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MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

**Issue No. 1067, 26 July 2013**

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Defense Update – Israel  
July 20, 2013

## Iran Could Reach Critical Capability by 2014

By Tamir Eshel

Iran is expected to achieve a critical capability in mid-2014, which is defined as the technical capability to produce sufficient weapon-grade uranium from its safeguarded stocks of low enriched uranium for a nuclear explosive, without being detected. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported in its recent analysis last week.

David Albright and Christina Walrond explain in their report that Iran would achieve this capability principally by implementing its existing, firm plans to install thousands more IR-1 centrifuges, and perhaps a few thousand IR-2m centrifuges, at its declared Natanz and Fordow centrifuge sites. Iran's criticality date could be achieved a few months earlier, if Iran successfully deploys and operates several thousand advanced centrifuges and continues installing thousands of IR-1 centrifuges. "Preventing Iran from achieving a critical capability through sanctions, increased frequency of international inspections, and negotiations is a priority". The report understated.

Iran's nuclear weapons capabilities continue to grow. However, by charting Iran's possible future paths to obtaining a nuclear weapon, the United States and its allies can identify opportunities to slow this growth. One critical factor affecting Iran's potential timeline to the bomb is the speed at which its declared centrifuge capacity could reach a level where it could use its existing, safeguarded stockpile of low enriched uranium to "dash," without timely warning for the international community, to the production of sufficient weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear explosive device. Adequate warning would allow enough time for a response to this action. During the final presidential debate of the 2012 campaign, President Barack Obama characterized such a time as when "we would not be able to intervene in time to stop [Iran's] nuclear program." When Iran reaches the technical capability to produce sufficient weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear explosive without being detected, it can be understood to have achieved what is defined here as a "critical capability."

*ISIS has assessed that in a breakout or dash to nuclear weapons Iran could produce a significant quantity (25 kilograms of uranium enriched to above 90 percent U-235) at its declared centrifuge enrichment plants in as little as a few months. During the next several months of 2013, this minimum timeline could decrease to about one month, depending on the growth of Iran's stock of near 20 percent low enriched uranium and the number of centrifuges it deploys to enrich uranium.*

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which regularly inspects Iran's declared centrifuge plants and the low enriched uranium these sites have produced, would be able to detect breakout within these time periods.

As Iran continues to expand the numbers of its deployed centrifuges at its declared Natanz and Fordow gas centrifuge sites, its breakout times are expected to further decrease. The number of centrifuges it can build and install in cascades depends, among other factors, on its ability to smuggle key goods in violation of other countries' national trade control laws and United Nations Security Council sanctions. But current efforts to stop Iranian smuggling are not sufficient. Iran has installed new centrifuges at a very fast rate over the past year, implying that it is still obtaining key supplies from abroad for its IR-1 centrifuges. Nonetheless, the available information is insufficient to conclude Iran has all it needs in hand to deploy thousands more IR-1 centrifuges or predict with certainty how many additional IR-1 centrifuges Iran will deploy in the next year.

Another factor that will likely decrease breakout times is Iran's deployment of the advanced centrifuge, the IR-2m, at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. Predicting the effect of this deployment remains difficult because Iran has not begun enriching in these centrifuges as of mid-June 2013 and little hard data are available about their performance.

Given uncertainty over the success of efforts to stop Iranian smuggling efforts to outfit its centrifuge program and its continued deployment of centrifuges, an assessment of future enrichment capabilities and reduced breakout timelines is warranted. This report evaluates Iran's ability to increase its number of deployed centrifuges beyond current levels and when Iran could produce sufficient weapon-grade uranium without the IAEA being able to provide timely and



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reliable warning of that breakout, or when Iran is first estimated to reach what is defined here as a critical capability. The report assesses this date by projecting the number of IR-1 and IR-2m centrifuges Iran could deploy in the next year and by estimating the resulting impact on breakout times.

A central conclusion is that Iran is expected to achieve a critical capability in mid-2014. To delay that date, this report recommends measures to head off significant increases in deployed centrifuges and improve chances of timely detection of a breakout.

[http://defense-update.com/20130720\\_iran-could-reach-critical-capability-by-2014.html](http://defense-update.com/20130720_iran-could-reach-critical-capability-by-2014.html)

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NBC News.com

## **New Iran President expected to Tap US-Educated Advisers, bringing 'Worldly Outlook' to Tehran**

July 21, 2013

By Alastair Jamieson, Staff writer, NBC News

Several U.S.-educated Iranians are expected to be tapped for key posts in President Hassan Rowhani's new administration, hinting at a break from the antagonistic rhetoric of predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The 64-year-old moderate cleric won an outright victory in June's election, in which he was the closest thing to a reform candidate running to replace Ahmadinejad.

A sudden thaw in relations with the West is unlikely, most experts agree. But Rowhani's installation could mark the beginning of a more open government and lead to friendlier relations between Washington and Tehran.

"I would not expect a change of agenda, but maybe a change in the way things are done – and that is important when it comes to diplomacy," said Sasan Aghlani, an expert on Iran at British think tank Chatham House.

After Rowhani is sworn in on August 3rd, he will unveil a new cabinet and team of advisers. Among the names being touted are four veteran Iranian politicians who all hold degrees from U.S. universities.

Mahmoud Vaezi, a senior figure at Rowhani's Center for Strategic Research think tank, could be appointed foreign minister, according to Bijan Khajepour, a Vienna-based Iranian business consultant and contributor to regional news site Al-Monitor.

Vaezi graduated with a degree in electrical engineering at California's Sacramento State University in 1976, and his biography lists two other U.S. degrees and a doctorate from Warsaw University in Poland.

Other candidates for administration positions are industrialist Mohammad Nahavandian, who was awarded a doctorate in economics by the George Washington University in January 1994, and Mohammadreza Nematzadeh, Rowhani's campaign manager who studied environmental engineering at California Polytechnic State University in 1968.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, likely to be a key foreign policy adviser, is another Sacramento State graduate - and currently a research scholar at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.

That senior Iranian figures are educated in the West is not unusual. One of the candidates Rowhani defeated, Ali Akbar Velyati, was a post-graduate fellow at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine while current foreign minister Ali-Akhbar Salehi has a doctorate from MIT.

But together, they come from a cohort of Iranians who were studying in the United States just before the 1979 Islamic revolution and returned to Iran to participate in overthrowing the U.S.-backed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. And all four of those touted for Rowhani's inner circle have extensive business or political ties outside their home country.

"I sense the cabinet will have a more worldly outlook than under Ahmadinejad," Chatham House's Aghlani said.

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Most have already served as ministers under previous presidents, according to Khajepour. "They bring experience, which is significant because there has been too much trial and error in the past."

"They also have an insight into how Iran is perceived in the West, and how the West is perceived in Iran."

Ahmadinejad has taken a confrontational approach with the West, going as far as calling for Israel to be wiped off of the map, as well as alienating members of Iran's conservative establishment.

Rowhani himself was educated in the West, having been awarded both a masters degree and a doctorate in law at Scotland's Glasgow Caledonian University, where his supervisor Mahdi Zahraa remembered him as "a quiet-spoken, very gentle man."

"His spoken English was good. Hassan knew his subject well and responded to my directions in an organised, thoughtful manner," Zahraa said in a statement.

The university on Wednesday released video footage of the 1999 ceremony at which Rowhani received his doctorate.

As he prepares to take office, Rowhani is likely to be preoccupied with the tasks ahead of him – not least repairing Iran's economy, which has been crippled by United Nations sanctions.

Last Sunday, Rowhani revealed the country's financial situation is more perilous than Ahmadinejad had led people to believe, with inflation at 42 percent. The admission appeared to hint that Iranians can expect more transparency from a Rowhani government – even if relief from spiraling prices for everyday goods is not on the immediate horizon.

He has also called for less filtering of the Internet – a recognition that Iran's Islamic principles cannot solely be maintained by sealing itself off from the outside world. "Gone are the days when a wall could be built around the country," he said in remarks reported on state-run Press TV. "Today there are no more walls."

Khajepour speculated that Rowhani would create "a government of unity – of reconciliation, perhaps." He speculated that even defeated election rival Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf could be offered a government role.

Still, Rowhani's open approach – and strong regional outlook - could cement opposition among ordinary Iranians to U.S.-led sanctions.

"A civil society could emerge, bringing together previously fragmented groups who could mount a campaign against sanctions."

In a hint at what lies ahead, Mousavian – one of the names tipped for a foreign policy role – said in an interview Monday that Washington's sanctions policy was a "lose-lose game."

He said: "[Rowhani] is courteous and logical and respects international norms and regulations. The key to resolving the dispute with Iran depends on whether the traditional Western policies of pressure, sanctions, threats and humiliating Iran will change to those based on respect, mutual interests and cooperation with Rowhani's administration."

*NBC News' Robert Windrem contributed to this report.*

<http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/news/2013/07/21/19541056-new-iran-president-expected-to-tap-us-educated-advisers-bringing-worldly-outlook-to-tehran?lite>

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FARS News Agency – Iran  
Monday, July 22, 2013

## **Iran's Supreme Leader: US Officials Unreliable, Dishonest**

**Issue No. 1067, 26 July 2013**

*United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL  
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TEHRAN (FNA) - Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei urged Iranian officials to keep vigilant about direct talks with the US, saying that Washington's empty promises testify to the White House's unreliability and dishonesty towards the Iranian nation during the past decades.

During an Iftar (Fast breaking) ceremony with a group of senior Iranian officials on Sunday night, Ayatollah Khamenei underlined that the US officials are unreliable and dishonest, adding, "...I am not optimistic about negotiation with the US although I have not rejected negotiations over certain issues such as Iraq in the past years."

The Leader noted that "We have always believed in interaction with the world," but any interaction must be based on a proper recognition of the other side.

On Sunday, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Seyed Abbas Araqchi underlined that the new Iranian administration has not yet decided on entering direct talks with the US.

"The new Iranian administration has not made any decisions about entering talks with the US," Araqchi said.

On Saturday, Iranian Ambassador to Paris Ali Ahani said, "The West should prepare the grounds for building mutual trust (with Iran) by putting aside its coercive policies ... against Tehran."

He noted that the Islamic Republic plays a pivotal role in the strategic equations of the world and the region due to its huge oil and gas resources and its important geopolitical situation.

The envoy hailed a recent letter sent by the US Congress to President Barack Obama for the start of serious talks with Tehran, but meantime, underlined that words do not suffice and Washington should show a change of approach in action.

A total of 130 US congressmen on Friday called on President Barack Obama to use the opportunity of the election of Hassan Rouhani as Iran's incoming president and offer direct talks with the Islamic Republic.

Political observers believe that the West has remained at loggerheads with Iran mainly over the independent and home-grown nature of Tehran's nuclear technology, which gives the Islamic Republic the potential to turn into a world power and a role model for the other third-world countries. Washington has laid much pressure on Iran to make it give up the most sensitive and advanced part of the technology, which is uranium enrichment, a process used for producing nuclear fuel for power plants.

