



USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

Issue No. 1006, 08 June 2012

Articles & Other Documents:

Featured Article: [U.S. Air Force Approves Concept for Future ICBM, Eyes Navy Collaboration](#)

1. [Israel Deploys Nuclear Weapons on German-Built Submarines](#)
2. [Iran Will Maintain Its Enrichment Right within NPT](#)
3. [Access to Iran Site to Top Agenda at IAEA Board](#)
4. [Ahmadinejad: West after Excuses, Wasting Time in Iran-P5+1 Talks](#)
5. [China Opposes Nuclear Weapons in Middle East, Pledges Cooperation with Iran](#)
6. [U.S. Says Syria Cynically Stonewalls U.N. Nuclear Probe](#)
7. [Iran, IAEA Start New Talks on Nuclear Probe](#)
8. [6 Powers, Iran, Remain Split on Nuclear Issues](#)
9. [South Korea Should Get Nuclear Weapons: Rep. Chung](#)
10. [Shortcomings Persist in China's Submarine-Based Nuke Force: Report](#)
11. [S. Korea, U.S. Far Apart on Extending Missile Range: Source](#)
12. [IAEA Sees No Prospect Now for North Korea Visit](#)
13. [SCO Calls for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, Space Security](#)
14. [India, Pak Developing New Systems for Delivering Nukes: SIPRI](#)
15. [Pakistan Tests Nuclear-Capable Hatf VII Cruise Missile](#)
16. [Russia Wants Missile Defense Guarantees - Putin](#)
17. [No Document on Missile Defence Prepared for Putin-Obama Meeting -- FM](#)
18. [Yury Dolgoruky to Complete Sea Trial on Thursday](#)
19. [Rogozin Doubts Need to Develop New Strategic Bomber](#)
20. ['Helping Israel Defend Itself Is Germany's Duty'](#)
21. [U.S. Air Force Approves Concept for Future ICBM, Eyes Navy Collaboration](#)
22. [Navy to Test Integrity of Fire-Damaged Submarine, Pingree Says](#)
23. ['Barack Obama Confronted Nightmare in 2009, Thought Taliban Had N-Bomb'](#)
24. [Furious US Lawmakers Say Security Leaks Must End](#)
25. [FBI Probes Leaks About Cyberattacks by U.S.](#)
26. [Mutually Assured Cyberdestruction?](#)
27. [War in Cyberspace](#)
28. [5+1 Group to Blame if Talks Fail](#)
29. [China on the Launch Pad](#)
30. [If the US Disarms, Will Its Adversaries Do the Same?](#)
31. [Congress' War on Leaks](#)
32. [Scotland Against the Bomb](#)

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Issue No.1006, 08 June 2012

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CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

Der Spiegel – Germany
June 3, 2012

Israel Deploys Nuclear Weapons on German-Built Submarines

By SPIEGEL

A German shipyard has already built three submarines for Israel, and three more are planned. Now SPIEGEL has learned that Israel is arming the submarines with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. The German government has known about Israel's nuclear weapons program for decades, despite its official denials.

Germany is helping Israel to develop its military nuclear capabilities, SPIEGEL has learned. According to extensive research carried out by the magazine, Israel is equipping submarines that were built in the northern German city of Kiel and largely paid for by the German government with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. The missiles can be launched using a previously secret hydraulic ejection system. Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak told SPIEGEL that Germans should be "proud" that they have secured the existence of the state of Israel "for many years."

In the past, the German government has always stuck to the position that it is unaware of nuclear weapons being deployed on the vessels. Now, however, former high-ranking officials from the German Defense Ministry, including former State Secretary Lothar Rühl and former chief of the planning staff Hans Rühle, have told SPIEGEL that they had always assumed that Israel would deploy nuclear weapons on the submarines. Rühl had even discussed the issue with the military in Tel Aviv.

Israel has a policy of not commenting officially on its nuclear weapons program. Documents from the archives of the German Foreign Ministry make it clear, however, that the German government has known about the program since 1961. The last discussion for which there is evidence took place in 1977, when then-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt spoke to then-Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan about the issue.

The submarines are built by the German shipyard HDW in Kiel. Three submarines have already been delivered to Israel, and three more will be delivered by 2017. In addition, Israel is considering ordering its seventh, eighth and ninth submarines from Germany.

The German government recently signed the contract for the delivery of the sixth vessel. According to information obtained by SPIEGEL, Chancellor Angela Merkel made substantial concessions to the Israelis. Not only is Berlin financing one-third of the cost of the submarine, around €135 million (\$168 million), but it is also allowing Israel to defer its payment until 2015.

Merkel had tied the delivery of the sixth submarine to a number of conditions, including a demand that Israel stop its expansionist settlement policy and allow the completion of a sewage treatment plant in the Gaza Strip, which is partially financed with German money. So far, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has met none of the terms.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/israel-deploys-nuclear-weapons-on-german-submarines-a-836671.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Press TV – Iran

Iran Will Maintain Its Enrichment Right within NPT

Monday, June 4, 2012

Iran's UN mission has rejected the recent claims by two US dailies about Tehran's entitlement to uranium enrichment and reaffirmed Iran's right to the activity within the terms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has unambiguously recognized "the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination", which covers all areas of peaceful uses of the nuclear energy, including the immutable right to develop a full national fuel cycle, said the Iranian mission in a letter to the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*.

Issue No. 1006, 08 June 2012

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The NYT editorial, published May 24, claimed that an NPT country “has no explicit right to enrich,” citing unnamed members of the P5+1 (the six major world powers) that negotiated with Iran in Iraq last month.

Referring to Iran’s demand during the talks for global powers to recognize its right to enrich uranium, the paper quoted a “senior American official” as saying that the group was “obviously not willing” to acknowledge the right.

Published on June 1, Iran’s rebuttal letter further argued that each NPT member has the “sovereign right to define its national energy policies in accordance with its national requirements.”

Iran is fully committed to its obligations under the treaty and is firmly determined to exercise its rights. In future talks, Iran will continue to insist on all its rights for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including a full national fuel cycle, the letter stated.

According to the *New York Times* editorial, the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia hoped that the P5+1 talks would at least lead to the suspension of Iran’s enrichment efforts in its nuclear energy program.

“The failure to do much more than agree to another set of talks,” said the editorial, “is likely to be criticized by Republicans and by pro-Israeli lobbying groups and legislators in the United States.”

The letter by Tehran’s representative office at the UN expressed hope that “a positive and constructive approach regarding Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities” would finally emerge.

Iran and the P5+1 countries -- Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States plus Germany -- wrapped up their latest meeting in Baghdad on May 24 after two days of negotiations.

The Iranian negotiating delegation was headed by the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili, and the P5+1 delegations were led by EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton.

Both sides agreed to hold another round of talks in Moscow on June 18-19.

Tehran and the P5+1 have already held three rounds of talks, one in Geneva in December 2010, and two in Istanbul in January 2011 and in April 2012.

<http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/06/04/244565/iran-reaffirm-enrichment-rights/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

France24.com

Access to Iran Site to Top Agenda at IAEA Board

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

04 June 2012

Iran's suspected nuclear drive will top the agenda when the UN atomic agency's governors meet this week in Vienna, aiming to get unlimited IAEA access to a key Iranian military base.

Last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said new satellite imagery of the Parchin base near Tehran indicated "extensive activities" where there had been "virtually" none for years.

This "could hamper the agency's ability to undertake effective verification" of the site, the IAEA warned.

The agency already sought access to Parchin -- where it believes suspicious explosives testing was carried out -- in two visits to Iran in January and February.

But this was denied, with Tehran arguing the site was not linked to its nuclear programme so it need not allow inspections.

Iran insists its nuclear programme is solely for civilian purposes but Western powers believe it is trying to develop a bomb.

Issue No. 1006, 08 June 2012

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After a visit to Iran on May 21, IAEA chief Yukiya Amano said he and chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili would soon sign a deal to resolve issues over Tehran's nuclear programme. But two weeks on, there is still no sign of it.

Last week, IAEA chief inspector Herman Nackaerts also showed delegations new satellite pictures of Parchin taken on May 25 that analysts say suggest cleanup activities at the military base.

Iran's enrichment of uranium to 20-percent purity, bringing Tehran consistently closer to producing 90-percent enriched uranium needed to make a bomb, is another matter of concern, according to Western powers.

Iran and the P5+1 powers -- the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany -- met in Baghdad on May 23-24 in a bid to ease tensions over Tehran's suspected nuclear drive but little was achieved.

A further meeting was set in Moscow on June 18-19, before an EU oil embargo against Iran comes into force on July 1.

On Sunday, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei slammed suspicions that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons as "based on a lie" and insisted that sanctions on his country were ineffective and only strengthened its resolve.

The meeting of the IAEA's 35-member board of governors will be held behind closed doors, starting Monday, and is due to go on all week.

<http://www.france24.com/en/20120604-access-iran-site-top-agenda-iaea-board>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Press TV – Iran

Ahmadinejad: West after Excuses, Wasting Time in Iran-P5+1 Talks

Wednesday, June 6, 2012

Iran says the West is seeking to manufacture excuses and waste time in talks between Tehran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1).

Iran and the veto-wielding Security Council members -- Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States -- plus Germany, held three sessions of plenary talks in Baghdad on May 23 and 24 after an earlier round of negotiations in Istanbul in mid-April. The two sides are now scheduled to resume negotiations in less than two weeks' time in Moscow.

Meeting with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in Beijing on Wednesday, Iran's visiting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, however, said the Western side has failed to keep the promises it made during the Baghdad meeting, the Iranian president's official website reported.

Ahmadinejad explained that officials from Iran and the P5+1 were to hold several meetings prior to the Moscow negotiations, but Tehran's efforts to arrange the preparatory talks have been unsuccessful.

He said "following the Baghdad talks and based on the agreement reached there," Tehran has "in several stages, pursued and requested the continuation of negotiations at the level of [the EU foreign policy chief, Catherine] Ashton's deputies and the secretary of our country's Supreme National Security Council, and no result has yielded (from our calls)."

Accordingly, "we believe that the West is after concocting excuses and wasting time," he stated.

It is feared that the group's failure to hold preparatory meetings at the level of deputies will result in the absence of a clear agenda for the Moscow negotiations, and will thus undermine the prospects of reaching any viable agreement.

The Iranian president restated his country's willingness to continue dialogue, "despite the Western countries' reluctance towards realization of a fundamental agreement" on Iran's nuclear energy program.



Ahmadinejad acknowledged that the West's standoff with Iran over Tehran's nuclear energy program could take more than one meeting to resolve. However, he expressed hope that the Islamic Republic's good will and the previous talks in this regard will push the case forward towards an immediate resolution.

The United States and some of its allies accuse Iran of pursuing military objectives in its nuclear energy program. They have used this pretext to impose international and unilateral sanctions on the Islamic Republic and to call for a military strike against the country, all in a bid to mount pressure on Iran and force it to give up on its nuclear fuel cycle used for civilian purposes.

Iran refutes such allegations, arguing that as a committed signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it has every right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

<http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/06/06/244946/iran-ahmadinejad-west-p51-talks/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Xinhua News Agency – China

China Opposes Nuclear Weapons in Middle East, Pledges Cooperation with Iran

June 6, 2012

BEIJING, June 6 (Xinhua) -- Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said Wednesday that China opposes any Middle-East countries' push to acquire nuclear weapons and upholds that the Iranian nuclear issue should be addressed through diplomatic channels in an impartial way.

"The Chinese side is willing to keep in close communication and coordination with the Iranian side," Wen said as he met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who arrived in Beijing Tuesday night to visit China and attend the 12th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Wen said the Chinese side cherishes the traditional friendship with Iran and attaches importance to the Iranian people's own choice of their development path and supports Iran in its efforts to improve the national economy and the people's livelihoods.

The economic ties between China and Iran are based on equality and reciprocity and serve each side's economic development, said the premier, adding that China is willing to make joint efforts with Iran to upgrade pragmatic cooperation between the two nations.

