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United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL
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Obama Advisor: U.S. Will Not Abandon Military Options on Syria

Saturday, 14 September 2013
By Nadia Bilbassy-Charters - Al Arabiya Washington

The United States does not yet plan to abandon military options on Syria, an advisor to President Barack Obama told Al Arabiya in an exclusive interview on Friday.

Ben Rhodes, the deputy national security advisor for strategic communications, stressed the White House’s insistence that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad step down, adding that the U.S. will continue to support the Syrian opposition both politically and militarily.

Rhodes said the U.S. will not wait long to ensure the Syrian regime’s commitment to surrender its arsenal of chemical weapons, a process that he said should be verified by the U.N. Security Council.

“We only believe that we’re having this discussion about removing chemical weapons because of the [U.S.] threat of military force, so as the president said the other night, that threat continues, and we need to see Syria follow through on its commitments in terms of the Assad regime giving up these weapons and ultimately destroying them,” Rhodes said.

“We certainly believe that this should be something that takes a matter of weeks, not a matter of months,” said Rhodes, adding that the Obama administration does not want a “drawn-out stalling tactic” by Syria’s government in handing over its chemical weapons stockpile.

Labeling chemical weapons as the “most dangerous” armaments in the regime’s arsenal, Rhodes added that the handover of the Syrian regime’s stockpile will take time due to its size.

The advisor highlighted what he described as U.S. assistance being given to both the political and military wings of the Syrian opposition, although he declined to comment on what sort of military assistance was being given.

The advisor said that the U.S. was working to solve the Syrian crisis along with other countries in the region including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan.

“We want to make sure that we’re all working together in supporting the same opposition so that they are strengthened as a political and military body within Syria,” he said.

Iranian threat

Rhodes stressed the long-term importance of a U.S. initiative against the Syrian regime.

“If Bashar al-Assad can get away without any consequences for the use of those weapons, the risk is that Iran makes a similar calculation about developing nuclear weapons, and they need to understand that the international community, and the United States in particular, does not see that as an acceptable outcome,” he said.

Emphasizing the Obama administration’s stance against Iran developing nuclear weapons, Rhodes said that the U.S. was committed towards the international non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

“If Iran gets a nuclear weapon, not only does that threaten the region, it risks a greater nuclear arms race, which is in nobody’s interest,” said Rhodes, adding that Iran acquiring nuclear weapons carries a risk of them being transferred to allies such as Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah.

Rhodes stated the desired U.S. outcome for Syria was a political process in which Assad steps down.

“We anticipate an interim political authority that involves Assad leaving, but we also want to make sure that each sect inside of the country can see a future for themselves in a government that is representative of them,” he said.
Israel Froze Production of Nuclear Warheads in 2004, Foreign Experts Say

**Ha’aretz Daily News – Israel**

**Israel Froze Production of Nuclear Warheads in 2004, Foreign Experts Say**

In a report published in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, experts say Israel has 80 nuclear warheads, but could double that number if it sees fit.

By Amir Oren

September 14, 2013

Israel ceased production of nuclear warheads nine years ago, according to a report published over the weekend by nuclear proliferations experts in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The report adds that at present, Israel is satisfied with the number of warheads in its possession, yet could increase the quantity - and even double it - if it sees fit.

The experts, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, mostly concur with the 1999 assessment by the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency, which claimed that Israel has 80 nuclear warheads.

In a table appearing alongside the report, the experts point out that during 1999, Israel had 70 nuclear warheads; the number reached 80 in 2004 and has since remained unchanged. They also claim Israel has fissile material sufficient for anywhere between 115 to 190 warheads.

According to Kristensen and Norris, between 1967 and 2004 Israel produced two or three nuclear warheads a year. Between 1970 and 1990, once every four years, annual production stood at three warheads. In other years, two nuclear warheads were produced. The quantity of warheads gradually increased from 15 during the Yom Kippur War to 35 during the 1982 Lebanon War, 56 during the Iraq War and 78 in 2003.

Kristensen and Norris’ table shows all of Israel’s nuclear warheads in the "Deployed Warheads" column, as opposed to the "Stockpiled Warheads" column. They estimate India has 110 nuclear warheads, and Pakistan 120.

Israel has never confirmed its nuclear capabilities.

From time to time, U.S. documents assess Israel's nuclear arsenal. According to the State Department’s Office of the Historian, at the end of the Yom Kippur War, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was asked during a briefing to Congressional leaders how many nuclear weapons Israel has. "A small number," he replied at the time.

According to Kristensen and Norris’s table, at the time Israel has 15 nuclear warheads.


Russia to Push for WMD-Free Zone in Middle East

**The Hindu – India**

**Russia to Push for WMD-Free Zone in Middle East**

By Vladimir Radyuhin

September 14, 2013

Taking forward its initiative to secure Syria’s chemical weapons Russia said it will push for establishing a zone from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East.

“Resolving the problem of chemical weapons in Syria will mark a big step towards implementing a long-standing goal of setting up a WMD-free zone in the Middle East,” Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in Geneva following his three days of talks with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on Syria’s chemical arsenals.
Mr. Lavrov recalled that the 2010 Non-Proliferation Review Conference appointed Russia, Britain and the U.S. the co-founders of a conference on establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

“The conference was to be convened last year,” the Itar-Tass news agency quoted Mr. Lavrov as saying. “Unfortunately, we have faced delays. We think this is an unacceptable situation. We will firmly and consistently work to bring about this conference.”

The U.S. has blocked efforts to declare the Middle East a WMD-free zone as this would involve stripping its main ally, Israel of its nuclear weapons.


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The London Guardian – U.K.

John McCain and Lindsey Graham Criticise US-Russia Deal on Syria

*Statement says agreement on chemical weapons reached after Geneva talks will allow Bashar al-Assad to 'delay and deceive'*

By Martin Pengelly and agencies
Saturday, 14 September 2013

The Republican senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham have criticised the deal struck by the US and Russia regarding the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. In a statement released on Saturday, McCain and Graham said the deal would give the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, time "to delay and deceive" while the country's civil war continued.

The statement said: "It requires a willful suspension of disbelief to see this agreement as anything other than the start of a diplomatic blind alley, and the Obama administration is being led into it by Bashar Assad and [Russian president] Vladimir Putin."

The agreement, which is the result of three days of talks in Geneva between the US secretary of state, John Kerry, and Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, was announced on Saturday morning. It requires Syria to provide a list of its chemical weapons within a week, to allow inspectors into the country by November and to help ensure the removal and destruction of all chemical weapons by the middle of 2014.

The US government says the Assad regime was responsible for a chemical weapons attack in Damascus last month that is believed to have killed more than 1,400 people. Assad, who has denied such culpability, offered this week to surrender his government's chemical weapons. On Saturday, the United Nations said it had received all documents necessary for Syria to join the Chemical Weapons Convention, and confirmed that Syria would come under the treaty starting on 14 October.

President Barack Obama welcomed the agreement achieved in Geneva, for providing "the opportunity for the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons in a transparent, expeditious, and verifiable manner, which could end the threat these weapons pose not only to the Syrian people but to the region and the world".

In their joint statement, however, McCain and Graham – who two weeks ago were invited to the White House, to discuss the administration’s attempts to win Congressional support for military strikes in Syria – said: "What concerns us most is that our friends and enemies will take the same lessons from this agreement – they see it as an act of provocative weakness on America’s part. We cannot imagine a worse signal to send to Iran as it continues its push for a nuclear weapon."

They added: "Assad will use the months and months afforded to him to delay and deceive the world using every trick in Saddam Hussein’s playbook."
The statement concluded: "The only way this underlying conflict can be brought to a decent end is by significantly increasing our support to moderate opposition forces in Syria. We must strengthen their ability to degrade Assad’s military advantage, change the momentum on the battlefield, and thereby create real conditions for a negotiated end to the conflict."

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/14/john-mccain-lindsey-graham-syria-statement

Tehran Times – Iran

New Iranian Envoy Hopeful Disputes with IAEA can be Resolved

Political Desk
Sunday, September 15, 2013

TEHRAN – Iran will cooperate with the UN nuclear agency to find ways to “overcome existing issues once and for all”, Tehran’s new envoy said on Thursday, according to Reuters.

Ambassador Reza Najafi, at his first board meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), also repeated Iran’s stance that it would not cede its legitimate right to a peaceful nuclear energy program.

“Based on its rights and obligations recognized under the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), Iran is ready to faithfully engage and remove any ambiguity on its nuclear activities,” Najafi told the 35-nation governing board of the IAEA.

Iran is at odds with Western powers, which claim its nuclear program may be covertly directed at giving it the means to build nuclear weapons. Tehran denies this and rejects any illegal limits on its enrichment of uranium or a more intrusive IAEA inspection regime.

Separately from big power diplomacy to resolve a decade-old dispute, the IAEA has held 10 rounds of talks with Iran since early 2012 in a bid to resume further investigation into the country’s nuclear program.

A new round of talks is scheduled to be held in Vienna on September 27.

Najafi, appointed as Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA after President Hassan Rohani took office on August 3, cited a strong political will on Tehran’s part to “constructively interact” on the nuclear issue.

“We are looking forward to working closely with the Director General (Yukiya Amano) and his team in the coming days,” the soft-spoken career diplomar and disarmament expert said.

Asked whether he was hopeful that an agreement could be reached in the Vienna meeting, he later told a brief news conference, “We sit together, we directly and frankly discuss the differences. We hope that we can solve those differences.”

