



**USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER**  
**CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL**  
MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

**Issue No. 1027, 05 October 2012**

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The Daily Star – Lebanon

## Iran Warns Against Syrian Use of Chemical Weapons

October 02, 2012

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

NEW YORK: Iran on Monday added its voice to warnings against Syria ever using chemical weapons in its increasingly large-scale war with anti-government insurgents.

Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said in New York that Iran could not support any country -- including ally Syria -- that used such weapons, calling this "a situation that will end everything."

"If any country... uses weapons of mass destruction, that is the end of the validity, eligibility, legality, whatever you name it, of that government," he said at a talk given to the Council on Foreign Relations think tank.

He was responding to a hypothetical question from the audience about Iran's reaction if fallout from chemical weapons drifted across the border in the event of the Syrian government there unleashing its chemical arsenal.

"Weapons of mass destruction, as we said it, is against humanity, something that is not acceptable," he said.

Iran suffered from Iraqi use of chemical weapons during the countries' 1980-1988 war and says it opposes all such weapons, although Western powers and Israel accuse Iran of trying to build a nuclear bomb.

The Syrian military has not used chemical weapons against the increasingly widespread rebellion. US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has said the Syrian regime recently its chemical arms to help keep them safe.

<http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Oct-02/189868-iran-warns-against-syrian-use-of-chemical-weapons.ashx#axzz2892tZCj6>

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Press TV – Iran

Tuesday, October 02, 2012

## Iran to Enrich Uranium to 60% if P5+1 Talks Drag on: MP

An Iranian lawmaker says the Islamic Republic will enrich uranium up to 60-percent purity if negotiations with world's major powers (the P5+1) prove ineffective.

"In case our [multifaceted] talks with the P5+1 group -- including the US, the UK, France, China, Russia and Germany -- fail to pay off, Iranian youth will master [the technology for] enrichment [of uranium] up to 60 percent [purity] to fuel [Iranian] submarines and ocean-going ships," Mansour Haqiqatpour, deputy head of Iran Majlis (parliament) Foreign Policy and National Security Committee, said on Tuesday.

*"The P5+1 that postpone negotiations [with Iran] to the future should know that if these talks continue into next year, Iran cannot guarantee it would keep its enrichment limited to 20 percent. This [level of] enrichment is likely to increase to 40 or 50 percent," he said.*

"They should not think that we will stay calm in the face of threats, sanctions and pressure," the Iranian MP noted.

The United States, Israel and some of their allies have repeatedly accused Iran of pursuing non-civilian objectives in its nuclear energy program.

Iran argues that as a signatory to Non-Proliferation Treaty and a member of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it is entitled to develop and acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

IAEA has conducted numerous inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities, but has never found any evidence indicating diversion in Tehran's nuclear energy program toward military purposes.

**Issue No. 1027, 05 October 2012**

United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education / Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL  
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<http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/10/02/264589/iran-to-enrich-uranium-to-60/>

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Aviation Week

## **Iran May Still Be Years Away From Nuclear-Armed Missile**

By Fredrik Dahl, Reuters

October 2, 2012

Iran already has enough low-enriched uranium for several atomic bombs if refined to a high degree but it may still be a few years away from being able to build a nuclear-armed missile if it decided to go down that path.

Israel's warning last week that Iran will be on the brink of developing a nuclear weapon by mid-2013 seemed to refer to when it could have a sufficient stock of higher-grade uranium to make a quick dash to produce a bomb's worth of weapon-grade material.

But, analysts say, Tehran would need time also for the technologically complicated task of fashioning highly refined uranium gas into a nuclear warhead small enough to fit on a missile - if it opts for such weapons of mass destruction.

"If they haven't worked out all the steps with dummy materials beforehand they will have a lot to do," said a Vienna-based diplomat who is not from one of the six world powers involved in diplomacy over Iran's disputed nuclear activity.

"Maybe they have all of the equipment ready. Maybe they have played with surrogate materials. I don't think anyone knows."

Experts stress that timeline estimates are fraught with uncertainty as it is unclear how advanced the Islamic Republic may be in its suspected nuclear bomb research.

"I still think that we are talking about several years ... before Iran could develop a nuclear weapon and certainly before they could have a deliverable nuclear weapon," said Shannon Kile, head of the Nuclear Weapons Project of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a think-tank.

Iran rejects suspicions of a covert quest for atomic bomb capability. But its refusal to curb nuclear work with both civilian and military applications, and its lack of openness with U.N. inspectors, have drawn tough Western sanctions.

A high-level group of U.S. security experts - including former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage - estimated that Iran would need between one and four months to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a single nuclear device.

"Additional time - up to two years, according to conservative estimates - would be required for Iran to build a nuclear warhead that would be reliably deliverable by a missile," they said in a report published last month.

Mark Fitzpatrick, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think-tank, also said Iran would need at least two years for assembling a nuclear-tipped missile.

Senior researcher Greg Jones of the U.S.-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Center put forward a much quicker breakout scenario for any bomb bid and suggested a truck rather than a missile could be used for delivery to target.

Iran could refine uranium for a nuclear weapon in 10 weeks and produce the required non-nuclear components in six months or less, he said, adding this could be done simultaneously.

### **NO BREAKOUT WITH JUST ONE BOMB?**

But the IISS argued in a report last year that the weaponisation time must be added to that required to produce the fissile material to calculate when a usable bomb could be made.

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Making the actual weapon entails converting uranium gas to metal, designing a nuclear triggering device and the production and fitting of spherical explosive lenses, it said.

The United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) last year published a report with a trove of intelligence indicating past, and some possibly continuing, research activities in Iran that could be relevant for nuclear weapons.

They included suspected high explosive experiments and possible work on designing a device to produce a burst of neutrons for setting off a fission chain reaction.

"The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the activities took place under a structured program; that some continued after 2003; and that some may still be ongoing," the IAEA said in its latest report on Iran, issued in late August.

Washington still believes that Iran is not on the verge of having a nuclear bomb and that it has not made a decision to pursue one, U.S. officials said in August.

Israel, believed to have the Middle East's only nuclear arsenal, has threatened military action to stop Iran obtaining such weaponry, although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last week signaled any attack was not on the cards this year.

In a speech at the annual United Nations General Assembly on Thursday, Netanyahu drew a "red line" on a cartoon bomb just below a label in which Iran was 90 percent along the path to having sufficient weapons-grade material.

Experts put that at the point when Iran has amassed enough uranium, purified to a fissile level of 20 percent, that could quickly be enriched further and be used to produce a bomb.

Iran has produced more than 6.8 tonnes of uranium refined up to 5 percent since 2007, an amount experts say could be used for about five nuclear weapons if processed much further.

Worryingly for the West and Israel, some of that material has been refined to 20 percent, representing most of the effort involved in reaching potential bomb material.

According to the latest IAEA report, Iran has produced about 190 kg of this higher-grade uranium, about half of which has been earmarked for conversion into research reactor fuel, leaving a stockpile in August of just over 90 kg.

Traditionally, about 250 kg is estimated to be needed for a bomb, but some believe less would do.

"It is widely known that even a first device can be made with much less," the diplomat in Vienna said. But, "no one breaks out to make one warhead. Estimates vary but most think three to five warheads is a minimum to be a real nuclear power."

An Israeli official briefed on the Netanyahu government's Iran strategy told Reuters: "Once Iran gets its first device, no matter how rudimentary, it's a nuclear power and a nuclear menace. With that said, we have always noted that, from this threshold, it would take Iran another two years or so to make a deployable warhead."

*Additional reporting by Dan Williams in Jerusalem; Editing by Mark Heinrich.*

[http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx\\_10\\_02\\_2012\\_p0-502257.xml](http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_10_02_2012_p0-502257.xml)

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Press TV – Iran

## **Iran Will Never Back Down on Nuclear Rights: Ahmadinejad**

October 3, 2012

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says Iran will not relinquish its right to have a civilian nuclear energy program despite the West's pressure.



Ahmadinejad made the remarks at a press conference in Tehran on Tuesday.

*Asked if the Islamic Republic would retreat from its nuclear energy program in the face of Western pressure, Ahmadinejad told local and foreign reporters, "The Iranian nation and I will never back down."*

"Keep in mind that it's a battle. The enemy imagines that it can shatter the [will of] the Iranian nation by exerting such pressures and they may even make new decisions," he noted, adding that the nation would eventually overcome the pressure.

At the beginning of 2012, the United States and the European Union imposed new sanctions on Iran's oil and financial sectors with the goal of preventing other countries from purchasing Iranian oil and conducting transactions with the Central Bank of Iran.

The sanctions came into force in early summer 2012.

The illegal US-engineered sanctions were imposed based on the unfounded accusation that Iran is pursuing non-civilian objectives in its nuclear energy program.

Iran rejects the allegations, arguing that as a committed signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it has the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

In addition, the IAEA has conducted numerous inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities but has never found any evidence showing that Iran's civilian nuclear program has been diverted to nuclear weapons production.

<http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/10/03/264650/iran-wont-back-down-on-nuclear-rights/>

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Al Arabiya – U.A.E.

## **Assad 'Moved' Chemical Weapons, Sought Cooperation with 'State of Israel:' Leaks**

Thursday, 04 October 2012

By Al Arabiya, Exclusive

Officially, the Syrian regime and its allies, Russia and Iran, have consistently dismissed allegations that President Bashar al-Assad intends to use or relocate chemical weapons in his ongoing war for survival.

But classified documents obtained by Al Arabiya have revealed that the Syrian regime did move chemical weapons stockpile with the help of Iran and knowledge of Russia.

Furthermore, additional documents also reveal that Assad has also sought cross border cooperation with the "State of Israel" which the Syrian regime often refers to in public as a hostile "entity".

The confidential files were acquired by Al Arabiya with the assistance of members of the Syrian opposition who refused to elaborate on how they got hold of the documents.

Al Arabiya says that it has verified and authenticated hundreds of these documents and that it has decided to disclose the ones with substantial news value and political relevance.

### **'Wareheads ready to be relocated'**

In a highly-classified -- but undated -- document sent from Iran, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, a division of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), addressed President Assad directly, affirming that the chemical warheads are ready to be relocated.



This was in contrary to previous statements by Iran that it would not support any country with plans to use the chemicals.

Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi had said that Iran could not support any country -- including ally Syria -- that used such weapons, calling this "a situation that will end everything."

"If any country... uses weapons of mass destruction, that is the end of the validity, eligibility, legality, whatever you name it, of that government," he said at a talk given to the Council on Foreign Relations think tank.

Last week, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta had already divulged that the Syrians have moved some of their chemical weapons capability to better secure it.

It was not clear when the movement took place, or even if it was recent, but Panetta told a Pentagon news conference it had occurred in more than one case.

In a recent TV interview, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem accused the United States of seeking a pretext to attack Syria, comparing the tactic to those that preceded the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

"It is a myth they invented to launch a campaign against Syria like they did in Iraq," he said.

#### ***Reason why document was undated***

In another leaked document, also obtained by Al Arabiya; an order sent from the Syrian Presidential Palace and signed by the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service; Maj. Gen. Bassam Marhej discusses the detection of an "administrative error."

The error, which apparently is a leak of secret documents, was discovered by the Joint Command (Syria-Iran-Russia) in cooperation with the Syrian embassy in Moscow.

The supposed "error" was likely related to information about Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles.

According to Marhej -- and following the discovery of the "error" -- Syrian President Assad issued orders prohibiting writing reference numbers and/or dates on secret official documents.

