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Articles & Other Documents:

Featured Article: [Navy Fears Pentagon Neglects New Missile Sub; SSBN\(X\) Must Survive Almost 80 Years](#)

1. [Iran Ready to Discuss 20-Percent Enrichment if Fuel Guaranteed: Official](#)
2. [Iran Won't Give In At Nuclear Talks: Supreme Leader](#)
3. [Iran Further Expanding Enrichment Capacity: Diplomats](#)
4. [South Korean Official Warns of 'Existential Threat' From North](#)
5. [PACOM: S. Korea's Improved Missiles to Boost 'Defensive Capability' Against N. Korea](#)
6. [Chinese A-Bomb Test Base Open to Tourists](#)
7. [In Sept. Meeting, N. Korea Passes Ball to U.S.: Report](#)
8. [India Plans to Impart Power Punch to Jaguar Fighters](#)
9. [Pakistan Calls for Addressing Security Concerns of UN Members](#)
10. [Pakistan's Missile Capability](#)
11. [Russia to Protect South Borders With S-400 Air Defense Systems](#)
12. [Russia Tests Short-Range Interceptor Missile](#)
13. [Putin Signs 'DARPA' Future Research Fund Bill](#)
14. [Moscow Sees Western Missile Shield Threat to Russia's Security](#)
15. [Russia Launches Topol Ballistic Missile from Northern Launching Pad](#)
16. [£25Bn to Remove Trident from Scotland](#)
17. [Navy Fears Pentagon Neglects New Missile Sub; SSBN\(X\) Must Survive Almost 80 Years](#)
18. [Nuclear Trafficking Getting More Professional: IAEA Chief](#)
19. [Day After Libya Attack, CIA Found Militant Links](#)
20. [Iran May Hit U.S. with First Cyberattack](#)
21. [Without U.S. Aid, Will Russia Keep Scrapping its Nuclear Arsenal?](#)
22. [A Terrifying Threat Obama and Romney Aren't Talking About](#)
23. [Cuban Missile Crisis 50 Years on: Nuclear Deterrence Is Still Playing a Major Role in the World](#)
24. [Nuclear Stewardship Requires a Special Trust](#)
25. [SLCM Data Exchanges Revisited](#)
26. [Liam Fox: There Is a Price to Pay for National Security](#)
27. [Nuclear Weapons and Rationality](#)
28. [Putin's Pride Has No Price Tag](#)
29. [Mr. Putin's Gift to Terrorists](#)
30. [Banning Nuclear-Armed ABMs](#)
31. [A Nuclear Research Facility](#)
32. [Arms Control Should Be High on President's Agenda](#)

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Issue No.1029, 19 October 2012

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Press TV – Iran

Iran Ready to Discuss 20-Percent Enrichment if Fuel Guaranteed: Official

Saturday, October 13, 2012

Iran's Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast has expressed the country's readiness to show flexibility in order to allay international concerns over its nuclear energy program.

"If a guarantee is provided to supply the 20-percent [enriched uranium] fuel for Tehran Research Reactor, our officials are ready to enter talks about the 20-percent enrichment [of uranium]," Mehmanparast said at the 10th Eurasian Media Forum (EAMF) in the Kazakh capital of Astana on Friday.

However, he said, this does not mean that Iran does not have the right to enrich uranium to the level of 20 percent.

"All countries have this right."

Iran is ready to show flexibility to remove concerns within a legal framework but such measures should be reciprocal, the Iranian spokesperson pointed out, adding that the other side should also make moves to completely recognize Iran's nuclear and enrichment rights for peaceful purposes.

He noted that in the previous talks with the six major world powers of the P5+1, Iran expressed readiness to remove concerns in a step-by-step and mutually agreed framework.

Mehmanparast once again reaffirmed the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear energy program based on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), saying the Islamic Republic is a signatory to the treaty and opposes the production of nuclear weapons.

Iran decided to enrich uranium to the 20-percent level to provide fuel for Tehran Research Reactor, which produces medical isotopes for cancer patients, after potential suppliers failed to provide the Islamic Republic with the required uranium.

On September 17, Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Fereydoun Abbasi said that Iran has no intention of enriching uranium above the 20-percent level.

Abbasi added that Iran started producing 20 percent enriched uranium when it could not obtain fuel for Tehran Research Reactor from the international market due to the sanctions imposed against the country.

<http://presstv.com/detail/2012/10/13/266398/iran-ready-to-allay-concerns-on-nissue/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

France 24.com - France

Iran Won't Give In At Nuclear Talks: Supreme Leader

October 16, 2012

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

AFP - Iran will not give in to "bullying" at the negotiating table with world powers over its disputed nuclear programme despite new economic sanctions, its supreme leader said on Tuesday.

The West "keeps saying pressure against Iran is aimed at forcing the Islamic republic to return to the negotiating table" about the nuclear programme, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in remarks carried on state television.

"But when did we leave the table that now we need to return?" he asked during his visit to the northeastern province of North Khorasan.

"Their real objective is (forcing) the Iranian nation to surrender to their bullying at the negotiating table... (but) you are too weak to bring Iran to its knees," said Khamenei.



His remarks came a day after the European Union toughened sanctions against Tehran, targeting its dealings with Iran's banks, shipping and gas imports and banning trade in metals.

Without directly mentioning the sanctions, Khamenei accused the European leaders of seeking to bully Iran.

"European officials are still stuck in the bullying mindset of the colonial 19th century, but they will face many problems in the face of the resistance of the Iranian nation and officials," he said.

The measures announced on Monday add to a series of sanctions from Europe, the United States and the UN Security Council designed to pressure Iran to curb its nuclear programme.

Khamenei has termed the Western sanctions as "barbaric" and said they amount to "a war against a nation." But he has said Iran can overcome problems caused by the sanctions.

The West is involved in talks with Tehran on the nuclear impasse, but those negotiations have stalled for years.

Efforts to restart them this year failed, despite three rounds of face-to-face talks between representatives of Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council, plus Germany.

Western powers suspect Iran is using to the programme to develop atomic weapons capability. Iran denies that and says its nuclear activities are purely peaceful.

<http://www.france24.com/en/20121016-iran-wont-give-nuclear-talks-supreme-leader>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Al Arabiya – U.A.E.

Iran Further Expanding Enrichment Capacity: Diplomats

Thursday, 18 October 2012

By Fredrik Dahl, Reuters

VIENNA: Iran is believed to be further increasing its uranium enrichment capacity at its Fordow plant buried deep underground, Western diplomats say, in another sign of Tehran defying international demands to curb its disputed nuclear program.

But they said the Islamic Republic did not yet appear to have started up the newly-installed centrifuges to boost production of material which Iran says is for reactor fuel but which can also have military uses if processed more.

"Iran continues to build up enrichment capacity," one Western official said.

A diplomat accredited to the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said: "We think that they have continued installing centrifuges at Fordow. We think that their pace has continued the same as it was, which was pretty rapid."

If confirmed in the next IAEA report on Iran's atomic activities, expected in mid-November, it would suggest Iran is steadily moving towards completing installment of centrifuges at the Fordow subterranean centrifuge site.

The work may be "near complete," the Vienna-based diplomat said, in remarks echoed by another envoy.

There was no immediate comment from Iran or the IAEA, the U.N. nuclear agency based in the Austrian capital.

Fordow - which Tehran only disclosed the existence of in 2009 after learning that Western spy services had detected it - is of particular concern for the United States and its allies as Iran uses it for its higher-grade enrichment.

Iran says it needs uranium refined to a fissile concentration of 20 percent, compared with the level of up to 5 percent it produces at its main enrichment facility at Natanz, to make fuel for a medical research reactor in Tehran.



Stalled diplomacy

But it also takes Iran a significant technical step closer to the 90 percent concentration needed for bombs, explaining the West's growing concern about the Islamic state's stockpile of the material.

A U.S.-based think-tank, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), this month said Iran would currently need at least two to four months to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear bomb, and additional time to make the device itself.

Last week, Iranian officials said Tehran would negotiate on halting higher-grade enrichment if given fuel for the research reactor, in a possible attempt to show flexibility in stalled nuclear talks with world powers.

The IAEA said in its last report on Iran in late August that the country had doubled the number of centrifuges to 2,140 at Fordow since the previous report in May. More than 600 remained to be installed, the report showed.

Since then, diplomats said they thought Iran had put in place more centrifuges at the site near the holy Shiite Muslim city of Qom, about 130 km (80 miles) from Tehran and located deep under soil and rock for protection against any attack.

"They continue sort of unabated," one envoy said.

But they said Iran was still operating the same number of machines as it has been since early this year, nearly 700 centrifuges.

It was not clear when the new equipment would be launched or whether Iran was holding back for technical or political reasons. It is also not known whether the centrifuges which are not yet operating will be used for 5 or 20 percent enrichment, or both, the diplomats say.

Any move by Iran to increase the number of working centrifuges - and the production rate - would be swiftly condemned by its foes in the West and Israel and may further complicate diplomacy aimed at resolving the dispute.

Iran says its nuclear program is a peaceful project to generate electricity but its refusal to limit the work and lack of transparency with U.N. inspectors have been met with increasingly tough Western sanctions targeting its oil exports.

European Union governments imposed sanctions on Tuesday against major Iranian state companies in the oil and gas industry, and strengthened restrictions on the central bank, cranking up financial pressure on Tehran.

<http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/10/18/244414.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times
October 12, 2012

South Korean Official Warns of 'Existential Threat' From North

By CHOE SANG-HUN

SEOUL, South Korea — A senior South Korean policy maker on North Korea said on Friday that it must be assumed that the North has the capacity to mount a nuclear device on a ballistic missile, adding that such a capability would pose "an existential threat" to South Korea.

The official, who spoke to a group of journalists on condition of anonymity, stressed that reliable information about the North's capabilities is scarce, and he cautioned that he was not confirming that the North had built an operational nuclear weapon. But his comment, which was one of the most explicitly worded assessments of the North's nuclear and missile capabilities by a senior official, reflected growing concern in the South Korean government that the North may have more advanced technology than previously believed.



“We must assume that North Korea has already reached the stage” of “being able to mount a nuclear device on its ballistic missiles,” the official said. “If not, they are getting closer to that level.”

The official made the comment while explaining why South Korea and the United States had recently reached a deal under which South Korea will be allowed to nearly triple the range of its ballistic missiles, giving it the ability to strike all known North Korean missile sites. He said the South now had “less margin of error, because North Korean ballistic missiles tipped with a nuclear explosive would be an existential threat to us.”

The missile agreement with the United States was announced Sunday. On Tuesday, the North claimed to have missiles that can reach the American mainland, and on Wednesday it said it felt freer to conduct long-range missile tests in light of the American-South Korean missile accord.

The South Korean official said he could not verify the North’s recent claims, stressing the paucity of reliable information. “There is no such thing as a North Korea expert,” he said. “No one has enough information about North Korea.” But he said there was no doubt that the North was determined to develop the means to deliver a nuclear warhead.

Since 1998, North Korea has launched several long-range rockets, which Washington and allies have considered a cover for testing long-range missile technology. They all exploded in midair or failed in their stated purpose of putting satellites into orbit, casting doubt on the North’s ability to deliver a payload on an intercontinental ballistic missile.

In a paper published by the RAND Corporation earlier this month, an analyst, Markus Schiller, said that there were strong indications that North Korea’s missiles served largely as “a bluff” to “create the impression of a serious missile threat and thereby gain strategic leverage, fortify the North Korean regime’s domestic power, and deter other countries.”

“It cannot be ruled out that North Korea has nuclear warhead designs for its missiles, but without actual testing, the reliability of these warheads has to be assumed to be low,” he wrote. “It seems likely that the North Korean missile threat is limited to the range of its Nodong missile,” roughly 1,000 kilometers. “Missiles beyond this range seem not to be operationally deployed or sufficiently reliable.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/world/asia/south-korean-official-warns-of-existential-threat-from-north.html?_r=0

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Yonhap News Agency – South Korea
October 15, 2012

PACOM: S. Korea's Improved Missiles to Boost 'Defensive Capability' Against N. Korea

By Lee Chi-dong

WASHINGTON, Oct. 14 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) said Sunday that South Korea's improved missile range will bolster its "defensive capability" to counter North Korea's ballistic missile threat.

