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United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL
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UN Atomic Agency Says Iran Nuclear Talks to Resume on Sept 27
Agence France-Presse (AFP)
August 28, 2013

VIENNA: Talks between the UN atomic agency and Iran over Tehran's controversial nuclear programme will resume on September 27, a spokesman from the International Atomic Energy Agency said on Wednesday.

The last round of discussions between the two parties were last held in mid-May, before the election of current Iranian President Hassan Rowhani, who was Tehran’s chief nuclear negotiator under reformist president Mohammad Khatami in the early 2000s.

The September meeting will take place in Vienna, the IAEA headquarters, the atomic agency’s spokesman said, but did not specify who would attend.

The lineup of two teams will likely be significantly altered at the new round of talks, as the Iranian representative to the IAEA Ali Asghar Soltanieh has recently been replaced and the agency's chief inspector Herman Nackaerts is due to retire in September.

Delegates from the UN atomic agency and Iranian officials have held ten rounds of failed meetings since the November 2011 publication of a major IAEA report on Tehran's nuclear programme.

Director-general Yukiya Amano expressed his frustration in June at talks that were "going around in circles".

The IAEA wants Iran to grant access to sites, documents and scientists involved in Tehran's alleged efforts to develop atomic weapons, which the agency suspects mostly took place before 2003 but are possibly still ongoing. Iran says the IAEA's findings are based on faulty intelligence from foreign spy agencies such as the CIA and Israel's Mossad — intelligence it complains it has not even been allowed to see.

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Syrian Officials’ ‘Panicked Calls’ Prove Culpability, US Says

Information pointing to Assad also includes Israeli intel showing regime moved chemical weapons to site of attack
By Haviv Rettig Gur and Associated Press (AP)
August 28, 2013

Last Wednesday’s chemical attack in an eastern suburb of Damascus that killed hundreds caused panic within the ranks of the Assad regime and has been raising questions in the West about the Assad regime’s control over its own nonconventional stockpiles, according to US intelligence sources.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the US intercepted panicked phone calls between defense officials in Damascus and the commander of a chemical weapons unit demanding details about the strike, Foreign Policy reported early Wednesday.

The report comes just days after a report in a major German publication claiming that an IDF intelligence unit had listened in on similar conversations between senior Syrian officials discussing the chemical attack.

According to the report in the German magazine Focus, a squad specializing in wire-tapping within the IDF’s 8200 signals intelligence unit intercepted a phone call between high-ranking regime officials regarding the use of chemical agents at the time of the attack. The German report cited an ex-Mossad official saying the intercepted conversation proved the Assad regime was responsible for the attack.
An American intelligence official, speaking to Foreign Policy, noted that while the phone calls intercepted by US intelligence proved that regime forces had perpetrated the attack, they also raised disturbing questions about the regime’s control over its large stockpiles of chemical weapons — considered one of the largest in the world — including its arsenal of deadly nerve gas of the type thought to have been used in last week’s attack.

“It’s unclear where control lies,” the official was quoted as saying. “Is there just some sort of general blessing to use these things? Or are there explicit orders for each attack?”

Israel TV reported last week that a unit under the command of President Bashar Assad’s brother, Maher, fired the shells in the attack last Wednesday.

The official did not mince words regarding the American assessment of the wisdom of the strike. “We don’t know exactly why it happened. We just know it was pretty fucking stupid.” The official repeated the comment later in the report, saying of the attack: “It’s horrible, it’s stupid.”

Despite Washington’s certainty over the source of the attack, many US intelligence officials supported letting the UN investigation of the incident run its course before the US follows through on recent threats to conduct punitive strikes against the Assad regime. But the official suggested a US attack was extremely likely. “Whatever happens in the next few days — they get what they deserve.”

US officials’ belief that the regime perpetrated the attack is not based only on the phone interceptions, the official indicated. US weapons experts confirmed that the dozens of videos produced by rebel groups showing victims of the strike were consistent with the aftermath of a nerve agent attack. In addition, missiles used in the attack were not destroyed upon landing, suggesting that their warheads were filled with something other than conventional explosives.

US intelligence officials told the Washington Post on Wednesday that they had established a timeline for the attack. A report on the strike, which Obama administration officials said would prove it was committed by the regime, is expected to be released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as early as Thursday.

An American official cited by AP said the report would include signals intelligence — information gathered from intercepted communications. The report would also be based on the number of reported victims, the symptoms of those injured or killed, and eyewitness accounts. The officials who offered the details to press outlets insisted on anonymity because they were not authorized to publicly discuss the internal deliberations.

Officials told the Wall Street Journal that evidence would include satellite imagery. Arab diplomats were also quoted by the paper to the effect that a crucial piece of the intelligence puzzle was provided by Israel, whose spy services discovered that chemical weapons of the type used in the attack were moved in advance to the site of the strike. The report said the Israeli intelligence had been verified by the CIA.

On Tuesday, Vice President Joe Biden said there was no doubt that Assad’s government was responsible for the heinous use of chemical weapons. Biden’s comments make him the highest-ranking US official to finger the Syrian regime in the attack.

Biden said the Syrian government is the only actor in the two-year civil war that possesses and can deliver chemical weapons. He echoed Kerry in saying Assad has blocked UN investigators from the site of the attack and has been bombing it for days.

The United Nations said Tuesday that its team of chemical weapons investigators in Syria had delayed a second trip to investigate the alleged attack by one day for security reasons. On Monday, the team came under sniper fire.

While President Barack Obama hasn’t settled on how to respond to the attack, according to the White House, America’s top defense planner said Tuesday that US forces are ready to act on any order by the president.

The Arab League also threw its weight behind calls for punitive action, blaming the Syrian government for the attack and calling for those responsible to be brought to justice.
British Prime Minister David Cameron recalled Parliament to hold an emergency vote Thursday on his country’s response. It is unlikely that any international military action would begin before then.

Russia, Syria and Iran have warned of grave consequences should action be taken.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Monday that the West should be under no illusion that bombing Syrian military targets would help end the violence in Syria, a staunch ally of Moscow, and he pointed to the volatile situations in Iraq and Libya that he said resulted from foreign military intervention.

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem said his country would use “all means available” to counter an attack.

“We have the means to defend ourselves and we will surprise everyone,” he said.

If Obama decides to order a strike against Syria, it would most likely involve sea-launched cruise missile attacks on Syrian military and communications targets. The US Navy has four destroyers in the eastern Mediterranean Sea within range of targets inside Syria. The US also has warplanes in the region.

In Cyprus, Defense Minister Fotis Fotiou said naval traffic in the eastern Mediterranean was very heavy with vessels from “all the major powers.” He also said Cypriot authorities were planning to deal with a possible exodus of foreign nationals from Syria.

The prospect of US military intervention in Syria was running into fierce opposition from some members of Congress. A growing chorus of Republican and Democratic lawmakers demanded that Obama seek congressional authorization for any strikes against the Assad regime.

Charles Heyman, a former British officer who edits The Armed Forces of the UK, said the lack of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against the Syrian government greatly complicates matters for the West. He said that may make it difficult for Cameron to win parliamentary backing.

“It’s clear the governments want some form of military operation, but if the Security Council doesn’t recommend it, then the consensus is that it’s plainly illegal under international law,” Heyman said. “The only legal way to go to war is in self-defense and that claim is difficult to make.”

Russia, a permanent member of the Security Council, has steadfastly opposed any international action against Syria.

Italian Foreign Minister Emma Bonino said her country would not back any military action against Syria unless it was authorized by the Security Council — even though it considers a chemical attack to be a war crime.

German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said Monday that if the Syrian government were proven to have been behind the gas attack, then Germany would support “consequences.” But with less than four weeks until national elections, it is unlikely Germany would commit any forces.

Center-left opposition parties have rejected military intervention without UN proof that the Syrian government was behind the attack. And a senior member of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s party said the German military was already at “the breaking point” due to commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Support for some sort of international military response is likely to grow if it is confirmed that Assad’s regime was responsible.

In a veiled allusion to difficulties in getting any strong action through the Security Council, France’s President Francois Hollande said that “international law must evolve with the times. It cannot be a pretext to allow mass massacres to be perpetrated.”

He went on to invoke France’s recognition of “the responsibility to protect civilian populations” that the UN General Assembly approved in 2005.

Obama discussed Syria on Tuesday with Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada, a NATO ally, and in recent days with Cameron, Hollande and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.
Russia Beyond the Headlines (RBTH) – Russia

Lavrov Disagrees with Kerry on Blaming Syrian Govt for Chemical Attacks
- Russian Foreign Ministry
August 28, 2013
Interfax

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry discussed the latest tensions surrounding Syria in a telephone conversation late on Tuesday.

"John Kerry set out his judgments based, as was stated, on information from trustworthy sources, according to which the government of the Syrian Arab Republic is to blame for the incidents involving the possible use of chemical weapons," the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement available on its website.

"This interpretation was rejected by Lavrov, who presented Russia's arguments," it said.

"The minister stressed that we favor a substantive and deeper exchange of information we have on each instance of the possible use of chemical weapons in Syria through expert channels," the Russian Foreign Ministry said.

