



**USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER**  
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Ahlul Bayt News Agency (ABNA) – Iran

## Iranian Commander Stresses Strong Deterrent Power of Iran

*Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh said Iran is now enjoying the highest level of military deterrence.*

May 26, 2013

(Ahlul Bayt News Agency) - Speaking to reporters on the sidelines of a ceremony to supply long-range ground-to-ground missile launchers to the IRGC Aerospace Force on Sunday, Hajizadeh said that the Iranian Armed Forces have elevated their military preparedness to confront potential threats.

"Today, we are experiencing the best condition of military deterrence and no power in the world is capable of confronting and hurting the Islamic Iran," Hajizadeh said.

Earlier today, The Iranian Defense Ministry supplied large numbers of long-range ground-to-ground missile launchers to the IRGC.

The launchers were supplied to the IRGC's Aerospace Force in a special ceremony attended by Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi and Hajizadeh.

Addressing the ceremony, Vahidi underlined the defensive nature of the country's military power, saying that the capability is for crushing possible enemy invasions.

"The Islamic Iran does not want war with anyone and will never initiate war and conflict, yet, it will not allow anyone to make an aggression or take a hostile action and will mightily crush any invading enemy and will make him regretful of his deeds," Vahidi stated.

The Iranian Army has recently test-fired different types of newly-developed missiles and torpedoes and tested a large number of its home-made weapons, tools and equipments, including submarines, military ships, artillery, choppers, aircraft, UAVs and air defense and electronic systems, during massive military drills.

Defense analysts and military observers say that Iran's wargames and its advancements in weapons production have proved as a deterrent factor, especially at a time of heightened threats by the US.

<http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&id=423157>

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London Daily Telegraph – U.K.

## Syria: French Journalists Catalogue Extensive Use of Chemical Weapons

*The Syrian government has been unleashing a barrage of chemical weapons against its own people, according to two French journalists who spent two months undercover in the country.*

By Harriet Alexander

27 May 2013

Embedded with anti-government forces on the outskirts of Syria's capital Damascus, Jean-Philippe Remy and photographer Laurent van der Stockt from *Le Monde* witnessed a series of attacks.

"No odour, no smoke, not even a whistle to indicate the release of a toxic gas," wrote Mr Remy, from the front line in the suburb of Jobar.

"And then the symptoms appear. The men cough violently. Their eyes burn, their pupils shrink, their vision blurs. Soon they experience difficulty breathing, sometimes in the extreme; they begin to vomit or lose consciousness. The fighters worst affected need to be evacuated before they suffocate."

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Mr van der Stockt was beside the rebel fighters when they were targeted by the gas, leaving him suffering from blurred vision and respiratory difficulties for four days.

The French team were told that the attacks in the capital began on April 11, near Abbasid Square – one of the key gateways to Damascus. Stronger chemicals were used close to a meat market, where government tanks were stationed.

Abu Atal, one of the fighters in Jobar, said that the rebels were initially confused by a chemical attack on April 13, and did not desert their positions, but remained still – wheezing for breath and pupils constricted, "terrorised and trying to calm themselves through prayer."

General Abu Mohammad Al-Kurdi, commander of the Free Syrian Army's first division, said that his men saw government soldiers leave their positions just before other men "wearing chemical protection suits" surged forward and set "little bombs, like mines" on the ground that began giving off a chemical product.

Other attacks outside of Damascus were reported to have taken place on March 14, in the town of Otaiba. The French reporters spoke to doctors who had treated the fighters.

They claim furthermore that the attacks were continuing across the country – with the most recent on May 23 in the zone of Adra, north east of Damascus.

"The aim of the attacks seemed to be essentially tactical at this stage – an attempt to destabilise rebel units in areas where government soldiers have been unable to dislodge them, and at the same time a test," wrote Mr Remy.

"If Syrian army forces could dare to use chemical weapons in their own capital without setting off a serious international reaction, would that not be an invitation to pursue the experiment a bit further?"

Laurent Fabius, the French foreign minister, said that the accounts needed to be verified but they presented "increasingly strong evidence" of chemical attack by President Bashar Assad.

"We are consulting with our partners to see what concrete consequences that we are going to draw from this," said Mr Fabius.

Reports of chemical weapons used by Mr Assad's forces have been swirling for months. But the report in the French newspaper is remarkable for the depth of its sources.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10082837/Syria-French-journalists-catalogue-extensive-use-of-chemical-weapons.html>

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The Washington Times

## **Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Stocks Election to Replace Ahmadinejad with Loyalists**

*Nuclear standoff, Syria backing to persist with candidates loyal to Khamenei*

By Guy Taylor and Ashish Kumar Sen, *Washington Times*

Monday, May 27, 2013

Iran's June 14 elections are expected to produce a president loyal to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and do nothing to improve prospects for an end to its nuclear standoff with the West or support for President Bashar Assad's embattled regime in Syria.

The Guardian Council, composed of jurists and clerics that vets all candidates for elected office, has slashed a list of nearly 700 presidential hopefuls down to eight.

"The field of candidates has been whittled down to men who are extreme loyalists to Khamenei," said Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies.



“The decisions on Iran’s nuclear program are most likely to remain in the hands of the Supreme Leader and his Revolutionary Guard. ... Unless the West is prepared to bring the regime to the brink of economic collapse combined with the credible threat of military force, we are unlikely to break the nuclear will of the regime,” he said.

Kenneth Katzman, a Middle East specialist at the Congressional Research Service, called the remaining candidates “pliable tools of the supreme leader.”

“None of the likely winners will attract significant momentum in the U.S. or the West to ease any sanctions,” he said, referring to punitive economic measures imposed over Iran’s nuclear program.

Iran’s supreme leader controls foreign policy and the country’s nuclear ambitions. Iran insists its nuclear program is intended for peaceful purposes, but the United States, Israel and European nations suspect the regime is building nuclear weapons.

Some analysts believe Ayatollah Khamenei could have more domestic political security after the election of one of the loyalist candidates and possibly more flexibility in nuclear negotiations.

Ayatollah Khamenei has been locked in a political struggle with two-term President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is prohibited from running for a third time.

“But there’s also a school of thought that says once Khamenei has his internal situation under control that he’s going to be more inclined to go with his own instincts,” Trita Parsi of the National Iranian American Council added, “and his instincts have consistently been to be paranoid, be suspicious, be skeptical and be averse to taking risks toward peace in the negotiations.”

Saeed Jalili, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, and Tehran Mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, former head of the air force wing of Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, have emerged as the election’s front-runners.

Besides Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, the Obama administration also is concerned about the role Iran is playing in Syria, where a 2-year-old civil war has claimed the lives of at least 80,000 people, according to U.N. estimates.

In an unprecedented move, Iran has deployed its Revolutionary Guard ground forces on training and advisory missions with the Assad regime inside Syria.

Iran-backed Lebanese Hezbollah militants also are fighting alongside Mr. Assad’s forces.

“The mistrust between Iran and the West — Tehran and Washington in particular — is not going to go away anytime soon,” said Ali Vaez, an Iran specialist with the International Crisis Group, said during a panel discussion at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in the District on Thursday.

The Guardian Council most controversially disqualified two-time former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who had supported a less-hostile relationship with the United States, and Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, Mr. Ahmadinejad’s chief of staff.

“Disqualifying Rafsanjani further signals the regime’s unwillingness to reach a compromise with the West in the nuclear issue, and resistance to domestic demands for political and economic liberalization,” said Ali Alfoneh, an independent Iran analyst.

“The Islamic Republic seems reduced to a garrison state preparing itself for suppression of the domestic opposition and resisting pressure from the outside world in the nuclear issue.”

Besides Mr. Jalili and Mr. Qalibaf, the other candidates are former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati; Hassan Rowhani, a former chief negotiator in nuclear talks with the European Union; Gholamali Haddad-Adel, whose daughter is married to Ayatollah Khamenei’s son; Stanford University-educated reformist Mohammad Reza Aref; Mohsen Rezai, a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; and Mohammad Gharazi, a little-known former petroleum minister.



<http://p.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/27/analysts-see-no-change-after-ahmadinejad/?page=all#pagebreak>

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The Star – Malaysia  
Thursday, May 30, 2013

## **U.N. Nuclear Investigation Could Be Foiled by Clean-Up - Diplomats**

By Fredrik Dahl

VIENNA (Reuters) - The U.N. nuclear watchdog acknowledged on Wednesday it might not find anything if allowed access to an Iranian military facility, in an apparent reference to suspected clean-up work there, diplomats said.

Herman Nackaerts, deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), made the comment during a closed-door briefing where he showed satellite imagery indicating Iran had now partly paved the site, they said.

The picture was the latest sign of what Western officials suspect is an Iranian attempt since early last year to remove or hide any evidence of illicit nuclear-related activity at Parchin, located southeast of the capital Tehran.

In response to a question, "he (Nackaerts) said there is a chance they won't find anything", in view of the suspected sanitisation efforts, said one diplomat who was at the meeting.

Nackaerts made no public comment.

The U.N. agency believes Iran may have carried out explosives tests relevant for nuclear weapons development at Parchin, possibly a decade ago, and has been pressing Tehran for more than a year to be allowed visit the sprawling facility.

Iran, which denies Western allegations that it seeking the capability to make nuclear weapons, says Parchin is a conventional military complex and rejects accusations that it is trying to remove any evidence.

The IAEA said in a report to member states last week that Iran had asphalted a "significant proportion" of the specific part of Parchin it wants to inspect.

It did not say why Iran may have decided to do this, but one Western official who attended Wednesday's briefing said it could be a bid to cover up any remaining traces there.

Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, declined to speak to reporters when he left the meeting room.

The U.N. agency wants to check Parchin as part of its long-stalled investigation into suspected atomic bomb research by Iran, which says its nuclear programme is entirely peaceful.

Iran says it first needs to agree with the IAEA on how the broader inquiry is to be conducted before granting access.

Citing satellite imagery, Western diplomats earlier this year said that Iran appeared to be rebuilding the site, after previously razing smaller buildings and removing soil.

Experts say that while it may now be difficult to find any evidence, it could still be possible to locate any traces of nuclear materials with the IAEA's sophisticated equipment.

"The more they (Iran) do, the less likelihood there is of picking up something easily," one Western envoy said.

"(But) I think the chances of wiping out every trace of whatever might have been going on there is very slim."

*Editing by Robin Pomeroy.*

<http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2013/5/30/worldupdates/un-nuclear-investigation-could-be-foiled-by-cleanup-diplomats&sec=>

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Defense News.com

## Japan Plans More Aggressive Defense

May 26, 2013

By PAUL KALLENDER-UMEZU

TOKYO — After almost seven decades of maintaining a limited defense posture, Japan should develop its amphibious and pre-emptive strike capability while bolstering sea- and ground-based ballistic-missile defenses, according to policy proposals by the country's ruling party.

The proposals, obtained by Defense News and released to a select group last week ahead of widespread distribution, were drawn up by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). They also call for Japan to beef up its space-based early warning systems and invest in cyber defense.

The proposals were generated by several internal LDP committees led by former LDP Defense Ministers Shigeru Ishiba and Gen Nakatani, and therefore carry considerable weight, according to Narushige Michishita, director of the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies here.

"They're important," he said.

The recommendations will feed into policy, spending and acquisition priorities for Japan's next five-year Mid-Term Defense Plan, which is being crafted by the Defense Ministry and will be published by December.

They also come as the LDP administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seeks to revise Article 9 of Japan's constitution to delete provisions that prohibit Japan from using "war as a sovereign right of the nation" and maintaining "war potential," and replace them with the right to hold a "National Defense Force" under the prime minister as commander in chief.

The LDP's policy proposals do not name weapon systems or suggest budgets, and are deliberately more vague than similar proposals drawn up by the LDP in 2009, just before the party suffered a disastrous electoral defeat to the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

"The LDP was not in power then [in 2009]," and so could be more direct, Michishita said.

The 2009 proposals openly discussed Japan acquiring, for example, the Boeing KC-46 tanker refueling plane as a step toward developing pre-emptive strike capability, such as knocking out fueled North Korean missiles. They also suggested adding the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to Japan's ship-based Aegis and ground-based Patriot systems.

Fast forward four years, and the proposals come from a resurrected LDP that delivered an even bigger electoral defeat to the DPJ last December. This time around, the language is more cautious because each word has more value.

While they carefully avoid all reference to Japan's major sources of concern — China and North Korea — the proposals open intriguing possibilities over the extent to which Japan will strengthen its defense posture. In this context, Japanese defense planners are considering a number of options for each of the force enhancements, according to analysts and people familiar with the LDP's discussions.

Most interesting and controversial is the proposed discussion of pre-emptive strike capability, which would require Japan to acquire Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), long-range refueling capability for its nascent F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and/or a naval platform for the F-35B jump jet, should Japan opt to purchase that variant.

The proposals make no mention of the KC-46 this time around. The Air Self-Defense Force, meanwhile, has steadily equipped its fleet of Mitsubishi F-2 multirole fighters with JDAMs. It is thought that the two 19,500-ton 22DDH-class helicopter destroyers planned for the Maritime Self-Defense Force can be converted to carry the F-35B.