It emphasized the communist nation poses the most urgent threat to its area of jurisdiction -- the Pacific Ocean.

"This improved range distance will provide a defensive capability that will allow the ROK and allies to defend against the DPRK ballistic missile threat," the Hawaii-based command said in response to an inquiry by Yonhap News Agency. The DPRK stands for North Korea's formal name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

After years of negotiations, the U.S. recently agreed to allow South Korea to develop ballistic missiles with a range of up to 800 kilometers (500 miles), nearly triple the previous range of 300km.



Seoul has been subject to such a bilateral missile guideline for decades in exchange for access to Washington's missile technology.

The PACOM commands more than 300,000 military personnel from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, and its role has become more vital in the U.S. defense strategy, which is rebalancing toward Asia.

It vowed to maintain the "same level of commitment" in Northeast Asia as the U.S. regards North Korea's denuclearization, provocations and proliferation to be the "most urgent threat in the region."

PACOM expressed confidence that South Korea and the U.S. will keep their joint defense posture intact even after the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) in 2015.

The Combined Forces Command, which has served as a control tower of the allies' military partnerships, will be dismantled when Seoul regains OPCON for its troops from Washington to Seoul.

"ROK (South Korean) forces are a capable fighting force," PACOM said. "The resilience of our alliance has been publicly reaffirmed."

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2012/10/15/4/0401000000AEN20121015000800315F.HTML>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

China Daily – China

Chinese A-Bomb Test Base Open to Tourists

October 16, 2012

(Xinhua)

URUMQI - China is giving the public access to a deserted nuclear experiment site where scientists worked day and night more than half a century ago to develop the country's first atomic bomb.

About 6 million yuan (\$944,882) will be invested to turn the Malan Base in the remote Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region into a "red tourism" site, a local official said on Monday.

The project is being undertaken by the local government and Beijing-based Tsinghua University. Labs and dormitories used by the nuclear scientists, as well as a 300-meter anti-air strike tunnel, will be preserved, said Arken Haasmoo, an official with Bayinggolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, which has jurisdiction over Malan.

China detonated its first atomic bomb in the desert near Malan on October 16, 1964. The move was hailed as being of great historic significance at a time when the country was faced with a complex international environment.

China has never used an A-bomb in an attack. The government says it has suspended nuclear weapon programs since 1996 and is committed to advancing global nuclear disarmament.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-10/16/content_15819735.htm

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Yonhap News Agency – South Korea

October 17, 2012

In Sept. Meeting, N. Korea Passes Ball to U.S.: Report

By Lee Chi-dong

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16 (Yonhap) -- In a rare meeting in China late last month, North Korea made clear to the United States that it would continue its nuclear programs as long as the U.S. maintains what it termed a hostile policy, a news report said Tuesday.



Clifford Hart, the Obama administration's special envoy to the now-suspended six-party talks, met informally with two senior North Korean officials in Dalian, China, on the sidelines of the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue.

The two-day forum from Sept. 27 drew government officials and academics from the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan, which are the members of the six-party talks on North Korean denuclearization.

Han Song-ryol, North Korea's deputy ambassador to the United Nations, and Choe Son-hui, the deputy director-general of the North American affairs bureau at its foreign ministry, told Hart that Pyongyang "will not continue on its path to denuclearization, as promised in 2005" until Washington averts its policy, according to the Cable, an online news provider specializing in foreign affairs. It cited "two government officials briefed on the meeting."

Under the 2005 deal, produced at the six-way talks, North Korea vowed to abandon all nuclear weapons programs in return for political and economic rewards.

North Korea's threat to break the agreement is not new. But the reported comments by Han and Choe in such an unusual chance for direct talks with the U.S. were a reminder of the wide gulf between the two sides after more than three years of impasse in the denuclearization process.

"No progress was made on toward resuming negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program," the two unidentified U.S. officials were quoted as saying.

The State Department did not respond immediately to Yonhap News Agency's inquiry on the report.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2012/10/17/52/0401000000AEN20121017000400315F.HTML>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Economic Times – India

India Plans to Impart Power Punch to Jaguar Fighters

By Rajat Pandit, Tamil News Network (TNN)

17 October 2012

NEW DELHI: India is finally giving its Jaguar "strike" fighters some much-needed new teeth with advanced missiles, engines and avionics. Apart from having a maritime strike role as well, the Jaguars have long been identified by IAF as the jets capable of delivering nuclear weapons if required.

The IAF on Monday issued a RFP (request for proposal) to M/s Honeywell Aerospace, the US-based manufacturer of aircraft engines and avionics, to "completely re-engine" 125 Jaguars and provide 270 F-125IN turbofan engines.

Concurrently, IAF is all set for the first test-flight of a Jagaur fighter upgraded to "Darin-III" standards by defence PSU Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL), with new-generation avionics including a glass cockpit and autopilot, next month.

Grappling with only 34 fighter squadrons when at least 44 are needed to be "comfortable" against Pakistan and China, IAF has been progressively going in for upgrade of its existing fighters as well as planning new inductions to retain its aerial combat ratio while phasing out the old MiG variants.

IAF already has upgrade projects underway for 51 Mirage-2000s for Rs 17,547 crore and 63 MiG-29s for \$964 million, even as it inducts 272 Sukhoi-30MKIs at a cost upwards of \$12 billion. Then, it plans to induct 126 French Rafale fighters in the almost \$20 billion MMRCA (medium multi-role combat aircraft) project.

For futuristic requirements, IAF is looking at inducting over 200 stealth fifth-generation fighter aircraft from 2022 onwards, after joint development and production with Russia, at an overall cost that will eventually touch \$35 billion.

Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne on Tuesday told top IAF commanders that the force was "going through a very busy and challenging" period. "Our focus now, and at all times, must be on three priority areas - operational capability, operational infrastructure and operational security, especially in view of the new inductions in our inventory."



As for the Jaguar project, the plan is to finish the "design and development" phase with Honeywell on the initial two fighters by 2015-16. The "complete re-engine" phase of the remaining 123 fighters will be completed by 2023-24 by HAL under transfer of technology from the US firm.

IAF had inducted 40 Jaguars from UK from 1979 onwards, which was later followed by indigenous licensed production by HAL. But with progressive upgrades of avionics and weapon systems, the overweight fighters have been suffering from their "under-powered" Adour-811 engines manufactured by Rolls-Royce. Several Jaguar crashes have also occurred due to engine problems.

"There is a serious low thrust engine issue. Earlier, Rolls-Royce was also in the race to supply more powerful engines for the Jaguars but the company withdrew its bid last year. So, IAF got the clearance from the Defence Acquisitions Council to move the project on a single vendor (Honeywell) basis," said a source.

<http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/india-plans-to-impart-power-punch-to-jaguar-fighters/articleshow/16844499.cms>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Nation – Pakistan

Pakistan Calls for Addressing Security Concerns of UN Members

By Special Correspondent

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

UNITED NATIONS: A senior Pakistani diplomat told the UN Monday that a lack of consensus in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on negotiating a treaty to ban the production of fissile material used as fuel for nuclear weapons could not be attributed to the position of one state — Pakistan — as claimed by some western delegates.

"The CD is not a body to negotiate only one item on its agenda: FMCT (Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty)", Pakistani delegate Ambassador Zamir Akram said in a speech to the General Assembly's First Committee, which deals with disarmament and international security matters.

"If there is no consensus on negotiating FMCT, there is also no consensus on negotiating Nuclear Disarmament, Negative Security Assurances or PAROS (prevention of an outer space arms race)," said Ambassador Akram, who is Pakistan's permanent representative to the UN's European offices in Geneva, as he set the record straight.

Over the past few years, Pakistan has been blocking the launching of negotiations on the proposed US-backed treaty in the Geneva-based CD on the ground that it is prejudicial to its national security interests.

The Conference has 65 members. Speaking in the general debate, Ambassador Akram referred to what he called "contrived lament" over the failure of the disarmament machinery, and said in Pakistan's view, the diagnosis was partial and focused almost exclusively on symptoms rather than causes.

Even worse, he noted that the solutions put forward were selective, discriminatory and inconsistent.

For an objective evaluation of the causes underlying the impasse at the Conference on Disarmament, he said it was important to acknowledge the following: the Conference's work was a reflection of prevailing political realities; no treaty could be negotiated in the Conference that was contrary to the security interests of its member states; the lack of progress could not be attributed to the rules of procedure; and the Conference had four core issues on its agenda — nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances or prevention of an outer space arms race.

In this contest, Ambassador Akram called for addressing the security concerns of all members of the Conference. He said the problems in the Conference were not of an organizational nature, but related to the external political environment, and the challenges facing the international disarmament agenda and the machinery were not exclusive to the Conference.

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The United Nations International Drug Control Programme and the First Committee confronted similar difficulties, he said, wondering why the Conference alone was blamed for their inaction.

Referring to the deteriorating global security environment, Ambassador Akram said new weapons systems were being developed and deployed, including anti-ballistic missile systems in several parts of the world, as well as the indiscriminate use of drones.

Other worrying trends included the growing weaponisation of outer space and the hostile use of cyber-technologies.

The production of conventional weapons with destructive capacity equal to nuclear weapons would be dangerously destabilizing and would increase the temptation to respond with use of nuclear weapons.

An agreed approach, he said, must be evolved for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under appropriate international safeguards.

Until nuclear disarmament was achieved, non-nuclear-weapon States should be given assurances that they would not be threatened with nuclear weapons and those assurances should be translated into a legally-binding treaty. An agreement was also needed to address concerns arising from anti-ballistic missile systems, which were inherently destabilizing, the Pakistani delegate said. There was also a need to strengthen the international legal regime in order to prevent the militarization of outer space.

As a pragmatic step towards disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States should halt future production and eliminate all stocks of fissile materials through a fissile material treaty.

The move should be based on the premise of the recognition of the right to equal security for all States, which was a critical prerequisite for progress in areas of arms control and disarmament, Ambassador Akram said.

Measures should also address the motives that drove States to acquire weapons to defend themselves, including perceived threats from superior forces and discrimination in the application of international norms.

Finally, he urged nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate a renewed commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament within a reasonable timeframe, with the eventual objective, the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

<http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/17-Oct-2012/pakistan-calls-for-addressing-security-concerns-of-un-members>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Pakistan Observer – Pakistan

Pakistan's Missile Capability

By Muhammad Daheem

Thursday, October 18, 2012

Pakistan started planning its missile program to equip its forces with short and medium range missiles to enhance its defense capabilities in 1987. It has, now, various types of missiles programs, including ballistic missiles, based on highly accurate technology. It developed its ballistic missile program rapidly to counter the enemy's attack. Anza was developed under the shoulder-fired ground-to-air missile program. Later on, anti-tank Baktarshikan missile programs was introduced in 1987. Pakistan tested its short range surface-to-surface ballistic missile in 1988. The pace of production of short-range missiles is reasonable.

The modest range of Hatf I is 80 kilometers and it can carry a load of 500 kilograms. Efforts continued to improve its performance, resulting in Hatf II with an enhanced range of 250 kilometers and the same payload of 500 kilograms. Both are free flight missiles with inertial guidance systems following a ballistic trajectory. The Hatf II was produced in 1989. Both were possibly designed and developed by the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO). The testing of Hatf III seems to be a major break-through in the development of missiles technology in



Pakistan. It has a range of 600 kilometers with a payload of 500 kilograms and a proper terminal guidance system giving it an accuracy of 0.1 per cent. The main features of Hatf III missile are its two-stage rocket ability for war-head separation, a terminal guidance system and five different types of warheads. The most difficult part of the missile was its guidance system which was developed by Pakistani engineers and scientists. The test firing of Hatf III was necessary to tackle with difficult situation in hard times.

There is a possibility of conventional and nuclear clash between India and Pakistan. Naturally Pakistan needs to develop its missile program to a large-scale industry. India deployed its medium-range ballistic missiles near Pakistan's border in 1997. It was a matter of serious concern for Pakistan. In fact, it was dangerous signal towards Pakistan's safety. Pakistan carried out its medium range surface ballistic missile program in 1998. It is pertinent to mention here that ballistic missile reaches its target faster than other weapons and is difficult to defend against its attack. The missile system plays vital role in the modern defense technology.