<http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13920431000212>

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FARS News Agency – Iran  
Wednesday, July 24, 2013

## **Putin to Visit Iran Next Month to Discuss Arms, Nuclear Deals**

TEHRAN (FNA) - Russian President Vladimir Putin is slated to pay a visit to Tehran in August to discuss bilateral ties and mutual cooperation with senior Iranian officials, including construction of the new phase of Bushehr Nuclear Plant and the possible delivery of a substitute for S-300 defense shield, media reports said.

"The Russian president will travel to Tehran on August 12," Russian newspaper Kommersant quoted an informed source in the Russian foreign ministry as saying.

"Putin wants to discuss two important issues which are construction of a new phase for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant and replacing S-300 missile system with Antei-2500 missile defense shield delivery," the source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, added.

The source noted that Putin is also due to discuss the latest developments in the West's standoff with Iran over the latter's peaceful nuclear program in his upcoming visit to Iran.



The Russian president last month underlined Iran's inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology, saying that no evidence has been found so far to show military aspect of Iran's nuclear program.

Last month, Tehran strongly rejected media reports that it has agreed to receive Tor-M1 missile defense system instead of S-300 defense shield from Russia.

"The reports released on the replacement of S-300 with Tor missiles by Russia is strongly rejected," Commander of Khatam ol-Anbia Air Defense Base Brigadier General Farzad Esmayeeli said.

Iran has filed a \$4bln lawsuit against Russia in the international arbitration court in Geneva, which is currently pending review.

Moscow has struggled to have the lawsuit dropped, including by offering the Tor anti-aircraft systems as replacement, media reported earlier this month, adding that the offer was rejected by Tehran.

In a recent development, Moscow made a new attempt to dodge the \$4bln lawsuit from Tehran by offering another type of air defense system to Iran.

The new offer on the table is Antei-2500, AKA S-300VM, or SA-23 Gladiator in NATO nomenclature, the Kommersant Daily said, citing unnamed sources in the Russian arms trade industry.

The missile defense system can simultaneously destroy up to 24 aircraft within the range of 200 kilometers or intercept up to 16 ballistic missiles.

The Antei-2500, however, may be a better solution. The system does not formally fall under the existing sanctions against Iran while still being useful for the Middle-Eastern country.

While the S-300 was developed for the use by missile defense forces, the Antei-2500 was specifically tailored for the needs of ground forces, which could also be an advantage for Iran, known for its large land force.

Russia is already exporting the Antei-2500, having delivered two missile systems to Venezuela earlier this year. India and Turkey were also named as potential buyers, though no deals were formalized so far, RIA Novosti reported.

<http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13920502000874>

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

## **UN Chemical Weapons Experts Arrive in Syria**

24 July 2013

MOSCOW, July 24 (RIA Novosti) – Two senior UN chemical weapons experts, tasked with investigating alleged chemical attacks in Syria, have arrived in Damascus to discuss details of their possible future inquiry, Western media reported on Wednesday.

Swedish chemical weapons expert Ake Sellstrom, who heads the UN fact-finding team, and UN High Representative for Disarmament Angela Kane arrived from neighboring Lebanon for a two-day visit on an invitation from the Syrian government. They are to meet with a number of high-ranking officials, including Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem.

The aim of their visit is to prepare ground for the future investigation and to reach an agreement allowing UN experts to start their work.

The UN team of investigators had been unable to travel to Syria because of diplomatic wrangling over the scope of access they would have.



Syria said it was ready to grant the UN team access to the site of an alleged chemical attack in the town of Khan al-Assal, in Syria's northern Aleppo province. The UN, however, wants to investigate other alleged attacks, including in Homs.

The Syrian government and opposition forces have traded allegations of chemical weapons use in the conflict, which has claimed nearly 100,000 lives since March 2011.

Earlier reports by foreign experts claimed that the Syrian government used chemical weapons on several occasions during the two-year conflict.

<http://en.rian.ru/world/20130724/182402429/UN-Chemical-Weapons-Experts-Arrive-in-Syria.html>

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The Gulf Times – U.A.E.

## **Iran Wants Direct Nuclear Talks with US - Iraq**

*Al Maliki indicated that he had been in touch with confidants of Khamenei*

By Michael R. Gordon

July 26, 2013

Washington: Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki of Iraq told the Obama administration this month that Iran was interested in direct talks with the US on Iran's nuclear programme and said that Iraq was prepared to facilitate the negotiations, Western officials said Thursday.

In a meeting in early July with the US ambassador in Baghdad, Al Maliki suggested that he was relaying a message from Iranian officials and asserted that Hassan Rouhani, Iran's incoming president, would be serious about any discussions with the US, according to accounts of the meeting.

Although Al Maliki indicated that he had been in touch with confidants of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, he did not disclose precisely whom he was dealing with on the Iranian side. Some Western officials remain uncertain whether Iranian leaders have sought to use Iraq as a conduit or whether the idea is mainly Al Maliki's initiative.

State Department officials declined to comment on Al Maliki's move or what steps the US might have taken in response. US officials have said since the beginning of the Obama administration that they would be open to direct talks with Iran.

"Iraq is a partner of the United States and we are in regular conversations with Iraqi officials about a full range of issues of mutual interest, including Iran," said Patrick Ventrell, a State Department spokesman.

"As we have repeatedly said, we are open to direct talks with Iran in order to resolve the international community's concerns about Iran's nuclear programme."

Gary Samore, who served as the senior aide on nonproliferation issues at the National Security Council during President Barack Obama's first term, said that it was plausible that Iran would use Iraq to send a message about its willingness to discuss nuclear issues.

"The Iranians see Maliki as somebody they have some trust in," said Samore, who is the director of the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs at Harvard.

"From Maliki's standpoint, it would serve a number of different purposes. He does not want to be squeezed between Washington and Tehran."

In a separate move Thursday, the State and Treasury departments announced that the US was expanding the list of medical devices, like dialysis machines, that could be sold to Iran without a license.



In a conference call with reporters, David Cohen, the undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said that the move was intended to “accelerate trade” and address humanitarian needs in Iran. The announcement was also seen by many observers as a good-will gesture before Rouhani prepares to take office in Tehran on August 4.

Direct talks have the potential to ratchet down some of the pressure on Obama over one of his greatest foreign policy challenges, the build-up of Iran’s nuclear programme.

Obama has said that he will not permit Iran to have a nuclear weapon and has asserted that the use of military force is an option.

Israeli officials have staked out a far tougher position, asserting that Iran should not be allowed to have the ability to build a weapon - and that the US should do more to convince the Iranians that its threat to use force is credible. Israel has not ruled out military action of its own.

International sanctions have taken a serious toll on the Iranian economy and have helped bring Iran to the negotiating table but have not yet extracted significant concessions from Iran on its nuclear programme. For years, the US and its partners - Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China - have met on and off with Iranian officials in a dialogue that has become known as the “P5 plus 1” talks.

Nonproliferation experts continue to argue that it is difficult to make major headway in such a committee like forum and that if progress is to be made, it will have to happen in private one-on-one discussions between Iranian officials and the Obama administration.

Whether Iran is genuinely interested in such talks, however, has been a subject of debate. In 2009, William Burns, then the undersecretary of state for political affairs, met with Saeed Jalili, the Iranian nuclear negotiator, on the margins of the “P5 plus 1” talks.

They agreed in principle that a portion of Iran’s enriched uranium could be used to make fuel for Tehran’s research centre, which would preclude that material from being further enriched to make nuclear weapons.

But that deal fell through after Khamenei objected, and there have been no direct talks since.

In a meeting this month with Iran’s departing president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Khamenei was sharply critical of the US stance.

“The Americans are unreliable and illogical, and are not honest in their approach,” Khamenei said. But he also said that he did not oppose talks “on certain issues”.

Even if direct talks are agreed to they are almost certain to be tough.

“The establishment of a bilateral channel is a necessary but not sufficient condition for coming to an agreement,” Samore said.

“They want a nuclear weapons capability, and we want to deny them a nuclear weapons capability. Finding a compromise between those two objectives is going to be very difficult.”

Al Maliki, Western officials said, is not the only Iraqi politician who has encouraged a dialogue between the US and Iran. Ammar Al Hakim, the leader of a major Shiite party in Iraq, is also said to have made that point.

During the war in Iraq, Iraqi officials also urged direct dealings between the US and Iran.

Talks were held in Baghdad, but they were focused on the conflict in Iraq and Iran’s support for Shiite militias there - not the nuclear question - and got nowhere.

Al Maliki’s government appears to have been aligned with Iran on some issues, like its support for President Bashar Al Assad of Syria.



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Iranian aircraft have ferried huge quantities of arms through Iraqi airspace. Iraqi officials have asserted that they do not have the means to stop the flights, but Al Maliki has also been concerned that Al Assad's fall will lead to an escalation of Sunni challenges to his government in Iraq.

US officials have repeatedly said that Al Maliki is not a pawn of Iran and that the US should try to expand its influence in Iraq, including by selling arms.

<http://gulfnews.com/news/region/iran/iran-wants-direct-nuclear-talks-with-us-iraq-1.1213585>

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Yonhap News Agency – South Korea

July 23, 2013

## **N. Korea Not Ready for 'Productive' Talks: Ex-U.S. Envoy**

By Oh Seok-min

SEOUL, July 23 (Yonhap) -- North Korea doesn't appear to be prepared for any "productive" dialogue with the international community, showing few signs of change, a former United States ambassador to Seoul said Tuesday.

After months of simmering tensions triggered by its third nuclear test in February and bellicose threats against South Korea and the U.S., North Korea has shifted to a charm offensive, offering talks with them.

Seoul and Washington, however, have called on Pyongyang to first demonstrate its sincerity for denuclearization through actions before such talks take place.

"Dialogue takes two parties to have an effective, productive dialogue. And I have seen very little sign that North Korea is prepared to have a productive dialogue now," Thomas Hubbard said in an interview with Yonhap News Agency in Seoul.

He arrived here on Sunday for a six-day trip to meet high-level officials including Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se to explore ways to further improve the 60-year-old Seoul-Washington alliance.

Hubbard served as ambassador to Seoul from 2001 to 2004 and played a key role in U.S. negotiations with North Korea in the 1990s. He is now the chairman of the Korea Society, a New York-based organization promoting people-to-people ties between the two allies.

Pointing to Pyongyang's series of provocations, Hubbard said it is "hard to be optimistic" about the North, at least for now.

"Initial impressions (about North Korean leader Kim Jong-un) were misleading that he was warm and more engaging. In fact, his policy is just the same as his father and his grandfather," he said.

The six-party talks that involve the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia "is useful to bring all parties together," but the U.S. is "not ready to have dialogue just for the dialogue's sake," Hubbard said, urging the North to show "concrete signs" of willingness to denuclearize.

The multilateral talks aimed at persuading the North to discard its nuclear programs were suspended in December 2008 after the North walked out of the dialogue in protest of the United Nations' condemnation of its banned rocket launch.

"I think now the ball is in the North Korean court," he said. "They can either choose the economic development or useless nuclear weapons."

Hubbard, known for his extensive experience with and expertise in Korean affairs, spoke highly of South Korean President Park Geun-hye's signature "trustpolitik" policy, saying the U.S. President Barack Obama "firmly and strongly supports her with the approach."