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In 2003, before Japan had deployed its Aegis SM-3 and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) ballistic-missile defense (BMD) systems, then-Defense Minister Ishiba made it clear that Japan could launch a strike against a missile base in North Korea in specific sets of circumstances.

For example, a strike could take place if there was evidence the missiles were fueled and aimed at Japan, and Japan had no other credible means of defense, Michishita said.

But now Japan is steadily building out its BMD systems to intercept North Korea's longer-range Unha and Musudan mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles, so such a strike would be potentially unconstitutional, he said.

Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said he found recent talk of Japan bolstering its pre-emptive strike capability worrying.

"CSIS has been conducting discussions on the issue of pre-emptive strike for six years, and in recent months, we have seen resumption of calls to develop this capability resurface. I am concerned about the proliferation of these capabilities because of the potentially destabilizing consequences," he said.

Japan probably won't develop a separate marine corps, but it will more likely reinforce its amphibious capability, largely based on the Western Infantry Regiment of the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) that trained in amphibious warfare as part of the Iron Fist exercises with the US Marine Corps in California, analysts say.

Paul Giarra, president of US-based consulting firm Global Strategies & Transformation, said the language of the policy proposal opens the possibility of the GSDF equipping one or perhaps two regiments with advanced capabilities, including up to four dozen amphibious landing vehicles over the next five years, beyond the four AAV-7A1S vehicles already planned, and a suitable number of Bell-Boeing V-22 tilt-rotor Osprey aircraft.

"I read it more as the [Japan Self-Defense Forces] with some improved amphibious capabilities like vehicles and tilt-rotor aircraft. That is potentially a significant development, but the LDP does not look like it wants to go the whole hog on a marine corps," said Christopher Hughes, professor of international politics and Japanese studies at Britain's University of Warwick.

Japan is considering several options to boost its BMD portfolio, consisting of four Kongo-class destroyers and two larger Atago-class Aegis cruisers, and PAC-3 units. While the 2009 version of the proposals specifically mentions purchasing THAAD and an "advanced" version of the PAC-3, the new version recommends strengthening land-based BMD, leaving Japan a choice between purchasing either THAAD or the Aegis Ashore land-based version of the Aegis system, and the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) system for last-ditch interdiction.

Giarra said deploying the PAC-3 MSE would complement Aegis Ashore, which Japan has shown an interest in purchasing to the tune of one or two 24-missile interceptor batteries, a number that could increase. In this case, purchasing THAAD systems might be too much of an overlap of similar capabilities, he suggested.

Japanese defense planners see cruise missiles in general and China's DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile in particular as growing threats. This means that on top of the planned upgrades to employ the SM-3 Block IIA Aegis system when it becomes available, Japan also is considering purchasing the extended-range anti-air warfare RIM-174 missile.

"Cruise missile defense is becoming as important to Japan as ballistic-missile defense," Michishita said.

Hughes said the proposals face many roadblocks, including opposition from more dovish LDP members and the MoD's own panel scheduled to meet in January, which may have its own priorities. Last but not least is the Ministry of Finance, which will be unwilling to raise the defense budget under any circumstances.

"[But] if Abe/the LDP can pull all this off, then it will be very radical indeed," Hughes said.

### **Regional Concerns**

Japan's moves will likely be welcomed across a region concerned about China's aggressive territorial claims.



"Japan and the Philippines have a strained history, but the Filipinos are for a stronger Japan because Tokyo is helping train its Coast Guard," Giarra said. "South Korea is less dependent on Japan and tensions run deeper, so it's much less willing to go along with it."

Tensions soared last week after Osaka's mayor said forced prostitution in occupied nations was a military necessity for invading Japanese forces, prompting a South Korean newspaper to write that US atomic attacks on Japan were "divine punishment" for Tokyo's brutality.

Some in Asia and Washington worry Japan's nationalist leader believes Japanese forces did nothing wrong during World War II.

"Passive support for Japan will hold unless Japanese behavior changes," Giarra added. "The question is whether Japanese officials can resist the temptation to undo what they believe were unnecessary apologies for wartime actions they don't believe were wrong."

"The feeling of being wronged is as powerful in Japan as it is the other way around in Korea, Philippines, Indonesia . . . Germany dealt with its past and continues to do so, but Japan suppressed the issue, creating pent up pressure, and when it vents, it could change how this buildup is seen."

<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130526/DEFREG03/305260004/Japan-Plans-More-Aggressive-Defense>

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Yonhap News Agency – South Korea  
May 28, 2013

## **N. Korea Says No Plans to Give Up Nuclear Capabilities**

SEOUL, May 28 (Yonhap) -- North Korea said Tuesday that it has no plans to unilaterally give up its nuclear capabilities in the face of ceaseless threats from the United States.

The stance announced in a article carried by the Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), said Washington needs to first end its belligerent attitude and claims that the North poses security risks.

"Under the condition of ceaseless nuclear threats by Washington, Pyongyang will not unilaterally abandon its war deterrence," the paper monitored in Seoul said.

North Korea's nuclear weapons are the ultimate defender of national interest and a trusted shield to defend peace, the media outlet said. The communist country despite international pressure detonated its third nuclear device in February and launched two long-range rockets last year.

The daily, which effectively reflects the views of the WPK and its leadership, then said that it is the United States that had triggered a global nuclear arms race and contributed to the spread of atomic weapons, not North Korea. The U.S.'s nuclear arsenal must be the first to be viewed as a destabilizing force in the region, it said.

The position comes just days after Pyongyang's special envoy visited Beijing and said the communist country will return to the stalled six-party talks that were set up to deal with the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Choe Ryong-hae, the General Political Bureau of North Korea's People's Army, while in the Chinese capital promised to engage in dialogue with all "interested parties." The Chinese official, on the other hand, made clear to Choe that China's real goal is denuclearization.

The envoy, however, did not respond to calls by Chinese leaders, including its President Xi Jinping, for a nuclear-free peninsula.

The paper's view was echoed by Radio Pyongyang, which argued it was Washington that fueled tensions by permitting the sale of advanced drones to South Korea.





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The broadcaster said actions taken by the U.S. justified the North's efforts to strengthen its country's status as a nuclear power and to expand its deterrence capabilities.

The latest report comes as the National Defense Commission said Saturday that it is because of Pyongyang's calls to simultaneously build up its nuclear arms and its economy that it was able to deter U.S. aggression.

The goal of attaining economic growth and nuclear capabilities was announced by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un earlier in the year.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/05/28/92/0401000000AEN20130528008400315F.HTML>

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The Korea Times – South Korea

May 28, 2013

## **S. Korea Urges N. Korea to Show 'Sincerity' on Denuclearization**

North Korea must demonstrate its "sincerity" through actual deeds in its denuclearization efforts, South Korea's top diplomat said Monday, reacting coolly to a reported offer by the North that it is open to dialogue over its nuclear weapons program.

Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se also took note of the lack of indications from North Korea that it is willing to return to the six-party talks, while China's state media stressed that Chinese President Xi Jinping applied pressure on Pyongyang to rejoin the long-stalled negotiations during a meeting with North Korean special envoy, Choe Ryong-hae, last Friday.

"Our stance is that there should not be talks for the sake of talks with North Korea and the North must show its sincerity to the international community by implementing its past denuclearization pledges," Yun told reporters.

[http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/05/116\\_136469.html](http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/05/116_136469.html)

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Yonhap News Agency – South Korea

May 29, 2013

## **N. Korea Calls for Replacing Korean War Armistice with Peace Treaty**

SEOUL, May 29 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Wednesday called for replacing an armistice signed at the end of the Korean War with a formal peace treaty in order to enhance stability on the Korean Peninsula.

In an article carried by the Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), the communist country claimed efforts to hold onto the cease-fire pact that halted the three-year conflict in July 1953 can only be viewed as an attempt to start another war of invasion.

"There is a pressing need to replace the Armistice Agreement, which is a relic of the war, with a permanent peace regime," the daily monitored in Seoul said.

An armistice does not guarantee "complete peace" and Washington's move to hold onto the cease-fire agreement reflects its desire to stifle the DPRK by force, it said. DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.

"If the peace regime was created in the past, the current standoff over denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would not have become a problem in the first place," said the paper, which effectively reflects the view of the WPK and its leadership.

The country has come under attack from the international community for detonating its third nuclear device earlier this year.

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The Rodong Sinmun said that the joint South Korea-U.S. Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercises that took place in March and April represent a gross violation of the armistice and argued that Pyongyang's decision to unilaterally nullify the cease-fire pact was in direct response to these provocations.

The Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army announced it was scrapping the armistice on March 5.

The media outlet said it is unnatural for a cease-fire pact to be maintained for 60 years and if a ruinous situation were to develop on the Korean Peninsula, the blame for such a development will rest solely on the shoulders of the United States that resisted all moves to sign a peace treaty.

The latest offensive by the North comes a day after the same newspaper said the North will not give up its nuclear deterrent capability in the face of continuing U.S. threats. This stance also follows Chinese leaders telling North Korea's special envoy Choe Ryong-hae that Beijing wants a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

In a separate article, the paper said that the attempt by Japan to create its version of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) can only be viewed as the country's attempt to again invade the Korean Peninsula.

"The move to create its own NSC can only be viewed as a plot to push the current situation surrounding the region into a war setting," it said.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/05/29/38/0401000000AEN20130529002600315F.HTML>

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The Hindu – India

## **Agni-V to Be Modified to Attack Multiple Targets**

*Weapon system to be fitted with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles*

HYDERABAD, May 28, 2013

By Y. Mallikarjun

The configuration of Agni-V, India's long-range nuclear weapons capable ballistic missile, is set to be changed to make the 5,000-km weapon system deadlier and capable of attacking multiple targets.

The modification is to enable fitting Agni-V with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs), V.K. Saraswat, Director-General of the Defence Research and Development Organisation and Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister, told *The Hindu*. Another test in the present configuration of the three-stage missile would be conducted later this year.

Besides imparting canister-launch capability, Agni-V would be equipped with MIRVs. "Work on that is going on and it is at design stage."

The resounding success of the maiden flight test of Agni-V in April 2012 catapulted India into a select league of nations having the technological prowess to develop Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles, he said. The Agni series will form the bulwark of land version of India's nuclear deterrence triad.

Meanwhile, the reactor on board the indigenously-built nuclear powered submarine, INS Arihant, is expected to go critical in a few weeks. The powering of the system should happen in a week or two, Dr. Saraswat said.

(Once that happens, the 80-MWt (thermal) reactor would be in a position to deliver power to the platform and sea trials of Arihant would begin subsequently when the submarine is expected to move at the designed speed, go to the diving depth, attain maximum speed and perform all safety and emergency operations).

Referring to the home-grown Ballistic Missile Defence programme, he said the next interceptor missile test to be conducted at a higher altitude of 100-150 km in July would be the most important one. "We have developed a new interceptor missile for it."

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Another crucial DRDO missile test this year would be a “repeat launch” of ‘Nirbhay’. During the maiden trial of the subsonic cruise missile, the flight had to be terminated midway after it strayed from its trajectory. Dr. Saraswat attributed the problem to a manufacturing defect in the navigation sensor. Flight tests of air-to-air Astra and anti-tank Nag missiles would be also conducted.

<http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/agniv-to-be-modified-to-attack-multiple-targets/article4758676.ece>

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The San Francisco Chronicle

## **Russia Says US Missile Defense Offer Insufficient**

The Associated Press (AP)

Monday, May 27, 2013

MOSCOW (AP) — A senior Russian diplomat says Washington's latest moves aimed at easing Moscow's concern about NATO's U.S.-led missile defense plans are insufficient.

Monday's statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov followed an exchange of letters by President Barack Obama and Russia's President Vladimir Putin that mentioned the missile defense dispute, a longtime irritant in bilateral ties. Russian media said Obama offered to provide Russia with more information about the missile defense plans.

The Kremlin has dismissed U.S. assurances that the shield is a defense against Iranian missiles and sought legally binding guarantees that it wouldn't be aimed against Russia.

Ryabkov told Voice of Russia radio that the latest U.S. proposals on missile defense are "concrete" and "serious," but Moscow still sees them as insufficient and wants more specific technical guarantees.

<http://www.sfgate.com/news/world/article/Russia-says-US-missile-defense-offer-insufficient-4551340.php>

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

## **Russia Calls for Multilateral Nuclear Cuts**

28 May 2013

MOSCOW, May 28 (RIA Novosti) – Russia is not willing to negotiate further bilateral nuclear cuts with the United States until other nuclear powers join the process, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said.

“We cannot endlessly negotiate with the United States the reduction and limitation of nuclear arms while some other countries are strengthening their nuclear and missile capabilities,” Ryabkov told the Voice of Russia radio on Monday.

“Making nuclear disarmament a multilateral process is becoming a priority,” he said.

Ryabkov added that Russia has never shunned a discussion of total nuclear disarmament, or “nuclear zero,” but this should not be an absolute goal, “otherwise we will simply undermine the very foundation of our national security.”

The New START nuclear arms treaty, signed by Russia and the United States in 2010, limits the number of nuclear warheads deployed by each side to 1,550, and the number of their delivery vehicles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear-capable bombers, to 700.