Pakistan made a successful test of medium range surface ballistic missile Hatf V named Ghauri in 1998. It can cover a vast area of India excluding southern and eastern regions, along the Bay of Bengal. It can target its prey 1500 kilometers away. It weighs 16 tons and can carry a payload of about 700 kg. Its flight time is 8 minutes. Its terminal guidance system has been developed by skilful, diligent and dedicated Pakistani scientists and engineers working on the research and development of missile technology. It may have its impact on regional circles. It contributes enormously to the military strength of the nation. A potential aggressor would think hundred times before attacking Pakistan. The Ghauri series are liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles while Shaheen series are solid-fuelled ballistic missiles. The missile system plays key role in the modern war games based on scientific strategies. It is now an essential element in the defense planning of a nation. Moreover, it is an effective and reliable deterrent. Pakistan is now in a position to retaliate its enemies with great force. India, in the past, created a dangerous security atmosphere and made violation of Pakistan's air space. Naturally Pakistan got every right to take measures for its security. Shaheen I and Shaheen II, medium range solid-propellant missiles, are the solutions of the enemy's evil designs.

The missile technology is still in the research and development phase in Pakistan. It is key part of the Integrated Missile Research and Development Program. The successful tests of Hatf V and Hatf VI confer on Pakistan a reliable indigenous missile capability. Pakistan tested Hatf VII Babur ground-launched cruise missile in 2005. It has a range of 700 km and can carry a payload of 450 kg. It can carry nuclear warheads and is guided by stealth technology. Pakistan possibly relies mainly on ballistic missiles to overpower India's defense system. Pakistan has developed Inter-continental Ballistic missile too. It is ready for test flight. History tells us that weak nations have no place in the world community in the presence of ruthless imperialistic forces. Pakistan's missile program is an effective and reliable deterrent and provides foundation for lasting peace and security all over the world. Pakistan should deal with the world forces on the basis of sovereign equality and fundamental principles based on human values. Pakistan possesses several different types of missiles and these are led and supervised by the Armed Forces of Pakistan. Several lethal types of missiles are under development process. It is believed that Pakistan is already working on long range Missiles Shaheen 4 and Taimur. Pakistan's missile Shaheen-IA was reportedly shot southward to the Indian Ocean and managed to cover some 4,000-4,500 kilometers. This missile covers the whole of Indian region. Indian Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile Agni-V has a range of 5,000 km. It can target any part of China and some regions of Europe. It is generally believed that Pakistan and India have more capable missiles yet not announced publicly. Pakistani scientists and engineers have Intercontinental range ballistic missiles technology in their range.

It is believed that Pakistani engineers and scientists are making rapid progress in the field of MIRV technology. It means military would be in a position to fit several warheads on the same ballistic missile and launch them at separate targets in different regions. Pakistan claims that it has acquired ballistic missile technology without outside assistance. Nonetheless, it is believed that China and North Korea have assisted Pakistan in its efforts. Moreover, it is believed that several missiles were transported indirectly from Ukraine and Balrus in the nineties. It is the duty of every government to protect the country from foreign aggression and internal subversion. Pakistani scientists and engineers have ability to build missiles of short, medium and long range with proper guidance systems. This program can make Pakistan a strong, stable and prosperous nation.



<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=178539>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Russia to Protect South Borders With S-400 Air Defense Systems

15 October 2012

The air defense units of Russia's Southern Military District will be rearmed with advanced S-400 Triumf air defense systems by the end of 2012, a spokesman for the district said on Monday.

The Southern Military District was created in October 2010. It comprises the republics of Adygea, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, Chechnya, and the Krasnodar, Stavropol, Astrakhan, Volgograd and Rostov regions.

"In line with a plan for the rearmament of the southern Military District, the S-400 air defense systems will be put on combat duty by the end of this year to replace the S-300PM systems," Col. Igor Gorbul said.

The S-400 Triumph long- to medium-range surface-to-air missile system can effectively engage any aerial target, including aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise and ballistic missiles at a distance of up to 400 kilometers (250 miles) and an altitude of up to 30 kilometers (18.6 miles).

Russia already has four S-400 regiments protecting national airspace around Moscow, in the Far East and in the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad.

Gorbul said that the Southern Military District received 16 pieces of new military hardware in 2012, including Pantsir-S (SA-22 Greyhound) short-range gun and missile air defense systems.

Pantsir-S is primarily designed to defend higher ranking air defense systems such as S-300 and S-400.

MOSCOW, October 15 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20121015/176652312.html

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Russia Tests Short-Range Interceptor Missile

16 October 2012

Russia's Aerospace Defense Force successfully tested a short-range anti-missile defense system on Tuesday, a Defense Ministry spokesman told RIA Novosti.

"The Aerospace Forces and defense industry successfully tested a Russian short-range interceptor missile at Sary-Shagan range at 12.01 p.m. on Tuesday, October 16," Col. Alexei Zolotukhin said.

The launch was carried out to confirm the effectiveness of interceptor missiles, deployed as part of the Russian A-135 (ABM-3) anti-ballistic missile network, and their performance specifications, he said.

"The anti-missile system test was successful and it succeeded in destroying a test target in the time set," Aerospace Forces Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Valery Bratishenko said.

The Defense Ministry has not disclosed the type of missile involved in the testing.

The A-135 ABM network is deployed around Moscow to counter enemy missiles targeting the city or its surrounding areas. It became operational in 1995 and consists of the Don-2N battle management radar and two types of ABM missiles.



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The short-range 53T6 (SH-08 'Gazelle') endoatmospheric interceptor missiles are deployed at five launch sites with 12 or 16 missiles each. These are tested roughly annually at the Sary Shagan test site.

The previous test of a 53T6 missile was carried out in December 2011.

The A-135 system is compliant with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty from which the United States unilaterally withdrew in 2002.

MOSCOW, October 16 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20121016/176667537.html

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Putin Signs 'DARPA' Future Research Fund Bill

17 October 2012

Russia will go ahead with setting up a defense research agency analogous to America's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, after President Vladimir Putin signed into law a bill on the new body on Tuesday.

The law on the establishment of the Future Research Fund, published on the government's legislative website was approved by the Federation Council on October 10 and by the Duma on September 28.

The fund's main purpose will be to sponsor high-risk scientific research and development for defense-related studies which could lead to breakthroughs in defense technology for Russia. Rights to all intellectual property and scientific developments produced by the fund will remain state property.

The fund will replace the military-technical commission headed by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin and will be subject to the Defense Ministry and Russian government. It will be run by a supervisory board, management and a general director. It is not known if Rogozin, who was the driver behind creation of the agency, will be its director.

Around 100 staff will work in the agency initially, managing around 150 projects.

America's DARPA was set up in 1958 as a direct response to the USSR's progress in rocket science and the launch of the Sputnik satellite. It is currently involved in developing robots for the Pentagon, and has previously contributed to development of the internet.

MOSCOW, October 17 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20121017/176692006.html

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Xinhua News Agency – China

Moscow Sees Western Missile Shield Threat to Russia's Security

October 18, 2012

MOSCOW, Oct. 18 — The U.S. concept of the anti-missile defense poses threat to Russia, a high-ranking Russian official said Thursday.

“This concept of anti-missile defense has a global and mobile character and creates unpredictability,” deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin told a visiting delegation of NATO's parliamentary assembly.

He demanded explanations from Washington and NATO as a whole on what their anti-missile system would target.

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“Their technical parameters are such that they could not be used to intercept tactical and middle-range missiles. Actually, the potential of deployment around Norway and in Romania has been aimed at interception of strategic missiles,” Rogozin said.

According to the official, the Western missile shield capabilities poses threat to Russia because Moscow considers its nuclear strategic missiles a guarantee for national sovereignty and independence.

Rogozin warned NATO Russia would undertake responsive measures if it determines that the development of the anti-missile system has crossed a certain threshold.

“We ask you not to do that, because Russian response has so far been rather of virtual, political, diplomatic nature. But in certain conditions we will respond in the way you definitely wouldn’t like,” Rogozin said.

Moscow repeatedly demands guarantees that the U.S.-led NATO missile shield would aim at only missile threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic region, that is, not from Russia.

At the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, Portugal, leaders agreed to install a ballistic missile defense system in Europe, and the alliance invited Russia to participate in the scheme.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-10/18/c_131915058.htm

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

ITAR-TASS – Russia

19 October 2012

Russia Launches Topol Ballistic Missile from Northern Launching Pad

MOSCOW, October 19 (Itar-Tass) — A joint unit of Barnaul-based Missile Strategic Purpose troops (RVSN) and air and space defense troops have made a successful launching of an intercontinental ballistic missile "RC-12M Topol" from Russia's northern cosmodrome in Plesetsk at 1.12 pm Moscow time Friday, RVSN spokesman Colonel Vadim Koval told Itar-Tass.

The missile carried a dummy warhead which hit the assigned target on the Kura test site on Kamchatka with a high degree of precision, Colonel Koval said.

The aim of the missile launching was to confirm stability of the main technical parameters of the missile within its design service life extended to 24 years and assess a possibility for further lengthening of its service life to 25 years, the spokesman said.

<http://www.itar-tass.com/c154/550326.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

London Daily Express – U.K.

£25Bn to Remove Trident from Scotland

Monday October 15, 2012

By Dean Herbert

Removing Britain’s nuclear deterrent from Scotland if the country votes for independence will cost taxpayers £25billion, it has been claimed.

The SNP insists Trident will be removed from the Clyde if Britain is broken up, leaving the Ministry of Defence the task of finding a new base.

The MoD says it has not made contingency plans for a “yes” vote, saying it is confident Scots will vote to remain in the UK.

Issue No. 1029, 19 October 2012

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But UK Government sources say the cost of relocating the deterrent would be “difficult and astronomically expensive”, – costing from £20billion to £25billion.

The MoD is expected to insist on Scotland footing the bill for the cost of removing the submarines, missiles and warheads and building a replacement facility.

The existing base at Faslane and the armaments depot at Coulport would also have to be closed and cleaned up.

Nick Harvey, former armed forces minister, told a Commons committee in June the cost of pulling the 220 nuclear warheads from Faslane and Coulport would be “gargantuan”.

At the time, he said that relocation would be “just about the least favoured option it would be possible to conjecture”.

SNP sources say that an independent Scotland would have a written constitution outlawing the storage of nuclear weapons on its territory.

A spokesman said: “This is another childish scare story, and would be a ridiculous response by the UK Government to a democratic decision of the people of Scotland to have Trident removed.”

An MoD spokesman said: “No plans for independence are being made as the Government is confident that people in Scotland will continue to support the UK in any referendum.”

An independent Scotland would also be left without any tanks, submarines or jets, it was claimed.

Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Crawford predicted Scotland would be left with only a cheap Hawk trainer jet to protect its skies, while its navy would have nothing larger than a frigate.

Scottish soldiers would also expect little more than armoured vehicles equipped with light guns.

Lt-Col Crawford said he compiled a report into how the military would look in an independent Scotland along with economist Richard Marsh as the SNP has failed to provide any detailed plans.

It’s predicted Scotland would have between 10,000 and 12,000 troops, a navy of 20 vessels and an air force of only 60 aircraft, made up mostly of helicopters and surveillance craft.

<http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/352178>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

AOL Defense

Navy Fears Pentagon Neglects New Missile Sub; SSBN(X) Must Survive Almost 80 Years

By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

October 18, 2012

WASHINGTON: Right now, the Navy is designing the ballistic missile submarine that will provide 70 percent of the nation's nuclear deterrent until 2080. Yet even as the service prepares to award research and development contracts this December, the submarine community is deeply worried that the rest of the military is neglecting the program -- which has already had to make some painful trade-offs on schedule, numbers, and capability. And the service has not even started work on whatever nuclear missile the new sub will end up carrying for the latter half of its life.

The SSBN(X) program to replace the 1980s-vintage *Ohio* missile subs is a massive effort that few non-submariners talk about. "People are assuming it away," said Rear Adm. Robert Thomas, a submarine officer who is now head of the strategic plans and policy section (J-5) on the Joint Staff.

Even Strategic Command, whose nuclear deterrence role is often overshadowed by its space and cyber missions, isn't focused on the aging missile subs, Thomas told the audience at the Naval Submarine League's annual conference: "I sit

Issue No. 1029, 19 October 2012

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in the Tank and I listen to STRATCOM and frankly I don't hear them talking about Ohio replacement. We need to do better missionary work."