"The two sides should continuously improve their mutual understanding and trust to advance the China-Iran relationship in a healthy and stable way," Wen said.

Hailing the friendship and cooperation between the two nations, Ahmadinejad said the Iranian side is willing to further boost reciprocal cooperation in trade, energy resources, investment, technology, tourism and other areas while enhancing cultural and people-to-people exchanges to make new progress in the bilateral ties.

During the meeting, Ahmadinejad voiced his appreciation for China's respect for Iran's sovereignty and legitimate rights and the constructive role China plays in international and regional affairs.

The Iranian side is willing to continue dialogues and negotiations to solve the problems with some countries concerned, Ahmadinejad said.

The SCO was founded in Shanghai on June 15, 2001, and currently has six full members -- China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Iran as well as Mongolia, Pakistan and India is an observer state of the organization.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/06/c_131635526.htm



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[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Chicago Tribune

U.S. Says Syria Cynically Stonewalls U.N. Nuclear Probe

By Reuters

June 6, 2012

VIENNA (Reuters) - The United States accused Syria on Wednesday of cynically using its crackdown on an uprising at home to justify its stonewalling of a United Nations watchdog investigation into the Arab state's nuclear activities.

The U.N. nuclear chief said earlier this year that Syria had asked for understanding of its "delicate situation" in response to requests for Syrian cooperation with an International Atomic Energy Agency inquiry into suspected illicit nuclear work.

President Bashar al-Assad is fighting a 15-month-old revolt by peaceful protesters and armed insurgents, in which the United Nations says more than 10,000 people have been killed.

Syria "has said that events on the ground in Syria, events that I would note involve the Syrian government's deliberate use of lethal force against civilians, prevent Syria from cooperating with the IAEA", U.S. envoy Robert Wood said.

"This is a cynical rationale for continuing to stonewall the agency. The Syrian government's own destabilizing actions are no justification for Syria's refusal to abide by its commitments," he told a session of the U.N. agency's board of governors.

The IAEA has been seeking access to a Syrian desert site at Deir al-Zor that U.S. intelligence reports say was a nascent, North Korean-designed reactor intended to produce plutonium for atomic weaponry before Israel bombed it to rubble in 2007.

The Vienna-based watchdog has also been seeking information about other sites that may have been linked to Deir al-Zor.

Syria says Deir al-Zor was a non-nuclear military facility but the IAEA concluded in May 2011 that it was "very likely" to have been a reactor that should have been declared to its anti-proliferation inspectors.

In June last year, IAEA governors voted to report Syria to the U.N. Security Council, rebuking it for failing to cooperate with the agency's efforts to get concrete information on Deir al-Zor and other sites. Russia and China opposed the referral, highlighting divisions among the major powers.

"Syria's attempt at constructing a covert plutonium-production reactor remains a serious (nuclear) safeguards violation," Wood said. "Today, it is more than clear that Syria has no intention to cooperate with this Agency regarding its undeclared nuclear activities."

Reporting by Fredrik Dahl; Editing by Mark Heinrich

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-nuclear-syria-iranbre8550uz-20120606,0,3752808.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Trend – Azerbaijan

Iran, IAEA Start New Talks on Nuclear Probe

June 08, 2012

The U.N. nuclear watchdog and Iran began a new round of talks on Friday in an attempt to seal a framework deal to resume a long-stalled probe into suspected nuclear weapon research in the Islamic state, a charge Tehran denies, Reuters reported.

Issue No. 1006, 08 June 2012

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Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency, smiled but declined to comment to reporters as he entered the IAEA's headquarters in Vienna for his meeting with senior agency officials.

The IAEA wants an agreement that would enable its inspectors to visit a military complex, Parchin, and other sites which it suspects may be linked to what it calls the "possible military dimensions" to Iran's nuclear programme.

Iran has said it will work with the agency to prove that such allegations are "forged and fabricated".

Both sides say progress has been made in previous discussions on the issue this year, though differences remain.

Edited by S. Isayev

<http://pda.trend.az/en/2035321.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Seattle Post Intelligencer

6 Powers, Iran, Remain Split on Nuclear Issues

By GEORGE JAHN, Associated Press

Friday, June 8, 2012

VIENNA (AP) — Iran and six world powers seeking to coax Tehran into curbing its nuclear activities appear to be coming to talks later this month without resolving the differences that scuttled previous rounds, according to recent letters exchanged between the two sides.

One letter, shared with The Associated Press Friday, shows Iran seeking an expert-level meeting ahead of the June 18-19 Moscow negotiations to "prepare the necessary ground for the Moscow talks."

In response, a senior European Union representative speaking for the six powers suggests there is no need for such preliminary talks because the six remain committed to their "straightforward proposal" presented at the last meeting in Baghdad.

Her letter instead urges Tehran to embrace that proposal, which offers a mix of incentives if Tehran reduces uranium enrichment, which can generate weapons-grade material as well as nuclear fuel.

The letters were shared by two diplomats amid a renewed effort in Vienna Friday by the U.N. nuclear agency to coax Iran into reopening a long-stalled probe into suspicions that Tehran worked secretly on atomic arms. The diplomats demanded anonymity because the correspondence is confidential.

The investigation has been stalled for nearly five years by Iran's insistence that it does not need to cooperate because the allegations are based on forged U.S. and Israeli intelligence.

The six powers — the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany — are watching the Vienna talks closely for signs of Iranian flexibility ahead of their latest attempt to persuade Tehran to stop enriching uranium to a grade that can be turned quickly into the core of nuclear missiles.

Iran says it needs to continue higher-grade enrichment to 20 percent to power a research reactor and to make medical isotopes.

Iran denies any interest in nuclear weapons and wants the international community to ease sanctions before it makes a move, something Western nations among the six powers are unwilling to do. Instead, they are offering spare parts for Iran's aging commercial airline fleet and other goods restricted by sanctions.

An Iran armed with nuclear weapons is considered a threat. Israel has indicated readiness to attack Iran if diplomacy and sanctions fail. The U.S. has said it wants to keep "all options" on the table. Both suspect that Iran is aiming to build nuclear weapons, and Israel believes it would be a prime target.

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But the letters show little progress in bridging differences less than two weeks before the Moscow talks and before sanctions are tightened still further on Iran's oil. The U.S already has started to enforce penalties against countries importing Iranian crude, and the 27-nation European Union, which recently accounted for 18 percent of Iran's oil shipments, plans to begin an oil boycott July 1.

Dated Monday, the Iranian letter is signed by Ali Bagheri, his country's No. 2 nuclear negotiator. It complains of a lack "of any oral or written response" to Tehran's request for a preliminary meeting ahead of the Moscow talks.

But senior EU official Helga Schmid suggests in a letter dated Thursday that the six-power proposal at the Baghdad talks stands and addresses "our key concerns on the 20 percent enrichment activities" while offering "interesting opportunities for cooperation in the nuclear and other areas."

Comments posted Friday by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on his website also suggested a tough line by Tehran ahead of the Moscow talks.

"If Iran wants to build an atomic bomb, it doesn't fear anyone and will publicly announce it and no one will be able to prevent it," Ahmadinejad said, while insisting the Iran has no intention of building nuclear weapons.

Associated Press writer Ali Akbar Dareini contributed from Tehran.

<http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/6-powers-iran-remain-split-on-nuclear-issues-3618926.php>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Dong-A Ilbo – South Korea

South Korea Should Get Nuclear Weapons: Rep. Chung

June 4, 2012

Leading ruling Saenuri Party Rep. Chung Mong-joon said Sunday that South Korea should have the capability to possess nuclear weapons in going beyond a nuclear strategy of dependence on the U.S.

In a news conference, the former party chairman said, "North Korea's declaration as a nuclear power in its constitution means that the North no longer intends to consider the dismantlement of nuclear weapons as a subject for negotiations. We need a comprehensive reexamination of our security policy."

With his comments, Chung went a step further from his earlier argument for "repositioning tactical nuclear weapons (withdrawn in 1991) on the Korean Peninsula."

"Peace cannot be secured without the balance of fear or nuclear weapon for nuclear weapon," he said, adding, "Even if (South Korea) doesn't possess its own nuclear weapons immediately, it should secure the capability to possess them."

Chung apparently meant that South Korea paradoxically needs to arm itself with nuclear weapons to achieve the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

"The declaration of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula was effectively discarded due to the North's nuclear weapons development," he said. "It is the duty of the next administration to declare a commitment (to possess nuclear weapons) and gradually take steps one by one."

Calling Seoul's policy toward Pyongyang a "failure," Chung added, "South Korea has focused only on its relationship with the North, and has had the wrong perception that all problems can be resolved through negotiations."

He also presented as one of his campaign pledges reconsideration of South Korea's plan to retake wartime operational command of its forces from the U.S. in 2015.

<http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=050000&biid=2012060446358>



[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Global Security Newswire

Shortcomings Persist in China's Submarine-Based Nuke Force: Report

June 4, 2012

China's ballistic missile submarine force lacks the ability to mount a major counteroffensive following a potential nuclear strike against the nation, the *Straits Times* reported on Monday (see *GSN*, June 1).

The limitation stems from the vessels' inability to coordinate with their control centers, as well as the storage of launch vehicles and their warheads at separate locations under an oversight system providing insufficient control to navy commanders.

"The [People's Liberation Army] has only a limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea, and [the PLA navy] has no experience in managing a [submarine] fleet that performs strategic patrols with live nuclear warheads mated to missiles," the U.S. Defense Department said in 2010.

It is possible to ultimately address the first of the two issues, but the second concern lacks a viable solution, according to one observer.

"It would require a major change in Chinese nuclear policy and practice for Beijing to deploy a second-strike nuclear capability at sea," said Hans Kristensen, who heads the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. "This goes both for deploying nuclear weapons on a military platform, something which the [Chinese Central Military Commission] has never to my knowledge ever allowed, and sailing SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines] on patrols, which they have never done.

"They would also have to resolve the complex issue of how to maintain reliable command-and-control with a nuclear-armed submarine at sea," Kristensen added.

"Even if one assumed that the Chinese leadership would, in a crisis, release warheads to the navy, deploying them raises all the thorny issues of how they would react in a crisis if an SSBN went missing or they couldn't communicate with it," he said. "Would they assume it had been sunk and therefore consider it an attack on China, leading them to launch nuclear weapons?"

In addition, the predicted 4,600-mile maximum flight distance of China's developmental JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile raises complications in targeting the United States.

"If strategy and survival were the issues, then China would focus its nuclear retaliatory capability on (mobile) land-based missiles that it can hide deep inside its vast territory," Kristensen said (Robert Karniol, *Straits Times*, June 4).

The United States intends "of necessity" to field three-fifths of its naval forces in the Pacific Ocean by the end of the decade, the Associated Press on Sunday quoted U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta as saying (Eric Talmadge, Associated Press I/ABC News, June 3).

Panetta said Washington and Beijing "both understand the differences we have, we both understand the conflicts we have, but we also both understand that there really is no other alternative but for both of us to engage and to improve our communications and to improve our (military) relationship" (Lolita Baldor, Associated Press II/Google News, June 2).

Panetta's statement prompted a fairly limited Chinese response on Monday, Reuters reported.

"At present, the grand trend and broad aspiration of the Asia-Pacific region is towards seeking peace, fostering cooperation and encouraging development," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin said. "All sides should strive to preserve and promote regional peace, stability and development. The approach of artificially stressing military



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security, enhancing military deployments and strengthening military alliances is out of keeping with the times" (Chris Buckley, Reuters, June 4).

<http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/shortcomings-persist-chinas-submarine-based-nuke-force-report/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Yonhap News Agency – South Korea
June 4, 2012

S. Korea, U.S. Far Apart on Extending Missile Range: Source

SEOUL, June 4 (Yonhap) -- The talks between South Korea and the United States that could allow Seoul to extend the range of its ballistic missiles to cover all of North Korea have not been going well, as the allies have failed to narrow differences, a government source here said Monday.

