to the chronic dispute of Kashmir though composite dialogue and to improve Indo-Pak relations but could make no headway due to Indian leaders rigid stance that Kashmir is integral part of India. Gen Musharraf crossed all limits to appease India by suggesting a solution outside the realm of UN Resolutions but he couldn't bring any change in India's uncompromising stand. The current regime is also following the policy of appeasement but has failed to solicit positive response from India. Rather, India has all along maintained a belligerent posture and on several occasions Indian military might got deployed along the border and came close to an all-out war.

India has gone to war with Pakistan five times including two limited conflicts in Rann of Katch and Kargil. In 1971, aided by USSR, India succeeded in truncating Pakistan but when it found that Pakistan refused to become its satellite, its infamous RAW recommenced its covert war to weaken other parts of Pakistan and also accelerated its force modernization program with emphasis on mechanization of ground forces and upgrading its naval and air arms with the help of USSR.

Sindh was chosen as the next target of subversion after East Pakistan. One reason of picking up Sindh was the importance of Karachi with lone seaport and economic hub of Pakistan. Its covert operations succeeded in accentuating antagonism between old and new Sindhis and thus creating urban-rural divide in Sindh. 1973 Baloch insurgency in Balochistan was supported by USSR, Afghanistan and India. When Soviet forces occupied Afghanistan in 1979 and the US and Pakistan became strategic allies to confront the Soviet threat, India's RAW joined hands with KGB and KHAD to carryout subversive activities in Pakistan. The MRD movement in rural Sindh was also supported by India. Alignment with USA from 1991 onward enabled India to spoil Pak-US relations.

Strategic alliance with the sole super power in the aftermath of 9/11 is helping India in fulfilling its grandeur plans to become a regional and a world power and to keep the dispute of Kashmir on the back burner. Considering Pakistan to be the only stumbling block in her way to achieve her ambitions, she considered occupation of Afghanistan by USA and its allies in November 2001 and establishment of a pro-India regime in Kabul together with ongoing war on terror an ideal opportunity to encircle Pakistan and force it to give up Kashmir and accept India's hegemony, or else balkanize it or remove it from the world map. Above all, it opened the avenues for India to regain its lost influence in Afghanistan and to further expand it and become a key player.

Notwithstanding that acquisition of nuclear and missile capability by Pakistan has greatly minimized the risk of war with India; however, nuclear Pakistan has earned perpetual hostility of India, Israel and USA. News ways are now being devised to disable our nuclear program without having to wage a war. While continuing to procure latest state-of-art weapons from all quarters, India vociferously objects to any effort by Pakistan to procure its modest defence needs from any country and the west lends receptive ears to its laments. In order to offset Pakistan's nuclear strategic deterrence, India has ventured upon its Cold Start Doctrine which initially envisaged 7-8 self-containing battle groups but has now been increased it to 15 groups. Indian hackers tried to hack secrets of Army Exercise Azm-e-Nao III, a response action to Cold Start, and succeeded partially. Water war and now the economic war to supplement covert



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war are part of India's overall scheme to isolate Pakistan and make it irrelevant. It is desperate to get land access to Afghanistan through Pakistan.

Pakistan should offset India's nefarious encirclement plan by disagreeing to grant land route to India through Wagah border for its contemplated trade with Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics and that too without resolving core disputes. Our military responses to Cold Start will have to be rehashed at the earliest.

The writer is a retired Brig and a defence analyst.

<http://paktribune.com/articles/Indias-ambitions-to-encircle-Pakistan-242993.html>

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Global Security Newswire

Russia Says Exit from New START Treaty would be "Undesirable"

November 19, 2012

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov on Friday said it is possible but "undesirable" that his nation would abandon a strategic arms control accord with the United States, ITAR-Tass reported.

Moscow has warned previously it could unilaterally pull out of the New START agreement if its concerns about planned U.S. missile defense deployments in Europe are not addressed. The treaty requires the United States and Russia to by 2018 each cap their arsenals of deployed long-range nuclear weapons at 1,550 warheads and 700 delivery systems.

"I think that everything is possible in the future, including Russia's withdrawal from the treaty," Ryabkov told Russia Today. "But for us it would be an undesirable event."

Russia objects to U.S. plans to through 2020 field increasingly capable sea- and land-based missile interceptors around Europe in support of NATO efforts to construct a continent-wide ability to defeat possible ballistic missile strikes from the Middle East. Moscow has demanded a legally binding guarantee from Washington and Brussels that Russian strategic missile forces would not be targeted by the NATO system.

"If something in the missile defense sphere goes in an undesirable way, and we will fail to reach any agreement, it would be irresponsible on our part not to take corresponding measures in the sphere of ... offensive weapons that are the subject of the START 2010 treaty," Ryabkov said. He added that it was "too early" to discuss how Washington might respond to Moscow's withdrawal from the treaty.

The former Cold War foes have for years sought unsuccessfully to reach a compromise on U.S. antimissile plans in Europe. Still, Ryabkov said he was optimistic that "we will be able to get the ball rolling again," ITAR-Tass reported.

"We insist that the solution must meet two basic criteria. First, we need legal guarantees that what is happening in this sphere will not have a negative impact on the Russian nuclear deterrent potential. Second, we need some mechanism with the help of which we would independently verify whether these statements are true," he said.

"These are two fundamental points, our position will not change on them," the deputy minister continued. "If the American side seeks to reach an agreement with Russia, it should meet us halfway on these issues."

<http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/russia-says-exit-new-start-would-be-undesirable/>

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Russia Beyond the Headlines – Russia

Why Russia Upgrades Early Warning Systems

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With nations possessing nuclear weapons and missile technologies, the ability to detect missile launches in a timely manner is vital for any strategic weapons systems – hence Russia’s current upgrade of its missile attack early warning system.

November 20, 2012

By Andrei Kislyakov

The Voronezh-DM early warning radars deployed near Armavir in Russia’s Krasnodar Region will start working at full capacity in the first quarter of 2013, according to former commander of Russian aerospace defense troops and new deputy defense minister, Oleg Ostapenko.

“Once the new Armavir radar is commissioned and put on alert, it will cover the Daryal-type Gabala radar station’s zone of operation, and even replace it in this zone,” said Ostapenko.

Deployed in February 2009, the decimeter-range radar referred to by Ostapenko faces southwest and covers the area from Southern Europe to the coast of North Africa. The new station segment will also cover Turkey, Iraq, Iran, India and countries in the Middle East.

Indeed, the role of the early warning radar system cannot be overstated: This is literally a security signaling system that covers the entire planet.

There are widely known cases when a failure in such a system could have resulted in a global catastrophe.

The first case took place on November 9, 1979, when computers at the National Control Center of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the Pentagon National Military Command Center, and the Alternate National Military Command Center in Fort Ritchie all indicated a massive Soviet nuclear strike aimed at destroying the U.S. nuclear command system.

Senior officers were immediately convened to meetings at all three command posts. Launch control centers for Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were ordered to be prepared for launch. The alarm was raised across the entire air defense system, and at least 10 interceptors were airborne. The National Emergency Airborne Command Post – the president’s “doomsday plane” – was also launched, although the president was not on board.

However, within a few minutes of the alert, the officers reviewed the raw data from the early missile warning satellites and stations circling the United States. The systems showed no signs of a missile attack, so the alert was canceled.

It was later determined that a software program designed for missile attack action drills was inadvertently inserted into a computer running the nation’s early warning programs.

On June 3, 1980, U.S. command posts received another nuclear strike warning. As in the earlier episode, launch units for Minuteman ICBMs were given preliminary launch instructions, and strategic bomber crews manned their aircraft.

This time, however, the computers did not present a recognizable or consistent attack pattern, and the displays showed a changing number of attacking missiles. Furthermore, these numbers did not always agree across the different command posts. Although many officers did not take this incident as seriously as the previous one, an emergency conference was again convened to assess the threat. An investigation showed that a single computer chip failure had caused random numbers of attacking missiles to be displayed.

The most dramatic episode took place at the height of the Cold War. It can be said with absolute certainty that mankind was saved by Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, who was hardly known to anyone at the time.