Western diplomats welcomed his conciliatory tone. They said Najafi’s remarks were more matter of fact than those of his predecessor, Ali Asghar Soltanieh.

Iran says it is enriching uranium only for civilian energy and medicine, denying any aim to acquire nuclear weapons.

Rohani, who has vowed that Iran will be more transparent and less confrontational in talks both with the IAEA and the big powers, said this week that time for resolving Iran’s nuclear dispute with the West was limited.

He said he would meet foreign ministers of some of the six powers - Russia, China, France, Britain, the United States and Germany - when he attends the UN General Assembly in New York this month.

A senior adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was expected to meet Rohani on Friday, told reporters Moscow hopes that new talks between Iran and the six powers will be held very soon and that both sides need to be flexible.
“It is important that Iran display the necessary flexibility and readiness to meet the international community’s demands,” Yuri Ushakov said. “The six nations, in turn, should also demonstrate a creative approach and be ready to respond adequately to the positive steps that we expect from Iran.”


(Times of Israel – Israel)

Assad’s Biological Weapons Absent from US-Russia Deal

Syrian regime has two bases producing anthrax and other devastating agents, Israel’s Channel 10 reports

By Times of Israel Staff
September 15, 2013

Syrian President Bashar Assad has two biological weapons bases, developing anthrax and other devastating biological agents, and yet the US-Russia deal aimed at stripping his regime of chemical weapons makes no provisions for his biological weapons capability, Israeli TV reported Sunday night.

There is “not a word” about biological weapons in the agreement that US Secretary of State John Kerry discussed with Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on Sunday, Channel 10 news said.

Assad has two biological weapons bases, one of them subterranean and a second in a coastal location, producing anthrax and other agents, the report said.

In an unclassified report in April, US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper assessed that Syria could be capable of producing limited biological weapons.

“Based on the duration of Syria’s longstanding biological warfare (BW) program, we judge that some elements of the program may have advanced beyond the research and development stage and may be capable of limited agent production,” Clapper wrote. “Syria is not known to have successfully weaponized biological agents in an effective delivery system, but it possesses conventional and chemical weapon systems that could be modified for biological agent delivery.”

A 2008 report on Syrian WMDs, by Anthony Cordesman of the US Center for Strategic and International Studies, went further, citing Israeli sources. According to Israel, Cordesman wrote, “Syria weaponized botulinum and ricin toxins in the early 1990s, and probably anthrax.” He noted “reports of one underground facility and one near the coast,” cited a “possible production capability for anthrax and botulism, and possibly other agents,” and mentioned “limited indications [Syria] may be developing or testing biological variations on ZAB-incendiary bombs and PTAB-500 cluster bombs and Scud warheads.”

The Cordesman report noted that “using advanced agents – such as the most lethal forms of anthrax – can have the effectiveness of small theater nuclear weapons. It is difficult to design adequate missile warheads to disseminate such agents, but this is not beyond Syrian capabilities – particularly since much of the technology needed to make effective cluster munitions and bomblets for VX gas can be adapted to the delivery of biological weapons.

“The design of biological bombs and missile warheads with the lethality of small nuclear weapons may now be within Syrian capabilities, as is the design of UAV, helicopter, cruise missile, or aircraft-borne systems to deliver the agent slowly over a long line of flight and taking maximum advantage of wind and weather conditions,” he wrote.

On Friday, Sen. John Cornyn (R., Texas) wrote to President Barack Obama to warn that “omitting Assad’s bioweapons from any agreement would represent a gaping hole in the plan.” Such weaponry, in the hands of Assad or his allies, wrote Cornyn, “represent a direct security threat” to the US and its allies. If Hezbollah and other terror groups got hold of this materiel, he warned, “this would be a direct threat to the United States and our allies, particularly Israel.”
United Nations -- Banned chemical weapons have been used on a wide scale in the Syria war and there is clear evidence sarin killed hundreds of people in one major attack, UN inspectors said Monday.

Chemical arms have been used in the 30-month-old conflict "on a relatively large scale," says the report to be released by UN leader Ban Ki-moon.

UN experts, who went to Syria last month, are not allowed to say who carried out the attacks. But they said there is "clear and convincing" evidence that sarin gas killed hundreds of people in an attack on Ghouta near Damascus on August 21.

The attack sparked threats by the United States and other western nations of a military strike on President Bashar al-Assad's forces. The United States says more than 1,400 people died in Ghouta.

Though the military threat has eased after Russia and the United States agreed a plan to put Syrian chemical arms under international control, the UN report will influence what measures are taken to make Assad stick to the plan.

"Surface-to-surface rockets containing the nerve agent sarin were used" in the August 21 attack, said the report.

While Assad blames opposition rebels for the attack, Western nations say only the government has such weapons.

"The environmental, chemical and medical samples we have collected provide clear and convincing evidence that surface-to-surface rockets containing the nerve agent sarin were used" in Ghouta, said the first page of the inspectors' report, which was inadvertently leaked by the United Nations.

"This result leaves us with the deepest concern," they added.

The experts said that based on evidence they had found, "the conclusion is that chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic ... against civilians including children on a relatively large scale.

A UN-mandated independent commission of inquiry into rights violations in the Syria war announced separately on Monday that it was investigating 14 alleged chemical weapons attacks in Syria.

The UN experts went to Damascus on August 18 to investigate claims that chemical weapons were used at Khan al-Asal, near Aleppo on March 19 and at two other sites, which were named on Monday as Sheik Maqmod and Saraqueb.

The experts were in Damascus when the attack on opposition-held Ghouta was staged on August 21. The team was immediately ordered to concentrate on Ghouta attack and will return later to investigate the other sites.

The detail was in the first page of the report mistakenly made public when it was included in an official picture of UN investigation leader Ake Sellstrom handing over the report to UN leader Ban Ki-moon.

Ban was to give the full report to the UN Security Council on Monday.

While the government, backed by Russia, denies any use of chemical weapons, Ban said on Friday that Assad has carried out "many crimes against humanity" and called for accountability. He did not, however, accuse Assad of using chemical weapons.
The UN Security Council is expected to start negotiations this week on a resolution to back the plan agreed at the weekend by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State John Kerry to destroy Syria’s chemical stockpile.

After a meeting of their foreign ministers in Paris on Monday, France, the United States and Britain called for a “strong” resolution to put pressure on Assad to stick to the plan.

The United States and France have said that military action in Syria is still possible.

Russia has insisted, however, that it will not agree a UN resolution that includes a threat of force against Assad. Russia and China have vetoed three resolutions since the start of the Syrian uprising in March 2011 that sought to increase pressure on Assad without imposing any sanctions.

Lavrov on Monday warned Monday that western talk of a tough resolution could wreck hopes of convening a Syria peace conference.

"That is another path to wrecking completely the chances of calling the Geneva-2 conference," Lavrov told a press conference in Moscow.


FARS News Agency – Iran

Monday, September 16, 2013

Top Commander Says IRGC Not to Remain Cool in Case of US Attack on Syria

TEHRAN (FNA) - Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari called on Washington to adopt a wise decision on Syria, warning that a US military move on Syria will trigger IRGC action.

"If the US makes any military move, it will face numerous problems," Jafari told reporters in Tehran on Monday.

"God willing, the US will adopt wise decisions in this regard and won’t expose itself to danger," he added.

Meantime, Jafari underlined that if the US makes any mistake and embarks on a military attack on Syria, "the IRGC will act upon its responsibility", but he declined to explain more in this regard.

In relevant remarks late August, the IRGC Commander warned Washington to abort war plans against Syria, saying that the US will be faced with reactions coming from beyond the Syrian borders if it goes on with its aggression plans.

“The US imagination about limited military intervention in Syria is merely an illusion, as reactions will be coming from beyond Syria’s borders,” Major General Jafari said.

The IRGC commander pointed to the recent US threats of a military strike on Syria, and said when the White House leaders failed to rally international support to form a coalition for a new war in the region, they were made to resort to the so-called plans for limited war on Syria.

He stressed that those who assist the US in such military intervention would themselves face immediate crises in their national security.


Trend News Agency – Azerbaijan
Iran Confirms Letter Exchange between Obama, Rouhani
By D.Khatinoglu, S. Isayev, Trend
September 17, 2013

Azerbaijan, Baku -- The Spokeswoman of Iran's Foreign Ministry Marzieh Afkham has confirmed that Iranian and U.S. presidents, Hassan Rouhani and Barack Obama have exchanged letters, IRINN TV channel reported.

During the weekly press conference, she said that Obama has sent a letter to Iranian president, and has received a response.

According to Afkham, the matter of letter was Obama’s congratulation to Rouhani due to his victory in Iran’s presidential elections.

Obama said on Sept.15 during an interview with ABC that he has exchanged letters with Rouhani, without revealing the details of the letter.

Afkham also said that Hassan Rouhani has not yet planned any meeting with his American counterpart at the UN General Assembly's annual meeting, scheduled to be held in late September.

Prior to her statement, British Guardian News Paper reported that Rouhani may meet with Obama, while Britain's foreign secretary, William Hague, is also due to meet his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, at the UN general assembly in New York.

Later, the White House denied any scheduled meetings between Iran and the U.S. presidents.

http://en.trend.az/regions/iran/2191055.html

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The Economic Times – India

Russia Says No Proof Bashar al-Assad was Behind Chemical Attack
By Reuters
17 September, 2013

MOSCOW: Russia and France disagreed radically on Tuesday over a report by U.N. investigators into a chemical weapons attack that killed hundreds of people in Syria, highlighting the problems agreeing on action at the United Nations Security Council.