He also ordered that all top-secret (written) instructions to be delivered 'by hand' and to be 'burnt' following receipt along with all telegram and written communication in all embassies and diplomatic missions.

Assad's confidentiality instructions were to be implemented immediately, the document said.

#### ***Relation with Israel***

Another batch of leaked files obtained by Al Arabiya were related to the Syrian regime's secret relations to Israel.

Officially, the two states are at war; particularly since Israel is still occupying the Syrian Golan Heights.

On April 3, 2011, less than one month after the beginning of the popular uprising in Syria, the Chief of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence, Sakr Mennoun, sent a written order to Col. Suheil Hassan to head to the Syrian-Israeli borders and ensure the safety of the frontiers.

Mannoun requests from Hassan to secure the borders "in cooperation with the state of Israel."

Al Arabiya's exclusive series on the newly-leaked Syrian security documents continues on Saturday Oct. 6.

<http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/10/04/241792.html>

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New York Times

## **Iran Offers Plan, Dismissed by U.S., on Nuclear Crisis**





By DAVID E. SANGER  
Friday, October 5, 2012  
Page – A6

WASHINGTON — With harsh economic sanctions contributing to the first major protests in Iran in three years, Iranian officials have begun to describe what they call a “nine-step plan” to defuse the nuclear crisis with the West by gradually suspending the production of the uranium that would be easiest for them to convert into a nuclear weapon.

But the plan requires so many concessions by the West, starting with the dismantling of all the sanctions that are blocking oil sales and setting off the collapse of the Iranian currency, that American officials have dismissed it as unworkable. Nonetheless, Iranian officials used their visit to the United Nations last week to attempt to drum up support, indicating that the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is finally feeling the pressure.

“Within the intelligence community, I think it’s fair to say that there is split opinion about whether the upper level of the regime is getting seriously worried,” one senior intelligence official said when asked why the Iranians appeared to be backing away from their earlier stand that nothing would stop them from producing more medium-enriched uranium, which can be turned into bomb fuel in a matter of months.

“He’s erratic, and we’ve seen him walk up to the edge of deals before and walk away,” the official said, referring to Ayatollah Khamenei.

The Iranian plan is based on a proposal made to European officials in July. It essentially calls for a step-by-step dismantling of the sanctions while the Iranians end work at one of two sites where they are enriching what is known as “20 percent uranium.” Only when the Iranians reach step No. 9 — after all the sanctions are gone and badly depressed oil revenues have begun to flow again — would there be a “suspension” of the medium-enriched uranium production at the deep underground site called Fordow.

Obama administration officials say the deal is intended to generate headlines, but would not guarantee that Iran cannot produce a weapon. “The way they have structured it, you can move the fuel around, and it stays inside the country,” a senior Obama administration official said. “They could restart the program in a nanosecond. They don’t have to answer any questions from the inspectors” about evidence that they conducted research on nuclear weapons technology, but nonetheless would insist on a statement from the agency that all issues have been resolved.

“Yet we’re supposed to lift sanctions that would take years to reimpose, if we could get countries to agree,” the administration official said.

The United States has not put a formal offer on the table. But the outline of a way to a solution they described to Iranian officials before the summer is almost the mirror image of the Iranian nine-step proposal.

Under the American vision, Iran would halt all production of its 20 percent enriched uranium immediately, ship the existing stockpile out of the country and close the Fordow plant. That would defuse the threat of an Iranian “breakout” to produce a weapon, leaving the Iranians with a stockpile of low-enriched uranium that would require far more lengthy processing to weaponize.

Then the United States and its allies would offer some cooperation on civilian nuclear projects, and would agree not to add new sanctions at the United Nations Security Council. But the sanctions squeezing the Iranian economy would remain in place until a final deal is reached.

To the Iranians, this is a prescription for government change, and they insist it will fail. “I ask you sincerely, can anyone go to war with Iran,” even an economic war, and “come out a victor?” President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said last week during a meeting with a half-dozen authors who have written books about Iran. “Why does the U.S. believe she can prevail?”

Yet Mr. Ahmadinejad declined to talk about the current negotiations. Instead, to the astonishment of Iranian officials, he argued at the session that the Iranian people were better off economically than they had been when he came to



office. Since Mr. Ahmadinejad's return to Tehran, Iranian officials have begun looking for any signs that their proposal, although rejected by Washington, could represent the basis of a conversation.

So far, it is difficult to find much overlap between the American and Iranian proposals. Both countries want to retain leverage, so the Iranians believe it is essential to keep the capability to produce uranium, and they reject any proposals to dismantle the nuclear infrastructure they have built, which they say is for civilian use. Similarly, the Americans, Europeans and Israelis believe they must maintain the constant pressure of sanctions.

On Wednesday, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made it clear that the United States had no intention of relaxing the sanctions — particularly now, just as they show the first sign of forcing Iran's leaders to rethink the costs of their nuclear program.

"We have always said that we had a dual-track approach to this, and one track was trying to put pressure on the Iranian government to come to the negotiating table," Mrs. Clinton told reporters. But she said it was Iran's own mismanagement of its economy, more than the sanctions, that deserved "responsibility for what is going on inside Iran."

"And that is who should be held accountable," Mrs. Clinton said. "And I think that they have made their own government decisions, having nothing to do with the sanctions that have had an impact on the economic conditions inside the country."

[http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/world/middleeast/iranians-offer-9-step-plan-to-end-nuclear-crisis.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/world/middleeast/iranians-offer-9-step-plan-to-end-nuclear-crisis.html?_r=0)

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Yonhap News Agency – South Korea

September 28, 2012

## **S. Korea, U.S. Halt Talks on Nuclear Energy Cooperation**

By Lee Chi-dong

WASHINGTON, Sept. 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States have called a halt to their sensitive negotiation on future nuclear energy cooperation, an informed source here said Thursday.

"Actual talks are deemed difficult this year," said the source well versed in the issue, requesting anonymity.

South Korea's Lee Myung-bak government "has decided to pass negotiations to the next administration," added the source. Lee is to retire in February.

Seoul instead plans to focus on efforts to publicize its position on the matter for the time being, the source said.

South Korean officials argue that the current pact with the U.S. is obsolete.

The existing pact, signed in 1974 and set to expire in 2014, bans South Korea from enriching uranium even for commercial purposes and reprocessing nuclear waste from about two dozen reactors using U.S.-supplied nuclear materials.

Seoul wants Washington to allow the expansion of its nonmilitary activities to meet its enhanced status as an exporter of nuclear plants.

But the U.S. has been reluctant, apparently out of concern over a negative impact on nonproliferation and arms control initiatives.

Speaking to Korean reporters here, Gary Samore, arms control coordinator at the White House National Security Council, said South Korea can continue to buy enrichment services from the U.S. and France and other international markets rather than having its own uranium-enrichment technology.

"So there is no danger that Korean industry will not be able to get access to low-enriched uranium," he said.





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South Korea, however, points out that the restrictions in the existing accord are based on a view decades ago, when Washington was wary of Seoul's possible development of nuclear arms.

South Korea has proved its commitment to peaceful operation of nuclear reactors and it has abided by international obligations, according to officials in Seoul.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/09/28/39/0301000000AEN20120928000300315F.HTML>

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Asahi Shimbun – Japan

## **Korean Peninsula Could Face 'Thermonuclear War,' North Tells U.N.**

By Reuters

October 02, 2012

UNITED NATIONS--U.S. policy toward North Korea has made the Korean Peninsula the most dangerous place on the planet because a "spark" there could ignite a nuclear war, a senior North Korean official told the U.N. General Assembly on Oct. 1.

One of the last speakers at the 193-nation assembly's annual gathering in New York, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Kil Yon was also full of praise for Kim Jong Un, the reclusive communist country's young new leader.

"Today, due to the continued U.S. hostile policy towards DPRK, the vicious cycle of confrontation and aggravation of tensions is an ongoing phenomenon on the Korean Peninsula, which has become the world's most dangerous hot spot where a spark of fire could set off a thermonuclear war," Pak said.

DPRK refers to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the country's official name.

Speaking of North Korea's nuclear "deterrent," Pak said that it was a "mighty weapon that defends the country's sovereignty."

North Korea is under U.N. Security Council sanctions due to its 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests. Earlier this year, Western powers had expressed concern that North Korea would carry out another atomic test but that detonation never took place.

North Korea has long argued that in the face of a hostile United States, which has military bases in South Korea and Japan, it needs a nuclear arsenal to defend itself.

Six-party aid-for-disarmament talks involving the two Koreas, the United States, Japan, Russia and China have been stalled since 2008.

Pak said that the North Korean people were united behind their new leader, who came to power after Kim's father Kim Jong Il died last December.

"Our dear respected marshal, Kim Jong Un, is firmly determined to make our people, who have overcome manifold hardships, enjoy a happy life to their heart's content in a prosperous, socialist state," he said.

"Our people are following dear respected marshal Kim Jong Un with absolute trust in him and are vigorously advancing to the final victory with full conviction and optimism about the future, single-heartedly united behind him," Pak said.

United Nations estimates show that a third of North Korea's population is malnourished, and the economy still has yet to regain output levels seen in the 1990s, when a devastating famine and the withdrawal of Soviet aid hit the country hard.

A formal peace treaty to end the 1950-53 Korean War between the North and South, rather than the armistice in place, has been a longstanding demand from North Korea, which wants diplomatic recognition from the United States.

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The United States and its ally South Korea, which is host to more than 28,000 U.S. troops, insist that North Korea give up its nuclear ambitions before considering a peace treaty and large-scale economic aid.

North Korea withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003, the first country to do so. For North Korea, analysts say its ability to threaten nuclear war has long been its only real diplomatic leverage with the outside world, especially the United States.

[http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/korean\\_peninsula/AJ201210020051](http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/korean_peninsula/AJ201210020051)

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Yonhap News Agency – South Korea

October 3, 2012

## **U.S. Urges N. Korea, 7 Others to Join Chemical Weapons Convention**

By Lee Chi-dong

WASHINGTON, Oct. 2 (Yonhap) -- A top U.S. diplomat in charge of arms control and nonproliferation demanded Tuesday that North Korea and seven other nations immediately join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

"Eight states including Syria have chosen to remain outside of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the United States calls upon all of them to join the Convention without delay," Rose E. Gottemoeller, acting under secretary of state for arms control and international security, said in a statement.

It was released to mark the 15th anniversary of implementing the CWC, which outlaws the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.

The convention has 188 member states, but North Korea, Syria, Angola, Myanmar, Egypt, Israel, Somalia and South Sudan are not signatories yet.

"The Chemical Weapons Convention is an historic achievement in addressing the threat from weapons of mass destruction and has significantly contributed to international peace and security," Gottemoeller said.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2012/10/03/13/0401000000AEN20121003000100315F.HTML>

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Dawn.com – Pakistan

## **Pakistan's Nuclear Programme Fully Secure: FM Khar**

By Associated Press of Pakistan (APP)

29th September, 2012

UNITED NATIONS: Pakistan told the United Nations on Friday that it accords the "highest priority" to ensuring a fool-proof safety and security mechanism for the country's nuclear programme.

"Nuclear security is both a global challenge and a national responsibility," Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar said in a speech to a high-level meeting on Countering Nuclear Terrorism.

"Over the years," she said, "we have put in place extensive physical protection measures, robust command and control structures, comprehensive export controls and wide-ranging regulatory regimes," she said.