On September 26, 1983, the newly inaugurated Soviet missile warning satellite system indicated an attack from the United States. Soviet satellites monitored the base areas of U.S. missiles at such an angle that they were seen at the edge of the Earth; the system thus detected attacking missiles against the black background of space and identified a launched missile by infrared light given off by its engine. Such a configuration was chosen to reduce the chances that satellite sensors would be activated by sunlight reflected from clouds or snow banks.

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As military space expert Yuri Zaitsev said of that day: "It so happened that the satellite, the launching positions of the U.S. missiles and the Sun were aligned in such a way that sunlight was strongly reflected from clouds. The satellite decided that the reflected sunlight was a column of fire coming from the nozzles and transmitted a message that five missiles had been launched from the continental United States."

According to instructions, the officer in charge of the bunker at Serpukhov-15 in central Russia was obliged in the event of a missile strike to pass the information to the nation's leadership without hesitation; Soviet leaders would then make a decision on whether or not to deliver a retaliatory strike. The flight time of a ballistic missile from the continental United States to the Soviet Union was about 30 minutes, so Petrov's options were limited: he could either inform the general secretary, who would then make the final decision with his nuclear briefcase; or he could tell his superiors that the information was false and thus face the consequences.

Given that the Soviet leader at the time, Yuri Andropov, would have had just 15 minutes to make the decision, it is almost certain that he would have believed Petrov and launched a retaliatory nuclear attack. Petrov, however, was not prepared to have the lives of billions on his conscience and acted against protocol. He did not push the button to let his superiors know the country was under attack, despite the fact that the information was checked 30 times, with the same result each time.

In the end, common sense prevailed – after all, people do not start a war with just five missiles. Petrov "did not believe" the computer and thus saved the world.

http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/11/20/why_russia_upgrades_early_warning_systems_20269.html

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Russia to Deploy New ICBM in 2014

21 November 2012

MOSCOW, November 21 (RIA Novosti) - Russia will deploy its newest medium-weight solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile in 2014, a military source told RIA Novosti on Wednesday.

Previously, Strategic Missile Forces (RSVN) commander Sergei Karakayev said Russia would deploy such a weapon only in 2015.

"According to the latest information, it will be accepted into service in 2014; the new weapon is part of a response program to the United States ballistic missile defense program," the source said, without naming the new system.

The Strategic Missile Forces test-fired a prototype of the new weapon in October from the Kapustin Yar test range, he said. "This was a test launch as part of combined state trials," he said, adding the weapon will be formally accepted only after completion of those trials.

The new weapon will be primarily based on mobile launchers, he said. "So far there has been no decision on whether to base them in silos," he added.

The missile will have intercontinental range, or more than 3,500 miles (5,500 kilometers), he said.

http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20121121/177633695.html

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Los Alamos Daily Post – Los Alamos, NM

NNSA Delivers W76-1 Units to Navy for 2012

Submitted by Carol A. Clark

November 18, 2012

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WASHINGTON, D.C. – The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has announced that it delivered all of its scheduled W76-1 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile warhead units to United States Navy in FY 2012.

“As our stockpile ages, we have to put ourselves in a position where the president can be certain that it is safe, secure and effective,” said NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Don Cook. “Our continued success with the W76-1 Life Extension Program is key to the United States’ nuclear deterrent. As we move forward with other life extension programs, we’re looking at our joint work with the Navy on the W76 as a model for the future – one where we’re on time, on budget and delivering exactly how the American people need us to.”

The W76-1 Life Extension Program involves engineers, scientists and technicians from NNSA’s Pantex Plant, the Y-12 National Security Complex, Savannah River Site, Kansas City Plant, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories.

The W76-1 Life Extension Program’s first production unit was achieved in September 2008. The program remains on track to produce and deliver the warheads to the Navy in keeping with its commitment to complete production not later than the end of FY 2021, which is consistent with the Nuclear Posture Review.

The primary goals of the W76-1 Life Extension Program are to extend the original warhead service life from 20 to 60 years, address identified aging issues, and meet requirements identified by the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM.)

In addition, the goals of the program are to incorporate nuclear surety enhancements, maximize reuse of W76-0 components, minimize system certification risk in the absence of underground nuclear testing, and refurbish the system in a managed affordable manner.

As a key part of its national security mission, NNSA, through its Office of Defense Programs, ensures that the U.S. nuclear arsenal meets the country’s national security requirements and continues to serve its essential deterrence role.

<http://www.ladaily.com/content/nnsa-delivers-w76-1-units-navy-2012>

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Defense News

Sequestration or Not, U.S. Firms, DoD Will Take a Hit

November 18, 2012

By MARCUS WEISGERBER

Even if the U.S. Congress is able to hammer out a debt deal that avoids sequestration in January, the resulting agreement will likely result in billions of dollars in additional cuts to the Defense Department — perhaps as much as \$25 billion — likely forcing the military to alter its roles and missions.

Internally, some of the nation’s largest defense companies are also planning for a possible \$25 billion cut annually from current spending levels. That \$25 billion is half of what DoD is expected to absorb annually under sequestration. This month, Boeing announced a major reduction among its executive ranks as it prepares for a decline in U.S. defense spending.

“If they come up with a deal to avert sequestration, I think the defense portion of that deal will be cuts [at] about half the level that sequestration would require,” said Todd Harrison, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

But the cuts, under a debt deal, would likely be distributed differently than under sequestration.

“Instead of an even \$25 billion across every year for the next 10 years, it could be more back-loaded and it certainly would give DoD the flexibility to target those cuts, to allocate them in a thoughtful, strategic manner,” Harrison said.

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As lawmakers and the White House attempt to craft a debt reduction deal to avert sequestration, new voices are offering suggestions for ways to include defense cuts as part of the governmentwide package. Experts argue that some of these plans, by simply trimming more fat, significantly reduce DoD spending without harming readiness.

Others say Pentagon leaders have to make real choices when it comes to which weapon systems and troop levels to fund.

Without a debt reduction deal, the Pentagon would get hit with an immediate 10 percent cut to its spending accounts in fiscal 2013, which totals about \$50 billion beginning Jan. 2.

The consensus in Washington is that cuts under sequestration are not likely, although some experts believe they might temporarily go into effect until the newly elected Congress is seated and able to iron out a debt deal.

The only parts of the Pentagon budget not subject to sequestration are funding for war operations in Afghanistan, for which the Pentagon requested \$88.5 billion in fiscal 2013, and all personnel accounts. DoD is contemplating a roughly \$64 billion Afghanistan operations request in 2014, sources said, the same year major combat in the country is expected to end.

Another New Military Strategy

DoD unveiled a new military strategy in January, designed with \$487 billion in cuts to defense spending already taken into account as a result of the Budget Control Act. Top DoD leaders often have said further spending cuts — through sequestration or other measures — would force them to rethink that strategy.

Now, with additional cuts looming, think tanks are chiming in with ways to further tailor defense spending.

Last week, the Stimson Center think tank in Washington released a report presenting a new military strategy for DoD that could be tailored to various levels of spending.

The Project on Defense Alternatives also put together a defense plan, which calls for cutting military end strength by 19 percent. It also called for cutting large swaths of military equipment.

Along with the strategy, the Stimson-organized group — which includes a handful of retired generals and admirals — also looked at ways to make DoD more efficient without cutting end strength and major weapons programs. The panel examined a vast number of official studies and expert recommendations and concluded DoD could save about \$1 trillion over the next decade if it instituted “better manpower utilization” measures and compensation system and acquisition reforms.

While the group recognized that DoD achieving the entire \$1 trillion in savings is highly unlikely, it looked at what would have to be done to meet sequestration-level cuts if 20 or 40 percent of these efficiency savings were met.

“We used it to illustrate how much less difficult the choices would be if you’re forced to reduce defense spending if you were able to implement these efficiency measures,” said Barry Blechman, co-founder and distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, on Nov. 14.

The panel also looked at what it calls a “smooth sequester” — phasing in the mandated cuts gradually over several years and not cutting all accounts evenly at 10 percent.