Sitting beside French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius at a news conference in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the report had produced no proof that President Bashar al-Assad's troops carried out the Aug. 21 attack and that Russia still suspected rebels forces were behind it.

Fabius took the opposite view, saying the report left no doubt that Assad's forces were to blame for the attack which Washington says killed more than 1,400 people. The United States has also blamed Syrian government forces.

Lavrov acknowledged that the investigators' report proved that chemical weapons had been used but that "there is no answer to a number of questions we have asked," including whether the weapons were produced in a factory or home-made.

"We have very serious grounds to believe that this was a provocation," Lavrov said after talks in Moscow between two countries with veto powers in the U.N. Security Council.

He said there had been "many provocations" by the rebels fighting Assad's government and added: "They were all aimed, over the last two years, at provoking foreign intervention."
Lavrov said the U.N. report should be examined not in isolation but along with evidence from sources such as the Internet and other media, including accounts from "nuns at a nearby convent" and a journalist who had spoken to rebels.

"We want the events of Aug. 21 to be investigated dispassionately, objectively and professionally," he said.

After Lavrov spoke, Fabius, whose country has stood with U.S. President Barack Obama in backing military action against Syria, challenged Lavrov's interpretation by saying the result of the report was clear.

"When you look at the amount of sarin gas used, the vectors, the techniques behind such an attack, as well as other aspects, it seems to leave no doubt that the regime is behind it," Fabius said.

Lavrov and Fabius agreed there should be a renewed push for a political solution in Syria. The Russian minister also thanked France for supporting a U.S.-Russian deal which calls for Syria to account fully for its chemical weapons within a week and for the removal and destruction of the entire arsenal by mid-2014.

But the differences over culpability for the Aug. 21 attack indicated the hurdles faced in translating the chemical weapons agreement into progress towards ending a civil war that has killed more than 100,000 people since March 2011.

**France Urges Vigilance**

Their comments also pointed to likely wrangling in the U.N. Security Council over the mechanism for enforcing the agreement, which Assad has accepted, and disputes over punishment for any violations.

Fabius, who went to Moscow to discuss a U.N. resolution that would frame the U.S.-Russian accord, said the agreement was an "important step forward but not the end of the story".

"There is a series of precise mechanisms that have to be placed into a U.N. decision. We spoke about this and it should be dealt with in the coming days. I insisted, like Sergei Lavrov, on the necessity to go quickly," he said.

But Lavrov cautioned that while the Security Council was to adopt a resolution supporting the chemical weapons deal, a separate resolution would be needed to authorise use of force in response to any new attack and after guilt was proven.

Along with diplomatic ally China, Russia has used its veto power three times to block Western-backed Security Council resolutions meant to push Assad out or muscle him into ending a conflict that began with a crackdown on protests.

Lavrov said putting too much pressure on Assad would encourage his opponents and hurt the chances for peace.

"The more frequently and loudly the declarations come from different capitals that Assad is a criminal, has no place in this world and his place is in court, the more unwilling to compromise the (opposition) coalition becomes," he said Fabius suggested it was Assad who should be kept in line and that he must keep his promise to abandon chemical arms.

"We are not bellicose, but we must remain vigilant because it is vigilance and firmness that enabled Syria to change its position and will ensure tomorrow that its commitments are kept," he said.


**The Korea Herald**

**N. Korea Seeks Talks for Becoming 'Nuclear State,' U.S. Envoy Says**

September 14, 2013
N. Korea seeks talks for becoming 'nuclear state,' U.S. envoy says North Korea is seeking direct or multilateral negotiations involving the United States in a bid to get recognized as a nuclear state, Washington's top envoy on Pyongyang said.

Amb. Glyn Davies, special representative for North Korea policy, stressed Washington is interested only in talks on denuclearizing the communist nation.

"It seems clear that North Korea is attempting to make these talks, when and if they occur in the future, about something very different, which is about their right to be a nuclear weapons state. That is not something we can countenance. That is not something we can accept," Davies told reporters on his visit to Tokyo, according to a transcript released by the State Department.

Earlier this week, he also traveled to Seoul and Beijing for consultations on ways to deal with the North.

His remarks suggested that there is still a long way to go for the resumption of the six-party talks, although Pyongyang is calling for dialogue after spring's provocations and threats of war.

The six-way negotiations, launched in 2003, were last held in December 2008. The participating countries are the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia.

In 2005, the North agreed to abandon all of its nuclear program in exchange for political and economic incentives from the five dialogue partners. But it went ahead with three known underground nuclear tests.

"Obviously, ultimately, we hope that we can get back to meaningful, authentic, and credible six-party talks," the ambassador said. "But they should be about -- because this is what the Joint Statement of 2005 specifies -- they should be about the denuclearization in a peaceful fashion of the Korean Peninsula."

Davies expressed strong concern over reports that North Korea appears to have restarted its once-disabled nuclear reactor in Yongbyon.

"If it turns out that these reports are true, that North Korea has restarted the 5-megawatt plutonium reactor, this would be a very serious matter -- we think a misstep on the part of North Korea because, of course, it would violate a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions," he said.

Despite the reports, based on commercial satellite imagery, by some U.S. research institutes, Pyongyang has not made any announcement on whether it has actually put the reactor back into operation.

"We're watching this very closely," Davies said. "We'll see what developments occur in the coming days, but this is potentially quite a serious matter."

In Washington, the State Department also urged Pyongyang to comply with its commitments and international obligations.

"We've put a great deal of pressure on the North Koreans over this issue, including with some very, very strong sanctions," Marie Harf, the department's deputy spokeswoman, said at a press briefing.

The Obama administration will not give up denuclearization efforts, she emphasized.

"So we'll continue working with the international community to try to get North Korea to a place that it will in fact take irreversible steps to abandon its nuclear weapons and all existing programs in a complete and verifiable manner," Harf said. (Yonhap News)


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Yonhap News Agency – South Korea
September 16, 2013
China Calls on U.S. for 'Swift' Resumption of N. Korea Nuclear Talks

BEIJING, Sept. 16 (Yonhap) -- China has urged the United States to pursue a "swift" resumption of the long-stalled talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear weapons program, China's foreign ministry said Monday, amid reports that the North appears to have restarted its nuclear reactor.

The request was made at a series of meetings on Saturday in Beijing between Daniel Russel, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, and China's high-ranking officials, including Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

China's foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters that Russel and Chinese officials had an "in-depth exchange of views on bilateral relations and international and regional issues."

"On the Korean nuclear issue, China stressed that, to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, uphold peace and stability and serve the common interests of both China and the U.S., both sides should be committed to the swift resumption of the six-party talks," Hong said during a regular press briefing.

"Both sides agreed to stay in close communications on relevant issues," Hong said.

Hong's remarks suggested that Russel and Chinese officials apparently failed to narrow differences over how to revive the six-way talks.

China is currently pushing to organize an informal multilateral meeting this week of senior government officials and academics from the six nations involved in the denuclearization talks with North Korea. The talks, which involve the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan, have been stalled since late 2008.

South Korea, the U.S. and Japan are cautious about the Chinese proposal for an informal meeting at a time when North Korea's seriousness on dialogue about its nuclear programs remains untested and an American citizen is still jailed in the communist nation.

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/09/16/27/0401000000AEN20130916007900315F.html

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The Economic Times – India

India Successfully Launches Nuclear Capable 'Agni-V' Missile for Second Time

By Press Trust of India (PTI)
September 15, 2013

BALASORE (ODISHA): India today conducted a second test flight of its indigenously developed nuclear- capable 'Agni-V' long-range ballistic missile, which has a strike range of more than 5000 km, from the Wheeler Island off Odisha coast.

The three stage, solid propellant missile was test-fired from a mobile launcher from the launch complex-4 of the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at about 8:50 AM, defence sources said.

The surface-to-surface missile, which can carry a nuclear warhead of more than one tonne, witnessed an 'auto launch' and detail results of the trial will be known after thorough analyses of all data retrieved from different radars and network systems, they said.

"The sleek missile, within a few seconds of its blast-off from the Island launch pad, roared majestically into a clear sunny sky leaving behind a trail of thin orange and white column of smoke and within seconds it pierced into sky," said an eyewitness to the launch.

Today's launch, conducted in the presence of defence scientists and experts, was the second developmental trial of the long range missile while the first test was conducted on 19 April, 2012 which was a total success.
The indigenously developed missile Agni-V is capable of striking a range of more than 5000 km. It is about 17 meter long and 2 metres wide with launch weight of around 50 tonnes.

Unlike other missiles of indigenously built Agni series, the latest one 'AGNI-V' is the most advanced version having some new technologies incorporated with it in terms of navigation and guidance, warhead and engine.

Many new technologies developed indigenously were successfully tested in the first Agni-V trial. The redundant navigation systems, very high accuracy Ring Laser Gyro based Inertial Navigation System (RINS) and the most modern and accurate Micro Navigation System (MINS) had ensured the missile reach the target point within few meters of accuracy.

The high speed onboard computer and fault tolerant software along with robust and reliable bus guided the missile flawlessly, said a defence official.

In the Agni series, India at present has Agni-1 with 700 km range, Agni-2 with 2000 km range, Agni-3 and Agni-4 with 2500 km to more than 3500 range.

After some more trials, Agni-V will be inducted into the services, the sources said.