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Asked of his assessment on Seoul's request for another delay in the schedule for the takeover of wartime operational control (OPCON) of its troops by the agreed-upon date of December 2015, he simply said the key is not the timing but the way it is pushed for.

"We would not be common on the precise timing of when the OPCON transfer should takes place, but none of us want to do anything that would weaken our deterrence. That should be the sign of strength, not weakness, in our alliance," he said.

[http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/n\\_interview/2013/07/23/37/4801000000AEN20130723004900315F.HTML](http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/n_interview/2013/07/23/37/4801000000AEN20130723004900315F.HTML)

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The San Francisco Chronicle

## **AP Exclusive: NKorea Halts Rocket Launch-Pad Work**

By FOSTER KLUG, Associated Press (AP)

Tuesday, July 23, 2013

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea has stopped construction work at a site meant to launch bigger and better long-range rockets, a possible sign that Pyongyang is slowing or even halting development of larger rockets, according to a new analysis of recent satellite imagery.

The sight of unfinished roads and grass growing from the foundation of a large new rocket assembly building could be welcome news for Washington and others who see Pyongyang's nuclear and missile work as a threat — though it is unknown if the work stoppage is only temporary.

Another unknown is why North Korea about eight months ago stopped construction on the launch pad, rocket assembly building and launch control center at what was intended to be a major new facility at the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground on the northeast coast, according to analysis provided to The Associated Press by 38 North, the website for the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

But the analysis of May 26 commercial satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe and Astrium provides some possible scenarios about what's happening.

One theory is that equipment and construction troops sent from the site to help repair widespread rain damage last year may still be at other posts. Another is that North Korea's leadership has decided that its more modern Sohae rocket launching site on the northwest coast, the one used to launch rockets in April and December 2012, will be sufficient to support large rocket development

But the most intriguing theory from the analysis is that the work stoppage could reflect a decision in Pyongyang to slow or stop building larger rockets.

"If Pyongyang ultimately abandons facilities to launch large rockets it only began building in 2011, that could have important implications for North Korea's space launch program as well as the development of long-range missiles intended to deliver nuclear weapons," Joel Wit, a former U.S. State Department official and now editor of 38 North, said in an email.

Any clues about North Korea's secretive rocket program, which Washington and others see as a cover for work on missiles that could strike the U.S. mainland, are significant.

Another analyst said North Korea's construction stoppage may be linked to a desire to ease tensions that spiked this year after weeks of North Korean war threats following U.N. sanctions over its nuclear test in February and rocket launch in December. The rival Koreas have since made tentative efforts at diplomacy.

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"North Korea may have concluded that there's nothing more to be gained from confrontation," said Ohm Tae-am at the state-run Korea Institute for Defense Analyses in South Korea. He said North Korea's struggling economy may also have figured into a decision to stop funding the construction work.

The 38 North analysis said there's no sign of activity, equipment or personnel at the new launch pad at Tonghae. Grass is growing from the foundation of a large new rocket assembly building, and work is incomplete on a road meant to bring construction equipment and, eventually, large rocket stages to the site.

Even if North Korea resumes work at the site, the delay means completion could be pushed back to 2017, at least a year longer than earlier estimates, according to the analysis.

Earlier this year, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un enshrined the drive to build a nuclear arsenal, as well as expand the economy, in North Korea's constitution. The Korean Peninsula remains technically in a state of war because the Korean War ended 60 years ago Saturday with a cease-fire, not a peace treaty.

Since 2006, North Korea has staged three nuclear tests of apparently increasing power and a series of long-range rocket launches. North Korea says its rocket launches are meant to put peaceful satellites into orbit.

What the Obama administration saw as faster-than-anticipated North Korean progress on nuclear weapons and missiles prompted a March announcement that Washington would spend \$1 billion to add 14 interceptors to the U.S.-based missile defense system.

Outsiders have difficulty assessing North Korea's intentions and technical capabilities, but many doubt that Pyongyang has yet mastered the technology needed to miniaturize a nuclear device to mount on a long-range missile and attain its goal of being able to directly threaten the United States. Some analysts, however, believe Pyongyang may be able to arm shorter-range missiles with warheads.

*Associated Press writer Hyung-jin Kim contributed to this report.*

<http://www.sfgate.com/news/world/article/AP-Exclusive-NKorea-halts-rocket-launch-pad-work-4680759.php>

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The Washington Free Beacon

## **PLA Navy to Begin First Strategic Missile Submarine Patrols Next Year**

*China's navy to debut new class of submarine next year*

By Bill Gertz

July 23, 2013

China's navy is expected to begin the first sea patrols next year of a new class of strategic missile submarines, highlighting a new and growing missile threat to the U.S. homeland, according to U.S. defense officials.

"We are anticipating that combat patrols of submarines carrying the new JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile will begin next year," said one official familiar with recent intelligence assessments of the Chinese strategic submarine force.

China's strategic missile submarine force currently includes three new Type 094 missile submarines each built with 12 missile launch tubes.

The submarine patrols will include scores of new JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on the Type 094s. The submarines are also called Jin-class missile boats by the Pentagon.

The missile submarine patrols, if carried out in 2014, would be the first time China conducts submarine operations involving nuclear-tipped missiles far from Chinese shores despite having a small missile submarine force since the late 1980s.

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The *Washington Free Beacon* first reported in August that China carried out a rare flight test that month of the JL-2, a missile analysts say will likely be equipped with multiple warheads.

That test was carried out in the Bohai Sea near the northeastern coast of China, according to officials familiar with reports of the test.

Defense officials said the JL-2 poses a “potential first strike” nuclear missile threat to the United States and is one of four new types of long-range missiles in China’s growing strategic nuclear arsenal.

The Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center earlier this month published a report on missile threats that identified the JL-2 as a weapon that “will, for the first time, allow Chinese SSBNs to target portions of the United States from operating areas located near the Chinese coast.” SSBN is a military acronym for nuclear missile submarine.

The Pentagon’s most recent annual report on China’s military stated that Beijing’s Navy has placed a high priority on building up submarine forces.

In addition to the three Type 094s currently deployed, China will add at least two more of the submarines before deploying a new generation missile submarine dubbed the Type 096, the report stated. It was the first time the Pentagon has revealed the existence of the follow-on strategic missile submarine.

“The JIN-class and the JL-2 will give the PLA Navy its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent,” the Pentagon report said.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert told Congress in May that he was not worried by the Chinese naval buildup, including the new missile submarines, but that it is a development that needs to be watched.

Greenert boasted during a House defense appropriations subcommittee hearing that “we own the undersea domain.”

The Chinese navy is “not there yet” in terms of undersea power despite deploying a current force of 55 submarines, both diesel and nuclear powered, Greenert said.

“I would just say that I’m vigilant,” he said in response to questions about the Chinese submarine buildup. “I would hate to say that I’m worried, yet, because I’m not necessarily worried. Very vigilant and we need to pay attention and understand the intent. And challenge them on that intent.”

David Helvey, deputy assistant defense secretary for East Asia, told reporters in May that the Chinese are investing heavily in undersea warfare programs and submarines.

Still, the Chinese have not yet conducted an underwater test firing of a submarine-launched missile, Helvey said. “We see China investing considerably in capabilities for operations in this area,” he said.

A 2008 report produced for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission said there are indications China is planning to deploy an anti-satellite missile on its missile submarines.

That missile includes the last stage of a ground-launched “direct-ascent” ASAT missile on top of a JL-2. The commission report quoted a 2004 article by Liu Huanyu of the Dalian Naval Academy as saying “by deploying just a few anti-satellite [missile] nuclear submarines in the ocean, one can seriously threaten the entire military space system of the enemy.”

Mark Stokes, a Chinese military affairs analyst, said the first Chinese ballistic missile submarine patrols next year would not be surprising.

“The most significant question is which organization controls, stores, and ensures the readiness of the nuclear warheads that ostensibly would be mated with the SLBMs on patrol,” said Stokes, with the Project 2049 Institute.

China maintains tight secrecy over its nuclear forces, such as how many are deployed, how they are controlled and stored, over fears that any public discussion would undermine their deterrent value.



“The [Central Military Commission] has traditionally entrusted only the Second Artillery Corps with centralized control over nuclear weapons,” Stokes said. “The CMC granting the PLA Navy the power to develop and maintain its own independent infrastructure for warhead storage and handling would be a significant departure from past. This kind of decentralization would have implications well beyond the navy.”

Richard Fisher, an expert on Chinese military affairs, said the commencement of missile submarine patrols would fulfill the ambitions of Chinese Communist Party leaders since Mao Zedong in the early 1960s.

“With three Type 094 SSBNs now called ‘operational’ by the Pentagon, it is possible that one Type 094 could be maintained on constant patrol,” said Fisher, with the International Assessment and Strategy Center.

“Three Chinese SSBNs versus 14 for the U.S. Navy may not seem to be cause for concern, but if one assumes the JL-2 has a 8,000-kilometer (about 5,000 miles) range akin to its closely related DF-31 ICBM, then the Type 094 could handily cover critical Alaskan air and missile defense bases from protected areas in the Yellow Sea, and from the eastern coast of North Korea, could cover the U.S. Navy’s SSBN base at Kitsap Island in Washington state,” he said.

Fisher warned that Obama administration plans to cut U.S. nuclear forces could increase the risk of a future Chinese first-strike attack.

“Should the Obama administration be successful in its goal of reducing U.S. nuclear warheads down to about 1,000, then it is conceivable that the Kitsap Base could become responsible for a much larger proportion of the U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability,” he said. “Such a move could result in a significant increase in risk for the United States.”

Considering the “uncertainties” about the actual levels of China’s current and future nuclear arsenal, “it would be most unwise to consider further nuclear reductions, and that could threaten a robust U.S. nuclear triad of ICBMs, SSBNs and bombers,” Fisher said.

On China’s next-generation missile submarine, Fisher said the Type 096 could have an longer-range “JL-3” missile capable of hitting targets throughout the United States.

Thomas M. Skypek, a national security analyst, stated in a 2010 paper that China over the next 10 years could build several types of strategic missile forces, ranging from a modest force of four Type 094 submarines, to a force with two Type 094s and up to eight Type 096s, each armed with 24 JL-3 missiles fitted with multiple warheads.

“In its drive to develop a credible at-sea nuclear deterrent, Beijing will look to field stealthier submarines with more MIRVed ballistic missiles, providing far greater capability than the first- and second-generation SSBNs and SLBMs could offer,” Skypek stated.

Skypek said China’s military has encountered problems with the Type 094 JL-2. However, he added the Chinese navy’s “current trajectory suggests that China is on the cusp of a significant leap in capability and will soon deploy a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.”

“Once fully operational, the [Chinese] SSBN fleet, even with a modest number of boats, will enhance China’s strategic strike capabilities and strengthen Beijing’s overall deterrence posture by providing enhanced range, mobility, stealth, survivability, penetration, and lethality.”

Japan’s government warned in a defense white paper made public earlier this month about the threat posed by the JL-2. “Once the JL-2 reaches a level of practical use, it is believed that China’s strategic nuclear capabilities will improve by a great margin,” the white paper stated.

Chinese Maj. Gen. Yao Yunzhu, a researcher, suggested in May that U.S. efforts to increase missile defenses in Asia will produce a buildup of China’s strategic nuclear arsenal.

