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The Hill
DEFCON Hill Blog

Report: Iran's Nuke Work Moving Ahead of Schedule

By Carlo Muñoz
August 7, 2012

Iran's nuclear enrichment program is progressing faster than western intelligence had initially realized, raising the stakes in Tehran's showdown with the international community over the controversial program.

The assessment that Iran was ahead of schedule in its enrichment work is based on new information gathered by Israel and several other western intelligence agencies, according to reports by Israeli newspaper *Haaretz*.

Senior diplomats from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Israel have reportedly agreed the new-found information proves Iran's nuclear ambitions have far exceeded previous assessments by the United States and its allies, according to the report.

Citing sources with knowledge of western efforts to gain access to Tehran's nuclear facilities, signs of the advanced state of Iran's nuclear program began to emerge in February.

That month, Iranian officials denied inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency access to its nuclear facility in Parchin — where western officials believe the bulk of Iran's nuclear weapons work is taking place.

In July, European media reports claimed leaders of Iran's Revolutionary Guards had sent a team of nuclear scientists to assist with ongoing enrichment work on the country's nuclear facility in Lavizan, miles from Tehran.

At the Lavizan location, Iranian officials are suspected of developing nuclear warheads and detonators, according to those reports. IAEA inspectors visited the Lavizan base, in 2006. The military installation is part of the Iranian military's missile development agency, according to *Haaretz*.

Tehran has repeatedly claimed its nuclear work is strictly focused toward developing a new energy source for the country. However, western powers continue to argue Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon, citing the country's refusal to allow international inspectors access to its facilities.

Three subsequent meetings between Iranian diplomats and members of the P5+1 council — the five permanent United Nations Security Council members and Germany — have yielded little progress in shedding any light into Tehran's nuclear work.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that Israel will not hesitate to launch a preemptive attack against Iran's nuclear facilities, should it become clear Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons.

Officials from presumptive GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney's campaign said in July that the former Massachusetts governor would support Israel if it decided to launch an attack against Iran.

For its part, the Obama administration has repeatedly stated that military action remains an option, but has focused its efforts on sanctions and talks to convince the country's leaders to back off their ongoing nuclear work.

That said, U.S. military and intelligence officials have said publicly there has been no evidence that Iran has crossed any of the "red lines" that would prompt military action by American forces.

These so-called "red lines" are U.S. or Israeli-imposed limits on how far Iran can go in terms of advancing their nuclear program. Should Iran cross any one of these red lines, it could trigger an armed response by either Washington or Tel Aviv.

<http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/242577-report-irans-nuke-work-moving-ahead-of-schedule->

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Jerusalem Post – Israel

PM: If Iran Goes Nuclear, It May actually Use Bomb

“This is a regime that has broken every rule,” Netanyahu says. “They very likely could use weapons of mass death.”

By HERB KEINON

08 August 2012

If Iran gets a nuclear bomb it may actually use it, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said Monday, rejecting the notion that Tehran would act responsibly if it became a member of the world’s nuclear “club.”

Netanyahu, in a meeting with visiting Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr, spelled out five things that would likely happen, were Iran allowed to go nuclear: There will be nuclear proliferation in the Middle East as various other actors will then want to have a bomb; Iran will have a firmer hand on the “choke point of the world’s oil supply,” namely the Strait of Hormuz; there will be a magnification of global terrorism because the terrorists under Iran’s sway will believe that they have immunity; and Israel’s cities will be rocketed even more because those firing the rockets will feel that they enjoy a nuclear umbrella.

That the Iranians might actually use the bomb is a reality that cannot be denied, Netanyahu said.

“This is a regime that has broken every rule in the book,” he added. “They very likely could use weapons of mass death.”

Netanyahu said there was an illusion among many in the world that if Iran acquired nuclear weapons, it would behave responsibly like the world’s other nuclear states.

The prime minister, during the discussion dominated by the Iranian issue, said Iran is governed by a “fanatical regime” that sees itself on a sacred mission of global Islamic domination, and destroying Israel was just one step toward its larger vision.

Everyone talks about the cost of stopping Iran, “but they shouldn’t ignore the cost of not stopping Iran,” he said.

Netanyahu’s comments come a week after he said that the decision to attack Iran would be taken by the country’s elected political leadership, and not by the defense and security establishment.

Those remarks followed media reports of Israel’s top security officials being opposed to an Israeli attack without US backing.

In a television interview last week, Netanyahu said that he sees “the regime of the ayatollahs declaring what it has etched on its banner – to destroy us. It is working to destroy us, and is preparing atom bombs to destroy us. As much as it is dependent on me, I will not let that happen.”

<http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=280333>

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Ha’aretz Daily News – Israel

Obama Gets New U.S. NIE: Iran Making Surprising Progress Toward Nuclear Capability

National Intelligence Estimate backs Israel's view of surprising, significant progress; 2007 NIE report claimed Iran had suspended nuclear program.

By Barak Ravid

August 09, 2012

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President Barack Obama recently received a new National Intelligence Estimate report on the Iranian nuclear program, which shares Israel's view that Iran has made surprising, significant progress toward military nuclear capability, Western diplomats and Israeli officials have informed Haaretz.

This NIE report on Iran was supposed to have been submitted to Obama a few weeks ago, but it was revised to include new and alarming intelligence information about military components of Iran's nuclear program. Haaretz has learned that the report's conclusions are quite similar to those drawn by Israel's intelligence community.

The NIE report contends that Iran has made surprising, notable progress in the research and development of key components of its military nuclear program.

The NIE reports are the most important assessments compiled by the U.S. intelligence community and are submitted to the president and other top governmental officials. This NIE report was compiled by an inter-departmental team headed by director of National Intelligence James Clapper. Its contents articulate the views of American intelligence agencies.

In 2007, the NIE report on the Iranian issue included a non-classified abstract, but this time the White House decided to keep the new report's contents under wraps. There has been no clear disclosure of the very existence of the report and its submission to Obama.

The 2007 NIE report on Iran stunned Israel, many Western countries and even some White House officials. The report maintained that Iran suspended its military nuclear program in 2003, and that there was no conclusive proof of its revival.

Serious blow

The report's conclusions delivered a serious blow to the international campaign waged by Israel against the Iranian nuclear program. Israeli officials reasoned at the time that the NIE report's conclusions were influenced by the failure of the U.S. intelligence community with regard to rumors of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq's arsenal. Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, American intelligence analysts concluded that Saddam Hussein had continued his efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction; that assessment spurred President George W. Bush's war plans.

But after American forces occupied Iraq, it became clear that Saddam had suspended his nuclear program, as well as his chemical weapons program. This intelligence failure sparked public criticism in the U.S.

Israeli officials reasoned in 2007 that American intelligence and defense officials were concerned that Bush would launch a war against Iran, concurrent to U.S. military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and so these U.S. intelligence experts concluded in the 2007 document that a drive by Tehran to develop nuclear weapons could not be conclusively demonstrated.

In response to inquiries, Tommy Vietor, the Spokesman for the National Security Council at the White House said that he "is not going to comment on intelligence matters like this."

<http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/obama-gets-new-u-s-nie-iran-making-surprising-progress-toward-nuclear-capability.premium-1.456921>

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New York Times
August 9, 2012

U.S. and Gulf Allies Pursue a Missile Shield Against Iranian Attack

By THOM SHANKER
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WASHINGTON — The United States and its Arab allies are knitting together a regional missile defense system across the Persian Gulf to protect cities, oil refineries, pipelines and military bases from an Iranian attack, according to government officials and public documents.

It is an enterprise that is meant to send a pointed message to Tehran, and that becomes more urgent as tensions with Iran rise. But it will require partner nations in the gulf to put aside rivalries, share information and coordinate their individual arsenals of interceptor missiles to create a defensive shield encompassing all the regional allies.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, among the first to raise the need for the missile shield three years ago, sought to spur the gulf allies on during a recent visit to Saudi Arabia.

“We can do even more to defend the gulf through cooperation on ballistic missile defense,” she said during a session in March of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

“Sometimes to defend one nation effectively you might need a radar system in a neighboring nation,” she said, adding, “But it’s the cooperation — it’s what they call ‘interoperability’ — that we now need to really roll up our sleeves and get to work on.”

That would include deploying radars to increase the range of early warning coverage across the Persian Gulf, as well as introducing command, control and communications systems that could exchange that information with missile interceptors whose triggers are held by individual countries.

For that purpose, the Pentagon late last year announced a contract for the sale of two advanced missile defense radars to the United Arab Emirates. And early this year, officials disclosed that a similar high-resolution, X-band missile defense radar would be located in Qatar, as well.

The objective in the gulf is shared by a more widely publicized missile defense shield being installed in Europe: to deter any Iranian attack and, if required, to blunt the effect of missiles launched against allied territory and American forces.

But the similarities end there. The administration’s European initiatives have been embraced by NATO and are being put into place after formal negotiations with countries that will host early warning radars, ground-based interceptors and Navy warships equipped to track ballistic missiles and shoot them down.

In contrast, the Persian Gulf effort is mostly behind the scenes — and on a country-by-country basis — with billions of dollars in arms sales negotiated bilaterally between the United States and nations in the region. Thus, the next challenge is coaxing gulf nations to put aside their rivalries and share early warning radar data, and then integrate the capabilities of their unilateral missile interceptor systems to extend defenses over the entire region.

While officials would not provide a full list of the weapons sales, a study of the public record — Defense Department contract announcements, foreign arms transfer notifications required by law and studies conducted for Congress — offered a detailed picture of the American initiatives.

If the planned European missile defense system is growing from a full engineering blueprint, the approach in the Persian Gulf is more like assembling a jigsaw puzzle. And with the latest arms sales, important pieces are coming together that, when connected, will bring toward fruition a project that American officials have pursued for years.

Three weeks ago the Pentagon announced the newest addition to Persian Gulf missile defense systems, informing Congress of a plan to sell Kuwait \$4.2 billion in weaponry, including 60 Patriot Advanced Capability missiles, 20 launching platforms and 4 radars. This will be in addition to Kuwait’s arsenal of 350 Patriot missiles bought between 2007 and 2010.

The United Arab Emirates acquired more than \$12 billion in missile defense systems in the past four years, documents show. In December, the Pentagon announced a contract to provide the Emirates with two advanced missile defense launchers for a system called the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, valued at about \$2 billion, including radars and

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command systems. An accompanying contract to supply an arsenal of interceptor missiles for the system was valued at another \$2 billion, according to Pentagon documents.