FirstPost.India – India

US Wary of Indo-Pak Nuke Arsenal, Cites No Mechanism to Prevent Use

Press Trust of India (PTI)
September 16, 2013

Washington: The absence of any mechanism to prevent the use of atomic weapons by India and Pakistan worries the United States, even as their nuclear arsenals make war unthinkable, a top Pentagon official said.

“Pakistan and India, obviously, have a history of very tense relationships. Both countries possess nuclear weapons, which I know the Indian government recognises is the kind of weaponry that makes war really unthinkable, yet another reason for making it more unthinkable,” said Deputy Secretary of Defence Ashton B Carter.

“I think the leaders on both sides recognise that,” said Carter.

“Therefore, our principal concern is that there not be any mechanism that could lead inadvertently to the use of nuclear weapons or resort to nuclear weapons. That’s my principal worry, as was during the Cold War (the) principal worry with respect to the US and the Soviet Union,” he said.

Carter said he did not think the leaders of India and Pakistan “were crazy enough or foolish enough” to use nuclear weapons against one another’s people, but “there was always the possibility that this thing could get out of control”.

Ahead of a visit to the region, including Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, Carter said the Obama administration is trying very hard to keep the momentum going with Pakistan which it regained about five or six months ago.

“We all need, I think, a good security relationship with Pakistan. They have internal challenges, and I think they’re increasingly seeing that the internal insurgency in Pakistan is a threat to the Pakistani state,” he said.

“And that, in turn, is a threat to Afghanistan, because those insurgents (come over the) border in Afghanistan, and that’s a threat to India, because those groups have shown the willingness and the capability to make attacks in India.”

The US is continuing to “work very hard, including with the new Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif”, on the defence relationship with Pakistan and to emphasise that "Pakistan’s relations with its two neighbours are very critical, not just to Pakistan, but to the US, and obviously to India and to Afghanistan”, he said.
Pakistan’s ties with the US hit an all-time low after CIA contractor Raymond Davis gunned down two men in Lahore in early 2011 and Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden was killed in a unilateral American raid in Abbottabad a few months later.

The CIA-operated drone campaign in Pakistan’s tribal belt continues to be an irritant in bilateral ties ahead of the drawdown of foreign forces in war-torn Afghanistan.

Responding to questions, Carter made it clear the US is not leaving Afghanistan at the end of 2014.

“I expect that the bilateral security agreement will be signed, which is the only sort of technical obstacle to the enduring presence, the continuing presence of American forces in Afghanistan, helping the Afghan forces to continue to grow in size, but especially in their capability,” he said.

“And they’re really showing it now. They’re really showing it this summer.”

Carter said though the campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan has fallen off the world’s radar screen and out of the media, it has been successful in defeating the insurgency in many key areas and in building the Afghan security forces.

“I’m very optimistic about it,” he said.

“What we want is, as the Afghan security forces get more powerful, that we can slowly wind down the international coalition forces so that the sum, in any year, of Afghan power and coalition power is much greater than insurgent power,” he said.

“That’s what we’ve had for several years now and the balance is shifting, but the fact still remains that we’re defeating the insurgency. And that’s going to continue to go on after 2014.”

The US, Carter said, is in Afghanistan for the long run. “So I say that because some people seem to think that we’re leaving at the end of 2014 or something. I know that would be a concern to India, because it would mean that there was a greater risk of instability in Afghanistan, and that’s your neighbourhood.”

The US administration’s Asia-Pacific rebalance is not aimed at China and India is a key player in this new policy, Carter said.

“India’s right at the centre of things. It’s the only country that is called out by name in our new strategic guidance that the President gave us a year-and-a-half ago that enshrines the so-called rebalance,” the Deputy Secretary of Defence said.

“We like to say that our rebalance is not only a rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, Indian Ocean area, but a rebalance within that region. The traditional American focus, going back to the Cold War, was on Northeast Asia. And now our focus is all around Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and very importantly, the Indian Ocean area.”

India has “tremendous interests” in the Indian Ocean region and can exercise a lot of responsibility on behalf of the countries in the area, he said.

“I know that’s important to India, and it fits right into our idea of a rebalance,” Carter said in response to a question.

The philosophy behind the rebalance, he said, is the perpetuation of a role the US has played in the Asia-Pacific for decades – its military power has had a pivotal role in keeping peace in a region with lots of flashpoints.

“You see antagonism between China and Japan, between China and Korea, between Korea and Japan, and...a lot of historical animosity, no formal security structure like NATO,” he said.

The US has had a “balancing and reassuring role” in the region that has made possible the political and economic development that started in Northeast Asia, then Southeast Asia, and now South Asia. “I think that was enabled by the role and posture of the US,” he said.
Carter said the rebalance is “not aimed” at China. “Our leaders have made it very clear that they don’t want competition between our two countries. They don’t want an arms race between our two countries. My own view is that that is unlikely as it is unwise,” he said.

“So if you think about it, China has benefited from the stability that the US has contributed to. It is the US which has in part created the climate in which China can pursue its own path to economic and political development.”

Responding to a question on India-China relations, Carter said India wants to have good relations with China. “Quite apart from what we’re doing, we respect the Indian view, which I think is pretty much the same as hours, namely that India, too, wants to have good relations with China,” he said.

“But, you know, nothing’s automatic in…the world of security. You have to work to keep good, sensible results going. Peace within the Asia Pacific region isn’t guaranteed.

We all have to play our role to earn it. I think that’s what the leaders of India and China and the US and all the other countries are trying to do in Asia right now,” he said. http://www.firstpost.com/india/us-wary-of-indo-pak-nuke-arsenal-cites-no-mechanism-to-prevent-use-1112655.html

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Russia’s Troubled Bulava Missiles Returned to Maker – Official
16 September 2013

MOSCOW, September 16 (RIA Novosti) – All Bulava missiles from the same batch as the one that failed on September 6 will undergo additional tests by their manufacturer, a senior defense industry official told RIA Novosti Monday.

Oleg Bochkarev, deputy head of the government’s Military-Industrial Commission, said the extent of the examination will be determined after the cause of the S. 6 launch failure has been identified.

The tests will be carried out by the Votkinsk plant that makes Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles, and could take place on-site at storage facilities, Bochkarev said.

There will also be additional launches using Bulava missiles from the same batch as the one that malfunctioned on Sept. 6, he said.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu ordered five additional launches of Bulava missiles following the failed launch of Sept. 6, when a missile fired during state trials of the Alexander Nevsky nuclear-powered submarine in the White Sea malfunctioned.

Including this latest failure, eight out of 19 or 20 test launches of the troubled Bulava have been officially declared unsuccessful.

The Russian military has repeatedly stated that there is no alternative to the Bulava.

The three-stage Bulava carries up to 10 MIRV warheads, has a range of over 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles) and is designed for deployment on Borey-class nuclear submarines.


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The Moscow Times – Russia

Fire on Nuclear Sub Injured 15, Investigators Say
Reuters

Fifteen seamen were in the hospital Tuesday after a fire on a nuclear submarine in the Far East, federal investigators said, contradicting earlier reports that nobody was hurt in Monday's blaze.

The fire started during welding works on the navy submarine named Tomsk, which was being repaired at the giant Zvezda shipyard near Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan, military officials said.

The fire was extinguished after about five hours, the state-owned United Shipbuilding Corporation, which operates the shipyard, said in a statement Monday. It said there were no injuries.

In a report to President Vladimir Putin later on Monday, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made no mention of injuries.

But the federal Investigative Committee said in a statement Tuesday that the fire had "caused damage to the health of 15 servicemen" and they remained in the hospital. It gave no details about their condition.

The Investigative Committee said it was conducting a criminal investigation into the fire, which is usual procedure in Russia after such an incident.

Shoigu told Putin that the missiles the submarines usually carried had been removed in 2009 before the repairs began, and officials said that the atomic reactors that power the submarine had been shut off and that there was no radiation leak.


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United Press International (UPI).com

Russia’s Arctic Military Moves Seen as NATO Missile Shield Response

September 17, 2013

MOSCOW, Sept. 15 (UPI) -- Russia’s weekend announcement of a permanent military presence in the Arctic is partly a response to NATO sea-based missile defenses, a Russian expert says.

Anatoly Tsyganok, a retired colonel and head of the Center for Military Forecasting in Moscow, told the InfoRos online newspaper Saturday’s announcement that the Russian Northern Fleet had returned to the Arctic on a permanent basis is likely a move to counter the U.S. Aegis ballistic missile defense system.

The ability of the Northern Fleet to patrol the territory east of the Barents Sea will greatly enhance the strategic potential of the Russian Navy, Tsyganok told the publication.

If NATO ships equipped with missile defense systems are sent to the Arctic Ocean, the capabilities of the Russian strategic nuclear forces will be put at risk, and therefore the task has fallen to the Northern Fleet to counter foreign sea-based missile defense systems, the analyst told InfoRos.

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency says that of July 2013, there were 28 Aegis ballistic missile defense-equipped ships in deployment, including five cruisers and 23 destroyers -- of those, 16 are assigned to the Pacific Fleet and 12 to the Atlantic Fleet.

The Atlantic elements were first deployed in 2011 as part of the first phase of the United States' European missile defense shield efforts, which have long been viewed by Moscow as a potential threat to its nuclear deterrent.