To get to \$400 billion in efficiencies, the panel looked at cutting the Army budget by 2 percent per year, reducing brigade combat teams from 45 to between 35 and 40. The Navy could accelerate its retirements of Ticonderoga-class cruisers.

It also looked at a 1 percent cut to the Air Force budget each year and retiring 13 active-duty F-16 fighter squadrons. The report recommends keeping lower-end F-16s in the Air National Guard and placing high-end aircraft, such as F-35 joint strike fighters, in active-duty squadrons.



Lastly, DoD could choose between cutting missile defense spending and reducing nuclear and modernization forces. Even with these cuts, DoD could use money it saves to double its funding of basic applied research and increase special operations forces, cyber warfare capabilities and funding for space systems, the report states.

Assuming the lower level of efficiency savings — \$200 billion — DoD would need to make deeper cuts to its force.

It could include cutting the Army budget by 5 percent and the number of brigade combat teams to 30, according to the report.

In the Air Force, the service could choose between active-duty F-16 cuts and reducing F-35 development. For the Navy, it could mean reducing F-35 development. The Marine Corps could cut its budget by 1 percent, reduce end strength by 7 percent and reprioritize its procurement plans.

Lastly, as in the first scenario, DoD could choose between cutting missile defense and reducing nuclear and modernization forces.

But generating efficiencies above the more than \$200 billion DoD has already targeted over the next five years — which are separate from the \$1 trillion identified by Stimson — is not realistic, Harrison said.

“It’s a noble goal. We should always be trying to get more efficient,” he said. “The reality is it’s hard to do that.”

Since DoD has given up the funds — or re-obligated them — for the already identified efficiencies, it will have to cut from other areas should those levels of saving not materialize.

“I think banking further efficiency savings as part of deficit reduction, it’s really just a way of avoiding the hard choices that you have to make,” Harrison said.

These choices include preserving near-term military readiness at the expense of giving up more force structure or forgoing modernization programs.

“No one wants to cut readiness, but you have to weigh that against the alternatives,” Harrison said. “If you don’t reduce readiness, you are going to be reducing other things, perhaps to a level that’s just not acceptable.”

DoD is facing other choices, including on the size of its ground forces, active duty versus reserves and special operations versus conventional. In aviation, the Air Force must confront its mix of stealth vs. nonstealth aircraft, as well as manned versus unmanned. As for naval, choices are needed between surface and undersea vessels.

“The reality is, you’re not going to be able to choose both,” Harrison said.

<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121118/DEFREG02/311180001/Sequestration-Not-U-S-Firms-DoD-Will-Take-Hit?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE>

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Knoxville News Sentinel – Knoxville, TN

Feds May Pursue Sabotage Charges against Y-12 Protesters

By Frank Munger, *Knoxville News Sentinel*

November 20, 2012

The government may seek additional, even more serious felony charges against the Plowshares protesters who broke into the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant July 28.

Jeff Theodore, an assistant U.S. attorney who specializes in national security cases, confirmed Tuesday that the government is still mulling whether to pursue charges under the Sabotage Act. "It hasn't been decided," Theodore said during a break in a motion hearing held Tuesday in U.S. District Court in Knoxville.



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If government prosecutors opt to move forward, Theodore said they would seek additional charges before a federal grand jury. If a true bill were returned, he said the resulting indictment would supersede the previous three-count indictment against the protesters — Sister Megan Rice, 82; Michael Walli, 64; and Greg Boertje-Obed, 57.

Theodore wasn't specific about the potential charges, but they reportedly could include interference with war activities of the U.S. government, which carries a maximum punishment of 30 years in prison, and/or destruction of national security premises, which carries a penalty of up to 20 years.

The protesters already face two felonies — destruction and depredation of government property — as well as a federal misdemeanor charge of trespassing. Those charges collectively carry a maximum sentence of 16 years in prison and up to \$600,000 in fines.

The possibility of additional charges has been a topic of discussion between attorneys representing the protesters and the U.S. Attorney's Office. Asked if the government was using the threat of additional charges to help gain a plea bargain in the case, Theodore said he couldn't talk about plea discussions.

The protesters, who refer to themselves as Transform Now Plowshares, have openly and repeatedly acknowledged that they broke into Y-12 early July 28, crossing a ridge and cutting through four security fences. They ultimately reached the high-security core of the plant, where they spray-painted peace messages on barricades and splashed human blood on Y-12's storage facility for bomb-grade uranium.

Although admitting their actions, Rice, Walli and Boertje-Obed have pleaded not guilty to the government charges. They said they were compelled to take action to expose the evil operations taking place at the Oak Ridge plant and draw attention to the billions of dollars being spent on new weapons-making operations.

They've stated that the only criminal activity taking place the morning of July 28 was Y-12's work on weapons of mass destruction. In a written statement released earlier to the News Sentinel, the protesters vowed they would not agree to plead guilty in this case.

The possibility of additional charges against the Plowshares protesters was apparently at least part of a bench conference between U.S. Magistrate Judge C. Clifford Shirley and attorneys during Tuesday's motions hearing. The discussion was not in open court, but afterwards, Shirley said "if and when" any new charges are filed against the defendants in the case, the defense would have the opportunity to file additional motions.

Tuesday's hearing lasted almost three hours. Shirley heard vigorous arguments from both sides on a variety of motions, including the government's request that the judge restrict evidence on international law, Nuremberg Principles and the use of various "justification" or "necessity" defenses to justify their actions. The defense argued for dismissal of the charges, saying the Y-12 operations are in violation of treaties and international law.

The trial in U.S. District Court is scheduled to begin Feb. 26.

<http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/nov/20/feds-may-pursue-sabotage-charges-against-y-12/>

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Washington Post

FBI: 4 Southern California Men Arrested on Terrorism Charges, Planned to join al-Qaida

By Associated Press

Tuesday, November 20, 2012

LOS ANGELES — Four Southern California men have been charged with plotting to kill Americans and destroy U.S. targets overseas by joining al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan, federal officials said Monday.

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The defendants, including a man who served in the U.S. Air Force, were arrested for plotting to bomb military bases and government facilities, and for planning to engage in “violent jihad,” FBI spokeswoman Laura Eimiller said in a release.

A federal complaint unsealed Monday says 34-year-old Sohiel Omar Kabir of Pomona introduced two of the other men to the radical Islamist doctrine of Anwar al-Awlaki, a deceased al-Qaida leader. Kabir served in the Air Force from 2000 to 2001.

The other two — 23-year-old Ralph Deleon of Ontario and 21-year-old Miguel Alejandro Santana Vidriales of Upland — converted to Islam in 2010 and began engaging with Kabir and others online in discussions about jihad, including posting radical content to Facebook and expressing extremist views in comments.

They later recruited 21-year-old Arifeen David Gojali of Riverside.

Authorities allege that in Skype calls from Afghanistan, Kabir told the trio he would arrange their meetings with terrorists. Kabir added the would-be jihadists could sleep in mosques or the homes of fellow jihadists once they arrived in Afghanistan.

The trio made plans to depart in mid-November to carry out plots in Afghanistan, primarily, and Yemen, after they sold off belongings to scrape together enough cash to buy plane tickets and made passport arrangements.

In one online conversation, Santana told an FBI undercover agent that he wanted to commit jihad and expressed interest in a jihadist training camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

The complaint also alleges the men went to a shooting range several times, including a Sept. 10 trip in which Deleon told a confidential FBI source that he wanted to be on the front lines overseas and use C-4, an explosive, in an attack. Santana agreed.

“I wanna do C-4s if I could put one of these trucks right here with my, with that. Just drive into, like, the baddest military base,” Santana said, according to the complaint.

Santana added he wanted to use a large quantity of the explosive. “If I’m gonna do that, I’m gonna take out a whole base. Might as well make it, like, big, ya know,” he said.

According to the complaint, at the shooting range that day both Santana and Deleon told a confidential FBI source they were excited about the rewards from becoming a shaheed, which is Arabic for martyr.

Ten days later, during another trip to the shooting range to fire assault-style rifles, Santana told the source he had been around gangs and had no problem taking a life.

On Sept. 30, Gojali was recruited to the plot after he was asked if he had it in him to kill in jihad. Gojali answered, “Yeah, of course.”