The foreign minister told delegates that Pakistan's regulatory regime encompasses physical protection of materials and facilities, material control and accounting, transport security, prevention of illicit trafficking and border controls, as well as plans to deal with possible radiological emergencies.

"We have also developed technical solutions, personnel responsibility programmes, and intelligence capabilities to deal with WMD- (Weapons of Destruction) related terrorism," she said.

**Issue No. 1027, 05 October 2012**

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The foreign minister said Pakistan would cooperate in international efforts to strengthen regulatory mechanisms and establish effective barriers against the common threat of nuclear terrorism.

"We are part of global efforts to make sure that terrorists do not law their hands on nuclear materials, knowledge and expertise," Khar added.

<http://dawn.com/2012/09/29/pakistans-nuclear-programme-fully-secure-fm-khar/>

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Economic Times – India

## **Nuclear-Capable Prithvi II Ballistic Missile Test-Fired**

4 October 2012

Press Trust of India (PTI)

BALASORE (Odisha): Sharpening its missile prowess, India today successfully test-fired its nuclear- capable Prithvi-II ballistic missile with a strike range of 350 km from a test range near here as part of a user trial by the army.

"The surface-to-surface missile was flight tested at around 0907 hrs from a mobile launcher from Integrated Test Range's launch complex-3 at Chandipur," defence sources said.

Describing the trial of the indigenously developed strategic missile as "fully successful", ITR Director MVKV Prasad said, "All the mission objectives were accomplished."

The state-of-the-art Prithvi is the first ballistic missile developed under the country's prestigious Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMPD) and has the capability to carry 500 kg of both nuclear and conventional warheads with a strike range of 350 km, sources said.

The missile uses advanced inertial guidance system with manoeuvring trajectory.

The test-fire of the sophisticated short-range ballistic missile, already inducted into the armed forces, was a user trial by the army and monitored by scientists of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

The sleek missile is handled by the strategic force command (SFC), a defence scientist said, adding the trial was conducted to gauge the effectiveness of the weapon in a real time situation and improve accuracy.

"The whole exercise was aimed at studying the control and guidance system of the missile besides providing training to the Army," said a DRDO official.

The missile is 9 metre-long and one metre in diameter with liquid propulsion twin engine. A defence scientist associated with the trial said radars and electro-optical systems located along the coast tracked and monitored all the parameters of the missile throughout the flight path.

Prithvi-II has been successfully flight tested several times as part of the training exercise and the last trial was a complete success on August 25, 2012 when it reached the predefined target in the Bay of Bengal with a high accuracy of better than 10 meters, sources said.

<http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/nuclear-capable-prithvi-ii-ballistic-missile-test-fired/articleshow/16665150.cms>

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OneIndia News – India

## **India Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Dhanush Missile**

Friday, October 5, 2012

Press Trust of India (PTI)

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Balasore (Odisha), Oct 5: India successfully test-fired nuclear capable *Dhanush*, the naval version of Prithvi short-range ballistic missile, from a warship off Odisha coast today. The indigenously developed naval version of the *Prithvi* short-range ballistic missile has a strike range of up to 350 km and can carry 500 kg of conventional or nuclear warhead, a DRDO official said.

"*Dhanush* was test-fired from a naval ship off Odisha coast at 1125 hours," Ravi Kumar Gupta, Director in the Directorate of Public Interface in Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) told *PTI* over phone. Describing the trial as fully successful, Gupta said the test was conducted by the strategic force command (SFC) of the Indian Navy.

"The trial was a complete success and all the mission objectives were accomplished," he said. Developed by the DRDO, the missile is about 8.53 metre in length and 0.9 metre in diameter. This single stage missile uses liquid propellant. The *Dhanush* missile can be used as an anti-ship weapon as well as for destroying land targets depending on the range, sources said.

<http://news.oneindia.in/2012/10/05/indiasuccessfully-test-fires-nuclear-capable-dhanushmissil-1079727.html>

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

## **Moscow Issues Point-of-No-Return Warning on Missile Defense**

28 September 2012

Russia and the United States could still reach agreement on the missile defense issue but time is running out, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said on Friday.

"When the implementation of the third and then fourth and subsequent stages of the phased adaptive approach on the [U.S.] global defense system begins, the situation could alter for us," Sergei Ryabkov said.

He reiterated Moscow's demand for legally binding guarantees that U.S. and NATO missiles will not be aimed at Russia, warning that otherwise unspecified "compensatory" countermeasures would follow.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow indicated on Thursday that a compromise with Moscow on the U.S. missile defense system in Europe is possible, despite the current deadlock.

Several prominent Russian researchers and military experts have recently spoken out in support of NATO's claims that the alliance's plans do not target Russia, Vershbow noted, adding that their proposals could help Moscow and Brussels find common ground on the issue.

MOSCOW, September 28 (RIA Novosti)

[http://en.rian.ru/military\\_news/20120928/176288402.html](http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20120928/176288402.html)

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Global Times – China

## **Russia Knows Everything about US Missile Shield in Europe: Official**

Xinhua, September 29, 2012

By Agencies

Russia knows everything about the composition of the US missile shield in Europe, the country's Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said here Friday.

"We have technical data about the number of interceptors, the set of launch-tracking tools and warning radars, the new platforms such as ground-based launchers and additional cruisers and destroyers," he told reporters.

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The senior diplomat said there is still time for Russia and the United States to reach an agreement over the missile defense system, but a deadline is fast approaching.

Such an agreement should be reached before Washington starts the third phase of the missile shield deployment, Ryabkov said.

NATO announced at the Chicago summit in May that the first phase of the missile shield in Europe has become operational. The system is expected to be completed by 2020 in four phases.

Ryabkov reiterated Moscow's insistence on a legally binding pledge that the system would not target Russia.

"Otherwise, they will face so-called compensatory measures from us, and everyone knows them," Ryabkov warned.

At the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, Portugal, leaders agreed to install a ballistic missile defense system in Europe, and the alliance invited Russia to participate in the scheme.

Moscow has always opposed the deployment of US-led European missile defense facilities near its borders and has called for legally binding guarantees from the United States and NATO that the missile shield will not target Russia.

<http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/736074/Russia-knows-everything-about-US-missile-shield-in-Europe-official.aspx>

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Global Security Newswire

## **Russia May Resume Subcritical Atomic Testing: Sources**

October 1, 2012

Russia could conduct new sub-critical atomic tests on its nuclear arsenal at the old detonation site in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago in the Arctic, the *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* newspaper reported on Friday, citing informed sources with the state energy company Rosatom.

Moscow is a signatory of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits the detonation of nuclear devices. However, the Kremlin has refused to pledge an end to sub-critical atomic experiments.

Separately, the first of a new generation of Russian ballistic missile submarines is ready to be inducted into the navy, ITAR-Tass reported on Monday.

The *Yuri Dolgoruky* is one of eight planned Borei-class submarines that are to form the core of Russia's sea-based nuclear deterrent once they are outfitted with the new Bulava ballistic missile.

"Sevmash [shipyard] specialists have removed all the shortcomings found by the standing commission for state acceptance of vessels, to which testifies the vessel's inspection act, signed by Chief of the Main Staff of the Russian Navy Admiral Alexander Tatarinov," the shipyard said.

Elsewhere, different figures offered up by the Defense Ministry on the composition of its ICBM arsenal indicate the country's strategic missile forces are rapidly growing older, according to a separate Monday report by *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*.

According to Strategic Missile Forces spokesman Col. Vadim Koval, "the share of modern missile systems in the Strategic Missile Forces amounts to about 25 percent now." However, toward the end of May, the head of the missile branch, Lt. Gen. Sergei Karakayev said, "In the last few years, the share of modern armament in our troops grew to 30 percent."

The Russian military has yet to give a reason behind the disparity in accounting.



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Koval, though, in recent days said the Strategic Missile Forces has prioritized efforts to extend the lifespan of its deployed ICBMs. Occasional test-firings of the longest-serving silo-based RS-20 Voevoda and the RS-18 Stiletto, as well as the transportable RS-12M Topol, show the missiles remain reliable.

Russian academic Yuri Zaitsev, in an interview with Interfax, said two of Russia's three most critical strategic assets -- its sea-based RSM-52 heavy missile and missile launcher railcars are no longer active.

"The biggest concern of the United States has always been three Russian missile systems practically immune from missile defense. These are BZhRK missile trains, RSM-52 sea-based missiles and RS-20 heavy missiles," the Russian Engineering Academy adviser said. "Only RS-20 is still on duty now."

The incoming Bulava SLBM and the Topol-M ICBM do not make up for the lost strategic capabilities of the heavy missiles, he asserted.

<http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/russia-may-resume-subcritical-atomic-testing-sources/>

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Knoxville News Sentinel

Frank Munger's Atomic City Underground

## **IG Report: NNSA May Not Be Able to Meet W76 Life-Extension Goals because of Technical Delays, Cost-Bound Production Rates, Tight Budgets**

October 1, 2012

In a follow-up to previous reports, the Dept. of Energy's Office of Inspector General today reported that the National Nuclear Security Administration is at risk of not meeting its commitments on the refurbishment of W76 warheads. To meet those commitments, there'll be a need to bump up the production rates significantly because of previous delays that have put the program behind. Increasing those rates will be difficult, however, because there are tight budgets expected and so far the NNSA and the multiple plants involved in the project have not been able to get costs lowered enough to accommodate the tightened spending.

"By the end of Fiscal Year 2011, NNSA had completed less than half of the anticipated units due to technical production issues," the report said. "NNSA intended to address this problem by increasing production rates in future years."

So far, that strategy has not proved successful.

"NNSA may be unable to complete the W76 LEP within established scope, cost and schedule parameters, unless it adopts a more effective approach to reducing unit costs," IG Gregory Friedman wrote in a memo to Energy Secretary Steven Chu. "This concern is exacerbated by the fact that the program is faced with a relatively flat budget over the next few years, even though its annual scope of work is projected to increase significantly."

While the budget is projected to increase by 2.9 percent in FY 2013 and 2014, the production schedule shows production increasing 59 percent in the same time period, the report said.

"The increase in production appears to be unsustainable given the projected funding," the report said.

Decreasing the cost per unit would help, but that's going to be difficult to achieve as well because of some things that are out of NNSA's control -- such as the extra costs associated with the Kansas City Plant moving its W76 LEP work to a new facility (adding \$19 million in relocation costs).

Contractor pension costs increases are also an issue, the report said.

"If the NNSA is not able to lower unit costs below current projections, the W76 LEP will face large cost overruns," the IG report said.

**Issue No. 1027, 05 October 2012**

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The IG said senior-level NNSA officials have said they would reallocate funds from other weapons programs if they were unable to achieve W76 cost reductions, but so far NNSA has not determined the impact on programs by doing so or identify the source of the reallocated funds.

The delays could mean the NNSA wouldn't meet its commitments to the Defense Department and that has potential consequences.

"These commitments require that NNSA conclude the W76 LEP by FY 2018, allowing only 7 years to complete the 85 percent of refurbishments remaining; therefore any delays have downstream implications . . . Until the W76 LEP is completed, NNSA cannot meet the scheduled FY 2018 start date for refurbishment of the B61 bomb that is needed to meet United States' commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

The IG said it's possible that decreases in budget could require the NNSA to make even greater production cost reductions than contained in the report's tables, and recommended that the federal weapons program develop a "forward-looking plan" to reduce cost across the entirety of the program to meet the plant production rates within budget.