Lavrov also called for supporting and facilitating as much as possible the work of the team of experts in Syria, whose mechanism has been agreed upon between Damascus and the UN. "This would fully meet the agreements the G8 leaders reached at the June summit at Lough Erne," it said.

"Moscow is especially alarmed by the dangerous line pursued by a number of countries, which has already become obvious, to deliberately undermine preconditions for a political-diplomatic settlement of the conflict," it said.

Lavrov and Kerry agreed on the need to maintain further contacts on Syria. The conversation took place at the U.S.' initiative, the Russian Foreign Ministry said.

The Chicago Tribune

Iran Expands Advanced Uranium Enrichment Capacity: IAEA
By Fredrik Dahl, Reuters
August 28, 2013

VIENNA (Reuters) - Iran has installed about 1,000 advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges and is set to test them, a U.N. nuclear report showed, a development likely to worry Western capitals hoping for a change of course under the country's new president.

The International Atomic Energy Agency's quarterly report - the first since relative moderate Hassan Rouhani won Iran's June presidential election - also said the Islamic state had started making fuel assemblies for a reactor which the West fears could yield nuclear bomb material. Iran denies any such aim.

On the other hand, in what may provide relief for world powers seeking a peaceful settlement of the decade-old nuclear dispute with Iran, the planned commissioning of the Arak reactor itself has been delayed from early next year, the IAEA said.
In addition, Iran’s most sensitive nuclear stockpile has grown little - remaining below its arch-enemy Israel’s stated "red line" that could provoke military action - since the previous IAEA report in May. Iran's possible restraint here could buy time for more negotiations with six world powers.

Growth in Iran’s reserve of uranium gas refined to 20 percent was held back as Iran stepped up conversion of the material into oxide to make fuel for a medical research reactor in Tehran. The stockpile of 186 kg compares with the 240-250 kg which experts say would be needed for a bomb if refined further.

The report still showed Iran pressing ahead with its nuclear program at a time when the outside world is waiting to see if Rouhani will increase transparency and reduce confrontation in its foreign relations, as he has pledged.

However, envoys accredited to the IAEA had cautioned against reading too much into the latest inspectors’ report as it mainly covered developments before Rouhani in early August, succeeding the conservative hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Iran says its nuclear energy program is for electricity generation and medical uses only. It has rejected Western accusations that it is trying to develop the capability to produce nuclear bombs, despite having hidden sensitive activities from U.N. non-proliferation inspectors in the past.

Separately the IAEA announced a resumption on September 27 of talks with Iran over how to get it to cooperate with an agency inquiry into "possible military dimensions" to its nuclear work. There have been 10 fruitless rounds of talks since early 2012, but the next session will be the first with Rouhani in office.

REACTOR DELAY

Obtained by Reuters on Wednesday, the IAEA report said Iran had fully installed a total of 1,008 new-generation centrifuges at the underground Natanz complex and was planning to test their performance ahead of feeding them with uranium material.

Iran's progress in introducing advanced centrifuges is under close scrutiny in the West and Israel - which is assumed to have the Middle East's only nuclear arsenal - because this would enable Tehran to speed up its accumulation of material that could be put to producing atomic bombs.

The machines were "under vacuum", an important step towards starting them up, the report said. Iran, it added, had also completed preparations for installing about 2,000 more advanced centrifuges, which experts say could increase the rate of refinement by two- or three-fold.

The rapid installations at a production unit at the Natanz underground enrichment site so far this year indicates that Iran can manufacture such equipment, at least to some extent, itself despite tightening sanctions on the country.

Centrifuges spin at supersonic speed to produce enriched uranium, which Iran says it needs to fuel a planned network of nuclear power plants. But if further refined, uranium can also provide the explosive core of a nuclear bomb.

The report further said Iran had begun making nuclear fuel for its planned Arak heavy-water research reactor but had put off its commissioning beyond the planned first quarter of 2014.

The delay "was in the stars already because many people couldn’t believe the schedule. But this is the first time that Iran acknowledged this," an international official familiar with the issue said. The IAEA said Iran had only told it of the postponement on Sunday, three weeks after Rouhani was sworn in.

Western leaders are concerned the Arak complex could offer Iran a second path to weapons-grade fissile material by churning out plutonium. Iran denies any such intention, saying the Arak facility is to produce isotopes for agriculture and medicine.

Israel has threatened to attack Iran if diplomacy fails to rein in its program and it amasses enough medium-enriched uranium to make a nuclear weapon, if refined further.
But the election of Rouhani, who served as chief nuclear negotiator under Ahmadinejad’s reformist predecessor, Mohammad Khatami, has raised cautious Western hopes of breaking the prolonged, increasingly volatile deadlock in the negotiations.

*Editing by Mark Heinrich.*


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FARS News Agency – Iran
Thursday, August 29, 2013

**Putin: No Evidence on Use of Chemical Weapons by Syrian Gov't**

TEHRAN (FNA) - Russian President Vladimir Putin in a phone conversation with his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rouhani condemned the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and said there is no evidence that the Syrian government has used such weapons since it doesn’t need to do so.

During the phone talk on Wednesday evening, President Putin said international issues have become very complicated, adding that Russia, like Iran, believes that use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, is unacceptable.

Putin said no evidence has been given on the use of chemical weapons by the government of Syria, adding that Russia does not believe that Syrian government has used chemical weapons since they have been advancing in the war and did not need to do it.

Putin said Iran and Russia's stances on Syria are identical, adding that if US has any evidence to prove that Syria has used chemical weapons, as they claim, they should give their information to the UN inspectors.

President Rouhani, for his part, said that Iran is keen to consult with Russia on different issues including the problem of Syria.

Praising the principled stance of Russia on Syria, he said that this stance helps establish peace in Syria.

President Rouhani said the Islamic Republic of Iran strongly condemns use of chemical weapons anywhere and by anybody but believes that any prejudgment on the issue can be dangerous.

Rouhani said likely military move of the western countries against Syria is a source of concern, adding that Syria has a sensitive and strategic position and any military attack against it can cause instability all over the Middle-East.

Rouhani called for all efforts to prevent the military attack, and said such an attack can put at risk all the achievements of peace-loving countries.

On Saturday, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel claimed that the White House is studying different military options against Syria under the alleged pretext of using chemical weapons.

Hagel suggested the Pentagon is moving forces into place ahead of possible military action against Syria, even as President Barack Obama voiced caution.


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Press TV – Iran

**Iran to Unveil Passive Phased Array Radar System: Senior Cmdr.**

Thursday, August 29, 2013
A senior Iranian commander says the Islamic Republic plans to unveil a passive phased array radar system capable of detecting stealth aircraft.

The radar system is “technically and tactically unique,” Commander of Khatam al-Anbiya Air Defense Base Brigadier General Farzad Esmali was quoted by Fars news agency as saying on Thursday.

“The radar will be unveiled on September 1st in the Sacred Defense Week and it will be deployed once its location is determined,” Esmali said.

He added that the country’s Defense Ministry has upgraded Mersad 2 missile system, which is being used at Khatam al-Anbiya Air Defense Base.

The commander said Mersad 2 is an upgraded version of Mersad 1 system, adding it has great capabilities in electronic warfare and that its range has increased as well.

On Monday, Esmali said that Iran’s air defense was fully self-sufficient in producing the required military equipment, adding all the country’s old systems had been upgraded and domestically manufactured.

Meanwhile, Iran’s first indigenously manufactured floating radar has also been installed and launched on a vessel at the country’s northern Amirabad Port.

The seaborne Sahand Radar, which has been designed and developed by Iranian experts, was mounted on Miankaleh vessel, tested and put into operation on Wednesday.

The achievement is part of an ongoing national drive to fully tap into the potential of local industries and indigenously produce state-of-the-art equipment.

The home-made radar device has a 4.0-kilowatt transmitter unit and has been tested seven miles (11 kilometers) offshore, which compares to the foreign-made Furuno 1832 radar unit.

The Sahand Radar is on experimental service and will eventually be mass-produced after undergoing final tests.

In recent years, Iran has made great achievements in its defense sector and attained self-sufficiency in producing essential military equipment and systems.

The Islamic Republic has also held several military drills to enhance the defense capabilities of its armed forces and to test modern military tactics and equipment.

Iran has repeatedly said that its military might poses no threat to other countries, reiterating that its defense doctrine is based on deterrence.


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Los Angeles Times

China Warns U.S. against Attack on Syria

By Barbara Demick
August 29, 2013

BEIJING -- In what has become a predictable refrain from Beijing, the Chinese government Thursday warned the United States against conducting airstrikes against Syria.

All of the major Chinese news organizations railed against military action, saying Syria could turn into another Iraq. The Chinese also said they were not convinced that Syrian President Bashar Assad’s government used chemical weapons against its own people, as asserted by the White House.
In a statement posted on the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s website, Foreign Minister Wang Yi implied that Beijing would exercise its veto power on a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. The point is somewhat moot because Russia already has said it would block such a resolution.

"External military intervention is contrary to the U.N. charter aims and the basic norms governing international relations and could exacerbate instability in the Middle East," Wang said.

"Turning Syria into another Libya or even Iraq is the last thing most people around the world want to see," opined the English-language China Daily in a strongly worded editorial on Thursday. "Before the crisis takes a turn from bad to worse, it is high time the U.S. learned from its past mistakes."