“I watch videos on the Internet, and I see what they are doing to our brothers and sisters. ... It makes me cry, and it gets like I’m, like, so angered with them,” Gojali said, according to the complaint.

The men wiped their Facebook pages of radical Islamist content and photos of themselves in traditional Muslim attire, and devised a cover story that they were going to Afghanistan to attend Kabir’s wedding.

Federal authorities said the trio and the FBI’s confidential source bought airplane tickets last week for a Sunday flight from Mexico City to Istanbul, with plans to later continue to Kabul.

After Kabir began talking to him about Islam, Santana said he “accepted Islam without knowing anything about it besides it being the truth” and that he believed the religion would help him “fit in and actually be able to fight for something that’s right,” according to the complaint.

If convicted, each defendant faces a maximum of 15 years in federal prison.



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Kabir is being detained in Afghanistan. The other three appeared for a detention hearing Monday in Riverside, and all but Gojali were remanded to federal custody with no bail. His detention hearing was delayed.

After-hours calls left for the men's attorneys were not immediately returned Monday.

A preliminary hearing is slated for Dec. 3, and an arraignment is set for Dec. 5.

Kabir is a naturalized U.S. citizen who was born in Afghanistan. Santana was born in Mexico, while Deleon was born in the Philippines. Both are lawful, permanent U.S. residents. Gojali is a U.S. citizen.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/fbi-4-southern-california-men-arrested-on-terrorism-charges-planned-to-join-al-qaida/2012/11/20/87d2bd08-32d3-11e2-92f0-496af208bf23_story.html

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Al Arabiya – U.A.E.

Al-Qaeda Chiefs Decimated, but U.S. Must Persist in Fight: Panetta

Wednesday, 21 November 2012

By AGENCIES

U.S. forces have decimated al-Qaeda's leadership and made gains against some of its affiliates, but the fight has shifted in new directions that will require persistent U.S. efforts to truly end the threat, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said on Tuesday.

Despite blows dealt to al-Qaeda, including the killing of its leader Osama bin Laden, "this is not a time for retrenchment and isolation. It is a time for renewed engagement and partnership," Panetta said at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a Washington think tank.

Panetta, in a speech to the Center for a New American Security, said military force will never be enough to wipe out the organization's threat.

While the United States had achieved progress against al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Somalia, associated groups had made inroads in Mali and Nigeria and were trying to gain a foothold in Libya, he added.

"We must sustain and in some areas deepen our engagement in the world -- our military, intelligence, diplomatic and development efforts. And over time, we also must address the religious, economic, and cultural differences that create tension and are exploited by extremists," he said.

Threats of massive U.S. government budget cuts, especially to the Pentagon, are major concern, Panetta said.

Yet "if we turn away from these critical regions of the world, we risk undoing the significant gains they have made. That would make us all less safe over the long-term," he warned.

"I frankly worry that our political system will prevent us from making the investments in diplomacy and development that we need to ensure we protect America's interests in these volatile regions of the world."

The campaign against al-Qaeda "will largely take place outside declared combat zones, using a small-footprint approach that includes precision operations, partnered activities with foreign Special Operations Forces, and capacity building so that partner countries can be more effective in combating terrorism on their own," Panetta said.

He said the key to achieving "the end of al-Qaeda" was to finish the job in Afghanistan in a way that ensured the group could never again establish safe havens there.

<http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/11/21/250884.html>

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Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
OPINION/Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) Blog

The Myth of Nuclear Blackmail

November 16, 2012

By Matthew Fargo

A common characteristic prevalent in discussions surrounding the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran includes the notion that Iran, once in possession of only a handful of nuclear weapons, will be able to impose its will upon other neighboring nations and increase its influence through the use of nuclear blackmail and emboldened foreign policies. But do nuclear weapons actually help their possessor secure additional concessions or successfully demand changes in an adversary's behavior?

This coupling of nuclear weapons and coercive threats is distinct from the more widespread belief that nuclear weapons are instruments of deterrence – passively threatening an adversary from engaging in nuclear or large-scale conventional military action – but it is by no means new. In *Arms and Influence*, Thomas Schelling describes an alternative to deterrence – compellence, whereby nations actively threaten others to follow a desired course of action – that suggests that nuclear weapon states can exert additional influence based upon their nuclear arsenals. Despite this long history and renewed concerns of nuclear compellence worldwide, the continuing argument has failed to resolve the fundamental question of whether nuclear blackmail can work.

In his 2002 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush warned that nations seeking weapons of mass destruction could “attempt to blackmail the United States.” This admonition presumes that a nation in possession of nuclear weapons can intimidate its adversaries or will act in ways that non-nuclear nations cannot. It has been argued that even nuclear states that can be contained using traditional deterrence methods will benefit from increased freedom of action that could contravene American interests abroad, however, this concern ought not be conflated with the fear of nuclear blackmail as it would not allow the government of a new nuclear-armed nation to directly apply its arsenal to the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. Critically, studies examining the likelihood of successful crisis bargaining have found that nuclear states are no more likely to enjoy success in forcing behavioral change upon other nations than states that do not possess nuclear weapons.

In addition, there is extensive research analyzing how the behavior of nuclear weapons states in crisis situations compares to the behavior of non-nuclear states. Those studies similarly indicate that suggesting nuclear powers gain a demonstrable advantage in crisis bargaining through the possession of nuclear weapons is fundamentally flawed. Between nuclear powers, disputes involving threats or displays of force breed reciprocal responses rather than acquiescence. Nuclear powers also demonstrate greater caution toward their nuclear rivals, likely as a result of the potential risk of escalation in a nuclear crisis.

Furthermore, empirical evidence demonstrates that the possession of nuclear weapons does not constrain the actions of non-nuclear opponents and even moderates the behavior of its owner. In mixed confrontations – where one party possesses nuclear weapons and the other party does not – non-nuclear powers often become *more* aggressive than their nuclear rivals and are more prone to escalation, possibly because of the low credibility of any nuclear threats. Both the irreversible destruction and the international condemnation that would stem from any use of nuclear weapons may even make the most capricious nuclear weapon states think twice before they consider executing nuclear threats.

Nuclear weapons are similarly impractical means for nations attempting to acquire material resources or territory. As Robert Jervis et al. noted in *Psychology and Deterrence*, the overwhelming destructive power of nuclear weapons hinders their utility in contributing to the realization of any of the typical objectives of warfare, such as conquering disputed territory, enhancing one's ability to project power, or occupying a region rich in natural resources. Moreover, any use of nuclear weapons would risk triggering an enormous international response which could go so far as to unseat the aggressor regime. These tremendous costs severely diminish the credibility of any threat of the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis or other negotiation.

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Aftermath

The discourse on decision-making in nuclear weapon states indicates that methods of coercion other than war become more likely when rival nations possess nuclear weapons. Surprisingly, Iran already exhibits behavior observed in nuclear-armed nations – caution in foreign policy and the use of methods short of war such as proxy warfare and other unscrupulous diplomacy – to increase its influence and limit the potential for conflict escalation. These activities – and the wealth of research on the behavior of other nuclear weapon states, many of whom have been ruled by supposedly irrational autocrats or oligarchs – undercut arguments that Iran would become a more unpredictable or threatening actor if it obtained nuclear weapons.

Even if Iran attempted to coerce its non-nuclear neighbors such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt, any nuclear threats would inherently lack credibility. Any use of a nuclear weapon by Iran would immediately invite reprisal, military or otherwise, from allies of the victim – namely, the United States – and would solidify Iran's estrangement from the international community. Although analysts may argue that Iran seeks nuclear weapons in part to increase its influence in the Middle East, if Iran chose to carry out a nuclear threat it would forfeit the more significant benefit that nuclear weapons are commonly believed to confer – the security of the state and the regime.

While the potential consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran remain hotly debated, it is time to drop the absurd suggestions that the U.S. or any other nation will acquiesce to nuclear coercion.

Matthew Fargo is a research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues. The views expressed above are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Strategic and International Studies or the Project on Nuclear Issues.