Washington insists the anti-missile shield is not targeted at Russia but to protect Europe from attacks from rogue states such as Iran and North Korea.
Another advantage of establishing a permanent arctic military presence will be to allow combat ships to traverse a northern sea route "from the west of the continent to the east and vice versa," Tsyganok said.

Russian Navy Commander Viktor Chirkov said Saturday that an arctic expedition of troop ships led by the heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great had plowed through 2,000 nautical miles of ice to make a landing on the northernmost point of the island archipelago of Franz Josef Land.

"The expedition is performing the task of gathering information about changing the navigation and hydrographic conditions, proof of maps and nautical sailing directions, hydro-meteorological observations and geodetic survey points in the archipelago, as well as studying the possibilities of sailing ships in the high latitudes," Chirkov said.

First Deputy Minister of Defense Arkady Bahini hailed the achievement as a signature moment for Russia’s military history.

"We have come here -- or rather come back here -- forever because it is a native Russian land, and the tasks that are performed today ships of the Northern Fleet is the first part of a mission set by the president of Russia (Vladimir Putin) and minister of defense (Sergei Shoigu) for the development of and improvement of the entire Northern Sea Route and the adjacent arctic zone," Bahini said.

Also part of the Arctic plans is the improvement of a Russian airfield on the New Siberian Islands archipelago in the country’s Far East. Bahini said Shoigu has set a target of expanding and lengthening the runway airfield there to accommodate heavy military transport aircraft such as the An-72 and An-74.

"Construction of the airport will be conducted using the latest technology," he told Interfax. "This relates directly to runway surface, which must meet the rigorous climatic conditions in the arctic. During installation coating materials will be used to withstand the extremely low temperatures. This will be a permanent airfield."


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The London Guardian – U.K.

Liberal Democrats Vote for Fewer Trident Nuclear Submarines

Major victory for leadership as party conference backs its plan to reduce number of nuclear submarines from four to three

By Rowena Mason, political correspondent

Tuesday, 17 September 2013

Liberal Democrats have voted to reduce rather than scrap Britain’s Trident nuclear submarines, in another major victory for Nick Clegg.

They backed the leadership's plan for just three new submarines, rather than the current four, after senior party figures argued it would be reckless to get rid of them all in one go.

Danny Alexander, the chief secretary to the Treasury, led the argument for a partial replacement of the multibillion-pound Trident programme, saying it would be a "credible and deliverable" first step towards nuclear disarmament.

His remarks suggest the Lib Dems are hoping to have their plan implemented in a future coalition, although David Cameron has made it clear the Conservatives would not accept such a compromise.

The motion made the bold claim that scrapping one of the four submarines would amount to "the greatest single act of de-escalation ever undertaken by one of the established nuclear powers".

It faced a challenge from George Potter, a Lib Dem activist, who tabled an amendment calling for the party to "eliminate entirely the UK's nuclear deterrent as soon as practicable".
Several speakers supported this bid for swift disarmament, including Paul Coleshill, leader of the Lib Dems in Glasgow, who compared Trident to a sports car inherited by a middle-aged man "of failing prowess".

However, the amendment was defeated by 322 votes to 228, after a number of senior party figures lined up to claim the leadership motion represented a highly significant reduction of Britain's nuclear weapons.

Sir Nick Harvey, a former defence minister, said there was no longer any need to "continue to sail the high seas waving weapons of mass destruction at no one in particular", when they could be sent out at a few days' notice.

Reducing the number of submarines from four to three would be a "clear precursor" to further disarmament and allow Britain to "beat a path to the nuclear exit door", Harvey said.

He described it as both an "an entirely practical proposition" and the "boldest and most radical suggestion to come from any of the [major] nuclear powers".

Simon Hughes, the party's deputy leader, also spoke in support of a gradual reduction in Britain's nuclear weapons, urging members not to vote to get rid of them all in one go.

Lady Garden of Frognal, a Lib Dem whip and defence spokesman in the Lords, said the motion was the only "roadmap for disarmament".

"It will strengthen our credibility in international disarmament talks," she said.


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The National Journal

**Obama Official: Scant Hope of Congress Weighing Test-Ban Anytime Soon**

By Rachel Oswald, *Global Security Newswire*

September 13, 2013

WASHINGTON -- Despite President Obama’s hopes of seeing a nuclear-test-ban treaty ratified during his second term, a senior administration official on Thursday was not optimistic about the near-term prospects for putting the accord before the Senate for ratification, saying it was a “delicate” matter because of partisan tensions in Congress.

Anita Friedt, the State Department’s principal deputy assistant secretary for nuclear and strategic policy, said “there really are no timelines set” for naming a White House coordinator to take charge of the effort to secure Senate approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Members of the arms-control community have been urging the White House to name an official who would be in charge of rallying public and congressional support for the CTBT accord in preparation for the treaty's eventual Senate introduction.

“I think there are good reasons for no timelines set for naming a coordinator,” Friedt told an audience at a Washington event organized by the Arms Control Association, Green Cross International and the Kazakhstan embassy -- entities that support CTBT ratification. “Politically, we just have to test the waters and see where we are.”

Obama views CTBT ratification as a core component of his arms-control agenda. In a high-profile June speech in Berlin on his second-term nuclear policy goals, the president said, “We will work to build support in the United States to ratify” the CTBT accord.

Given that a two-thirds majority in the Senate would be required for approval of any treaty, the Obama administration is seen as having a difficult time winning enough Republican support to secure the test-ban’s ratification in today’s sharply divided political climate.
Linton Brooks, a former head of the National Nuclear Security Administration under President George W. Bush, was pessimistic about the CTBT accord’s prospects for being approved during the Obama administration.

“It will be ratified in the United States when there is a Republican president who supports it,” Brooks told attendees.

Brooks noted that the New START pact, which sets new limits for Russia and the United States’ respective deployed strategic nuclear arsenals, was the first arms-control accord to be approved under a Democratic president since President Kennedy secured ratification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963.

“I think in this partisan environment it is going to take a Republican president to bring this off,” he said. “I wish that weren’t true, but it probably is.”

Still, Brooks, who served on a National Academy of Sciences panel that studied technical issues related to a global test-ban, said there is “no chance” of the United States resuming nuclear-weapons testing.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has already been ratified by 159 countries. However, for it to go into effect, it still needs ratification by eight advanced nuclear nations: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States.

Reiterating past U.S. statements, Friedt said “the fact that the United States has not ratified should not hold other countries back from ratifying.”

The Kazakhstani ambassador to the United States, Kairat Umarov, pushed back on that statement, saying that if Washington were to ratify, “I think the other countries will follow.”

As home to the former Soviet Union’s now-shuttered test site at Semipalatinsk, which saw 456 atomic trials, Kazakhstan has taken on a public role in calling for the global abolition of nuclear explosions.

Roman Vassilenko, ambassador-at-large for the Kazakhstani Foreign Affairs Ministry, told attendees that getting to the point of treaty implementation “is indeed a matter of trust … which the world unfortunately is lacking.”


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The Japan Times – Japan
OPINION/Editorial

Pyongyang Must Honor Pledge

Editorial
September 14, 2013

It looks as though North Korea has restarted its plutonium reactor at Yongbyon, a move that violates Pyongyang’s international pledges and threatens to reinvigorate its nuclear weapons program. It is not clear if the plant is in fact in operation, but it is certain that North Korea will use the possibility of a resumption of activity as a bargaining chip to force its interlocutors in the six-party talks back to the negotiating table. Those talks can only resume when Pyongyang agrees to honor its denuclearization pledge.

While it commenced operations in 1986, the 5 megawatt reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear facility has been in the spotlight for two decades, ever since the North conceded that it was using it to produce plutonium to use for a nuclear weapon. The program was slowed with the announcement of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework in 1994, and was the subject of intense negotiations during the six-party talks. North Korea agreed to close the facility down to demonstrate its commitment to denuclearization: Its cooling tower was blown up in June 2008 as a public statement of its fealty to that goal.
Since then, however, the nuclear talks have gone off the rails. International condemnation of North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests allowed Pyongyang to claim that the West, and the United States in particular, had not abandoned its “hostile policy” toward it and used that as an excuse to claim that it would not honor its denuclearization commitment. The six-party talks have remained suspended ever since, with North Korea demanding that it be recognized as a “nuclear weapon state” and the other parties refusing, countering that negotiations cannot resume until Pyongyang acknowledges its pledge to give up its nuclear weapons and related programs.

During that time, the North has conducted more nuclear and missile tests and revealed a uranium enrichment program that will provide the country with yet more raw material to build a bomb. Pyongyang has maintained a high volume of rhetoric, alternatively threatening its neighbors and then declaring itself a victim of U.S., Japanese and South Korean hostility when they take steps to protect themselves. In recent months, however, Pyongyang’s belligerence has been muted, as it has offered to resume discussions with Seoul over a variety of projects and it hosted a special envoy of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

A decision to resume operations at Yongbyon would be a typical North Korean tactic: upping the ante to pull its negotiating partners back to the table and force them to resume aid in exchange for a halt to the nuclear restart. In other words, Pyongyang expects to be rewarded again for doing what it promised to do in the first place.

Pyongyang had threatened in April to restart the reactor, a step that U.S. officials called “extremely alarming.” Not only would the Yongbyon plant be able to produce about 6 kg of plutonium a year — enough for one or two bombs — but there is real concern about the stability of the facility itself. Russian diplomatic sources worry that “The reactor is in a nightmarish state. … For the Korean Peninsula, this could entail terrible consequences, if not a man-made catastrophe.”