According to a report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2011, the eight recognized nuclear powers - Russia, the United States, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel - possess more than 20,500 nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, India, Pakistan and Israel have not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and achieve complete nuclear disarmament.



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The report says in particular that "India and Pakistan continue to develop new ballistic and cruise missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons" and are also "expanding their capacities to produce fissile material for military purposes."

North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and publicly declared that it possessed nuclear weapons in 2005. It has never been recognized as a nuclear power, though.

Iran is a party to the NPT but was found to be in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement, and the status of its nuclear program remains in dispute.

Iran insists on its right to a peaceful nuclear program, but there are justified suspicions that the country may be on track to develop its own nuclear arms.

<http://en.ria.ru/world/20130528/181378655/Russia-Calls-For-Multilateral-Nuclear-Cuts.html>

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Space Daily.com

## **Russia Developing Counter-Measures for European Anti-Missile Shield**

By Staff Writers

Vladivostok, Russia, United Press International (UPI)

May 28, 2013

Moscow is taking countermeasures that would negate a U.S. anti-missile shield's ability to affect its nuclear deterrent, a Russian defense official says.

Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov said in an interview Saturday that should NATO and the United States unilaterally proceed with a European anti-ballistic missile shield without Russia as an equal partner, Moscow is readying "military-technical measures" that would hamper its ability to function.

Russian officials have repeatedly voiced vehement opposition to a unilateral U.S.-NATO missile defense shield as a threat to its own security and a major obstacle to bilateral relations, saying it could easily be re targeted from countering threats from Iran and the Middle East toward Russia's own nuclear deterrent.

Moscow is insisting on long-term legally binding guarantees that any such system wouldn't be used against it and is seeking de facto joint control through the sharing of technical criteria -- a possibility the U.S. Senate has rejected.

It is also pushing for a new security treaty covering all of Europe, including Russia, to replace NATO's role.

The United States in March effectively suspended the fourth and final phase of its unilateral European missile defense system -- part of a plan to instead deploy additional ABM interceptors to counter North Korea, The New York Times reported.

Antonov, fresh from last week's Moscow Conference on European Security, told the Russia 1 television channel in an interview from Vladivostok the Kremlin is preparing unnamed contingency plans to ensure its nuclear deterrent force would remain viable if NATO and the United States go ahead with their anti-missile plans.

"On the possibility of taking military-technical measures, we've talked all the time about it," he said. "This was first stated by (Russian President Vladimir Putin) in November of last year.

"If and when the U.S. missile defense system is created and is aimed at undermining the nuclear deterrent, the Department of Defense will take steps that will not allow the Americans to achieve any result," Antonov said.

Asked if that meant that a future U.S.-NATO anti-missile shield would be "neutralized" if a nation such as Iran launched a nuclear missile at Europe, Antonov said it would be difficult to speculate on such a scenario.

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"Well, first, the Iranians do not have such missiles and when they will have them nobody will know," he said. "And by the way, the last-minute decision by the Americans to suspend the implementation of the fourth stage suggests Washington recognizes that the Iranians in the short term have no such missiles and will not have such missiles."

The Russian official asserted that by "electing Iran" as the enemy of Europe, "the Americans are trying to realize their missile defense plans, which, in fact, won't defend Europe and create a problem for the Russian-American and Russian-NATO relations."

At last week's Moscow conference, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Security Policy Dirk Brengelmann said political assurances that a European missile defense wouldn't target Russia were already made at last year's NATO summit in Chicago.

Instead, NATO is offering two joint NATO-Russia missile defense centers and "reciprocal transparency measures to address concerns and avoid misperceptions."

Antonov, however, told RIA Novosti last week, "'Transparency' is a good word but transparency will never solve all the concerns that exist in our country."

"Today we warn our American friends: We do not want confrontation, we want cooperation. Please do not create a system that leads us into an arms race. All we want is to agree under certain conditions."

[http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Russia\\_developing\\_counter-measures\\_for\\_European\\_anti-missile\\_shield\\_999.html](http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Russia_developing_counter-measures_for_European_anti-missile_shield_999.html)

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British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News – U.K.

28 May 2013

## **Review 'to Find Trident Alternatives Too Expensive'**

Alternatives to Trident would either be impractical or more expensive, a review instigated by the Lib Dems will say, according to The Financial Times.

The Lib Dems and their Tory coalition partners disagree over whether to renew the submarine-based nuclear weapons system on a like-for-like basis.

The newspaper reports the review is to conclude that other delivery platforms would not work, or would cost more.

But it may suggest cutting submarine numbers could save billions of pounds.

The government said newspaper reports were speculative and the review would be published in due course.

A final decision on whether to build a new fleet of Vanguard submarines, which carry ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads, has been pushed back until after the next election in 2015 amid disagreements within the coalition.

The existing submarines are due to be taken out of service in 2028.

### **Coalition differences**

The Lib Dems have long argued that the projected £20bn cost of building new submarines and ensuring that at least one is on patrol at any time - known as continuous at-sea deterrence - is too high and other options should be considered.

The Conservatives and military chiefs support Trident's renewal, believing it is the best guarantee of security for the UK.

When they entered government in 2010, the coalition partners agreed to a "value for money" review of Trident examining the cost of possible alternatives - overseen since last year by Lib Dem cabinet minister Danny Alexander.

According to the FT, the review - likely to be published before the end of July - is likely to reject alternative delivery mechanisms such as a land-based or airborne missile system.

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The former would be deemed impractical, the paper said, as it would leave the UK unable to mount a meaningful response in the event of a nuclear attack while the latter would require a completely new aircraft which would be more costly.

The FT said the report would also cast doubt on the feasibility of using other submarines - such as the Astute Class due to come into service in the near future - to carry the nuclear missiles.

Conservatives have warned that this approach would mean an entirely new missile having to be designed.

But the newspaper said the report may float the idea of reducing the number of submarines from the current four to three or even cutting this back to two.

### **Speculation**

It quoted sources with knowledge of the report suggesting this could save at least £5bn in upfront design costs and £1bn in annual expenditure on crewing and maintenance per submarine.

Professor Malcolm Chalmers, research director at the Royal United Services Institute, said it was the "working assumption" in Whitehall that Trident would continue to operate off four submarines but the question of whether this could be reduced to three had always been "left open".

Any suggestion, he added, that the UK could maintain an effective deterrent with two submarines would be entirely new and would spark a debate going into the next election about whether a continuous at-sea presence was needed.

The review will not have any direct impact on the policy of the coalition government, which affirmed its commitment to Trident in its programme for government in 2010.

But it will inform debate on spending priorities going forward and on Lib Dem policy in the run-up to the next election.

### **'No date'**

A Lib Dem spokeswoman said the review had yet to be published but the party was "still looking at alternatives".

Prof Chalmers said the Lib Dems had never before spelled out in detail what the alternative should be and maintaining the current system, but with fewer submarines and at a lower cost, could be a potential way forward for them politically.

"If the leaks are correct, what it would suggest is that the Lib Dems would be getting closer to having an alternative of their own," he said. "They would have an actual policy rather than simply saying they do not agree with the current policy."

The Cabinet Office said it would not comment on speculation about what may or may not be in the report.

"No date has been set for the review but we still expect to report to the prime minister and the deputy prime minister in the first half of 2013," a spokesman said.

Labour, which backed renewal of Trident while in government, says it is committed to retaining an independent nuclear weapons system although it is prepared to look at options to do this in a way that reduces the burden to the taxpayer.

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22690016>

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Houston Chronicle

## **Navy Ships Form First Line of Missile Defense**

By LOLITA C. BALDOR, Associated Press

May 30, 2013

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NORFOLK, Va. (AP) — In the operations center on board the USS Stethem, sailors keep watch on a dizzying array of maps, graphics, sensors and radar data — all focused on North Korea.

The Stethem, a destroyer, is one of two warships in the western Pacific that are responsible for detecting, tracking and, if necessary, shooting down a ballistic missile launched by Pyongyang. And they represent the first line of defense for U.S. allies and territories in a region that has become increasingly nervous as North Korea has ratcheted up its rhetoric and threats in recent months.

Thousands of miles away, two more of the ballistic missile defense ships are in the eastern Mediterranean Sea monitoring the threat from Iran while giving the Obama administration the ability to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles at potential targets in Syria, if officials call for military action.

As the missile threats from Iran and North Korea have advanced in recent years, the U.S. has become more invested in Navy cruisers and destroyers that carry the high-tech Aegis radar system and dozens of missile interceptors.

As a result, the ballistic missile defense destroyers and cruisers are a growing capability that is in hot demand from military commanders across the Middle East, Europe and the Pacific.

"They give the capability to the combatant commanders that allows them to position (the ships) where there's a need, and we feel they're a pretty good investment," said Adm. Bill Gortney, commander of U.S. Fleet Forces in Norfolk. Unlike other missile defense systems, he said the ships are "able to sail to where the crisis is."

Anthony Cordesman, a national security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said the ships provide a layered defense that can quickly provide warning and details of a missile launch in areas of the world where there may be only a limited time to mount a response. And they present an added complication and deterrent for an adversary such as North Korea or Iran that may be trying to target a nearby U.S. ally — such as South Korea or Israel.

At the same time, however, he said the missile defense ships with their constantly improving sensors, radars and missiles have become a critical yet costly weapon.

"This is going to be an evolving technology duel," Cordesman said. "We will see steadily better missiles, warheads and countermeasures, and that means that ships will have to be upgraded." But he added that those things are considerably easier to upgrade than the military's pricey aircraft.

Still, the increasing requirements for the ships also exact another toll on the already strained naval forces. Commanders are routinely forced to extend the ships' deployments, keeping sailors at sea for longer periods and shrinking their time at home.

The USS Stout, which is pierside at the Norfolk Naval Station, returned from its deployment to the Persian Gulf region in June 2011, and its crew is now preparing to go back out this summer. While most Navy cruisers and destroyers deploy for about 6-1/2 months, and then spend more than three years at home, the missile defense warships are spending up to 7-1/2 months deployed and get a bit more than two years at home between tours.

"They are the most stressed, they have the highest operational tempo of all our forces," Gortney said. "What we're trying to do in the Navy is to meet that demand at an acceptable personnel tempo for our sailors and their families, as well as allow us to continue to do the maintenance so these ships go to their service life."

During a reporter's visit recently to the USS Stout, crew members were preparing for the eventual deployment. Loaded below the sun-streaked deck were dozens of Tomahawk missiles, while anchored above were large, sophisticated sensors and radars.

Below, in the operations center, a ring of computer stations lined the room, combined into groups that could detect or follow a launch and those that communicate with others and coordinate the response strike. Overhead, displays lighted up with high-tech graphics and lines of trajectory.

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Navy officials say that at this point they simply don't have enough of the ballistic missile defense ships to meet the demands while still adhering to the regular deployment schedules. So Navy leaders waived the rules governing lengths of deployments and time at home in order to keep the ships at sea longer, while warning of the potential consequences.

The rigors of the more frequent deployments will hasten the wear and tear on the ships, increasing their need for maintenance and repairs and potentially shortening their usable lifespans. And the more frequent pace of operations can also strain the crews, hurting efforts to recruit and retain quality sailors.

In all, the Navy has 28 ballistic missile defense ships — 16 are based in the Pacific and 12 in the Atlantic. That number is expected to grow to 30 by the end of 2018, with funding for several more in the pipeline in the years ahead. The average cost to upgrade the ships with the new Lockheed Martin Aegis radar system and the Raytheon SM-3 missiles is roughly \$45 million.

The ships serve as both defensive and offensive weapons. The sophisticated SM-3 missiles can zero in on and take out short- to medium-range missiles that might be fired at U.S. or allied forces, and they also carry Tomahawk cruise missiles that can be launched from sea and hit high-value targets or enemy weapons systems from afar, without risking pilots or aircraft.

That dual mission is particularly key now, as the ships in the eastern Mediterranean keep watch on Iran for any possible missile launches but also are ready if the U.S. decides it needs to take action against Syria, where there are ongoing concerns about the government's use of chemical weapons against its own people.

Much like during the 2011 operation in Libya, missiles launched from Navy ships could take out Syrian air defense systems without putting U.S. troops at risk in a ground assault or sending fighter jets into Syrian airspace.

To date, the ships have executed just one missile launch that was not a test. In a mission code-named Operation Burnt Frost, the guided missile cruiser USS Lake Erie sailed out into the Pacific and on Feb. 20, 2008, launched a strike that blew apart a disabled U.S. spy satellite that was tumbling in orbit at more than 17,000 mph about 130 miles above the Earth.

The actual target, Navy leaders said, was a spot on the satellite the size of a postage stamp. And the missile, traveling at about 30,000 mph, hit it directly, destroying the satellite's onboard tank of about 1,000 pounds of toxic hydrazine fuel. Officials had been worried about possible injuries, including from the hazardous fuel, if the satellite came down in a populated area.

For Navy leaders, it was a decisive moment, proving publicly that the sensors, radars and missiles could successfully hit an object under real-time, threatening circumstances.