Under an agreement with the U.S., first signed in 1979 and revised in 2001, the range of South Korean ballistic missiles is limited to 300 kilometers and their payload to 500 kilograms. The agreement is up for renewal at the end of this year.

South Korea wants to lengthen its missile range, but Washington fears that the South Korean move, if endorsed, could spur an arms race in the region.

The bilateral talks between Seoul and Washington drew fresh public attention in South Korea following North Korea's launch of a long-range rocket in April, prompting Seoul's military to announce plans to bolster its missile arsenal.

"Working-level consultations on extending our missile range are continuing, but the two sides have failed to find common ground," the source said on the condition of anonymity.

The source said that it would be difficult for South Korea and the U.S. to reach an agreement by the end of this month.

"The U.S. side is still opposed to extending the missile range," the source said.

Whenever North Korea intimidates others with its missile or nuclear programs, calls spike in South Korea for longer-range missiles to counter the threats. Since 2010, South Korea and the U.S. have been in talks to revise the missile range pact, though few details have been released.

Earlier in the day, a local newspaper, the JoongAng Ilbo, reported that South Korea and the U.S. have agreed to extend Seoul's missile range to 550 km, and the two sides plan to announce the agreement in the middle of this month, when foreign and defense chiefs from the two nations hold a so-called "two-plus-two" security meeting in Washington.

Kim Min-seok, a spokesman at Seoul's defense ministry, denied the report, saying the allies have made "no decision" over the issue.

There has been no decision made on whether the issue will be raised at the Washington meeting involving Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, Kim told reporters.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/06/04/60/0301000000AEN20120604002000315F.HTML>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Chicago Tribune

IAEA Sees No Prospect Now for North Korea Visit

By Reuters
June 4, 2012

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CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

VIENNA (Reuters) - The U.N. nuclear watchdog chief said on Monday it had become clear through recent contacts with North Korea that there was no immediate prospect of the Vienna-based atomic agency visiting the Asian state.

The International Atomic Energy Agency said in early April it needed more information before it could take up an invitation from Pyongyang to travel to the reclusive country three years after the IAEA's inspectors were expelled. North Korea said later that month it was no longer bound by an agreement with the United States for a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests and the return of IAEA inspectors.

"Since an attempt by the DPRK (North Korea) to launch a 'satellite', the agency has been carefully monitoring the situation," IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said, referring to a failed test-launch of a long-range missile in April.

"Through recent contacts with the DPRK, it has become clear that there is no immediate prospect of an agency mission taking place," he told the IAEA's 35-nation governing board, according to a copy of his remarks at the closer-door meeting.

Amano, a veteran Japanese diplomat, called on the North to comply with its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions and to cooperate "promptly and fully" with the IAEA.

Reporting by Fredrik Dahl; Editing by Alison Williams

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-nuclear-northkorea-iaeabre8530dx-20120604,0,3351439.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

China Daily – China

SCO Calls for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, Space Security

June 7, 2012

(Xinhua)

BEIJING, June 7 (Xinhua) -- Member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in central Asia in a declaration released after the conclusion of the group's Beijing summit on Thursday.

The SCO calls on all nuclear weapon states to sign relevant protocols to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia and take real steps to move forward the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the region, according to the declaration on Building a Region of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity.

All member states stand for ensuring outer space security, peaceful use of outer space and prevention the weaponization of outer space, said declaration of the heads of state of the member states of the SCO.

Member states will work to build a peaceful, secure, fair and open information space, on the basis of the principles of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in other countries' internal affairs, according to the declaration.

The member states oppose using information and telecommunication technologies in a way that "endangers their political, economic and social security" and will work to prevent the Internet from being used to promote terrorism, extremism and separatism, it said.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/xinhua/2012-06-07/content_6122812.html

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Indian Express – India

India, Pak Developing New Systems for Delivering Nukes: SIPRI

By Agencies

London, Monday, June 04, 2012

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India and Pakistan are continuing to work towards developing new systems for delivering nuclear weapons and are expanding their capacities to produce fissile material for military purposes, according to an international think tank report.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) said Pakistan was developing a number of new short-range ballistic missiles which suggests that it may use "battlefield nuclear weapons resulting in these warheads being deployed on a "launch-ready posture".

"India and Pakistan are increasing the size and sophistication of their nuclear arsenals. Both countries are developing and deploying new types of nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles and both are increasing their military fissile material production capabilities," the SIPRI yearbook said.

The report also claimed that in May last year, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh convened a meeting of the Nuclear Command Authority to assess progress towards the goal of achieving an operational triad including weapon delivery systems based in air, land and sea.

SIPRI claimed that the number of nuclear warheads with India and Pakistan have continued to be the same in comparison with last year with New Delhi having 80-100 such nukes in its arsenal while Islamabad has 90-110 of them.

The battlefield nuclear warheads, also known as Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs), were first reported to be with Pakistan during the Operation Parakram in 2001-02.

Traditionally it is believed that TNWs are not to be used against strategic targets and can be used to smoke out an armoured regiment or column advancing into a country.

The report also said that Pakistan's doctrine is based on the principle of minimum deterrence but does not specifically rule out the first-use of nuclear weapons to offset India's superiority in conventional arms and manpower.

It said eight of the world's nuclear powers together possessed nearly 19,000 atomic weapons.

World military spending failed to rise last year for the first time since 1998 in a major shift from the international trend.

World military expenditure in 2011 was essentially flat at USD 1.73 trillion, an increase of just 0.3 per cent from 2010 representing 2.5 per cent of global gross domestic product or USD 249 per person, the report said.

"The eight nuclear states --the US, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel together possess a total of approximately 19,000 nuclear weapons, as compared with 20,530 at the beginning of 2011," it pointed out.

The decrease in the total number of warheads is mainly due to Russia and the US further reducing their inventories of strategic nuclear weapons under the terms of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) as well as retiring ageing and obsolescent weapons, the think tank pointed out.

At the same time, all five legally recognised nuclear weapon states China, France, Russia, the UK and the US are either deploying new nuclear weapon delivery systems or have announced programmes to do so, it added.

They appear determined to retain their nuclear arsenals indefinitely.

While the eight nuclear states possessed approximately 4400 operational nuclear weapons at the start of 2012, nearly 2000 of these are kept in a state of high operational alert, the SIPRI report cautioned.

The SIPRI yearbook 2012 assesses the current state of international security, armaments and disarmament.

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament.

<http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-pak-developing-new-systems-for-delivering-nukes-sipri/957740/0>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Issue No. 1006, 08 June 2012

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Times of India – India

Pakistan Tests Nuclear-Capable Hatf VII Cruise Missile

By Omar Farooq Khan, Tamil News Network (TNN)

June 5, 2012

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan on Tuesday tested a fifth nuclear-capable cruise missile since India launched last month a new long-range ballistic missile, Agni V, capable of delivering a one-ton nuclear warhead anywhere in China.

The statement issued by the military said that indigenously developed Cruise Missile Hatf-VII (Babur) having a range of 700 kilometers, is a low flying, terrain hugging missile with high maneuverability, pin point accuracy and radar avoidance features. It can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads and has stealth capabilities.

"It also incorporates the most modern cruise missile technology of Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) and Digital Scene Matching and Area Co-relation (DSMAC), which enhances its precision and effectiveness manifolds," the statement said.

The missile was launched from a state-of-the-art multi tube Missile Launch Vehicle (MLV) which significantly enhances the targeting and employment options of Babur Weapon System in both the conventional and nuclear modes. "The test will consolidate Pakistan's strategic deterrence capability, and further strengthen national security," the statement said. President and Prime Minister of Pakistan congratulated the scientists and engineers on the successful test of the latest cruise missile.

The Hatf-VII (Babur) was the fifth missile tested by Pakistan since last month. On May 31, Pakistan test fired nuclear-capable Hatf-VIII cruise missile with a range of more than 350 km. On May 29, Islamabad tested its quick reaction tactical nuclear-capable Hatf-IX missile with a range of 60 km on May 29.

Pakistan conducted a test of the nuclear-capable Hatf-III ballistic missile with a range of 290 km on May 10. On April 25, six days after India tested the Agni-V missile with a range of 5,000 km, Pakistan tested an improved version of the nuclear-capable Hatf-IV intermediate range ballistic missile with the range of 1,000 km.

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Pakistan-tests-nuclear-capable-Hatf-VII-cruise-missile/articleshow/13840385.cms>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Russia Wants Missile Defense Guarantees - Putin

2 June 2012

Russia will hold partner-like dialogue on missile defense with Western countries if it has guarantees that the missile shield is not directed against it, President Vladimir Putin said on Friday.

"We are constantly being told that the missile defense system is not directed against Russia. We would like to receive military and technological guarantees fixed in legally binding documents," Putin told journalists after talks with his French counterpart Francois Hollande in Paris.

"Only then will we be able to feel safe and hold normal partner-like dialogue," he said.

"Statements like 'don't be afraid, we promise that nothing will happen' are clearly insufficient in the modern world. This is childish. We need guarantees and serious agreements in the security sphere," Putin said.

He added that he hopes constructive dialogue with France and other NATO members is possible.

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Russia and NATO agreed to cooperate on the so-called European missile defense system at the Lisbon summit in November 2010. NATO insists there should be two independent systems that exchange information, while Russia favors a joint system with full-scale interoperability.

Russia's military and political leaders have repeatedly warned their western partners that if talks fail, Moscow may take a series of measures including deployment of Iskander short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave.

PARIS, June 2 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20120602/173800599.html

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

ITAR-TASS News Agency – Russia
2 June 2012

No Document on Missile Defence Prepared for Putin-Obama Meeting -- FM

MOSCOW, June 2 (Itar-Tass) — No document on missile defence is being prepared for the upcoming meeting between President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama at the G20 summit in Mexico, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said.

“No document on missile defence is being prepared. We are engaged in dialogue on missile defence, but it has so far been futile because of the American partners’ categorical refusal to take into account our concerns. They have thought up their own scheme and do not want to, or cannot, step aside from it even by an inch, which does not match our understanding of cooperation,” Lavrov told Vesti V Subbotu (News on Saturday) news programme on Russia-1 television channel on June 2.

Lavrov said earlier that Moscow would insist that Washington take its position into account “in full measure”.

“It is clear that we have no accord, but we have agreed that experts will continue the work, and we will insist that our stand be taken into consideration in full measure,” the minister stated.

“We have explained to the American colleagues what risks we see in their four-stage 'adaptive plan' and hope that the professional contacts will allow us to find possibilities to agree in such a way that this [missile defence] system does not create threats for Russia and risks for strategic stability on the global scale,” Lavrov said.

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defence Policy and Verification Operations Frank Rose said in response that the U.S. was ready to make a political statement to the effect that the missile defence system in Europe will not be directed against Russia but would not give any binding guarantees.

In an interview with Vesti V Subbotu, Lavrov also touched upon by U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul's remarks regarding Russia, which he made on May 25, 2012 at a meeting with students of the Higher School of Economics.

When asked to comment on the fact that McFaul was included in the U.S. delegation to the G20 summit to be held on June 18-19, Lavrov said, “In our profession, we have to take realities as they are, not rejoice. And realities are such that the American delegation is formed by President Obama. But at the same time realities are such that Ambassador McFaul should make conclusions from what happened.”

“We were extremely perplexed by U.S. Ambassador in Moscow Michael McFaul's remarks made on May 25, 2012 at a meeting with students of the Higher School of Economics. His assessments of interaction between Russia and the U.S. go far beyond diplomatic etiquette in form and are an intentional distortion of some aspects of the Russian-American dialogue in substance,” the ministry said.

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“Just as unprofessional appear to be McFaul's assertions about some ‘linkages’ that Russia supposedly insists on when discussing acute international issues. Saying that we allegedly proposed to exchange ‘Iran for Georgia’ and ‘human rights in Russia for North Korea’ means to be totally unaware of Moscow's position, according to which fundamental issues, including non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, are an unconditional priority and are not subject to any bargaining.”