Saudi Arabia also has bought a significant arsenal of Patriot systems, the latest being \$1.7 billion in upgrades last year.

The United States' own military forces provide a core capability for ballistic missile defenses in the Persian Gulf, in particular the American Navy vessels with advanced tracking radars and interceptor missiles. According to Navy officials, these Aegis missile defense systems, carried aboard both cruisers and destroyers, are in the region on continuous deployments.

And the United States has deployed a number of land-based missile defense systems to defend specific American military facilities located around the gulf.

Even so, the challenges to creating an integrated regional missile defense system are both technological and political.

On the technical side, no missile defense system can promise 100 percent effectiveness. And the task is made more difficult by the fact that the capability emerging in the Persian Gulf is more ad hoc than the carefully designed architecture for Europe. Also, Iran is increasing both the type and number of missiles it is fielding.

Political challenges stem from historic rivalries, prompting the Persian Gulf partner nations to enhance their security through bilateral relationships with the United States. And while all six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council share concerns over Iran, all have resisted multilateral security initiatives.

Kitty Bennett contributed reporting.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/world/middleeast/us-and-gulf-allies-pursue-a-missile-shield-against-iranian-attack.html?_r=1

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Trend News Agency – Azerbaijan

U.S. Believes Iran Not on Verge of Nuclear Weapon

10 August 2012

The United States still believes that Iran is not on the verge of having a nuclear weapon and that Tehran has not made a decision to pursue one, U.S. officials said, Reuters reported.

Their comments came after Israeli media reports claimed U.S. President Barack Obama had received a new National Intelligence Estimate saying Iran had made significant and surprising progress toward military nuclear capability.

Later, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak suggested that the new U.S. report, which he acknowledged might be something other than a National Intelligence Estimate, "transforms the Iranian situation into an even more urgent one."

But a White House National Security Council spokesman disputed the Israeli reports, saying the U.S. intelligence assessment of Iran's nuclear activities had not changed since intelligence officials delivered testimony to Congress on the issue earlier this year.

"We believe that there is time and space to continue to pursue a diplomatic path, backed by growing international pressure on the Iranian government," the spokesman said. "We continue to assess that Iran is not on the verge of achieving a nuclear weapon."

U.S. officials would not directly comment on whether there was a new National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, which is a compilation of views of the various U.S. intelligence agencies.

The last formal NIE on Iran in 2007, partially made public by the administration of President George W. Bush, became highly controversial because it said Tehran had halted nuclear weaponization work in 2003, although other aspects of



the overall program continued. A later update to that report retained that central assessment, sources have previously said.

James Clapper, U.S. director of national intelligence, said in congressional testimony in January: "We assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons."

Another U.S. official said the United States regularly exchanges intelligence reporting with its allies, which would include Israel.

The United States has been concerned that Israel may conduct a unilateral strike on Iran's nuclear sites, adding to turmoil in the Middle East.

Israel sees an atomic armed Iran as a threat to its existence and there is persistent speculation over whether it will launch a pre-emptive military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Tehran denies it is trying to build nuclear bombs, saying it is enriching uranium only for peaceful purposes.

Washington has tightened sanctions on Iran and sought to ramp up international diplomatic pressure to curb Tehran's nuclear ambitions.

Israel, widely believed to have the Middle East's only nuclear arsenal, says little time remains before Iran achieves a "zone of immunity" in which Israeli bombs would be unable to penetrate deeply buried uranium enrichment facilities.

<http://en.trend.az/news/nuclearp/2055067.html>

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Bloomberg Businessweek

North Korea Able to Test Nukes in Two Weeks, Study Says

By David Lerman

August 08, 2012

North Korea is technically capable of conducting a nuclear test in as little as two weeks, according to a study published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Commercial satellite imagery shows an underground tunnel has been prepared for containing a nuclear explosion near the sites used for the regime's two earlier tests in 2006 and 2009, according to the study written by Siegfried Hecker, a scholar on North Korea's nuclear program at Stanford University in California, and Frank Pabian, a geospatial information analyst at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

A third test would be the first authorized by new North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, who took power after the death of his father in December. A demonstration of the country's nuclear capability would raise tensions on the Korean Peninsula at the same time the U.S. and Israel are threatening possible military action to thwart Iran's advances toward being able to produce its first atomic weapon.

South Korea said in April that the North may conduct a nuclear test to bolster public support at home after the failure of a long-range missile launch. While North Korea in May denied immediate plans for a nuclear test, it said two months later that it is reviewing its nuclear capabilities against South Korean and U.S. threats.

"We cannot rule out the possibility that the technological and military benefits may sway Pyongyang to test again," the scientists wrote. Hecker has visited North Korea to assess its nuclear program, although the study is based on commercial satellite imagery and other publicly available information.

Two Explosions?



The Unification Ministry in Seoul declined to comment on the report's findings and on whether it spotted any recent nuclear weapons developments, spokeswoman Park Soo Jin told reporters yesterday.

The underground tunnel that would be used in a new nuclear test "apparently has been under construction since 2009 and significant activity was reported at the tunnel site after the failed April space launch," the authors said.

The scientists also raise the possibility that North Korea would conduct two detonations simultaneously, with one bomb made from plutonium, as in previous tests, and the other made from highly enriched uranium.

"Two detonations will yield much more technical information than one, and they will be no more damaging politically than if North Korea conducted a single test," the report found.

Circumstantial Evidence

Still, evidence of North Korea possessing highly enriched uranium "is only circumstantial," the scientists wrote.

The North Korean regime disclosed a uranium enrichment plant in November 2010, theoretically providing it with a second means to create nuclear weapons, in addition to plutonium.

The scientists said a new test "would greatly increase the likelihood that Pyongyang could fashion warheads to fit at least some of its missiles -- a circumstance that would vastly increase the threat its nuclear program poses to the security of Northeast Asia."

While Kim weighs the political costs of a nuclear test, "it is imperative for Washington, Beijing and their partners in the six-party talks to join forces to increase the costs on North Korea of continued testing," Hecker and Pabian wrote.

The talks involving China, Japan, Russia, the U.S. and the two Koreas began in 2003 and haven't resumed since 2008.

The Group of Eight world leaders warned in a statement following their May summit that North Korea will face additional international sanctions from the United Nations Security Council if it takes provocative actions such as proceeding with a nuclear test.

The U.S. has publicly sought to deter North Korea from testing. "We are concerned about any potential for provocative action taken by North Korea," Defense Department spokesman George Little told reporters last month at the Pentagon.

<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-08-08/north-korea-able-to-test-nukes-in-two-weeks-study-says>

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Pakistan Observer – Pakistan
Monday, August 06, 2012

India's 'K-15 Black Project'

By Marya Mufty

Lahore -- If there was any arms race in the region, India has won it, at whatever the cost may be. But the claims to have good neighbourly relations, with MFN-status, no-war pact or no-first-use nuclear arsenal are just a dream seemingly never to come true.

In April this year India yanked open the door of the exclusive ICBM (International Ballistic Missile) club with the first test of Agni-V. Now, if DRDO is to be believed, India has quietly gate-crashed into an even more exclusive club of nuclear-tipped submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The most ironic part of this achievement on part of India is that New Delhi had been able to successfully keep it as a secret 'black project'.

The annual awards function of the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) the other day witnessed Prime Minister Manmohan Singh handing over the "technology leadership award" to a scientist, A K Chakrabarti, of the Hyderabad-based DRDL lab, for the "successful development" of the country's first SLBM. This capability has been



acquired only by four nations, the US, Russia, France and China. Long shrouded in secrecy as a “black project”, unlike the surface-to-surface nuclear missiles like Agni, the SLBM may now finally come out of the closet. Called different names at different developmental phases, which included “Sagarika” for an extended period, the SLBM in question is the ‘K-15’ missile with a 750-km strike range. Much like the over 5,000-km Agni-V that will be fully operational by 2015 after four-to-five “repeatable tests”, the K-15 is also still some distance away from being deployed. While the SLBM may be fully-ready and undergoing production now, as DRDO contends after conducting its test several times from submersible pontoons, its carrier INS Arihant will take at least a year before it’s ready for “deterrent patrols”.

India’s first indigenous nuclear-powered submarine, the 6,000-tonne INS Arihant, is still undergoing “harbor-acceptance trials” with all its pipelines being cleared and tested meticulously on shore-based steam before its miniature 83 MW pressurized light-water reactor goes “critical”. The submarine will then undergo extensive “sea-acceptance trials” and test-fire the 10-tonne K-15, which can carry a one-tonne nuclear payload, from the missile silos on its hump.

The sea-based nuclear leg in the shape of SLBMs is much more effective — as also survivable being relatively immune to pre-emptive strikes — than the air or land ones. Nuclear-powered submarines, which are capable of operating silently underwater for months at end, armed with nuclear-tipped missiles are, therefore, considered the most potent and credible leg of the triad. With even the US and Russia ensuring that two-thirds of the strategic warheads they eventually retain under arms reduction agreements will be SLBMs, India with a clear “no-first use” nuclear doctrine needs such survivable second-strike capability to achieve credible strategic deterrence.

<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=168293>

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Times of India – India

India's Elusive Nuclear Triad will be Operational Soon: Navy Chief

By Rajat Pandit, Tamil News Network (TNN)

August 8, 2012

NEW DELHI: India's nuclear triad - the ability to fire nukes from land, air and sea - will soon be in place. After some delays and hiccups, the country's first nuclear submarine INS Arihant is getting ready "to go to sea" within the next few months.

"INS Arihant is steadily progressing towards becoming operational...we are pretty close to putting it to sea (for extensive trials and missile firings)," announced Navy chief Admiral Nirmal Verma on Tuesday.

"Navy is poised to complete the triad, and our maritime and nuclear doctrines will then be aligned to ensure our nuclear insurance comes from the sea. Given our unequivocal 'no first-use commitment', a retaliatory strike capability that is credible and invulnerable is an imperative," he added.

The Navy chief's emphatic statement comes a week after DRDO officially declared the country's first-ever SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) or the K-15 missile, with a strike range of 750-km, was "ready for induction".

India has for some time possessed the Agni series of ballistic missiles as well as fighter-bombers to constitute the land and air-based legs of the triad. The long-elusive underwater leg, considered the most effective for both pre-emptive as well as retaliatory strikes, now finally seems to be taking shape with INS Arihant and its two follow-on SSBNs (nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic nuclear-tipped missiles).