It's easy to procrastinate because the timelines are so long. The first SSBN(X) will not deploy until 2031 -- which is already two years later than the original plan and starts after four Ohios will have already retired. That means the missile submarine fleet will drop to just 10 subs for over a decade. Even when all the new subs are in service, the fleet will stand at only 12 missile submarines, compared to 14 today.

What's less well known than the total numbers is how the Navy has cut back the new submarine's capabilities, something the top brass were remarkably candid about at the conference, especially for a service known for its persistent silence.

"The Ohio replacement is not, is *not* a multi-mission platform," program manager Capt. William Brougham said at the conference. "My team is designing Ohio replacement with the singular mission of being the nation's [nuclear] strategic deterrent."

The original vision for the SSBN(X) would have cost \$7 billion a sub, a figure the Navy has brought down to \$5.6 billion and hopes to reduce to \$4.9 billion. To cut those costs, the Navy has cut capabilities across the board, but particularly for conventional combat against enemy subs and warships. According to official briefing slides, the revised design will have the "minimum [torpedo] capacity," "minimum acoustic sensors," and "reduced force protection features" in general, suited only for self-defense against enemy hunter-killer subs rather than for taking the offensive. (It will also have fewer and smaller launch tubes for nuclear missiles: 16 87-inch tubes instead of 20 97-inchers).

Some of the older warriors at the conference were skeptical. So what can SSBN(X) contribute to the fight, one asked, after it launches its ballistic missiles? The official Navy answer: They will remain focused on their strategic deterrent mission, not on conventional naval combat. The unspoken answer, of course, is that if things get bad enough that a sub has fired all its nuclear weapons, there won't be much of a planet left to fight over anyway.

"This is not like an SSN [attack sub]," Rear Adm. Barry Bruner, director of submarine warfare, summed up for reporters at the conference. "It's not a hunter-killer submarine."

So the Ohio replacement's job is not to hunt: It's job is the traditional role of a boomer -- to hide and to hope its onboard Armageddon is never unleashed. The question in some quarters is whether it can hide well enough.

The threat is not so much from traditional sonar as from "non-acoustic" systems, like magnetic detectors that can find the metal hull or satellites that can peer below the surface of the water. The Navy insists this is one area where they have not cut back, "not in terms of stealthiness and survivability," said Bruner.

The SSBN(X) will be built to evolve with the threats, as past subs have, including the possibility of new sensors and new stealth coatings, added Rear Adm. David Johnson, the program executive officer for all Navy submarines. But "there are some things you have to build in from the start," he said. "We haven't compromised on the stealth."

Given the long lifespan of the sub, it's immensely difficult "to envision what the world's going to be like in 2050 or 2060," Bruner admitted. "There are technical breakthroughs all the time, but we've looked at trends in acoustic quieting and trends in non-acoustic performance, [and] we're convinced that the Ohio replacement is the right ship to take us through the rest of this century."

That extraordinary lifespan creates more complications than just forecasting anti-submarine threats. Most critical to the SSBN(X) mission is that the ballistic missile it will carry for the last half of its life hasn't been invented yet.

When it enters service circa 2031, the Ohio replacement will carry the same Trident II D5 missile now standard on the Ohios, and as long as the D5s can do the job, said Bruner, "we'll wait as long as we can before we tackle that next big bill."



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Major investment in the missile can only be put off so long, added Rear Adm. Terry Benedict, the Navy's director of strategic systems. "We will need to do something with the current D5 design between now and 2080," he said. "The system's not going to last that long."

"We're not alone," Benedict added. The Air Force's mainstay Minuteman missile is aging, too, as is both service's inventory of nuclear warheads -- and there's no plan on the books to replace any of them. The minimum would be perpetual upgrades and service-life extensions to keep old missiles in service, as is already being done for the workhorse B-52 bomber. The maximum would be all-new missiles for each service -- or, perhaps, a single common missile for both.

Given budget constraints, "we may be forced to go to a revolutionary position of a joint ballistic missile," Benedict declared. That's a tremendous technical challenge. Submarine-launched missiles have to launch from underwater, something Air Force ICBMs do not. They have to fit not in roomy silos but in narrow tubes -- especially since the Navy shrank the SSBN(X)'s tubes from 97 inch diameter to 84 inches to save costs. A new missile could be, at maximum, no larger than today's D5.

Benedict assured the assembled submariners at the conference that the Navy would not compromise its unique requirements, and a common missile with the Air Force may not be practical. But the two services will definitely collaborate on research, development, and building components that can be used in both their arsenals, like gyroscopes and constituents for rocket fuel. (The Navy needs a unique fuel mix, but some of the ingredients can be shared with the Air Force and NASA).

Just before the Submarine League conference, Benedict said, he had visited Barksdale Air Force Base to talk missile cooperation with 20 Air Force generals and Senior Executive Service civilians. "The future is going to be much more intertwined between these two services," Benedict said. "Collaboration and commonality is not an option, it is a requirement."

The other crucial partner on ballistic missiles is the United Kingdom, whose only remaining nuclear weapons are on its Vanguard submarines. Ironically, the Navy has a better record of collaboration with the Brits than with America's Air Force. The Royal Navy has relied on U.S.-designed missiles since the Polaris Sales Agreement was signed in 1963.

Even after the Americans delayed the SSBN(X) program by two years, they stuck to the original schedule to develop the missile compartment so it would be ready in time for the British could use the design in their own new missile submarine, which must enter service two years before the American sub.

So all together, the new submarine and its missiles are an extremely costly, complex, international effort with long lead times. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert signed off on the requirements for SSBN(X) this August; the Capability Development Document, or CDD, must now pass muster before the all-service Joint Requirements Oversight Council in time for detailed design work to begin in 2017. Even though the first sub will not hit the water until 2028, once those requirements and designs are set, changing them is a recipe for disastrous cost overruns and delays, as the Navy found out with its first two Littoral Combat Ships.

"This ship is going to take us through this century, so not only through my children's lives but through my children's children's lives and maybe even their children," said Bruner, "so we have to make sure we're building the right ship."

<http://defense.aol.com/2012/10/18/navy-fears-pentagon-neglects-new-missile-sub-ssbn-x-must-survi/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Chicago Tribune

Nuclear Trafficking Getting More Professional: IAEA Chief

By Maria Golovnina, Reuters

October 17, 2012

Issue No. 1029, 19 October 2012

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LONDON (Reuters) - Terrorist groups trying to get hold of nuclear weapons on the black market are becoming more sophisticated and the world needs to do more to prevent sensitive material from falling into their hands, the U.N. nuclear chief said on Wednesday.

Addressing the Chatham House think tank in London, International Atomic Energy Agency chief Yukiya Amano said one of the main risks was that militants could detonate a so-called nuclear "dirty bomb" to contaminate a major city.

Terrorists (gaining) access to nuclear material is a real threat ... The amount (trafficked illicitly) is small but they are getting more and more professional," Amano said.

The IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database, which monitors theft and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials, contains more than 2,200 incidents registered since it was set up in 1995, he said.

Global powers have long warned of the growing threat of nuclear terrorism and urged closer cooperation to prevent acts of sabotage against nuclear materials.

A deepening confrontation between Iran and the West over Tehran's nuclear program has intensified the debate nuclear security, with some experts predicting that Israel could launch a military strike to stop Iran developing a nuclear bomb.

Nuclear experts say much of the world's smuggled nuclear material is traceable to stockpiles in Russia and other former Soviet nations where many ageing Soviet-era reactors and research facilities remain poorly guarded.

Amano said more needed to be done to stop illicit nuclear trafficking.

"This is a real threat. We need to collect information, we need to analyze it. We have to train people and we have to provide equipment," Amano said.

"Most of these (incidents) are very minor but some are very serious."

A so-called dirty bomb can combine conventional explosives such as dynamite with radioactive material.

Experts describe the threat of a crude fissile nuclear bomb, which is technically difficult to manufacture and requires hard-to-obtain bomb-grade uranium or plutonium, as unlikely but with the potential to cause large-scale harm to life and property.

But a dirty bomb, where conventional explosives are used to disperse radiation from a radioactive source, is what is known as a "high probability, low consequence act" with more potential to terrorize than cause large loss of life.

Writing by Maria Golovkina; Editing by Alison Williams.

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-nuclear-security-extremistsbre89g1an-20121017,0,993371.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

USA Today

Day After Libya Attack, CIA Found Militant Links

By Kimberly Dozier, Associated Press (AP)

October 19, 2012

WASHINGTON (AP) — The CIA station chief in Libya reported to Washington within 24 hours of last month's deadly attack on the U.S. Consulate that there was evidence it was carried out by militants, not a spontaneous mob upset about an American-made video ridiculing Islam's Prophet Muhammad, U.S. officials have told The Associated Press.

It is unclear who, if anyone, saw the cable outside the CIA at that point and how high up in the agency the information went. The Obama administration maintained publicly for a week that the attack on the diplomatic mission in Benghazi

Issue No. 1029, 19 October 2012

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that killed U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans was a result of the mobs that staged less-deadly protests across the Muslim world around the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 terror attacks on the U.S.

Those statements have become highly charged political fodder as the presidential election approaches. A Republican-led House committee questioned State Department officials for hours about what Republican lawmakers said was lax security at the consulate, given the growth of extremist Islamic militants in North Africa.

And in their debate on Tuesday, President Barack Obama and Republican challenger Mitt Romney argued over when Obama first said it was a terror attack. In his Rose Garden address the morning after the killings, Obama said, "No acts of terror will ever shake the resolve of this great nation, alter that character or eclipse the light of the values that we stand for."

But Republicans say he was speaking generally and didn't specifically call the Benghazi attack a terror attack until weeks later, with the president and other key members of his administration referring at first to the anti-Muslim movie circulating on the Internet as a precipitating event.

Now congressional intelligence committees are demanding documents to show what the spy agencies knew and when, before, during and after the attacks.

The White House now says the attack probably was carried out by an al Qaida-linked group, with no public demonstration beforehand. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton blamed the "fog of war" for the early conflicting accounts.

The officials who told the AP about the CIA cable spoke anonymously because they were not authorized to release such information publicly.

Congressional aides say they expect to get the documents by the end of this week to build a timeline of what the intelligence community knew and compare that with what the White House was telling the public about the attack. That could give Romney ammunition to use in his foreign policy debate with Obama on Monday night.

The two U.S. officials said the CIA station chief in Libya compiled intelligence reports from eyewitnesses within 24 hours of the assault on the consulate that indicated militants launched the violence, using the pretext of demonstrations against U.S. facilities in Egypt against the film to cover their intent. The report from the station chief was written late Wednesday, Sept. 12, and reached intelligence agencies in Washington the next day, intelligence officials said.

Yet, on Saturday of that week, briefing points sent by the CIA to Congress said "demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault."

The briefing points, obtained by the AP, added: "There are indications that extremists participated in the violent demonstrations" but did not mention eyewitness accounts that blamed militants alone.

Such raw intelligence reports by the CIA on the ground would normally be sent first to analysts at the headquarters in Langley, Virginia, for vetting and comparing against other intelligence derived from eavesdropping drones and satellite images. Only then would such intelligence generally be shared with the White House and later, Congress, a process that can take hours, or days if the intelligence is coming only from one or two sources who may or may not be trusted.

U.S. intelligence officials say in this case the delay was due in part to the time it took to analyze various conflicting accounts. One official, speaking on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to discuss the incident publicly, explained that "it was clear a group of people gathered that evening" in Benghazi, but that the early question was "whether extremists took over a crowd or they were the crowd."

But that explanation has been met with concern in Congress.



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"The early sense from the intelligence community differs from what we are hearing now," Democratic Rep. Adam Schiff said. "It ended up being pretty far afield, so we want to figure out why ... though we don't want to deter the intelligence community from sharing their best first impressions" after such events in the future.

"The intelligence briefings we got a week to 10 days after were consistent with what the administration was saying," said Rep. William Thornberry, a member of the House Intelligence and Armed Services committees. Thornberry would not confirm the existence of the early CIA report but voiced skepticism over how sure intelligence officials, including CIA Director David Petraeus, seemed of their original account when they briefed lawmakers on Capitol Hill.