<http://csis.org/blog/myth-nuclear-blackmail>

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AOL Defense

OPINION/Strategy & Policy

The Triad Is Not the Trinity: A Response to Gen. Chambers

By Kingston Reif

November 16, 2012

The recent commentary by Maj. Gen. William Chambers touting the war-prevention benefits of nuclear weapons in this publication is unconvincing.

Gen. Chambers, the Air Force's assistant chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration, overstates the peace-promoting virtues of nuclear weapons. In addition, he exaggerates the benefits of the nuclear triad and downplays the significant financial resources that will be required to sustain it.

Gen. Chambers argues that the United States should continue to maintain a triad of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers for the foreseeable future.

In particular, he leaps to the defense of the land-based missiles and the bombers, the two legs of the triad provided by the Air Force which of course is Gen. Chambers' service.

The general opens his essay by marking the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which occurred in October 1962, and is the closest the world has ever come to destroying itself. According to Gen. Chambers, "our nuclear forces played a central role in winning the peace."

This is a bad misreading of history. While President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev exhibited restraint because they feared the consequences of a nuclear war, it was in fact nuclear weapons that made the crisis so perilous. As author Michael Dobbs has written, "As the two superpowers geared up for a nuclear war, the chances of something going terribly wrong increased exponentially."

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Based in part on his understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Gen. Chambers contends that the stability engendered by nuclear weapons has "prevented the deaths of tens of millions of civilians in wars between great powers that did not occur." Yet while it is true that the great powers have avoided major wars and that nuclear weapons may be one of the causes, it is not at all clear that the bomb has been the decisive factor. It is also worth noting that nuclear weapons have not prevented all types of war.

Moreover, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and other brushes with disaster during and since the Cold War, demonstrates that nuclear deterrence is not foolproof. It is susceptible to misperception, miscalculation, technical failure, and/or accident. The threat of nuclear terrorism poses an additional harrowing danger.

Gen. Chambers' case for the triad is equally flawed. He writes that the triad remains vital because "the number of nuclear armed states is increasing" and "complex regional crises" could "approach the nuclear threshold in the near future." However, only North Korea has joined the nuclear club since 1998 and it is believed to possess fewer than 10 nuclear weapons. Gen. Chambers does not explain why the triad is necessary to deter North Korea or prevent a regional conflict between smaller nuclear powers such as India and Pakistan from escalating to the nuclear level.

Gen. Chambers defends the ICBM leg of the triad on the grounds that it ensures "no future enemy would consider nuclear use or coercion." But what of the ability of nuclear warheads on a dyad of submarines and bombers to perform this deterrence function? Gen. Chambers is silent on the matter.

Given the survivability and promptness of the submarine leg and the fact that ICBMs are unlikely to be used in a nuclear conflict with most of the countries we might attack with nuclear weapons (because the missiles would have to fly over Russia to reach their targets), ICBMs are really only useful for fighting a major nuclear war with Russia – a threat which has long since disappeared.

Gen. Chambers claims that the cost to maintain the triad indefinitely is manageable. But our budget pressures are real and likely to get worse, which is why high-level Pentagon officials without a bureaucratic interest in the survival of the triad have been raising questions about its affordability.

As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. James Cartwright put it: "The challenge here is that we have to recapitalize all three legs [of the nuclear triad], and we don't have the money to do it."

Every dollar spent to modernize and replace aging nuclear weapons systems is a dollar that cannot be spent on defense priorities that are far more relevant to the 21st century security environment, such as upgrading conventional air and naval power projection capabilities.

The assumptions that undergird the current U.S. arsenal of approximately 5,000 nuclear warheads were devised for a confrontation with the Soviet Union that no longer exists. As the Obama administration contemplates its second term defense priorities in a time of budget austerity, it should not let outdated Cold War constructs such as the triad stand in the way of reshaping U.S. nuclear policy.

Kingston Reif is director of nuclear non-proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

<http://defense.aol.com/2012/11/16/the-triad-is-not-the-trinity-a-response-to-gen-chambers/?cid=related1>

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Foreign Policy

OPINION/Killer Apps

Dozens of Cyber Vulnerabilities Found at Department of Energy Facilities

By John Reed

Friday, November 16, 2012

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At a time when senior defense officials are sounding the alarms about the potential for a devastating cyber attack against America's critical infrastructure, the U.S. Department of Energy's inspector general (IG) has found dozens of unaddressed cyber vulnerabilities at key DOE facilities, including ones dealing with nuclear programs.

The good news? The overall number of cyber vulnerabilities at DOE has declined from 56 to 38 since 2011 as a result of better IT security practices. The bad: 22 of those 38 vulnerabilities are brand-new while the remaining 16 went unresolved even after the inspector general noted them in 2011, according to a report released this month. This comes as the department has suffered "nearly 3,000 cyber-related incidents" over the last four years, according to the report.

"Our review of the Offices of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Under Secretary for Science and Under Secretary of Energy organizations identified various control weaknesses related to access controls, vulnerability management, system integrity of web applications, planning for continuity of operations and change control management," reads the report.

The report found that actual, real live people (quaint, right?) could access places they weren't supposed to at six DoE facilities due to inadequate standards in physical controls -- e.g., failing to properly to keep track of who is allowed inside certain facilities. It also found networks and computers at some facilities had weak password protection -- something that could make it easier for the wrong people to log onto DoE computers.

Meanwhile, 1,132 desktop computers (out of 1,952 that were inspected, or 58 percent) had unpatched software holes and dozens of servers were in the same shape. At eight locations, the IG found that twenty-nine web applications dealing with financial, human resources, and "general support" were vulnerable to hacking.

The report goes on to knock DOE for failing to implement known fixes and policies designed to enhance cyber security.

"The cyber security control weaknesses we identified were due, in part, to inadequate development and implementation of security control processes," the report says. "In particular, many sites developed policies and procedures that did not always satisfy Federal or Department security requirements."

Even when security policies were officially in place, some sites failed to follow them. This is exactly the type of problem that government officials constantly lament when they say that most cyber vulnerabilities could be addressed if organizations practiced basic IT "hygiene"-- meaning they need to require strong passwords and frequently update software with security patches.

At the end of the day, these vulnerabilities, if left unchecked, leave the department open to "increased risk of compromise and/or loss, modification and non-availability of the Department's systems and the information residing within them."

The department agreed with the IG's findings (though it did quibble with some of the findings regarding security standards and policies, and said some of the vulnerabilities may involve acceptable levels of risk) and is moving to implement its recommendations for fixing the security holes, according to the report.

While the report detailed numerous vulnerabilities, simply patching them may only result in a permanent game of catch up against hackers, said one cyber security expert.

"It reminded me of the results of most vulnerability assessment reports for any decently sized organization," said Richard Bejtlich, chief security officer of cybersecurity firm, Mandiant. "Vulnerabilities of all kinds are found, involving unpatched systems, code waiting to be exploited, and the like. The next report will look the same."

"It would have been much more useful if DoE had brought a third party to each of its sites to determine 'what intruders are actively exploiting those sites right now', then prioritize incident response and countermeasures to frustrate the adversary," he added. "Instead, I expect another round of trying to fix every problem, while intruders watch and evade any security 'improvements' that DOE applies."

At the time of this posting, DOE officials had not responded to requests for comment.



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John Reed reports on the frontiers of cyber war and the latest in military technology for Killer Apps.

http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/16/dozens_of_cyber_vulnerabilities_found_at_department_of_energy_facilities

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Arms Control Wonk
OPINION/Commentary

Deterrence and the Unitary, Rational Actor

By Michael Krepon
November 18, 2012

The theory and practice of deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union were predicated on the unitary, rational-actor model. Life-or-death decisions in deep crises would be made by leaders driven by rational calculations of national interest and executed by coherent chains of command. The unitary, rational-actor model, from which the constructs of escalation control and escalation dominance were built, was perhaps the greatest intellectual conceit of the Cold War.

Rational decision-making requires sufficient, real-time information, awareness of risks, and control over all the pieces on the chessboard. The stolid line-up of leaders atop the Kremlin Wall would act as one, even if they didn't think as one. When core members of the Politburo met, no matter how paranoid, they wouldn't make foolhardy decisions. Nor would the White House and the National Security Council. Both Superpowers would be able to decipher messages and actions rationally *in extremis*, avoiding catastrophic choices.