The 6,000-tonne submarine, which has four missile silos on its hump to carry either 12 K-15s or four of the under-development 3,500-km range K-4 missiles, will head for sea only after its 83 MW pressurized light-water reactor goes "critical". So far, it has been undergoing systematic checks of all its sub-systems as well as "harbour-acceptance trials" on shore-based steam at Vizag.



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With 46 warships and submarines being constructed, and another 49 in the pipeline under overall plans worth Rs 2.73 lakh crore, Admiral Verma said, "Today, I am confident we do not suffer asymmetries with anyone. We have the wherewithal to defend our maritime interests."

Brushing aside questions on the new US strategy to "rebalance" forces towards the Asia-Pacific as well as China's growing maritime might and assertiveness, the Navy chief said India's "primary" area of strategic interest lay between the Gulf and Malacca Strait, extending "down south to the Cape of Good Hope".

While India is not going to "actively deploy" in the contentious South China Sea, where China is enmeshed in territorial disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and others, he said "all the players" there should ensure hostilities do not erupt in the region and hit global shipping and trade.

Turning to maritime terrorism, Admiral Verma said both the Navy and Coast Guard were now much better prepared and equipped to tackle 26/11-like attacks from outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba. "Even before Abu Jundal (key 26/11 handler) said it, we had factored in such possibilities," he said.

"Terrorism from the sea and terrorism at sea are now realities of our times. In our external environment, one of our core concerns is the coalescing of the 'state' with 'non-state' entities," he added.

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indias-elusive-nuclear-triad-will-be-operational-soon-Navy-chief/articleshow/15396539.cms>

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Sahara Samay – India

India under Threat from Pakistan Nuclear Weapons

09 August 2012

Primarily aimed at India, Pakistan is making qualitative and quantitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal and "could increase the number of circumstances under which it would be willing to use nuclear weapons," a Congressional report has said.

Pakistan appears to be increasing its fissile production capability and improving its delivery vehicles in order to hedge against possible increases in India's nuclear arsenal.

"Islamabad may also accelerate its current nuclear weapons efforts," the independent Congressional Research Service (CRS) said in a report.

In addition to making qualitative and quantitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan could increase the number of circumstances under which it would be willing to use nuclear weapons, the report said.

In its latest report, prepared for the US lawmakers, CRS said that Pakistan's nuclear weapons program is mainly aimed to address the threat perception it has from India and thus act as a deterrent from India.

"India has stated that it needs only a "credible minimum deterrent", but has never defined what it means by such a deterrent and has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," it said, adding that Pakistani officials have stated that the government may need to increase significantly its nuclear arsenal in response to possible Indian plans to do the same.

Besides lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons, Pakistan may also consider fielding non-strategic nuclear weapons in order to increase the credibility of its nuclear deterrent versus Indian conventional military operations. Dated July 23, the CRS in its report said Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger.

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"Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles," it said, adding these steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal.

"Whether and to what extent Pakistan's current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 US-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. "Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its 'minimum credible deterrent' is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan," CRS said.

<http://english.samaylive.com/world-news/676510929/india-under-threat-from-pakistan-nuclear-weapons.html>

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International Business Times (IBT)

India Successfully Test-Fires Nuclear Capable Ballistic Missile- Agni II

By IBT Reporter

09 August 2012

In a step forward in the missile proliferation, India on Thursday successfully test-fired nuclear capable Agni II, 2000 km range ballistic missile, from the wheeler island off the coast of Odisha.

The Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile carrying a ton of dummy payload, was fired from mobile launcher at 8.46 a.m, which achieved a maximum range of 2000 km.

Agni II, Indigenously developed by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), has already been commissioned into the arsenal of Indian Armed Forces. The development of Agni-II missile had begun in 1979 and it became part of India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) in 1983.

Thursday's test fire was carried out by Strategic Forces Command as part of the training exercise to ensure preparedness.

"The two-stage solid-propelled missile followed a text-book trajectory and zeroed in on to a pre-determined target point in the Bay of Bengal with a single to two digit accuracy after a 700-second flight," a top DRDO official told *The Hindu*.

"The re-entry systems worked well and all other systems functioned perfectly. The electro-optical systems and telemetry stations tracked and monitored the missile's flight path. Two ships stationed in the vicinity of the target point witnessed the terminal event," the official added.

Last month, the Strategic Forces Command also test-fired Agni 1, India's 700 km range ballistic missile. It was a textbook launch, meeting all mission objectives and the missile reached the target point in the Bay of Bengal following the prescribed trajectory.

India has been rapidly developing its missile arsenals and its image as nuclear-armed country surged to a new level after the successful launch of Agni-V, a solid fueled Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), in April. Agni-V was a milestone in India's ballistic missile technology, which is capable of reaching deep into Asia and Europe.

<http://www.ibtimes.co.in/articles/371912/20120809/agni-ballistic-missile-nuclear-capable-drdo-army.htm>

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RIA Novosti Russian Information Agency

First Borey Class Subs to be Deployed in Pacific

8 August 2012

Issue No. 1019, 10 August 2012

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Russia's first two Borey class strategic submarines will be ultimately deployed with the Pacific Fleet, First Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Sukhorukov said on Wednesday.

The Yury Dolgoruky and the Alexander Nevsky vessels are undertaking test runs in the White Sea and are expected to be commissioned by the end of 2012.

"I am absolutely certain that the first two subs will be initially placed with the Northern Fleet and will be redeployed to the Pacific Fleet after all the infrastructure there is ready," Sukhorukov said.

Two more Borey class submarines are under construction at the Sevmash shipyard in the port city of Severodvinsk on the White Sea.

The Russian Navy is expected to receive at least ten Borey class submarines by 2020.

The submarines, to be armed with Bulava ballistic missiles, will constitute the core of Russia's strategic submarine force after 2018.

MOSCOW, August 8 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20120808/175074099.html

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Air Defense Forces to Get New Defense Systems by 2020

10 August 2012

All the Russian Air Force's air defense missile units will be reequipped with modern S-400 (SA-21 Growler), S-300V4 Vityaz (SA-12 Gladiator) and short-range Pantsyr-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) gun/missile air defense systems by 2020, Air Force Commander Maj. Gen. Viktor Bondarev said on Friday.

"By 2020 we plan to reequip all units of Russian air defense missile units with modern S-400, Vityaz and short-range gun and Pantsyr-S1 air defense systems," Bondarev said at a conference.

Russia's modern air defense systems are as good as, or even better than their foreign analogs, he said.

MOSCOW, August 10 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20120810/175114679.html

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RT (formerly "Russia Today") – Russia

Warsaw Blasts US Missile Defense Deal

06 August 6, 2012

By Robert Bridge, RT

In a sign of shifting loyalties, the Polish president has slammed his government's former decision to deploy elements of a US missile defense system on its territory, calling it "a mistake."

The agreement to deploy US ballistic missiles on Polish territory was "a political mistake" that failed to take into account the inherent political risks of the deal, said President Bronislaw Komorowski.

The deal, according to Komorowski, held Poland hostage to the foreign-policy whims of US politics

"Our mistake was that, while accepting the US proposal, we have not taken into account a political risk related to the change of the US President," Komorowski said. "We have paid a too high political price for that."

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Komorowski is not opposed to the general idea of missile defense, and argued that Poland needs its own anti-missile shield in an interview with Wprost magazine published on Saturday.

"We must have this element of the Polish defense (missile defense system)," he said. "Spending large sums on military hardware is actually meaningless if it is not secured from... missile attack and air raids."

Any Polish system must also be a part of the existing European missile defense system, Komorowski added.

Washington's original plans for a European missile defense system – the brainchild of former US President George W. Bush – called for a battery of ten ballistic missiles on Polish territory, directed by a radar installation in the Czech Republic. President Obama, in one of his first initiatives as president, agreed to shelve the system after heated criticism from Moscow.

It soon emerged that the Obama administration intended to build a new missile defense system that was every bit as dangerous – at least from Moscow's perspective – as Bush's proposal. Russia has repeatedly warned Washington that, barring Russian participation in the project, Moscow would view the system as a threat to its national security.

The rejection of the project was not well received in Warsaw, which took a sizeable domestic political risk endorsing the plan: According to a government poll, 57% of Poles were opposed to the idea of their country hosting a US missile defense system.

"It's not that we need the shield, but it's about the way we're treated here," former Polish President Lech Walesa said on Polish TV, shortly after the US announced its decision to shelve the first system.

European leaders were eager to join NATO in the new missile scheme, despite domestic and international opposition. Komorowski's remarks concerning the political risks of hosting US ballistic missiles amid changing political weather came shortly after US Republican challenger Mitt Romney called Russia "America's number-one geopolitical foe."

Warsaw likely has no desire to be caught in the middle of a showdown – rhetorical or otherwise – between two nuclear powers.

Washington's commitment to build a worldwide missile defense system has sparked heavy international anxiety and animosity. Moscow has already deployed its 'S-400' missile defense system in Kaliningrad, a western Russian exclave that nestled between Poland and Lithuania. The Polish President's statement suggests that fears of a new arms race are mounting, as the unintended consequences of the US missile defense system are beginning to be felt through the region.

<http://rt.com/politics/warsaw-us-missile-defense-russia-972/>

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Boston Globe

US General Asks Cut in Nuclear Stockpile

Says arsenal is too large, costly

By Bryan Bender, Globe Staff

August 6, 2012

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon calls the stockpile an "active reserve." Others call it a hidden nuclear arsenal. International arms control treaties do not apply to it and officials rarely discuss it publicly. But now, the nation's backup supply of nuclear weapons may be next up for major cuts.

For the first time a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is suggesting the United States' nuclear weapons reserve is too large and becoming too expensive to maintain.



“We have more backup systems in terms of weapons systems than we actually have deployed,” General Norton A. Schwartz, chief of staff of the Air Force, told the Globe in a recent interview. “Some of that is a reasonable hedge [but] there is probably room for reductions.”

The call by Schwartz to consider cutting the stockpile is supported by the findings of a report cowritten in May by retired Marine Corps General James Cartright, who had been in charge of all nuclear weapons. The report recommended that the United States during the next 10 years reduce its nuclear force to a total of 900 weapons, half of them on alert and half in reserve.

An offer to substantially reduce the reserve arsenal, arms control specialists said, could be a bargaining chip in future negotiations with Russia, which considers the arsenal a threat to the nuclear parity that is central to ensuring stability between the two former foes.