Chinese scholars pointed to the errors of U.S. intelligence in 2003 claiming that former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime possessed weapons of mass destruction.

"Who used the chemical weapons in Syria isn’t clear," said Li Wei, director of the Beijing-based Institute of Security and Arms Control Studies at a briefing for journalists Thursday.

China is Syria’s largest trade partner, with exports from China totaling $2.4 billion in 2011. But analysts said economic relations with Syria, which has modest oil reserves, were not a primary factor in Beiking's opposition to military action.

Yin Gang, a widely quoted Middle East expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said airstrikes against Assad’s regime would strengthen the hand of Al Qaeda and other Islamic militants.

"A democratic Christian country should not be interfering in an Islamic civil war. It would be a big mistake," Yin said.


The London Daily Telegraph – U.K.

**Syrian Army Moves Scud Missiles Ahead of Expected US Military Strikes**

*President Bashar al-Assad’s forces have removed several Scud missiles and dozens of launchers from a base north of Damascus, possibly to protect the weapons from a Western attack, opposition sources said on Thursday.*

Reuters

30 August 2013

The move from the position in the foothills of the Qalamoun mountains, one of Syria’s most heavily militarised districts, appears part of a precautionary but limited redeployment of armaments in areas of central Syria still held by Assad’s forces, diplomats based in the Middle East told Reuters.

They said rebel raids and fighting near key roads had blocked a wider evacuation of the hundreds of security and army bases that dot the country of 22 million, where Assad’s late father imposed his autocratic dynasty four decades ago.

With U.S. air strikes looming in response to poison gas attacks last week on rebel-held Damascus suburbs, some of the formations on the move are accused by Assad’s opponents of firing the chemical weapons. The Syrian government blames rebels for releasing gas but Western powers hold Assad responsible.

At the headquarters of the army’s 155th Brigade, a missile unit whose base sprawls along the western edge of Syria’s main highway running north from the capital to Homs, rebel scouts saw dozens mobile Scud launchers pulling out early on Thursday.

Rebel military sources said spotters saw missiles draped in tarpaulins on the launchers, as well as trailer trucks carrying other rockets and equipment. More than two dozen Scuds – 11-metre (35-foot) long ballistic missiles with ranges of 300km (200 miles) and more – were fired from the base in the Qalamoun area this year, some of which hit even Aleppo in the far north.
The base was among a list of suggested targets presented by the rebel Syrian National Coalition to Western envoys in Istanbul earlier this week, opposition sources said. Scud units, of Soviet or North Korean manufacture, are designed to be mobile and so could still be set up quickly to fire from new positions.

Syrian military authorities do not discuss troop movements publicly. No government spokesman was available for comment.

Assad’s forces appeared already by Wednesday to have evacuated most personnel from army and security command headquarters in central Damascus, residents and opposition sources in the capital said.

In the Qalamoun area, an activist calling himself Amer al-Qalamouni told Reuters by telephone: "Most of the personnel in the base appear to have left.

He added that trailer trucks loaded with military equipment were also seen on the Damascus ring road to the south: "Either the hardware is being transported to be stored elsewhere or it will remain constantly on the move to avoid being hit," he said.

Captain Firas Bitar of the Tahriri al-Sham rebel force, who is from the Qalamoun area but is based in a Damascus suburb, said two other missile units based near the 155th in the districts of Qutaifa and Nasiriya were also moving rockets out.

He said they could be move northwest to loyalist strongholds near Homs or further into the coastal mountain heartland of Assad’s minority Alawite sect.

Opposition sources also suspected the evacuation of another missile unit based in Sahya, just south of Damascus. "The Sahya barracks have been hitting the southern suburbs with rockets and artillery non-stop," said rebel Commander Abu Ayham of the Ansar al-Islam brigade. "Since yesterday, nothing has been fired from the camp, suggesting it has been emptied."

Edited by Steve Wilson.


Los Angeles Times

U.N. Chemical Weapons Inspection Team Wraps up Work in Syria

By Patrick J. McDonnell

August 30, 2013

BEIRUT—The United Nations chemical weapons inspection team in Syria was reported to have wrapped up its field work Friday and was preparing to leave the war-torn country on Saturday.

U.N. officials have generally described the 20-member contingent’s work as a success. The inspectors visited several sites of the suspected Aug. 21 poison gas attack and gathered samples, apparently of possibly contaminated soil, tissue and other evidence, and also interviewed victims, witnesses, doctors and others in and around Damascus, the Syrian capital.

The U.N. team spent four working days on the ground in the Damascus area, crossing rebel lines to collect evidence in areas that are, in effect, war zones. The team fell prey to one sniper attack but there were no casualties, officials said.

The Syrian government and the opposition expressed public support for the U.N. mission. Each side blames the other for the incident, which reportedly killed hundreds of civilians, sparking international outrage. Some experts say images uploaded on the Internet of the victims suggest a nerve agent was unleashed, though the photographic record was not conclusive.
The collected samples are expected to be analyzed at laboratories in Europe for traces of chemical agents. Whether the process will take days or weeks is unclear. The team’s mandate is limited to determining whether chemical agents were released, not apportioning blame for the use of toxic substances. Experts, however, have said the findings could provide important clues about who was responsible for the incident.

Earlier this week, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon urged U.S. and other Western officials to give the U.N. an opportunity to do its work before resorting to a military strike on Syria.

“Give peace a chance,” Ban said Wednesday in a speech in the Hague. “Give diplomacy a chance. Stop fighting and stop talking.”

Amid reports of an impending U.S. retaliatory missile assault on Syrian government targets, some have suggested that Washington would prefer to wait until the U.N. contingent departs before mounting any attack. The U.N. says the team plans to leave Syria on Saturday.


Asahi Shimbun – Japan

**Experts Urge Japan to Break Away from ‘Failed’ Nuclear Reprocessing Program**

August 28, 2013
By YASUJI NAGAI, Senior Staff Writer

In a proposal submitted to The Asahi Shimbun, researchers at an international group of nuclear experts outlined steps they say Japan must take to break away from its “failed” nuclear fuel recycling policy.

Masafumi Takubo and Frank von Hippel of the International Panel on Fissile Materials noted that Japan currently has 44 tons of already separated plutonium, enough to make more than 5,000 Nagasaki-type atomic bombs, while it has no clear path toward disposal.

In the proposal titled, “Ending plutonium separation: An alternative approach to managing Japan’s spent nuclear fuel,” they said Japan’s reprocessing policy has “insignificant” resource conservation and radioactive waste management benefits.

It is also “becoming increasingly dysfunctional, dangerous and costly,” since weapon-useable separated plutonium is a “magnet for would-be nuclear terrorists,” the authors said. Japan’s program is also setting an ill example for countries interested in nuclear-weapon options, they added.

The IPFM is a group of independent nuclear experts from 17 countries whose goal is to promote international initiatives to reduce stocks of plutonium and uranium and limit any further production.

Japan still pins hope on starting reprocessing at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Aomori Prefecture. But the practical use of its prototype breeder reactor, Monju, is nowhere in sight, the researchers said.

Japan has decided to recycle its accumulating separated plutonium into mixed-oxide (MOX) uranium-plutonium fuel for light water reactors, but this program, too, has failed, they added.

The report says Japan cannot change its reprocessing policy without the central government and nuclear utilities making a number of difficult decisions at the same time.

One of the decisions is that the central government should convince prefectural and local governments that host Japan’s nuclear power plants to allow on-site dry-cask storage.
The government should also make arrangements to allow Aomori Prefecture and the village of Rokkasho, which are accepting spent fuel, to receive benefits in forms of tax revenue and employment, even after the government gives up its recycling program, the report says.

The government also needs to amend the law governing the national Reprocessing Fund to allow Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. to continue to pay back the loans used to pay for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant even if a decision is made not to start its commercial operation.

The difficult decisions regarding the pluthermal program to recycle plutonium in light water reactor fuel mean that the industry ministry must concede that the method does not make the radioactive waste less dangerous or easier to dispose of, contrary to its repeated claims, the report says.

The central government should also accept its responsibility to dispose of spent fuel. Then it should move ahead to directly dispose of the 44 tons of already separated plutonium by burying it deep in the ground instead of trying to force public acceptance of the use of MOX fuel at nuclear power plants.

“The United States and most of the other countries that operate nuclear power plants avoid the costs and risks of reprocessing simply by moving older spent fuel into air-cooled dry casks when their spent fuel pools fill up,” the report says.

If the current plan is carried out and the MOX program continues to be stalled, Japan’s total plutonium stockpile will rise to about 100 tons within 10 years—nearly equal to the amount that the United States has produced for weaponry, the report says.

“As the only non-weapon state that reprocesses, Japan is undermining the nonproliferation regime by setting an example that other states interested in a nuclear-weapon option—or even nuclear weapons—can emulate,” it says.

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/AJ201308280071
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Xinhua News – China

**S.Korean President Urges DPRK to Dismantle Nuclear Program**
August 28, 2013

SEOUL, Aug. 28 (Xinhua) -- South Korean President Park Geun-hye on Wednesday urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to give up its nuclear weapons program.