“This is not the first time when statements and actions by Mr. McFaul, who holds such a high post, startle” the ministry said.

<http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/436913.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Yury Dolgoruky to Complete Sea Trial on Thursday

6 June 2012

Russia's latest ballistic missile submarine, the Borey class Yury Dolgoruky will complete an initial sea trial on June 7, its maker Sevmash shipyard said on Tuesday.

"The Yury Dolgoruky will complete an initial sea trial on June 7. If all testing goes successfully, the boat will be accepted into service in the near future," a Sevmash source told RIA Novosti, adding that no tests of the boat's future primary armament, the Bulava ICBM, are planned during the sea trial.

The Bulava will be test-fired again this year, but from another boat of this class, the Alexander Nevsky, and if the test is successful, the two systems will be accepted into the service this year.

Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and former navy commander Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky have previously said that the Borey class boats and Bulava, would enter service this fall.

The 24,000 ton displacement Borey class boats will carry 16 Bulava missiles. The new boats will be the mainstay of Russia's naval nuclear deterrent fleet after 2018, replacing the existing Project 941 and Project 667 (NATO Typhoon and Delta-3 and Delta-4) class ballistic missile submarines.

MOSCOW, June 6 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20120606/173873869.html

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Rogozin Doubts Need to Develop New Strategic Bomber

6 June 2012

A long-running dispute between the Russian military and defense industry over procurement of new weaponry may enter a new phase as Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin has questioned the need to develop a new strategic bomber, the Izvestia daily said on Wednesday.

Russia announced plans in 2009 to develop a fifth-generation strategic bomber, which will feature new airframe and elements of stealth technology, by 2025.

The new bomber is expected to replace the Tu-95MC Bear and Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bombers, and Tu-22M3 Backfire long-range bombers currently in service with Russia's strategic aviation.



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“Look at the current level of air defense and anti-missile defense – these aircraft will not get anywhere. Not ours, not theirs,” Rogozin, who oversees defense industry and will soon assume full control over financing of R&D for military purposes, said in an interview with Izvestia.

He added that strategic bombers could not be viewed as means of delivering nuclear strikes on enemy territory anymore.

Meanwhile, Chief of the Russian General Staff Gen. Nikolai Makarov told Izvestia that the new bomber project was underway as planned.

“We have made some progress in the development of the new bomber,” Makarov said. “If we reach production phase, this plane will outperform any modern aircraft of the same class, including those built by the Americans.”

It is not the first time Rogozin and Makarov have clashed over arms procurement issues.

In the beginning of this year, Makarov sharply criticized the quality of Russian-made weaponry for the Ground Forces and said the Defense Ministry would stop purchasing domestic-made armored vehicles for the next five years because they are outdated.

Rogozin, clearly angered by Makarov’s blunt statement, responded that the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces “is not the only one who makes decisions on the purchase of arms and military hardware.”

He said Russia’s Armed Forces would be modernized as scheduled in accordance with the state armament procurement program and the defense budget.

MOSCOW, June 6 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20120606/173879617.html

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Der Spiegel – Germany

June 5, 2012

'Helping Israel Defend Itself Is Germany's Duty'

By David Gordon Smith

Opposition parties in Germany are demanding answers about the sale of nuclear-capable submarines to Israel, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that the vessels are "very important" for his country's security. Media commentators argue that Germany has a historical duty to support the Jewish state.

SPIEGEL's cover story about the sale of German-built submarines to Israel, which were then equipped with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, has provoked a storm of debate in Germany and internationally.

According to extensive research carried out by SPIEGEL, Israel is equipping submarines built in the northern German city of Kiel and partly paid for by the German government with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Three Dolphin-class submarines have already been delivered to Israel, and three more will be delivered by 2017. The contract for the sixth submarine was signed only recently.

On Monday, opposition parties called for an explanation from the German government and more transparency on weapons deals. "The German governments needs to reveal the facts and make a report to the relevant parliamentary committee," Cem Özdemir, co-leader of the Green Party, told SPIEGEL ONLINE.

The opposition center-left Social Democrats (SPD) have been muted in their reaction, however. In 2005, former SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder personally approved the delivery of submarines to Israel.

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The German government has neither confirmed nor denied the SPIEGEL report, which was published Monday. Government spokesman Steffen Seibert said that the government did not get involved "in speculation about a possible later armament" of the submarines, adding that the vessels were delivered "without weapons."

Philipp Missfelder, parliamentary foreign policy spokesman for Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservative Christian Democratic Union, told the daily *Süddeutsche Zeitung* that the Israeli government was solely responsible for the decision about how the submarines were equipped. "We have to respect that," he said.

'Give Us the Tools and We Will Do the Job'

In an interview published in the Tuesday edition of the mass-circulation daily *Bild*, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the German-built submarines were "very important" for defending Israel's security. The recent sale of another German submarine was "an important adjunct to our national security," he said.

Netanyahu stressed that Israel had never asked other countries to come to its defense. "One of the great transformations in the reconstitution of the Jewish state is the regaining by the Jewish people of the ability to defend ourselves by ourselves against any threat," he told *Bild*. "While I appreciate Germany's concern for Israel's security, the most important assistance that can be given to Israel is -- to paraphrase Churchill -- to give us the tools and we will do the job of defending ourselves."

Merkel's stated position is that the security of Israel is part of Germany's *raison d'état*, or national interest.

In the past, the German government has always stuck to the position that it is unaware of nuclear weapons being deployed on the vessels. Former high-ranking officials from the German Defense Ministry, including former State Secretary Lothar Rühl and former chief of the planning staff Hans Rühle, told SPIEGEL, however, that they had always assumed that Israel would deploy nuclear weapons on the submarines.

Experts had long suspected that the submarines were intended to carry nuclear weapons. Few insiders believed the official explanation that the vessels' unusually wide torpedo tubes were designed to allow combat swimmers to exit the submarines. The SPIEGEL story provided previously unknown details of the deal and reconstructed the historical context of the German-Israeli negotiations.

On Tuesday, German commentators took a look at the ramifications of the news.

The center-right **Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung** writes:

"It's been known for a long time that Israel ordered German submarines with unusually large torpedo tubes -- and that the diameter of the tubes has nothing to do with the girth of its combat swimmers."

"Every German government which provided Israel with these submarines must have known that they were not for protecting the coast. The German military aid for Israel has, however, had new implications ever since the Israelis started thinking about a conventional or nuclear preemptive strike against Iran. The German submarines with their fuel cells could have been designed specifically for use in the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf. From there, cruise missiles fired (from a submarine) could easily reach almost any destination in Iran. But the German government does not, of course, want to get involved in such speculation. That would run counter to the country's *raison d'état*."

The **Financial Times Deutschland** writes:

"In the German political debate, 'Israel' is an emotive word that triggers kneejerk reactions from the public -- especially when combined with terms such as 'arms exports' or even 'nuclear bombs.' (...) The context and the complexity of individual decisions regarding Israel, arms sales, the settlements or controversial border barriers are quickly forgotten in the process."

"None of the major German political parties have fundamentally criticized supplying weapons to Israel. (...) After all, no serious politician would claim that Israel's security and existence is not in Germany's interests -- for historical reasons,



naturally, but also for geopolitical ones. (...) And if the state of Israel considers submarines to be necessary for its protection, then Berlin has little reason to contradict it."

The left-leaning **Berliner Zeitung** writes:

"Israel is so small that it could be destroyed with a few nuclear bombs. The submarines, however, give the country an effective deterrent, because they allow it to retaliate. Second-strike capability, as it is called in military jargon, is Israel's most important insurance policy if a hostile country like Iran actually gets the bomb one day."

"By supplying Israel with submarines, Germany has not provided it with new offensive weapons -- of which the country already has enough. The submarines are instead the means for a final, desperate act of defense. Helping Israel in that respect is Germany's historical duty."

The left-leaning **Die Tageszeitung** writes:

"Germany is a strange country. When SPD leader Sigmar Gabriel recently traveled to Hebron and said that the disenfranchisement of the Palestinians reminded him of apartheid in South Africa, a storm of outrage broke out. But the fact that Israel's government is pushing ahead with settlements, thereby destroying the basis for a two-state solution, is accepted by most German politicians and journalists with a shrug of the shoulders."

"Similarly, the (news) that Germany is supplying Israel with submarines which can be equipped with nuclear weapons has prompted little indignation. But when a writer such as Günter Grass, in an unfortunately worded poem, gives expression to his concern that this could lead to an escalation in the conflict with Iran, half of Germany takes offense. It is to SPIEGEL's credit that it has tried to steer the debate back along rational lines."

"It's a serious matter when Germany, as the world's third-largest arms exporter, apparently pays little consideration to the consequences of its policy (of exporting submarines to Israel). After all, military equipment is not supposed to be exported to crisis regions (under German government guidelines). This applies to the export of German tanks to Saudi Arabia as well as to the supply of nuclear-capable submarines to Israel, whose government is currently openly threatening to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. When he criticized that fact, Grass had a point."

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-press-supports-sale-of-submarines-to-israel-a-837093.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

National Journal

U.S. Air Force Approves Concept for Future ICBM, Eyes Navy Collaboration

By Elaine M. Grossman
June 1, 2012

A senior-level U.S. Air Force panel has approved a document that formally articulates the need for a new ground-based missile system to replace today's nuclear-armed Minuteman 3 arsenal (*See GSN, Feb. 10*).

The future intercontinental ballistic missile might be either a modernized Minuteman or a completely new design, but one attribute appears increasingly certain: The ICBM will likely share an unprecedented number of "common" hardware and software components with a new Navy ballistic missile for basing on submarines, according to Defense Department officials.

There is even some talk of building identical missiles for Navy deployment at sea and Air Force fielding on land, though at this early date the odds appear against that for military and technical reasons.

Plans are for the Air Force's new "ground-based strategic deterrent" to begin replacing today's 450-missile Minuteman 3 force by 2030. Under the terms of last year's New START arms-control agreement with Russia, the United States has said it would retain no more than 420 ICBMs in coming years.



The Air Force Requirements Oversight Council on May 17 signed off on an “initial capabilities document” for the future ICBM, according to Capt. Caroline Wellman, a service spokeswoman. Such military documents typically are kept secret, spelling out key attributes needed for military equipment, such as range, speed, and payload.

To proceed with an ICBM developmental effort, the Air Force must next vet the document through a multiservice review board, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. That top-level Pentagon panel is chaired by the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and includes the No. 2 military officers from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.

Once armed with the joint board’s approval — anticipated sometime in roughly the next two to 12 months — the Air Force can begin work in fiscal 2013 on a more detailed assessment of technical options. The Obama administration requested \$11.7 million to launch the Analysis of Alternatives after the new spending year commences on Oct. 1 (*See GSN, Feb. 14*).

The analytical work is to continue in fiscal 2014 at a cost of \$9.4 million, laying the groundwork for a White House decision on how the Minuteman 3 force — first fielded in 1970 — should be replaced.

As the Air Force prepares for the Analysis of Alternatives, “we are looking at basing modes. We are looking at affordability,” said Maj. Gen. William Chambers, the service’s assistant chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration. “We are looking at the right — and the most compatible — warhead.”

Speaking at a May 24 breakfast event on Capitol Hill, the Air Force two-star general noted it was early in the developmental process and said the future system’s technical attributes will “become more clear” once the two-year Analysis of Alternatives is complete.

Still, some hints have surfaced that could make the Minuteman follow-on missile interesting to policy wonks, technology junkies and maybe even some in the broader American public.

For one thing, the Pentagon’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review — a wide-ranging assessment of the nation’s deterrence policy, forces and readiness — said the Defense Department would consider “new modes of ICBM basing that enhance survivability and further reduce any incentives for prompt launch.”

That might mean the replacement missile could be made mobile, with a capability for transport on trucks or trains, according to defense experts. In a crisis, the ICBMs could be dispersed or hidden, making them more survivable against potential enemy attack and less likely to trigger a preemptive nuclear launch by either side.