Cartright’s report indicates that the US arsenal of reserve warheads is about 2,800 — significantly larger than the deployed force, which is about 1,700 warheads mounted in silos, aboard submarines, and available to be dropped from aircraft. Russia has about 2,000 warheads in reserve.

The size of the reserve stock is a legacy of the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union, locked in a global nuclear standoff, maintained tens of thousands of warheads in the event of an all-out nuclear exchange. Having a large reserve was considered an insurance policy against the possibility that the weapons on alert might malfunction or the remote possibility that a surprise attack could wipe out US silos and nuclear bomber bases.

Both countries are steadily reducing their deployed forces; the weapons now on alert, for example, are slated to come down to no more than 1,550 by 2018 under a treaty with Russia.

Any move to substantially cut the US nuclear reserves probably will bring strong opposition from members of Congress with nuclear weapons contractors in their districts. Opposition is also expected from some national security experts who think the United States must maintain overwhelming nuclear superiority to deter nations like Iran believed to be seeking nuclear weapons, and ensure smaller nuclear powers like China do not try to reach parity.

A third group has argued that the large US arsenal is also needed to guarantee the security of dozens of US allies without nuclear arms.

In a critique published this month, Mark Schneider of the National Institute for Public Policy said relying on a substantially smaller arsenal of deployed and reserve weapons akin to the Cartwright proposals would be too risky.

“This smaller, less-ready force will be tasked with deterring or defeating a difficult and toughening set of targets,” wrote Schneider, a former Pentagon director of strategic defense.

Thus far, the backup systems — in the form of different types of warheads stored at air and naval bases — have received little attention even though arms control specialists maintain they remain destabilizing.

Russia views the larger US reserve arsenal as a particular threat and has kept its own stockpiles high in response, said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, a nonpartisan Washington think tank.

Russia has also maintained a larger arsenal of smaller, tactical nuclear arms for battlefield use. The United States could trade reductions in its reserve stocks for cuts in Russia’s tactical weapons, Kimball said.

There is also a mounting financial incentive to reduce the stockpile.

On average, the weapons — the US military maintains seven types of nuclear warheads — are several decades old and require upgrades to ensure their reliability and safety. Additional measures are taken to ensure they are not vulnerable to sabotage or theft.

“We can save money and logistics costs if we could get at the reserve,” said Jon Wolfsthal, who until last spring served as a top adviser to Vice President Joe Biden on arms control and nonproliferation.



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Cartright's report said there is little strategic value in having so many warheads. The current overall stockpiles "vastly exceed what is needed to satisfy reasonable requirements of deterrence between the two countries as well as vis-à-vis third countries whose nuclear arsenals pale in comparison quantitatively," said the report, published by Global Zero, an international coalition seeking to eliminate nuclear weapons.

"The deployed forces of 450 warheads would be de-alerted and require a small number of days [24-72 hours] to become launch ready," it added. "Most of the 450 reserve warheads could be taken from storage and loaded on delivery vehicles within weeks to months."

The White House is studying the prospects for dramatic new reductions in the overall arsenal, according to officials knowledgeable about the review.

Kimball said he believes in the next round of US-Russian reductions, the Obama administration wants the next agreement to address not just deployed weapons but also the backup stocks. But that would require some key decisions that the administration and Congress have been unwilling to do, experts say.

For one, the United States needs more capacity to dismantle nuclear weapons. A facility in Amarillo, Texas, is now upgrading the warheads for the active force as well as destroying older weapons.

"We are running that dismantlement program at full capacity," Schwartz said.

But Wolfsthal, who is now deputy director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, estimates that the dismantlement capacity could be swiftly increased at the Texas facility, known as Pantex, for a fraction of the cost to maintain and upgrade the reserve weapons.

For example, he said, it will cost roughly \$10 billion during the next decade to upgrade the inventory of B-61, the primary thermonuclear weapon in the US arsenal.

"For 1 percent of that you could speed up dismantlement by half," he said. "You can dismantle them quick if we spend a little more but no one has taken on that issue."

http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2012/08/06/top_air_force_officer_backup_supply_of_nuclear_warheads_larger_than_needed/?page=full

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The Hill

Lugar Visits Moscow to Press for Renewal of Nuclear Pact

By Julian Pecquet

August 6, 2012

Sen. Dick Lugar (R-Ind.) left for Moscow on Monday as part of a three-nation trip during which he'll press for extending his signature Nunn-Lugar disarmament agreement, which expires next year.

Lugar is also slated to travel to Ukraine and Georgia as part of his annual oversight visits to verify the implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. He authored the program with then-Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) in 1991 to provide countries of the former Soviet Union with funding and expertise to dismantle their weapons of mass destruction programs.

"My visit comes at a time of considerable stress in our bilateral relationship with Russia, great challenges in Ukraine and tremendous opportunity in Georgia," he said in a statement announcing the trip. "The constant basis for cooperation against existential threats in all three nations has been the Nunn-Lugar program, which has endured despite great differences and dramatic changes.

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"Renewing the umbrella agreement with Russia is important to continuing the WMD destruction that is in both of our national interests. The Nunn-Lugar program is also a critical element of our military-to-military and security cooperation with Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia as we face global security challenges."

In Ukraine, Lugar is expected to verify that the last rocket motors left over from Soviet days are being eliminated, while urging the continued reduction of biological weapons. And in Georgia, he will review the country's partnership with the U.S. Army.

Lugar, the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was defeated in the Republican primary earlier this year.

<http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/europe/242369-lugar-visits-moscow-to-press-for-renewal-of-nuclear-pact>

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Sydney Morning Herald – Australia

US Blueprint for War with China Flawed and could Spark Nuclear Strikes, Says Expert

August 9, 2012

By Dylan Welch, National Security Correspondent

THE US government might like to deny it, but Barack Obama's former intelligence chief has confirmed China is a principal target of a major US war plan.

The American plan, known in Washington as Air-Sea Battle, is strategically flawed, Australia's foremost regional defence expert, Hugh White, said, and risks escalating a US-China struggle to the level of nuclear strikes. It is also known to have angered the Chinese military, and the confirmation is likely to be viewed with displeasure in Beijing.

The confirmation was provided by Admiral Dennis Blair, a straight-talking Asia expert who until 2010 was Mr Obama's director of national intelligence. Before that he led the US Pacific Command, which represents about a fifth of the US military machine.

His answers were in response to questions posed by the *Herald* about Air-Sea Battle, a Pentagon strategy designed to knock out an enemy's long-range surveillance radar and precision missiles, followed by a blistering air and sea assault.

When asked about Air-Sea Battle and whether it directly related to China, Admiral Blair said: "I'm not in the Pentagon anymore, so I can't say [what] that [is] in particular, but it doesn't take any classified piece of information to let you know that countries like Iran and China ... have taken advantage of technology in terms of submarines and missiles to be able to keep US maritime and air forces at a distance."

As a result, he said, it was the job of US military commanders to "figure out ways that we can send our forces to conduct military operations despite these sorts of threats".

It is widely understood Iran would pose very little threat to a full-scale US military campaign, and Air-Sea Battle is unofficially acknowledged in Washington as the central tenet of American plans to deal with an aggressive and heavily armed China.

"I don't doubt for a moment ... that the real target of the Air-Sea Battle is China," said Professor White, the author of a just-published book on the US-China relationship, *The China Choice*.

Professor White is also a strong critic of Air-Sea Battle, which he says has three fundamental problems. "Firstly, I don't think it will work; second, even if it does work operationally it won't achieve its strategic aims; and thirdly it runs a very strong sense of escalating to a nuclear war."

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Professor White said the battle plan was also an old 20th century concept that is being repackaged for a 21st century enemy.

"The US has always done sea control in the Pacific, but what's changed? The enemy has changed. And he has a boat, as they say," Professor White said.

Admiral Blair also believes it is an old strategy that has been repackaged.

"The concept is nothing new, in typical American fashion we often pour the old wine into new bottles with fancy new labels. But the navy and air force co-operating to be able to get to our allies that are within range of Chinese missiles is nothing new, and most Americans expect that to be their job."

<http://www.smh.com.au/world/us-blueprint-for-war-with-china-flawed-and-could-spark-nuclear-strikes-says-expert-20120808-23uom.html>

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Washington Post

Book Details Soviet Plans to Wage Germ Warfare with Lethal 'Designer' Strains

By Joby Warrick
August 8, 2012

In the Soviet playbook for all-out war with the United States, the wasting of U.S. cities by nuclear bombs was to be followed by something equally horrifying: waves of plagues to kill any survivors. Soviet scientists spent decades preparing for the second attack, concocting new kinds of biological weapons more lethal than any ever invented.

None of these weapons were used during the Cold War, but a new book suggests that the dangers posed by the program never completely abated. The authors reveal new details about the deadly achievements of Soviet weapons scientists — from multiple-drug-resistant anthrax to "stealth" bugs that elude detection — and they say the strains probably still exist inside the freezers of military laboratories inside Russia.

The book also suggests that U.S. intelligence operatives may have inadvertently fueled the Soviets' experimentation with germ warfare, in part by spreading false stories that convinced communist leaders that the United States was also secretly making such weapons after the U.S. program was officially halted in 1969.

At minimum, Soviet officials appear to have increased production of an anthrax weapon because they falsely believed that the United States was doing the same, contend the authors of "The Soviet Biological Weapons Program," an exhaustively researched, 890-page history of the Soviet Union's 65-year effort to develop the tools for germ warfare.

"It may have led to the massive expansion of the Soviet *b. anthracis* program," write Milton Leitenberg and Raymond Zilinskas, scientists and biological weapons experts who interviewed some of the Soviet Union's former top bioweaponers during more than a decade of research for the book.

Russia maintains a policy of official denial with regard to Soviet-era production of bioweapons, which were banned by an international treaty signed by the Soviet Union in 1972. But former Russian president Boris Yeltsin confirmed the existence of a secret Soviet program to top U.S. officials in the early 1990s, and since then, defectors, former Soviet scientists, U.S. officials and journalists have published extensive accounts.

Such reports revealed the outlines of a vast program that employed tens of thousands of people at its peak, and they also shed light on the 1979 industrial accident in a bioweapons plant in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk, in which anthrax spores spread through a residential area, killing at least 68 people.

Leitenberg and Zilinskas draw from hundreds of interviews, documents and intelligence files to generate a catalogue of the Soviet bioweapons arsenal and its intended use. Among their book's revelations is an account of a largely

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successful Soviet effort to engineer deadly new strains, such as drug-resistant forms of the bacteria that cause anthrax and tularemia.