"How could they be so certain immediately after such events, I just don't know," he said. "That raises suspicions that there was political motivation."

National Security Council spokesman Tommy Vietor declined comment. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence did not respond to requests for comment.

<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/10/19/cia-libya/1643443/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Times

Iran May Hit U.S. with First Cyberattack

By Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta's pointed warning that the United States will strike back against a cyberattack underscores the Obama administration's rising concern that Iran could be the first country to unleash cyberterrorism on America.

Mr. Panetta's unusually strong comments last week came as former U.S. government officials and cybersecurity experts said the United States thinks Iranian-based hackers were responsible for cyberattacks that devastated computer systems of Persian Gulf oil and gas companies.

Unencumbered by diplomatic or economic ties that restrain other nations from direct conflict with the United States, Iran is an unpredictable foe that national security experts contend is not only capable but willing to use a sophisticated computer-based attack.

Mr. Panetta made it clear that the military is ready to retaliate — though he didn't say how — if Washington believes the nation is threatened by a cyberattack, and he made it evident that the United States would consider a pre-emptive strike.

"Iran is a country for whom terror has simply been another tool in their foreign policy toolbox, and they are a country that feels it has less and less to lose by breaking the norms of the rest of the world," said Stewart Baker, former assistant secretary at the Department of Homeland Security and now in private law practice.

"If anybody is going to release irresponsible, unlimited attacks, you'd expect it to be Iran."

National security experts have long complained that the administration should be more open about what the military could and would do if the United States were to be the victim of cyberattacks. They argue that such deterrence worked in the Cold War with Russia and would help convince would-be attackers that an assault on America would have dire consequences.

Mr. Panetta took the first steps toward answering those critics in a speech that analysts said was a thinly veiled warning to Iran and the opening salvo in the campaign to convince Tehran that any cyberattack against America would trigger a swift and deadly response.

Issue No. 1029, 19 October 2012

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“Potential aggressors should be aware that the United States has the capacity to locate them and hold them accountable for actions that harm America or its interests,” he said in a speech in New York to the Business Executives for National Security.

While he did not directly connect Iran to the Gulf cyberattacks, he warned that Iran’s abilities were expanding.

The presumed Iranian cyberattacks hit the Saudi Arabian state oil company Aramco and Qatari natural gas producer RasGas using a virus, known as Shamoon, which can spread through computers networks and ultimately destroy files by overwriting them.

In his speech, Mr. Panetta said the Shamoon virus replaced crucial system files at Aramco with the image of a burning U.S. flag. He said it also overwrote all data, rendering more than 30,000 computers useless and forcing their replacement. He said the Qatar attack was similar.

“This one worries me,” said Richard Bejtlich, chief security officer for the Virginia-based cybersecurity firm Mandiant.

“I’m not an alarmist, but when I saw that 30,000 computers at Saudi Aramco got just deleted, that was a big deal. You don’t see the Chinese government, you don’t see the Russian government, or even their patriotic hackers go out and delete anything, for the most part.”

From the Iranians’ point of view, however, attacks against the United States may be justified because they have been hit hard by American sanctions leveled on their country because of its suspected nuclear weapons program.

Iran also believes that the United States and Israel were behind the Stuxnet cyberattack that forced the temporary shutdown of thousands of centrifuges at a nuclear facility there in 2010.

Frank Cilluffo, a former special assistant for homeland security to President George W. Bush, said U.S. authorities have suspected Iran of trying to plot cyberattacks against American targets, including nuclear plants. He said that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps appears to now be trying to bring some hacker groups under its control.

“Iran has been doing a lot of cyber-saber-rattling,” said Mr. Cilluffo, now director of George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute. “What they lack in capabilities, they more than make up for in intent.”

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/oct/17/iran-may-hit-us-with-first-cyberattack/?page=all#pagebreak>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post
OPINION/Editorial

Without U.S. Aid, Will Russia Keep Scrapping its Nuclear Arsenal?

By Editorial Board

October 12, 2012

TWENTY YEARS ON, it can be hard to recall the chaos and uncertainty that spread across the Soviet Union in the months after the superpower imploded in December 1991. The strict controls that had been a hallmark of the Soviet system seemed to vanish. A sprawling inventory of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and materials lay vulnerable, often protected by no more than a padlock.

In Washington, there were sighs of relief at the end of the Cold War, but there was deep ambivalence about aiding a former adversary. Much to their credit, Sens. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) rallied Congress to approve legislation that transferred \$400 million in Pentagon spending to begin securing nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union.

Nunn-Lugar, as it came to be known, was one of the most farsighted foreign policy initiatives of its generation. It helped dismantle a vast arsenal, from giant submarines carrying nuclear-armed missiles to chemical-weapons shells that could fit in a briefcase, and then expanded well beyond Russia. At a current budget of \$1 billion a year in the

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departments of Defense, Energy and State, the program has been a bargain if you think about what might have happened without it.

It was never going to be easy for the United States to extend a hand to Russia in this way. Russia's sense of humiliation has been a constant undercurrent. But many in Russia recognized the dangers and the country's meager resources in those early post-Soviet years. They did the right thing, and cooperation paid off not only in scrapping warheads but also in alleviating mistrust, increasing transparency and deepening stability.

Today, Russia can afford to dismantle weapons on its own. The Foreign Ministry announced Wednesday that it will not extend the Nunn-Lugar agreement when it expires next year. No doubt, the decision is motivated in part by President Vladimir Putin's desire to reassert Russia's sense of self-sufficiency and his own primacy. He recently expelled the U.S. Agency for International Development, which was funding pro-democracy and civil society programs, and pushed legislation through parliament that would stigmatize as "foreign agents" nongovernmental organizations from abroad working in Russia. Alleviating mistrust is not his priority.

On weapons, the important question is not aid but willpower. Will Russia keep up the dismantlement effort on its own? Despite great strides, the legacy of the Cold War has not been completely secured nor cleaned up. Russia, like the United States, is also building new weapons. A wise next step would be to negotiate a replacement agreement that would better fit Russia's revival, keeping both countries engaged and focused on the unfinished business. That might be difficult in the current political environment, but Nunn-Lugar stood the test of time over two decades, and it is too soon to give up on its mission.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-and-russia-need-a-successor-to-nunn-lugar/2012/10/12/4caafe5e-13b4-11e2-ba83-a7a396e6b2a7_story.html

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Bloomberg News
OPINION/Editorial

A Terrifying Threat Obama and Romney Aren't Talking About

By the Editors

October 14, 2012

U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta made some alarming predictions during a speech on Oct. 11. Cyber attacks are looming, he said. They "could be as destructive as the terrorist attack of 9/11" and might amount to a "cyber Pearl Harbor."

Strong words -- and ones that have the virtue of being both accurate and necessary. One of the most pressing military threats facing the U.S. today is one we can't see, and therefore is the most difficult to have a sensible discussion about.

Panetta provided chilling details of recent attacks that disrupted U.S. financial institutions and a virus that infiltrated the computers of the Saudi Arabian Oil Co. These are just the latest examples of a disturbing trend. According to General Keith Alexander, leader of the U.S. Cyber Command, computer-based intrusions against U.S. infrastructure increased 17-fold between 2009 and 2011, and cyber attacks have led to the theft of about \$1 trillion in intellectual property.

There are two prudent ways the government can respond.

First, because Congress this year failed to pass the Cybersecurity Act, a bipartisan measure that would have been an important first step, President Barack Obama would be justified in taking the initiative. He could issue an executive order directing regulators to require companies operating critical infrastructure to meet federal cybersecurity standards. The order should follow the spirit of the legislation: Companies should have to meet certain goals, but be given free rein to determine how best to do so. As a partial blueprint, regulators could use the Consensus Audit Guidelines, a set of 20 best-practices developed by government agencies and private-sector cybersecurity experts.

Issue No. 1029, 19 October 2012

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As we've argued before, uniform federal requirements are the best way to ensure companies spend enough to protect their networks. A study by Bloomberg Government of 172 organizations found that cybersecurity spending would need to increase almost nine-fold to repel 95 percent of potential attacks. Under current rules, responsible businesses that make such investments are at a competitive disadvantage to those that don't. A single set of requirements would even the playing field and reduce the chance that one poorly secured company would leave everyone else vulnerable.

Second, Panetta said that the Department of Defense is drawing up new rules of engagement for the age of cyberwarfare. In doing so, it should make clear that the U.S. is prepared to preempt attacks, and to respond with overwhelming force -- in kind or through conventional warfare -- when facing a serious threat. Adversaries disrupting essential services, stealing information or engaging in espionage should know that they can be targeted for retaliation.

What the Pentagon shouldn't do is draw "red lines" -- or describe the specific U.S. response to various types of attacks or intrusions. If adversaries know precisely what they can't get away with, they'll have an incentive to invent new weapons and new forms of attack. Red lines could also commit the U.S. to imprudent reactions. Panetta was right to say that any retaliation should be a presidential decision: Cyberattacks can escalate quickly and have unpredictable consequences, and they should only be undertaken in extreme circumstances.

He was also right to note that more information-sharing between the government and the private sector -- with adequate privacy and legal safeguards -- is essential. Establishing hotlines between countries, much as the U.S. and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, would also help. And increased investment in cyber-intelligence and forensic investigations should be a priority.

Our digital infrastructure is vulnerable. Yet the Department of Defense can't do everything on its own. Companies that don't protect themselves are putting both their bottom lines and national security at risk. Yes, cybersecurity standards are an imperfect response to a strange and dangerous new realm of warfare. At the moment, though, they're the only thing standing between us and the abyss.

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-14/a-terrifying-threat-obama-and-romney-aren-t-talking-about.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency
OPINION/Valdai Club Interview
15 October 2012

Cuban Missile Crisis 50 Years on: Nuclear Deterrence Is Still Playing a Major Role in the World

Valdaiclub.com interview with Robert Legvold, Marshall D. Shulman Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, Columbia University.

How would you generally assess the Cuban missile crisis after 50 years have passed? What role did it play in the development of bilateral system?

Its primary impact was on the Cold War itself and on the existing international system. I am not sure it has a major lingering effect today. At that time, the crisis constituted a critical stage altering the bilateral nuclear relationship in several aspects.

Before the Cuban missile crisis there had been a tendency to use nuclear weapons politically--to threaten the other superpower during a crisis. This was especially true of the Soviet leadership. During the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Berlin crises of 1958 and 1961, the Soviet side evoked the possibility of nuclear escalation in order to prevail diplomatically. However, after October 1962 never again did either side engage in what was sometimes called "rocket rattling" during a crisis. This is not to say that the risk of a political crisis sliding toward nuclear war disappeared. In October 1973, for example, the US forces went to DEFCON 3 alert during the Yom Kippur war, but this was an integral step in a military confrontation, not the manipulation of nuclear weapons for political effect.



The second effect of the 1962 crisis was mostly psychological. The Cuban missile crisis had a profound impact on key U.S. policymakers, such as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and, probably on at least parts of the Soviet leadership, when they realized how close we had come to the nuclear abyss. As we learned subsequently, during the crisis the risk of a large-scale nuclear exchanges was very real.

The psychological impact of this accelerated agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, including the hotline established between the Kremlin and the White House in early 1963 and then the rapid conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the fall of that year. Somewhat more indirectly the decision by the two leadership to get serious about strategic nuclear arms negotiations toward the end of the decade also doubtless was partially impelled by the lingering memory of what nearly happened in October 1962.

Do mutual assured destruction and nuclear deterrents play a vital role today, when we have no bipolar system, and when there are lots of states with nuclear weapons, or states on the threshold of possessing nuclear arms?

Yes and no. This question requires a more refined framework of analysis. But, if you start with the bilateral nuclear relationship between the United States and Russia, even though it is now unequal in many respects, it continues to be influenced by the shadow of mutual assured destruction. Although a crisis in U.S.-Russian relations that would justify reaching for the nuclear button is extremely unlikely, were such a crisis to occur, the shadow of mutual deterrence, including its specific aspect of mutual assured destruction, would still operate.