"Our test record speaks for itself," said Gortney, adding that the ships "are there because there are countries that are threatening or have the ability to threaten our partners as well as our forward deployed forces. Having this capability there to be able to defend our allies and our own people is pretty important."

<http://www.chron.com/news/politics/article/Navy-ships-form-first-line-of-missile-defense-4559763.php>

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Air Force Magazine.com

## Looking at Nuclear Motivations

By Marc V. Schanz

May 31, 2013

While US policy is pushing towards nuclear disarmament, the rest of the world is taking a different tack, said Barry Watts, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, on Thursday. While the United States and Soviet Union held the overwhelming majority of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, the concentration is not as dense today, as countries from Pakistan to North Korea to Iran are either declared nuclear powers or seeking to expand

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into the realm, he said during a presentation sponsored by AFA's Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies in Arlington, Va. Watts cited North Korea and Iran, in particular, as countries that learned lessons from the US invasion of Iraq—and see nuclear weapons as a protective measure against "conventional regime change," as he put it. Use of nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional war is not necessarily clearly defined by some countries, noted Watts. For example, Russian military doctrine has a very different view about limited nuclear use in a theater context and Pakistan appears to entertain similar thoughts. The danger is that the limited use of nuclear weapons could be seen as a "new normal" by some nations, he said during his May 30 talk. (See also Watts' April CSBA study [Nuclear-Conventional Firebreaks and the Nuclear Taboo](#).)

<http://www.airforcemag.com/DRArchive/Pages/2013/May%202013/May%2031%202013/Looking-at-Nuclear-Motivations.aspx>

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Global Post – Boston, MA

## **Argentine Prosecutor Accuses Iran of 'Latin America Terror Plot'**

*An Argentine prosecutor accused Iran on Wednesday of trying to infiltrate Latin American countries in order to plan and conduct terror attacks.*

By Jill Langlois and Simeon Tegel  
May 30, 2013

A prosecutor in Argentina has accused Iran of building a spy network across Latin America capable of carrying out "terrorist activities" in the region.

Prosecutor Alberto Nisman, who is investigating the 1994 deadly bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, made the accusation in a detailed 502-page report submitted to the federal court.

"I legally accuse Iran of infiltrating several South American countries to install intelligence stations — in other words espionage bases — destined to commit, encourage and sponsor terror attacks like the one that took place against AMIA," Nisman told reporters.

He also accused Iran of "making dual use of diplomatic agencies, as well as cultural and charitable associations to conceal terrorist activities."

"The immediate result was building intelligence stations to provide logistical, financial and operative support for possible attacks planned by the Islamic regime as it seeks to 'export the revolution.'"

It's not the first time Iran has been accused of attempting to spread Islamic jihad to Latin America, although analysts say the claims have sometimes been exaggerated for domestic political purposes.

The 1994 bombing of Argentine Jewish Charities Federation (AMIA) building killed 85 people.

The prosecutor Nisman singled out Mohsen Rabbani, who was the cultural attache at the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires at the time, as the main person responsible.

He also said Rabbani has, over the last two decades, worked to create an intelligence network in Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Surinam, and Trinidad and Tobago.

"These are sleeper cells. They have activities you wouldn't imagine. Sometimes they die having never received the order to attack," Nisman said in the indictment.

The report is likely to come as a major embarrassment for Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, who earlier this year struck a controversial deal with Iran.



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The deal was intended to get to the bottom of the unresolved AMIA bombing but has been heavily criticized as effectively allowing an alleged murderer to run his own trial given that the attack is alleged to have been ordered by the Iranian government.

Iran, which does not currently have an ambassador in Argentina, has repeatedly denied the charge that it ordered the 1994 bombing.

*Senior Correspondent Simeon Tegel contributed reporting from Lima, Peru.*

<http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/130529/argentine-prosecutor-accuses-iran-latin-america-terror-plot>

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The Chicago Tribune

## **Iran's Sponsorship of Terrorism Sees "Marked Resurgence": U.S.**

May 30, 2013

By Warren Strobel, Reuters

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Iran's sponsorship of terrorism overseas underwent "a marked resurgence" in 2012, reaching levels not seen in 20 years, the U.S. State Department charged on Thursday in its annual report on trends in political violence.

The report cited a series of actual and planned attacks in Europe and Asia linked to Hezbollah, Iran's Lebanon-based ally, including a July 2012 bombing in Bulgaria that killed five Israeli citizens and a Bulgarian, and wounded 32 others.

"The year 2012 was ... notable in demonstrating a marked resurgence of Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism," via Tehran's elite al Quds force, its intelligence ministry, and Hezbollah, the report said. "Iran and Hezbollah's terrorist activity has reached a tempo unseen since the 1990s."

There was no immediate reply to a request for comment from Iran's mission to the United Nations.

Last July, Iran's U.N. ambassador denied his country's involvement in the Bulgaria bombing, which he accused Israel of carrying out. "We have never, and will not, engage in such a despicable attempt on ... innocent people," Ambassador Mohammed Khazaee said.

The report's release comes as U.S. and European officials and intelligence agencies say Iran and Hezbollah have stepped up their military backing for the besieged government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on Saturday publicly committed the group to an Assad victory over Syrian rebels who, like the Damascus government, have been accused of abuses in the two-year-old civil war.

"Both Iran and Hezbollah are providing a broad range of critical support to the Assad regime, as it continues its brutal crackdown against the Syrian people," the State Department report said.

The report covers events in 2012 and does not include such incidents as the Boston Marathon bombings in the United States or last week's brutal killing of a British soldier on a London street.

### MIXED PICTURE

President Barack Obama last week announced he was shifting the United States away from a "boundless global war on terror" begun by his predecessor as a response to the September 11, 2001, attacks. While continuing to target militants, he said he would restrict deadly drone strikes abroad and seek once again to close the Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba.

Overall, the State Department's "Country Reports on Terrorism 2012" paints a mixed picture of efforts to counter violent extremism.

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It said that al Qaeda's Pakistan-based core group "continued to weaken" and that losses in leadership have driven the group's affiliates to become more independent, "setting their own goals and specifying their own targets."

Al Qaeda's two most dangerous franchises, Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al Shabaab in Somalia, "have suffered significant setbacks," it said.

But at the same time, the tumultuous events set in motion by the "Arab Spring" revolutions have complicated the picture, the report said. The dispersal of weapons stocks following the fall of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi as well as the coup in Mali "presented terrorists with new opportunities," it said.

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the report said, is seeking to establish a long-term presence in Syria "under the pseudonym of al-Nusra Front," an anti-Assad rebel group that the U.S. government has designated a terrorist organization.

Iraq was the site of three of the 10 most lethal attacks worldwide in 2012, it said, and 97 percent of the strikes whose perpetrator could be identified were attributed to AQI.

While terrorist attacks occurred in 85 countries last year, 55 percent of the attacks and 62 percent of the fatalities took place in just three countries: Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan, the State Department said.

The report said there were 6,771 terrorist attacks in 2012, killing 11,098 people. More than 1,280 people were kidnapped or taken hostage.

Because of changes in methodology, the figures are not directly comparable to previous years, it said.

(The full report is available at <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/index.htm> )

*Reporting by Warren Strobel; Additional reporting by Louis Charbonneau Editing by Eric Beech.*

[http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-30/news/sns-rt-us-usa-terrorismbre94t16y-20130530\\_1\\_quds-iran-tehran](http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-30/news/sns-rt-us-usa-terrorismbre94t16y-20130530_1_quds-iran-tehran)

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U.S. News & World Report

## **Report: China Hacked Costly U.S. Missile Defense, Weapon Designs**

*Missile systems and jet blueprints were among the reportedly hacked designs*

By Steven Nelson

May 28, 2013

The confidential version of a Defense Science Board report compiled earlier this year reportedly says Chinese hackers accessed designs for more than two dozen of the U.S. military's most important and expensive weapon systems.

Weapons named in the report included the PAC-3 Patriot missile system, the Army's Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, the Navy's Aegis ballistic-missile defense system, the F/A-18 fighter jet, the V-22 Osprey, the Black Hawk helicopter and the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship, according to the Washington Post, which was given a copy of the document.

Plans for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, estimated to cost \$1.4 trillion to develop, were also hacked, according to the report.

"If they got into the combat systems, it enables them to understand it to be able to jam it or otherwise disable it," Winslow Wheeler, director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Project on Government Oversight, told the Post. "If they've got into the basic algorithms for the missile and how they behave, somebody better get out a clean piece of paper and start to design all over again."

Earlier this year, the Defense Science Board warned in the public version of its report that the Defense Department "and its contractor base have already sustained staggering losses of system design information."

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According to the public version of the report, "[m]ost successful attacks reaching [Defense Department] networks today result from a personnel failure or out-of-date software in firewalls and detection systems."

The Defense Science Board is a 32-member committee of military experts that reports to the Secretary of Defense. Members are selected for one- to four-year terms "on the basis of their preeminence in the fields of science, technology and its application to military operations, research, engineering, manufacturing and acquisition process," according to the board's website.

A report to Congress earlier this month from the Defense Department accused the Chinese government of hacking military secrets. "China is using its computer network exploitation capability to support intelligence collection against the U.S. diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors that support U.S. national defense programs," said the report, according to the Wall Street Journal.

"As we all know, the United States is the real 'hacking empire' and has an extensive espionage network," China's People's Daily newspaper responded. "The groundless accusations reflect U.S. distrust of China," Wang Xinjun, a researcher with the Chinese People's Liberation Army, told the Xinhua News Agency.

A February report by Mandiant, an American cybersecurity company, revealed that an "overwhelming" percentage of Chinese cyberattacks on U.S. companies and government agencies are conducted by a special unit of the Chinese military based at a single Shanghai office building, The New York Times reported. Attacks dropped off for three months after the revelation, but have since resumed.

The confidential report's findings were reported Monday, the same day the Australian Broadcasting Corporation accused Chinese hackers of snatching blueprints for the Australian Security Intelligence Organization building, which experts say could make the \$630 million building easier to bug. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei denied the report, telling reporters Tuesday: "China pays high attention to the cyber security issue and is firmly opposed to all forms of hacker attacks. ... I don't know what the evidence is for media to make such kinds of reports."

<http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/05/28/report-china-hacked-costly-us-missile-defense-weapon-designs>

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China Daily – China

## **Beijing Seeks Cooperation with US on Cyberattacks**

May 30, 2013

By Zhu Zhe and Zhao Yanrong (China Daily)

China reiterated on Wednesday that it is against all Internet hacking attacks and hopes to conduct dialogues and cooperate with the United States on this matter under the principle of mutual respect and trust.

The remarks, made by Assistant Foreign Minister Zheng Zeguang at a news briefing, came ahead of the summit between President Xi Jinping and his US counterpart Barack Obama on June 7 and 8 — the first face-to-face communication between the two leaders since Xi became president in March.

China has repeatedly been accused of being behind hacking activities. The latest accusation came from The Washington Post on Tuesday, which cited a US Defense Science Board report as saying that Chinese hackers have gained access to designs of two dozen US weapon systems.

Reuters reported on Wednesday that Obama will discuss cybersecurity with Xi during their meeting in California next week.

Asked whether cybersecurity will be a topic at the summit, Zheng said the two leaders will discuss a whole range of issues that are of strategic importance to both countries.

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But he reiterated, "China opposes all types of cyberattacks and is a victim of such attacks."

He said China and the US have agreed to set up a working team on cyberissues under the framework of the China-US Strategic Security Dialogue, and China is willing to conduct further talks and cooperation under the principle of mutual respect and trust. Xi's meeting with Obama, planned at Sunnylands, the Walter and Leonore Annenberg estate in Rancho Mirage, California, will be conducted on his way back from a trip to Latin America and the Caribbean. Xi is scheduled to pay state visits to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico from Friday to June 6.

Zheng said China and the US both expect the two leaders to meet as soon as possible to communicate and plan for future development of Sino-US relations.

"It is expected that in the meeting guidelines can be established on how to develop a new type of relationship between major powers," Zheng said.

He said new relations between big countries, such as China and the US, should be established on the basis of equality, inclusiveness, mutual trust and mutual learning, as well as win-win cooperation.

Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University of China, said China has been eyeing a new type of relationship between major countries. However, he said, it seems the concept has not been well accepted by Washington, so it could be a key issue for discussion at the upcoming summit.

"At the meeting, it's expected that the two leaders can reach a consensus on the concept and try to carry out the idea in practice in the future."

Shi said that despite the differences between the two countries, the new type of relationship between China and the US should clearly define the key interests of each and be built on the basis of mutual respect.

[http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-05/30/content\\_16545343.htm](http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-05/30/content_16545343.htm)

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Global Times – China

OPINION/Article

## **NK Envoy Doesn't Signal Policy Reverse**

Global Times, May 27, 2013

By Global Times

North Korean envoy Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae paid an unexpected visit to Beijing last week, reportedly signaling Pyongyang's apprehension that it is time to ease the concerns of all parties caused by its recent snubs and actions. This top envoy also delivered a handwritten letter from North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to Chinese President Xi Jinping, with no details about the contents given.

Once again, North Korea is trying to play the China card.