In one of their more chilling accomplishments, Soviet scientists learned to alter microbes to give them stealthy characteristics, the authors say. The bacteria that cause plague, for instance — *Yersinia pestis* — were modified so that standard medical tests could not detect an infection until the disease had progressed to an advanced stage, the authors say.

Similar changes were made to a strain of the bacteria that cause Legionnaire's disease. In the altered state, the bacteria would stimulate the body's immune response to conceal symptoms of the disease, while simultaneously secreting a toxin that attacks a critical component of the nervous system known as myelin.

"The destruction of myelin . . . induces an illness similar to multiple sclerosis, but with a quick death," the authors state.

Despite such achievements, the Soviet program suffered from deficiencies and gaps, including a failure to perfect delivery vehicles such as missile warheads.

The gaps suggest that Soviet leaders were conflicted over how and when to use such weapons. One theory, explored by the authors, is that biological weapons were "developed not for military purposes, but for sabotage or terrorism."

Details about the dismantling of the bioweapons program after the Soviet Union's collapse have been kept secret for two decades. Despite repeated requests, Russian officials also have refused to allow outside access to three biological laboratories operated by the Defense Ministry.

The labs were part of the Soviet-era program, and it is "reasonable to conclude" that collections of microbes from the weapons program are warehoused there, in the same way that disease strains are kept in heavily guarded military and civilian laboratories in the United States, the authors say. They add that the lack of any transparency raises concerns about the security of the collections and the possibility of continuing research.

"One must assume that whatever genetically engineered bacterial and viral forms were created . . . remain stored in the culture collections of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense," the authors write.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/book-details-soviet-plans-to-wage-germ-warfare-with-lethal-designer-strains/2012/08/08/7d69b8b8-e0b1-11e1-a421-8bf0f0e5aa11_story.html

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Washington Times

Inside the Ring: Stratcom on Cyberwar

By Bill Gertz - The Washington Times

Wednesday, August 8, 2012

The commander of the U.S. Strategic Command said Wednesday that U.S. military forces are prepared to engage in offensive cyberattacks that could include efforts to cripple an adversary's nuclear capabilities.

Asked about the use of offensive cyberwarfare attacks on opposing nuclear control systems, Air Force Gen. C. Robert Kehler told reporters at a conference in Omaha, Neb.: "We need to be able to conduct offensive operations through cyberspace, just as we conduct offensive operations through other domains."

Offensive cyberattacks are "a viable and legitimate way to conduct military operations if we need to in the future," Gen. Kehler said.

"But we don't see that in isolation," he said. "We see that as part of military operations writ large. And offensive action would be taken at the direction of the president. The nature of that offensive action remains to be seen based on the scenario."



It was a rare public comment on the military's plans for cyberattacks in future warfare.

Military analysts have said recent offensive cyberwarfare efforts are focused on first learning the command and control of foreign nuclear programs in Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, and then preparing to break into the control networks and disrupt them so that when someone pushes a button to launch a nuclear missile, nothing happens or the missile blows up on the launch pad.

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/8/inside-the-ring-china-warship-grounded/?page=all>

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Observer Research Foundation – India

OPINION/Analysis

Japan's Nuclear Debate Stirs Anxieties in the Region

By Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

04 August 2012

Former Japanese defence minister Shigeru Ishiba's recent statement that "having nuclear plants shows to other nations that Japan can make nuclear weapons," has raised fresh questions on Tokyo's nuclear intentions. However, the statement is to be seen in the backdrop of opposition to nuclear energy power plants after the 2011 Fukushima crisis. While Ishiba is not arguing for Japan to develop nuclear weapons, the technical know-how and the material availability will suggest a certain capability about Japan - that it can develop a weapon capability should the need arise in the future. Estimates suggest that given that Japan already has the technology and the know-how, it could take up to one year to develop a weapon.

However, this debate deserves greater attention in the backdrop of another development - the June 20, 2012 change in the Japanese Atomic Energy Basic Law, considered to be the fundamental document pertaining to use of nuclear energy. Amendment to Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law involved insertion of a national security phrase, saying nuclear safety should be guaranteed not only to defend lives, people's health and the environment but also to "contribute to Japan's national security." This has come under criticism within the country with several commentators questioning Japan's long-term intentions. In one of the opinion pieces, Tetsuya Endo, former diplomat and acting chairman of the Cabinet Office's Japan Atomic Energy Commission, argued that given the ambiguity and anxiety following the insertion of the phrase "national security," the Atomic Energy Basic Law should be amended again to revise security clause.

In an effort to moderate the anxieties, nuclear policy minister Goshi Hosono and Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura, among others, have clarified that the term security only connotes to security against proliferation or security against terrorism. While this may have been true, both the amendment to the nuclear law and the Ishiba statement has aroused curiosity among the regional powers as well. Referring to the Japanese government statement that it is not considering at all the possibility of weaponisation, the South Korean official position maintained that it is keeping a watch on the developments. However, some South Koreans have been much more critical. An editorial in the South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo said, "Tokyo is displaying its schizophrenia by eyeing nuclear weapons ... Its main excuse is North Korea's own nuclear program." Similar concerns have been expressed in other South Korean newspapers such as Donga Ilbo and Joongang Ilbo too. Similarly, China is also watching closely. Commenting on the amendment, deputy director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University, Beijing, in an interview to the Global Times (China) opined that the new language could become the legal basis for Japan to develop a nuclear weapon programme.

There has also been a change in the Japanese Aerospace Basic Law which has mentioned that its space assets will have "contribution to Japan's national security," which again sparked regional attention. The change implied the use of space assets for defense and military purposes. In an interview to the Global Times (China), Kazuto Suzuki from Hokkaido University, Japan, maintained that the change was more of a necessity as there is a growing demand for

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military satellite communications because of the deployment of Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) for peacekeeping operations.

On the other hand, Lee Sangsoo, a research fellow with the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy, was much more aggressive and ambitious about the Japanese space programme. He suggested that Japan could possibly shift to re-militarisation with the military utilization of space assets, including beefing up its missile detection system and that it will possibly be increasing R&D funding for military uses of space technology. He also added that these amendments will pave way for expansion of Japan's military capabilities while easing the security restraints imposed by Article 9 of the Japanese constitution.

This is not the first time that there have been such debates about Japan's military capabilities. There have been numerous efforts in the past to make changes to its pacifist posturing - after the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, during the Vietnam War, in the context of the end of the Cold War, during the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, and also after the indefinite extension of NPT. Japan contemplated a nuclear weapon programme in each of these situations. The very fact that there is an open public debate on the nuclear issue today reflects that there is a more mature and realistic appraisal of Japan's geopolitics and security than ever before.

In conclusion, while the amendment to the atomic law and the statement may be innocuous, it has given scope for fresh anxieties within the region and beyond about the Japanese nuclear programme, particularly its recycling programme of extracted plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Article 9 and Japan's pacifist posture have meant that it never enjoyed the clout of a major geopolitical power. This, however, is changing gradually. It is clear that Japan is beginning to assume larger security responsibilities in an effort to emerge as a more "normal" nation. And the changes being undertaken in the nuclear law may be the beginning of more concrete changes to come in the future.

Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

<http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=40341&mmacmaid=40342>

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Asahi Shimbun – Japan
OPINION/Editorial

EDITORIAL: Japan Has a Duty to Spell out its Non-Nuclear Vision

The Asahi Shimbun
August 6, 2012

On Aug. 6, Hiroshima marked the 67th anniversary of the city's atomic bombing. Nagasaki will hold its own observances on Aug. 9.

No nuclear conflagration has taken place since the 1945 events that ushered in the nuclear age.

There is a widespread belief the world has managed to avoid nuclear Armageddon because of deterrence strategies put in place after World War II.

In fact, the world came to the brink of nuclear conflict more than once.

One such a situation occurred in 1983, when the nuclear early warning system of the former Soviet Union's military detected a launch of five nuclear missiles by the United States.

The duty officer at the command center for the Soviet warning system thought it was probably a false alarm because the United States would have fired hundreds of missiles in an all-out blitz against the Soviet Union.

After agonizing over what to do, the officer decided to trust his judgment and didn't report the matter to his superiors. Later, it turned out to be a false alarm, as he had thought.



Since it was during the Cold War era, when the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a tense standoff, the Kremlin might have pressed the nuclear button if the officer had failed to trust his instincts.

The disaster that struck the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant last year, triggering a massive release of radiation into the environment, occurred in part because of a complacent assumption that no really severe nuclear accident would ever occur at Japanese power plants.

A similar disastrous mistake could be made with regard to nuclear weapons. Making light of the risk posed by them could lead to catastrophe.

That's why Japan, which has experienced both atomic bombings and an unprecedented nuclear disaster, has to take up a historic mission.

As the only country with first-hand experience of the two kinds of devastation due to nuclear energy, Japan should play a key role in eliminating the risk of nuclear winter in the world.

'SAFETY MYTH' OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

We need to take a fresh, hard look at the hidden danger posed by the "safety myth" of nuclear deterrence, which would have people believe that nuclear arms make the world safer.

The danger is not limited to the risk of making a bad call.

The possibility that nuclear arms could be used in regional conflicts is growing due to nuclear proliferation.

In South Asia, India and Pakistan both have nuclear weapons. They are in conflict over territorial and terrorism-related issues. In addition, the political situation in Pakistan is unstable.

In the Middle East, Israel is a virtual nuclear power. If Iran, which has vowed to destroy Israel, develops nuclear weapons, the risk of a nuclear war in the region could dwarf the threat that exists in South Asia.

In Northeast Asia, reclusive North Korea has conducted underground nuclear tests. There are fears North Korea could detonate an atomic bomb out of despair or as a result of a reckless act by the military if it is hit with a crisis like the collapse of the autocratic regime.

There is, undoubtedly, growing concern about nuclear warfare, and experts in nuclear deterrence are beginning to pay close attention to the voices of people in the Japanese cities that suffered nuclear devastation.

They are beginning to heed the message that Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been sending out to the world for years: The only way to get rid of the fear of nuclear war is to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether.

Global Zero, an international nongovernmental organization comprising former senior government officials and retired military officers in various parts of the world, is advocating the elimination of nuclear weapons by 2030.

As a step to achieve this goal, a group of advocates of a nuclear-free world, including a former commander of a U.S. nuclear-armed unit, has called on the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear stockpiles by 80 percent over the next 10 years.