The 50th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis and the rehashing of its particulars remind us that these assumptions were heroic. They are even more tenuous in South Asia, where the chain of escalation begins with mass-casualty attacks on iconic Indian targets planned by extremist organizations that enjoy safe havens on Pakistan's soil. The number one offender so far has been Lashkar-e-Taiba. Pakistan's military and intelligence services acknowledge continuing linkages to the LeT and other shadowy, mutating organizations, in order to keep tabs on their activities. This makes sense.

Assistance provided to these groups for operations carried out against Indian targets is another matter entirely. Intercepted transcripts of conversations during the 2008 Mumbai attacks clarify direct involvement by ISI operatives. These transcripts may not be acceptable for prosecution in Pakistani courts, but they are more than sufficient in the court of international opinion. Whenever spectacular acts of terrorism have a "made in Pakistan" label, Pakistan loses without India's firing a shot. It doesn't matter whether active-duty or retired ISI operatives are involved. It doesn't matter that determining prior knowledge of the operation up the military chain of command is guesswork. Either way, Pakistan's military and intelligence communities are culpable or incapable of preventing these attacks. Either way, Pakistan loses international standing and its prospects for economic recovery recede.

Pakistan is a non-unitary state. The civil-military divide runs deep. Leadership and the procedures for its safekeeping and transfer are not settled. Governance is poor at multiple levels. Swaths of the country are beyond the writ of the state. Regional and sectarian divisions are worsening. Horrific Muslim-on-Muslim violence is a daily occurrence.

How, under these circumstances, can deterrence stability be strengthened in South Asia? Stimson has just published the first in a series of analytical and prescriptive essays around this topic. The author is George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment. Readers will not be disappointed in George's essay, "The Non-Unitary Model and Deterrence Stability in South Asia," which can be found on Stimson's website. Here's a sampler:

"Within the large frame of deterrence stability, a vital subsidiary concept is that a state cannot be a responsible possessor of nuclear weapons if it does not have sovereign control over organized perpetrators of international violence operating from its territory. The absence of such sovereign control impedes efforts by state authorities to

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ensure national preservation and minimize risks of escalatory conflict that risk annihilation. To put it colloquially, US officials could say to Pakistanis, "We do not challenge your possession of nuclear weapons. Our objective is to promote in any way we can the responsible management of nuclear forces. First and foremost, this means sovereign control over all organizations that can project violence from your territory which is also an obligation under international law. Second, and relatedly, it means you should not tolerate acts that could start wars with other nuclear-armed states, because that would be suicidal and therefore irrational. Given the global implications of nuclear war and the breaking of the nuclear taboo, all states have a shared interest in Pakistan's coherence, sovereignty, and responsible nuclear stewardship."

...The challenge is enormous, obviously, but it is not impossible due to the vital fact that India does not harbor offensive intentions toward Pakistan. India does not covet territory that Pakistan controls. India does not wish for Pakistan to be dismembered. Indian leaders recognize that it is in their country's interest for Pakistan to develop economically, to democratize politically, and to live in peace. India does not want Pakistan's problems to spill over into its territory or restive Muslim populations. The two countries diverge in their visions for an ideal political outcome in Afghanistan, but could settle for an Afghan state that does not allow itself to be a base for hostile actions against Pakistan and India. The fundamental point is that India will not be a military or security threat to Pakistan if Pakistan will cease pursuing offensive strategies (albeit of a low-intensity nature) against it.

Michael Krepon is Co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and the author or editor of thirteen books and over 350 articles. Prior to co-founding the Stimson Center, Krepon worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, and in the US House of Representatives.

<http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3607/deterrence-and-the-unitary-rational-actor>

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AOL Defense

OPINION/Strategy & Policy Blog

Iran Wobbles between Talks and Bombs

By Michael Adler

November 19, 2012

WASHINGTON: Iran is at an crucial point in its nuclear negotiations with the world's major nuclear powers.

What it does on the diplomatic front and what it does with its disputed nuclear program are vacillating between the hardline and the conciliatory. This comes as the United States looks post-election for a fresh start in talks with Iran on its alleged pursuit of the bomb.

On the technical front, Iran could go in one of two directions. It could stand pat with the capabilities it has built or it could increase enrichment, the process that can create fuel with which to make nuclear bombs. At the same time Iran is at a crucial point in diplomacy, as moves towards talks resume now that the US presidential election is over. With the American elections over, Iran no longer has a reason to put off negotiations. So there is hope that there is a new window for diplomacy.

Iran has completed installing a full complement of centrifuges, almost 2,800, at the nearly impregnable underground site of Fordow, the UN nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, reported last week. This leaves Iran able to radically increase the medium-grade uranium it is producing there, an enrichment level a step closer to weapon-level. It would need about 230 kilograms of uranium to refine as fuel for an atomic bomb. Israel has said it is reassured that Iran was turning this 20-percent enriched uranium into fuel for a research reactor, thus keeping its stockpile from building too quickly. That would not be the case if Iran ramped up production, as it could now do. Uranium is enriched for normal reactor fuel (up to 5 percent), for research reactor fuel (at Fordow up to 20 percent) and also for weapons (over 90 percent).

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The progress at Fordow, putting in the last 644 centrifuges for a full complement of 2,784 centrifuges, is thus a key development. Fordow is built under a mountain and its entrances and air vents are all carefully built for protection against attack. Israel saw Iran moving towards a "zone of immunity" because of the work at Fordow. But the zone of immunity, like so many other red lines, has faded as a tripwire for military action with the United States convincing Israel to follow it in a drive for diplomacy for now.

But this pause has allowed Iran again able to manage, despite the diplomatic and sanctions offensive against it, to create facts on the ground that will make reining in its nuclear work all the more difficult. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report also said that Iran continues to stonewall on answering questions about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear work. It continues to refuse access to one key site, Parchin, where Iran may have carried out explosives tests. Satellite imagery shows that Iran is cleaning up this site, said the IAEA, so that "when the Agency gains access to the location, its ability to conduct effective verification will have been seriously undermined."

However, the IAEA reported that Iran has not increased the enrichment it is doing in Fordow. The same number of centrifuges, only 696 out of the 2,784, are enriching as were at the time of the previous report, last August. The other centrifuges are either spinning empty or sitting idle. Iran has not told the IAEA what it plans to do with them. The report thus presents an added element of uncertainty in Iran's confrontation with the international community. Iran is clearly adding to its nuclear capabilities but is also holding new capability in reserve rather than moving closer to the ability to make a weapon.

This is why last week's IAEA report is more interesting for what it does not tell us than what it does. The technical and political timelines seem to be in sync at this point. For instance, what Iran does with the nuclear capacity it has assembled and has not yet used will affect the diplomatic process. This is not to say that Iran is not struggling with technical problems which could affect its progress more than political considerations.

It looks as if Iran is continuing to have trouble getting advanced centrifuges to work on an industrial scale. These machines would significantly increase the speed at which Iran could churn out enriched uranium. None of the advanced centrifuges, the so-called IR-2m and IR-4 machines, are those installed in Fordow. Iran also looks to be having problems at Bushehr, its only operating nuclear power plant. The 1,000 megawatt reactor was built by the Russians and was plugged into the national electricity grid in September 2011. It was to be handed over to Iran next year for normal power generation use and has been running at 75 percent of nominal power. But there has been a problem with fuel assemblies, which had to be transferred from the reactor core to a spent fuel pond, the IAEA reported. This meant that the plant was shut down, something one diplomat described as "certainly not foreseen, that's for sure."

In such a confusing situation, all manner of speculation can have value. The Federation of American Scientists last week released a report on "the potential effects on the global economy of U.S. actions against Iran." It posited six scenarios, including increasing sanctions against Iran, isolating Iran by imposing a Persian Gulf blockade, carrying out surgical military strikes against Iran, waging a comprehensive bombing campaign, mounting a full-scale invasion and finally the option of de-escalation of the conflict with the United States "willing to make concessions." The cost estimate for these different outcomes ranged from costs of 1.7 trillion dollars to the world economy from an invasion to a benefit windfall of 60 billion dollars from de-escalation. As to the value of such estimates: who knows? The variables and the scenarios that will actually unfold are unknown at this point and almost certain to be otherwise than today's predictions.