But the situation is far more complicated now. During the Cold War the arms race unfolded along a single vector between the United States and the Soviet Union, even though there were other nuclear states – Britain, France, China. The two superpowers controlled from 95% to 98% of all nuclear weapons, and the nuclear arsenals of the other states were basically an extension of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear axis. Now, however, while the United States and Russia still possess 95% of the nuclear weapons, the dynamic in today's nuclear world is multi-vectored. For example, when it comes to the question of building missile defense or the militarization of space, China is as much a player as is Russia and the United States. Moreover, a separate competition exists between Pakistan and India, and the Indian half of this competition is also focused on China. Thus, India is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles clearly designed for Chinese targets, and, while China says it is not concerned with the Indian nuclear program, almost certainly it will also feel compelled to adjust its nuclear posture to deal with an emerging Indian threat—not simply with the nuclear challenge posed by U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

In all of those cases, mutual deterrence plays a certain role, because in any international crisis, assuming national leaderships are rational, nuclear weapons are likely to deter their use. Each of the parties would know that were it to strike without being able to disarm the other side, the other side could deliver a catastrophic retaliatory blow. True, this deterrent effect depends on the ability of countries to sustain an initial strike and then retaliate even if with relatively minimal nuclear forces. The balance need not be equal; almost any level of nuclear retaliation is likely to be sufficient, given the destructiveness of these weapons.

However, the new concern, when it comes to nuclear weapons, is that there may be actors who cannot be deterred were they to get their hands on nuclear weapons. International terrorist groups like al-Qaeda may not operate with the same rational calculus as national leaders responsible for the survival of their state. Some would argue that same risk exists with a leadership such as that in Iran, but I doubt that. I believe that the Iranian leadership is rational when it comes to the implications of using nuclear weapons, just as I believe that so was Saddam Hussein. Were they to possess weapons of mass destruction Saddam would have operated or Iran will act within a deterrence framework.

But in this broader, more complex, multi-vector nuclear configuration, the refined elements of mutual assured destruction as the embodiment of mutual deterrence in the U.S.-Soviet relationship do not apply to the cruder and less disciplined nuclear competition underway between other players. That in some ways makes today's nuclear world more dangerous than its predecessor.

What about North Korea, which is also on the threshold of obtaining nuclear weaponry? Can it be deterred?



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I believe that North Korea's leaders, despite erratic behavior, nonetheless, understand the risks in playing games with nuclear weapons, and, therefore, that they can be deterred from using them. The real danger with North Korea, and probably with Iran, is their willingness to share nuclear technology, as Pakistan's A. Q. Khan did with Syria, Iran, and North Korea. It is primarily the danger of nuclear proliferation rather than the danger of a state actually and recklessly using nuclear weapons that represents the key threat—and, incidentally, that is the principal reason prominent figures and many governments have rallied behind the idea of striving to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

If nuclear deterrence are still applicable and still useful in international relations, is the Global Zero initiative, or other initiatives aimed at the total destruction of nuclear weapons, or the total abolishment of nuclear arms, useful? Can these initiatives be productive in maintaining international security?

The question of whether these initiatives are useful and whether they will be productive should be answered separately. I don't believe anyone advocating Global Zero or the elimination of nuclear weapons – including the governments that have endorsed the idea, President Obama, and somewhat reluctantly, former President Medvedev, let alone those who originally advocated the idea, Sam Nunn, George Shultz, William Perry and Henry Kissinger – believes that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is something that will happen anytime soon, or perhaps ever.

Their basic aim is to achieve as much nuclear disarmament as possible, because they believe that in this complex multi-vector nuclear world, where nuclear weapons have a chance of falling into the hands of al-Qaeda or, in theory at least, governments that might not be deterred, the real risk comes from proliferation, not the risk of war between nuclear states. They believe that the only way to control that risk of proliferation is by making real progress toward nuclear disarmament. As some of them say, we may never reach the top of the mountain, but it is a mountain that we should climb because of the constructive things that can be accomplished along the way.

Basically, these initiatives are useful as a lodestar or an objective that helps to regulate and stabilize our nuclear world. Will they be productive? That is another matter. One of the concerns I have is that, even while governments, including the U.S. government, are endorsing the idea of eliminating nuclear weapons, they have plans over the next 10 years to modernize and improve their nuclear arsenals. Over this period the nuclear weapon states are scheduled to spend 1 trillion dollars on improving their strategic nuclear systems. In many respects this runs directly counter to shrinking and marginalizing nuclear weapons as a path to a safer world.

Thus, there is a tension between what nuclear weapon states are saying and actually doing. We will know whether initiatives, such as Global Zero, are productive, only if major nuclear weapon powers take the next steps toward strategic nuclear arms control. Right now the key leadership in that respect has to come from the two countries that have 95% of the weapons – the United States and Russia. While both governments say they're ready to think about new steps in nuclear disarmament, they are far apart in methods and approaches. Until these two states re-launch a stalled process, China or any other major nuclear power, including India and Pakistan, will not join the effort to create a more stable nuclear regime.

Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

<http://valdaiclub.com/history/50060.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

San Antonio Express
OPINION/Commentary

Nuclear Stewardship Requires a Special Trust

By Retired Gen. Eugene E. Habiger, for the Express-News
Monday, October 15, 2012

Issue No. 1029, 19 October 2012

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During the summer of 2007, a pivotal event occurred that shattered the special trust bestowed by the American people on the Department of Defense, specifically the Air Force in the management of the Nuclear Enterprise.

Six nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles were loaded on a B-52 bomber at Minot AFB, N.D., with no security checks and without the knowledge of the ground and aircrew and flown to Barksdale AFB, La. This inexcusable mistake was not discovered for approximately 30 hours until routine post flight checks.

How do things like this happen? It is not easy! The outcome was the result of many events and leadership actions taken over 20 years. Each by itself was not fatal or attributable to any individual.

The sequence of events began with the end of the Cold War in late 1991. During this period, a series of changes in the Air Force resulted in significant organizational, cultural and paradigm shifts.

First, the Air Force aggressively embraced the Total Quality Management movement, which can be a good thing for many organizations but can be toxic to the culture of a military entity that relies on a strict code of discipline and order.

Next, the Air Force eliminated regulations and substituted instructions in their place. The former were directive in nature and the latter were designed to be guides with a great deal of latitude. When dealing with nuclear weapons, there can no room for doubt. Everything must be binary, no exceptions, no gray areas.

Additionally, the Air Force as an institution underwent a major reorganization in which the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was disbanded and the bombers, ICBMs and refueling tankers were dispersed to other commands within the Air Force. This resulted in significant disruption and instability. A new joint command, the U.S. Strategic Command, was stood up to replace SAC.

The tragic attack on our nation on Sept. 11, 2001, also played a significant role in a change in focus relative to nuclear forces. Our response to that attack was to emphasize a "Global War on Terror" at the expense of our focus on nuclear deterrence. National Security Council staffing by credible and senior members was dramatically diminished. Nuclear policy in the office of the Secretary of Defense was relegated to the Assistant Secretary of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. The U.S. Strategic Command was also tasked to take on new missions of cyberwarfare, missile defense and combating weapons of mass destruction.

Except for the Navy's submarine launched ballistic missile force, the U.S. military lost the necessary focus of our nuclear mission and failed to take corrective action until the revelation of the unauthorized flight of the nuclear armed cruise missiles in the summer of 2007. The result was a wakeup call that was both dramatic and effective. At least 14 major reviews and studies were conducted which produced literally hundreds of recommendations. The Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff were unceremoniously fired.

Over the past five years, all relevant government agencies and especially the Air Force have taken many bold steps to correct virtually every issue found to be deficient and establish clear lines of accountability. A new USAF Global Strike Command has been established to ensure that all of the Air Force nuclear forces are organized, trained and equipped to support the commander of U.S. Strategic Command. The White House, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff have taken appropriate steps to regain focus.

It took nearly 20 years for the problems of our Nuclear Enterprise to surface. It is inexcusable that a breakdown in our nuclear security ever occurred. Fortunately, our Nuclear Enterprise is again on solid ground. The challenge now is to make sure it stays that way.

Retired Air Force Gen. Eugene E. Habiger is a former commander in chief, U.S. Strategic Command, and a Distinguished Fellow and policy adviser in the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs.

<http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/Nuclear-stewardship-requires-a-special-trust-3950559.php>

Issue No. 1029, 19 October 2012

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[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

ArmsControlWonk.com

SLCM Data Exchanges Revisited

By Jeffrey Lewis

16 October 2012

Regular readers know that one of my hobby horses is that the US and Russia should revive the sea-launched cruise missile data exchanges that expired with START as a confidence-building measure because the next agreement will probably have to say something about SLCMs.

A short version of my proposal appears in a new Carnegie monograph, *Beyond Treaties: Immediate Steps to Reduce Nuclear Dangers*. (*Beyond* treaties isn't quite right since, at least in my case, the confidence-building measure is designed to make possible a future treaty.)

You should check them all out, especially the proposal by Linton Brooks on "Joint Experiments and Studies."

The full text of mine is after the jump.

RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RESUME DATA EXCHANGES ON NUCLEAR-ARMED SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES.

The Obama administration intends to seek, in the next round of negotiations with Russia, an agreement that would "include both non-deployed and nonstrategic nuclear weapons." Administration officials call this approach the "whole enchilada." Republicans, too, have strongly pressed that any future agreements address Russia's tactical nuclear weapons.

One of the more difficult problems in the negotiations over the original START—and one that will need to be resolved in any arrangement that covers tactical nuclear weapons—relates to long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Although the United States has now retired its last nuclear-armed SLCM, there are concerns that Russia still deploys them and some evidence it may build a new system. Any future agreement will need to account for these weapons.

The United States and Soviet Union ultimately agreed to exclude SLCMs from START, instead issuing "politically binding" declarations under which the parties would deploy no more than 880 nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles aboard naval vessels and declare, on an annual basis, deployments for each of the next five years. These exchanges ended with the expiration of START in 2009. Such a solution will not be possible under a comprehensive agreement that seeks to account for every warhead.

Nonetheless, a useful near-term confidence-building measure would be to resume the data exchanges under a politically binding agreement identical to the one that lapsed with START. The parties could use the same text that had been developed as part of the START process, even if the limit of 880 deployed nuclear-armed SLCMs is too high. (If Russia insists on declaring all long-range SLCMs, a new limit high enough to avoid interfering with conventional operations would be required.)

The resumption of data exchanges could be the first in a series of confidence-building measures related to SLCMs. New START includes provisions for tagging sea-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles with a unique identifier and for staging exhibitions of treaty-limited items converted for conventional use. Further confidence-building measures could explore how these provisions could be extended to deal with SLCMs. Such measures would contribute to any agreement that constrains Russia's tactical nuclear weapons, whether it is the form of the "whole enchilada" or something more limited.

Jeffrey Lewis is the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

<http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5814/slcm-data-exchanges-revisited>

Issue No. 1029, 19 October 2012

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[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Scotsman – Scotland, U.K.

OPINION/Commentary

Liam Fox: There Is a Price to Pay for National Security

IF an independent Scotland outlaws nuclear weapons the decision will threaten the UK's place in Nato writes Liam Fox

By LIAM FOX

Wednesday, 17 October 2012

For probably the first time in my political career, I find myself agreeing with Alex Salmond. There is simply no way that the Scottish Nationalist Party can continue with a defence policy that argues an independent Scotland could not be part of Nato.

To leave after enjoying the alliance's protection for the last 60 years is like leaving the pub before your turn to buy the round. Those against Nato in Scotland will point to the other northern European countries that are not part of the alliance but, to take the pub analogy a little further, they've been buying their own drinks all night and don't owe anybody anything.

The clear existential threat of the Soviet Union may have gone but there are new threats emerging; the geopolitical landscape is changing and, besides, you don't choose your wars, they choose you. We live in uncertain times and any suggestion that a western, multi-faith, multi-cultural and resource rich nation - possibly soon sitting on a strategically important sea lane - will face no threat if it adopts a pacifist security policy, betrays the most incredible naïveté over the ways of the world. Norway and Denmark are no warmongers but they are investing heavily in their maritime capabilities and prize their Nato membership because they foresee competition in the Arctic and High North. Unsurprisingly, they would expect an independent Scotland to do the same.

But the Scottish Nationalists must not be taken in by Alex Salmond's unilateral decision to re-interpret the Nato treaties. Nato is a nuclear alliance. In its Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, released at the Chicago Summit earlier this year, that was re-affirmed without ambiguity. "Nuclear weapons are a core component of Nato's overall capabilities for deterrence and defence" could not be clearer. Nor could "allies acknowledge the importance of the independent and unilateral negative security assurances offered by the United States, the United Kingdom and France."