It is not clear that Yongbyon is in operation. Satellite photos show preparations being made, such as drilling and installation of pumps to divert water for cooling. The graphite-moderated reactor is believed to have been linked to the cooling system of an adjacent light-water reactor facility under construction. White steam can be seen to be rising from a building next to the reactor that houses turbines and generators that are driven by heat created by the reactor. Experts note that the volume and color of the steam are consistent with that produced by an electrical generating system that is about to go back on line.

It is reckoned that North Korea already has enough plutonium for four to eight crude weapons. Resuming production at Yongbyon will allow that stockpile to slowly grow. Yet regardless of the status of that plant, the North’s uranium enrichment program continues apace as well; satellite photos show that the facility is expanding as well, which provides another source of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

North Korea cannot be allowed to blackmail the world into once again buying its nuclear weapon-making potential. Pyongyang cannot “sell that horse a third time.” But the only way that will happen is if all other parties in the six-party talks send a single unified message to the North Korean leadership. A readiness to talk about some problems does not give Pyongyang license to disregard its nuclear commitments. China in particular must demand that North Korea honor its pledges and not suggest that a smile is a substitute for serious negotiations.

As a first step, the Japanese government should consult with its U.S. and South Korean counterparts to develop a unified position. The repeated condemnations of North Korea are a start, but they are not a strategy.

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/09/14/editorials/pyongyang-must-honor-pledge/

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Los Angeles Times

OPINION/ Op-Ed

Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

It’s been signed and ratified by 154 member countries; the United States is one of just nine key nations that hasn’t ratified it. The Senate can change that — and should do so now.
By Hazel R. O’Leary and Daryl G. Kimball
September 14, 2011

More than 100 government leaders from around the globe will meet this month at the United Nations to discuss the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an international accord whose goal is to make the world safer by stemming the spread of nuclear weapons.

The treaty has been in limbo for more than a decade. Negotiations on it were concluded at the United Nations General Assembly in 1996, with the treaty calling for the ban of nuclear test explosions for any purpose. It’s been signed and ratified by 154 member countries, including Russia, Japan, South Korea and all of America’s NATO allies.

The United States is one of just nine key nations that hasn’t ratified the treaty. The U.S. Senate can change that — and should do so now. Its ratification and entry into force would immediately bolster the international community’s efforts to stop rogue states from developing and potentially proliferating nuclear weapons.

In 1996, President Clinton was the first world leader to sign the treaty. But the Senate in 1999, after only a brief consideration, rejected ratification of the measure and hasn’t taken up the issue since.

The treaty is an essential tool for dealing with today’s security threats. The age of a superpower nuclear arms race is over. Instead, world leaders must focus on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states, blocking advances in their nuclear weapons technologies — and not letting nuclear weapons slip into the hands of terrorists.

Countries with nuclear weapons, such as China, India and Pakistan, cannot create advanced nukes without further nuclear test explosions. Without nuclear tests, Iran could not confidently build warheads for delivery by ballistic missiles. By ratifying the treaty, the United States would put pressure on these nations to shelve their nuclear programs and engage more productively with the international community.

To detect and deter nuclear testing, the treaty empowers the United States and the international community with strong inspections authority. The treaty provides for a global network of 337 monitoring stations, many of which are in sensitive locations like Russia and China to which the United States doesn’t have access. Once in force, the treaty would give inspectors the ability to conduct short-notice, on-site investigations of any suspicious sites. That’s an ability the United States does not possess now.

In 1999, opponents of the treaty expressed concern that it would hamper America’s ability to maintain a robust nuclear arsenal. Those worries are now moot. Thanks to technological progress over the last decade, nuclear scientists can determine with high confidence that warheads work without detonating them. Indeed, the United States hasn’t conducted a nuclear test explosion since 1992.

Research has shown that plutonium, the key ingredient in nuclear weapons, is not affected by aging for 85 years or more. Scientific advances have also allowed America’s nuclear scientists to refurbish and modernize existing warheads with “life extension programs.” A September 2009 study from the JASON panel, a group of independent scientists, concluded that the “lifetimes of today’s nuclear warheads could be extended for decades” without explosive testing.

Nuclear experts have argued forcefully against testing. Earlier this year, the head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, Thomas D’Agostino, said that the United States has “a safe and secure and reliable stockpile” and that "there’s no need to conduct underground [nuclear] testing."

Even some of those who opposed ratification of the treaty in 1999 have come out in favor of the agreement. George Shultz, the secretary of State under President Reagan, has said that his fellow Republicans "might have been right voting against [the treaty] some years ago" but they’d "be right voting for it now."

After all, the treaty does not hamstring America’s efforts to maintain its nuclear arsenal. President Obama has called for $85 billion over the next 10 years for our nation’s nuclear weapons laboratories — a full 13% increase over the level of spending during President George W. Bush’s administration, and more than enough to get the job done.
By ratifying the treaty, the United States would gain the political and moral leverage to end nuclear testing worldwide. And we’d help establish the kind of robust framework needed by the international community to monitor and deter the nuclear activities of the most dangerous countries.

Now is the time for the Senate to seriously reconsider and approve the test ban treaty.

Hazel R. O’Leary served as U.S. secretary of Energy from 1993-97; Daryl G. Kimball is executive director of the nonpartisan Arms Control Assn.


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The Space Review
OPINION/Essay

Space and Nuclear Deterrence
By Michael Krepon
Monday, September 16, 2013

[Editor’s Note: the following essay is excerpted from a new collection of essays titled “Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations” being published this week by the Stimson Center.]

“Space deterrence” is defined here as deterring harmful actions by whatever means against national assets in space and assets that support space operations. Analogously, nuclear deterrence is defined as deterring harmful actions by means of nuclear weapons. Concepts of nuclear deterrence have been well developed. In contrast, attention to space deterrence has been sporadic during and after the Cold War, sparked mostly when anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities have been tested. These concerns faded after the demise of the Soviet Union, and have now revived with the advent of China’s ambitious space program.

Demonstrable vs. inferred deterrence

Nuclear deterrence and space deterrence have common elements as well as distinct differences. No difference is more striking than with respect to the visibility of nuclear deterrence capabilities compared to the largely inferential nature of space deterrence. The advent of nuclear weapons was advertised with spectacular effect, with the mushroom cloud immediately becoming the symbol of the “atomic age.” Ever since, nuclear deterrence widely was presumed to be strengthened by visible displays. Tests of warhead designs were carried out in the atmosphere and were subsequently driven underground, easily confirmed by seismographs. Missile flight tests repeatedly affirmed vigilance and readiness. Some states possessing nuclear weapons still parade nuclear-capable missiles on national holidays.

In contrast, capabilities to harm space assets have been tested only occasionally in dramatic ways and mostly have been pursued quietly or by indirect methods. Consequently, space warfare capabilities rarely make headlines, unlike actions signaling nuclear deterrence, which are the subject of intense public and media attention. While nuclear deterrence rests on deployed or readily deployed capabilities, the weaponization of space —defined here as the placement of dedicated war-fighting capabilities in this domain—has yet to occur. The nuclear superpowers deployed large numbers of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles carrying thousands of warheads, many ready for launch on short notice. At the same time, military capabilities specifically designed to harm satellites were rarely deployed, had limited operational utility, and were subsequently mothballed during the Cold War.

The Eisenhower administration considered contesting a Soviet “right” to have its Sputniks orbiting over US soil, but thought better of it: American satellites would soon follow—including ones revealing military secrets in a closed society. It took no great gift of prophecy to foresee benefits accruing from the norm of free passage. The Kennedy administration saw fit to position a crude ASAT capability in the Pacific after the Cuban Missile Crisis—a decision that extended into the Johnson and Nixon administrations. This capability was hardly worth the bother in military terms. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson were far more interested in beginning to establish norms for the
peaceful uses of outer space. The Soviet Union was soon eclipsed by the United States in the “space race,” and was amenable to downplaying the prospect of confrontation in this domain. In 1967, the nuclear superpowers agreed to the Outer Space Treaty, their second major codified constraint of their strategic competition, after an agreement four years earlier to stop testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere.

There were, to be sure, periods of heightened military friction and competition in space, particularly following Soviet ASAT tests in the 1970s and after President Ronald Reagan’s announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983. In retrospect, a striking aspect of these periods of heightened competition in space was how little residue they left on the strategic competition, and how careful both superpowers were not to cross each other’s red lines in space, as well as on the ground and at sea. Just as Washington and Moscow learned not to play with fire in particularly sensitive zones after crises over Berlin and Cuba, so, too, did they reach tacit and formal agreements not to create havoc with each other’s satellites—despite multiple capabilities that enabled them to do so.

One reason why demonstrable deterrence was deemed crucial for the nuclear competition, while inferential deterrence would suffice for space, was that military capabilities designed for one domain—including missiles deployed for the purpose of nuclear deterrence and for missile defense intercepts—could be used in the other. Another reason was that after crises in Berlin and Cuba, the United States and the Soviet Union acted for the most part as status quo powers. Will this Cold War record of uncommon restraint in space continue between a status quo power and a rising power? Caution is warranted before reaching overly optimistic or pessimistic answers to these questions. Conditions have changed, and the competition between Washington and Beijing will be different in crucial respects than that between the United States and the Soviet Union. Besides, there has never been a consensus in the United States over the definition of, and requirements for, successful deterrence. Moreover, Beijing’s strategic objectives and the means that will be employed to achieve them remain opaque. What can be said with certainty is that the mix of US-Chinese cooperation and competition in space is not predetermined. Instead, this mix will reflect, and be influenced by, a much larger canvas of bilateral relations.