"North Korea (DPRK) is still adhering to the nuclear weapons development despite oppositions from international communities in unison," President Park said in her opening address for the plenary session of National Unification Advisory Council (NUAC), a state body that gives advice on DPRK policies to President Park.

Unless the DPRK dismantles its nuclear program, national unification and peace would go farther away from the Korean Peninsula, Park said, stressing that the DPRK should "put down nuclear weapons from its hands" immediately.

Park's comments came amid easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula after the two Koreas agreed to reopen the jointly operated factory park in the DPRK's border town of Kaesong and hold reunion of families separated by the Korean War (1950-53) in late September.

Park said that the family reunion and the Kaesong industrial complex's normalization can be achieved because foundations have been accumulated for building trust between Seoul and Pyongyang with patience.

The country's chief executive noted that if denuclearization in the DPRK makes a clear progress, higher level of cooperation between the two countries can kick off.

Chicago Tribune

**Construction Work Seen Near Mothballed North Korean Reactor-IAEA**

* North Korea said in April it would revive reactor
* IAEA says observes construction work near plant
* But "not possible" to say when it may start operation

Reuters
August 28, 2013

VIENNA — North Korea has been carrying out construction work at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, including near a mothballed reactor that experts say could produce plutonium for bombs, a U.N. nuclear agency report showed on Wednesday.

The U.N. watchdog, which monitors the isolated state's nuclear developments via satellite, said the activities appeared to be broadly consistent with the North's "statements that it is further developing its nuclear capabilities."

North Korea's nuclear program "remains a matter of serious concern," the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report to member states said.

Pyongyang announced in April that it would revive the aged Yongbyon five-megawatt research reactor that yields bomb-grade plutonium, but stressed it was seeking a deterrent capacity.

Nuclear experts said at the time it would probably take about half a year to get the reactor up and running if it had not suffered significant damage from neglect.

The Yongbyon reactor has been technically out of operation for years. In 2008 the North destroyed its cooling tower as a confidence-building step in U.S.-led multilateral negotiations aimed at reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula.

But the thaw in tensions was short-lived. Six-nation aid-for-disarmament talks between the two Koreas, China, Russia, Japan and the United States have been stalled for years.

North Korea said in July it would not give up its nuclear deterrent until Washington ends its "hostile policy" towards Pyongyang, although it was ready to revive nuclear talks. The United States fought on the side of the South in the 1950-53 Korean War, which ended in a truce, not a peace treaty.

North Korea — which withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 — conducted its third nuclear test in February this year, prompting stiffer U.N. sanctions.

The IAEA report suggested North Korea may have enough uranium for a "full core load" of fuel but it was "not possible to determine when the reactor may start operation."

It said construction activities on buildings adjacent to the reactor building and the excavation of trenches in the vicinity were observed between March and June.

"These trenches appear to be related to the reconfiguration of the reactor's cooling system," it said. "If this is the case, such a reconfiguration could possibly enable the reactor to be restarted without rebuilding the cooling tower."


Yonhap News Agency – South Korea
August 30, 2013

**Wu's Trip to N. Korea 'Positive' Toward Resumption of Nuclear Talks**
By Kim Deok-hyun

BEIJING, Aug. 30 (Yonhap) -- This week's visit by China's chief nuclear envoy to North Korea is expected to have a "pretty positive" effect on the resumption of stalled nuclear talks, a Chinese foreign-policy expert said Friday, amid indications Beijing is accelerating its efforts to revive the six-party talks on the North's nuclear programs.

The Chinese nuclear envoy, Wu Dawei, flew to North Korea on Monday on a trip seen as aimed at re-starting the six-party denuclearization talks that have been stalled since 2008. The forum, launched in 2003, involves the two Koreas, China, the U.S., Japan and Russia.

Wu held talks with North Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan who doubles as the country's nuclear envoy. The North's Korean Central News Agency reported without giving any other details except to say that they had "friendly" discussions.

Ruan Zongze, the vice president of the China Institute of International Studies, said the trip by Wu to North Korea "is pretty positive and it's a very timely attempt from the Chinese side to conduct dialogues with our counterparts in the DPRK (North Korea).

"We will do whatever from the Chinese side to contribute to this kind of dialogue," Ruan told Yonhap News Agency in an interview. "We will do some preparations for a kind of resumption of the six-party talks as early as possible."

After stoking tensions early this year by conducting its third nuclear test, North Korea has recently made overtures toward South Korea and the U.S.

South Korea and the U.S. have called on North Korea to demonstrate its seriousness about denuclearization through concrete actions before any resumption of the six-party nuclear talks can take place.

North Korea has expressed its willingness to rejoin the six-party talks but has shown no signs of accepting such conditions set by Seoul and Washington. Instead, North Korea has insisted on being recognized as a nuclear power.

Seoul and Pyongyang, however, have shown clear signs of easing tensions in recent weeks, by agreeing to reopen a jointly run industrial complex in the North's border city of Kaesong that was shuttered in April.

In another conciliatory gesture, North Korea has agreed to resume programs to temporarily reunite separated family members on both sides of the border.

"I think this is a moment for relevant parties to boost a kind of dialogue concerning the Korean Peninsula," Ruan said.

"Earlier this year, it was a pretty tense situation. But now, I think the North and South are engaging in dialogue and China is also playing a part to facilitate and to encourage parties in the region to have more dialogues."

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/interview/2013/08/29/17/0800000000AEN20130829010900315F.html

ITAR-TASS News Agency – Russia
28 August 2013

Bulava Missile to be Test-Launched from Dmitry Donskoy Nuclear Sub

MOSCOW, August 28 (Itar-Tass) - An intercontinental ballistic missile Bulava will be test-launched from the Project 941 Akula nuclear-powered submarine Dmitry Donskoy in the autumn of this year, a source in the Russian defence and industrial complex told Itar-Tass on Wednesday.

In turn, another source acquainted with the situation explained to Itar-Tass, “A field test of an advanced modification of this missile can be one of possible goals of the Bulava launch from Dmitry Donskoy. “The nuclear-powered submarine Dmitry Donskoy is a well-developed testing complex, as opposed to silo-based Borei class Bulava carriers,” he added.
All previous test-launches of Bulava from the submarines Dmitry Donskoy and Yuri Dolgoruky (the Project 955 Borei head carrier of Bulava) failed, as no missiles were fired on the orders from the General Staff of the Armed Forces with the use of a new automatic control system for the missiles launches.

Director General of the Severodvinsk shipyard Sevmash Mikhail Budnichenko said at the international naval show, which was held in St. Petersburg last July, that the nuclear-powered submarine Alexander Nevsky, which is the first production Bulava carrier, will test-launch this missile. Budnichenko noted that Alexander Nevsky is planned to be put into service of the Navy on November 15. One or two more test-launches of Bulava are to be made before the end of this year, Director General of the Automation Research-and-Production Association Leonid Shalimov said last April. Thus, a Bulava test-launch from Dmitry Donskoy is to become the second test-launch of the missile this year. Last time the intercontinental ballistic missile Bulava was test-launched from the Project 955 head nuclear submarine Yuri Dolgoruky in December 2011.

It was decided that the modernized missile carrier Dmitry Donskoy will be left in service until 2017 as a testing platform for missiles and other weaponry. Two other Project 941 warships, Severstal and Arkhangelsk, will be scrapped. During the test-launches from Dmitry Donskoy more than ten test-launches of Bulava were made. A total number of the Bulava test-launches from Yuri Dolgoruky and The Dmitry Donskoy is now 18.

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

**S-300 Missiles for Iran ‘Dismantled, Scrapped’ – Manufacturer**

29 August 2013

ZHUKOVSKY, August 29 (RIA Novosti) – The S-300 advanced air defense missile systems that Russia refused to deliver to Iran have now been completely dismantled and scrapped, the CEO of the company that built them said Thursday.

“The equipment that was to have been delivered to Iran is no more,” Almaz-Antey Corporation’s CEO Vladislav Menshchikov said. “We have dismantled it completely. Some elements, which could be used, have been used. Some have been scrapped.”

Every contract is made for a particular client and cannot be adjusted to the requirements of another, he said.

“The makeup is different, the specifications are different, and the software is different,” Menshchikov said.

Russia signed a deal in 2007 to provide Iran four S-300 batteries. Russia annulled the contract in 2010 due to concerns over its nuclear program. Iran filed a $4 billion lawsuit for compensation over the failed deal, which is pending review in an international arbitration court in Geneva.

Russian daily Vedomosti said in June, citing undisclosed Russian arms industry sources, that Russia had offered to provide Iran with Antei-2500 air defense systems, but the offer was never officially confirmed.

Anatoly Isaikin, the head of Russia’s state-run arms export monopoly Rosoboronexport said in mid-August his agency had no plans to provide Iran with replacements for the S-300 missile defense systems that Russia had refused to deliver.

S-300 is a family of air defense missile systems capable of engaging aerial targets from helicopters to cruise and ballistic missiles. The more capable variants of the system would be capable of engaging aircraft far inside the airspace of neighboring states to Iran, according to analysts.