The main conclusion to be drawn from reports such as that by FAS is that the future in this crisis may turn out to be impossible to predict.

<http://defense.aol.com/2012/11/19/iran-wobbles-between-talks-and-bombs/>

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Investor's Business Daily (IBD) – U.S.
OPINION/IBD Editorial



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Nuclear Iran Means Mideast Atomic Arms Race

November 19, 2012

Arms Race: President Obama went to Cairo "to seek a new beginning between the U.S. and Muslims." But if you think the "Arab Spring" is change, just wait until Iran gets nukes.

Dennis Ross, a senior diplomat in the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations, confirmed in May that Saudi Arabian King Abdullah warned the U.S. in 2009 regarding Iran, "If they get nuclear weapons, we will get nuclear weapons."

A senior Saudi Arabian source earlier this year told the Times of London that the kingdom has no atomic ambitions, but "the dynamics will change immediately if the Iranians develop their own nuclear capability."

"It would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the kingdom," he said.

Iran is Shiite and Saudi is Sunni, and there are strong suspicions the Saudis have a secret pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan to buy nuclear weapons "the next day" after an Iranian nuclear bomb test.

In January, former Saudi envoy to the U.S. Prince Turki al-Faisal said that without a WMD-free zone in the Mideast there will "inevitably" be a nuclear arms race that could involve Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Egypt.

Israel destroyed Saddam Hussein's Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, and a Syrian reactor in 2007, and al-Faisal pointed out that Egypt "had a very vibrant nuclear energy program from the 1960s."

While president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak spent an estimated \$160 million on nuclear power consultants with an eye toward building as many as 10 plants. Under Mubarak's Islamist successor Mohamed Morsi, how much will animus toward nuclear-armed Israel spur making use of that already-purchased, high-priced expertise?

Last summer, Morsi was in China "on the way" to the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran and told Egyptian expatriates living there that Egypt was considering reviving its nuclear program. Israel's Hayom newspaper in August noted that Mansour Haqiqatpour, a member of the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said Iran and Egypt might conduct "joint activities in the nuclear field."

In this context, Henry Kissinger's warning last Friday that "the likelihood of some nuclear exchange will mount dramatically" if a nuclear Iran does indeed spark a Mideast atomic arms race doesn't seem far-fetched.

The former secretary of state warned that the bilateral stability of the Cold War would not apply, and that "countries within the reach of Iran's military but lacking a nuclear option would be driven to reorient their political alignment toward Tehran," while "reformist tendencies in the Arab Spring — already under severe pressure — would be submerged by this process."

The Mideast is definitely experiencing a "New Beginning." Just not the peaceful one President Obama naively promised.

<http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/111912-634042-obamas-mideast-nuclear-new-beginning.htm>

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Foreign Policy

OPINION/National Security

Rockets' Red Glare

No, Iron Dome does not prove that "Star Wars" was right.

BY YOUSAF BUTT

November 19, 2012

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United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education / Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL
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Israel's "Iron Dome" missile defense has been spectacularly successful at intercepting short-range Hamas rockets: officials relate that roughly 80-90 percent of attempted intercepts have succeeded. However, it is important not to learn the wrong lesson from this. Some have gone so far as to claim that Iron Dome's success finally vindicates Reagan's dream of a missile defense "shield" against nuclear-tipped ICBMs. That this small battlefield system has been so successful against the relatively slow-moving short-range rockets doesn't mean that larger and much more expensive missile defense systems, such as the planned NATO system, will work against longer-range strategic missiles that move ten times as fast.

Besides the speed of the quarry, there are two important distinctions between the systems: where the intercepts take place (in the atmosphere for Iron Dome vs. in space for the NATO system), and the nature of threat (conventional battlefield weapons vs. nuclear-tipped deterrent arms).

According to the current NATO missile-defense plan, the United States, working with European allies, would ramp up the deployment of a mix of increasingly sophisticated sea- and land-based missile interceptors around Europe in an attempt to guard against any possible future Iranian nuclear missiles. While this certainly sounds good, the problem is that an enemy intent on delivering a nuclear payload could easily defeat the NATO system by using decoy warheads, thereby swamping the defense's radars and other sensors with fake signals.

In contrast to the short-range Hamas rockets, which fly through the atmosphere during their whole trajectory, the longer-range ballistic missiles -- which the NATO missile defense system is designed to counter -- spend most of their flight in space. For decades it has been known that trying to intercept a warhead in space is exceedingly difficult because the adversary can use simple, lightweight countermeasures to fool the defensive system.

For instance, cheap inflatable balloon decoys -- similar to the shiny ones at children's birthday parties -- can be released together with the warhead when the missile burns out. Because the NATO missile-defense interceptors try to strike the warhead in the vacuum of space, these balloons and the warhead travel together, making it impossible to distinguish the decoys from the real thing. If many such lightweight balloons were released near the warhead, the defense would quickly be overwhelmed with fake targets.

In fact, the CIA's own top specialist in strategic nuclear programs testified in 2000 that "[m]any countries, such as North Korea [and] Iran ... probably would rely initially on readily available technology ... to develop penetration aids and countermeasures. These countries could develop countermeasures based on these technologies by the time they flight test their missiles."

Unfortunately, warnings of such fatal weaknesses were not heeded in designing the NATO missile defense system. Now, two government-sponsored scientific studies have shown that the missile defense system being planned to protect the United States and Europe is fundamentally flawed and will not work under combat conditions. As Philip Coyle, who was associate director for national security and international affairs in the Obama administration's Office of Science and Technology Policy, recently put it, the program is "chasing scientific dead ends, unworkable concepts and a flawed overall architecture."

The Pentagon's own Defense Science Board report on NATO missile defense says that "the importance of achieving reliable . . . discrimination [between the warhead and decoys] cannot be overemphasized." It underlined that missile defense is "predicated on the ability to discriminate" real warheads from other targets, "such as rocket bodies, miscellaneous hardware, and intentional countermeasures." And if "the defense should find itself in a situation where it is shooting at missile junk or decoys, the impact on the regional interceptor inventory would be dramatic and devastating!" In short, the interceptor inventory would be exhausted in chasing decoy warheads, rendering the system useless.

Both because they are about ten times slower than long-range missiles and because they fly through the atmosphere, the Hamas rockets are much easier to intercept. Any decoys would quickly slow down in the atmosphere and be rendered ineffective and so none are used. So extrapolating the success of Iron Dome to the NATO system is technically unwarranted -- they are entirely different beasts.



Another big difference between Iron Dome and the NATO missile defense system is the nature of the threat. Iron Dome guards against small battlefield rockets that are actually used, whereas the NATO missile defense system is designed to counter nuclear-tipped missiles that are useful for their deterrent value and that have never actually been used since they were invented. Such missiles are intended to protect one's own nation and influence adversaries' strategic calculations; they are not fired off in everyday battles.

So an 80 percent-effective tactical missile defense system against conventional battlefield rockets -- such as Iron Dome -- makes a lot of sense. If 10 conventional rockets are headed your way, stopping eight is undeniably a good thing. The possibility of stopping eight of 10 nuclear warheads, however, is less decisive in altering strategic calculations since even one nuclear explosion will inflict unacceptable devastation. Just one nuclear-tipped missile penetrating your missile shield is about the equivalent of a million conventional missiles making it through. An imperfect -- or, as is the case in the NATO incarnation, a deeply flawed -- missile defense system doesn't alter the deterrent calculus between states. At least, it shouldn't.

So even after NATO has set up and activated a strategic missile-defense system, it still will not have neutralized the perceived threat from Iran -- if and when Tehran obtains nuclear weapons -- or North Korea. Not only that, but Washington's strategic calculations toward our adversaries will remain unaffected: The United States will still need to be just as worried about Iran's missiles, since the destruction of even one NATO city or region is simply too high a cost to bear. For that security calculus to change, national missile defense would need to intercept 100 percent of incoming nuclear warheads. This is an unattainable goal for any piece of machinery, and especially for the system being fielded, given the government's own damning scientific assessments.