“The current development, especially the deployment of missile-defense systems in East Asia would be, in Chinese eyes, would be a very, very disturbing factor having implications for the calculation of China’s nuclear and strategic arsenal,” said Yao Yunzhu, a senior researcher at China’s Academy of Military Science.



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Yao also said joint U.S. missile defenses in Asia have "implications for China." The Pentagon is working closely with Japan on joint missile defenses to counter the threat posed by North Korean missiles.

The *Wall Street Journal*, quoting "Chinese experts," reported in May that U.S. military moves in Asia were unlikely to affect China's nuclear force buildup, including the launch of missile submarines in 2014.

However, the number of nuclear warheads and strategic missiles could be "adjusted" based on U.S. military plans in Asia.

The Obama administration has launched a "pivot" to Asia that includes a buildup of U.S. military forces in the region and an increase in exercises with Asian allies and friends.

Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter announced in April that the Navy will deploy a fourth nuclear-powered attack submarine in Guam by 2015.

<http://freebeacon.com/pla-navy-to-begin-first-strategic-missile-submarine-patrols-next-year/>

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The Asahi Shimbun – Japan

## **Interim Defense Report Cites China, North Korea in Call for Stronger Measures**

July 25, 2013

By KOJI SONODA, Staff Writer

The interim report of new National Defense Program Guidelines focuses on potential threats from China and North Korea and includes calls for the creation of a U.S. Marine-like strike force.

"The national security environment that Japan faces has become more serious," says the report, an advance copy of which was obtained by The Asahi Shimbun. Its official release is on July 26.

It cited military expansion by China and North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as particularly worrisome.

With the maritime advances being made by China in mind, the report states: "In order to respond to attacks against outlying islands, it will be indispensable to maintain advantages in both air and sea capabilities."

A Marine-like unit capable of amphibious landings would be one way to quickly respond to attacks on outlying islands.

The new guidelines are being compiled by the Defense Ministry and are scheduled for completion by the end of the year.

The current guidelines were drawn up in 2010 when the Democratic Party of Japan controlled the government.

With the return to power of the Liberal Democratic Party last December, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe decided to compile new guidelines in order to strengthen the alliance with the United States and review the nation's defense structure so it could more rapidly respond to a changing international environment.

In defending against ballistic missiles from North Korea, the report states that "consideration should be given for strengthening comprehensive deterrence measures as well as response capabilities."

The report stops short of clearly mentioning the acquisition of pre-emptive strike capabilities to attack enemy bases, as has been previously called for by Abe, but that topic will likely continue to be discussed in the process of compiling the guidelines in coming months.

An executive with the ruling LDP said the biggest question about the new guidelines will be how the issue of collective self-defense is handled.

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While the Defense Ministry continues its work on the guidelines, the Abe administration will at the same time discuss the possibility of changing the current government interpretation of the Constitution, which prohibits exercising the right to collective self-defense.

Abe wants to change the interpretation to allow Japan to exercise that right as a way of strengthening the Japan-U.S. military alliance.

However, a high-ranking Defense Ministry official said, "That would fundamentally change Japan's position from its current exclusively defensive posture."

To strengthen reconnaissance against North Korean ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, the report also calls for considering the acquisition of high altitude unmanned drones that would conduct around-the-clock surveillance over wider areas than is currently possible and monitor North Korea for possible ballistic missile launches.

[http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind\\_news/politics/AJ201307250075](http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201307250075)

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Yonhap News Agency – South Korea

July 25, 2013

## **Mid-Term Defense Program Focuses on Missile Defense against N. Korea**

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, July 25 (Yonhap) -- The defense ministry submitted a 214.5 trillion won (US\$192.6 billion) budget request for the 2014-2018 fiscal year to the parliament for deliberation on Thursday, which focuses on beefing up South Korea's missile program against North Korea's nuclear and missile weapons.

The budget proposal calls for 70.2 trillion won of the total, or 13.7 percent, to be used to purchase a missile shield program, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as multipurpose commercial satellites and high-altitude spy drones in the next five years.

Seoul has been gradually building an independent, low-tier missile shield called the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) since 2006 by acquiring Patriot missiles and long-range early warning radars.

The KAMD involves an early warning radar as well as ship-to-air and land-based missile defense systems, arming Seoul with the ability to track and shoot down the North's low-flying, short- and medium-range missiles, with the help of U.S. early warning satellites.

The budget draft also includes the additional purchase of PAC-2 missile interceptors and upgrading the current system to PAC-3 to deter North Korean missiles.

After Pyongyang successfully launched a long-range rocket last December and conducted its third nuclear test in February, Seoul has been speeding up to establish a pre-emptive missile destruction system, so-called "Kill Chain," to detect and strike North Korea's missile and nuclear facilities.

The Kill Chain is designed to detect signs of impending missiles or nuclear attacks from the communist country and launch pre-emptive strikes to eliminate the threat by using its advanced cruise and ballistic missiles to support its present missile defense system.

North Korea is believed to have over 1,000 missiles with varying capabilities as well as multiple launchers that can shoot rockets, putting South Korea well within its missile range.

The budget plan comes as the South Korean military is seeking to enhance its warfare capability to deter North Korean aggression before it takes back its wartime operational control from Washington in December 2015.

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Under the proposed structure, if a transition is completed as scheduled, the South Korean military will play a leading role, and American forces will offer support during a potential wartime situation, fighting side by side with their Korean allies.

"The government is pushing for major weapons procurement programs by securing an appropriate level of defense budget," Ju Chul-ki, the senior presidential secretary for foreign affairs and security, said in a Seoul defense forum on Thursday. "We are putting efforts to procure weapons to establish the Kill Chain to pre-emptively detect and strike North Korean missiles, and to establish the KAMD, which is capable of intercepting the enemy's missiles,"

In addition, each branch of the military is seeking to beef up its weapon systems against growing threats posed by North Korea.

The Army aims to develop the next-generation K-2 battle tank to replace aging K-1 and U.S.-built M48 tanks, and buy large combat helicopters in the next five years.

The Navy plans to build 5,000-ton destroyers, 1,800-ton submarines and landing platform ships to cope with rising tensions in Northeast Asia, in face of the ongoing territorial disputes between China and Japan.

The Air Force plans to purchase 60 next-generation fighter jets to replace its aging fleet of F-4s and F-5s starting from 2017 as well as large carriers and aerial refueling aircraft to extend the range of its F-15K and KF-16 combat jets.

The military also plans to adopt the Green Pine early warning and fire radar-guided rockets to deter provocations by North Korea.

The mid-term budget plan also includes improving welfare services and doubling the salaries within the five-year term of President Park Geun-hye.

Under the proposal, corporals' monthly pay will rise to 195,800 won (\$175) in 2017, up from 97,500 won for the 2013 fiscal year.

The move comes as Park promised to double soldiers' pay as an election pledge to appeal to them and their parents who have long demanded a pay raise for mandatory military service, which is required by law for all able-bodied men.

The current amount is roughly equivalent to three days of work, assuming an employee works eight hours a day at a minimum hourly wage set at 4,580 won.

The budget plan needs parliamentary approval before being implemented by the government in fiscal year 2014, which begins on Jan. 1.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/07/25/51/0301000000AEN20130725002700315F.html>

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Business Recorder – Pakistan

## **Draft CBRNE Disaster Management Policy Prepared**

July 23, 2013

By MUSHTAQ GHUMMAN

The government has prepared draft chemicals, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives (CBRNE) Disaster Management Policy aimed at making preparations for quick response in a critical situation as prevailing security calculus is confronted with enhanced threat of use of CBRNE both from state and non-state actors, well informed sources told *Business Recorder*.

This policy is being prepared by the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) on the request of Joint Staff Headquarters. Giving the background, sources said, geo-political changes since Iraq war and 9/11 attacks have given boost to looming threat of employment of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive weapons. Security environment becomes

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complicated due to enhanced possibility of use of CBRNE weapons by nonstate actors that are not governed by established international conventions and regimes. Pakistan, because of prevailing security calculus, is confronted with enhanced threat of use of CBRNE weapons both from state and non-state actors. It is, therefore, imperative to evolve an all encompassing national level CBRNE policy for a comprehensive response in a critical situation.

The sources said, National CBRNE Disaster Management Policy will be applicable to all provinces/regions falling within the territorial boundaries of Pakistan. It will be enacted as a law passed by the parliament and provide guidelines for building essential capacities where-ever required to manage the CBRNE threat efficiently. CBRNE threat from a state party would manifest in the event of an international conflict situation Multiple and persistent attacks with a variety of CBRNE weapons would be a worst case scenario.

Being benign and covert in nature, threat from non-state actor (s) will have most dangerous consequences as it will be difficult to distinguish between friend and foe, the sources quoted SPD's draft policy.

According to sources, Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA) have short lived effects. Production methods are straightforward and raw material readily/ legally available. Biological Warfare Agents (BWA) can be produced / delivered to affect the population, agriculture, livestock and water resources to spread disruption of normal civic life, Radiological Device is a weapon of psychological effect and almost no potential to cause significant damage.

Attack(s) by nuclear weapons would emanate from state(s) who possess this technology. However, radioactive sources being used in the field of medicine, agriculture and industry can be used in a crude device. Also, behind greater agenda, terrorists may attempt an attack on a nuclear power plant to remove the fissile material or affect a damage which would result in radioactivity.

SPD argues that the policy should be economically affordable initially and sustainable over long period. Available resources should be revamped / re-organised including creation of a nation-wide Volunteers Corps'. An action plan would be prepared by NDMA and funded by Federal Government. Multi-tiered response spreading across the public and private domain would affect the economy.

NDMA would play the lead role and formulate a national plan including creation of an effective organisation duly equipped at different administrative levels/tiers for management of a disaster. These organisations would serve as a nucleus around which other federal and provincial organisations will build upon. Distribution of resources and capacity building plans will be chalked out as part of master response plan.

Proposed DMU would comprise essential elements to operate in CBRNE environment. DMU would comprise the following: (i) an outfit fully equipped and trained in NBC Defence; and (ii) Rescue and Recovery Team (RRT) team holding specialist equipment to rescue people trapped under the debris. NBC Collective Protection Shelters (CPS) - team would hold NBC CPS to house at least 250 to 300 people for 3 to 4 hours and provide medical and other civil administration assistance.

NDMA as a central co-ordination agency responsible to activate all concerned during a CBRNE event / accident. It will have DMU(s) available to it for response within the capital territory. Provisional DMA will be the co-ordinating agency in each province having similar functions as those of NDMA in the centre. It would have following: - SPD would be the focal point for any co-ordination or assistance required from the strategic organisations. SPD would also be responsible for management of any accident / incident within the strategic installation / facility.

An MMIS Centre would be set up by NDMA in collaboration with Ministry of Information and Broadcasting close to the scene / area of CBRNE event / accident (at a safe location) to brief the media about the progress, assistance required and problems being encountered.

Preparation and protection is afforded by providing protection to the buildings, establishing related health care and medical R & D facilities, creating awareness amongst the general public utilising the media, giving protection equipment, discouraging illegal CBRNE related activities, enforcement of relevant laws and support in building disaster management capacity to deal with CBRNE emergency situation(s).