Israel, in particular, lobbied hard against the S-300 deal, according to Israeli media, over concerns that any Israeli air attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be made far more dangerous if Tehran operated the system.

http://en.rian.ru/world/20130829/183040436/S-300-Missiles-for-Iran-Dismantled-Scrapped---Manufacturer.html
RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

**Russia’s New Bomber to Carry Hypersonic Weapons – Source**
30 August 2013

MOSCOW, August 30 (RIA Novosti) - Russia’s next generation long-range bomber PAK-DA will be armed with hypersonic weapons, a Defense Ministry source told RIA Novosti, the news agency reported.

“PAK-DA will be equipped with all advanced types of precision guided weapons, including hypersonic,” the source said, adding that the bomber itself will be subsonic.

Earlier this week, Boris Obnosov, general director of the Tactical Missile Systems Corporation, revealed that Russia has developed a hypersonic missile. However, he added that although it has been developed, it can only make seconds-long flights.

In September 2012, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, whose brief covers the defense industry, announced plans to merge the Tactical Missile Corporation and NPO Mashinostroyenie.


In August 2012, Rogozin told the Rossiya 24 TV network “I think we need to go down the route of hypersonic technology and we are moving in that direction and not falling behind the Americans.”


DefenseNews.com

**Report: Russia to Deploy 'Star Wars' Missile System in 2017**

Agence France-Presse (AFP)
August 30, 2013

MOSCOW — Russia’s defense ministry plans to deploy in 2017 a sophisticated new air missile defense system that can hit targets in space, a senior ministry source told Russian news agencies Friday.

“The promising S-500 air defense missile system is at the development stage. It’s planned to be deployed in 2017,” the source was quoted as saying by the Interfax news agency.

The long-range system will be able to destroy targets even if they are in space and cover the whole Russian territory, the source added.

Russia is developing more and more effective missile defense systems for use as a deterrent while opposing plans by the United States to build a missile defense shield in Europe.

Russia says its most advanced anti-aircraft and anti-missile system currently in use, the S-400 Triumph, has a range of 400 kilometers.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said last year that Russia’s armed forces would acquire around 28 S-400s over the following decade.

Russia has declined to cancel hugely controversial contracts to supply Syria with four of its powerful S-300 air defense missile systems, a deal that has sparked international concern.
Putin in June praised the S-300s as the best such systems in the world and said Russia had not yet delivered the systems to Syria to avoid changing the balance of power in the region.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad told Izvestia pro-Kremlin daily on Monday that all Syria’s contracts with Russia were being fulfilled.


National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

**B61-12 Life Extension Program Radar Drop Tests Completed Successfully**

*Press Release*

*August 29, 2013*

WASHINGTON, D.C. – As part of the ongoing effort to refurbish the aging B61 nuclear bomb without resorting to underground nuclear testing, two successful B61-12 radar drop tests were successfully completed at the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada on Aug. 14 and 15, 2013, by engineers from Sandia National Laboratories.

Current B61s use decades-old vacuum tubes as part of their radar system. The new radar system, which had not been tested outside of a laboratory environment, was assembled in a gravity bomb configuration and successfully functioned as it was dropped from a helicopter.

“The B61 contains the oldest components in the U.S. arsenal,” said Don Cook, National Nuclear Security Administration Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs. “As long as the United States continues to have nuclear weapons, we must ensure that they remain safe, secure and effective without the use of underground testing. The B61 has been in service a decade longer than planned, and our refurbishment program is a scientific and engineering challenge. These successful tests have given us confidence in our ability to integrate the new radar design and move forward with our efforts to increase the safety and security of the bomb.”

The Nuclear Weapons Council, a joint Department of Defense and Department of Energy/NNSA organization established by Congress, moved the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP) from the planning stages to development engineering in February 2012. The scope of this LEP includes refurbishment of both nuclear and non-nuclear components to address aging, ensure extended service life, and improve safety, reliability and security of the bomb. With the incorporation of a new Air Force tail kit assembly, the design will also enable consolidation and replacement of the existing B61-3, -4, -7, and -10 bombs by the B61-12 bomb. The LEP will reuse or remanufacture existing components to the extent possible.

This radar drop test is one of several critical milestones for the B61-12 LEP this year. Radar testing will continue with integration of other B61-12 components, including the weapon and firing control units to demonstrate the arming, fuzing and firing subsystem. The B61-12 LEP is an essential element of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent and of the nation’s commitments to extended deterrence and it ensures the continued vitality of the air-delivered leg of the U.S. nuclear triad.

http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/droptest082913

AirForceTimes.com

**Exotic Weapons Aim to Destroy Chemical Weapons**

*By Tom Vanden Brook, USA Today*

*August 29, 2013*
WASHINGTON — The Pentagon has spent more than a decade trying to develop weapons to neutralize chemical weapons, the threat that has the United States poised to launch a missile strike on Syria, according to military planning documents and officials.

The weapons, which would be attached to a bomb dropped from an aircraft, are supposed to neutralize chemical weapons where they are produced or stored. U.S. and western officials accuse Syrian President Bashar Assad and his government of unleashing chemical weapons on civilians. Hundreds of Syrians died Aug. 21 in a suspected chemical attack, and the Obama administration has said Assad’s government is responsible for it.

What to attack — and how — are key questions for military planners. Four Navy destroyers in the eastern Mediterranean carry cruise missiles that can hit targets in Syria. The U.S. Air Force has used its stealthy B-2 bomber to hit high-priority targets in Iraq and Libya and would seem capable of carrying such a weapon.

The Pentagon’s interest in a countermeasure for chemical and biological weapons surged after the 9/11 terror attacks and the assumption that Saddam Hussein and other rogue leaders had stockpiles of nerve agents and biological weapons.

Pentagon budget documents show that testing of so-called Agent Defeat weapon continues. Getting one to work without causing more harm than good has been a struggle. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency has spent tens of millions of dollars developing and testing the weapon. The Navy dropped out of the Agent Defeat program in 2005 because byproducts from its explosion proved toxic.

The agency continues to explore ways to eliminate chemical weapons safely, said Jennifer Elzea, a Pentagon spokeswoman. Details of current research and development are classified, she said.

The Air Force has two Agent Defeat weapons, CrashPAD and the Passive Attack Weapon (PAW), according to Jennifer Cassidy, an Air Force spokeswoman. Instead of explosives, these relatively low-tech weapons use metal rods or fragments to pierce containers holding toxic chemicals, allowing them to escape.

To be effective in densely populated areas, an Agent Defeat bomb must destroy toxic chemicals without dispersing them.

In 2002, the Navy announced that it was developing the weapon and pairing it with bombs designed to penetrate fortified buildings. The Navy described it working this way: after bursting into a storage bunker, the warhead would spray copper plates at high speeds to tear into tanks containing toxic chemicals. Material within the warhead would burn so hot it would vaporize the chemicals that escape. A byproduct that explosion would generate chlorine gas, a disinfectant.

If successful, analysts say, the weapon would represent a significant step in the fight against chemical weapons. But destroying only part of the toxic chemical agents and spreading the rest would be a failure.

“The risk is that you would create a more serious mass-casualty event than what you were responding to,” said John Pike, executive director of GlobalSecurity.org, a defense policy organization.

A successful attack with the Agent Defeat weapon requires precise targeting. If chemical weapons are stored near populated areas, the need for a perfect strike increases, said Loren Thompson, a defense industry consultant and military analyst at the Lexington Institute.

“If the weapons miss their aim points or don’t burn intensely, they could disperse the chemical agents in a way that causes massive casualties,” Thompson said. “The most effective way to render nerve agents and other chemical weapons harmless is to quickly incinerate them in a isolated location such as a bunker. If they are stored among civilians, there is great danger of collateral damage.”


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Exclusive: Intercepted Calls Prove Syrian Army Used Nerve Gas, U.S. Spies Say

Posted By Noah Shachtman  
Tuesday, August 27, 2013

Last Wednesday, in the hours after a horrific chemical attack east of Damascus, an official at the Syrian Ministry of Defense exchanged panicked phone calls with a leader of a chemical weapons unit, demanding answers for a nerve agent strike that killed more than 1,000 people. Those conversations were overheard by U.S. intelligence services, The Cable has learned. And that is the major reason why American officials now say they're certain that the attacks were the work of the Bashar al-Assad regime -- and why the U.S. military is likely to attack that regime in a matter of days.

But the intercept raises questions about culpability for the chemical massacre, even as it answers others: Was the attack on Aug. 21 the work of a Syrian officer overstepping his bounds? Or was the strike explicitly directed by senior members of the Assad regime? "It's unclear where control lies," one U.S. intelligence official told The Cable. "Is there just some sort of general blessing to use these things? Or are there explicit orders for each attack?"

Nor are U.S. analysts sure of the Syrian military's rationale for launching the strike -- if it had a rationale at all. Perhaps it was a lone general putting a long-standing battle plan in motion; perhaps it was a miscalculation by the Assad government. Whatever the reason, the attack has triggered worldwide outrage, and put the Obama administration on the brink of launching a strike of its own in Syria. "We don't know exactly why it happened," the intelligence official added. "We just know it was pretty fucking stupid."