Today’s Minuteman 3 missiles are based in fixed underground launch silos in five states: Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming.

Whether the U.S. public is ready to embrace nuclear-armed missiles on its roads or railways is not entirely clear, following heated debate over similar concepts during the 1980s. On the other hand, mobility could make the ICBM force more secure and potentially serve as a basis for additional nuclear arsenal reductions — initiatives that could draw popular support.

New ICBM basing schemes might also include non-mobile options, such as “dense pack” deployment once contemplated — and rejected — for the since-retired Peacekeeper missile under President Reagan, according to one senior Defense official interviewed last month. Under this concept, silos would be closely spaced and theoretically made more challenging to destroy in an all-out attack.

Another basing alternative could be to maintain some underground silos with ballistic missiles in them while others randomly remain empty, creating a “shell game” that similarly could complicate enemy targeting and help deter a massive nuclear strike against U.S. forces.

“We could give [adversary] folks lots of aim points, which keeps your stability up,” said the senior official, who cited political and military sensitivities surrounding nuclear weapon programs as the reason for requesting anonymity in this article. “But they may be targeting an empty hole.”



There is also some early debate over whether to give the future ICBM a capacity for delivering multiple warheads. This comes despite a decision announced in the 2010 posture review to winnow down — or “de-MIRV,” in Pentagon parlance — each Minuteman from a maximum three warheads to one per missile.

The Nuclear Posture Review also alluded to retaining an ability to increase warheads on strategic platforms, as a hedge against the possibility — however remote — of a resurgent threat to the nation.

“Some ability to ‘upload’ non-deployed nuclear weapons on existing delivery vehicles should be retained as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise,” the 2010 policy document stated.

Although the posture review said that “preference will be given to upload capacity for bombers and strategic submarines,” some Defense officials say the Pentagon will also likely move to preserve this option on its future ICBM.

“I think it’s clear” that the Pentagon will “keep a MIRVed capability on the missile,” even if the ICBM continues to be typically deployed with a single warhead, the senior official told *Global Security Newswire*. A latent capacity to upload, if ever needed, would serve as insurance against “that resurgent threat, that unknown future that you have to worry about,” the official said.

There are technical and cost incentives to include a multi-warhead option in the missile design, according to the senior official.

“It doesn’t take that much, if you build [an upload capacity] in from the beginning,” the official said. “Now, if you have a missile that’s only designed for singlets and now you want to reMIRV it, ouch. You’ve got a problem. It’s just money, but it’s ... big money.”

Affordability will play a central role in the process to determine what technology replaces today’s land-based missile arsenal, this and several other officials emphasized.

A vocal group of lawmakers — mostly comprising Republicans — has suggested that plans for modernizing U.S. nuclear weapon systems should be spared from the budget axe that has affected many of the Pentagon’s conventional warfare procurement efforts (*See GSN, April 20*).

The 2011 Budget Control Act mandates a roughly \$450 billion cut in defense spending over the next decade. That amount could more than double under the sequester process if lawmakers do not by the end of this year reverse the legislation’s demand for \$1.2 trillion in additional government-wide reductions.

The senior defense official said that Pentagon personnel are operating under an assumption that cost discipline must be maintained across the board, to include nuclear weapon programs.

“Affordability is now a key parameter in every [Analysis of Alternatives] we do,” the official said. “The days of ‘it must be funded’ are over.”

Those suggesting in Pentagon meetings that nuclear efforts be exempted from budget-cutting considerations “get laughed right out of the room,” the official added.

The search for savings in tightening defense budgets has prompted the Navy and Air Force to discuss new ways of combining efforts. That has included new exploration of the potential for cross-service work on future ballistic missile development and procurement — largely a new frontier after decades of building and buying nuclear systems separately.

The Navy currently deploys 1,152 nuclear warheads aboard 288 Trident D-5 ballistic missiles, fielded on a fleet of 14 Ohio-class submarines, according to a 2012 profile of U.S. nuclear forces compiled recently by atomic-force experts Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris.

The service plans to continue fielding the D-5 missiles on a newly designed submarine in coming decades, but anticipates eventually replacing its ballistic missile with an updated weapon (*see GSN, March 30*).



Navy Rear Adm. Terry Benedict, who directs the Navy Strategic Systems Programs office, has led the charge on collaboration. In January, he reportedly told Lt. Gen. James Kowalski, who heads the Air Force Global Strike Command, that potential areas of commonality between his D-5 replacement and the air service's Minuteman follow-on could include a number of major components:

- Strategic guidance systems — the technology that directs a missile precisely from Point A to Point B;
- Rocket-motor and propulsion systems — which allow a missile to blast off and fly fast;
- Infrastructure and support equipment — to help control, monitor, and maintain the weapon system;
- Strategic industrial capacity — to sustain a national ability to produce ballistic missiles and supply them with spare parts.

"In today's budget environment we must ensure that we are not unnecessarily duplicating effort," Benedict is said to have told his Air Force counterpart in an early 2012 letter.

Kowalski did not reply to Benedict in writing for more than two months, but is said to have told the two-star admiral in an April missive that the two services must "leverage one another's efforts" and "be in sync from nose cone to nozzle," according to defense sources.

In May 10 remarks on Capitol Hill, Kowalski appeared convinced of the merits of joint work on the two future ballistic missiles — as well as, perhaps, in keeping today's Minuteman 3 ICBMs functional.

"I need to replace the missile guidance set on the Minuteman 3," the general said during a breakfast event. "I think Terry's going to need a new missile guidance set. I know that the follow-on to the Minuteman 3 — the ground-based strategic deterrent — is going to need a new missile guidance set."

"Does the nation need to go out and buy three different missile guidance sets?" Kowalski continued. "Or is there some way we can work this where we buy one missile guidance set — or at least have common components — so that we're not paying the same bill three times over?"

The Air Force and Navy are also working with the Energy Department's semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration to develop a joint fuse for ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as a common modernization package for warheads, the W-78 and W-88, respectively (*See GSN, Sept. 14, 2010, and Jan. 7, 2010*).

Sharing a single airframe for both missiles could be a stretch, though, Chambers said in response to an audience question during his appearance last month. Others agreed that the two services would likely have different parameters for the length and diameter of the missiles, and disparities in propulsion requirements might prove to be insurmountable.

"Given the two very different platforms, our charter is to pursue maximum amount of commonality, but it's going to be very difficult to be identical," Chambers said.

<http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/u-s-air-force-approves-concept-for-future-icbm-eyes-navy-collaboration-20120601>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Bangor Daily News

Navy to Test Integrity of Fire-Damaged Submarine, Pingree Says

By DAVID SHARP, Associated Press

June 04, 2012.

KITTERY, Maine — A fire inside a nuclear-powered submarine reached its greatest intensity in the control room, where charred wires, burned metal and melted glass remained after the removal of soot-covered debris, U.S. Rep. Chellie Pingree said Monday, giving the first glimpse of damage inside the USS Miami.



Investigators are looking into whether the extreme heat may have damaged the integrity of the metal hull, which must withstand extreme pressure under sea, Pingree said.

The hull's integrity plays into the cost of repairs, which will determine whether the Los Angeles-class attack submarine is scrapped or returns to sea, she said.

"The real question centers on whether we can bring this sub back into service again," said Pingree, a member of the House Armed Services Committee. "They're very busy trying to come up with an estimate. They've removed a lot of debris and are getting down to what the nature of the damage is."

Based in Connecticut, the \$900 million submarine was in dry dock at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard for an overhaul when a fire broke out on May 23.

Firefighters said insulation and wiring fueled a stubborn blaze that they battled for 10 hours, with firefighting reinforcements coming from as far away as Boston and New London, Conn. The metal hull trapped heat inside, turning the front part of the 360-foot-long sub into a superheated oven.

Workers began an assessment and cleanup last week. Pingree became the first member of Congress to get a look inside when she toured the sub Monday, observing the fire-damaged control room as well as the nuclear propulsion area in the rear of the sub, which was not affected by the fire.

Even after the cleanup, there was evidence of an intense fire in the forward portion of the sub, where the fire damaged command and control, crew quarters and the torpedo room, Pingree said. The smell of smoke hung in the air, even in areas untouched by the fire, she said.

The USS Miami was three months into a 20-month overhaul when the fire broke out. If the sub is scrapped, the workers would lose out on many months of work.

If the submarine is repaired, an older sub that was decommissioned last year could be used for spare parts, Pingree said. The USS Memphis was the oldest active Los Angeles-class submarine before it was decommissioned last year, and it has been at the shipyard as part of the deactivation process.

The Navy and the shipyard are working under the assumption that the Miami will be repaired and that the work will be done at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Pingree said.

Paul O'Connor, president of the Metal Trades Council, said there's no doubt that it can be repaired, but the bigger question is whether it's worth the cost.

All indications so far suggest the repairs would cost less than a preliminary estimate of \$1 billion by Sen. Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Pingree said. The congressional delegation and the Navy "will be anxious to do it if it can be done for a reasonable cost," she said.

Multiple investigations of the fire are under way and the first findings are expected in a couple of weeks.

Working against the USS Miami is its age. The submarine was commissioned 22 years ago, making it one of the older of the Navy's 54 Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines.

Working in the sub's favor was that the fire was confined to only part of the sub, sensitive equipment had been removed, and the fact that the propulsion system was unaffected.

Back in the late 1990s, the Navy had more than 90 submarines. It's projected there will be only 44 subs in 2020, so the Navy doesn't want to lose the USS Miami, which originally was expected to serve 12 to 14 more years after its overhaul at the shipyard, Pingree said.

"That makes this more critical. The commanders at sea are calling for these ships and we can't build them fast enough," she said. "That makes me think they'll do everything they can to return this ship to service."



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<http://bangordailynews.com/2012/06/04/news/portland/navy-to-test-integrity-of-fire-damaged-submarine-pingree-says/?ref=latest>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Times of India – India

'Barack Obama Confronted Nightmare in 2009, Thought Taliban Had N-Bomb'

By Press Trust of India (PTI)
June 6, 2012

WASHINGTON: Soon after assuming office in 2009, President Barack Obama experienced a security nightmare about the possibility of Taliban in Pakistan acquiring a nuclear bomb, with the fear lurking in the back of his mind that the loose weapon could be headed for a major US city.

US intelligence told the President during a key Oval office meeting that they had received information about Taliban acquiring a nuclear bomb, says the latest book by New York Times journalist David Sanger, adding Obama's aides also worried about the leak of the news to both India and Pakistan.

Though the US intelligence community had sketchy details on the "bomb scare", Obama decided to dispatch a nuclear-detect-and-disablement team to the region.

In the book entitled 'Confront and Conceal' that hit the stands on Tuesday, Sanger wrote: "Obama decided he could not take the chance that the story was false: he ordered one of the US government's nuclear-detection-and-disablement teams to travel to the region in case it was needed for the search. "But they dared not step into Pakistan itself, where the government would have a tough time explaining why there were foreigners with nuclear-detection equipment wandering around."

"Obama's aides worried that if news of Washington's suspicions leaked, the Pakistanis would shut down altogether and the Indians who had barely held back retaliating against Pakistan after a deadly attack in Mumbai the previous year would mobilise and put their forces on high alert," Sanger said.

That would inevitably trigger a Pakistani response, and the chance for miscalculations and deadly escalations would soar, he said.

And there was always the risk that the TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan), realising that the United States was on to the conversations, could issue a threat to make use of the weapon, even if none existed. If they included a threat to set it off in an American or Pakistani city, mass panic could follow. That could kill more people than a small explosion," the journalist wrote.

"Several officials who were involved in the briefings told the President that, more than likely, the Taliban threat 'focused on Pakistan itself'."

There had been a series of spectacular car-bomb and suicide attacks in Islamabad and the nearby garrison city of Rawalpindi, including one on the headquarters of the ISI, the author noted. Sanger said yet there was always the possibility, lurking in the back of Obama's mind, that the loose weapon, if there was one, could be headed for New York, Washington, or some other American city.