Their call is based on the notion that the risks posed by nuclear arms are bigger than the security benefits they offer.

LIMITS OF NPT ARE OBVIOUS

Another "safety myth"--the belief that nuclear power generation can be promoted without causing nuclear proliferation--also looks increasingly doubtful.

The world has been taking steps based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear-armed countries.



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The basic principle of the nonproliferation regime requires nuclear powers to reduce their arsenals while prohibiting other countries from acquiring nuclear arms.

Countries without nuclear arms that commit to this principle reap the benefit of being able to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes, such as nuclear power generation.

To be fair, the NPT has played an important role in international efforts to prevent proliferation.

But progress toward nuclear disarmament has been much slower than expected.

While nuclear powers are adhering to their deterrence strategies, a growing number of countries have been embarking on the path toward joining the nuclear club.

Under the NPT, the right by nations to use nuclear power peacefully has been stressed.

The risk of nuclear proliferation has risen because facilities to enrich uranium and extract plutonium to produce nuclear fuel can also be used to manufacture atomic bombs.

Symbolizing this problem is Iran. By taking advantage of its status as an NPT signatory country, Iran has been pursuing a uranium enrichment program that could lead to the development of nuclear weapons.

International efforts to reduce nuclear arms and prevent nuclear proliferation under the NPT have not proved particularly effective.

With the limits of the treaty becoming increasingly clear, the question that must be asked now is whether it is really a wise policy to increase the number of countries using atomic energy to generate electricity.

If things work out badly, the treaty could end up being used only as a justification for using nuclear power.

NEW VISION FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY

More attention should be given to the fact that efforts to create a global trend toward ending nuclear power generation can also contribute to both nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

This is clearly a time for new thinking.

Countries that don't have nuclear arms and choose to go without nuclear power generation should get help from the international community to develop renewable energy sources and use natural gas efficiently.

The idea is to turn the advantage of being a non-nuclear power into national development powered by energy sources other than atomic energy. This approach can be used to pursue the two goals of eliminating nuclear arms and stemming global warming.

Restricting the use of nuclear power by non-nuclear countries inevitably increases the responsibility of nuclear powers to accelerate their efforts to reduce their nuclear stockpiles.

Countries that produce a lot of electricity with atomic energy should move faster toward departing from their dependence on nuclear power generation.

By eliminating its reliance on nuclear energy, be it in military or civilian areas, the world can move toward a peaceful and prosperous future without nuclear risks.

As a nation that has experienced nuclear devastation, Japan can only claim the attention of the world by sending out such a future vision.

<http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201208070068>

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Stanford University News

Issue No. 1019, 10 August 2012

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OPINION/Interview

Stanford Report

August 7, 2012

North Korea May Be Preparing another Atomic Bomb Test, Stanford Expert Says

Scientists from Stanford and Los Alamos analyze nuclear device activity against backdrop of nation's new leadership.

By Beth Duff-Brown

Stanford nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker and Frank Pabian, a geospatial information analyst at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, used open-source technology to recalculate the epicenters of two nuclear tests by North Korea. They believe Pyongyang is capable of carrying out a third within a matter of weeks.

Their study was published in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Pabian was a recent visiting scholar at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, where Hecker is a co-director.

In an interview, Hecker answered questions about the current state of nuclear affairs in North Korea:

Following the failed launch of a satellite by North Korea in April, a third nuclear test appeared imminent. Yet more than three months have passed and there has been no test. Why?

We make the case in the article that Pyongyang has much to gain technically and militarily from another test, but the political costs may be too high. That was also the case in 2006 and 2009, but Kim Jong Il decided to pay the price, which turned out not to be that great in the end because China did not want to destabilize the regime despite its displeasure with the tests. Now we have a young new leader, Kim Jong Un, and a more assertive China trying to guide the regime toward market reforms. So the equation has changed.

Does that mean Kim Jong Un may take a less confrontational stance on the nuclear issue?

It's too early to tell, but the country is clearly under new management. Photos of the young leader on rides in Pyongyang's version of Disneyland and photos with his new wife in modern dress – and both of them mingling with the ordinary public – are a far cry from his father's style.

You believe that you have done the most accurate job to date in locating the epicenters of the two underground North Korean nuclear tests, and that leads you to the best estimate of what the explosion yields were. Yet there are still significant variations in yields between your analysis and the official U.S. government estimate released by the director of national intelligence. Why?

We have done the most precise analysis of locating the epicenters by combining results from seismic signals and Google Earth 3D maps of the test area. Taking our understanding of standard nuclear test practices, we were able to determine accurate depth-of-burial for the nuclear devices. We then took these new results and refined the calculations of Los Alamos National Laboratory researchers, who use a model in which yield depends on depth-of-burial.

However, researchers at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory use a model that does not depend on depth-of-burial within the range in question. Their model predicts a yield close to two kilotons, as expressed by the director of national intelligence. Our new analysis, based on the Los Alamos technique, suggests a yield between four and seven kilotons. The jury is still out as to which of the models is more accurate, but we believe we have the best estimate of the location of the epicenters to date.

What have recent satellite images shown around the Punggye-ri nuclear testing site?

Right after the missile launch, satellite imagery showed significant new activity at what has been identified as a likely third nuclear testing tunnel, which is why we believe it's important to re-examine North Korea's past nuclear tests to learn what we can about its future test capabilities.

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Why are you so concerned about another nuclear test?

I believe that North Korea has the bomb, but not much of a nuclear arsenal. With its limited testing success to date, Pyongyang likely does not have the confidence to field a miniaturized nuclear weapon on one of its missiles. If it can't mount a nuclear weapon on a missile, its bombs are more like a terrorist's threat – that is, they would have to be delivered by van, boat or plane. North Korea needs more nuclear tests to demonstrate it can build a miniaturized warhead.

Does that mean if it tests a weapon, it may attack the United States or its allies with nuclear-tipped missiles?

I don't believe another test would lead to that – but it greatly increases the threat that North Korea poses to all of us. That's exactly what Pyongyang is trying to convey when it says it will strengthen its deterrent. The deterrent is meant to warn the United States and putting warheads on missiles makes the deterrent more credible.

Does North Korea have missiles that can reach the United States?

No – the failed missile launch showed it still has a long way to go in improving its rocket technology. In addition, for a space launch the payload (a satellite) needs to reach orbit, whereas for a missile attack the payload (a nuclear warhead) also has to survive the enormous temperatures and stresses of re-entry. We have no indication that it has developed and tested the required re-entry vehicles to do so.

In the *Bulletin* article you speculate that the North may simultaneously test a plutonium bomb and one fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU). What brings you to that conclusion?

Plutonium production has ceased in the North, so it only has enough for four to eight bombs. When officials showed Stanford Professor John Lewis, Bob Carlin and me their new centrifuge facility during our November 2010 visit, they served notice that they can produce HEU if they so choose. So from a technical standpoint, a plutonium test gives them one more important data point for plutonium bombs and an HEU test opens up another line of possible bombs.

Why not just do two separate tests instead of complicating the containment challenges?

North Korea has to pay a political price for each test. Beijing may be getting very impatient with Pyongyang. If North Korea conducts two simultaneously, it would only have to pay the price for one test, not for two. That may be enough incentive to do multiple tests simultaneously. It can't do five like the Pakistanis, because each test depletes the meager supply of fissile materials.

What should Washington be doing to make sure that a third test does not take place?

Working with Beijing to make sure the political price for North Korea conducting another test is too high for the new regime to bear.

How were you able to gather and present the information in your study using open-source material? How does this work fit into the broader context of open-source nonproliferation work being done today by researchers and bloggers?

This is a great example of how the new information technology tools like Google Earth and social media are revolutionizing the intelligence world. Even for a country as reclusive as North Korea, there is an enormous amount of information available for a great number of socially networked analysts around the world. Some of the information comes from satellite imagery, some from what the state puts out in propaganda and some from Track II visits such as those made by my Stanford University colleagues and me.

Beth Duff-Brown is public affairs manager for the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

<http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/august/hecker-nkorea-ganda-080712.html>

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The Diplomat – Japan
OPINION/China Power Blog

China's Nuclear 'Leakage'

By Larry M. Wortzel
August 7, 2012

As a former military attaché in China and Army intelligence officer, I only very rarely managed to get my hands on “Top Secret” Chinese documents. Today, around the Washington, DC area alone, there are by my count some eight original copies of *The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns* in the hands of China specialists at universities, think tanks, and policy institutes.

The document, labeled “Top Secret,” is somewhat comforting to the community involved in thinking about nuclear weapons doctrine, escalation control, and crisis management. Embodied in Chinese policy, as set out in this PLA publication, is a confirmation that China will maintain a minimal nuclear deterrent of a few weapons able to effect a response to a first strike by another power, an affirmation that China will never be the first to use nuclear weapons, and an explanation of the alert levels and rough response times for the PLA Second Artillery force in the event of nuclear war.

The number of original documents in the hands of U.S. specialists on China stimulated me to think about why so many highly classified documents managed to leak out of one of its most secretive arms of the PLA. As a former intelligence collector, it is clear that losing one document like this is a major security breach, but losing a trove is a rare thing. And outside the Washington-based China-watching community, there are more copies. Some are on the US west coast, others are in Taiwan.

One explanation for this seeming breach is that although the PLA is not willing to sit down in government-to-government exchanges on nuclear doctrine and escalation control, PLA leaders decided to provide some sort of reassurance to the Western policy community. The implications of the underlying policy in *The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns* is that China is a “responsible nuclear power” that will not engage in an arms race. Stated nuclear doctrine is, indeed, embodied in what should be tightly controlled PLA doctrinal writings. And, to reinforce this interpretation, the discussion of nuclear force levels, “no first use” policy, and readiness levels contained in the Second Artillery Force publication is consistent with the contents of the unclassified PLA publication, *Seco*. If that is the case, why bother classifying the Second Artillery’s publication so highly? Taken together, these two publications affirm everything that the arms control community would advocate about building down U.S. nuclear forces toward “nuclear zero.”