American intelligence analysts are certain that chemical weapons were used on Aug. 21 -- the captured phone calls, combined with local doctors' accounts and video documentation of the tragedy -- are considered proof positive. That is why the U.S. government, from the president on down, has been unequivocal in its declarations that the Syrian military gassed thousands of civilians in the East Ghouta region.

However, U.S. spy services still have not acquired the evidence traditionally considered to be the gold standard in chemical weapons cases: soil, blood, and other environmental samples that test positive for reactions with nerve agent. That's the kind of proof that America and its allies processed from earlier, small-scale attacks that the White House described in equivocal tones, and declined to muster a military response to in retaliation.

There is an ongoing debate within the Obama administration about whether to strike Assad immediately -- or whether to allow United Nations inspectors to try and collect that proof before the bombing begins. On Tuesday, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney called the work of that team "redundant ... because it is clearly established already that chemical weapons have been used on a significant scale."

But within the intelligence community, at least, "there's an interest in letting the U.N. piece run its course," the official said. "It puts the period on the end of the sentence."

When news about the Ghouta incident first trickled out, there were questions about whether or not a chemical agent was to blame for the massacre. But when weapons experts and U.S. intelligence analysts began reviewing the dozens of videos and pictures allegedly taken from the scene of the attacks, they quickly concluded that a nerve gas, such as sarin, had been used there. The videos showed young victims who were barely able to breathe and, in some cases, twitching. Close-up photos revealed that their pupils were severely constricted. Doctors and nurses who say they treated the victims reported that they later became short of breath as well. Eyewitnesses talk of young children so confused, they couldn't even indentify their own parents. All of these are classic signs of exposure to a nerve agent like sarin, the Assad regime's chemical weapon of choice.
Making the case even more conclusive were the images of the missiles that supposedly delivered the deadly attacks. If they were carrying conventional warheads, they would have likely been all but destroyed as they detonated. But several missiles in East Ghouta were found largely intact. "Why is there so much rocket left? There shouldn't be so much rocket left," the intelligence official told The Cable. The answer, the official and his colleagues concluded, was that the weapon was filled with nerve agent, not a conventional explosive.

In the days after the attacks, there was a great deal of public discussion about which side in Syria's horrific civil war actually launched the strike. Allies of the Assad regime, like Iran and Russia, pointed the finger at the opposition. The intercepted communications told a different story -- one in which the Syrian government was clearly to blame.

The official White House line is that the president is still considering his options for Syria. But all of Washington is talking about a punitive strike on the Assad government in terms of when, not if. Even some congressional doves have said they're now at least open to the possibility of U.S. airstrikes in Syria. Images of dead children, neatly stacked in rows, have a way of changing minds.

"It's horrible, it's stupid," the intelligence official said about the East Ghouta attack by the Syrian military. "Whatever happens in the next few days -- they get what they deserve."

http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/27/exclusive_us_spies_say_intercepted_calls_prove_syrias_army_used_nerve_gas

GAFFNEY: America’s Vanishing Deterrent

Syria’s chemical weapons serve as a reminder that few are following the U.S. in disarming

By Frank J. Gaffney Jr., The Washington Times

Tuesday, August 27, 2013

President Obama appears to be poised to embroil the United States in a new war in Syria in response to the recent, murderous use of chemical weapons there. Ill-advised as this step is, it is but a harbinger of what is to come as reckless U.S. national security policies and postures meet the hard reality of determined adversaries emboldened by our perceived weakness.

The focus at the moment is on what tactical response the president will make to punish Syrian dictator Bashar Assad for his alleged violation of Mr. Obama’s glibly declared “red line” barring the use of such weapons of mass destruction. There seems to be little serious thought given at the moment to what happens next: What steps Mr. Assad and his allies, Iran and Hezbollah, may take against us, our interests and allies; what the repercussions will be of the United States further helping the Muslim Brotherhood and al Qaeda forces who make up the bulk of Mr. Assad’s domestic opposition; and the prospects for a far wider war as a result of the answers to both of these questions.

Even more wanting is some serious reflection about decisions made long before Mr. Obama came to office — but that are consonant with his own deeply flawed predilections about deterrence. More than two decades ago, President George H.W. Bush decided he would “rid the world of chemical weapons.” The United Nations Chemical Weapons Convention has had the predictable result that the United States has eliminated all such arms in its arsenal, leaving only bad guys like Mr. Assad with stockpiles of Sarin nerve gas and other toxic chemical weapons.

No one can say for sure whether the threat of retaliation in kind would have affected recent calculations about the use of such weapons in Syria. What we do know is that they have been used, evidently repeatedly, in the absence of such a deterrent.
Unfortunately, Mr. Obama seems determined to repeat this dangerous experiment with America's nuclear forces. He has made it national policy to rid the world of these weapons. As with our chemical stockpile, Mr. Obama seems determined to set an example in the hope that others will follow.

This policy has set in motion a series of actions whose full dimensions are not generally appreciated. All planned steps to modernize our nuclear arsenal have either been canceled or deferred off into the future, which probably amounts to the same thing. Consequently, we will, at best, have to rely indefinitely on a deterrent made up of very old weapons. Virtually all of them are many years beyond their designed service life, and most are deployed aboard ground-based missiles, submarines and bombers that are also approaching or in that status as well.

Another symptom of the deteriorating condition of our nuclear arsenal is the fact that the Air Force has taken disciplinary action for the second time in the past few months against some of those responsible for the operations of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. There are surely specific grounds for these punishments. We are kidding ourselves, though, if we fail to consider the devastating impact on the morale and readiness of such personnel when they are told, at least implicitly, by the commander in chief that their mission is not only unimportant — it is one he wishes to terminate as soon as practicable.

Does this seem far-fetched? Recall that eliminating outright our land-based missile force is something Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel personally endorsed prior to taking office. That may be the result if the president succeeds in reducing our nuclear forces to just 1,000 deployed weapons. As of now, it is unclear whether he intends to take that step only if the Russians agree or will do so unilaterally if they don’t. Another uncertainty is whether Congress will go along with such rash cuts.

What is clear is that with no more serious debate than has been applied to the implications of becoming embroiled in another war in the Middle East — this time with a country armed with chemical weapons against which we can threaten no in-kind retaliation — the United States has been launched on a trajectory toward a minimal nuclear deterrent.

Fortunately, a group of the nation’s pre-eminent nuclear strategists and practitioners under the leadership of the National Institute for Public Policy has just published a powerful indictment of this misbegotten policy initiative titled “Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence.” It lays bare the faulty assumptions that underpin the Obama denuclearization agenda — not least the fact that the other nuclear powers, including all the threatening ones, are not following the president’s lead.

Some say America can no longer afford a strong and effective deterrent. We may be about to test that proposition in Syria. Heaven help us if we compound the error there by continuing our slide toward a minimal nuclear deterrent posture, en route to a world rid only of our nuclear weapons.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr. was an assistant secretary of defense under President Reagan. He is president of the Center for Security Policy, a columnist for The Washington Times and host of the nationally syndicated program “Secure Freedom Radio.”

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The London Guardian – U.K.
OPINION/Comment Is Free

Even if Assad Used Chemical Weapons, the West Has No Mandate to Act as a Global Policeman

By ordering air strikes against Syria without UN security council support, Obama will be doing the same as Bush in 2003
By Hans Blix
Wednesday, 28 August 2013
It is true that the UN security council is not a reliable global policeman. It may be slow to take action, or paralysed because of disagreement between members. But do we want the US or Nato or "alliances of willing states" as global policemen either? Unlike George Bush in 2003, the Obama administration is not trigger-happy and contemptuous of the United Nations and the rules of its charter, which allow the use of armed force only in self-defence or with an authorisation from the security council. Yet Obama, like Bush and Blair, seems ready to ignore the council and order armed strikes on Syria with political support from only the UK, France and some others.

Such action could not be "in self-defence" or "retaliation", as the US, the UK and France have not been attacked. To punish the Assad government for using chemical weapons would be the action of self-appointed global policemen – action that, in my view, would be very unwise.

While much evidence points to the guilt of the Assad regime, would not due process require that judgment and consideration of action take place in the UN security council and await the report of the inspectors that the UN has sent to Syria – at the demand of the UK and many other UN members?

We may agree with John Kerry, the US secretary of state, that the use of gas is a "moral obscenity", but would we not feel that "a measured and proportionate punishment", like striking at some missile sites or helicopter bases, is like telling the regime that "you can go on with your war but do stay away from the chemical weapons"? And what is the moral weight of the condemnation by nuclear weapons states of the use of gas as a serious war crime when they themselves will not accept a norm that would criminalise any first use of their own nuclear weapons?

It is hard to avoid the impression that the political and military developments now in overdrive stem partly from pressure exerted by the rebel side to trigger an American military intervention – by trying to hold President Obama to an earlier warning to Assad that a use of chemical weapons would alter his calculation. Equally, if not more important, may be a need felt by the Obama administration to avoid criticism for being hesitant and passive – and appearing like a paper tiger to countries such as Iran that have been warned that the US will not allow them to have nuclear weapons.

In 2003 the US and the UK and an alliance of "friendly states" invaded Iraq without the authorisation of the security council. A strong body of world opinion felt that this constituted a violation and an undermining of the UN charter. A quick punitive action in Syria today without UN authorisation would be another precedent, suggesting that great military powers can intervene militarily when they feel politically impelled to do so. (They did not intervene when Iraq used chemical weapons on a large scale in the war with Iran in the 1980s.)