**Extrapolating to China and to space deterrence**

The United States maintains a great many nuclear weapons and diverse means for their delivery to deter a similarly armed and similarly vulnerable adversary. This force posture was sized in comparison with the Soviet Union during the Cold War and subsequently to the Russian Federation. Force sizing to deter the Kremlin appears sufficient for all lesser cases, including the objective of dissuading the People’s Republic of China from seeking to compete with the United States in this realm. US nuclear forces continue to be maintained in a high state of readiness—albeit not as high as during the Cold War—to deter surprise attack and to provide the National Command Authority with prompt and varied options in the event of a breakdown in nuclear deterrence.

In contrast, the requirements to deter attacks on US space assets, at present, do not appear to include kinetic-energy weapons dedicated to space deterrence that are deployed in space, on land or at sea. Dedicated ASAT weapon systems were considered deployed for portions of the Cold War, but they were rudimentary and poorly suited for operational requirements. They were not replaced, systematically upgraded and repeatedly tested to demonstrate vigilance, resolve and to reinforce deterrence, as was the case for nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

The Soviet Union possessed far more formidable military space and nuclear capabilities than the People’s Republic of China does now. The United States engaged in minimal commerce with the Soviet Union, compared to significant trade and financial interactions currently with China. The Cold War contest between the United States and the Soviet Union was ideological, global and geopolitical. In contrast, the competition between the United States and China lacks an ideological dimension and is, at present, more regional than global. These contrasts suggest that the relatively relaxed US-Soviet military competition in space might carry forward in a competitive relationship between the United States and China. On the other hand, Beijing’s intentions and ambitions are unclear, and bilateral cooperation in space between the United States and China is minimal compared to the US-Soviet and US-Russian experience.
There can be no doubt that space has become, as the Obama administration has noted repeatedly, more competitive, contested and congested than during the Cold War. Features of space operations have changed markedly, including the advent of commercial space operations and profit-taking related to satellites, the increase in the number of nations utilizing space for varied purposes, and the criticality of space systems for military operations. All major space-faring nations increasingly rely on satellites, but none more so than the United States. Multinational partnerships in space now figure prominently; the sharing of benefits and risks might alter deterrence calculations, as well. All of this, and more, is significantly different from the first three decades of the Space Age. Does this mean that Cold War-era calculations of the requirements for space deterrence have fundamentally changed?

To answer this crucial question, we must first try to reach an informed judgment as to why the requirements for space deterrence were presumed to be so different from nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, and then to assess whether these conditions remain in place. One possible reason is that major powers have long considered warfare in space to be linked to nuclear warfare. If so, the requirements of the former might have been subsumed in the latter. The linkages between nuclear warfare and activities in space are numerous and well understood. Satellites are connected in many ways to the execution of nuclear war-fighting plans by helping with weather forecasting; targeting, indications and warning of attacks; assessing damage and maintaining command, control and communications. During the Cold War, the contestants understood that to disable or attack these satellites by whatever means was unlikely to be viewed in a vacuum. Instead, attacks on critical assets and infrastructure in space commonly were viewed in the gravest terms, regardless of whether they were precursors to attacks on nuclear forces. These conditions continue to remain in place.

An appreciation of the linkages between space assets and nuclear assets does not, however, explain why nuclear tests were so prevalent and why ASAT tests were so limited during the Cold War. Despite the clear linkages between nuclear and space deterrence, requirements for the former were excessive and requirements for the latter were relatively relaxed. As noted earlier, this dichotomy can probably be explained, in some measure, by the abundance of other means to interfere with, damage or destroy critical assets in space, including non-kinetic kill mechanisms such as lasers and jammers. Counter-space capabilities reside in conventional- and nuclear-armed weapon systems, including missiles of various kinds, along with missile defense interceptors. The perceived requirements for dedicated systems to engage in space warfare might well have been reduced significantly because of these residual or latent capabilities. These conditions remain in effect. Indeed, latent capabilities to engage in space warfare have grown, and have become more prominent because missile defense interceptors have been tested dramatically in an ASAT mode by China in 2007 and by the United States in 2008.

A third possible explanation for Cold War restraint—albeit one that has become far more appreciated of late—might relate to the indiscriminate, abhorrent and self-defeating nature of some means to engage in warfare in space. This first became apparent with respect to atmospheric nuclear testing. These tests generated public revulsion and political activism. By the early 1960s, concerns over public health dangers arising from atmospheric tests overrode the arguments of those who desired their continuation to clarify military and operational requirements. Less well known were the potential hazards of atmospheric tests to the health of the first astronauts and cosmonauts, as well as to the first satellites placed in low Earth orbit. One particularly powerful US test on July 9, 1962, Starfish Prime, damaged at least six fledgling satellites.

Space debris poses a clear and present danger in space analogous to the danger atmospheric testing posed to satellites and human exploration at the dawn of the space age. The hazards of ASAT tests involving “hit-to-kill” technologies first became apparent during the Cold War, when a 1985 US ASAT test created over 250 pieces of trackable space debris, one of which came within one mile of the newly launched international space station 14 years later. The abhorrent, indiscriminate and self-defeating consequences of debris-causing ASAT tests were not widely appreciated during the Cold War because few of these tests were carried out.

A kinetic-energy ASAT test conducted in 2007 by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ended complacency over the hazards of space debris. This ASAT test produced more than 3,000 pieces of debris large enough to track, and tens of thousands of smaller pieces, endangering human spaceflight and hundreds of satellites, without regard for ownership and nationality. The Pentagon demonstrated an agile, sea-based ASAT capability in 2008 by shooting down a non-
functioning intelligence satellite, in a manner that minimized debris consequences. As a result of these tests, as well as other significant debris-causing events, recognition of the potential environmental consequences of space warfare is unquestionably greater now than during the Cold War. Reaction to the PLA’s 2007 ASAT did not spark mass protests, unlike the case of atmospheric testing. This ASAT test did, however, alarm space operators to such an extent that an international norm against further tests of this kind might take hold.

While the fragility of the global commons might induce restraint with regard to kinetic-energy ASATs, there are other means to interfere with and damage satellites. As noted above, lasers and jammers could also be employed to disrupt space operations, and could do so without creating debris fields. In this event, one critical element of space deterrence, as with nuclear deterrence, is the ability to determine who has sought to damage space assets, or succeeded in doing so, by non-kinetic means.

Attribution is a critical prior step to the choice of retribution. The attribution problem is likely to be harder with regard to space warfare, if for no other reason than the list of potential suspects is longer, including perpetrators that may not be under the control of governments. The attribution problem is, however, not unique to space warfare; it also applies to acts of terrorism, including nuclear terrorism. One means of deterrence across domains is the distribution of varied means of observation: some perpetrators might not carry out hostile acts if they have reason to expect discovery. Thus, redundant means of space situational awareness can serve deterrent purposes. Similarly, the development of forensic capabilities to attribute responsibility backs up deterrence across domains, but is likely to be more difficult in space, where physical evidence cannot be examined properly. In all domains, the context within which hostile actions are taken is likely to be strongly suggestive of the perpetrator, but may not be definitive.

Another common aspect of nuclear and space deterrence is the requirement for resilience. The value of any attack on space assets diminishes in proportion to the victim's ability to compensate, recoup losses and respond appropriately. Deterrence against limited attacks, including attacks by non-kinetic means, is thereby reinforced by the evident ability to adjust to disruptions and losses of capability. Limited attacks and disruptions might well be more likely in asymmetric warfare than in confrontations between major powers because the weaker party can expect to have less to lose in space warfare. At the same time, the weaker party might have insufficient means to disrupt the space operations of the dominant power—except by using nuclear detonations that would badly affect space assets of all major powers. Outlier states might have few friends, but they are unlikely to want to alienate them by disrupting their space operations.

Worst-case projections of a failure in space deterrence—as with the worst case projection of a failure of nuclear deterrence—involve catastrophic losses from a surprise attack. For some, the worst case of a “space Pearl Harbor” has displaced Cold War concerns over a disarming “bolt-out-of-the-blue” attack against US nuclear forces. Only major powers have the capacity for massive attacks against a wide range of space assets in low Earth and geosynchronous orbits, as well as in between. The most persuasive deterrent against the low probability, but high-consequence nature of worst cases is the evident ability to respond with devastating effect to grievous injury. In the worst case of a bolt-out-of-the-blue, massive nuclear attack, deterrence was reinforced by clarifying the degree of difficulty for the attacker’s success and the horrific consequences of failure.

The worst case of a bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack postulates that a nuclear response would cause insufficient retribution, or might be withheld to avoid even more fearsome punishment. Those who focus on the worst case of a breakdown in space deterrence argue that the aggressor has a greater likelihood of success than with a surprise nuclear attack, and that the victim will be reluctant to respond by crossing the nuclear threshold. While worst cases lie on the improbable end of the spectrum of possibilities, they cannot be ignored. US and Soviet leaders spent excessive amounts of money and deployed improbable numbers of nuclear weapons to guard against worst cases. The resulting nuclear force postures built to deter bolt-out-of-the-blue attacks were not very reassuring. To the contrary, the buildup of nuclear war-fighting capabilities to deal with worst cases raised insecurity. In a far more constrained budgetary environment, US national leaders must decide now how much of a deterrence and insurance policy to buy against a low probability/high consequence scenario of a massive surprise attack in space.
A severe crisis between major powers that plays out in space will reflect the magnitude of the stakes involved—a space age Cuban missile crisis. National leaders contemplating the first move of space warfare will face the same unalterable dilemmas of choice that Kennedy and Khrushchev faced. A leader can choose limited warfare for extremely uncertain gains and the possibility of uncontrolled escalation, or seek victory with the potential of all-out warfare and devastating consequences.