There is at least one alternative explanation, however. Inside the nuclear policy community in China we know there is some debate about the utility of the “no first use” policy. A minority of younger PLA officers and scholars argue that China needs to increase the size of its nuclear forces and leave open the question of how China might respond to conventional strikes on the Chinese mainland. Also, there is the suggestion by analysts like Phillip Karber that the United States may have seriously underestimated the size of China’s nuclear force, which is now mobile and may be hidden in a complex of tunnels. A few Russian scholars, and Karber’s work, suggest that China may have considerably more than the 400 or so U.S. documents credit the PLA with having. One Russian specialist, Alexei Arbatov, estimates that China may have between 1,000 and 3,500 reserve warheads stockpiled based on his analysis of Beijing’s fissile material production capabilities. Victor Yesin, a retired Russian general, estimates that China has between 1,600 and 1,800 warheads. Certainly the Chinese nuclear infrastructure is capable of producing the fissile material for more than 400 warheads.

An alternative explanation to the existence of so many highly classified documents leaking out to the West in so short a time is that the PLA is involved in a major perception management and disinformation campaign. Could what many of us have accepted, this writer included, as established PLA doctrine because of these books be part of a more nuanced effort designed to reinforce the effort in the United States to reduce the size of our nuclear forces and to rethink the scope and deployment of U.S. efforts on ballistic missile defenses?

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It would be one thing if one or two highly classified documents out of China somehow leaked out into the policy community and then copies made their way into the hands of interested scholars and policy analysts. But that is not the case. Instead, a large number of highly classified original documents have found their way out of China. It is as though a case or two of documents from a Chinese publishing house, which heretofore has managed to control its classified inventory, was shipped to bookstores in Taiwan and Hong Kong. My experience as an intelligence officer is that such a massive breach is a very rare thing. Intelligence collectors can labor for years to get their hands on one copy of a document at this level of classification.

If U.S. policy-makers accept the force levels and doctrines in The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns as established policy in China, then U.S. (as well as Russian and Indian) force levels can be safely reduced. Ballistic missile defense programs can be scaled in a way to counter a limited nuclear threat, not only from China, but other nascent nuclear powers like North Korea. But if the Karber thesis is closer to the truth, and China has a significantly larger nuclear force that we believe to be true, the U.S., and its allies that depend on extended deterrence, could be in for a shocking strategic surprise.

The manifestation of so many copies of this document in so many hands makes it all the more urgent that the U.S. continue to pursue a direct, government-to-government strategic dialogue with China. The Second Artillery Force has avoided such exchanges to date; even if there have been limited track-two dialogues. [Editor's note: The Pacific Forum manages two such dialogues annually, which help set the stage for, and would complement, but are no substitute for official exchanges.] The existence of so many PLA publications outside China on this heretofore carefully protected area of policy makes it unwise to base future U.S. force and defensive postures on what may be a managed perception management campaign.

Larry M. Wortzel, Ph.D. is a retired US Army colonel who served two tours of duty as a military attaché in China. He was director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College and is the author of China's Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control and Campaign Planning (Strategic Studies Institute, 2007). This article was originally published by Pacific Forum CSIS PacNet, and represents the views of the respective author.

<http://thediplomat.com/china-power/chinas-nuclear-leakage/>

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Heritage Foundation
OPINION/Lecture on National Security and Defense

The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Triad, Fiscal Austerity, and the Vision of “Nuclear Zero”

By Michaela Bendikova
August 8, 2012

Abstract: *The U.S. government's own policies risk creating a gap between U.S. nuclear capabilities and the future demands of the uncertain strategic environment. As a matter of national security, the U.S. must revitalize its nuclear-weapons complex. On June 27, 2012, The Heritage Foundation's Michaela Bendikova addressed an audience of nuclear experts and future leaders at the conference of the Project on Nuclear Issues (a project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. She explained why the U.S. nuclear-weapons complex and strategic delivery platforms require significant continuing investments.*

Churchill once said that, “Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing... after they have exhausted all other possibilities.” When it comes to doing the right thing on U.S. nuclear-weapons policy, this maxim may not hold true anymore. Fiscal and arms control policies of the U.S. government are putting us on the path toward a world without U.S. nuclear weapons. Never mind that the U.S. nuclear deterrent has safeguarded our, and allied, security for decades.

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Today, we are at risk of creating a gap between U.S. nuclear capabilities and the future demands of the uncertain strategic environment. We must revitalize the U.S. nuclear-weapons complex. We simply don't know what the future holds.

Let's look at the current situation: Most members of this audience are younger than our strategic systems. In about 2030, we will have 60-year-old intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 40-year-old submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and 35-to-70-year-old strategic bombers—a truly aging U.S. nuclear triad. At this point in time, there are no certain nuclear modernization plans.

These are just the delivery systems. The United States has not explosively tested its nuclear weapons since 1992. This country has underfunded its nuclear-weapons complex for years.

Our nuclear warheads were designed for safety and yield-to-weight ratio. They were not designed for long service lives in an environment in which nuclear testing is precluded. In a few years, for the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, the new generation of U.S. nuclear-weapons experts will have no nuclear-testing experience. Few of them will have participated in the design of a new nuclear weapon. Yet, these people will be relied upon to make judgments about changes to U.S. nuclear weapons. In the words of former Defense Secretary Robert Gates: "To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program."

The country now operates under spending caps established under the Budget Control Act of 2011. These will result in an approximately \$483 billion cut to the defense portion of the budget over the next nine years (the amount varies depending on which baseline is used). Unless the law is changed, another process called sequestration will result in about a half-trillion-dollar additional reduction of the defense budget. Secretary of Defense Panetta described these cuts as "devastating." Here is what could happen to U.S. strategic systems: The new strategic bomber could be terminated; the next generation of ballistic missile submarines could be delayed and the current fleet reduced to ten boats; and the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad could be eliminated.

Unrelated to the Budget Control Act, other critical nuclear complex modernization projects have been delayed in the President's FY 2013 budget request. This happened despite the President's own certification to the Senate during the debate on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). He promised to accelerate the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research and Replacement facility. He promised to request full funding for this project. Yet, for FY 2013, the Administration proposed to defer the construction of this facility for at least five years. It has cut the funding by 83 percent (compared to the FY 2012 enacted level).

The Administration also agreed to a nuclear-complex modernization plan in the updated 1251 Section of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act. Its promises did not survive the first year of New START's entry into force. The nuclear-weapons modernization requirements in the New START resolution of ratification were completely ignored. While the Administration pledged \$7.9 billion for nuclear infrastructure modernization in FY 2013, the President's current budget request misses this mark by \$0.3 billion.

Decisions that the United States makes today will influence its strategic posture and modernization plans for years to come. According to the President's Nuclear Posture Review, "preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism" and "reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy" are the two key objectives of U.S. policy and posture. Deterring nuclear war is third on the list of priorities.

Yet, there is no demonstrated link between the number of U.S. nuclear weapons and non-proliferation. U.S. policies are not the most important factor when a state decides on its nuclear program. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has reduced its total stockpile by 75 percent. Yet new actors armed with nuclear weapons have emerged.

U.S. nuclear weapons continue to serve critical national security objectives. Among these objectives is the deterring of an attack against the U.S. and allies. In a post-Cold War environment, U.S. policymakers must ask Dr. Keith Payne's favorite question about the capability needed for effective strategic deterrence: "How much is enough?" The Obama



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Administration seems to think that the lower the number of U.S. nuclear weapons, the better off the United States will be. Relying on minimal standards of force adequacy is risky. It requires fundamental shifts in U.S. targeting policy from counter-force to counter-value targets, such as cities. Counter-value targeting is an insufficient foundation for an effective deterrence.

The tension between the desire for a world without nuclear weapons and the need to support funding for nuclear-force modernization is particularly striking. The U.S. nuclear-weapons complex and strategic delivery platforms require significant investments. These investments are essential because U.S. nuclear weapons continue to serve critical American security interests. They deserve our support. Churchill needs to be right.

Michaela Bendikova is Research Associate for Strategic Issues in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. These remarks do not represent the views of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

<http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/2012/08/the-future-of-the-us-nuclear-triad>

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Washington Times
OPINION/Commentary

KAHLILI: Iran's Radical Rulers Close In On the Bomb

It's not too late to stop nuclear ambitions

By Reza Kahlili

Thursday, August 9, 2012

Iran continues unabated with its illicit nuclear and missile programs despite a decade of negotiations, being targeted by cyberwarfare and recent harsh sanctions on the Iranian Central Bank and oil industry piled on top of earlier, crippling sanctions.

Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a recent meeting with the Islamic regime's officials, called for a "resistance economy," urging them to work on lowering consumption, help with the private sector and reduce Iran's dependence on oil.

Ayatollah Khamenei emphasized that the enemy has been plotting to pressure Iran. "They clearly say that with pressure through sanctions, our officials will be forced to re-evaluate their decisions," the ayatollah said. "However, realization of the facts are that not only will we not rethink our decisions, but we will continue the chosen path with more confidence."

The Obama administration's dual policies of negotiations and sanctions have failed, in effect, enabling a terrorist regime to progress with its nuclear and missile programs.

When President Obama took office, the Iranians had barely enough enriched uranium for one nuclear bomb and were limited to an enrichment level of 3.5 percent. Today, Iran has mastered the enrichment to the 20 percent level, a critical step to weaponization, and has announced that it soon will enrich to more than 50 percent in order to provide nuclear fuel for future nuclear-powered vessels.

More than 11,000 centrifuges are currently spinning at the Natanz nuclear facility, an increase of 3,000 from just months ago. Hundreds of centrifuges are enriching uranium to the 20 percent level at the previously secret Fordow facility deep in a mountain.

The latest IAEA report as of May verified that Iran has enough enriched uranium for six nuclear bombs, should it advance enrichment to weaponization grade.

Meanwhile, Iran, in collaboration with China and North Korea, has stockpiled more than 1,000 ballistic missiles capable of reaching all U.S. bases and oil fields in the region, Israel and several capitals in Europe. Iran currently is working on

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intercontinental ballistic missiles under the guise of its space program that will soon be capable of reaching any point on the planet. It has produced hundreds of cruise missiles, a clear threat to the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf, and has armed its vessels with long-range ballistic missiles, with plans to expand its naval mission into the Atlantic Ocean and right behind the Gulf of Mexico.

According to a former intelligence officer of the Revolutionary Guards now defected to a country in Europe, Iran also has several neutron bombs (super-electromagnetic weapons). The source, who attended a commanders' briefing by the Revolutionary Guards, said they have discussed a strategy in which "many planes will fall from the sky" — a clear indication that Iran is prepared to deliver an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack. The International Atomic Energy Agency has verified that Iran has test-launched ballistic missiles off ships in an exercise similar to an EMP attack.

Studies have shown that a successful EMP attack would devastate America, slaughtering up to two-thirds of the United States population within a year of the attack.