So, what should the world reaction be to the use of chemical weapons? Clearly, evidence available – both from UN inspectors and from member states – should be placed before and judged by the security council. Even if the council could only conclude that chemical weapons had been used – and could not agree that the Assad regime alone was responsible – there would be a good chance of unanimous world condemnation. Global indignation about the use of chemical weapons is of value to strengthen the taboo.

Condemnation is not enough. With 100,000 killed and millions of refugees, the civil war itself is a "moral obscenity". The council must seek to achieve not just an end to chemical weapons use but an end to all weapons use, by a ceasefire. As was planned not long ago by the US and Russia, the council must seek to bring about a conference at which relevant parties and states can form an interim authority. The alternative is continued civil war in Syria and worsening international relations.

Is the ending of active hostilities totally unrealistic? Let us be clear that the government in Syria, as well as all rebel groups, depends upon a flow of weapons, munitions and money from the outside. Much is reported to come to the rebels from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey; and much is reported to come to the government from Russia and Iran. The supplier countries have leverage. Agreement should be sought, under the auspices of the security council, that all parties that have given such support demand that their clients accept a ceasefire – or risk losing further support.

Hans Blix is a Swedish diplomat and politician. He was Swedish minister for foreign affairs. Blix was also the head of the United Nations monitoring, verification and inspection commission from March 2000 to June 2003. In 2002, the commission began searching Iraq for weapons of mass destruction, ultimately finding none.
What South Korea Can Learn from South Asia’s Nuclear Experience

Those calling for South Korea to go nuclear should look at the India-Pakistan experience.

By Timothy Westmyer and Yogesh Joshi
August 29, 2013

India and Pakistan are again at loggerheads, with five Indian soldiers and two Pakistani soldiers were killed on the Line of Control (LOC) in the disputed Kashmir region earlier this month. Since then, the LOC has seen a rapid escalation in cross border exchanges of fire, bringing the sustainability of the 2003 cease fire agreement between the two neighbors into doubt. Earlier, in January, India had accused Pakistani Special Forces of killing two Indian soldiers, claiming one of them was beheaded. These provocations come as progress is stalled in the prosecution of the alleged Pakistan-based masterminds of the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. New Delhi remains unable to influence Islamabad’s policy on state-sponsored terrorism, despite the presence of nuclear arsenals in South Asia since the 1990s.

Something similar is visible on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean provocations have persisted since its first nuclear weapon test in 2006. Seoul, like New Delhi, has vacillated between diplomacy and military threats to no avail. South Korea’s current state of strategic frustration has convinced some leaders in Seoul that their country needs an indigenous nuclear capability. In the lead-up to President Park Geun-Hye’s inauguration, members of her own Saenuri Party encouraged a nuclear build-up. Rep. Shim Jae-Cheol argued the “only way to defend our survival would be to maintain a balance of terror that confronts nuclear with nuclear.” In June 2012, former Saenuri Party chairman and presidential candidate Chung Mong-Joon called for a “comprehensive re-examination of our security policy” that should give Seoul “the capability to possess” a nuclear arsenal. At a conference earlier this year in Washington, DC Chung leaned heavily on the U.S.-Soviet model: “The only thing that kept the Cold War cold was the mutual deterrence afforded by nuclear weapons...The lesson of the Cold War is that against nuclear weapons, only nuclear weapons can hold the peace.”

These proliferation optimists cite the U.S.-Soviet Cold War model of nuclear deterrence to claim that a South Korean nuclear arsenal would prevent future aggression. The experience of new nuclear weapon states in South Asia, however, suggests that South Korean nuclear weapons will not prove tremendously helpful to this end.

The South Asian Nuclear Instability

India and Pakistan have fought four major wars since independence, including hostilities even after openly attaining nuclear weapons in 1998. The Line of Control in Kashmir remains tense to this day with Pakistan-based terrorists operating in Indian-administered Kashmir for more than two decades. Pakistan’s revisionist motives in Kashmir and the deep-seated ideological divide between the two nations form the edifice of today’s India-Pakistan rivalry.

Several factors within Pakistan’s polity further aggravate animosity between the two nations, especially since nuclearization. First, Pakistan has historically been a garrison state: if all states have armies, Pakistan’s army has a state. Pakistani politics is dominated by the military, which derives legitimacy from its opposition to India. Second, Pakistan has been a conventionally weaker state vis-à-vis India’s military. Pakistan tried to initially offset this vulnerability by incorporating the element of risk and the cult of the offensive in its military doctrine. The major modern conflicts in South Asia were initiated by Pakistan. However, after a comprehensive defeat in 1971, Pakistan’s conventional inferiority prompted it to pursue nuclear weapons as well as sub-conventional warfare against India. Since 1989, Pakistan has supported insurgency in Kashmir and also other non-state actors in the region.

As Pakistan advanced its nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s, sub-conventional provocations and nuclear deterrence became intertwined in what Dr. S. Paul Kapur, professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, has called...
the *instability-instability* paradox. Contrary to the *stability-instability* paradox present during the U.S.-Soviet deterrent relationship where stability at the strategic nuclear level allowed instability for lower-intensity conflict in proxy theaters possible, Kapur writes that in South Asia: “ongoing violence has resulted from a significant possibility of sub-nuclear conflict escalating to the nuclear threshold. Thus, a substantial degree of *instability* at the strategic level has encouraged lower level South Asian violence.”

Pakistan relies on this paradox because as a conventionally weaker military power, it can only wage sub-conventional warfare against India’s vast military resources as long as the risk of nuclear escalation looms over the region. India, therefore, typically eschews larger-scale military options against Islamabad due to the fear of nuclear escalation. The instability-instability paradox was evident in several exchanges between India and Pakistan. A year after both sides tested nuclear devices, Pakistani troops in the garb of local insurgents occupied a large swath of Indian Territory in Kargil. New Delhi’s military response to wrestle back control was significantly more reserved than similar operations in 1965, due in large part to the threat of nuclear use by Pakistan. Further examples include after the 2001 attack on Indian parliament, the 2008 carnage in Mumbai, and recent border skirmishes in Kashmir. The presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia has not eliminated the risk of provocations and conflict. Nuclear proliferation optimists should expect no different if both sides of the 38th parallel go nuclear.

**The Korean Peninsula Experience**

The limitations of applying Cold War nuclear logic to the Koreas are now apparent. South Korea’s security concerns and grievances against North Korea are serious, but a ROK nuclear arsenal would be unlikely to prevent future sub-conventional provocations and will face the same challenges present in South Asia’s uneasy peace.

Nuclear proliferation optimists in South Korea point to a series of North Korean provocations to justify their position. Pyongyang tested nuclear weapons in 2006, 2009, and 2013 and missile technology in 2008, 2009, and 2012. In March 2010, South Korea accused Pyongyang of torpedoing one of its naval vessels, the *Cheonan*, killing 46 sailors. In November 2010, North Korea bombarded South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island, striking both civilian and military targets with artillery shells and rockets, killing four and wounding nineteen. Cross border clashes in 2010 resulted in the deaths of two South Korean marines. Scott Snyder, senior fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, recently predicted “more nuclear and missile tests and/or other North Korean provocations sooner or later, because Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy and his prospects for survival may depend upon it.”

The DPRK depends on instability at the nuclear level to achieve its national ambitions. Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared “we are no longer in a period of cyclical provocations [with North Korea] — where a provocation occurs and then there is a period of time when concessions are made...I think we are in a period of prolonged provocations.” North Korean leaders cultivate an image of irrational decision-making to convince the world that they have the will to move up the escalatory ladder to full-scale conventional or possibly even nuclear war.

Regular provocations are central to North Korea’s deterrent strategy. As U.S. Navy (Ret.) Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt explained, provocations “reinforce the credibility of North Korea’s conventional deterrent by demonstrating a political willingness to risk war.” Threatening “unacceptable consequences on South Korea” through its artillery pieces and long-range rockets is the primary method the DPRK uses to deter the U.S.-ROK alliance. Instability at the nuclear level is essential to this strategy since it further constrains allied responses. If Seoul procures its own nuclear arsenal, as it considered during the 1970s, it is unlikely that Pyongyang would abandon sub-conventional provocations necessary for its overall national security strategy.

**Applying Nuclear Lessons from South Asia**

The South Asian case is well suited for the Korean Peninsula. First, both South Asia and the Koreas represent a conflict dyad where one state is a status quo power (India, South Korea) and the other revisionist (Pakistan, North Korea). If Pakistan wants to assimilate Kashmir from a rather satisfied India, North Korean goals have ranged from uniting the peninsula under its leadership to reversing South Korea’s dominance in the region. Second, both Pakistan and North Korea have dovetailed brinksmanship into their respective conventional and nuclear strategies. On the other hand, India
and South Korea practice strategic restraint in dealing with their neighbors. Third, conflicting states have divergent identities in both cases. If Pakistan professes to be a Muslim state vis-à-vis the secular but Hindu-majority India, North Korea prides itself on its June/communist identity against the liberal democratic South Korea. Fourth, compared to India and South Korea, decision-making in both Pakistan and North Korea is concentrated in fewer hands, which derive much of their legitimacy from opposition to an outside force (Pakistan-India, DPRK-ROK/U.S.). Lastly, both Pakistan and North Korea are weaker states in terms of conventional firepower. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was a revisionist power with a massive conventional force, the revisionist tendencies of Pakistan and North Korea, both conventionally weaker states, require instability at the strategic nuclear level to provoke without prompting retaliation.