Among the sites visited for the IG follow-up audit of the W76 life-extension program was the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant and the NNSA site office at Oak Ridge.

NNSA management took exception with the methodology that the IG used to calculate the unit costs of the W76 refurbishments, but agreed that more adjustments are needed to help the program succeed in the budget environment.

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<http://blogs.knoxnews.com/munger/2012/10/ig-report-nnsa-may-not-be-able.html>  
<http://blogs.knoxnews.com/munger/2012/10/ig-report-nnsa-may-not-be-able.html>

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Knoxville News Sentinel

## **Y-12 Uranium Project's Safety, Equipment Issues Force Redesign; \$500M Already Spent**

By Frank Munger  
Knoxville News Sentinel  
October 3, 2012

The Uranium Processing Facility, already tabbed as the biggest construction project in Tennessee history, is apparently going to get even bigger.

At a federal safety board hearing Tuesday in Knoxville, officials at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant acknowledged that the UPF will have to be redesigned because all the equipment needed to process bomb-grade uranium and conduct other related activities won't fit into the 340,000-square-foot building as previously envisioned.

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board convened Tuesday's field hearing at the Knoxville Convention Center to hear testimony from project officials about the board's ongoing safety concerns and to gather public comment. Board members grilled the project team about delays in incorporating safety into the UPF's design and lingering issues about the government's strategy for building and operating the new uranium facility.

The biggest news, however, was that UPF planners hadn't figured out a way to fit all of the project's nuclear operations into the design package, despite years of work and about \$500 million already spent.

Steven Stokes, a staff member of the safety board, said the issue further complicates the safety picture for the Uranium Processing Facility, which is supposed to replace a series of old and outmoded nuclear facilities — some of which date back to World War II.

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"This redesign of UPF as it neared final design is a serious undertaking with the potential for significant impacts on public and worker safety," Stokes said at Tuesday's hearing.

Among other things, the new plans will remove a glovebox that was originally included as a way to help workers involved in the uranium processing activities, Stokes said.

Because the space issue was discovered so late in the design process it will have a greater impact on the project, and that could affect cost, schedule and safety, he said.

Dr. Peter Winokur, chairman of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, said the board is concerned UPF will continue to experience problems because safety got short shrift early on.

The cost range for the Uranium Processing Facility had been officially estimated at \$4.2 billion to \$6.5 billion, and it was not immediately clear how the redesign will change the project's cost.

John Eschenberg, the federal project director for UPF, told the board that in order to create more space for the facility's production activities that the roof of the building will have to be raised about 13 feet. After the meeting, he acknowledged that would add to the cost of the project.

In addition, the concrete foundation slab will have to be about a foot thicker, and the walls will have to be thickened from 18 inches to 30 inches, he said.

Those are the major structural impacts of the space/fit problem, Eschenberg said.

The federal project director said the Department of Energy had not yet determine the root causes for why the building design didn't meet the UPF needs. "The project prematurely established a hard footprint," he said, perhaps an outgrowth of having the early design team doing work at three different locations.

The scope of the Uranium Processing Facility had not changed since its inception, Eschenberg said, so that's not to blame for the space shortage.

Eschenberg said more information about the impacts of the redesign and other details would be available in about three weeks, after an engineering evaluation is completed.

<http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/oct/03/upf-to-be-redesigned-because-equipment-wont-fit/>

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Global Security Newswire

## **Russia, U.S. Cut Nuclear Deployments**

October 4, 2012

The United States as of Sept. 1 held 1,722 strategic nuclear warheads fielded on 806 active ICBMs, submarines-based missiles and bombers, a reduction of 15 deployed weapons and six launch-ready delivery vehicles over the prior six months, the U.S. State Department indicated in data released on Wednesday.

Russia at the start of last month maintained 1,499 nuclear warheads on deployed 491 extended-distance delivery systems, according to details provided under a bilateral strategic arms control pact.

The United States held 1,034 bombers and missile firing platforms on active duty and in reserve, while Russia had 884 such systems, according to the State Department.

The New START treaty requires each side by 2018 to each reduce deployment of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550, down from a cap of 2,200 mandated by this year under an older treaty. It also limits the number of fielded warhead delivery platforms to 700, with an additional 100 strategic systems permitted in reserve. The treaty, which took effect in February 2011, calls for the nations to regularly share quantities, siting and schematics of armament equipment and sites.

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The governments have carried out only minor cuts to their quantities of fielded strategic nuclear armaments since the pact entered into force, according to the Arms Control Association in Washington. U.S. deployments still significantly exceed the 2018 limits, while Russian numbers continue to fall below the caps, the independent think tank observed.

President Obama could encourage Moscow to deactivate more nuclear armaments by expediting the removal of additional fielded U.S. weapons and communicating readiness to establish deployments at quantities under those required under New START, the organization suggested. Each side has a desire and necessity to reduce military-related expenses, the group added in an analysis.

<http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-cuts-nuclear-deployments-under-new-start/>

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Military.com

## **Growing Chinese Telecoms Threaten US Security**

October 04, 2012

By Michael Hoffman

Congress and the Pentagon have set their sights on two Chinese telecommunications giants as dangerous potential threats to national security as their wildly popular cell phones start to infiltrate the American market.

U.S. military leaders have listed cyber attacks as a top national threat with the Defense Department, FBI and National Security Agency trying to keep up with the rapidly maturing technological threats facing the government.

The Defense Department sustains more than a 10 million cyber attacks per day. The White House sustained and repelled a serious enough attack Monday that administration officials acknowledged the risk it posed although it didn't provide details.

Attacks don't have to infiltrate nuclear missile bunkers or submarine messaging codes to bring a country to its knees. Digital technology penetrates most of American culture. Cell phones lead the way as these tiny computers dictate most Americans' schedules, communications and even banking.

This dependence on cellular networks has drawn the attention of the U.S. military as Chinese telecommunications firms have grown into global powers. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd leads the way as it has grown into the world's largest telecommunications supplier, recently surpassing Ericsson.

What concerns U.S. authorities are the close connections Huawei maintains with the Chinese government and People's Liberation Army. One report estimates the Chinese government has access to about 80 percent of the world's communications through their domestic telecommunications corporations.

The House Intelligence Committee has launched an investigation into Huawei and ZTE Corporation, another telecommunications giant, to probe those companies' Chinese government connections and decide if they can safely operate in the U.S.

Australian politicians have already decided that Huawei poses too severe a threat and has banned the telecommunications corporation from doing business in Australia.

The ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee flew to Hong Kong in June to meet with the leadership of Huawei and ZTE. U.S. Rep. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, D-Md., took the roughly 17-hour flight to deliver a message: The U.S. will not allow Huawei and ZTE to serve as espionage arms to the Chinese government inside American borders.

"The whole purpose of the investigation is to determine whether China or other countries had the ability to engage in our networks and control our networks and steal information from our networks by having some of their companies doing business in the United States," Ruppersberger said.

He takes cyber threats seriously saying the country doesn't realize just how vulnerable it is to a massive attack.

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"Cyber attacks are one of the most serious threats to our country, not only to our domestic business, but also our national security," he said.

A high level U.S. federal report released in March cited the Chinese military's access to civilian telecommunications hardware as a major concern. Huawei's founder is a former PLA soldier. His army background has caused much of the hand wringing over his company's connections to China's military.

"This close relationship between some of China's — and the world's — largest telecommunications hardware manufacturers creates a potential vector for state sponsored or state directed penetrations of the supply chains for microelectronics supporting U.S. military, civilian government, and high value civilian industry such as defense and telecommunications," stated a report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

The report's authors described how the penetration of a telecommunications supply line could cause a "catastrophic failure of select systems and networks supporting critical infrastructure for national security of public safety."

China's military has made major strides in its cyber capabilities as the U.S. still struggles to figure out how cyber attacks fit into its military's architecture. Service leaders still question what their responsibilities entail outside protecting their own networks.

The commission found that China's "capabilities in computer network operations have advanced sufficiently to pose genuine risk to U.S. military operations in the event of a conflict." Authors of the report expect China's initial response to a conflict with the U.S. to include a cyber attack against American logistics and intelligence networks.

Huawei's founder told Ruppersberger their company poses no threat to Americans' privacy or security. The congressman described his meeting with Ren Zhengfei, Huawei's founder, similar to a deposition in which he tried to collect information for the House investigation into the company. However he did deliver a warning to Zhengfei.

"I said we in the United States are [in favor of] free enterprise but we also have to protect our citizens and we are very concerned about Chinese cyber-attacking our businesses and it has to stop. [The] more active China is in cyber attacking the United States, the more it's going to hurt your ability to do business in our country," Ruppersberger said he told Zhengfei.

Officials from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission focused Huawei's relationship with the Chinese government. They found numerous examples of Huawei working together with China to include training events with military personnel.

"Huawei may also be involved in supporting PLA active-duty units with short term training in networking design and construction, possibly supporting the military region command system with technical experts and "train-the-trainer" program" the commission found.

Huawei works closely with the Chinese military on research and development projects either "directly as a vendor or indirectly as a research collaborator," which weakens "claims by Huawei's leadership that it maintains no ties with the Chinese government or the military," the commission found.

Much like the U.S., the British are closely monitoring how these Chinese telecommunications networks have infiltrated their domestic market. Huawei has tried to assuage British fears by establishing security teams inside British borders near Cheltenham.

The British military has its own doubts. Leadership fears that the British communications networks have already become too dependent on the Chinese telecommunications giants. Huawei equipment runs nearly half of the British communications network, said Ross Anderson, a professor at University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory.

Anderson described how a telecommunications company like Huawei doesn't necessarily need to install backdoor mechanisms to pose a threat. The company can implant a virus into the regular updates a network requires.



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Inside the tens of millions of lines of code that run those updates, a company can hide a targeted attack for espionage purposes, Anderson said.

Huawei officials have approached Anderson to learn about the global communications networks. Anderson has stopped his meetings with Huawei after he got tired of the one-way relationship the company maintained with the Cambridge professor.

"I found them to be an information sponge. [Huawei officials] always want to absorb information but never want to provide information," Anderson said.

He wrote a report for the European National Security Agency that focused on the importance of global routers and their control over the global communications node. Huawei controls about 20 to 30 percent of those routers, Anderson estimated.

Control of those routers could allow Huawei to shut down much of the world's internet access and communication network "for a few days" -- paralyzing international marketplaces and militaries.

"[Leadership] has nightmares of China being able to shut down communications in a national security crisis," Anderson said.

<http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/10/04/growing-chinese-telecoms-threaten-us-security.html?comp=7000023317828&rank=1>

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Bangkok Post – Thailand

## **US Needs Offensive Weapons in Cyberwar: General**

5 October 2012

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

The United States needs to develop offensive weapons in cyberspace as part of its effort to protect the nation from cyber attacks, a senior military official said Thursday.

"If your defense is only to try to block attacks you can never be successful," General Keith Alexander, director of the National Security Agency and commander of the US Cyber Command, told a Washington symposium.

"At times, the government has to look at what you have to do to stop an attack -- stop it before it happens. Part of our defense has to consider offensive measures."

Alexander, who spoke at a cybersecurity summit sponsored by the US Chamber of Commerce, said any offensive cyber action would need to follow rules of engagement similar to those in other military situations.

"We have to have a discussion on this," he said.

Alexander's comments come as the US military has started studying various strategies in cyberspace, including offensive weapons.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has begun studying building a platform for offensive capabilities in cyberspace and has called for participation from academic and industry experts.