The West, particularly America, despite years of failed negotiations with Iran, has yet to understand the very ideology that drives the regime.

"The most important fact that America and the West have continuously missed is the ideology behind Iran's destiny. Its doctrine knows no boundaries and stands in diametric opposition to and defiance of the most basic principles and fundamental forms taken by Western civilization." This is from a Guards analysis that was reported last November.

This ideology underpins Iran's confrontation with the West. The regime has expanded its threat to world peace and the global economy from the Persian Gulf to Africa, Latin America and even here in the United States, where hundreds of terrorist cells are well placed.

Some American officials and pundits promoted negotiations with Iran, claiming the United States was at fault because of its previous foreign policies, and that an extended hand would go a long way to defusing the crisis. Then they promoted sanctions, claiming that the Islamic regime is rational and will reconsider its behavior and actions. Now, not wanting to admit their error, they are even promoting the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran, claiming it won't be so bad because mutually assured destruction should surely work.

In an open letter to President Obama in February 2009, I reminded him that negotiations and sanctions won't work. It's not about the economy, but rather the ideology.

The West is now at an impasse with Iran, which I have been predicting would happen for a long time. War seems inevitable as the radicals ruling Iran close in on making a bomb. An attack on Iran's nuclear facilities will not solve the threat because the regime not only has mastered the technology and the know-how, but also there are many sites unknown to the West in which work on highly enriched uranium and nuclear weaponization of missiles continues daily.

The best solution is to help the Iranian people, thousands of whom have sacrificed to bring about regime change only to find out that the West is more interested in negotiations. A great opportunity was missed in 2009 when millions of Iranians took to the streets because Mr. Obama turned his back on them.

But it is not too late.

Today, the only viable solution in securing world peace and stability is regime change in Iran. To achieve that, we must help the Iranian people — not with arms — but with our support and technological advancements to inform, unify and enable the millions who are awaiting our leadership.

Reza Kahlili is a pseudonym for a former CIA operative in Iran's Revolutionary Guards and the author of "A Time to Betray" (Simon & Schuster, 2010). He is a fellow with EMPact America and teaches at the U.S. Department of Defense's Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy.

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/9/irans-radical-rulers-close-in-on-the-bomb/?page=all#pagebreak>

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Gatestone Institute
OPINION/ Columnist

Should the U.S. De-Alert Its Nuclear Missiles?

By Peter Huessy
August 10, 2012

Taking our missiles off alert actually makes our remaining forces into even more inviting targets for possible attacks. Today's stability would be undermined significantly.

Supporters of doing away with nuclear weapons are pushing for the de-alerting of our nuclear missiles. This could mean, for example, separating the warheads from the missiles and storing them in a remote area.

These critics worry that in a crisis, an American President would feel hurried in making a decision on whether to use our sea- or land-based missiles before the other side shoots first. One recent editorial warned that in a crisis:

"The decision to launch would have to be made in 13 minutes or less. The theory of deterrence...mean[s] being prepared to shoot fast."

Now it is true that our submarines in port and not at sea could be targeted by an enemy's missiles, and some of our land-based missiles could be taken out if an adversary could effectively launch its own missiles at our hardened, dispersed silos on thousands of square miles covering parts of five states. But neither makes any sense.

Such concerns did have some validity during the height of the Cold War, when, by 1980, the Soviets had over 10,000 missile warheads aimed largely at the US. Those concerns were heightened during the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations as the Soviets dramatically expanded their deployed nuclear arsenal from the fewer-than-2000 warheads allowed under the SALT I treaty.

The fear then was that Moscow could launch thousands of warheads at America's land-based missile silos, at our submarines in port and our bombers at their bases, and eliminate a large percentage of our strategic nuclear arsenal while still being able to retain many thousands of warheads with which to coerce the US to surrender. In short, our President worried during the Cold War that in a crisis the other side might shoot first and, in a sudden attack, wipe out most of our deterrent in under 30 minutes.

The correlation of forces, as the Soviets termed the geostrategic balance between Washington and Moscow, was deemed to be moving smartly in Moscow's direction at the time of the 1980 election between then President Jimmy Carter and the Republican challenger, Ronald Reagan. A "window of vulnerability," as Reagan termed it, was opening up between the US and the Soviets. Moscow, having expanded its empire by some 18 nations in the era of "detente," was emboldened.

When Reagan became President, nuclear freeze advocates wanted to halt all US modernization plans, including the Trident submarine and its C-4 and D-5 missiles; the modernized Peacekeeper and Small ICBM and Minuteman sustainment program; the acquisition of the new B-1 and B-2 bombers and sustainment of the B-52s.

But, with his landslide 1984 victory over Walter Mondale and the subsequent unfreezing of Peacekeeper acquisition-funds in the spring of 1985, Regan defeated the freeze. This set the stage for the US to move to a far lower, but modernized nuclear force, under CFE, START and Moscow arms reduction treaties, which dropped US deployed warheads to just over 2000, down from 12,000.

The US thus engaged in two parallel efforts which dealt with the concern about the alert status of our nuclear forces. First, the US kept a fully modernized nuclear Triad -- air, sea and land -- which continued to neutralize any attack against the three legs of the US nuclear Triad—bombers, submarines and land-based missiles. Second, through arms control -- dramatic reductions in warheads -- the number of warheads on each missile was reduced but strategic

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stability was enhanced. Our land-based missiles, Minuteman, were reduced to one warhead per missile, and widely dispersed across thousands of square miles, making them thoroughly unattractive targets.

These streamlinings not only transformed our land-based missiles from attractive targets during the Cold War to unattractive targets in the post-Cold War era, but also from destabilizing elements to extremely stabilizing ones. Any pre-emptive strike now by Moscow against any one element of the US Triad during a crisis is therefore only the most remote possibility. An adversary could hit some of our land-based missiles, or submarines in port, or bombers not airborne, but hitting all three simultaneously would be so fraught with risk as to be a remote worry. Some elements of each leg would survive, particularly our submarines on patrol at sea, so Moscow could only consider an attack a miserable idea.

The conclusion, therefore, that in a crisis our President would have only 13 minutes in which to decide to launch our missiles is nothing but bunk. To claim that an American President would have no choice in a crisis but recklessly to launch our weapons significantly undermines stability: it might even induce our adversaries to decide that in a crisis it would be better for them if they shot first.

There is, in fact, no requirement now to launch "fast:" The widespread force of Minuteman missiles spread over five US states makes any kind of effective attack against the missiles both impossible and irrational. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Minuteman missiles are totally survivable and thus no US President is under any compulsion to "launch fast."

As leading experts on nuclear matters -- such as former General Larry Welch, Ambassador Linton Brooks, Frank Miller, former General Frank Klotz, former Strategic Command head General Chilton, among many others -- have concluded, taking our missiles off alert actually makes our remaining nuclear forces into even more inviting targets for possible attack. Today's stability would be undermined significantly: it could merely make the "other guy shoot fast."

Worse, the Minuteman and the Trident would not even be useable if de-alerted. If the other side decided surreptitiously to re-alert its forces, there might be a "secret race to re-arm," but it would be one-sided in the other side's favor. Our Triad force elements would be totally vulnerable: What threat would there be in our launching a rocket with no warhead on it?

This problem could especially be damaging if the US were to collect all missile warheads and store them elsewhere -- an act that would produce the most attractive target ever: a few storage facilities, each with hundreds of nuclear warheads. We would be inviting -- not deterring -- an attack. Even supporters of de-alerting acknowledge this failing.

In short, attacking any or all of our 420-450 Minuteman silos makes absolutely no sense. Each would require an adversary to use two incoming, or attacking, warheads to ensure the silos were destroyed. But even then, there is a high likelihood that many of our land-based missiles would survive -- estimates are as high as 30-40%. So there is no vulnerability problem that is begging for a de-alerting solution. There is no requirement or compulsion to "prompt launch," and thus no need to change the alert status of our missiles.

The fear that an American President would be prompted to launch our missiles in port or in silos before they were attacked completely misses the reality of today's deterrent. No rational adversary could believe they would eliminate our deterrent force with an initial attack. Why? Because the US has a survivable and second-strike capability: submarines at sea, ICBMs that survive, and bombers that could be returned to alert and launched for survivability during a crisis.

The US thus has hundreds of warheads that would survive and are capable of deterring any current or foreseeable adversary---but only if we maintain, sustain and modernize our nuclear deterrent forces. We should preserve the stabilizing Triad and continue to maintain a very high ratio of our missiles and submarines and bombers (now over 500) against the array of adversary warheads.

As noted, supporters of de-alerting admit that its benefits cannot be verified, and that in a crisis there would still be a rush to put forces back on alert. But like a three year-old banging his spoon on his high chair demanding the world feed



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him what he wants, they demand that, whatever the reality may be, we nevertheless have to figure out a way to do what is foolhardy, unnecessary and dangerous.

Underlying the push for de-alerting, though usually unstated, is the assumption that once de-alerted, these forces can safely be eliminated. After all, some have argued, if the forces are de-alerted and war does not break out, they apparently are not needed.

At the moment, therefore, de-alerting is a senseless posture in search of a problem. It is also a backdoor means of reducing US nuclear forces -- a policy that, regardless of its dubious wisdom, its pacifist supporters, insistent on "first the numbers, then the strategy," apparently think must be pursued despite the risks to US national security in inviting adventurism.

In reality, an adversary would have nothing to gain by attacking Minuteman silos in a crisis. Thus, the panic over the deployed US missiles on three Minutemen bases or at two US submarine bases is both misplaced and irrational -- in itself dangerous.

It is misplaced in that the robust US Triad makes a successful adversarial attack impossible. It is irrational in that such de-alerting would in actuality make the geostrategic situation more unstable. And it is dangerous in that it makes the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis more likely than ever, thus creating the very problem it purports to solve.

The US deterrent Triad has kept the peace for well over half a century. As former USAF Chief of Staff and SAC Commander General Larry Welch said: The US nuclear deterrent has worked perfectly. And for nearly seven decades. It is time to drop such errant proposals as de-alerting, and get on with the important job of preserving and updating a deterrent that, as the Constitution requires, so successfully "provides for the common defense."

Peter Huessy is President of his own defense consulting firm, GeoStrategic Analysis, founded in 1981, and the senior defense consultant at the National Defense University Foundation. Mr. Huessy founded the congressional affairs division within ANSER that initiated coverage of the Hill for key Air Force programs.

<http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3266/us-nuclear-missiles-alert>

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