Nato membership means that you agree to nuclear weapons being the ultimate insurance of your sovereignty. That has been the case for Scotland within the United Kingdom since Nato formed in 1949 and for as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, I personally would want that to continue.

However, a Scottish constitution that outlaws nuclear weapons on Scottish soil threatens the UK's nuclear contribution to Nato. Mr Salmond may be promising the removal of our nuclear weapons from Faslane but he does so without consulting any of our Nato allies. Faslane has taken decades to develop; it employs thousands of highly vetted specialists and gives our nuclear submarines direct access to the deep anonymous waters of the North Atlantic. There are not many other pieces of coastline in the UK that afford the same access and that's before we consider the infrastructure costs and build times; and the need to either relocate - or recruit, vet and train - an entire workforce.

Now if the will of the Scottish people is that Scotland should be independent this will need to be worked around. Trident will have to leave but Salmond needs to start explaining a timeline for that so that the Scottish people and our Nato allies know exactly what they're dealing with. He knows that removing Trident immediately will be impossible and he knows he'll need to negotiate a sovereign base area solution with London that will last for decades whilst another nuclear base is built elsewhere.

I remarked in a speech in Birmingham last week that Mr Salmond is a political opportunist not a Commander-in-Chief. His credentials as the latter will be in sharp focus this week as he tries to reconcile the dawning realities of his haphazard foreign and security policies with the expectations of his party. Will he accept that Nato is a nuclear alliance



and that even if Scotland's long term plans are to be nuclear free, the responsibility of a Head of State and Commander-in-Chief is to ensure the stability of Nato's nuclear capability for as long as it takes to move it elsewhere? Or, will he continue to appease his party members by renouncing nuclear weapons and continuing to call for their immediate removal from the Clyde? His audience this week is not just in the conference hall in Perth, but in Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, Copenhagen and Oslo.

Finally, whilst the strategic aspects of the SNP's defence policy will take the headlines this week it is important that we continue to challenge the tactical inconsistencies too.

An army with six Scottish infantry battalions plus the Scots Guards and the Scottish Dragoon Guards is already just under 5,000 strong and would need around 12,000 engineers, artillerymen, signalers, mechanics, logisticians and medics to support them.

The SNP have committed to a total defence force of 15,000 so either these proud Scottish regiments are being made un-deployable because they have no supporting troops or the SNP cannot come good on its promise to restore and keep the Scottish regiments – especially when they also have plans for marines and Special Forces too.

In the air, they're taking a handful of Typhoon fighter jets to protect Scottish airspace but forget that whilst these jets may currently be based in Scotland, they are refueled in the air by tanker aircraft based in Oxfordshire. The SNP have no clear plans for any tanker aircraft of their own and it is difficult to see where they'd find the money even if they did.

And in this, the week of the anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar, the plans for a Scottish Navy are an insult to the countless brave Scots who have fought in the Royal Navy over the last 300 years.

State of the art, nuclear powered hunter-killer submarines from the Royal Navy are to be replaced in Scottish waters by diesel submarines that would have looked cutting edge in the 1970s. And the idea that this creates nuclear free waters off Scotland is laughable. We hear frequently about the Russian bombers that probe our airspace but the world of the submariner is less well publicised. The Royal Navy's Astute Class submarines will give the captains of nuclear-powered Russian subs plenty to think about before entering our territorial waters but the noisy and out-dated diesel subs favoured by the SNP will be very easily avoided.

In the United Kingdom we have armed forces of which we should all be very proud. Over the centuries soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen from Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland have come together to protect this country from whomever has intended her harm.

There are countless reasons to argue that we are better together but to my mind the defence of these islands and our shared history and ideals, must come right at the top of the list.

The SNP will fret over Nato and its nuclear heart in Perth this week but that isn't the real issue here.

The real issue for the people of Scotland is whether we are better, stronger and safer together as a United Kingdom. I passionately believe that we are.

Liam Fox is the Conservative MP for North Somerset and a former Secretary of State for Defence

<http://www.scotsman.com/news/liam-fox-there-is-a-price-to-pay-for-national-security-1-2582499>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Diplomat – Japan
OPINION/The Naval Diplomat

Nuclear Weapons and Rationality

By James R. Holmes

October 17, 2012

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Rationality is one of the central themes of *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age*. People gravitate toward an either/or view of this trait, to wit: you're either rational or you're irrational. It's not that simple.

We apply linear logic derived from economics and other fields to our daily lives. When considering some course of action, we estimate the costs, benefits, and pitfalls. We render a decision after judging whether the payoff we expect is worth the effort and risk.

That works reasonably well in everyday life, although it exaggerates how straightforward it is to assign numbers to the variables. What are the units of measurement for "benefits" when we debate whether to purchase a BMW instead of a Kia, or a mansion instead of a cottage? There's no objective answer, only subjective ones. So much for unadulterated rationality.

Injecting a competitive element into rational decision-making compounds these ambiguities. Nations (and competitors in other fields of endeavor) interact constantly, vying to outdo one another in their quest for power, interest, and prestige. Indeed, interaction is the second core theme of *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age*.

Strategist Edward Luttwak contends that linear logic gives way to a "paradoxical logic" of strategy once nations step into the arena of international competition. "Ironic reversals" of momentum are commonplace as thinking antagonists react to—and oftentimes outwit—each other's designs.

And as economist Thomas Schelling points out, groups of people—societies, big institutions—depart from rationality in a variety of ways, such as inefficient communication, "faulty calculation," "random or haphazard influences" on the decision-making process, or the sheer complexity of making decisions within groups where the members advocate for perspectives and courses of action sharply at variance with one another.

In short, the motives that drive human beings, the pitfalls of collective decision-making, and the nature of competition conspire to impair rational choice.

All of which is a long-winded way of getting around to today's topic: apartheid South Africa. We begin a book about Asia with a non-Asian case precisely because it dramatizes how nuclear newcomers can do things that outsiders find wacky. Helen Purkitt and Steve Burgess show that paranoia gripped the apartheid regime in its waning days. Its bunker mentality distorted the rational calculus of foreign policy and strategy.

Pretoria built a small arsenal of tactical nukes, then retrofitted a strategy to the weapons. Apartheid rulers rightly saw their regime as being on "death ground," to borrow Sun Tzu's evocative term. Survival concentrates minds—impelling cost/benefit calculations toward expending every resource available for as long as it takes. Strategy can take some bizarre turns when a belligerent considers itself cornered.

For instance, Pretoria ran a variant of the good-cop/bad-cop routine vis-à-vis a hoped-for ally, the United States. The difference: there was no good cop to restrain the bad cop from his worst predilections, and the bad cop was not only bad but slightly unhinged. Should a conflict with the Soviet bloc loom, South African officials planned to gradually disclose that they had a working mass-destruction arsenal at their disposal.

The prospect of nuclear-armed government's running amok, believed regime officials, would compel Washington to take Pretoria's side against Moscow and its African surrogates. Why U.S. leaders would back them under such circumstances, apartheid leaders never explained. Staring political death in the face, Pretoria fashioned a strategy of desperation.

Thomas Schelling observes that in hard bargaining, being seen as less-than-fully rational confers significant advantages. In other words, your interlocutors may appease you for fear of what you may do if pushed. Schelling could have been writing about apartheid South Africa—or about recent nuclear newcomers such as North Korea, Iran, or Pakistan.

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co-author of Red Star over the Pacific, an Atlantic Monthly Best Foreign Affairs Book for 2010 and a former US Navy surface warfare officer.

<http://thediplomat.com/the-naval-diplomat/2012/10/17/nuclear-weapons-and-rationality/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Moscow Times
Opinion/Commentary

Putin's Pride Has No Price Tag

18 October 2012

By Michael Bohm

First, the Foreign Ministry announced that USAID must leave Russia by Oct. 1. Then, early last week, the ministry said UNICEF, the United Nations children's agency, must wrap up its existing programs by the end of the year. Several days later, the ministry announced that Russia will discontinue its participation in the U.S.-funded Nunn-Lugar program, which over the past 20 years spent \$8 billion to help Russia dismantle and destroy its extraneous nuclear missiles, warheads and submarines as well as old stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.

In all three demarches, the Kremlin has sent a clear message to the United States: Russia no longer needs U.S. help because President Vladimir Putin has turned the country into a self-sufficient global power.

But has he?

Several key statistics paint a different picture:

- Russia has nearly 800,000 children in state institutions, placing it No. 1 in the world in terms of number of orphans per 10,000 citizens, according to journalist and Public Chamber member Nikolai Svanidze.
- The World Bank says Russia has 700,000 to 1.5 million HIV-positive citizens and one of the fastest-growing HIV-infection rates in the world. More than 85,000 Russians died from AIDS-related diseases in 2011, according to the government's Federal AIDS Center, a rate roughly three times higher than the average in Europe.
- More than 20,000 Russians died from tuberculosis in 2011.
- Russia's 14 million disabled people face institutional discrimination, social ostracism and neglect and have few opportunities to integrate into society.

USAID and UNICEF have spent hundreds of millions of dollars during their 20 years in Russia to assist people from these groups. Now, much of this money will disappear. Equally alarming, in March, the Kremlin turned down \$127 million from the Geneva-based Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

Russia's national pride apparently has no price tag.

Although Moscow has promised to fill at least part of the financing gap, these sectors will likely remain largely neglected as the Kremlin continues to give preference to financing law enforcement agencies, the Federal Security Service and the military.

One of the myths behind Putin's ideology is that under his rule, Russia has risen from the poverty, chaos and backwardness of the 1990s. But a visit to a Russian orphanage, a specialized clinic for HIV or tuberculosis patients, a retirement home or even a typical outpatient clinic in a provincial town is enough to see that very little has changed since the chaotic, bankrupt 1990s that Putin is so fond of cursing.

But what about nuclear weapons, which, unlike orphans and the disabled, have always been a top priority for the government? The Defense Ministry would need to allocate about \$400 million a year to continue destroying the large supply of remaining weapons of mass destruction after the Nunn-Lugar agreement expires in May.

Issue No. 1029, 19 October 2012

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Yet Russian hawks might argue that these funds would be better spent on upgrading the current nuclear arsenal as part of the country's ambitious weapons-modernization program, which Putin announced last year. Moreover, some generals could insist that it is better to maintain the country's old, nondeployed nuclear warheads and missiles as a bargaining chip against the U.S., or as a reserve that could, theoretically, be activated if Russia decides to pull out of its disarmament treaties.

In addition, Russia's decision on Nunn-Lugar is blow to both the "reset" and U.S. President Barack Obama's broader global program of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Nunn-Lugar was considered one of the most successful and farsighted U.S. foreign policy initiatives since the Soviet collapse.

The program also represented the apogee in U.S.-Russian cooperation as it built trust between the two sides, increased transparency and improved global security by controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to hostile countries and terrorist groups.

Unfortunately, Russian authorities, as if going out of their way to refute the achievements of Nunn-Lugar, said one of the reasons they are walking away from the program is their concern that the country's nuclear secrets might be revealed. Just like with USAID, the Kremlin was suggesting that Washington is using aid programs as a cover to carry out spy missions and undermine Russia's national security.

The Kremlin's latest decisions has sparked pessimism that Russia is constructing a new iron curtain of sorts to isolate itself from international assistance programs.

But perhaps not all is lost. Russia is negotiating with the United States and the UN on amending the Nunn-Lugar and UNICEF agreements. The goal is to develop a new approach that will allow the Kremlin to save face by minimizing the West's role as a donor and Russia's role as a recipient — something Moscow finds demeaning and unfitting for a country that claims to be a global leader and one that boasts of being a donor to other countries. As for USAID, perhaps it can find a mechanism suitable to the Kremlin that allows the agency to fund charitable and social-oriented Russian NGOs directly from Washington.

The United States should do everything it can to placate the Russians' wounded pride by repackaging Nunn-Lugar, USAID and other international assistance agreements while keeping the programs' core objectives intact. The stakes are too high for everyone.

Michael Bohm is opinion page editor of The Moscow Times.