The US government has stopped short of confirming involvement in cyber weapons such as the Flame and Stuxnet viruses that have targeted Iran, but many analysts say there is evidence of US or Israeli involvement.

<http://www.bangkokpost.com/tech/computer/315588/us-needs-offensive-weapons-in-cyberwar-general>

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Los Angeles Times

## **U.S. Indicts 11 in Alleged Technology Theft for Russia**

*Radar, surveillance and weapons technology was reportedly sent through a business in a Houston strip mall.*

By Molly Hennessy-Fiske and Richard Serrano, Los Angeles Times

October 3, 2012

HOUSTON —Eleven alleged members of a clandestine procurement network have been indicted in connection with what prosecutors say was a \$50-million conspiracy designed "to steal American technologies for the Russian government."

The grand jury indictment was unsealed Wednesday in federal court in Brooklyn, N.Y., but many of the defendants were arrested in Texas. One, Alexander Posobilov, appeared before a U.S. magistrate in Houston as prosecutors began seeking defendants' transfers to Brooklyn for trial.

Federal prosecutors said the ringleader is Alexander Fishenko, 46, the owner of U.S. and Russian companies. He immigrated to this country in 1994 and became a U.S. citizen nine years later. He is accused of acting as an unregistered agent "on behalf of the Russian government" to oversee shipments to Russia of radar and surveillance systems, weapons guidance systems and detonation triggers.

"These microelectronics had applications in a wide range of military systems, including radar and surveillance systems, weapons targeting systems and detonation triggers," the indictment says. Prosecutors say the equipment wound up with Russia's domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Security Service.

Much of the equipment is unavailable in Russia, and it is illegal to ship it out of this country. The crime can draw more than 20 years in prison.

"The defendants spun an elaborate web of lies to evade the laws that protect our national security," said U.S. Atty. Loretta Lynch in Brooklyn. "The defendants tried to take advantage of America's free markets to steal American technologies for the Russian government."

The indictment said Fishenko ran Arc Electronics Inc. in Houston, which sent the equipment to Russia. There was "a striking similarity" between Arc's gross revenue and Russia's defense spending over the last several years, prosecutors said.

Arc often gave false information to obtain the equipment from U.S. manufacturers and suppliers, the indictment said, and claimed that it "merely manufactured benign products such as traffic lights."

In other instances, the defendants allegedly labeled some equipment as material for fishing boats rather than as anti-submarine devices.

Prosecutors told U.S. Magistrate Judge George C. Hanks Jr. in Houston that three defendants — Fishenko, Posobilov and Viktoria Klebanova — should be held without bond. They said they had recovered hundreds of Fishenko emails that "constitute devastating evidence" of his work for Russia.

Prosecutors said Posobilov, 58, entered the U.S. in 2001 and became a U.S. citizen in 2008. He was arrested Tuesday as he was about to fly to Russia.

He was the first to appear in federal court, where he sat handcuffed, chained at the waist and ankles. Looking sleepy, Posobilov occasionally closed his eyes and leaned back in his chair as he listened to the proceedings translated into Russian on headphones.

The judge set Posobilov's detention hearing for 10 a.m. Friday in Houston.

His Houston-based attorney, Richard Kuniansky, said he expected more information to be released at the hearing.

"You're going to find out all about the case then," he said.

**Issue No. 1027, 05 October 2012**

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Prosecutors said Klebanova, 37, is a U.S. citizen but travels to Russia extensively. She allegedly exchanged emails with Fishenko and Posobilov about how to evade U.S. export laws.

More defendants are scheduled to appear in court Thursday.

FBI agents and Houston police have cordoned off Arc's offices, stringing yellow police tape around the strip mall that also houses a storefront church and an orthopedic supply company.

Lance Carter, 33, who works across the street at Showcase Cable, watched in disbelief as agents removed boxes of evidence from the building. "This is something you would see on an episode of '24,' not real life," he said as he snapped photos.

Dan Brown, 25, an orthopedic sales rep, said he had seen an older Russian man outside the building, smoking, but had never really talked to him. The business received a lot of deliveries, he said. Now he wonders what was in all the packages.

"It's crazy to think there's some kind of espionage and treason thing going on with Russia. None of us had an inkling," he said. "It's unnerving."

*Hennessy-Fiske reported from Houston; Serrano from Washington.*

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-russian-indict-20121004,0,2612375.story>

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France 24 – France

04 October 2012

## **US Charges against Russians 'Not for Espionage'**

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

Charges in the United States against Russian members of an alleged military exports ring were not related to espionage, Russia's Foreign Ministry said on Thursday.

"The charges shown to us by the US side are of a criminal character and do not involve any possible intelligence work," said deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov, quoted by Interfax.

The US on Wednesday announced criminal charges against members of a Texas-based ring for allegedly procuring US-made high-tech electronics on behalf of the Russian government while posing as civilian manufacturers.

"Much in this story is not clear, of course it brings out serious concerns, and we expect that the rights and interests of arrested Russian citizens... will be met by the American authorities," he said.

"Serious questions arise over the fact that US authorities did not notify Russia's consulate offices about the fact of arrest of our compatriots," foreign ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich added in a briefing.

He added that the Russian consul could only briefly speak to one of the individuals in court on Wednesday before the judge ordered the arrest of the group.

Embassy and consulate officials were trying to arrange a meeting with all arrested Russians, he said.

The alleged export network ran between 2008 and the present, by a Texas-based company called Arc Electronics, owned by Russian-American defendant Alexander Fishenko.

Fishenko was born in Soviet Kazakhstan and went to a Russian university before emigrating to the United States in 1994, according to the US prosecutors.

Another defendant Alexander Posobilov left Russia in 2001. Both are naturalised citizens, however it was unclear whether they held Russian passports as well.

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The scheme involved smuggling commodities with a wide range of military applications, including radar and missile guidance systems, the US prosecutors said.

Three of the 11 charged individuals were currently in Russia, US authorities suspected. One of them was 44-year-old Sergei Klinov who runs the company Apex, which is accused of supplying the microelectronics smuggled without export licences to Russian security agencies.

Klinov on Thursday said he was "saddened and confused" by the charges when contacted by the Echo of Moscow radio station.

Spy scandals have been a regular feature of US-Russian relations, with the most famous US arrest targeting a ring of ten sleeper agents, including tabloid sensation Anna Chapman, who were deported in a controversial 2010 spy swap.

<http://www.france24.com/en/20121004-us-charges-against-russians-not-espionage>

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Russia Today (RT) – Russia

## **Terrorists Lit European Forest Fires, Eyes on WMDs – FSB Chief**

03 October 2012

Russia's security chief has warned that international terrorism is changing and spreading its tactics, from setting fire to European forests to obtaining WMDs in Mid-East countries that suffer from internal crisis.

The threat of terrorist activities spreading all over the Middle East and North Africa is becoming of primary importance, Aleksandr Bortnikov warned. He added that the situation requires new approaches that could counter the terrorists' attempts to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

In his speech before the conference of heads of security and law enforcement agencies from 66 foreign countries, the FSB director stressed that international terrorist organizations are skillfully using the internal political conflicts in the separate countries of the region.

Bortnikov also noted that despite law enforcers' efforts, international terrorism is still expanding as it uses modern information technology and new media for recruitment and communications.

*"Broad use of modern information and communication technology makes the process of population radicalization a mass one,"* he said.

The Russian security chief noted that terrorists pay special attention to development of internet resources containing materials that allow self-teaching on all basics of terrorist activities – from undercover life to production of homemade explosive devices, including those with toxic components and also home production of biological weapons, such as plague and anthrax.

Bortnikov told his foreign colleagues that FSB possesses information that Al-Qaeda was complicit in recent forest fires in Europe as part of the terrorists' "strategy of a thousand cuts."

He added that extremist sites contained detailed instructions of waging the "forest jihad" and stressed that such a method had proved itself effective as it inflicted both physical and moral damage, needed little training or investment and it was extremely hard for police to find and apprehend the arsonists.

Those who succeed in proving themselves as worthy members of terrorist cells are sent to training camps and centers and then deployed to hotspots so that they can attain combat experience, Bortnikov said.

*"That is why the FSB pays special attention to the fact that residents of Russia's North Caucasus republics participate in anti-government groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria, where they are sent by the Imarat Kavkaz [Caucasian Emirate] terrorist network"* he added.



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The director also mentioned the channels where terrorists and extremists get the means for their activities. He said that the merger of terrorist cells with organized criminal groups poses a special threat and law enforcers must pay more attention to it. Such cooperation is typical for such criminal spheres as drug racketeering, illegal arms trade, kidnapping and credit fraud.

Bortnikov also told his foreign colleagues that the members of North Caucasus terrorist groups often move to Europe and settle there, joining criminal gangs and sending a large share of their incomes back to Russia in order to support the extremist and terrorist structures.

He urged foreign security officials to join forces in fighting the terrorist threat. In particular, he said that the current cooperation is based on mutual trust and often it is curbed by national legislative limitations.

*"Changing the national laws in the direction of facilitating the exchange of important information and coordination of joint operations – this is what should become a target of special services' lobbyism in order to make international cooperation more effective,"* he said.

He also noted that the special services should jointly develop an approach to countering the extremist ideology and building up the people's trust in counterterrorist agencies.

The Russian security chief also told his foreign colleagues that in his view, it was necessary to find opportunities and realize the conditions to "neutralize" the leaders of terrorist organizations in various regions of the world.

*"Activities by more than thirty emissaries and active functionaries of international terrorist organizations, which were aimed at destabilizing the situation in Vladivostok and the Primorye Territory, were thwarted during preparations for the APEC summit and during the APEC summit in Vladivostok,"* Bortnikov told the gathering.

The conference of the heads of foreign special services, security bodies and law enforcement agencies that are partners of Russia's FSB opened in Moscow for the 11th time. One hundred delegations from 66 countries take part in the security forum.

Russian President Vladimir Putin sent an address to the meeting in which he wished all participants success and promised all-round support to fight against terrorism.

<http://rt.com/politics/fsb-chief-world-security-555/>

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The Nation – Pakistan

## **US Preparing to Strike Targets Tied to Libya Embassy Attack**

By Special Correspondent

Wednesday, October 03, 2012

NEW YORK - The United States is planning to kill or capture some of the militants suspected in the attack last month in Libya that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans, The New York Times reported Tuesday.

Citing senior military and counterterrorism officials, the newspaper said that American military's top-secret Joint Special Operations Command was involved in preparing detailed information to accomplish the objective through actions such as the raid that eliminated Osama bin Laden.

Preparing the "target packages" is the first step in a process that the Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency are taking in preparation for, and in advance of, any orders from President Barack Obama and his top civilian and military advisers to carry out action against those determined complicit in the attack on the United States Mission in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi, it said.

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Obama, whose administration has faced criticism from both Republicans and Democrats over a possible intelligence failure before the Benghazi attack, has vowed that he would bring the killers of Stevens and the three other Americans to justice, but he and his top advisers have not indicated how that might happen.

Obama has a range of options available - including drone strikes, Special Operations raids like the one that killed the al-Qaeda leader; and joint missions with the Libyan authorities - but all carry substantial political, diplomatic and physical risks. Administration officials say no decisions have been made on any potential targets, the Times said.

The Joint Special Operations Command, which includes the Navy SEAL team that killed Bin Laden, works continuously with the CIA to update several lists of potential terrorist targets around the world.