"It was a remote but reasonable concern. Though al-Qaida was weakened, elements of the Pakistani insurgency were beginning to think about launching attacks of their own against the United States, as the administration was about to learn in the May 2010 of attempted car bombing in Times Square, for which the TTP provided the training," the author said.

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"It was a pretty tense series of conversations," the writer quoted a former senior intelligence official as telling him early in 2012.

"We didn't know if the Pakistanis really knew what was going on. And if they did discover something was missing, how could we be certain they would level with us?" In the end, the Pakistanis responded: they surveyed their arsenal and reported back that nothing was missing," Sanger said.

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/Barack-Obama-confronted-nightmare-in-2009-thought-Taliban-had-N-bomb/articleshow/13865501.cms>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

AsiaOne News – Singapore

Furious US Lawmakers Say Security Leaks Must End

Agence France-Presse (AFP)

Friday, June 8, 2012

WASHINGTON - The top US lawmakers overseeing intelligence stood united on Thursday in demanding an end to a "cascade" of national security leaks, as they scrambled to draw up legislation to rein in breaches that they say jeopardise lives.

Several members of Congress have fumed this week over a series of news reports, some quoting anonymous administration officials, that reveal details of covert US operations.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chair Dianne Feinstein said she wants Congress to swiftly enact legislation tightening rules to prevent unauthorised data breaches, and welcomed an investigation launched by the FBI into leaks that have infuriated lawmakers on both sides of the aisle.

But she held back on calling for a special prosecutor to look into the leaks, which some Republicans, notably Senator John McCain, say were done in order to give President Barack Obama the image of a tough commander-in-chief in an election year.

"A special prosecutor can take years," Feinstein told reporters, with committee ranking Republican Saxby Chambliss and the two leaders of the House intelligence committee at her side.

"We don't have years. We need to legislate, we need to get some solutions before us very quickly."

"This has to stop," she said of the leaks. "It puts lives at risk."

The bipartisan quartet - Feinstein, Chambliss, Republican congressman Mike Rogers and ranking Democrat Dutch Ruppersberger - were briefed Thursday by the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, who Chambliss said was "extremely upset" about the developments.

The group later met with FBI chief Robert Mueller, whose agency has launched an official investigation.

"All of us are extremely upset about the fact that not only have leaks occurred but there's been just a cascade of leaks coming out of the intelligence community over the last several weeks and months," Chambliss said.

Several explosive stories have emerged recently, including Obama's push for cyber attacks on computers that run Iran's nuclear facilities; an apparent "kill list" of counter-terrorism targets against whom Obama has authorized lethal action; and a secret drone campaign against terrorists in Yemen. The New York Times reported that sources for their articles on the covert programs included former or current administration officials.

Rogers said it was too early to determine whether the leaks had a political bent, although he said the overall problem "seems to be a pattern that is growing worse and more frequent," and he was critical of the administration's apparent "inability to keep a secret."

Issue No. 1006, 08 June 2012

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"To have all four of us come forward today and talk about the severity of these leaks I hope sends a very clear message about how dangerous this has become," Rogers said.

"There is a clear need for a formal investigation," he said.

The White House, which clashed with McCain by calling his accusations that the leaks were for political gain "grossly irresponsible," said Obama would not agree to an independent counsel to probe the breaches.

The administration is taking "all appropriate and necessary steps to prevent leaks of classified information or sensitive information that could risk our counter-terrorism operations," Obama's spokesman Jay Carney told reporters aboard Air Force One.

"Any suggestion that the White House has leaked sensitive information for political purposes has no basis in fact."

But Obama's Republican White House rival, Mitt Romney, believes the president should take greater charge in order to stop the leaks in their tracks.

"Leadership starts at the top. It's his sincere hope that the president is using all means at his disposal to put an end to this harmful practice," Romney campaign spokeswoman Amanda Henneberg told AFP.

McCain, who lost the 2008 presidential race to Obama and is now a key Romney supporter, reportedly stood by his accusation on Thursday, and received backing from Peter King, chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee.

"It has to be for re-election," King told Politico magazine about the leaks.

"They can deny it all they want. But it would require a suspension of belief to believe it's not being done for political purposes."

Feinstein gave no details of what tools she would seek to insert into legislation in order to prevent future leaks.

And she downplayed any fallout of a major investigation ahead of November's election, saying a probe should not be seen as a political ploy against the president.

"This is not finger pointing at anybody," she said.

<http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/World/Story/A1Story20120608-351303.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Wall Street Journal

June 5, 2012

FBI Probes Leaks about Cyberattacks by U.S.

By EVAN PEREZ and ADAM ENTOUS

WASHINGTON—The Federal Bureau of Investigation has opened an investigation into who disclosed information about a classified U.S. cyberattack program aimed at Iran's nuclear facilities, according to two people familiar with the probe.

The investigation follows publication last week of details of the cyber-sabotage program, including the use of a computer worm called Stuxnet, which Iran has acknowledged it found in its computers.

The Central Intelligence Agency ran the operation in conjunction with Idaho National Laboratory, the Israeli government and other U.S. agencies, according to people familiar with the efforts. The covert effort also includes persistent drone surveillance and cyberspying on Iranian scientists, the people said.

The New York Times on Friday published the account of the U.S. cyberattack operation in an excerpt from a forthcoming book by one of its reporters, David Sanger. Other news organizations, including The Wall Street Journal, followed up with details about the program.

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Paul Bresson, an FBI spokesman, declined to comment.

The probe comes on the heels of another leak investigation involving revelations about a double agent who infiltrated al Qaeda's Yemen affiliate. FBI Director Robert Mueller told lawmakers recently that the FBI was looking into how news leaked about the double agent and a new generation underwear bomb that the al Qaeda affiliate had hoped to use in an airliner attack.

The Associated Press, which first reported the Yemen news, has said it held the news for several days at the government's request.

Republican lawmakers have accused the Obama administration of selectively releasing information to help President Barack Obama's re-election campaign. Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz.) told reporters in Singapore over the weekend he found it "incredibly disturbing" that officials would leak details about a cyberattack on Iran. The senator said that leak and others were part of a "pattern in order to hype the national-security credentials of the president."

White House spokesman Josh Earnest on Friday brushed aside suggestions that the information was intentionally leaked.

"It's classified for a reason, because publicizing that information would pose a significant threat to national security," he told reporters. White House officials had no immediate comment on Mr. McCain's comments or on the FBI probe.

A spokesman for the New York Times Co. and Mr. Sanger declined to comment.

The U.S. and its Western allies suspect Iran's nuclear program is aimed at producing atomic weapons. Tehran denies that and says the program is for peaceful purposes.

The reports on the Iran cyberattacks said the operation, called Olympic Games, began in the Bush administration and accelerated under Mr. Obama. The New York Times account attributed some information to officials who served in both the Bush and Obama administrations.

Mr. Sanger, in an appearance on CBS News's "Face the Nation" program Sunday, suggested that deliberate White House leaking "wasn't my experience."

He added: "I spent a year working the story from the bottom up, and then went to the administration and told them what I had. Then they had to make some decisions about how much they wanted to talk about it...I'm sure the political side of the White House probably likes reading about the president acting with drones and cyber and so forth. National security side has got very mixed emotions about it because these are classified programs."

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303506404577448563517340188.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times
OPINION/Analysis
June 2, 2012

Mutually Assured Cyberdestruction?

By DAVID E. SANGER
Page – SR4

Washington: IT took years after the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima for the nation to develop a common national understanding of when and how to use a weapon of such magnitude. Not until after the Cuban Missile Crisis, 50 years ago this October, did a consensus emerge that the weapon was too terrible ever to employ again, save as a deterrent and a weapon of last resort.



Over the past decade, on a far smaller scale, the country's military and intelligence leadership have gone through a parallel debate about how to use the Predator drone. Because it is precisely targeted, often on an individual, it is used almost every week.

And now we know that President Obama, for the past three years, has been going through a similar process about how America should use another innovative weapon — one whose destructive powers are only beginning to be understood. In a secret program called "Olympic Games," which dates from the last years of the George W. Bush administration, the United States has mounted repeated attacks with the most sophisticated cyberweapons ever developed. Like drones, these weapons cross national boundaries at will; in the case of Olympic Games they invaded the computer controllers that run Iran's nuclear centrifuges, spinning them wildly out of control.

How effective they have been is open to debate; the United States and its close partner in the attacks, Israel, used the weapons as an alternative to a potentially far more deadly, but perhaps less effective, bombing attack from the air. But precisely because the United States refuses to talk about its new cyberarsenal, there has never been a real debate in the United States about when and how to use cyberweapons.

President Obama raised many of the issues in the closed sanctum of the Situation Room, participants in the conversation say, pressing aides to make sure that the attacks were narrowly focused so that they did not take out Iranian hospitals or power plants and were directed only at the country's nuclear infrastructure. "He was enormously focused on avoiding collateral damage," one official said, comparing the arguments over using cyberwar to the debates about when to use drones.

Does the United States want to legitimize the use of cyberweapons as a covert tool? Or is it something we want to hold in reserve for extreme cases? Will we reach the point — as we did with chemical weapons, and the rest of the world did with land mines — that we want treaties to ban their use? Or is that exactly the wrong analogy, in a world in which young hackers, maybe working on their own or maybe hired by the Chinese People's Liberation Army or the Russian mob, can launch attacks themselves?

These are all fascinating questions that the Obama administration resolutely refuses to discuss in public. "They approached the Iran issue very, very pragmatically," one official involved in the discussions over Olympic Games told me. No one, he said, "wanted to engage, at least not yet, in the much deeper, broader debate about the criteria for when we use these kinds of weapons and what message it sends to the rest of the world."

Cyberweapons, of course, have neither the precision of a drone nor the immediate, horrifying destructive power of the Bomb. Most of the time, cyberwar seems cool and bloodless, computers attacking computers. Often that is the case.

The Chinese are believed to attack America's computer systems daily, but mostly to scoop up corporate and Pentagon secrets. (Mr. Obama, one aide said, got a quick lesson in the scope of the problem when an attack on his 2008 campaign's computers was traced back to China, a foretaste of what happened to Google the following year.) The United States often does the same: the Iranians reported last week that they had been hit by another cyberattack, called "Flame," that appeared to harvest data from selected laptop computers, presumably those of Iranian leaders and scientists. Its origins are unclear.

But the cutting edge of cyberwar is in the invasion of computer systems to manipulate the machinery that keeps the country going — exactly what the United States was doing to those Iranian centrifuges as it ran Olympic Games. "Somebody has crossed the Rubicon," Gen. Michael V. Hayden, the former director of the C.I.A., said in describing the success of the cyberattacks on Iran. General Hayden was careful not to say what role the United States played, but he added: "We've got a legion on the other side of the river now. I don't want to pretend it's the same effect, but in one sense at least, it's August 1945," the month that the world first saw the capabilities of a new weapon, dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

That was deliberate overstatement, of course: the United States crashed a few hundred centrifuges at Natanz, it did not vaporize the place. But his point that we are entering a new era in cyberattacks is one the administration itself is trying to make as it ramps up American defenses. Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta — a key player in the Iran attacks



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— warned last year that the “next Pearl Harbor we confront could very well be a cyberattack that cripples our power systems, our grid, our security systems, our financial systems.”

IN March the White House invited all the members of the Senate to a classified simulation on Capitol Hill demonstrating what might happen if a dedicated hacker — or an enemy state — decided to turn off the lights in New York City. In the simulation, a worker for the power company clicked on what he thought was an e-mail from a friend; that “spear phishing” attack started a cascade of calamities in which the cyberinvader made his way into the computer systems that run New York’s electric grid. The city was plunged into darkness; no one could find the problem, much less fix it. Chaos, and deaths, followed.