North Korea has been irritating China and the rest of the world since a few months ago. It not only sent a satellite into orbit, but also declared invalid the armistice agreement that ended the Korean War in 1953.

Recently, it even fired six short-range missiles into the Sea of Japan within three days, defying warning from the relevant sides. A war seemed possible at any moment.

North Korea used to think like this: When the US becomes impatient with North Korea's actions, it will send aircraft carriers and warships to the Korean Peninsula. Under such circumstances, Chinese hawks cannot wait to say that the US has ulterior motives of containing China, and Sino-US relations will deteriorate, and Beijing will move close to Pyongyang.



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That's why the notions of the "southern triangle," comprised of the US, Japan and South Korea, and the "northern triangle," comprised of China, North Korea and Russia, have made an apparent return, as if today is still the Cold War.

Nevertheless, the new Chinese leadership is taking a more calm and analytical approach toward North Korea, which can be seen from the official statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The former administration always put ensuring the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula in first place, while the current administration sets the denuclearization of the peninsula first.

This policy adjustment shows China has realized that it can no longer indulge the North's development of nuclear weapons if it means sacrificing regional peace and stability.

This makes it difficult for the North to drive a wedge between China and the US or China and South Korea. Ironically, the North's recent moves apparently drew China and the US closer.

Both the two powers and other countries have realized that North Korea's actions threaten the stability of Northeast Asia. They have also come to a consensus that the reason behind Pyongyang's aggressive attitude is that it has acquired nuclear weapons.

The North is definitely not happy about how the situation has evolved, especially since President Xi is going to meet President Barack Obama in early June and the date of South Korean President Park Geun-hye visiting China is soon to be confirmed.

In such circumstances, Kim sent an envoy to China, stressing that China and North Korea are long-term friends.

Many media outlets see Choe's visit as a fence-mending mission and a positive sign of Pyongyang's intention to resume dialogues. However, it doesn't mean the North treats China as its "close brother." Actually, it never thinks that way.

The North's real aim is to set China up by requiring China to stand by its side against the US and South Korea and further pin down China's foreign policy.

Noticeably, Choe didn't mention "denuclearization," but only reportedly said the North wanted to strive to resolve the current crisis through the Six-Party Talks and other unspecified forms of dialogue. Here perhaps lies the biggest discrepancy between Beijing and Pyongyang.

*The article was compiled by Global Times reporter Wang Wenwen based on an interview with Zhang Liangui, an expert on North Korea at the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC.*

<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/784692.shtml#.UaaOZJQo5Dx>

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The Moscow Times – Russia

OPINION/Commentary

## **Spoiling U.S. Missile Defense at All Costs**

27 May 2013, Issue 5135

By Alexander Golts

Russian diplomacy has scored another victory as a spoiler. Once again, the Kremlin has thwarted a U.S. initiative aimed at breaking the deadlock on missile defense by accusing the West of using missile defense to "undermine Russia's national security."

The first step in Washington's cunning plan was in March, when it canceled the fourth stage of its European missile defense system — the stage that Kremlin specialists had claimed would give the U.S. the ability to destroy Russia's strategic missiles.

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Then, in April, U.S. National Security Adviser Tom Donilon came to Moscow with a proposal that Washington thought would end the impasse on missile defense: an agreement for the ongoing exchange of technical information on U.S. missile defense systems. He also proposed further cutbacks in strategic nuclear arsenals, perhaps to as low as 1,000 deployed warheads for each side. (The New START treaty set limits for deployed strategic warheads to 1,550.)

The Kremlin tried hard to find a way to rebuff Obama's peaceful overtures. Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev delivered the Kremlin's message during his visit to Washington last week, saying the U.S. was on the generally right path with these concessions, but its initiatives did not go far enough to win over the Kremlin. Moscow demanded a legally binding agreement in which both sides would guarantee that their missile defense systems would never be aimed at each other. At some point, Russia may extend its demands to include limiting the speed of U.S. interceptors to no more than 5 kilometers per second, or that U.S. missile defense bases must be located at a significant distance from Russia's borders.

Russian defense officials played the same spoiler role at an international conference on European security in Moscow on Thursday. Presidential administration head Sergei Ivanov casually announced that Moscow was very dissatisfied with Washington's "vague" proposals on missile defense. "Guarantees are needed that, first, the European missile defense system will not undermine Russia's strategic potential," Ivanov said. "Second, we must be assured that the U.S. system can only defend against possible attacks by countries outside the Euro-Atlantic region."

At the conference, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov explained to U.S. Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Rose Gottemoeller and Evelyn Farkas, deputy assistant secretary at the U.S. Defense Department, why Russia was dissatisfied with the U.S. proposal for an exchange of information on missile defense. "You ladies might have a wide variety of dresses in your closet," was his basic line of reasoning, "and even if they are just gathering dust, tomorrow you might buy or make more. And even if you inform us of the fact, how would that change the overall situation?"

The Kremlin is basically demanding that it have the final say in the location and architecture of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe.

If Washington does not agree with Russia's firm conditions, the Kremlin is more than ready to dispense with all these "diplomatic niceties" and get really tough. Head of the General Staff Vladimir Gerasimov said at Thursday's security conference that "Russia has already developed the military and technical means for neutralizing whatever negative impact the U.S. global missile defense system might have on Russia's nuclear forces." In other words, this could mean that Russia may want to destroy elements of the U.S. missile defense system if they are considered to be a threat to Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent. This threat sounded much like the one former President Dmitry Medvedev made five years ago to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad in response to U.S. missile defense plans.

The focus of Moscow's conference on European security, it would seem, was to give the Defense Ministry another chance to rebuff the West. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was declared to be an outdated relic of the Cold War. At the same time, Russian military chiefs constantly referred to the "balance of power" on the European continent. But if the political and military confrontation has ended, why are Russian military and political leaders still using the Cold War-era language of "balance of power"? Or is Russia positioning itself not merely as the former Soviet Union, but as the entire Warsaw Pact standing in opposition to NATO? If so, then why should the West comply with Russia's demands on missile defense?

Amid all of the bluster and spoiling, Russia's top brass has not made a single concrete proposal for cooperation. They are determined to obstruct the West, not cooperate with it. What's more, even if the West were to comply with all of Russia's demands — including the most unreasonable ones — Moscow would certainly announce a new set of demands shortly thereafter. For example, the Kremlin might demand that Russian singers never place lower than second in the Eurovision song contest. After all, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov promised to retaliate for the West's seeming conspiracy against Dina Garipova, Russia's entry in this year's Eurovision competition, whose votes were allegedly stolen.



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<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/spoiling-us-missile-defense-at-all-costs/480583.html>

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The Moscow Times – Russia

OPINION/Article

## How to Break the Deadlock on Missile Defense

27 May 2013, Issue 5135

By Daryl G. Kimball

When President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama meet next month at the Group of Eight summit in Northern Ireland and in St. Petersburg in September, they will have an important chance to move away from confrontation over missile defense and toward more cooperation. A good place to start is by accelerating the process of reducing their still massive and costly Cold War-era nuclear arsenals. Both sides should seize the opportunity.

Since 2011, U.S. and Russian leaders have failed to make progress on concepts for missile defense cooperation and data sharing, largely because of Russian concerns that U.S. plans for deployment of Standard Missile-3, or SM-3, IIB long-range interceptors in Poland by 2022 could threaten a portion of Russia's nuclear-armed ballistic missiles that are based in the European part of the country.

But on March 15, U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced the effective cancellation of the program. He said the U.S. would "restructure" the SM-3 IIB program because of significant technical problems and funding shortfalls for the program, which would cost about \$10 billion just to develop.

Although Hagel only said the program was being "restructured" to sidestep potential criticism in Washington, it is clear from other statements and actions that the SM-3 IIB interceptor program is dead. On April 18, a senior State Department official said the SM-3 IIB "will no longer be developed or procured." As further proof, Obama administration's budget request for the coming year contains no funding for the SM-3 IIB program.

The shift in U.S. missile defense plans has been accompanied by an exchange of letters between Putin and Obama on a possible agreement on missile defense data sharing and on U.S. proposals for further offensive nuclear arms cuts. Last week, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev delivered a letter from Putin responding to Obama's proposals.

Media accounts suggest that Russia is interested in data sharing but wants additional assurances that U.S. missile defense projects do not pose a threat to Russia's security before agreeing to new nuclear arms reduction talks. Further discussions are likely ahead of the Obama and Putin meeting in June.

What is clear to most Russian and U.S. experts is that in the absence of the SM-3 IIB program, there is no other U.S. missile interceptor capability in place nor under development in Europe or elsewhere that could plausibly threaten Russia's strategic nuclear retaliatory capability. The U.S. ground-based strategic interceptors in Alaska and California are limited in number — currently 30 with plans to increase to 44 over the next decade or so — and are not capable of defeating Russia's sophisticated ballistic missiles with their advanced penetration and decoy capabilities.

In an April 16 speech in London, even Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who is known for his hawkish stance on the U.S., said U.S. missile defense plans do not pose a threat to Moscow's strategic nuclear weapons. "We have solved the issue of penetrating the U.S. missile shield, and it poses no military threat to the country," Rogozin said.

Instead, the U.S. missile defense program will only have a limited capability to counter short- and medium-range missiles from Iran and North Korea and a handful of unsophisticated, long-range missiles that those two states might field in the years ahead.

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These realities should open the way to a legally binding U.S.-Russian agreement for the regular exchange of information on missile defense programs. This would help Russia verify U.S. claims about its technical capabilities and limitations of its interceptors. Such an agreement should also be accompanied by a joint presidential statement providing clear assurances that the two countries' missile interceptor programs do not threaten each other's security.

Such a deal would provide Putin and Obama with a win-win deal that protects each nation's security by enhancing strategic stability. Some Russian observers argue that such an agreement might only be binding on the U.S. leader who signs it and that the next president in 3 1/2 years, particularly if he is a Republican, can disavow the agreement. But in practice, it would set a firm standard that future presidents would be very likely follow, and it is highly likely that the decision to cut off funding for more advanced U.S. interceptors in Europe will extend far beyond Obama's presidency.

An agreement on missile defense would also open the door to further cuts in each nation's bloated and expensive nuclear arsenals. Even under the New START, both sides deploy up to 1,550 strategic warheads on 700 missiles, submarines and long-range bombers until 2021.

These numbers far exceed what is necessary to deter nuclear attack from any current or future adversary. An analysis conducted in 2002 by Physicians for Social Responsibility shows that a Russian attack involving 300 thermonuclear warheads hitting U.S. urban areas would kill 77 million Americans from blast effects and firestorms in the first half hour. A U.S. attack of similar size would have the same devastating impact on Russia.

Even a "limited" nuclear exchange would destroy national communications and transportation networks, public health, sanitation and food distribution systems. In the months following this initial assault, tens of millions more would die from starvation, exposure, radiation poisoning and infectious disease. An attack involving just one-fifth of either country's strategic nuclear force would trigger such a global disaster.

Doing nothing is not in either country's best interests. Russia has already cut its arsenal below the New START warhead ceiling, and the U.S. has a significantly greater capacity to upload stored warheads on its missiles and bombers.

A new round of reductions could ensure that Russia and the U.S. have equal but significantly smaller strategic arsenals and would help reduce the enormous costs of planned strategic force modernization by both countries in the coming years.

Reductions to 1,000 or fewer deployed strategic warheads for each side would help draw China and the other nuclear-armed states into a multilateral nuclear arms control process, which Russia says is one of its key goals. Ideally, this should be done by a formal treaty. Otherwise, Obama and Putin could announce they will implement further strategic reductions through reciprocal actions, which could be verified through the existing New START framework.

Renewed U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control efforts should also consider new accounting and confidence-building measures relating to tactical nuclear weapons, which could finally lead to the withdrawal of the roughly 180 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons that are based in five European countries.

More than 20 years after the end of the Cold War, there is no military rationale for Russia to maintain some 2,000 tactical nuclear bombs, many of which are on obsolete naval and air defense systems. Nor is there any military requirement for the U.S. to keep 180 air-delivered nuclear bombs in Europe.

The U.S. and Russia will from time to time have their disagreements on geopolitical issues, but our leaders need to find ways to cooperate on missile defense and nuclear arms control that are in our national interests and increase global security. Putin and Obama should work more closely together to achieve these results.

*Daryl Kimball is executive director of the independent, private Arms Control Association, based in Washington.*

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/how-to-break-the-deadlock-on-missile-defense/480570.html>

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Forbes

OPINION/Contributor

## Nuclear Weapons: How Few Is Too Few?

By Loren Thompson

May 28, 2013

After downplaying plans for additional cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal during the run-up to the 2012 elections, President Obama has returned to the subject in his second term. According to published reports, he has won military support for cutting the number of “deployed” (operational) nuclear warheads to barely 1,000, which would be easily the lowest level of his lifetime.

Let’s hope this latest effort to limit nuclear weapons turns out better than Obama’s gun-control initiatives in the aftermath of the Sandy Hook tragedy. However, there is good reason to believe it won’t, and for much the same reason that the National Rifle Association says gun control is a bad idea: if guns are illegal, then only criminals will have guns. What’s the connection? I’ll come back to that later, but first let me tell you a little bit about the Obama worldview.