Since the attack on the diplomatic mission and a nearby annex in Benghazi on the night of Sept 11, American officials say that Special Operations planners have sharply increased their efforts to track the location and gather information on several members of Ansar al-Shariah as well as other militants with ties to Al Qaeda's arm in North Africa - Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb - that American officials believe were involved in planning and carrying out the attack there.

But the paper said it remained unclear precisely how many of the "target packages" are being prepared - perhaps a dozen or more - but military and counterterrorism officials said that the Libyan authorities had identified several suspected assailants based on witness accounts, video and other photographs from the scene.

American intelligence-gathering assets - spies, satellite imagery, electronic-eavesdropping devices, among others - are finite, so counterterrorism authorities preparing the "target packages" must prioritise which militants in Benghazi - or elsewhere if they have fled the area since the attack - need to be monitored on a nearly hour-by-hour, if not minute-by-minute, basis, it said.

To help with this effort since the attacks, the Pentagon has increased the frequency of surveillance drones that fly over eastern Libya, collecting electronic intercepts, imagery and other information that could help planners compile their target lists. American intelligence agencies have assigned additional analysts to concentrate on the suspects.

Any decision to conduct kill-or-capture missions in Libya would almost certainly be made by Obama, after holding several classified meetings headed by John Brennan, the president's top counterterrorism adviser, and involving the administration's top national security deputies. American officials are also working closely with Libyan authorities who have been cooperating in the FBI's investigation into the attacks, the Times said.

"If Mr Obama were to conduct an operation, it is not clear under what legal authorities he would do so. Pentagon lawyers have argued that if a militant group has aligned itself with Al Qaeda against Americans, the United States can take aim at any of its combatants," the paper said. The Navy SEAL raid that killed bin Laden was conducted by commandos operating under the direction and legal authority of the CIA. The CIA and Defence Department declined to comment.

<http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/international/03-Oct-2012/us-preparing-to-strike-targets-tied-to-libya-embassy-attack>

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New York Times  
OPINION/Analysis

## **How to Help Iran Build a Bomb**

By WILLIAM J. BROAD  
September 30, 2012  
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ADVOCATES of airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities have long held that the attacks would delay an atom bomb for years and perhaps even buy Israel enough time to topple the Iranian government. In public statements, the Israeli



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defense minister, Ehud Barak, has said that an attack would leave Iran's nuclear program reeling, if not destroyed. The blow, he declared recently, would set back the Iranian effort "for a long time."

Quite the opposite, say a surprising number of scholars and military and arms-control experts. In reports, talks, articles and interviews, they argue that a strike could actually lead to Iran's speeding up its efforts, ensuring the realization of a bomb and hastening its arrival.

"An attack would increase the likelihood," Scott D. Sagan, a political scientist at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, said of an Iranian weapon.

The George W. Bush administration, it turns out, reached an even stronger conclusion in secret and rejected bombing as counterproductive.

The view among Mr. Bush's top advisers, recalled Michael V. Hayden, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was that a strike "would drive them to do what we were trying to prevent."

Those who warn against attacking Iran say that such a move would free officials in Tehran of many constraints. An attack, for instance, would all but certainly lead to the expulsion of international inspectors, which, in turn, would allow the government to undo hundreds of monitoring devices and safeguards, including seals on underground storage units. Further, an Iran permitted to present itself to the world as the victim of an attack would receive sympathy and perhaps vital imports from nations that once backed trade bans. The thinking also goes that a strike would allow Iran to further direct its economy to military ends.

Perhaps most notably, an attack could unite what is now a fractious state, these analysts say, and build an atmosphere of mobilizing rage. As the foreign ministers of Sweden and Finland wrote earlier this year, "It's difficult to see a single action more likely to drive Iran into taking the final decision."

History, the analysts say, demonstrates that airstrikes and military threats often result in unbending resolve among the beleaguered to do whatever it takes to acquire nuclear arms.

"People always assume the bad guys want nukes," says Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear nonproliferation specialist at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. "But I think there's usually a hesitation about the balance of risk. My sense is that the threat of military action makes bad guys feel like they need the bomb."

Pakistan's foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, seemed to have embodied that kind of determination when he said famously in 1965, "If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own."

Mark Fitzpatrick, a senior nonproliferation official at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a prominent arms analysis group in London, said in an e-mail interview that it was "almost certain" that a military strike on Iran would result in "a Manhattan-style rush to produce nuclear weapons as fast as possible."

These analysts maintain that the history of nuclear proliferation shows that attempting to thwart a nuclear program through an attack can have consequences opposite of those intended. Mr. Lewis of the Monterey Institute and other experts often cite Iraq. Israel's attack on the Iraqi Osirak reactor in 1981, they argue, hardened the resolve of Saddam Hussein and gave his nuclear ambitions new life.

"All of the historical evidence that I have seen," Mr. Lewis wrote recently, "suggests Saddam had yet to decide to seek nuclear weapons until the humiliation of the strike."

Top Israelis disagree. Amos Yadlin, one of the pilots who attacked the Iraqi reactor and a former chief of Israeli military intelligence, argued early this year that Iraq's nuclear program "never fully resumed" and cited the bombing episode as a compelling rationale for military action against Iran.

But a number of former Israeli officials have echoed those who think the attack emboldened Mr. Hussein and worry that an attack on Iran could do the same there.





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Yuval Diskin, who retired last year as director of Israel's internal security agency, told a gathering in April that "many experts" cite the acceleration risk. "What the Iranians prefer to do today slowly and quietly," he said, "they would have the legitimacy to do quickly and in a much shorter time."

Nuclear historians say intimidation alone can spur an atomic response, as when American hostility prompted China to seek nuclear arms. Beijing succeeded in 1964 with a thunderous blast.

In "China Builds the Bomb," John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai wrote that Washington's threats provoked "defiant anger and the decision to undertake the costly nuclear weapons program."

The question of what prompts the speedups would seem to go far beyond the Iranian crisis and atomic history because the number of latent nuclear states (ones that could make bombs but choose not to, like Japan and Germany) has risen around the globe in recent decades. The estimated number now stands at around 40.

Scholars have long debated the social factors that keep countries from crossing the line.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, told his colleagues before they won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005 that the bomb decision often turned on nothing more complex than a "sense of security or insecurity."

In a turbulent world, he added, that kind of evaluation could change rapidly. "Thin," he called the margin of safety, "and worrisome."

*William J. Broad is a New York Times reporter who has written extensively about weaponry.*

[http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/sunday-review/how-to-help-iran-build-a-bomb.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/sunday-review/how-to-help-iran-build-a-bomb.html?_r=0)

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Foreign Policy

OPINION/Shadow Government

## The Shifting U.S.-China Nuclear Balance

Posted By Tom Mahnken

Monday, October 1, 2012

I read Jeffrey Lewis' FP blog post with interest because he highlights the nuclear balance between the United States and China, a topic that deserves greater attention than it has gotten.

Recent years have seen growing attention to China's fielding of so-called anti-access/area denial systems, including an increasing number of accurate conventional ballistic missiles to strike airbases and other facilities in the Western Pacific and anti-ship ballistic missiles to target mobile power projection forces like carrier strike groups. To date, however, the nuclear dimension of Chinese military modernization has received less attention. Still, in recent months, China's military has reportedly tested a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-41, which is reportedly equipped with multiple, independently-targeted re-entry vehicles, or MIRVs, as well as its new JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). China's nuclear buildup remains unconstrained by strategic arms limitation agreements, such as the Russo-American New START Treaty, as well as arms control affecting ballistic and cruise missiles, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

In Lewis' view, the path to stability is predicated on the United States and China accepting mutual nuclear vulnerability. Indeed, his discussion of the Sino-American nuclear balance takes mutual vulnerability as its starting point. He goes on to argue that "Our refusal to recognize that vulnerability is simply a fact of life essentially blocks a productive dialogue with Chinese leaders."

There is, however, plenty of room to question whether Chinese political or military leaders share our perspective. Indeed, official publications of the People's Liberation Army such as the *Science of Second Artillery Campaigns* show

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that the Chinese military views nuclear weapons much differently than American strategic thinkers. Other books, such as *Coercive Deterrence Warfare*, portray launching missiles in close proximity to enemy forces as a form of deterrence. In other words, official literature espouses some very different -- and potentially very dangerous -- notions.

Writing in the latest issue of *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (which, in the interest of full disclosure, I edit) Tom Christensen of Princeton University argues that Chinese leaders believe that they are only now acquiring a secure second-strike capability. As a result, he raises the possibility that China will become bolder as the quantity and quality of its nuclear force increases. China's nuclear modernization program may thus have greater consequences for China's behavior than is commonly believed.

On the other side, as Dana Priest recently described in the *Washington Post*, the United States has an aging nuclear arsenal. The newest weapon in the U.S. nuclear force was designed and deployed in 1991. U.S. nuclear weapons, all of which are at least 20 years old, were designed for an expected operational life of 10-15 years. You can count the number of U.S. weapons laboratory employees who have actually designed a nuclear weapon on one hand -- and the number will only get smaller over time.

The Obama administration is committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons and has reportedly been conducting internal studies envisioning massive cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. A number of policy makers with whom I've spoken in recent weeks tell me that if Obama is re-elected, he will seek to slash unilaterally the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Such a move could grant China nuclear parity with the United States, or at least put it in reach. Such a move would give China greater nuclear leverage not through an expensive buildup on their side, but through disarmament on ours.

Although there is much in Jeffrey Lewis' piece with which I disagree, I do believe that the United States and China should enter into more serious discussions about nuclear weapons. Indeed, I believe that the United States should refuse to enter into future nuclear arms limitation talks without the participation of the Chinese. A failure to do so could jeopardize the nuclear balance that has underpinned American and allied security since the end of World War II.

*Thomas G. Mahnken is a Visiting Scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Between 2006 and 2009, he served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for policy planning.*

[http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/01/the\\_shifting\\_us\\_china\\_nuclear\\_balance](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/01/the_shifting_us_china_nuclear_balance)

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Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)  
OPINION/Asia Unbound

## **North Korea's Next Provocation: What Will They Do and When Will It Happen?**

By Scott A. Snyder  
October 2, 2012

Recent forays by North Korean fishing vessels across the disputed Northern Limit Line and DPRK Vice Minister Park Kil-yon's statement that a "spark" could set off nuclear war on the Korean peninsula are again raising questions about what North Korea will do next and when.

North Korea's 2009 multi-stage rocket launch and nuclear test, the 2010 sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong island, and the April 2012 failed rocket launch have stimulated speculation among North Korea watchers about the nature and timing of North Korea's next provocation. Many analysts who based their expectations on North Korea's 2009 pattern anticipated that a third nuclear test immediately follow the failed rocket launch last April. A quiet summer proved them wrong.

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However, North Korea's recent words and actions have renewed speculation over an impending provocation. There are four main schools of thought regarding North Korea's next move:

1) The October/November Surprise School: According to this school of thought, we are entering the prime moment of opportunity for North Korea to take advantage of Chinese, American, and South Korean distraction and preoccupation with their own elections and domestic leadership transitions. The North Korean leadership may believe that saber rattling will remind neighboring publics that North Korea is a threat. Provocations may be perceived as an opportunity to influence electoral results in North Korea's favor.

This logic suggests that an inter-Korean incursion is more likely than a nuclear or missile test given the history of North Korean efforts to influence South Korean elections (known as the North Wind, or bukpong), but the new North Korean leadership under Kim Jong-un could also use a missile and/or nuclear test to raise the level of crisis and dramatize the perceived failures of the current South Korean administration while anticipating that a charm offensive with South Korea's next government could complicate international coordination strategies for containing North Korea's nuclear program.