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<http://www.brecorder.com/general-news/172/1214025/>

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The Times of India – India

## **Nuclear Threat Real, Delhi Cops Train for the Worst**

By Raj Shekhar, Tamil News Network (TNN)

July 25, 2013

NEW DELHI: Managing the fallout of a nuclear, chemical or biological weapons attack is Delhi Police's next priority. Soon, every district in the city will have a specially trained and equipped squad for emergencies arising from CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) weapons, a source said.

The proposal follows from recent intelligence inputs about the likelihood of such attacks and has been sent to the government for approval. The south district has already trained 100 cops on bio-terrorism and countermeasures under the guidance of Major General JK Bansal, a National Disaster Management Authority member. They were trained to carry out rescue operations in radiation affected areas and also briefed on the new threats like poison letters and water contamination.

"The training has become pertinent as police are the first to respond in disaster and emergency situations," said BS Jaiswal, DCP south, adding that CBRN threats have become a significant concern and the danger of accidental exposure has also grown manifold. The Mayapuri radiation in 2010 is a case in point.

During the two-day training at a school in Hauz Khas, cops learned about community awareness and preparedness in prevention and mitigation of CBRN emergencies, threat of bio-terrorism and security countermeasures, use of biological agents for terrorism etc. A mock drill was also done with cops in protective gear practicing a rescue operation. The training modules have been designed in collaboration with NDMA. Jaiswal said various agencies were involved in the programme and similar training will be imparted in other districts soon.

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Nuclear-threat-real-Delhi-cops-train-for-the-worst/articleshow/21316952.cms>

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The Diplomat – Japan

Flashpoints Blog

## **Russia Announces a Naval Buildup in the Pacific**

By Zachary Keck

July 22, 2013

Russia will begin a naval buildup in the Pacific Ocean next year, a top military official said on Thursday.

In an interview on Russia TV, Rear Admiral Sergei Avakants, Commander of the Pacific Fleet, said that his fleet would begin receiving new warships next year for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

"Rather large-scale deliveries of new equipment, new warships to the Pacific Fleet will start in 2014," *Ria Novosti* quoted him as saying.

According to the article, Rear Admiral Avakants said the Pacific Fleet would be receiving at least one of the first two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships (helicopter carriers) that France is currently building for the Russian Navy.

In 2011, Russia and France signed a US\$1.52 billion agreement for four of the Mistral-class vessels, with the first two to be built in France and the other two in Russia. At the time, it was Russia's largest arms purchase since the Soviet Union

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era, and caused significant alarm among NATO nations. Moscow sought to ease these concerns by promising that some of them would be deployed in the Pacific.

According to *Reuters*, the Mistral-class ships can carry up to 16 helicopters as well as deliver troops, tanks and armored vehicles onto shore. Real Admiral Avakyants did not specify when the Mistral-class vessels would be arriving.

He did however say that “several” Project 20380 Steregushchy-class corvettes were being built for his fleet, with deliveries expected to begin as early as next year. Steregushchy-class corvettes are large multirole vessels that will replace the Grisha Class corvettes. With a length of 105 meters, width of 13 m, draft of 3.7 m, and full displacement load of 2,200 tons, they are classified as frigates by NATO.

According to *Naval-Technology*, the “Steregushchy Class can be deployed in coastal patrol, escort and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations. The vessels can engage surface ships, submarines, aircraft and shore-based targets,” potentially giving them a complementary role with the Mistral-class amphibious assault ships.

The Commander of Russia’s Pacific Fleet also said that one of the first Borey-class ballistic missile submarines would be given the fleet after they are first commissioned at the end of this year. The Borey-class is Russia’s fourth-generation nuclear-powered missile submarine and the first submarine to be built since the Soviet era. Russia intends to eventually build eight of them to serve as the core of its sea-based strategic deterrent, replace the aging Typhoon and Delta-III and Delta-IV class submarines.

Russian media outlets have reported that the Borey-class sub is 170 m long, with a hull diameter of 13 m, a depth of 450 m and a submerged speed of 29 knots. Its crew consists of 107 sailors, including 55 officers, and it will carry 16 of Russia’s new Bulava ballistic missiles, which are capable of carrying multiple warheads.

Many of the upcoming deliveries had previously been discussed or hinted at by Russian officials, although typically at different times rather than presented as a package.

Real Admiral Avakyants announcement came near the end of Russia’s massive snap military drill in the Far East of the country. Without prior notice President Vladimir Putin announced the exercise to his military commanders on July 12, the third such surprise drill he has ordered this year. The exercise reportedly included “160,000 servicemen, 1,000 tanks, 130 planes and 70 ships,” making it one of the largest ones Russia has held since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

As *The Diplomat* noted last week, the drill was almost certainly meant as a signal to Russia’s neighbors to the east, primarily China and Japan. Indeed, a couple of Russia’s Tu-95 Bear H strategic bombers flew over the Sea of Japan as part of the drill for over seven hours, prompting Japan to scramble jets to intercept them as they approached Japan’s Hokkaido Island in the north. Separately, a reconnaissance plane flew over the Kuril Islands that Russia administers but Japan also claims.

In early July, before last week’s snap drill, Russia and China held their largest ever naval drill, the Joint Sea/Naval Interaction 2013. As *The Diplomat* reported at the time, citing China’s Defense Ministry, the PLA sent “four destroyers, two missile frigates and a support ship” to that exercise.

According to the *Ria Novosti* article cited above, Russia’s Pacific Naval Fleet currently consists of “the Varyag missile cruiser, four Udaloy-class destroyers, a Sovremenny-class destroyer and dozens of submarines,” five of which are Delta-III ballistic missile submarines.

Previously Russia had been redeploying vessels from its Pacific Naval Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea as part of a new, permanent task force it established in response to the situation in Syria, where Moscow maintains a small naval base.

*Zachary Keck is Assistant Editor of The Diplomat. He has previously served as a Deputy Editor for E-IR and as an Editorial Assistant for The Diplomat.*

<http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/07/22/russia-announces-a-naval-buildup-in-the-pacific/>

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Pravda.ru – Russia

## US Biolabs Threaten Russia's Security

By Lyuba Lulko

24 July 24, 2013

The Russian Foreign Ministry responded to the allegations contained in the report of the U.S. State Department on compliance with the agreements and commitments on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament for the year 2012. The Russian Ministry noted that the irrepressible desire of the U.S. partners to judge others and place labels is combined with a categorical unwillingness to "look in the mirror."

In addition, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs drew attention to the fact that all U.S. accusations that Russia allegedly violated its obligations under several international treaties were unsubstantiated.

The State Department's report was published on July 12. It again called into question Russia's compliance with the obligations under the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), as always, without providing any evidence.

"Meanwhile, the Americans' concern would have been long and completely eliminated had the U.S. not blocked the creation of a verification mechanism in the framework of the BTWC," stated the Foreign Ministry in its comments.

A biological lab "Central Public Health Reference Laboratory" operates in Tbilisi, Georgia, under the American supervision. "Russia sees this as a direct violation of the BTWC, it is a powerful offensive potential," the chief state sanitary doctor Gennady Onishchenko said on July 20. His fears are not unfounded. For example, the swine flu that broke out in early 2012 in the South Caucasus region is linked to the activities of this particular lab led by Anna Zhvania, the former head of the special Foreign Intelligence Service of Georgia. It was created with the assistance of Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases of the U.S. Army (USAMRIID, Fort Detrick), and its opening was attended by the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for the programs of nuclear, biological and chemical defense Andrew C. Weber. All these facts prompt serious reflection.

Another secret laboratory operates in Odessa, Ukraine, in the framework of the "Joint reduction of threats." It specializes in the study of the most dangerous pathogens on the planet. Senator Richard Lugar (known as the co-author of the Nunn-Lugar program meant to assist the Russians in the destruction of weapons of mass destruction closed in 2012), said at the opening of the facilities in 2010 that in addition to Ukraine, the United States will build similar laboratories in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

This seems like an excessive number of these establishments at the Russian borders, given that they may be involved in a large-scale biological activity of dual-use. Why are the Americans unwilling to agree on the methods of their control? Russian Foreign Ministry has expressed its concern in this regard.

In its report, the U.S. State Department also accused Russia of the alleged non-compliance with the obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC). However, in the framework of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), no such accusations have been made against Russia. The Foreign Ministry stressed that Russia consistently met conventional requirements and regularly reported to the OPCW on the substantial progress in the destruction of its chemical weapons arsenal. "And all of this is happening against the background of virtually suspended by the United States destruction of chemical weapons, including delays in the construction and commissioning of the facilities designed to eliminate significant stockpiles of chemical weapons," the Foreign Ministry said in its statement. Indeed, the evidence shows that Russia has destroyed 25,000 tons of chemical agents by April 29<sup>th</sup> of this year, or nearly 62 percent of its chemical weapons stockpiles. These reserves were the largest in the world and amounted to 40,000 tons. The Russian Federation committed to a complete destruction of all its deadly reserves by December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2015.

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The United States that ranks second in terms of stocks of chemical weapons with 30,000 tons destroyed approximately 90 percent of its arsenal - 25,000 tons. However, the country still has 10 percent of toxic substances in the "reserve," and the Pentagon postponed the projected completion date of the program to eliminate their chemical weapons until 2023.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said that the U.S. continued to link the search for new approaches to the modernization of the conventional arms control in Europe to the settlement of local conflicts. Therefore, the Russian Foreign Ministry considers inappropriate the paragraphs of the report on Georgia. "The reality is that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are sovereign states. Reluctance to consider this will adversely affect the prospects of conventional arms control and the Open Skies Treaty (OST). According to the latter, any flight in the open sky closer than 10 kilometers from the borders of the countries not participating in the OST, which include Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is prohibited. Therefore, Russia will insist on compliance with Article VI of the Treaty.

The Russian Foreign Ministry is not only trying to justify itself, but also reminds that the United States, assuring the international community in its intention to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), has not been doing it for many years. "Therefore, the U.S. is also responsible for the fact that the Treaty has not yet entered into force," the Foreign Ministry stated.

According to the Ministry, the report of the U.S. State Department "is not conducive to an atmosphere of confidence and progress in actual cases in the field of non-proliferation and arms control." "Overall progress report gives the impression that the U.S., despite the changes occurring in the world, still remains in the grip of cold war propaganda."

[http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/24-07-2013/125246-usa\\_russia-0/](http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/24-07-2013/125246-usa_russia-0/)

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25 July 2013

RT (Russia Today) – Russia

## **Russia Calls on NATO to Review Cold War Methods of Arms Control**

July 25, 2013

Russia's deputy defense minister has suggested updating the agreements on conventional weapons control, which no longer match the political situation and the effectiveness of modern high-precision arms.

Speaking at a session of the Russia-NATO council, Anatoly Antonov said that the new ideas could be used when the European countries start building a new space of security and mutual trust.

*"In the current military-political environment there is no need to keep unchanged the tools of control over arms and disarmament that was formed in the times of the Cold War and based on the concept of military confrontation between two political systems,"* the Russian representative told the council.

He also said that more and more nations were coming to the conclusion that the Treaty on Conventional Weapons in Europe (CFE) has fully depleted itself and is practically dead.