The President’s plan to reduce nuclear weapons reflects a conviction he has expressed throughout his adult life that the world would be better off if all such weapons were eliminated. As William Broad and David Sanger of the *New York Times* reported on July 5, 2009, Obama first wrote about abolishing nuclear weapons when he was in college 30 years ago, and “at critical junctures of Mr. Obama’s career, the subject of nuclear disarmament has kept reappearing.”

For instance, he brought it up repeatedly during his initial run for the White House in 2008, and he returned to the topic during his first overseas trip as President. On April 5, 2009, he told an audience in Prague that “today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

So when Obama convinced the Senate to ratify a new strategic arms limitation agreement with Russia in 2010 that set the cap on deployed warheads 30% below what was previously permitted, that was just the beginning.

Now he wants to cut the allowable number of deployed warheads from 1,550 to somewhere between 1,000 and 1,100, with further cuts to come if Russia agrees before he leaves office or in a subsequent administration. Meanwhile, according to Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, the administration has quietly retired about 500 warheads from the U.S. reserve of undeployed weapons, leaving the total number of deployed and non-deployed warheads at about 4,700 — less than a fifth of the 25,000 warheads the arsenal contained when Obama was born in 1961. And he has blocked development of new nuclear weapons that might replace aging devices in the current arsenal.

There are plenty of learned observers who laud this trend, ranging from former Secretary of Defense William Perry to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. They have written eloquently about the menace posed by even a handful of nuclear weapons. And there probably isn’t much risk involved in reducing the number of warheads from 25,000 in 1961 to 4,700 today, given the massive destruction each device can cause. But when you get down to 1,000 warheads or fewer available during a crisis, then there’s a problem.

To understand why, you need to understand three things about U.S. nuclear strategy. First, Washington long ago gave up trying to defend against a large-scale nuclear attack, because it wasn’t technologically or fiscally feasible. Second, as an alternative to defenses, national leaders adopted a strategy of deterrence, meaning any enemy foolish enough to launch a nuclear attack would suffer devastating retaliation-in-kind. And third, under this strategic concept, what matters is how many usable weapons America still has *after* it suffers a surprise attack — because that’s the retaliatory force that deters aggression.

Thus, the U.S. has sought to organize its nuclear forces so that no enemy can launch a disarming first strike, mainly by fielding three distinctly different types of weapons: manned bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in hardened silos, and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles on stealthy Trident submarines. The theory is that the weapons in this so-called strategic “triad” are so diverse, no enemy can deprive America of its retaliatory capability in a surprise attack, and thus there is no rational incentive to attack in the first place.

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I won't get into all the debates about nuclear capability and credibility that occurred during the Cold War, because as Barry Blechman of the Stimson Center has sagely observed, "so-called 'requirements' for effective deterrence are based strictly on theories and speculation." However, there is one core paradox in any nuclear balance based on offensive forces that bears mentioning: all those nuclear weapons that we maintain to deter aggression become a powerful inducement to attack if an enemy thinks they can be destroyed in a first strike. After all, they are a constant threat to that enemy's survival.

Which brings me back to the National Rifle Association, and the danger of disarming. If you have a dozen Glocks in your house and you reduce the number to two, you're probably still in good shape for dealing with a home invasion. But when you go to zero, the situation changes fundamentally — because the home invader may have a gun and now you don't. My old mentor at Georgetown University, Dr. Stephen Gibert, explained to me how this logic applies to nuclear arms control.

He said that when both sides agree to reduce to 1,000 weapons and one side hides ten extra, that probably won't affect the military balance much. If the two sides then reduce to 100 weapons and ten more are hidden by one side, that could have some bearing on the military balance. But if the two sides agree to completely disarm — they go to zero nuclear weapons — then the side that has hidden ten rules the world.

Well, maybe that's a bit of an exaggeration, but you get the point: a handful of nuclear weapons confers huge power when nobody else has any. How likely is it that we will ever have the kind of air-tight inspection regime that prevents a hermit kingdom like North Korea from squirreling away a few fission devices?

But you don't need to go down to zero before problems start arising that lead to instability, given the deeply-felt desire of nuclear-armed adversaries to escape the balance of terror. Imagine that President Obama has his way and the U.S. nuclear arsenal is reduced to 1,000 deployed warheads. And let's say for counting purposes that the remaining warheads are distributed equally between bombers, land-based ICBMs and submarine-based ballistic missiles. An adversary with perfect intelligence could destroy two-thirds of the U.S. retaliatory force with 1-2% of his force because the bombers are deployed at only two or three bases and the sea-based warheads are deployed on a dozen or so submarines.

That's less than 20 aim-points that need to be hit to leave the U.S. with nothing but land-based ICBMs — and who knows what combination of kinetic and non-kinetic effects a future adversary might be able to employ to impede the launching of silo-based missiles? The silos might withstand blast, heat and radiation effects from a nuclear attack, but what about the command links enabling transmission of launch codes? Current U.S. strategy calls for riding out a nuclear attack if necessary, which reduces the danger of having to launch on warning — before all the facts are known — but increases the danger of being caught on the ground in a surprise attack.

U.S. strategic planners have considered such scenarios for decades, and introduced refinements into training and technology aimed at minimizing the prospects for a successful first strike. Although the nuclear triad evolved somewhat haphazardly, there's little doubt that having three different types of delivery systems greatly complicates the targeting plans of any adversary. Nonetheless, the fewer weapons there are in the force, the easier it will be to degrade U.S. capabilities in a first strike — especially if future enemies find new ways to track subs beneath the sea.

It isn't clear that the Obama Administration has thought this through. The Nuclear Posture Review that it conducted in 2010 was the first to formally embrace the concept of "a multilateral effort to limit, reduce, and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide." It was also the first to shift the focus of U.S. strategy from dealing with current nuclear states to preventing proliferation and/or terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The administration's investment decisions in the nuclear-weapons area have tended to match its policy pronouncements and diplomatic initiatives. It rebuffed efforts by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to develop a next-generation nuclear warhead. It delayed development of a new nuclear bomber and a successor to Trident ballistic-missile submarines. It canceled development of defenses against Iranian ICBMs destined for Europe, which had become

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a sticking point in convincing Moscow to further shrink its nuclear arsenal. And now insiders say it is starting to back away from commitments to modernize the nation's decrepit nuclear-weapons industrial base.

The problem with all these moves is that they will leave future administrations less prepared to cope with nuclear states if geopolitical conditions deteriorate. Cutting the size of the nuclear arsenal to a small fraction of its Cold War size and focusing on terrorists rather than state-based threats may seem sensible in the present environment, but the decisions the administration is making will have consequences for decades after it leaves office. It is not enough to say that the kind of aggression I have described here is unthinkable in today's world. The Holocaust was unthinkable too, but it happened.

Some supporters of nuclear disarmament describe our current approach to nuclear strategy as a failure of imagination that one day could lead to unprecedented catastrophe (proponents of missile defense often say the same thing). However, it may be that what the Obama Administration has failed to imagine in its strategic calculations is just how bad the global situation might become if Russia's next leader is a neo-fascist, or China decides to pursue regional hegemony. There's no way of knowing for sure when our efforts to shrink the nuclear arsenal cross the invisible line into greater vulnerability, but it may be we are already there today.

*Loren Thompson focuses on the strategic, economic and business implications of defense spending as the chief operating officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates.*

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2013/05/28/nuclear-weapons-cuts-how-few-is-too-few/>

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Japan Times – Japan  
OPINION/Commentary

## **New U.S. Weapons Have China Worried**

By Michael Richardson  
May 30, 2013

SINGAPORE – When the United States carried out a successful test recently of an advanced high-speed, long-range weapon ostensibly designed to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear arms in a crisis, it set alarm bells ringing in China. Far from reassuring Beijing, the May 1 test of the sleek hypersonic unmanned aircraft, known as the X-51A WaveRider, has added to China's concerns that U.S. superiority in conventional weapons may make nuclear conflict more, not less, likely.

During the test, the WaveRider's scramjet engine ignited high above the Pacific Ocean, thrusting the demonstrator to a speed of nearly 6,245 kilometers per hour (KPH), just over five times the speed of sound. Scramjet stands for supersonic combustion ram jet, which has no moving parts. Fuel is mixed with air rushing into the combustion chamber and then ignited to provide power.

The WaveRider flew for 3½ minutes on scramjet power, the longest such flight in history. At that speed, a flight from New York to Los Angeles could take less than 39 minutes.

While scramjet propulsion may one day be used in civil aviation and for outer space flight, the more immediate application is military. The U.S. Air Force, Army and the Pentagon's research arm, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), have been testing various super-fast unmanned aircraft over the past few years as part of a futuristic program called Prompt Global Strike (PGS).

DARPA has been testing an experimental arrowhead-shaped plane, the Falcon Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 (HTV-2). It is an unmanned, rocket-launched, maneuverable craft that glides through Earth's atmosphere at incredibly fast speeds.

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The HTV-2 is designed to travel at 20 times the speed of sound, or Mach 20. This would cut the flying time between New York and Los Angeles to under 12 minutes, 22 times faster than today's commercial airliners. DARPA says that the ultimate goal is "a capability that can reach anywhere in the world in less than an hour."

The last flight test of the HTV-2 in April 2012 was only a partial success. After being released from its protective cover atop the rocket, it nose-dived back toward Earth, leveled out and glided above the Pacific at just over 20,900 kph for about nine minutes before the searing speed and heat caused parts of its carbon composite skin to peel away.

Initiated nearly a decade ago, after al-Qaida's terrorist kingpin Osama bin Laden eluded capture in Afghanistan, these PGS tests are intended to develop a weapon armed with a nonnuclear high explosive warhead that could strike targets anywhere in the world in an hour or less.

The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review Report in 2006 said that the PGS weapons would hit "fixed, hard and deeply buried, mobile and re-locatable targets." At present, the only way the U.S. could with any certainty destroy such targets in an hour or less would be to use submarine-launched long-range ballistic missiles or U.S.-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

Like the PGS weapons now being tested, these rocket-assisted weapons travel at hypersonic speeds. However, they are all armed with nuclear warheads. So the result of a strike could be devastating, globally destabilizing, and out of all proportion to the terrorist or other threat.

Among early PGS plans were proposals to retrofit a small number of existing U.S. submarine-launched missiles or land-based ICBMs with conventional warheads. But Congress in Washington refused to fund these plans because of concerns that Russia and other nuclear powers would be unable to distinguish between a PGS launch and nuclear weapons launch, raising the risk of an unintended nuclear missile exchange.

Since then, the list of potential PGS targets has grown as terrorist groups and missile-armed states hostile or potentially hostile to the U.S. have increased in number.

A conference hosted by the U.S. Strategic Command last August discussed instances in which the White House might someday order a nonnuclear rapid strike. They included a sudden move by China toward destroying a critical U.S. or allied communication satellite by rocket or laser, a danger accentuated by what U.S. defense officials say was a high-altitude Chinese anti-satellite test on May 13, the third reported since 2007.

They also included a North Korean ballistic missile being readied for launch against U.S. allies Japan or South Korea, or against U.S. bases in either of those countries or on the U.S. island territory of Guam in the western Pacific. Iranian long-range missile launches, and terrorist assembly points for nuclear explosive devices or so-called dirty bombs that use conventional explosives to spread radioactive material, might be other reasons for a PGS weapon to be used.

The latest PGS tests by the U.S. worry Russia, but they worry China more because it has far fewer nuclear-tipped missiles that can reach the U.S. than Russia, and less effective systems for destroying incoming missiles than Russia. U.S. analysts estimate that China currently has a total of only a few dozen nuclear-armed ICBMs that can strike the U.S.

Writing on the China-U.S. Focus website on April 22, Major Gen. Yao Yunzhu, director of China-America Defense Relations at the Chinese Armed Forces Academy of Military Science, said that Chinese concerns stemmed from two facts:

- The ballistic missile defense systems that the U.S. and its allies had deployed, or were planning to deploy, in the Asia-Pacific region could intercept residue Chinese nuclear weapons launched for retaliation after China had been attacked, thus potentially negating the deterrence effect of the Chinese nuclear arsenal.
- The U.S. was developing a series of conventional strategic strike capabilities. When deployed, they could be used to hit China's nuclear arsenal.



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Hu Yumin, a senior research fellow at the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, wrote in January that the U.S. aimed to combine PGS with its space and anti-missile technologies to “form an integrated defense system, which could render other countries’ strategic weapons, including nuclear arms, almost useless.”

Hu was clearly referring to China. He added that this could put such countries in a dilemma: Either they would lose the ability to launch a strategic nuclear counter-attack or they would have to use nuclear weapons first to avoid devastation.

Chinese concerns are recognized by some U.S. officials and analysts. With swinging cuts in military spending biting in the U.S., the most likely outcome is a modification of the PGS program.

Existing shorter-range and slower-moving U.S. cruise missiles, launched from aircraft or submarines, could be used to strike PGS targets, while expensive research and development of hypersonic weapons is put on the back burner, at least for the time being.