2) The Testing Leadership School: According to this school of thought, the most likely window for a new North Korean provocation is early next year, and would be designed to test new governments in Washington and Seoul (as well as Beijing). North Korea's unilateral actions would dramatize the severity of the threat, affirm North Korea's nuclear status and capabilities, and place North Korea's challenge to the international community front and center as an important new reality that the international community must accept.

Such a test would magnify North Korea's threat in the minds of counterparts and would reinforce the impression that the task of reversing North Korean existing nuclear capabilities is remote. The last time South Korea and the United States managed near-simultaneous transitions in administrations was 1993, at which time North Korea announced its withdrawal of from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in a move that catalyzed direct talks with Washington over the head of Seoul. North Korea's leadership may feel that an early crisis, especially in the event that there are two new leaders in Washington and Seoul, would be an enticing environment in which Pyongyang can irreversibly establish itself as a nuclear weapons state.

3) The Capabilities and Needs School: According to this school of thought, the main driver for North Korean provocations is a combination of North Korea's own technical capabilities and internal political needs. North Korea launches rockets and conducts nuclear tests when it is technically ready to do so, and those decisions are made with little regard for external political circumstances. Likewise, if North Korea's leadership identifies an exploitable South Korean vulnerability, there is little that external actors will be able to do to deter the North from taking advantage. Since North Korea's motivations are internally driven with little regard for the views of external actors, there are few early warning signs available to foreign observers that might be used to signal a provocation, and there is little that external actors will be able to do to prevent one.

4) The North Korea-is-Reforming (aka Disney) School: According to this school of thought, North Korea's new leadership under the young Kim Jong-un has thrown away North Korea's old playbook and understands that North Korea's new game is not to provoke, but to move toward economic reform. Now that North Korea's nuclear capabilities are enshrined as part of Kim Jong-il's legacy and are reportedly written in to the constitution, North Korea has nothing more to prove in any event, and the international community will just have to get over it.

The face of North Korean reform will allow North Korea to draw needed capital into the country and will "normalize" perceptions of North Korea. A reforming North Korea would make their possession of nuclear capability appear to be less menacing and would allow North Korea to push its agenda with the United States and its neighbors toward economic reform and peace, potentially at the expense of denuclearization. International pressure against North Korea would be blunted, while North Korea would retain an unchecked and slowly growing nuclear weapons capability as a "deterrent" against perceived "U.S. hostility." The downside of this school lies with the strong conventional wisdom that North Korean reform will result in unmanageable risks and destabilization of the current system. In which case,



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the specter of reform plus system collapse that is so deeply entrenched as an article of faith among most North Korea watchers might constitute North Korea's last and biggest provocation of all.

The South Korean military has been ordered to prepare for future provocations. While North Korea watchers may speculate on DPRK's next move, the Kim Jong-un regime can be certain of a strong ROK response. Who is ready for what? – only time will tell.

*Scott A. Snyder is a CFR Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy.*

<http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/10/02/north-koreas-next-provocation-what-will-they-do-and-when-will-it-happen/>

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The Heritage Foundation

OPINION/The Foundry

## **DHS Admits It Is Unprepared for EMP Threat**

By Steven Ballew

October 2, 2012

In testimony delivered on September 12, Brandon Wales, director of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center, admitted that DHS remains unprepared for the possibility of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event or attack.

Wales testified that the nation's power grid is more vulnerable now than it was a few years ago. Nevertheless, he could not provide Congress with an estimate for how much it would cost to combat such vulnerabilities.

An EMP attack could bring this country to a screeching halt by permanently disabling electronic devices. ATMs would stop dispensing money. Water and sewage systems would fail. Even planes and automobiles would stop working. Imagine living in the Dark Ages: This is what it would be like to live through an EMP attack.

More than seven years ago, DHS released its National Planning Scenarios. This document outlined plans to prepare for and respond to 15 different man-made and natural disasters. The list included the detonation of an improvised nuclear device and the use of a plague as a weapon. However, one potential threat was noticeably missing; an EMP event or attack.

The possibility of an EMP is arguably just as likely to occur as the detonation of an improvised nuclear device or the use of a contagious and deadly biological weapon. A rogue nation could effectively disable, damage, or destroy critical infrastructure with a short-range ballistic missile carrying an EMP device or nuclear warhead. Countries such as North Korea and Iran already possess ballistic missile capabilities. Other weapons, such as a radio-frequency device, could also cause an EMP that would disrupt critical systems.

Natural events could also plausibly result in an EMP. NASA and the National Academy of Sciences have argued that a "solar maximum" could occur between now and 2014. As the solar maximum approaches its peak, the sun could propel electromagnetic fluctuations into the earth's atmosphere. These fluctuations would interact with our electrical systems and result in blackouts affecting 130 million people. Costs of such outages could range from \$1 trillion to \$2 trillion in the first year alone.

To make matters worse, an outage could last for years, because we would need to completely rebuild our infrastructure. In this scenario, food and water delivery systems would be devastated. We could see massive human casualties on a scale that hardly seems imaginable.

The United States is vulnerable to an EMP that could occur at the hands of our enemies or via uncontrollable natural forces. DHS is ignoring the threat posed by an EMP at the risk of literally plunging us into darkness.

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**Issue No. 1027, 05 October 2012**

United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education / Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL  
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<http://blog.heritage.org/2012/10/02/dhs-admits-it-is-unprepared-for-emp-threat/>

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The Commentator  
OPINION/Analysis

## 60 Years of Nuclear Deterrence

*A British deterrent has served us well for sixty years, and can serve us well for another sixty*

By Peter Cannon

3 October 2012

It was sixty years ago today, on October 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1952, that the United Kingdom tested its first nuclear weapon.

A plutonium implosion device was detonated in the hull of HMS Plym off Trimouille Island, one of the Montebello Islands, Western Australia. The UK became the third country to develop nuclear weapons, following the United States and the Soviet Union, and since then, the UK has remained as one of the (now five) recognised nuclear weapon states.

Since 1968, the UK has used submarine-launched ballistic missiles, firstly with the Polaris submarine patrols, and – since 1994 – with Trident. These submarine patrols have been based on the principle of continuous-at-sea deterrence, with the Royal Navy always having at least one submarine on patrol, able to launch its ballistic missiles in the event of a nuclear attack on the UK.

During the Cold War, the UK's nuclear deterrent, along with the US nuclear arsenal, deterred any Soviet attack against the United States and Western Europe. The fact that there was more than one nuclear command centre for the Soviets to factor into their calculations helped to keep them in check.

But Trident is much more than just a 'Cold War weapon'. The Cold War may be over, but the threat of nuclear attack has not disappeared. The UK's nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent against attack.

While the USSR has gone, it is not possible to determine what threats may emerge or which risks might develop in the future. To give up the UK's nuclear weapons capability now would be to make an assumption that future threats are predictable; they are not. That is why no British government so far has ever thought that this would be a good idea.

It has become fashionable to claim that nuclear deterrence is irrelevant in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, because of the new and varying threats we face. We often hear that Trident cannot protect us against rogue states and non-state actors which threaten terrorism, biological and chemical weapons, and cyber warfare. But the existence of these threats does nothing to diminish the danger of a future nuclear attack.

Not only that, but the UK's nuclear weapons do remain directly relevant to these newer threats, as the ultimate deterrent against rogue states which may sponsor terrorism or support attacks on the UK by proxies. Suicide bombers may be irrational, but that is not always the case for those backing them. And whatever progress is made in multilateral disarmament negotiations, these threats from rogue states will remain.

We also need to remember that the UK's nuclear deterrent contributes towards the collective security of NATO. For the UK to give up its deterrent would therefore weaken NATO's collective security, leaving this dependent on the US and France, at the very time that the US is turning its attention towards Asia and the Pacific and urging its European allies to take more responsibility for their own defence.

As well as weakening the broader Transatlantic relationship between the US and Europe, such a move would damage the UK's standing as a leading member of NATO and as an ally of the US.

With our armed forces subject to devastating cuts, we also hear it said that Trident no longer makes financial sense – that we should scrap it and invest the billions we would save into conventional defence.

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Aside from the small likelihood that such 'savings' would ever really be re-invested in defence, this argument ignores the fact that decommissioning Trident would itself be expensive and cost thousands of defence jobs. More importantly, with running costs at 5 percent of our annual defence budget, Trident actually provides excellent value for money.

Trying to mitigate defence cuts by scrapping our most significant military capability and last line of defence makes no sense. To take such a long-term decision for the sake of short-term financial savings would be to take a reckless gamble with our future.

Realising the unpopularity of the argument for unilateral disarmament, some have taken to advocating that Trident be replaced with some cheaper, scaled-down nuclear weapons system.

The Cabinet Office is currently undertaking a review into 'alternatives to Trident' on behalf of the Liberal Democrats. Sir Nick Harvey, who was a Lib Dem defence minister until the recent reshuffle, has recently suggested that the UK could move "down the nuclear ladder" by ending continuous-at-sea deterrence and instead "putting [our nuclear deterrent] away in a cupboard and keeping it as a contingency".

There are serious problems with such an approach. The whole point of continuous-at-sea deterrence is that the UK's submarines are always ready to respond instantly to an attack, and any potential aggressor knows this. Keeping our nuclear weapons in reserve somewhere in the UK takes away this advantage, and leaves the UK vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike.

It would take days, weeks or months for the UK's weapons to be deployed, by which time they could have been destroyed by an enemy attack. In addition, a decision to take the weapons 'out of the cupboard' in response to a perceived threat would surely be noticed by other countries, and could be seen as an escalation of what would already be a state of international tension, making a pre-emptive strike against the UK even more likely.

Such an approach has little to commend it. And as it would require the design and testing of a whole new nuclear weapons system, it is unlikely to save any money.

Nuclear defence is too important to be done half-heartedly, with slap-dash or 'cut-price' solutions. The UK's nuclear defence has always been grounded on having a credible deterrent based on the best option available. That is continuous-at-sea deterrence.

A British deterrent has served us well for sixty years, and can serve us well for another sixty. And if the UK is to continue doing nuclear deterrence, it must do it properly.

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[http://www.thecommentator.com/article/1740/60\\_years\\_of\\_nuclear\\_deterrence](http://www.thecommentator.com/article/1740/60_years_of_nuclear_deterrence)

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The Diplomat – Japan  
OPINION/Blog

## Can Moscow and Washington Join Hands in the Pacific?

*With Russia intensifying its regional diplomacy and America 'rebalancing' to the Pacific, both nations have much to gain by working together.*

By Richard Weitz

October 3, 2012

Russia's hosting of the annual Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vladivostok last month demonstrates that Russian leaders view their country as an Asian power as well as a European and Eurasian one. Indeed, a major shortcoming of the current U.S. Asia Pivot is that it has often treated Russia as an afterthought. But

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with the initial Russia-U.S. post-2009 “reset” having largely run its course, Moscow and Washington now need to consider how they will refashion their relationship in the next few years. In this context, Asia offers the parties some probable areas of conflict, but also several areas where mutual beneficial cooperation might be possible.

On the negative side, U.S. and especially Russian concerns about China’s growing nuclear potential are impeding further progress in their shared strategic arms control agenda. China has stayed aloof from bilateral Russian-American strategic-arms talks, arguing that their nuclear arsenals dwarf those of China. Yet, the substantial decrease in Russian and U.S. nuclear forces in recent years is narrowing this gap.