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putins-pride-has-no-price-tag/469977.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times
OPINION/Editorial

Mr. Putin's Gift to Terrorists

October 18, 2012
Page – A32

There will be plenty of losers from Russia's recent decision to end two decades of cooperation with Washington on cleaning up nuclear and chemical weapons sites left over from the cold war. Russia will now have to pay for such efforts on its own. The United States will lose the most cost-effective way yet found for reducing nuclear dangers. And the world must watch as Russia's unsecured weapons and materials remain a temptation for terrorists of all varieties to buy or steal for use in future attacks.

The cooperative threat reduction program Russia wants to walk away from next spring is the heart of the so-called Nunn-Lugar initiative, which was passed by Congress in 1991. This range of programs provides American money and



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expertise to countries of the former Soviet Union to help them eliminate or secure vulnerable nuclear and chemical weapons, materials and sites.

Over the past two decades, they have helped deactivate more than 7,600 nuclear warheads, destroy more than 2,000 nuclear capable missiles, convert more than 400 metric tons of highly enriched uranium bomb fuel into low-enriched reactor fuel and destroyed large stockpiles of chemical weapons. This has cost the American taxpayer less than \$15 billion over the 20-year life of the program, far less than the Pentagon spends each year for defense and deterrence against nuclear attack.

But the job remains barely half-done. Cutting off this successful program now is perverse and reckless — and all too typical of President Vladimir Putin's sour, xenophobic and self-isolating worldview. Last month, he expelled the United States Agency for International Development, which has sponsored human rights, civil society and public health programs since the fall of communism. Perhaps those civil society programs proved too successful — and too threatening to Mr. Putin — for their own survival. But the nuclear cleanup program affects everyone's survival.

The official explanation for ending them is based on national pride — the wish to proclaim that Russia can take care of these issues by itself, without American help. Another may be Moscow's reflexive desire to be shielded from foreign eyes that might see things President Putin and his military commanders do not want them to see. Paranoia and xenophobia in the Kremlin predates communism and has now outlasted it by more than two decades.

If Moscow lets the cooperative program lapse, it needs to replace it with adequately financed Russian programs. The continuing cleanup must be transparent enough to earn the world's trust. Currently, that confidence comes from the participation of American contractors in the cleanup work. Maintaining it without them will not be easy. But Mr. Putin, having created that problem, must now solve it.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/opinion/vladimir-putins-gift-to-terrorists.html?_r=2&

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

ArmsControlWonk.com

Banning Nuclear-Armed ABMs

By Jeffrey Lewis

18 October 2012

I have my semi-weekly column up at Foreign Policy arguing that the impending demise of Nunn-Lugar is of a piece with the loss of monitoring at Votkinsk and obligatory telemetry exchanges with the expiration of the START treaty. The Russians want us out as they modernize.

I worry that the bilateral arms control process is dying a slow death in large part because we've failed to expand it beyond reductions into a broader set of measures to strengthen strategic stability. In particular, as I've been arguing for some time, I think the Russians are much more worried about decapitation — the prospect that they could not command their nuclear forces following an attack and would be unable to retaliate. I've pestered my friends, enemies and people I don't even know with the odd idea that this Russian fear might account for a series of weird things they've said and done, including expressing concern about nuclear-armed missile defense interceptors in Poland.

How do we start talking about command and control with Russia, especially if the Russians won't address the matter directly? I would propose that the US and Russian agree to a joint statement prohibiting the placing of nuclear weapons on missile defense interceptors. It is a modest measure that begins, obliquely, to address Russian concerns while strengthening stability.

The full proposal is after the jump.

Prohibiting Nuclear Armed Missile Defense Interceptors

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The United States should propose, as a part of any dialogue on missile defense cooperation, that Russia also prohibit nuclear-armed ballistic missile defenses. This could be codified in a Joint Statement of a ten-year duration signed by both Presidents.

This should be a relatively easy proposal for the United States to accept. Such an agreement would not further constrain the US Missile Defense Agency. US missile defenses rely on “hit to kill” intercept technology and are not nuclear-armed. The Stevens-Feinstein Amendment prohibits the Defense Department from spending on the “research, development, test, evaluation, procurement, or deployment of nuclear armed interceptors of a missile defense system.”

The Russians might be less interested. As best I can tell, the Moscow ABM defense system still relies on nuclear warheads. There are some reports that Russia is arming the S-400 and S-500 with nuclear weapons, though I don’t know how much credence to give them. There is also some evidence that the Russians might be interested in moving to a conventional missile defense around Moscow. After I and a colleague floated the idea a few years back, Sergey Rogov told the 2011 Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference that Russia might eliminate the nuclear-armed ABM system around Moscow, but his asking price was a bit high. (Rogov told some of my colleagues he wanted the US to share SM-3 interceptors with Russia to help with the transition to conventional missile defenses.)

Still, the US and Russia have to talk about so-called “nonstrategic” nuclear warheads at some point — and this is probably the easiest basket to start with.

A Joint Statement would codify the US prohibition and permit basic confidence-building measures, such as exhibitions and complementary visits, that could take place in the context of broader missile defense cooperation. The Russians might value related confidence building measures regarding US missile defenses in Europe and some limited technical cooperation involving radars.

An agreement to prohibit nuclear-armed ABM interceptors would provide at least two benefits. First, a prohibition on nuclear-armed missile defense interceptors would provide a mechanism to address the least difficult portion of Russia’s stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons are obsolete, making them an excellent target for elimination. (The Joint Statement might also commit the parties to specific forms of missile defense cooperation that allow Moscow to replace its nuclear-armed missile defense system around Moscow.)

The Moscow ABM system really bothers me from a stability perspective. The system is nuclear-armed. It is kept off alert in peacetime, but the Russians plan to place it on alert during a crisis. As a result, the Russian military will be operating the system in an unfamiliar fashion during an extraordinarily tense environment in which an attack is believed likely. Furthermore, the decision to use an ABM interceptor must be made under the most dire time constraints and is, therefore, pre-delegated, possibly with the decision to alert. Even the US has experienced accidental ABM launches with theater systems. It is not clear to me that, if a nuclear-armed interceptor were used over Moscow against a flock of geese, that the Russian command-and-control system would understand it was one of their own or survive the EMP effects. Then all hell might break loose. I’d like to get rid of this thing.

Second, a prohibition on nuclear-armed missile defense interceptors would enhance strategic stability by reinforcing the prohibition on intermediate-range nuclear forces. Some existing missile defense interceptors exceed MTCR thresholds. Some planned versions may exceed INF treaty thresholds, which is bad news for a treaty that doesn’t need more bad news. A while back, I asked David Wright to do a basic calculation and he concluded that slow-speed SM-3 Block II (4.5 km/s burnout) could reach Moscow from Poland with a 200 kg payload, and the high-speed Block II (5.5 km/s burnout) could reach Moscow from either Poland or Romania with a 200 kg payload. A ban on nuclear-armed ABM interceptors, combined with some confidence-building measures, might make the difference in preserving INF.

Jeffrey Lewis is the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

<http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5820/banning-nuclear-armed-abms>



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[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times
OPINION/Letter to the Editor

A Nuclear Research Facility

October 19, 2012

To the Editor:

A recent editorial called into question the value of the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ("A Big Laser Runs Into Trouble," Oct. 7).

While the editorial does refer to the role the National Ignition Facility plays as a nuclear weapons facility, the fact is that it was conceived, designed, built and funded to conduct experiments that help replicate the conditions found inside nuclear weapons, and has already answered important questions about the United States' aging stockpile. Fusion energy — while an important area of study — has never been its primary purpose.

Last month we marked 20 years since the United States last conducted an underground nuclear test. The National Ignition Facility is an investment in the future — one where we never again have to perform explosive testing on nuclear weapons, one where we have a greater scientific understanding of fusion and one where the president has no doubt that our nuclear weapons will work when needed.

The consistent support the facility has seen from the Obama administration and Congress represents a shared belief in that vision for the future. To abandon it now after only a few years of effort, even while the facility is already paying dividends, would be an irresponsible disservice to national security and scientific discovery.

THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO
PENROSE C. ALBRIGHT
Washington, Oct. 10, 2012

Mr. D'Agostino is administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Mr. Albright is the laboratory's director.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/19/opinion/a-nuclear-research-facility.html? r=1&>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Los Angeles Times
OPINION/ Op-Ed

Arms Control Should Be High on President's Agenda

Whoever is president next year will have a chance to use arms control to make the world safer.

By Steven Pifer and Michael O'Hanlon
October 19, 2012

The presidential campaign has focused primarily on the economy and domestic issues, with foreign policy receiving relatively little attention — especially if it doesn't involve the tumultuous Middle East.

One foreign policy issue that shouldn't be ignored is arms control. The president in 2013 — whether it's Barack Obama or Mitt Romney — will have an opportunity to use arms control to make the United States and the world safer.

With the New START arms deal now in force, the strategic nuclear balance between the U.S. and Russia is stable. But we shouldn't settle for that. The nuclear arsenals of Russia and other countries still hold thousands of weapons that could be turned against us or our allies. And, over the last 15 years, the number of nuclear-armed states has increased by three, with Iran perhaps on the verge.

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There are three important things the next president could do to reduce the nuclear threat.

First, he should push for a new arms control agreement with Moscow that would further reduce the number of Russian strategic nuclear warheads capable of striking the United States. A new agreement could also cut the sizable numerical advantage that Russia holds in nonstrategic — or tactical — nuclear weapons. These more portable weapons pose a special concern to our allies in Europe and Asia. An agreement should also focus on methods for monitoring warheads in storage. That could help with future rounds of arms control with other nuclear powers and reduce the risk of loose nukes getting into the wrong hands.

A second focus of the president in the next few years will be the necessary task of deciding whether and how to recapitalize the strategic triad — the ballistic missile submarines, strategic missiles and bombers that make up U.S. strategic forces. New ballistic missile submarines, for example, would cost in the neighborhood of \$6 billion to \$7 billion each, and that doesn't include the cost of the missiles they would carry. The overall annual nuclear budget is somewhere between \$20 billion and \$40 billion, depending on how you count. Arms control, by reducing the number of new strategic weapon systems the United States has to build, could save money, which could then fund things that the military is far more likely to need — or it could be put to reducing the deficit.

Third, as the U.S. continues to reduce its nuclear arsenal, the ability of American diplomacy to raise the bar against nuclear proliferation will be bolstered. We will have set an example to the world that giving up nuclear weapons doesn't mean sacrificing security. That probably won't affect decision-making in countries such as North Korea or Iran, but it will make it easier to enlist other countries to apply pressure and sanctions against those countries or against any other state that was to consider acquiring nuclear weapons. The general sense that Washington and Moscow are reducing their arsenals is crucial diplomatically for achieving this goal.

Advancing these three goals should start with seeking a new negotiation with Russia aimed at reducing each side's nuclear arsenal to between 2,000 to 2,500 total nuclear warheads — strategic and nonstrategic. That would result in a significant reduction, but would still leave the United States and Russia each with nuclear forces an order of magnitude larger than any other country.

The president in 2013 should also pursue a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement. This would be something short of a binding treaty, but would still be specific enough to allow for a better defense of Europe against a ballistic missile attack and for eliminating the missile defense issue as an impediment to cooperation on further nuclear reductions. Of course, Russia might balk at such agreements. But it, too, has financial incentives to reduce offensive arms as well as strategic incentives to have clarity about U.S. missile defenses.

Finally, the president in 2013 should gauge the political feasibility of Senate approval of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which 157 nations have already ratified. If a two-thirds vote seems possible, the president should push hard for it. The U.S. stockpile stewardship program has demonstrated that our nuclear arsenal can remain safe and reliable without testing. This was reaffirmed by a recent National Academy of Sciences study. A worldwide ban on testing would pose a huge obstacle to states that want to join the nuclear ranks or to nuclear powers trying to perfect more advanced weapons.

Arms control will provide the president in 2013 with an important opportunity. As we mark the 50th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis this month, the United States and Russia thankfully do not stand at another nuclear brink, but they do still have a very considerable interest in seizing this opportunity.

Steven Pifer and Michael O'Hanlon are senior fellows at the Brookings Institution and authors of "The Opportunity: Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms." Pifer was U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and an arms control official at the U.S. State Department; O'Hanlon previously worked on nuclear weapons issues at the Congressional Budget Office.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-ohanlon-nuclear-arms-control-20121019,0,6469513.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

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