In the first-ever severe crisis between major powers in space, both contestants will possess the capacity to deny each other’s pursuit of space dominance. In this way, the nature of the space domain, where offense easily trumps defense, is like the nuclear domain. Consequently, the contestants will be unable confidently to ensure decisive victory by means of surprise attack. Just as protection from fallout in nuclear exchanges cannot be secured, so, too, will the first use of kinetic-energy ASATs be self-denying: mutating debris fields will make large swaths of space inoperable to one’s own satellites, either quickly or over time. The use of non-kinetic-energy ASATs on a modest scale invites retaliation in kind or retaliation across domains. The use of non-kinetic-energy ASATs on a massive scale invites massive retaliation, if not in kind, then across domains. In the event of a severe crisis between Washington and Beijing, would a Chinese leader risk everything with this cosmic throw of the dice?

In the event of warfare in space between major powers, national leaders will face an abundance of risk, just as they would in the event of warfare on the ground or at sea. The presumption inherent in worst case projections of space warfare is that disabling violence in space will dissuade conventional military responses and will not spill over to nuclear warfare. This assumption of compartmentalization weakens deterrence in all domains. The “space Pearl Harbor” scenario also assumes that warfare in space, unlike warfare in other domains, can be executed without unwelcome surprises, miscalculations, accidents or breakdowns in command and control.

US and Soviet leaders did not presume this to be the case during the Cold War, and US and Chinese leaders need not presume this to be the case in the future. The conclusion reached by Kurt Gottfried and Richard Ned Lebow during a dark Cold War chapter of heightened military competition in space seems equally relevant in a US-China context: “ASATs possess a considerably greater capacity for transforming a crisis into a war, and for enlarging wars, than they do for assisting in military missions or enhancing deterrence.” This conclusion seems equally applicable to space warfare by kinetic or non-kinetic means. With the benefit of hindsight, concerns over the worst case of a bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack now seem quite overdrawn. While military plans to execute this scenario existed, political leaders sought to avoid executing them. Worst case assessments of a space Pearl Harbor seem unlikely, as well.

If a breakdown in space deterrence occurs, it could be as a result of seeking tactical advantage in conjunction with limited military operations. Alternatively, a breakdown of space deterrence could be a defensive act for signaling purposes, as has often been postulated with a breakdown of nuclear deterrence. In either case, deterrence breakdowns are most likely to happen on a limited scale alongside attempts to maintain, as much as possible, the military use of space. While worst-case scenarios appear implausible, there may well be a greater potential ambit for limited warfare in space, since satellite interference and disruption can be reversible. The requirements to shore up deterrence or to compensate for a breakdown of deterrence in these scenarios are far more modest than the requirements to deal with worst cases.

**Conclusion**

The US dependency on space will grow as Chinese military space capabilities grow. As a consequence, the United States is obliged to reinforce space deterrence capabilities while engaging in diplomatic initiatives aimed at reassurance. This combination of initiatives proved successful during the Cold War, and can continue to be successful in the future.

The key elements of space deterrence, as with nuclear deterrence, are secure retaliatory capabilities sufficient to deny advantages to an attacker, effective command and control mechanisms, and redundant safety and security mechanisms to prevent accidental as well as unauthorized use of military capabilities. In addition, successful deterrence requires situational awareness, attribution capabilities, as well as resilient space assets so that the United States is able to identify the perpetrator of harmful actions and continue to utilize space for national and economic security despite these acts.
These requirements are not controversial, although they may not be affordable in sufficient measure—as was the case with the perceived requirements of nuclear deterrence. The crux of debate over space deterrence is whether to continue to rely very heavily on latent or residual capabilities to engage in warfare, if necessary, or to shift toward more evident, dedicated, kinetic and deployed means of dissuasion. There are several powerful arguments for the United States to continue to rely on inferred rather than heavily demonstrable deterrence in space. To begin with, a non-dedicated, non-deployed, non-kinetic space deterrence posture has been successful in the past. An inferred posture is also more conducive to stabilizing deterrence than the deployment and testing of dedicated, kinetic counter-space capabilities. These hallmarks of an intensified arms competition did not produce a great sense of security in the nuclear domain, and are unlikely to offer a greater sense of security in space. Instead, more demonstrable space deterrence efforts are likely to increase requirements and costs while decreasing assurance.

An accelerated competition in the development, testing and deployment of US and Chinese counter-space capabilities is likely to spill over into the nuclear domain. The practical effect of this linkage would be to increase nuclear requirements in China, while retarding reductions in deployed US nuclear capabilities that are in excess of the Pentagon’s needs. In a constrained budget environment, the United States could apply defense dollars more wisely and enjoy added security if this dynamic could be avoided. Another reason to avoid an intensified competition in dedicated and deployed counter-space capabilities is that residual and latent US counter-space capabilities are growing significantly, particularly with respect to new missile defense interceptors. The growth in inferred capability provides the basis to avoid a competition in dedicated, deployed counter-space capabilities—if China is amenable to inferential deterrence.

This is an essential qualifier. A continued US preference to avoid a heightened competition marked by repeated displays of dedicated capability to disrupt, damage or destroy space assets depends on Beijing’s acceptance of inferred deterrence. The United States and China have both demonstrated counter-space capabilities. If Beijing decides to ramp up its space warfare capabilities, the Pentagon will not be found wanting in this competition. A far more preferable posture would be one of “contingent restraint,” whereby the Pentagon does not exercise options well within its capabilities, as long as the PLA is similarly constrained. Parallel policies of contingent restraint worked during most, but not all, intervals of the Cold War. This dynamic can also succeed under far less demanding contemporary circumstances.

Deterrence is based on threats. Deterrence, by itself, is not reassuring. The Cold War did not become hot because deterrence was complemented by reassurance in the form of diplomatic accords to reduce nuclear dangers. Contingent restraint can be inferential, or it can be reinforced by diplomatic accords. Stable deterrence requires reassurance when competitors possess devastating military options.

Washington and Beijing have yet to demonstrate successful diplomatic engagement to moderate a military competition in space. Neither have they agreed on cooperative joint ventures in space, like those that helped diminish pressures to ramp up US and Soviet space warfare requirements during the Cold War. Reassurance during the Cold War took the form of treaties. Senate consent to, and the entry into force of treaties regarding military space capabilities seem unlikely. Executive agreements remain possible, however. One means of reassurance—an International Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations—is readily available. Another, in the form of collaborative ventures in space science and exploration, awaits the commitment of far-sighted leaders.

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Now's Not the Time to Cut Missile Defense

North Korea's capabilities are an increasing threat, yet the Obama administration is cutting the missile defense budget
By Claude Berube
September 16, 2013

Recent satellite imagery suggests that North Korea has greatly expanded its uranium enrichment capabilities. The nation just promised to launch more long-range rockets "soon." And, reportedly, labs in Pyongyang are hard at work developing nuclear-armed missiles capable of striking the U.S. mainland.

With the North Korean threat apparently mounting, it's essential for the United States to continue investing in missile defense.

Missile shield technologies first gained attention in 1983 when President Ronald Reagan proposed a bold endeavor called the Strategic Defense Initiative. At the time, critics famously dismissed the prospect of intercepting incoming missiles as a "Star Wars" fantasy.

Although the technology didn't exist, Reagan's concept was sound, therefore it quickly spawned a wave of development projects.

During the first Gulf War, the United States unveiled one of these technologies with the Patriot missile system. With Patriot batteries in Israel and Saudi Arabia, the U.S. military was able to eliminate 70 percent of the scud missiles fired by Saddam Hussein.

Today, American missile defense systems continue to keep the nation safe, reassure our allies and calm global tensions. This past spring, for instance, when North Korea announced its decision to unilaterally nullify the 1953 armistice and threatened to attack its southern neighbor, the United States deployed a Navy destroyer equipped with the advanced "Aegis" anti-missile system. The move helped quiet the region, stifling further provocations by the North and preventing the South from taking any action of its own.

Recent tests have shown that technological progress continues apace. In May, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency and sailors aboard the U.S. Navy's USS Lake Erie engaged and destroyed a short-range ballistic missile that was launched from Hawaii over the Pacific Ocean. This was the Missile Defense Agency's 59th successful intercept in 74 tests since it debuted the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense in 2001.

Despite these strides — and the growing threats we face — missile defense is on the chopping block. In its 2014 budget request, the Obama Administration proposed cutting the Pentagon's missile defense budget by about 6 percent.

These planned cuts are particularly surprising given that the Obama administration has also just announced a new joint anti-missile initiative with key allies across the Atlantic. The European Phased Adaptive Approach is expected to incorporate new detection and destruction techniques to keep our European allies safe from rogue missile threats.

These cuts will undermine the development of this system. Indeed, just this March, American defense officials canceled the final phase of another Europe-based missile defense initiative because of budget constraints.

We've made tremendous progress since Ronald Reagan first announced the Strategic Defense Initiative. Now is no time to choke off funding for these promising technologies. America must continue to invest in these systems to counter the growth missile threat presented by North Korea and other dangerous regimes.

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