The Russian official also noted that the newly-developed weapons have practically erased the difference in effectiveness between nuclear and conventional weapons. He said that conventional high-precision weapons must be considered when nations discuss nuclear weapons control, especially those weapons that can be used as means of delivery for nuclear warheads and other weapons of mass destruction.

Russia proposed that NATO take a closer look at the 2010 Russia-US talks on strategic offensive weapons, which ended in a treaty that offered no restrictions and allowed both parties to decide on the structure of their own nuclear arsenals.

*"In our view it is much more important to take a broader look at the control of all types of weapons that can be used in solving the offensive and defensive tasks,"* Antonov emphasized.



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He noted that experts have not yet reached an agreement on how to evaluate the combat effectiveness of drone aircraft that were not at all covered by old treaties. The same applies to modern missile defense systems and space-based weapons, he added.

Antonov pointed out that in current conditions, compact and highly-effective units can act in greater distances from their bases. Russia holds that this changes the application of international agreements on force dislocation and regional restrictions, and proposes having a broader look at the “*geography problem*” Antonov said.

At the same time, he noted that the 2011 Vienna Document and the Treaty on Open Skies remained urgent and allowed for an adequate estimation of the balance of conventional forces in the Europe-Atlantic region.

<http://rt.com/politics/russia-nato-conventional-control-572/>

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The Scotsman – Scotland, U.K

## **Trident: MPs Want Replacement Deal Signed Soon**

By DAVID MADDUX

21 July 2013

A CROSS-PARTY group of MPs is to launch a campaign to force the UK government to sign the contract for the replacement Trident submarines before the next election.

The campaign group, which is currently led by Tory backbenchers, fears that if the contract date is postponed until 2016 then Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent could become the casualty of future coalition negotiations after the 2015 general election.

While the MPs will be trying to use their influence in parliament to persuade Prime Minister David Cameron to sign the contracts for the replacement submarines by 2014, Scotland on Sunday understands that a PR company has been approached to launch a public campaign. Part of the strategy will be to woo support in Scotland as the nuclear deterrent is based at Faslane on the Clyde and supports around 9,000 Scottish jobs.

The decision to launch a campaign follows the publication of a Lib Dem government document examining the options on the future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent and a suggestion by Treasury chief secretary Danny Alexander that there may only be a need for two new subs – instead of the present four – ending the continuous seaborne deterrent.

The leader of the campaign, Tory New Forest MP Dr Julian Lewis, said that there is now no reason to delay a decision on replacing Trident.

Insisting that the campaign has cross-party support, he pointed out that Labour shadow defence minister Kevan Jones had recently challenged Defence Secretary Philip Hammond to bring forward the decision to build the new generation submarines.

He said: “The only reason why the decision was delayed was so the Lib Dems could have their review. Now we have had it, there is no reason to delay further.

“We can certainly put down an order for two or three of the four submarines and get on with replacing Trident. What was interesting is that even the Lib Dems admitted that the new version of Trident is the only option.”

But he added: “What should be of great concern is that despite what they said this week the Lib Dems clearly want us to drop our nuclear deterrent.

“It is imperative that we sign the contract before the next election because if we end up with another hung parliament the Lib Dems will blackmail either my party or Labour into dropping the replacement of Trident.”

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The review was ordered by Cameron and the Lib Dem leader Nick Clegg, reflecting the Lib Dems' wish to find a cheaper alternative to the ageing submarines. The review, published last week, called for an end to the round-the-clock patrols by nuclear missile submarines. Post-publication Clegg insisted the country can be kept safe without a Cold War-era nuclear weapons policy which involves being able to "flatten Moscow at the push of a button".

Despite opposition from former defence chiefs, the Liberal Democrat leader claimed there were "plenty of very senior military people" who agreed with his opposition to the like-for-like replacement of the submarine fleet carrying the Trident missiles based on the Clyde.

Clegg said: "The big threat is not the old Cold War threat, but is stateless groups, is terrorist groups, is people getting hold of makeshift nuclear bombs. So, then the question is, does the kind of equipment and the design of the nuclear system we have, which was for a different age, are there options for slimming it down or changing it such that it can meet security needs?"

The campaign comes as Edmond Seay, the former advisor to the US's ambassador to Nato, Ivo Daadler, has called for America to pull its nuclear weapons from Europe in a move which has been seen by the SNP as justification for its anti-nuclear stance while wishing to join Nato.

Seay wrote: "Nato must opt to discuss realistic scenarios for dealing with its nuclear sharing problems in the very near future. Chief among these must be the agreed, deliberate removal of theatre nuclear weapons from Europe and their return to American soil."

He added: "Working in concert with the most affected states, the Obama administration can and should lead the way to a responsible decision on the removal of theatre nuclear weapons from Nato Europe in the national security interests of all Allies."

SNP Westminster leader Angus Robertson said: "Edmond Seay's views are well worth listening to. He brings a huge reserve of experience to the table and is widely respected for his knowledge of how Nato works at a strategic level and how it should proceed into the 21st century.

"What is really significant and encouraging is that he is laying out a possible direction of travel that theatre nuclear weapons should and could be completely removed from European soil, without weakening Nato.

"In fact, he argues it will make the alliance stronger."

<http://www.scotsman.com/news/trident-mps-want-replacement-deal-signed-soon-1-3008589>

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The Daily Mail – U.K.

## **The Nuclear Bomb Simulator that Lets Users Nuke their Home Cities in 3D**

- *The Nukemap 3D uses Google Earth images to simulate nuclear bombings*
- *Users can select the location and size of the bombs*
- *Site shows the spread of the mushroom cloud including casualty numbers*

By Victoria Woollaston

22 July 2013

A new interactive map lets users nuke any location in the world with a nuclear bomb of their choosing.

The Nukemap 3D uses Google Earth images to simulate the nuclear attack and bases the animations on how mushroom clouds have behaved using information from various nuclear tests since the 1940s.

Users can select a location, choose their weapon and their viewing location, and see the bomb drop and the cloud develop. The altitude of the cloud, how far it spreads and the number of casualties is also shown.



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Nukemap 3D is the third in a series of nuclear bombing simulators created by historian Alex Wellerstein from the American Institute of Physics in Mayland.

According to Wellerstein, the map was designed to provide a visual and accurate simulation of what would happen if a nuclear bomb was dropped on any city in the world.

It was also created to give people a better understanding of how it would affect their hometowns or places they are familiar with.

And the map can highlight the varying levels of nuclear bombs and their respective threat.

Wellerstein said on his blog: 'We live in a world where nuclear weapons issues are on the front pages of our newspapers on a regular basis, yet most people still have a very bad sense of what an exploding nuclear weapon can actually do.'

Casualty numbers quoted on Nukemap are based on how many people live in that region and their various distances from ground zero.

This population information was bought by the Centre for History of Physics at the American Institute of Physics.

The behaviour of the clouds is based on equations by E. Royce Fletcher, Ray W. Albright, Robert F.D. Perret, Mary E. Franklin, I. Gerald Bowen, and Clayton S. White, as well as U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Civil Effects Test Operations, written in February 1953, and Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan's *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons*, 1964 edition.

The bombs Nukemap users can choose from include a North Korean bomb tested in October 2006 as well as the 'Little Boy' Hiroshima bomb and the 'Ivy King' - the largest known pure fission weapon ever tested.

Each bomb is shown with its relative yield in tonnes or kilotonnes, which determines the size and impact of the nuke.

Wellerstein adds that all of the information used to create the Nukemap 3D is publicly available and doesn't provide any secret data.

He defends the map against critics who claim the site could be used by terrorists by saying: 'If we get to the point where a terrorist group is asking, 'where should I set off my nuclear weapon that I have?' then we've already gone past the point of no return. There's no way to avert a catastrophe at that point.'

Because the Nukemap 3D uses Google Earth images, users must have the Google Earth plug-in installed on their browser to use the map.

Previous versions of the Nukemap use Google Maps but don't have the 3D animations of the Nukemap 3D.

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2373620/The-nuclear-bomb-simulator-lets-users-nuke-cities-devastation-caused-radioactive-mushroom-clouds.html>

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Military Times

## **3-Star: Even More Missile Interceptors Possible at Greely**

July 22, 2013

By Associated Press (AP)

FAIRBANKS, ALASKA — The number of interceptor missiles at Fort Greely could rise beyond the level announced earlier this year, depending on threats from other nations, the director of the Missile Defense Agency said.

In March, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said the Obama administration had decided to increase the number of missiles at Fort Greely to 44 in response to actions by North Korea.

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But last week, the director of the Missile Defense Agency, Vice Admiral James Syring, told a Senate subcommittee that number could go higher as the department evaluates additional threats, the Fairbanks Daily News-Miner reported. Fort Greely is near Delta Junction.

“The 44 is important; it addresses what we are seeing from North Korea today,” he said in response to a question from Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, who serves on the panel. “What you’ll see is the department evaluate the need or the requirement to go beyond the 44 as we evaluate the threat from Iran and other nations like that.”

Syring also was questioned by Murkowski about progress toward the expansion at Fort Greely, including the restoration of Missile Field 1, which the administration mothballed in 2011, with the additional ground-based interceptor missiles to be installed by 2017.

Syring said contracts for work could be released this summer.

“The first step is for us to complete on schedule the Field 1 refurbishment and to get those silos ready for the GBIs we’re going to buy,” he said. “There would be growth possibilities beyond that if we decided to go beyond 44 missiles; 44 gives us a roughly 50 percent increase in terms of the defense of our homeland, against a ballistic missile attack.”

Murkowski reiterated her criticism of the decision to mothball Missile Field 1, calling it short-sighted. “My concern is that we not leave Greely at less than full capacity and capability,” she said.

Last week’s hearing was related to the Missile Defense Agency’s request for about \$7.7 billion for the next fiscal year. The budget request includes \$51 million to continue radar work at Clear Air Force Station, near Anderson, Syring said.

Murkowski also asked Syring about an interceptor missile test failure earlier this month, the third straight such failure.

“We understand what the problem is through ground testing,” Syring said. “We’re confident it’s been completed and adequately addressed.”

Another flight test is planned in March.

<http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20130722/NEWS05/307220030/3-star-Even-more-missile-interceptors-possible-Greely>

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U.S. Department of Defense

July 24, 2013

## **Kehler Lauds Capability, Credibility of Nuclear Enterprise**

By Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, July 24, 2013 – Sweeping improvements across the U.S. nuclear enterprise since a 2007 incident have increased the focus on the nuclear mission and raised the bar in terms of standards and performance, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command told reporters today.

“In general, I feel much more comfortable today with the level of attention,” Air Force Gen. C. Robert Kehler said during a Defense Writers Group breakfast roundtable. “I am very confident in the capability and credibility of the forces. And I am very, very confident in our ability to continue our deterrence mission.”

Kehler was deputy commander of Stratcom during the August 2007 “Bent Spear” incident in which nuclear-equipped missiles were mistakenly transported nearly 1,500 miles on the wing of a B-52 Stratofortress bomber.

Revelation of the incident -- defense officials emphasized at the time that the weapons were never unsecured and never at risk of detonating -- led to personnel dismissals, organizational changes and heightened performance requirements.