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<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/05/30/commentary/new-u-s-weapons-have-china-worried/>

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Jerusalem Post – Israel  
OPINION/Op-Ed Contributor

## **How Russia Undercuts Itself with the S-300**

*Supply of the S-300 by Moscow will create an air defense umbrella over Syria allowing Damascus to carry out weapons transfers to Hezbollah.*

By DORE GOLD  
May 30, 2013

In making the case for the supply of S-300 missiles to Syria, Russia’s highly experienced foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, tried to make the point that his government was only selling Damascus “a purely defensive system.” The S-300, he said, as was clear from its name, was for purposes of “air defense.”

In other words, he was suggesting that there were weapons systems, like air defense missiles, that were inherently defensive by their nature.

Ironically, by making this argument, Lavrov was undermining one of the main pillars of Moscow’s case against other defensive systems which it has opposed vociferously in the past. If defensive weapons systems should not be opposed because, by definition, they have no offensive applications, then why not accept US missile defense deployments in Eastern Europe or in other countries ringing Asia? For while Russia has been stressing that its air defense systems are not offensive in character, it has been strenuously opposing missile defenses for many years, refusing to see them as defensive weapons alone. Since president Ronald Reagan first proposed the US anti-missile system known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) – also called the “Star Wars” program – in 1983, Russian strategists argued to their American counterparts that missile defenses are inherently destabilizing. During the Cold War, stability was based on the maintenance of deterrence and the credibility of each superpower’s retaliatory strike capability. The argument against missile defenses back then was that a robust SDI-type system could neutralize the weakened retaliatory capacity of the side that was hit first.

This strong opposition to missile defenses was maintained by Moscow after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. To some extent it was intensified as the Soviet missiles forces were degraded and even cut by arms control agreements like START. In 2007, for example, when the Bush administration proposed installing missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, the chief of the Russian General Staff declared that Moscow would withdraw from arms control agreements with the West in retaliation.

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In that same year, President Vladimir Putin even compared the deployment of Western anti-missile systems to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

Russian generals in 2007 spoke about targeting these missile defense systems if they were ordered to do so by the Russian leadership. More recently, the US defense correspondent Bill Gertz reported on Russian military exercises simulating an attack on US sea-based missile defenses deployed on an Aegis cruiser near Japan.

In a speech in late December 2009, Putin laid out the logic behind the Russian opposition to missile defenses: "By building such an umbrella over themselves our [US] partners could feel themselves fully secure and will do whatever they want which upsets the balance."

In short, according to the Russians' strategic doctrine, missile defenses were completely destabilizing.

It would take extraordinary political acrobatics to explain why missile defenses in Eastern Europe endanger stability, yet robust air defenses based on the S-300 in Syria somehow contribute to stability.

What ultimately gives a weapons system an offensive or defensive character is the strategic context in which it is placed. In 1970, for example, Moscow deployed SA-2 air defense systems in Egypt and then decided to move them up to the Suez Canal, in violation of the US-Soviet Standstill Agreement at the time. By providing the Egyptian Army with an air defense umbrella over the Suez Canal, and in so doing protecting it from the Israel Air Force, Moscow made it possible for the Egyptians to cross the canal three years later and launch the Yom Kippur War. Air defenses were not just for defensive purposes but rather made possible offensive ground operations.

In the Syrian case today, Israel is not likely concerned with a surprise attack by the Syrian army like in 1973, given the state of Syria's ground forces after two years of fighting against rebel troops. What is changing in Israel's north is the buildup of Hezbollah, backed by a growing Iranian military presence on the ground that has become engaged in combat operations against President Bashar Assad's opponents.

The most immediate problem is Syria's willingness to deliver advanced weaponry to Hezbollah that can upset key aspects of the strategic balance.

Besides the transfer of chemical weapons, Israel has been concerned with Syria providing Hezbollah with long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, like the supersonic Russian Yakhont that can strike targets 300 kilometers into the Mediterranean. Last year, the director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency described the proliferation of such missiles as a concern to the US Navy as well.

Israel has also focused on the supply to Hezbollah of surface- to-surface missiles armed with particularly heavy warheads for striking Israeli cities.

The payload of the Fateh 110 is 30 that of the Grad rockets used by Hezbollah in 2006.

Finally, Israel is monitoring whether Syria is equipping Hezbollah with long-range airdefense missiles like the SA-17.

Using Putin's own logic, supply of the S-300 by Moscow will create an air defense umbrella over Syria which will provide Assad and his generals in Damascus with the security to make these kinds of weapons transfers to Hezbollah and to "do whatever they want which upsets the balance."

This is a development which Israeli officials have clearly stated they must prevent.

The next time US officials sit across from Russian negotiators over the deployment of Western missile defense systems, and the Russians charge that missile defenses are destabilizing, Washington should be prepared with all the statements that came out of Moscow insisting that the S-300 air defense system in Syria is purely defensive and hence threatens no one. President Putin will not accept the application of Lavrov's statements about the S-300 to the US missile defense deployments, but in taking that position he will be going into important negotiations for Russia with a much weaker hand than he had before.



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<http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/How-Russia-undercuts-itself-with-the-S-300-314945>

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Breaking Defense.com  
OPINION/ Strategy & Policy

## **No Longer Unthinkable: Should US Ready For ‘Limited’ Nuclear War?**

By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.  
May 30, 2013

Air FORCE ASSOCIATION HQ: For more than 60 years, most Americans have thought of nuclear weapons as an all-or-nothing game. The only way to win is not to play at all, we believed, because any use of nukes will lead to Armageddon. That may no longer be the game our opposition is playing. As nuclear weapons proliferate to places that might not share our reluctance to use them in small numbers, however, the US military may face a “second nuclear age” of retail Armageddon for which it is utterly unprepared.

Outside the US, both established and emerging nuclear powers increasingly see nuclear weapons as weapons that can be used in a controlled, limited, and strategically useful fashion, said Barry Watts, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, arguably the Pentagon’s favorite thinktank. The Cold War “firebreaks” between conventional and nuclear conflict are breaking down, he wrote in a recent report. Russia has not only developed new, relatively low-yield tactical nukes but also routinely wargamed their use to stop both NATO and Chinese conventional forces should they overrun Moscow’s feeble post-Soviet military, Watts said this morning at the headquarters of the Air Force Association. Pakistan is likewise developing tactical nukes to stop India’s much larger military. Iran seeks nuclear weapons not only to offset Israel’s but to deter and, in the last resort, fend off an American attempt to perform “regime change” in Tehran the way we did in Baghdad. The US Air Force and Navy concept of “AirSea Battle” in the Western Pacific could entail strikes on the Chinese mainland that might provoke a nuclear response.

It’s precisely because US conventional power is so overwhelming that the temptation to turn to nuclear weapons to redress the balance is so irresistible. Ten years ago, the Iraqis sidestepped American dominance in the middle of the spectrum of conflict – regular warfare with tanks, planes, and precision-guided non-nuclear weapons – by going low and waging guerrilla warfare, for which the US proved painfully unprepared. In the future, nuclear proliferation means more and more countries will have the option to sidestep US conventional power by going high and staging a “limited” nuclear attack, for which we aren’t really prepared either. Indeed, some countries, notably a nuclear Iran with its terrorist proxies and North Korea with its criminal ties and special operations forces, could outflank America’s conventional military from both sides at once.

So, could the US military keep going after losing an Army brigade or a Navy aircraft carrier to a tactical nuclear strike? “I don’t think we’ve thought about continuing to do conventional operations in an environment in which some nuclear weapons have been used, [not] since the Cold War,” Watts told me after his talk. “You’ve got to have equipment that continues to work in that environment, and, in general, we don’t.”

For example, one of the ways the Army economized on its new “Nett Warrior” communications gear for foot troops was to scrap the requirement for its circuit to survive the electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, from a nuclear detonation, which can spread far below the lethal blast and radiation effects: Such shortcuts make sense for Afghanistan and Iraq, but not for Korea.

“So there are a lot of things you might want to invest in, to put it mildly,” said Watts.

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One particularly controversial suggestion Watts offered is for the US to invest in new tactical nuclear weapons of its own. Currently, Watts argued, if an enemy attacks with a relatively low-yield atomic bomb, America's choices for a response are limited to conventional strikes or thermonuclear weapons, with very little in between.

"The problem is most of the warheads we've retained... are huge weapons," Watts said. "The ones on the [submarine-launched] Trident missiles are 450 kilotons." The Air Force's B-61 warhead is small enough to fit in the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and its yield can be "dialed down" to as low as an 0.3 kiloton yield, but the B-61 is a 60-year-old design that's been out of production for years, although old bombs have been modernized. Said Watts, "Congress's absolute prohibition about developing new warheads... makes it very difficult for us to have credible nuclear weapons that could be used in a limited way, not at the Armageddon level."

Adversaries are less likely to be deterred by America's nuclear arsenal if they decide we won't strike back with our big bombs in response to a limited, low-yield nuclear attack on US troops. It's even less credible the US will retaliate massively if the adversary stages the nuclear strike on its *own* soil as a last-ditch defense against "regime change," as Russia has wargamed and as Iran is no doubt tempted to do. Least credible of is US nuclear retaliation for a nuclear attack that doesn't actually kill anyone: An enemy with even modest space capability can detonate a nuclear warhead high in the atmosphere, where it will generate a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (or HEMP) that disrupts the electronics on which the US military depends without actually taking any lives. (Congress has held hearings on electromagnetic pulse in the past, albeit focused on threats to the American homeland rather than US forces abroad, but legislative interest has waned since the 2012 defeat of Maryland Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, the Hill's foremost hawk on EMP).

Whether it's morality or lack of suitable weapons that holds the US back from retaliating to a limited nuclear attack in kind, the American military at least needs to plan for how to take an atomic hit and keep on going. "You may end up fighting a nuclear/EMP environment even though you're not using those kinds of weapons yourselves," Watts said.

Watts is less worried about the threat of nuclear terrorism than he is about nation-states. He doubts Iranian mullahs, for example, would trust even their favorite proxies, Hezbollah, with a nuclear weapon. But he's skeptical of the conventional wisdom that the Chinese have sworn never to use nuclear weapons except in response to a nuclear attack on them.

"If you start digging into the literature [by Chinese strategists], they say all the politically correct things in the front of the book about how we're not going to use nuclear weapons first," Watts said. As you read more deeply, however, he found an unnerving willingness to consider nuclear detonations to generate EMP, for example, under the special circumstances of what Chinese doctrine called "local high-tech warfare under informationalized conditions."

Such special circumstances might well arise in a Western Pacific war, perhaps triggered by a Sino-Japanese clash over the Senkaku Islands, in which the US came to an ally's defense by waging a long-range AirSea Battle. In theory, both sides could swear off strikes on each other's homelands and try to limit the fighting to the air and sea. But there's one big problem: While America's main weapons for a naval battle are ships, submarines and aircraft launched from carriers at sea, China's naval arsenal depends heavily on long-range sensors and missiles based on land. The US would either have to take shots from Beijing's best weapons without responding or escalate to an attack on China's coastal provinces.

Watts did not discuss this topic in detail, but another strategist at the discussion did. "The issue is escalation... if you cross the Chinese coastline," said Peter Wilson, a national security consultant. "How do you keep the war regional?" Even if the US strike causes no Chinese casualties – for example, a precision missile or even cyber attack that shut down China's power grid – "the reply may be a HEMP shot over Hawaii."

"We've gotten very used to bombing countries, going downtown and working our will" from Baghdad to Belgrade, Wilson said. When the target has nuclear weapons, however, even using America's fading conventional superiority starts looking a lot more dangerous.

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<http://breakingdefense.com/2013/05/30/no-longer-unthinkable-should-us-ready-for-limited-nuclear-war/>

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THE DIPLOMAT – Japan  
OPINION/The Diplomat Blogs

## Recipe for Disaster: Israel & Pakistan's Sea-Based Nukes

*Both Israel and Pakistan look to the sea to provide strategic depth. It's a quest that could undermine stability.*

By Iskander Rehman

May 31, 2013

The policy of a nation, Napoleon once quipped, can be read in its geography. For much of human history, the verity of such an assertion would have appeared self-evident. After all, what is geostrategy if not a state's chosen response to a preexisting spatial reality? For many thinkers of the early modern era, a country's geographical position shaped its strategic behavior, whether in times of peace or war. Maritime powers, some have noted, appear both more democratic and inclined to pursue alliances than their territorially obsessed continental counterparts. Amidst the swirling tides of global geopolitics, geography formed a key fundamental — an enduring physical truth — providing a degree of structure and continuity to otherwise arcane national strategies.

The dawn of the nuclear age, however, greatly eroded the importance attached to the study of maps. Nuclear weapons, with their terrifying and seemingly indiscriminate power for destruction, seemed to render cartographic musings somewhat irrelevant. In an era where the devastating effects of a single bomb could extend over land and sea, casting their radioactive shadow over bustling cities and sleepy hamlets alike; what did it matter whether a nation was urban or rural, maritime or continental?