Therefore, the South Asian conflict dyad portends a grim future for a possible nuclear South Korea since provocations would likely continue. Whatever Seoul may hope to gain in deterrence benefits, may be outweighed by loss of international standing and security. In addition, unlike South Asia where the United States may try to serve as neutral intermediary during a crisis, Washington is an active party to the conflict in the Koreas due to troop deployments in ROK and its formal security alliance. The worry that instability at the conventional level will cause instability at the nuclear level to escalate motivates the United States to press for calm and an end to hostilities – including retaliation – after a provocation before the attacked party has a chance to respond. Seoul could expect similar pressure should North Korean provocations occur against a nuclear-armed South.

The U.S. nuclear umbrella aims to provide South Korea with a measure of protection against DPRK aggression that neither Pakistan nor India enjoys. North Korean leaders must calculate the willingness of the United States to respond with its nuclear stockpile should Pyongyang attack South Korea with nuclear or large-scale conventional forces. North Korea still chooses to engage in a range of provocations – short of full-scale invasion or nuclear weapon use – despite this umbrella. The experience of India under the instability-instability paradox demonstrates that Seoul should not expect for DPRK provocations to radically diminish simply because nuclear bombs in the region have South Korean flags painted on the side.

Conclusion

The historian and Oxford University professor Margaret MacMillan warned in her book Dangerous Games that “analogies from history must, of course, be treated with care. Using the wrong one not only can present an oversimplified picture of a complex situation in the present but can lead to wrong decisions.” While analogies are difficult to establish and the variations in context may lead to spurious comparisons, nuclear behavior on the Korean Peninsula can be better explained by trends in South Asia rather than the Cold War. As South Korea weighs whether to join the nuclear armed club, the antagonistic experience of new nuclear states in South Asia – not the more optimistic U.S.-Soviet model – should feature most prominently in those debates.

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http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/29/what-south-korea-can-learn-from-south-asias-nuclear-experience/?all=true

(U.S. News & World Report)

OPINION/Article

Obama's Inconceivable, Undesirable, Nuclear-Free Dream

To respond to global threats in Egypt, Syria and elsewhere Obama must have a clear strategy

By LOUIS RENÉ BERES, THOMAS G. MCINERNEY

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From a global security standpoint, escalating events in Egypt and Syria are only the tip of the iceberg. Over the next several years, the United States will also have to deal with a steadily expanding number of other global "hot spots." Some of these flash points could involve the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

How shall we best respond to this significant threat? In order to fully maintain American security in these volatile circumstances, President Barack Obama will need to garner the indispensable benefits of a newly-refined and robust national nuclear strategy.

On its face, this seems like a perfectly obvious and unremarkable observation. Nonetheless, from the moment that he first entered the White House, this president has made it clear that he opposes all nuclear weapons. Ignoring post World War II history, when such weapons likely prevented a third world war between the two superpowers, he steadfastly maintains that they are inherently corrosive and destabilizing. Indeed, for Mr. Obama, there seemingly can be no more high-minded objective than creating "a world free of nuclear weapons."

Plainly, however, global denuclearization is an improbable, and possibly inconceivable, goal. Selectively, at least, it is also undesirable.

For some states, nuclear weapons may be all that stand between continued survival and annihilation. Without nuclear weapons, for example, Israel, a country smaller than Lake Michigan, and surrounded by more than 20 dedicated enemy states, would no longer be able to deter existential aggressors. Deprived of nuclear weapons, it could quickly be stripped of any residually meaningful way to defend itself.

America, too, may now be placing itself at unnecessary risk. With too deteriorated a nuclear arsenal of nuclear weapons, the U.S. could ultimately find itself without a credible deterrent, against a variety of both present and future nuclear adversaries. In this connection, one must first understand that a credible nuclear deterrence posture always involves more than an assembled arsenal of highly destructive warheads. Much more.

Before it is too late, President Obama’s declared goal should cease being "a world free of nuclear weapons," but rather a world that would be less susceptible to eruptions of total war and megaterror. The national strategic objective, therefore, ought no longer be a concocted or idealized world. America needs a nuanced and sophisticated nuclear doctrine, not a thoroughly fictive vision, not one that remains premised on the stubbornly banal syntax of amateur thought.

We require a finely-codified plan for national security, a plan that can deal capably with various jihadi adversaries, both state and sub-state, and also with prospective and still-formidable nuclear foes in Russia, North Korea, China, Iran and, possibly, even a post-coup Pakistan. Whether the White House willingly acknowledges it or not, the world’s first nuclear war could begin not in the Middle East (where it is fairly expected, because of Iran’s unimpeded nuclearization), but in Southwest Asia. In both the Middle East and Southwest Asia, we will need a substantially upgraded strategy for deterring nuclear terrorism.

At least in part, this strategy should involve better worldwide security for fissile material, such as highly-enriched uranium. There are already clear and unassailable indications that al-Qaida has been seeking nuclear weapons for several years. Following earlier disclosures about Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan and his elaborate network for selling nuclear secrets, we know also that there exists a functioning black market for smuggling weapons-usable nuclear material.

During the 1950s, the United States first began to institute various formal doctrines of nuclear deterrence. At that time, at least geopolitically, the world was a much simpler place. Global power distributions were then tightly bipolar; our indisputable enemy was the Soviet Union.

At that time, American national strategy was founded on a policy of “massive retaliation.” Later, especially during the Kennedy years, this narrowly-circumscribed stance was modified by “flexible response.”

Today, a much more complex strategic landscape reveals multiple, inter-penetrating, and sometimes synergistic axes of conflict. There are now almost four times as many countries as existed back in 1945. In this expressly multipolar world,
Russia is once again a justifiably major American security concern. Initially, in the earlier post-Soviet era, the Russian nuclear stance had been prematurely downgraded as a prospective threat to the United States.

Understandably, perhaps, Russian President Vladimir Putin remains fearful of possibly still-planned U.S. ballistic missile defenses in Europe. In his view, a perspective that actually exhibits a standard or “classical” idea of nuclear deterrence, such active defenses would jeopardize the stability of our changing balance of power. This is because the inherent logic of nuclear deterrence (Manhattan Project physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer had once spoken of the superpowers as "two scorpions in a bottle") is based firmly on the idea of "mutual vulnerability."

To shape an authentically improved U.S, strategic doctrine, President Obama will need to reconsider critically fundamental decisions on nuclear targeting. Among other things, any such reconsideration would examine certain basic differences between the targeting of enemy civilians and cities (“countervalue” targeting), and the targeting of enemy military assets and infrastructures (“counterforce” targeting).

Originally, the essence of “massive retaliation” and its corollary, Mutually Assured Destruction, had been counter value targeting. Presently, in those relatively promising scenarios where enemy rationality might still be reliably assumed, effective U.S. deterrence could once again require recognizable policies of counter city targeting. In those unprecedented circumstances where we might need to face non-rational and nuclear state adversaries, however, gainful deterrence calculations could prove markedly more difficult.

America’s strategic doctrine will have to address still-impending options for American preemption, known in law as "anticipatory self-defense," as well as more systematic methods for distinguishing adversaries (state and sub-state) according to whether they are rational, irrational or “mad.” Among these three discrete adversarial designations, there exist very consequential and discernible differences. This refined U.S. strategic doctrine will also need to measure and configure certain vital components of nuclear deterrence, active defense, cyberdefense and cyberwarfare.

As codified at Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution (the “Supremacy Clause”), and at several corollary decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court (especially, The Paquete Habana, 1900), international law is integrally part of the law of the United States. We will, therefore, have to examine such more-or-less intersecting elements of doctrine within the wider and more subtly layered strata of pertinent treaties, customs and legal principles. This jurisprudential examination should include authoritative criteria for identifying and justifying "anticipatory self-defense," and for undertaking nonproliferation regime enforcement.

Within the Department of Defense, and the larger U.S. defense community, a protracted lack of emphasis on nuclear strategy and tactics may already have left our military unprepared for certain uniquely threatening scenarios. To suitably confront this unsustainable deficiency, one generated, in part, by our continuing application of mistaken strategies to wars that involve nation-building, the president needs to commission a special and largely re-imagined Nuclear Posture Review.

This hard-nosed and dialectical assessment should emphasize, inter alia, new program designs for advanced nuclear weapons; further modernization of needed nuclear infrastructures and warheads; and more consciously precise calibrations of American nuclear strategy and tactics to different levels and sites of notable enemy threat. Most dangerous of all, perhaps, will be the conspicuously urgent threat of nuclear terrorism.

In the final analysis, the main thrust of our national security policy efforts must be determinedly intellectual. Even in much simpler times, the highest achievements of U.S. strategic doctrine always managed to emerge not in the triumph of mind over matter, but of mind over mind.

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