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“A lot has changed in the last six to seven years,” Kehler said. “A lot has changed organizationally, ... in terms of the intensity of the focus on the nuclear part of our mission, ... [and] in terms of the assessment and evaluation that we put on the units that are involved in all of this.

“And as we say, perfection is really the standard when we talk about nuclear weapons,” he said.

Among the changes was the Air Force’s standup of Global Strike Command, with a singular focus on the nuclear mission and the standards applied to those involved, he said. The Navy underwent its own top-to-bottom review of its nuclear operations and activities.

The increased focus on nuclear-related units and activities has paid off in better performance levels, Kehler reported.

The general recalled his own experience with these “hard looks” during his earlier years within the nuclear force. “These are not easy evaluations to pass,” he said. “And they have gotten harder.”

Stratcom’s nuclear deterrence mission remains critical to the United States, Kehler noted, injected with a renewed focus and sense of urgency by the president’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the national defense strategy.

“We recognize the Cold War has been over for 20 years,” he said, but he noted President Barack Obama’s pledge to maintain a “credible deterrent force” for both the United States and its allies and partners.

That deterrent is based on the triad of ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-capable heavy bombers and the associated aerial tankers, and the assured warning and command-and-control system that interconnects them.

Kehler called modernization of the nuclear enterprise “essential.”

“We find ourselves in the position today where most of the platforms and virtually all of the weapons are well over 20 years old, and, in some cases, substantially over 20 years old,” he said.

“Life extensions are due on the weapons, [and] modernization is due on the platforms ... and the nuclear command-and-control system,” said Kehler, noting that some of these efforts already have been deferred for almost 10 years.

Asked about morale within the nuclear force, Kehler said it’s generally good. “It is not an easy job,” he added, noting the intellectual intensity of the nuclear mission.

Kehler visited the Global Strike Command headquarters at Barksdale Air Force Base, La., earlier this month, to emphasize the importance of that mission to the men and women charged with carrying it out every day.

“The skills that we have for the nuclear-deterrence mission will be needed as far into the future as I can see,” he said.

“As long as we have nuclear weapons, it’s our job to deter nuclear attack with a safe, secure and effective force. That’s what we’re here for.”

<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120513>

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Air Force Times.com

## **STRATCOM Chief: Upgrades Needed for Nuclear Weapon Arsenal, Global Strike Fleets**

July 24, 2013

By Brian Everstine, Staff writer

The head of U.S. Strategic Command today urged an end to the gridlock that has delayed long-overdue upgrades to the nation’s nuclear arsenal and the aircraft fleet that protects them.

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“We find ourselves in a position today that most of the platforms and all of the weapons are well over 20 years old,” Gen. Robert Kehler told reporters.

A top priority for upgrades: the bombs themselves. The Defense Department is moving forward on upgrades and service life extension programs for the B-61 nuclear gravity bomb, which was first developed in the 1950s and produced in the 1960s. The bomb will be the primary nuclear bomb for the B-2 Spirit and the next-generation bomber and is “essential” to a credible deterrent force, Kehler said.

The command is looking to have one variant of the weapon, and to combine electronics upgrades and service-life extension programs into one process to save money, Kehler said. The upgrades would keep the bomb flying, and would be necessary for it to be carried on the F-35 or upgraded B-2s, officials said.

But the push for upgrades has met opposition.

The National Nuclear Security Administration has estimated the B-61 life-extension program will cost more than \$8 billion, and other assessments have found it to be even higher, according to the Center for Arms Control and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. The center states the upgrade is unnecessary because it assumes a threat that might no longer exist in a decade.

Another focus for updates is the flying fleet that protects the bombs: the Air Force’s fleet of UH-1Ns assigned to Global Strike Command.

The 43-year-old UH-1Ns are still flown by the security forces assigned to Global Strike Command, but these aging helicopters are “overall, not the right aircraft for the mission,” Kehler said. The security forces need a newer aircraft to complete its mission, which would allow the Air Force to reduce the size of the fleet.

“You can do that mission with fewer helicopters, if you have the right helicopter,” Kehler said.

The older helicopters have trouble flying in all weather, and Global Strike Command was planning on a replacement until budget cuts stalled that effort last year.

Upgrades are moving forward on another plane in Global Strike Command’s aging fleet: The first B-52H touched down this month at a depot at Tinker Air Force Base, Okla., for new communications software and hardware that will let Stratofortress crews see real-time digital information, such as intelligence, mapping and targeting information. The Combat Network Communications Technology upgrades include on-board equipment such as servers and new workstations.

“It’s going to look considerably different,” said Chief Master Sgt. Jeffrey Buxton, 2nd Maintenance Group superintendent, in an Air Force release. “There will be six new monitors in the aircraft which will give us increased functionality. We’ll be able to tie in more systems to those monitors.”

<http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20130724/NEWS04/307240030/STRATCOM-chief-Upgrades-needed-nuclear-weapon-arsenal-Global-Strike-fleets>

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National Journal

## **Asian Spying Said to Focus on U.S. Radiation-Hardened Electronics**

By Rachel Oswald, Global Security Newswire  
July 25, 2013

WASHINGTON -- The Pentagon has documented a sharp increase in military espionage from the Asia-Pacific region that focuses on specialized electronics designed to withstand radiation, such as that caused by nuclear warfare or accidents, according to an official review released last week.

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For a number of years, foreign entities from East Asia and the Pacific “have demonstrated a strong interest in obtaining export-controlled U.S. rad-hard circuitry,” states the report by the Pentagon’s Defense Security Service, referring to radiation-hardened electronics.

Radiation hardening is a process by which electric components are made to withstand the effects of ionizing radiation released in a nuclear explosion, by commercial atomic reactors or the sun.

These strengthened circuits “have applications in nuclear weapons, aerospace vehicles, ballistic missiles, and other electronics used in environments subject to radiation,” the review reads.

A number of Asia-Pacific nations with growing space programs could be motivated to seek out information about radiation-resistant technology.

The fiscal 2012 DSS report did not specifically single out China as the principal culprit behind this type of spying. However, it is generally understood that Beijing is the biggest perpetrator of digital espionage in the region and is also keenly interested in improving its own strategic military capabilities.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army is believed to be concerned about the possibility of an atomic electromagnetic pulse attack -- that is, one aimed at neutralizing its nuclear deterrent or other strategic assets that rely on electronics to operate. Additionally, China could be developing EMP weapons of its own, according to a declassified 2005 U.S. Army intelligence report.

North Korea may similarly take an interest in protecting its ballistic missiles from an EMP strike; however, the isolated nation is not believed to conduct weapons espionage to the degree that China does.

In a strike optimized for electromagnetic pulse, a nuclear warhead would be detonated far above a country. The attack could send out large amounts of radiation with the intention of confusing or simply frying the electrical systems below, including those used to run weapon systems. Some U.S. lawmakers worry about the possibility of the United States coming under this form of disruptive assault.

An alternative explanation for the intense Asia-Pacific interest is that a number of nations there with developing space capabilities likely would be interested in making sure their space-based systems are built to withstand things like solar flares and cosmic rays, according to the report. Australia, China, Japan, and South Korea all have space programs of varying size and ambitions.

The Defense Security Service, which works to limit unauthorized access to U.S. weapon system details, found that rad-hard electronics “will very likely remain highly sought after” in the future.

More broadly, the Pentagon organization has seen a major uptick in espionage efforts by Asian nations aimed at gaining backdoor knowledge of U.S. missile systems.

From fiscal 2011 to fiscal 2012, defense contractors working on U.S. missile programs self-reported an 86 percent increase in instances of attempted foreign espionage. Of these attempts, more than half came from organizations connected to the Asia-Pacific region, the Defense Security Service said.

“Foreign entities, especially those linked to countries with mature missile programs, increasingly focused collection efforts on U.S. missile technology, usually aimed at particular missile subsystems,” the report found.

Among the U.S. missile systems targeted in fiscal 2012 by intelligence collectors in this region were the submarine-launched Trident ballistic missile, the tactical Tomahawk missile, the Standard Missile 3 interceptor, the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 interceptor and the Ground Based Interceptor, according to the DSS report.

In its tracking of foreign espionage efforts, the Pentagon branch cites a number of espionage efforts under the umbrella of “collection activities.” These methods include cyber spying, attempts to acquire technology, outright requests for technical information, and foreign visits.

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For the first time ever in fiscal 2012, cyber sleuthing -- termed "suspicious network activity" in the report -- was the No.1 collection method used by foreign organizations. It supplanted in rank both attempted acquisition and requests for information, which were the first and second most preferred methods, respectively, in fiscal 2011.

What is particularly troubling to the U.S. military about this change is that it has become more difficult to detect spying when it occurs; cyber espionage is harder to track than the more traditional spying methods.

"These changes meant that more direct and transparent methods were increasingly displaced by more indirect and opaque methods," the DSS office found.

<http://www.nationaljournal.com/global-security-newswire/asian-spying-said-to-focus-on-u-s-radiation-hardened-electronics-20130725>

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The London Independent – U.K.

OPINION/Comment

## **On Trident, We're still Fighting the Cold War**

Britain's nuclear deterrent does not require 24-hour patrols

By Danny Alexander

Sunday, 21 July 2013

The UK does not need a hair-trigger nuclear weapons system to keep it safe. To suggest otherwise is Cold War thinking at its most outdated – and last week it was a shame to see both the Conservative and Labour parties in denial.

This debate is too important to be dictated by the political ghosts of Margaret Thatcher and Neil Kinnock. We need to move on from old Cold War assumptions and consider the facts.

To help open the debate, on Tuesday the Government published the Trident Alternatives Review. It is a detailed and forensic analysis, the most thorough for decades. It clearly shows there are credible and viable alternatives to the UK's current approach to nuclear deterrence.

For the first time in a generation, the British people can see for themselves that 24-hour nuclear patrols against no adversary in particular are unnecessary.

The review demonstrates that there is a ladder of nuclear capability and readiness and that there exist a number of options for taking steps down its rungs without getting off altogether.

I believe we should cease round-the-clock patrols when they are not justified by a threat, but retain the capability to restart them if we need to in the future. That is not a "part-time" approach: our conventional forces are constantly available, but held at lower readiness according to the threats we face.

Of course, coming down the ladder depends on the judgements we make about future threats, as well as about our legal and international obligations; it means accepting a different calculation of risk from that which existed during the Cold War.

If continuous at-sea deterrence is an insurance policy, we're paying too high a premium.

I believe we can and should go much further in de-alerting our nuclear deterrent.

Just last month in Berlin, President Obama announced a major reduction in the US nuclear arsenal and called for movement beyond "Cold War nuclear postures". I want the UK to meet this call.

As the US President has said, a world free of nuclear weapons may be a long way away off but that should not stop us taking responsible steps towards it.

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The easy option, of course, is to do nothing, as both the Conservatives and Labour parties suggested they will do. That is the easy approach, not the right approach. The right approach is to meet President Obama's call while maintaining our national security and our ultimate insurance policy against future threats.

It is my hope that in the next Parliament the UK's response will be to seriously consider the end of continuous nuclear deterrence. The division on this issue is now clear: Labour and the Tories are stuck in the past, the Liberal Democrats are looking to the future.