Whereas U.S. officials want the next major nuclear arms reduction agreement to include only Russia and the United States, President Vladimir Putin and other Russian policymakers insist that future nuclear arms reductions occur on a multilateral basis. They want China and other nuclear weapons states to participate. In particular, Russian representatives insist they cannot reduce their major holdings of non-strategic (“tactical”) nuclear weapons without considering China’s growing military potential. As Putin put it back in June, “With regard to further steps in the sphere of nuclear weapons, these further steps should be of a complex character, and this time all the nuclear powers should be involved in this process. We cannot disarm indefinitely while some other nuclear powers are building up their arsenal. It is out of the question.”

The next U.S. administration should assess how the United States might leverage Russian concerns and interests to induce China to participate in strategic offensive arms control. For example, China might offer a unilateral commitment not to increase the number of its nuclear warheads or strategic delivery vehicles if Russia and the United States agreed to make further reductions.

Another problem is how China and Russia have been aligning against the United States on important issues. In the United Nations and elsewhere, the two governments have already complicated U.S. policies regarding WMD proliferation, space and cyber security, and critical regional conflicts including Iran, North Korea, and Syria. They have both launched campaigns to constrain the growth of U.S. defensive alliances in Eurasia and counter global U.S. missile defense initiatives. Although they appeal to international law to defend traditional interpretations of state sovereignty, their opposition to Western assertions of universal liberal values also emanates from their interest in shielding their own human rights abuses as well as those of their client regimes.

Although Moscow opposes a nuclear-armed Iran, Russian officials do not consider such a threat as imminent or inevitable as the U.S. Their main concern, at least in the short-term, is that Iran’s nuclear and missile programs are driving NATO countries to support missile defense programs that Russians fear could eventually degrade their own nuclear deterrent. Meanwhile, they fear that supporting the West’s stance against Iran’s nuclear program might induce Iran to become more active in supporting Islamist militancy in the Russian Caucasus, while less cooperative in limiting American influence in Central Asia and the Middle East.

Moreover, Russia has economic and diplomatic interests in Iran’s continued alienation from the West. For instance, Russian companies benefit from the reluctance of Western companies to invest in Iran due to the numerous unilateral and multilateral sanctions imposed on its government, without which Tehran would likely return to its pre-2000’s pattern of trading mostly with Western countries and hosting mostly Western foreign direct investment. Keeping Iran alienated from its natural Western partners also gives Moscow the option to move closer to Iran if its relations with the West deteriorate. Given the benefits of the status-quo, however, Moscow has little incentive to support additional sanctions against Iran.

But greater Russian-U.S. cooperation is possible regarding several important Asian issues. In Central Asia and South Caucasus, Russia’s primary energy policy goal used to be controlling the transit routes by which Caspian Basin oil and gas went to Europe. Before 2005, all the major export pipelines went through Russian territory or were controlled by Russian companies, which allowed Russia to demand high transit fees and low purchasing prices for oil and gas and also gave Russia some leverage over downstream countries. Now, the construction of alternative pipelines has ended this monopoly and reduced Moscow’s leverage, so Russian policy is changing, with less focus on keeping third-party competitors out and more emphasis on joint developments and production of energy resources. This new approach



offers more opportunities for Russian-U.S. partnerships to develop and export oil and gas from the Caspian Basin to other regions.

In the case of the Korean Peninsula, Russian and U.S. goals strongly overlap. Russian officials ardently oppose the nuclear weapons program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The economic and security interests of both Moscow and Washington would both be served by an enduring period of peace and prosperity in the Koreas. They would benefit from almost any development that relaxed regional tensions. Russian policymakers also do not want yet another nuclear-armed state bordering Russia, especially one run by an erratic dynastic dictatorship possessing inaccurate missiles. In addition, they fear that the DPRK's possession of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles could encourage further nuclear proliferation in East Asia and beyond as well as the spread of missile defense systems in response.

Russian entrepreneurs envisage converting the DPRK into a transit country for Russian energy and economic exports to South Korea and other Asia-Pacific countries. Such a development would further Russia's integration into East Asia as well as revitalize Moscow's ties with North Korea. They have discussed linking a trans-Korean railroad with Russia's rail system, which would allow Russia to become a transit country for South Korean trade with Europe, which now involves mostly long-distance shipping. Furthermore, Russian planners want to construct energy pipelines between Russia and South Korea across DPRK territory.

From the perspective of the United States and other countries, Russia's Korean strategy offers several opportunities. First, Moscow seeks objectives (a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons, at peace, and economically well-integrated with Russia and other countries) widely shared by other governments. Second, Russians can contribute helpful assets to help achieve these goals, including providing North Korea with nuclear and energy assistance and other governments with another means to communicate, via Moscow, with DPRK leaders. Third, since Russia lacks the means to achieve these ends on its own, Moscow has incentives to cooperate with foreign partners—above all China, South Korea, and the United States—to achieve them.

Unfortunately, Russia's plans for the Koreas cannot be realized until the security situation on the Korean Peninsula improves. Russian, South Korean and other investors will not risk building the trans-peninsula rail and pipeline links when Pyongyang could again block commerce or seize these assets with little warning and no compensation.

Countering nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism are likely to remain a shared concern for Moscow and Washington whoever becomes the next U.S. president. Unfortunately, Asian countries present some of the most serious challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Three of the four nuclear weapon countries that are not current NPT parties are in Asia, with India, Pakistan, and North Korea having all tested nuclear weapons while continuing to strengthen their nuclear arsenals. Russian concerns about nuclear terrorism emanating from Pakistan are perhaps even greater than those in Washington.

Moscow and Washington have a long history of leading global efforts to secure loose nuclear material, eliminate excess fissile materials, and prevent their current or former nuclear scientists from sharing their knowledge with rogue states. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism was launched by Putin and U.S. President George Bush on the sidelines of the 2006 G8 summit in St. Petersburg. Russian and American diplomats also led efforts in the UN Security Council to mandate that states make greater efforts to avert nuclear terrorism. Despite initial hesitations, Russia has now become a full member of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which seeks to mobilize and strengthen the international community's ability to curb trafficking in WMD and their means of delivery among states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

Russia and the United States will also need to do the heavy lifting to keep more countries out of the nuclear club. For example, they can continue to strengthen the safety and security functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and require recipients of their nuclear assistance to join the Agency's Additional Protocol, which authorizes the IAEA to conduct additional monitoring and inspections of suspicious nuclear activities that might indicate the presence of an illegal nuclear weapons program.



The United States shares an interest in involving Russia more in East Asian economic and security affairs. Russian policymakers are eager to deepen their national integration into the prosperous East Asian region, which will enhance the health of the Russian national economy in general and the economic recovery of the Russian Far East (RFE) in particular. Russia's trade with the major East Asian countries of China, Japan, and South Korea lags far behind these three states' economic exchanges with one another. During the APEC summit, Putin noted that, "Two-thirds of Russian territory is located in Asia, and yet the bulk of our foreign trade — more than 50 percent — comes from Europe, whereas Asia only accounts for 24 percent."

Similarly, the RFE lags behind western Russia economically and is becoming a security liability due to its diminishing ethnic Russian population, which creates a troublesome demographic imbalance along the Russia-China border. Securing greater Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean trade and investment would help stimulate the growth and modernization of Russia, especially in the RFE. But any enduring results will likely require Moscow to adopt a more attractive legal and regulatory environment for foreign companies.

The United States also wants Russia to become a more active Asian power to help manage the rise of China, such as by reinforcing calls to maintain freedom of the seas. An important priority for the next U.S. administration is to facilitate this process by helping resolve or dampen the territorial conflict between Russia and Japan, a close U.S. ally. Better ties between Moscow and Tokyo might prove to be the catalyst for a long-anticipated geopolitical realignment that sees Russia adopt a more guarded approach to the PRC's rise by strengthening ties with China's neighbors, including Japan. This repositioning would help manage the potentially disruptive consequences that could potentially result from the emergence of the new superpower along Russia's eastern borders.

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<http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/03/can-russia-and-the-u-s-come-together-over-asia/?all=true>

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The Korea Herald – South Korea  
OPINION/Columnist

## **A Nuclear-Armed S. Korea?**

October 4, 2012

By Lee Byong-chul

South Korean officials have recently realized that the United States is likely to try to forbid them from enriching uranium and expanding their country's missile range, rather than leave these issues on the diplomatic back burner. Indeed, recent discreet talks, in which the U.S. has disregarded South Korean efforts to supplement the controversial U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which expires in March 2014, suggest that there are reasons to be deeply worried about the alliance's future.

American negotiators — the reluctant midwives of South Korea's increasing responsibility in the field of atomic energy — remain steadfast in their opposition to South Korea's drive for improved defensive capabilities and a more advanced energy policy, despite the potential strategic benefits. But American nonproliferation experts do not anticipate progress on South Korea's efforts to win support for its preferred policies until the U.S. gains more leverage.

Such a stalemate is not new. Nuclear talks between the two countries have often been characterized by poor communication and a lack of understanding. While South Korean officials rarely say in public what they really think, it is widely believed that U.S. policymakers have little motivation to reconcile with South Korea's government right now — they would prefer to stifle South Korea's increasingly loud demands.

In the U.S.-South Korea relationship's heyday, American politicians considered the country an "extended arm of America." Such condescension may have been defensible when South Korea's military dictatorship needed America's



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political protection and security guarantee, but now the country is a beacon of democracy in East Asia. So, while South Koreans understand the need for compromise and cooperation, they believe that the time is right for a more balanced partnership.

This belief does not imply South Korean cynicism about nonproliferation. Rather, it reflects concern about a nuclear North Korea, compounded by anxiety over the recent U.S.-Japan missile-defense accord. Given that the U.S. and South Korea have the same assessment of the intelligence regarding North Korea's nuclear progress, not to mention South Korea's vulnerability, their failure to reach a practical agreement is troubling.

Former Deputy Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo warned an American official in 2010 that revising the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement could soon become a "defining issue" in South Korea-U.S. relations, and that it was already attracting "significant amounts of negative press attention." Given South Korea's status as one of the world's top five nuclear-power producers, Chun argued, the South Korean public would not tolerate the perception that Japan was receiving preferential treatment.

Indeed, right-wing leaders like Representative Chung Mong-joon of the governing Saenuri Party have been vocal in expressing their doubts about South Korea's current denuclearization policy, suggesting that a nuclear weapons program could prevent a second war on the peninsula. The conservatives seem to believe that American nuclear protection for South Korea is a thing of the past.

Despite their hawkish approach to North Korea's nuclear threats, South Korean officials know that uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing remains only a distant possibility. As a result, they are approaching negotiations skeptically, rather than emphasizing the sense of mutual obligation that should characterize the alliance.

But their pessimism is hardly groundless, given that the United Arab Emirates has already signed a similar agreement with the U.S. declaring that it would not produce nuclear fuel. Indeed, South Korean negotiators appear convinced that they will not be able to make any headway with the U.S. on the issue. (To be sure, this failure may not matter much, given South Korean scientists' past declaration that they will not contribute to any nuclear program that could be used for military purposes.)

The U.S.-South Korea debate over nuclear weapons should show both sides that their 59-year-old alliance urgently needs to be updated. Together, the allies can improve global prospects for nuclear nonproliferation, but only if they hammer out a grand bargain that accounts for South Korea's current — and future — security concerns.

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