The administration ran the demonstration — which was far more watered-down than the Pentagon’s own cyberwar games — to press Congress to pass a bill that would allow a degree of federal control over protecting the computer networks that run America’s most vulnerable infrastructure. The real lesson of the simulation was never discussed: cyberoffense has outpaced the search for a deterrent, something roughly equivalent to the cold-war-era concept of mutually assured destruction. There was something simple to that concept: If you take out New York, I take out Moscow.

But there is nothing so simple about cyberattacks. Usually it is unclear where they come from. That makes deterrence extraordinarily difficult. Moreover, a good deterrence “has to be credible,” said Joseph S. Nye, the Harvard strategist who has written the deepest analysis yet of what lessons from the atomic age apply to cyberwar. “If an attack from China gets inside the American government’s computer systems, we’re not likely to turn off the lights in Beijing.” Professor Nye calls for creating “a high cost” for an attacker, perhaps by naming and shaming.

Deterrence may also depend on how America chooses to use its cyberweapons in the future. Will it be more like the Predator, a tool the president has embraced? That would send a clear warning that the United States was ready and willing to act. But as President Obama warned his own aides during the secret debates over Olympic Games, it also invites retaliatory strikes, with cyberweapons that are already proliferating. In fact, one country recently announced that it was creating a new elite “Cybercorps” as part of its military. The announcement came from Tehran.

David E. Sanger is the chief Washington correspondent for The New York Times. This article is adapted from his new book, “Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/03/sunday-review/mutually-assured-cyberdestruction.html?_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss&pagewanted=all

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Baltimore Sun
OPINION/Our View/Editorial

War in Cyberspace

Our view: Computer viruses may have slowed Iran's drive for a bomb, but the U.S. is vulnerable to similar attacks
June 5, 2012

Reports that the U.S. and Israel have tried repeatedly over the years to derail Iran's nuclear weapons program by using malicious computer codes to cause machines at the country's Natanz nuclear facility to malfunction have lifted the veil of secrecy over the war unfolding on the world's newest battlefield. The elaborately designed and executed series of cyber-attacks reportedly slowed Iran's progress toward getting a bomb, but they also raise troubling questions about the United States' own vulnerability to such weapons and whether the nation's defenses are adequate.

The reports, first published Friday in The New York Times, suggest that the U.S.-Israeli collaboration against Iran's nuclear program began as far back as 2006 under President George W. Bush. Mr. Bush authorized the operation at a time when there was little international support for foreign intervention to stop Iran's drive to build a bomb and the U.S. military was tied down in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Fearing the consequences of doing nothing, Mr. Bush gave the go-ahead for the cyberwar project that eventually produced the "Stuxnet" virus that was discovered in Iran's computer networks in 2010. That bit of malicious code reportedly caused several hundred centrifuges used to purify uranium into weapons-grade material at Natanz to suddenly spin out of control and self-destruct.

When the Obama administration took office in 2008, the secret cyberwar program was continued with the goal of delaying Iran's progress toward a weapon long enough for the president's new diplomatic and economic sanctions to force Iran back to the bargaining table. Iran agreed to resume negotiations this year, but it remains unclear what role Stuxnet's sabotage played in that decision, or whether the country's leaders will ultimately agree to stop enriching uranium, as the U.S. and its allies have demanded.

Meanwhile, another recently detected virus on Iranian computers, called "Flame," remains shrouded in mystery, although investigators have surmised the weapon is at least five years old and was probably designed to target information stored on the computer drives of Iranian nuclear researchers and technicians. The revelation of Flame's existence suggests there may be still other complex cyber weapons operating against Iran's nuclear program that remain undiscovered.

The Times' report suggests that one of the major goals of the secret operation was to dissuade Israel from unilaterally bombing the Natanz plant and other Iranian sites, which U.S. officials feared could set off a wider regional war with unpredictable consequences. In order to convince Israeli leaders that the U.S. was serious about not tolerating an Iranian bomb, American officials acceded to Israel's demand that experts from the Israel Defense Forces' cyberwarfare unit be involved in the operation at every stage.

The U.S., Russia, China and other major powers all have developed offensive cyber weapons that are said to be capable of taking out an adversary's communications, power and water supplies, air traffic control system, financial markets and other critical national infrastructure. Conceivably, with the click of a mouse, an enemy could inflict as much physical and economic damage as a major shooting war.

Yet, in the digital realm, even small, weak states — or terrorists — could develop the potential to bring a superpower to its knees. Because modern societies are so dependent on the computers that run everything from street lights and cellphones to nuclear power plants, virtually every developed nation, by definition, is vulnerable to this kind of threat.

While it is certainly preferable for the U.S. to try to deter Iran's nuclear ambitions by attacking its computer systems rather than by bombing the country into rubble, policymakers must recognize that a troubling new chapter in the military use of cyberspace has begun, one in which the traditional rules governing conflicts may no longer apply. There's no question America and its allies are right to be concerned by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran, but we have entered uncharted waters in which the threats to our security have become as dangerous in cyberspace as they are by land, sea and air, and we must be prepared to meet them.

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-cyber-warfare-20120605_0,2255926.story

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Tehran Times – Iran

OPINION/Analysis

5+1 Group to Blame if Talks Fail

By Mohammad Jamshidi

Tuesday, June 5, 2012

International Atomic Energy Agency Director Yukio Amano's visit to Tehran two days before the Baghdad talks between Iran and the 5+1 group (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) was interpreted by analysts as a sign of Iran's goodwill and intention to clear up any ambiguities about its nuclear program.



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Despite the IAEA's decision to refer Iran's nuclear dossier to the United Nations Security Council, which was described by Iranian officials as a politically motivated move, Iran has continuously cooperated with the nuclear watchdog in the framework of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is Iran's trump card in the face of the Western media's massive propaganda campaign, which is trying to give the world the impression that Iran's nuclear program is not transparent.

Thus, Iran's green light to Amano's trip to Tehran paved the way for sorting out issues and drawing up a modality for the Baghdad meeting. And Iranian officials' openness during the Baghdad negotiations once again showed Iran's determination to clear up all ambiguities and misunderstandings.

Western countries are also expected to respond positively to the measures adopted by Iran and to start cooperation without setting new preconditions. This can raise the level of trust between the two sides and can pave the way for more interaction in the future.

However, the negotiations should not entail any additional safeguard. In other words, the only framework acceptable for Iran to continue the talks is the NPT. Although the Iranian government is ready to cooperate on some issues outside of the NPT framework in order to build more trust, this should not be considered a responsibility of the Iranian side during future negotiations. Otherwise, the Westerners would bear the responsibility if the talks founder.

Mohammad Jamshidi is the director of the Foreign Policy Department of the Research Center of the Iranian parliament.

<http://www.tehrantimes.com/opinion/98430-51-group-to-blame-if-talks-fail>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Project Syndicate – New York
OPINION/Commentary

China on the Launch Pad

By Michael Raska

June 6, 2012

SINGAPORE – Behind a veil of secrecy, China's development of strategic and tactical missiles is well into its third generation of modernization. While the development of Chinese long-range missile and nuclear forces has traditionally been characterized as conservative, incremental, and slow, it has taken place against a backdrop of steadily growing official emphasis on the country's defense-industrial complex, particularly its aerospace sector.

This process has been accelerated by a confluence of defense-industry reforms, comprehensive military upgrading, and integration of innovative operational concepts. The net effect is a growing capability of China's strategic missile forces and military space platforms.

Various reports suggest that China is selectively enhancing its strategic and tactical missile capabilities by developing solid-fuel motors; diversifying its range of warheads and increasing their accuracy; deploying missiles with multiple warheads; and upgrading its ballistic-missile defense countermeasures, such as decoys, chaff, jamming, and thermal shielding, and possibly maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

In particular, China is developing, testing, and deploying a new generation of solid-propellant, road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). These include the DF-31 and DF-31A, which are equipped with nuclear payloads. It is also designing and developing new classes of conventional short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), such as the DF-21 – mobile, solid-propellant, longer range, more accurate, and able to exploit vulnerabilities in ballistic missile-defense systems.

As part of its missile and nuclear-force modernization, China is also focusing on developing its sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) such as the JL-2, testing the DF21-D as an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) for maritime strikes, and further developing its anti-satellite weapon capabilities (ASAT).

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survivability of its nuclear forces. Thus, China is diversifying its missiles in terms of their strike capabilities and mobility, and formulating innovative anti-access/area-denial asymmetric warfare concepts to close the gap with technologically more advanced adversaries and near competitors – principally the United States, Russia, and Japan.

China's progress in modernizing its strategic assets and capabilities owes much to the ongoing transformation of China's defense industries, particularly the aerospace sector, over the past decade. Since the late 1990's, China's government has gradually introduced elements of competition and globalization, with the aim of overcoming the entrenched monopoly of China's traditional defense-industrial conglomerates.

The reforms have been guided by two broad concepts: the "Four Mechanisms" – competition, evaluation, supervision, and encouragement – and *yujun yumin*, or identifying military potential in civilian capabilities, with defense industries integrating into the broader civilian economy.

The reforms have essentially enabled China to streamline research and development efforts, as well as technology transfers between selected components of its civil and commercial space programs. As a result, China has also been able to bypass existing export controls and restrictions on the transfer of sensitive military technologies, particularly aerospace and satellite components and know-how.

Indeed, China's military use of space is increasingly dependent and interlinked with civilian and commercial space activities, infrastructure, and human capital. Its space launch vehicles (SLVs) can be used for satellites with a range of applications – including communications, weather, observation, and navigation – which may significantly enhance the effectiveness of China's military space operations and systems. While ballistic missiles have generally different rocket engines, basing profiles, and launch methods, their guidance and control systems may use similar components, and SLVs may use stage components based on ballistic missiles.

The trajectory of China's ballistic missile R&D and production shows a gradual transition from copying and reproducing first-generation Soviet ballistic-missile technologies to adapting and modifying smaller, mobile, solid-propellant ballistic missiles and their follow-on second-generation systems. China is now an independent producer and technological innovator of selected missile systems and related aerospace technologies.

Ultimately, China views its military, civil, and commercial space programs as being at the forefront of its national defense, economic development, and geostrategic influence. The rest of the world should regard China's aerospace capabilities as an important part of its future power projection.

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<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-on-the-launch-pad>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Gatestone Institute – New York
OPINION/Columnist

If the US Disarms, Will Its Adversaries Do the Same?

By Peter Huessy
June 7, 2012

Our force structure would be smaller than that of China, Pakistan or India, let alone Russia. It would be the smallest of the entire nuclear age, so low that an adversary would have as few as six targets to hit to eliminate all US weapons available for nuclear deterrence.

Although the American public -- according to countless polls including one earlier this year by "Let Freedom Ring" -- overwhelmingly supports a strong US nuclear deterrent, there are pressures from some anti-nuclear elements to

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eliminate 70% of our deterrent and unilaterally reduce our nuclear forces to a level near that of the Chinese communists.

One such group, "Global Zero," recommends that the US deploy no more than 450 nuclear warheads compared to the 1550 now allowed by the new START treaty, ratified between the US and Russia in late 2010. Global Zero generously says the US can do this unilaterally.

The organization cites five reasons why nuclear deterrence is irrelevant to today's threats facing America and its allies, among which is incomplete view that as nuclear weapons would not have stopped the attacks of 9/11, they now serve little useful purpose.

Global Zero also proposes that US nuclear forces be cut to ten submarines and ten bombers (compared to 14 submarines and 60 bombers allowed under new START). In its most radical proposal, it recommends eliminating entirely our 450 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and that all our remaining forces be put on a non-alert status -- unable to be launched for up to three days. Undoubtedly our adversaries will be moved to cooperate, and, in a crisis, not threaten us for any of that time.

These ideas are worse than dangerous: they would leave the US vulnerable; increase nuclear dangers by assuring any adversary that a strike would have no immediate consequences; provide incentives for further nuclear proliferation, and in a crisis make it more likely that force, including nuclear weapons, would be used by a US adversary.