The assumption that geographical factors play only a minor role in the formulation of nuclear strategy is, however, deeply flawed. Territorial insecurity and the attendant quest for strategic depth are profoundly embedded within the nuclear strategies of small to medium-sized powers. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the evolving naval nuclear postures of two nations, which would seem, at first glance, to have little in common: Pakistan and Israel. Indeed, irrespective of numerous sizable differences — both in terms of institutional history and strategic culture — the nuclear force structures adopted by both countries' small navies are disturbingly similar. In both cases, the perceived pressures of geography have played an enormous role in the conceptualization of naval nuclear deterrence.

### Continental Suffocation, Maritime Oxygenation

Both Israel and Pakistan have decided to field tactical nuclear weapons aboard their small flotillas of diesel-electric submarines. While Pakistan is a declared nuclear power and Israel has opted to pursue a policy of nuclear ambiguity for the past four decades, both nations' military thinkers echo each other in their frequent referrals to the sea as a source of strategic depth. This shared emphasis stems, in large part, from their growing sense of continental claustrophobia. Both countries are territorially shallow, and resulting sentiments of vulnerability have helped shape and sustain already potent senses of embattlement.

### Israel's Naval Nuclear Option

For strategists in Jerusalem, apprehensions over the widening demographic divide between Israel and its more populous Arab neighbors has been compounded by the severe political turmoil and uncertainty in the wider Middle East. In particular, there is growing concern that further waves of upheaval in the Arab world could produce a regional climate more staunchly hostile to Israeli interests. In addition to the potential existential threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran, Israeli planners must also confront a rapidly changing conventional military environment — one in which the shallowness of Israeli territory increasingly acts as a major liability. Whereas in earlier years Israel's very compactness generated certain operational benefits — by enabling its armed forces to maneuver with fluidity within interior lines — the diffusion of precision guided munitions (PGMs) and precision strike systems amongst Israel's prospective antagonists has largely negated any such advantage. Hybrid and non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah



increasingly have the aptitude to “see deep and shoot deep,” while Iran continues to acquire a bristling array of ballistic missiles aimed at Israel. The Israeli Defense Force’s stationary bases and airfields are thus increasingly exposed to missile attacks. Hezbollah, for instance, is estimated to be sitting on a steadily growing stockpile of more than 40,000 rockets and missiles. In previous conflicts, Israel could rely on its command of the skies as a means of offsetting its numerically superior foes. In the long run though, the difficulties inherent in prosecuting hybrid actors concealed within crowded urban environments, along with the densification of cheaper and more capable anti-aircraft systems, are liable to impede the Israeli Air Force’s freedom of action. In sum, Israel’s continental exiguity acts as a growing constraint on its ability to guarantee the safety of its citizens from both conventional and nuclear attack.

The solution, suggests one Israeli naval officer, lies at sea – the country’s traditionally underfunded navy can play a greater role not only in dispersing the armed forces’ conventional firebases along the nation’s maritime flank – but also in ensuring nuclear survivability in the event of a large-scale atomic assault. Having almost certainly decided to place a portion of its nuclear arsenal at sea, Israel can better ensure the survivability of its second strike capability, as well as its ability to wage “broken-back” nuclear warfare from under the waves.

While Israel has never confirmed the existence of its naval nuclear deterrent, it is an open secret that, for the past decade or so, Israel has relied on its three, German-designed, Dolphin-class submarines, all of which are allegedly equipped with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Three more submarines have been ordered from Germany, and should join the Israeli fleet in 2013, 2014, and 2017, respectively. The trio of supplementary Dolphins will be upgraded models, equipped with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems. This should enable them to loiter in the congested waters off the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf coasts for longer periods of time. In the words of an Israeli admiral, the existence of the submarines provide a “way of guaranteeing that the enemy will not be tempted to strike preemptively with non-conventional weapons and get away scot-free.”

### **Pakistan’s Quest for Maritime Depth**

In Pakistan, meanwhile, last year’s decision to formally establish a Naval Strategic Forces Command should not be solely construed as a tit-for-tat response to India’s own advances in the naval nuclear domain (India launched its first indigenous nuclear submarine, the INS Arihant, in 2009), but also as an attempt to add a measure of strategic depth to Islamabad’s own growing nuclear arsenal. Despite the fact that India has publicly stated that it abides by a strict No-First-Use policy, Pakistan lives under the constant fear that India, the United States or both operating in collusion could swoop in and preemptively seize or destroy the smaller nation’s arsenal.

This deep-rooted paranoia is exacerbated by the growing conventional military imbalance between India and Pakistan. This asymmetry is particularly stark in the maritime sphere, as India steadily modernizes and expands its blue-water navy, and an underfunded Pakistan Navy struggles to make its case to an Army-dominated national security apparatus. There are growing concerns over Islamabad’s vulnerability to a naval blockade, given that 95 percent of its trade by volume is transported by sea.

This has led some to conclude that the country urgently needs to nuclearize its submarine fleet. When interviewed, Pakistani commanders mention the precedent set by Israel’s alleged decision to place nuclear-tipped cruise missiles aboard conventional submarines, and suggest, somewhat provocatively, that Pakistan should follow suit. Another option, some have argued, would be stationing nuclear weaponry aboard surface ships and maritime-patrol aircraft. Not only would this provide the country with greater strategic depth, it would also extend some of the more dysfunctional elements of Indo-Pakistani nuclear interactions from land to sea. By threatening first nuclear use against an advancing Indian aircraft carrier strike force, Islamabad can hope to acquire escalation dominance and considerably dilute its larger neighbor’s coercive naval power.

Moreover, the introduction of nuclear weapons will have a major impact on the future of naval warfighting in the Indian Ocean. As veteran naval analyst Captain Wayne Hughes has noted, fleets caught under a nuclear shadow are compelled to operate under different principles. Most notably, ships must loosen up their deployment patterns and adopt more dispersed configurations in order to better shield themselves from the ripple effects of a nuclear blast. For Pakistani planners, acquiring nuclear-armed cruise missile submarines (SSG) would provide an opportunity to skew its existing



power relationship with India in Pakistan's favor, primarily by injecting a sizable degree of uncertainty and ambiguity in India's tactical calculus, but also by preventing the Indian Navy from concentrating the bulk of its power projection platforms in one specific location.

### **The Damaging Effects of Continental Claustrophobia for Nuclear Stability**

Needless to say, the strategic side-effects of both Israel and Pakistan's continental claustrophobia have the potential to be highly destabilizing. Mounting concerns over a perceived lack of strategic depth have led to a privileging of offensive naval nuclear strategies, which fuse dual-use systems and doctrinal opacity with forward postures. In the event of a conflict, there would be no way for their adversaries to ascertain whether Pakistani or Israeli subsurface vessels are nuclear-armed or not. In addition to the radioactive "fog of war" that would float over naval combat operations, there are certain risks tied to both navies' conventional ways of war that would likely carry over to their nuclear posture in times of crisis.

In an environment already marked by dual-use, it would be injudicious to assume that conventional and nuclear dynamics will evolve within tightly sealed vacuums. Both the Pakistani and Israeli navies have learnt to offset their numerical inferiority in times of war by engaging in daring asymmetrical maneuvers— Pakistan through the offensive deployment of its submarines, and Israel through the use of naval commandos and missile strikes. Notwithstanding manifold differences in terms of tactical approaches, offense has often been perceived as the best form of defense for small navies laboring under overwhelming odds.

In effect, weaker naval powers have, throughout history, manifested their desire to alleviate their vulnerability by engaging in acts of deception or preemptive attrition. Military historians and political scientists have demonstrated the extent to which it can be arduous for a military organization steeped in a specific operational culture to espouse an entirely different set of procedures and tactics under wartime conditions. While it has been reported that the elite crews aboard each Israeli nuclear-armed submarine have been subjected to a rigorous battery of psychological tests and are cognizant of the responsibilities that come with their nuclear role, the Pakistan Navy's future command and control arrangements remain alarmingly obscure. If the same Pakistani naval officers charged with the conduct of conventional operations against the Indian fleet suddenly find themselves entrusted with strategic weapons, their organizational predisposition for "offensive defense" could be a recipe for disaster. The scattering of nuclear assets at sea, particularly aboard surface ships, also heightens the risks of a nuclear weapon being intercepted by a malevolent non-state actor, an already perennial concern when discussing Pakistan's growing nuclear arsenal.

### **The Overriding Importance of Geography in Nuclear Strategy**

Geography remains one of the most important determinants of a country's nuclear strategy. Whether a country feels territorially secure or insecure has an immense impact on the shape and form of its deterrent. For relatively small coastal states such as Pakistan and Israel, the quest for maritime depth has given birth to naval nuclear force structures with the potential to undermine stability during a crisis regardless of the legitimacy or strength of some of their strategic concerns. While it remains unclear what can be done to alleviate both states' sense of existential vulnerability, appreciating the extent to which a feeling of territorial claustrophobia undergirds much of their elites' strategic culture could enable a better understanding of their nuclear trajectories.

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<http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/31/recipe-for-disaster-israel-pakistans-sea-based-nukes/?all=true>

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Khaleej Times – U.A.E.

OPINION/World View



## Need for Nuclear Dialogue

By Dr Maleeha Lodhi (World View)

31 May 2013

In a speech last month in Delhi, a distinguished former foreign secretary of India, Shyam Saran, made several pronouncements about the evolution of his country's nuclear policy and the current status of its nuclear deterrent.

He cast these remarks as his personal views. But Saran is current chairman of India's National Security Advisory Board. Many in India and outside saw his statements as articulating official policy while maintaining deniability. The Times of India, for example, said Saran was "placing on record India's official nuclear posture with the full concurrence of the highest levels of nuclear policymakers in Delhi". And Islamabad asked Delhi for an official clarification.

The most consequential part of Saran's speech is where he presents a scenario that culminates with India engaging in "massive nuclear retaliation" against Pakistan. He posits an escalatory ladder that presumably starts with a sub-conventional event or terrorist attack, after which Pakistan tries to dissuade India from carrying out punitive conventional retaliation, by deploying its tactical nuclear weapons. India responds by using strategic weapons.

Saran warns that any nuclear attack — whether by strategic or tactical weapons — would be met by "massive retaliation" from India. "Pakistan", he declares, should "be prudent not to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to do, most recently by developing and perhaps deploying theatre nuclear weapons".

Several of Saran's assumptions are open to question. First there is a presumption that Pakistan's decision to develop battlefield nuclear weapons represents a nuclear war-fighting option. Official spokesmen have repeatedly said that Pakistan regards the surface-to-surface solid fuel-based Hatf IX (Nasr) as primarily a weapon of deterrence. Its purpose is to reinforce deterrence and restore nuclear stability. Islamabad remains committed to its nuclear policy of achieving credible nuclear deterrence at the lowest practical level. The central tenet of its nuclear policy is for its capability to be maintained for the purpose of deterrence against aggression.

Saran's escalatory scenario seems to suggest that India's Cold Start Doctrine, now known as "proactive operations", has been challenged if not blunted by Pakistan's TNW response. That is why this emerges as the main thrust of his remarks. In doing so he also reaffirms the Indian intent to preserve the limited war option.

That Saran believes that India can or should consider a punitive war against its nuclear neighbour in retaliation for an act of terror carried out by a non-state actor is disconcerting enough. But he then warns that if Pakistan tried to deter an Indian conventional attack by its TNWs, India would retaliate with nuclear weapons. This fails to factor in Pakistan's full spectrum capabilities to counter "massive retaliation" not to speak of its potent second-strike capability.

The rationale for Pakistan's decision to pursue a TNW capability bears repetition to place Saran's remarks in perspective. Pakistan perceived a number of rapid developments in the past decade to adversely affect the region's strategic equilibrium established after the 1998 nuclear tests by both countries. They included the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal and the NSG exemption under which India was assured of fuel supply by many countries. These significantly enhanced India's ability to expand its strategic arsenal and altered Pakistan's security calculations.

Meanwhile, the new Indian military doctrine, which came on the back of these developments, became a gamechanger. The effort to find space for limited conventional engagement below the nuclear threshold impelled Pakistan to seek a response at the tactical level in the nuclear domain. In trying to call Pakistan's 'nuclear bluff' by operationalising proactive war-fighting strategies, these Indian moves urged Pakistan to develop TNWs to deter Cold Start and re-establish nuclear stability.

Against this backdrop what Saran now seems to be signalling is that if Pakistan thinks it can deter limited conventional war by tactical nuclear weapons, then India too can use strategic weapons in "massive retaliation". This is dangerous talk in a situation where a delicate balance holds between the nuclear neighbours.



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Nuclear powers do not define their relations by threats or bluster. The only answer to dilemmas created by the region's nuclearisation is for both nations to engage seriously to build better understanding of each other's nuclear policy, doctrines and postures. This means advancing the nuclear dialogue to put in place credible confidence building measures in both the strategic and conventional military spheres.

The two countries have a mutual interest in stabilising their nuclear relationship. The way forward is not by ill-thought nuclear signaling but in engaging substantively to narrow the perception gaps and address the issues that lie at the root of both countries' security predicament.

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[http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2013/May/opinion\\_May53.xml&section=opinion](http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2013/May/opinion_May53.xml&section=opinion)

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