As Pavel Podvig succinctly put it, "it would take only a small probability of success to make such a [nuclear] threat credible while missile defense would need to offer absolute certainty of protection to truly be effective." Even the largely successful Iron Dome system, while providing a worthy cover has not provided normalcy for Israeli citizens: the terror is still there.

A defense against deterrent nuclear-tipped missiles could also backfire by causing our adversaries to pre-emptively increase the number of missiles in their stockpile. So while the NATO system creates incentives for NATO adversaries and competitors, including Russia and China, to increase their nuclear stockpiles, it offers no credible combat capability to protect the United States or its allies from this -- increased -- weaponry.

And if policy makers mistakenly believe that the strategic missile defense system can protect them from nuclear attack, they may stake out riskier policies than they otherwise would. In fact, it is possible that the protection afforded by Iron Dome may have played a role in encouraging Israel to escalate the recent conflict, secure in the system's effectiveness. A similar escalation, but with a dysfunctional missile defense system, may lead to a much more dire nuclear miscalculation.

But what if a system could be invented that *did* offer a high degree of protection from long-range nuclear missiles? Unfortunately, such a system would only encourage a change in the *delivery method* of the nuclear weapons used by our adversaries. It would not devalue the nuclear weapons themselves.

A "functional" missile defense to counter North Korea's ICBMs, for example, could encourage Pyongyang to develop a ship-borne nuclear device instead. Since such a weapon is more difficult to detect and attribute to a given country, our adversaries may be less inhibited in using it as compared to an easily detected ICBM, which has a clear point of origin. (U.S. satellites continually monitor the globe for missile launches.) So if a missile defense encouraged our adversaries to exchange even a single ICBM for a ship-borne one, our security would actually decrease. Of course, an adversary might develop these alternate delivery methods in any case, but creating incentives for them to do so is not in our interest.

In short, if our adversaries obtain nuclear weapons, we should actually hope that they are mounted on missiles, because missiles are attributable -- we can pinpoint their launch sites -- and thus our enemies are deterred from using



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them. The real danger of a strategic missile defense that works is that it may work to discourage the missiles --without discouraging the nuclear weapons themselves.

The real lesson in all this is that we should work hard to stop the spread of nuclear weapons -- once our adversary has them, we will be deterred no matter what kinds of defenses we think we have. But to stop the spread of nuclear weapons we need the assistance of major players like Russia and China. Ironically, the infatuation with the NATO missile defense ensures that we don't get that cooperation because those nations *may fear* that the system alters the strategic balance with the United States. Indeed, the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission has pointed out that "China may already be increasing the size of its ICBM force in response to its assessment of the U.S. missile defense program."

Although Iron Dome has been remarkably successful in intercepting slow-moving battlefield rockets in the atmosphere, one ought not jump to conclusions about what this means about attempting to defend against high-speed nuclear missiles in space -- or even its desirability.

Yousaf Butt, a nuclear physicist, is professor and scientist-in-residence at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. The views expressed are his own.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/19/rockets_red_glare?page=full

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OPINION/Insight & Opinion

Putting Asia on Alert as Bioterrorism Risk Grows

Jaime Yassif says better management of research is crucial given the potential for biological attack

Tuesday, 20 November, 2012

By Jaime Yassif

A global infectious disease outbreak involving a lethal pathogen - whether spread through a deliberate attack or originating from natural sources - could claim millions of lives and cause severe economic damage. It is essential not only to mitigate the consequences of a pandemic, but also - with respect to deliberate biological attacks - to minimise the likelihood that it will happen.

An important yet underdeveloped tool for protecting against biological attacks is effective governance of life sciences research. Biotechnology can yield tremendous benefits - including improvements to public health and new sources of energy - but there is also the risk that it will be exploited to develop weapons that target human health. Improved governance can help manage this risk.

A new approach to life sciences governance is needed worldwide, and this issue has particular significance for Asia. The biotech industry, regarded as an engine for growth and job production, has been expanding rapidly in Asia. China, for one, is investing heavily in its domestic biotech industry. Biotechnology in Malaysia reportedly constitutes 2.5 per cent of national economic output, and Indonesia has set its sights on developing robust domestic research and development capabilities in the industry.

In view of this rapid growth, policy and regulatory frameworks to manage the associated risks have to play catch up.

Managing the risks presents several challenges. Firstly, dual-use biotech tools, materials and knowledge are widely distributed, and research takes place at thousands of facilities worldwide. This increases ease of access and hence risk of exploitation by those with malevolent intent.

Secondly, technical barriers are considerably lower for producing an effective biological weapon than for making nuclear weapons, and are well within reach of non-state actors.

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Finally, a major concern has been the feasibility of producing a lethal virus from scratch. This capability is presently limited to trained scientists at well-funded research centres, but as technology develops it may become more widely accessible - making it easier to obtain deadly viruses.

More effective management of biosecurity challenges means establishing a culture of responsibility among researchers, developing self-governance practices in the industry, and strengthening institutions to support these efforts.

Many of the tools for life science governance have yet to be developed. This is fertile ground for co-operation across the Pacific.

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<http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1086177/putting-asia-alert-bioterrorism-risk-grows>

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Wall Street Journal
OPINION/Editorial
November 20, 2012

Israel's Iron Dome

A breakout performance for missile defense.

Page – A14

However Israel's latest war with Hamas ends, the Gaza conflict will long be remembered for images of a military feat in the skies above Israel. Israeli interceptors have eviscerated the Iranian-supplied Hamas missiles heading for population centers. Chalk up an important strategic and technological win for missile defense.

The Jewish state's Iron Dome system was conceived after the 2006 war with Lebanon, when nearly 4,000 Hezbollah missiles killed 44 civilians in northern Israel; it was deployed only last year. Missile defenses have had vocal doubters since Ronald Reagan championed them in the 1980s, and Israeli critics focused on the price—around \$50,000 for each Tamir interceptor—and supposedly dubious reliability. The last week ends that debate.

Iron Dome is designed to protect crowded civilian areas from short-range missiles. A radar attached to each battery determines whether an incoming volley threatens a population center to ensure that interceptors aren't wasted on unthreatening missiles.

Israel's system is modest, with five batteries deployed so far. Yet in only six years they've managed to make Tel Aviv and other cities nearly impregnable to missile attacks. The hit rate approaches 90%. About a thousand missiles have come from Gaza so far, and according to an official cited by Time magazine, 300 or so were deemed worth intercepting.

The engineering achievement has saved countless lives, but the strategic benefits are also significant. By limiting civilian casualties, missile defenses provide more options and more time for military and political leaders to decide how to respond. If missiles were landing willy-nilly in Israeli cities, the pressure would be great either for a ground incursion into Gaza, or a possibly humiliating accommodation with Hamas. Much as the late strategist Albert Wohlstetter predicted, defenses can deter aggressors and offer the chance to make war less destructive.

There's a lesson here as well for the U.S. In an overlooked study in September, the National Research Council pointed out shortcomings in current American missile-defense strategy, saying the U.S. needs to do more to protect the homeland against long-range attacks from Iran, North Korea and other countries. The report specifically recommended an additional defense site on the U.S. East Coast to augment interceptors in California and Alaska.

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Three years ago, the Obama Administration pulled the plug on a site in Poland and the Czech Republic, bending to Russian pressure. In its place, the White House decided to protect Europe from a short- and medium-range Iranian missile with Aegis interceptors initially based at sea and later on land.

The revised plan's last, fourth stage would eventually address the long-range threat by putting interceptors in Central Europe. But that's the issue that President Obama famously promised Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev that he'd have "more flexibility" on in a second term. Missile defense could also suffer from budget cuts.

With missiles proliferating and the world unprepared to stop Iran's nuclear program, missile defenses are becoming more urgent than ever for the U.S. The Israelis are showing the importance of being protected in an era of rogue missiles.

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324307204578129261984054132.html>

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