Russia, for example, is modernizing its entire nuclear arsenal. Its president, Vladimir Putin, is building 400 new nuclear armed ballistic missiles. By contrast, the US is planning to build some too, but is not yet modernizing any of the three legs of our nuclear deterrent.

Moreover, under the new START treaty, Russia can increase its current missiles and bombers up to the 700 level allowed by the treaty, while the US has had to reduce its nuclear arsenal from 1100 platforms. Further unilateral US reductions would seriously upset the strategic balance upon which a deterrence rests.

China, too, is modernizing its arsenal, and building or testing countless new ballistic missiles. While the size of China's nuclear warhead arsenal remains, unsurprisingly, a mystery -- the People's Republic has rebuffed all efforts to improve transparency -- China is also building a new submarine force, and a new land-based mobile missile. According to China expert Michael Pillsbury, the PRC military says that China is building all the weapons needed to become a world hegemon.

The most wrong-headed Global Zero recommendation of all, however, is to eliminate all 450 land-based ICBMs in the US arsenal. This would leave the US on a day-to-day basis with submarines at only two bases, in Georgia and Washington, and with 3 submarines at sea. Our force structure would be smaller than that of China, Pakistan, and India, let alone Russia. It would be the smallest of the entire nuclear age, so low that an adversary would have as few as six targets to hit to eliminate all US nuclear weapons available for deterrence.

This means an adversary such as Russia or China, facing the US in a crisis over Syria, Iran or North Korea, could eliminate the entire US strategic nuclear arsenal by using very few weapons of their own, a very attractive, almost irresistible, option. Submarines at sea and in port could even be destroyed slowly, surreptitiously, using conventional torpedoes or missiles launched from attack submarines, without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons, and thus significantly lowering the threshold over which a crisis might become an open conflict.

In a crisis, therefore, or in a run-up to a crisis, the incentives by our adversaries to use force or threaten the first-use of force, including nuclear weapons, would also rise precipitously. Our enemies would no longer need to fear our land-based retaliatory capability from our Minuteman missiles: they would no longer be available. As a result, an adversary would have every incentive to "get our submarines," a probability the report even acknowledges, but only in a footnote. The report then concludes by stating that a technological breakthrough could, in fact, make our entire nuclear submarine fleet vulnerable and thus "dramatically" change the recommendations of the report -- a conclusion particularly worrisome in light of the proposals to reduce our submarine fleet to only ten submarines.

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The report also makes the astounding argument that as all 450 US deployed warheads would be available to deter Russia, we would thus have nothing to worry about. But this would be true only if the US launched a nuclear strike *first*. Historically, however, our deterrent needs have always been calculated based on what would be needed for retaliation, or what is known as an "assured second strike". Under the Global Zero force structure, an adversary might well conclude that only a very limited number of US nuclear forces would survive an initial attack or series of surreptitious attacks. The temptation to "go for it" in a crisis might look too good to pass up – creating the most highly unstable deterrent policy one could possibly propose.

Every administration in the nuclear age, over some 60 years, has built, maintained, modernized and supported what is known as a strategic triad of nuclear forces—submarines, bombers and land-based missiles. The idea has been to prevent any enemy from being able to take a cheap, sudden shot at the US and eliminate our nuclear capability. This new report has hung a sign on the US on which is written: "Come Get Me."

Deterrent stability, however, is not the only casualty of the zero-nuclear campaign. Equally foolish is its quaint parallel notion that persuading other nations to cut their nuclear arsenals requires the US to first – dramatically, even unilaterally – to cut its nuclear arsenals. We are led to believe that the nuclear arsenals of China and North Korea, for instance, have been built and expanded because the US does not have the moral authority to seek non-proliferation as long as we maintain our own nuclear arsenal.

If this is true, the argument goes, then we can only be a paragon of virtue in the eyes of these nuclear powers once we have eliminated all our nuclear forces. But we already *have* gone the extra arms control mile. Starting with the Reagan and Bush eras' INF, START and Moscow treaties, our nuclear weapons have been cut from 12,000 deployed weapons to the fewer than 2000 deployed today.

What did we get in return? North Korea went nuclear. Pakistan and India both tested more nuclear weapons and built up their arsenals. China is modernizing its nuclear arsenal in dramatic fashion, as is Russia. And both Russia and China have repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons. In short, there is little evidence that nuclear arms control by the United States has engendered similar efforts by other nuclear or aspiring-to-be-nuclear powers.

As our nuclear "umbrella" protects over 30 countries, they have been able to forgo nuclear weapons -- ironically, one of the great non-proliferation success stories.

Have other countries given up their nuclear arsenal or advanced nuclear programs? Yes Iraq in 1991, Libya in 2005 and South Africa in 1988.

Also, when Desert Storm ousted Saddam from Kuwait, that act eventually led to the discovery of an Iraqi nuclear program and its dismantlement.

Operation Iraqi Freedom led to regime-change in Iraq in 2003, the capture of Libyan-bound nuclear centrifuges, and the subsequent capture of Saddam Hussein. The late Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi saw the hand-writing on the wall and gave up Libya's nuclear program

And the approaching end of apartheid in South Africa led to that government voluntarily giving up its nuclear weapons. All successes were initiated by and led by the United States, two by the US military.

Unfortunately, this important history is ignored.

The Global Zero report substitutes fairy tales for sound thinking, wishes for realities, and would leave us in a world of heightened nuclear dangers. It is advice heard before but which successive American administrations have rejected for over half a century and which the American people still oppose. Let us keep it that way.

Peter Huessy is President of his own defense consulting firm, GeoStrategic Analysis, founded in 1981, and the senior defense consultant at the National Defense University Foundation. Mr. Huessy founded the congressional affairs division within ANSER that initiated coverage of the Hill for key Air Force programs.

<http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3098/us-nuclear-disarmament>

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[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Los Angeles Times
OPINION/Editorial

Congress' War on Leaks

Lawmakers understandably are concerned about secret government information being published by the media, but the use of that information by journalists serves the public interest.

June 8, 2012

An angry Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) is calling for a special prosecutor to investigate leaks he says are designed to portray President Obama as a strong leader on national security issues. Without going that far, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), the chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, says that recent leaks "endanger American lives and undermine America's national security."

She is proposing, among other things, that Congress provide "additional authorities and resources ... to identify and prosecute those who violate various federal laws and non-disclosure agreements by revealing highly classified information." Although she did not advocate prosecuting journalists, the senator probably spoke for many of her colleagues when she told CNN that part of the problem was that "we have an enormously smart constituency of journalists ... who piece things together."

So far most of the outcry has been directed at the administration, not the media, but in similar controversies in the past, critics have not been so discerning. So we would urge Congress — and the administration — not to criminalize the reporting of information that may have come into the possession of the media because a government official was indiscreet.

It's understandable that McCain, Feinstein, Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.) and other members of Congress are disturbed by a New York Times story in which unnamed officials described how Obama directed cyber-attacks on Iran's nuclear program. That the United States and Israel had been targeting computers in Iran was widely suspected, but confirmation of the operation creates a diplomatic problem for the U.S. (It seems less plausible that this and other recent disclosures — for example, that Obama was personally involved in ordering U.S. drone attacks — threaten American lives.)

But it's also clear why the New York Times, having obtained information about the administration's actions, chose to publish it: to foster debate about what one of the paper's editors called "two significant, history-making programs ... the rise of cyber-warfare and the rise of drones."

There has evolved in this country an effective if sometimes untidy division of labor: Government may strive to keep information secret, but once the media have information about matters of public concern, they may share that information with readers without fear of prosecution. It may sound like special pleading for a newspaper to urge that the campaign against leaks stop at the reporter's door. But society as a whole benefits from public-spirited journalism that, in some cases, depends on the willingness of a government official to scale a wall of secrecy.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-leaks-20120608,0,5420059.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The National Interest – Washington, D.C.
OPINION/Commentary

Scotland Against the Bomb

By William Walker
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In 2014, a referendum will be held in Scotland to decide whether it should become a sovereign state or remain within the United Kingdom. A yes vote would result in the world witnessing the breakup of a nuclear-armed state for the second time.

The Soviet Union's collapse in 1990 raised the specter of nuclear proliferation and the loss of central control over assets and expertise. A British breakup would not give rise to similar threats. Instead, the question is whether the successor state, presumably the UK shorn of Scotland, could retain its nuclear deterrent. Although the weapons system might survive political fragmentation, a breakup could result—unlike for Russia—in the UK's nuclear disarmament.

For fifty years, the UK's nuclear-armed submarine force—first Polaris, then Trident—has been operated out of Faslane and Coulport on Scotland's west coast, near Glasgow. This imposition, as it has often been seen in Scotland, has contributed to the rise of the Scottish National Party (SNP), which presently heads the regional government in Edinburgh (having the majority of seats in the Scottish Parliament that was reestablished in 1999). It has pledged to remove all nuclear weapons from an independent Scotland, insisting that the London government will have to find alternative bases in England or Wales. But there are no such alternatives. Although an equivalent to Faslane, where the submarines are berthed, might be developed at considerable cost, the base at nearby Coulport is irreplaceable. It is there that missiles and warheads are stored and loaded on the submarines. Evicting Trident from Scotland therefore amounts to closing down the UK nuclear deterrent.

Could a newly established Scottish state implement this policy? After a vote for independence, international recognition and agreements with London on a range of issues, including economic relations and rights over North Sea oil and gas fields, would be the highest priorities. Forcing the nuclear deterrent's abandonment would hardly encourage London's cooperation, let alone that of Paris, Washington and other capitals. That said, it would be politically hard for a sovereign Scotland to concede to Trident's presence in perpetuity.

In addition, the London government could not impose, without international protest, nuclear weapons on an independent Scotland determined to become both a nuclear-weapon-free country (like Denmark and Norway within NATO) and a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Subject to control over weapons being retained, the NPT allows nuclear-weapon states to operate their forces out of the territories of non-nuclear-weapon states, even though operating all nuclear forces out of another country, as in this instance, would be unprecedented. Without the host country's willing consent, however, the situation would be neither manageable nor legitimate.

A compromise can be imagined in which the Scottish bases would continue to be used until the current fleet of four submarines becomes obsolete in the 2020s and 2030s, on the understanding that replacement boats would have to go elsewhere. But this is not a solution if there are no other conceivable bases at home or abroad. Deploying the UK's nuclear force out of French or American bases—an idea occasionally floated—is politically implausible. Alternative delivery systems that might allow relocation to England, such as air-launched cruise missiles, are also not favored by the Ministry of Defence. As a consequence, either the Scottish government and people would have to resign themselves to Trident's stay in Scotland, in return for concessions on other core issues, or the London government would have to abandon the deterrent.

Current opinion polls predict defeat for the Scottish nationalists in the referendum. But defeat would likely still be followed by a more extensive devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament. The issue of self-government will not go away, especially if London's malfunctioning institutions—the union's troubled heart—are incapable of reform. Whatever happens in 2014, the UK's possible breakup will henceforth be an issue for military planners, especially when considering long-term investments and deployments like Trident.

The fate of the British nuclear deterrent depends on more than the union's future. Heavy spending on Trident's replacement is due to begin in a few years' time. There is already concern in military and political circles, amidst questioning of the deterrent's relevance to Britain's future security, that Trident will squeeze out more essential defense investments. Irrespective of the referendum on independence, a debate about Trident's cost and value to the

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UK is likely to reopen on a very different political landscape than 2007, when the UK Parliament voted decisively—blind to the union’s fragility and anticipating endless prosperity—to replace Trident.

Trident’s value will be assessed in more than security terms. From the outset, the UK’s nuclear force has been used to express great-power aspirations. Along with permanent membership on the UN Security Council, it has protected the UK’s position at the high table. It has also, together with intelligence sharing, helped to anchor the “special relationship” with the United States. Fearing international diminution of Trident’s perceived prestige value if Scotland breaks away, London’s—not Edinburgh’s—desire to preserve Trident may increase just as its economic costs are becoming hard to bear.

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<http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-perils-losing-scotland-7027>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

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