As Nick Harvey noted, the dinosaurs may have sounded loud in the House of Commons but the British people are more open-minded. We should not allow backward-looking, Cold War assumptions to stop us doing the right thing.

*Danny Alexander is Chief Secretary to the Treasury.*

<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/on-trident-were-still-fighting-the-cold-war-8722944.html>

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Huffington Post  
OPINION/The Blog

## Ash at Aspen: Low-Balling the Cost of Nukes

By William Hartung  
July 22, 2013

By all accounts, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter is a smart man: Yale graduate, Rhodes scholar, doctorate in theoretical physics, teaching stints at the JFK School of Government and MIT, and two rounds of service at the Department of Defense, one in the Clinton years and now in the Obama administration. But even the smartest guy in the room gets it wrong once in a while, and such was the case at this year's Aspen Security Forum. When asked by *New York Times* chief Washington correspondent David Sanger whether it might not "save you considerably" to cut U.S. nuclear forces by one-third, Carter responded by saying that nuclear weapons are not "a big swinger of the budget" because "they don't cost that much."

As the late Everett Dirksen was alleged to have said, a billion dollars here, a billion dollars there, and pretty soon you're talking real money. And even by Washington standards, the nation is spending real money on nuclear weapons -- money that would be better used for virtually any other purpose at a time of tight budgets and shifting national security priorities. The high cost of nukes should motivate us to do what we should be doing anyway -- getting rid of weapons that serve no useful purpose and do far more harm than good to U.S. and global security. Reasonable people can disagree about how to get there, but President Obama was right when he said we need to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

This brings us back to Carter's response at Aspen. His low-balling of the costs of nuclear weapons came in the context of a prior question in which David Sanger asked if we wouldn't be just as safe going down to about 1,000 deployed nuclear warheads from the 1,550 allowed under New START. This would be a cut of about one-third that would still leave the United States with devastating nuclear overkill. And since we'd be just as safe at this lower number, Sanger asked why we shouldn't just do so unilaterally and "save considerably" in the process.

Carter made more than one error in his response to Sanger's two-pronged question. First, he suggested that since "we aren't going to attack ourselves" with our own nuclear weapons, why get rid of them? Why not trade reductions in the U.S. force for reductions or increased nuclear safety measures on the part of other nations? This is Cold War thinking at its worst, and ignores the fact that U.S. reductions may be positive in their own right, serving as a spur to others to cut their own nuclear arsenals. These reductions would also be a step towards meeting U.S. obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which calls for nuclear weapons states to eliminate their nuclear weapons in exchange for non-nuclear states agreeing not to develop them.

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In short, Carter vastly overstates the strategic value of nuclear weapons while drastically understating their budgetary costs.

The cost question is worth looking it in more detail. At Aspen, Carter claimed that the U.S. spends "only" \$16 billion a year on nuclear weapons (by the way, only at the Pentagon is \$16 billion considered pocket change). In coming up with his figure, Carter appears to be understating or ignoring large categories of expenditure, including the ballooning projects designed to build new nuclear warheads, bomb factories, submarines, bombers and inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Each one of these projects is likely to cost in the tens of billions of dollars. One nuclear warhead project alone -- the B-61 bomb -- costs more than its weight in gold, at \$10 billion and counting. Current plans also call for spending \$55 billion or more on 100 new nuclear bombers, roughly \$100 billion on new ballistic missile submarines, and untold billions more on bomb-making facilities like the planned Uranium Processing Facility (UPF).

But the aforementioned projects are long-term efforts, which will be paid for over time by ourselves, our children and, in some cases, our grandchildren. An apples-to-apples comparison can be had by looking at two independent analyses: a 2008 report by Stephen Schwartz and Deepti Choubey for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a 2012 analysis by Russell Rumbaugh and Nathan Cohn for the Stimson Center, which represent the most comprehensive current estimates of direct nuclear weapons spending.

The Carnegie report, which builds on the methodology of the path-breaking 1998 study, the *Atomic Audit*, documented over \$29 billion in nuclear weapons spending, including procurement, operations, research and development costs, nuclear weapons-related intelligence spending, and the nuclear warhead complex. The Stimson Center's more recent estimate covers similar ground and pegs annual nuclear weapons spending at about \$31 billion per year, or about twice the amount Carter cited at Aspen.

In addition to the Stimson tally, the Ploughshares fund has done a comprehensive estimate that includes nuclear-related activities like cleanup costs at nuclear weapons facilities and ballistic missile defense. The Ploughshares estimate comes in at well over \$60 billion per year, or about four times Carter's estimate.

Clearly Dr. Carter needs to think again. Sharp reductions in nuclear weapons will make us safer while saving tens of billions of dollars in the next decade and beyond. That should be a no-brainer, particularly for someone with his intellectual credentials.

*William D. Hartung is the director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy.*

[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-hartung/ash-at-aspen-lowballing-t\\_b\\_3634758.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-hartung/ash-at-aspen-lowballing-t_b_3634758.html)

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Great Falls Tribune – Great Falls, MT  
OPINION/Op-Ed

## **Opinion: Nuclear Cuts Proposal Misses Mark**

July 22, 2013

Written by the Montana Defense Alliance

On June 19, President Barack Obama proclaimed in Berlin: "So today, I'm announcing additional steps forward. After a comprehensive review, I've determined that we can ensure the security of America and our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third."

Some share Obama's hope of eliminating nuclear weapons. That hope is a naive, myopic view of selective data to draw illogical and unsupportable conclusions that a world without nuclear weapons is possible.

The key, in any decision for reducing or eliminating national capabilities, must be national security.

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There doesn't appear to be *any* analysis indicating reductions or eliminations of capabilities will improve national security. All the reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons has not deterred several sovereign states' decision to build their own nuclear forces.

The president's vision of going to zero nuclear weapons is not shared by other nations with a current nuclear capability. No one is following the United States regarding nuclear disarmament.

During confirmation hearings, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated in response to Sen. Fischer: "I do not agree with any recommendation that would unilaterally take any action to further reduce our nuclear warheads and our capability. Every option that we must look at, every action we must take to reduce warheads or anything should be bilateral. It should be verifiable. It should be negotiated."

The president's driving factors appear to be to reduce numbers at all costs "hoping" we're "lucky" enough that reductions miraculously provide for the security and safety of the U.S. and our allies.

Neither hope nor luck are good plans.

As instruments of national policy, nuclear weapons are designed for "war avoidance." As Admiral Richard Mies, U.S. Navy retired, stated, "The great paradox of nuclear weapons is that they deter conflict by the possibility of their use, and the more a potential adversary perceives the credibility of our capabilities and will, the less likely he is to challenge their use."

By eliminating capability, it by definition adds to an increased possibility for war.

Are we to "hope" the president has correctly calculated the impact on our allies reaction to further reductions to extend deterrence? Two-dozen countries rely on our nuclear deterrent for regional stability.

The nuclear umbrella doesn't just protect our allies; it also dissuades them from pursuing nuclear weapons, preventing further proliferation. We'll just "hope" they continue to see us as a credible deterrent. And we'll just "hope" they don't decide to build nuclear weapons.

History clearly indicates that when we cut our nuclear arsenal, not all countries follow our lead. Where is the analysis to indicate the proposed reductions don't tempt potential adversaries to race to achieve parity? Deterrence is like oxygen ... very rarely do you know that you have too much ... but you sure know it when you don't have enough.

Will Obama live by the words stated in Berlin? "Our current programs are bound by the rule of law, and they're focused on threats to our security — not the communications of ordinary persons. They help confront real dangers, and they keep people safe here in the United States and here in Europe. But we must accept the challenge that all of us in democratic governments face: to listen to the voices who disagree with us; to have an open debate about how we use our powers and how we must constrain them; and to always remember that government exists to serve the power of the individual, and not the other way around."

The president's June 19, announcement prompted a terse news release from some state senators and a letter to the president from 44 House members. It's good they responded.

But why wasn't there a letter from all members of the Senate and House regarding the nuclear enterprise?

Why aren't they mounting a persistent effort to hold the president accountable for the common defense?

We would expect all members of Congress to hold the president to task in retaining national capability to provide for the security of the nation and not resort to "hope" that the president's dream does not become a nightmare.

This piece was submitted by the Montana Defense Alliance, a committee of the Great Falls Area Chamber of Commerce made up of five major stakeholders: The chamber, city of Great Falls, Cascade County, Great Falls Development Authority and the Great Falls International Airport Authority. The main purpose of MTDA is to advocate for retention of missions at the Montana Air National Guard, Malmstrom AFB and in Montana, and to procure new missions.

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Foreign Policy  
OPINION/Killer Apps

## The U.S. Might Be Buying Weapons with Enemy Access Built In

By John Reed  
Monday, July 22, 2013

It's bad enough that U.S. intelligence officials are constantly discovering new plans to insert spyware and back doors into the Defense Department's supply chain. But what may be worse is that American analysts are only discovering indirect evidence of this infiltration, according to a senior DOD intelligence official. The back doors themselves remain maddeningly hard to find.

"Our adversaries are very active in trying to introduce material into the supply chain in ways that threaten our security from the standpoint of their abilities to collect [intelligence] and disrupt" U.S. military operations, said David Shedd, deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency during a speech at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado on July 19.

DIA is finding more and more plots to deliver these parts through front companies that are "the instrument of the hostile service that's guiding and directing them," Shedd told Killer Apps during the forum.

"My concern is that our adversaries -- and they're multiple in the supply chain context -- have been very active for a very long time," David Shedd, deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency told Killer Apps at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado. "We're finding things, not in the supply chain itself but plans and intentions through" front companies posing as legitimate DOD parts suppliers.

This is hardly a new threat. (Yours truly has written about the epidemic of counterfeit parts poisoning DOD supply chains since 2008.) A 2011 Senate investigation discovered an unbelievable amount of fake semiconductors in brand new DOD weapons such as the Navy's P-8 Poseidon sub-killing plane and anti-ICBM missiles used by the Missile Defense Agency. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the vast majority of the parts were found to come from China.

In addition to the obvious safety threat posed by say, fake aircraft bolts or wiring harnesses, one of the main dangers to the supply chain is that spyware or back doors can be built into critical electronic circuits. Spyware and backdoors could allow an enemy to easily monitor U.S. operations or even disable American weapons systems.

Israel is rumored to have used digital back doors planted in the software of Syrian air defenses to disable their radars during its 2007 air strike against the Dayr as-Zawr nuclear facility.

Just as scary as the fact that this kind of espionage has been going on for years, is the fact that the massive advantage the U.S. military has in hardware and manpower doesn't exist in the digital world.

"As we learn more about our own cyber requirements and needs, we have a better understanding that the world is a flatter world in terms of what our adversaries can do in the supply chain," Shedd told Killer Apps. While DOD has poured counterintelligence resources at the problem, "I sense a little bit that it's insufficient" said Shedd during his speech.

"I'm generally an optimist, [but] in the supply chain area, I'm very concerned" given the fact that he doesn't truly know the full extent of adversary penetration into DOD weapons systems, said Shedd. "You don't know what you don't know and the old adage of the weakest link is obviously what we need to be concerned about."

Despite all this, there aren't enough people looking at the problem, and sequestration may make this worse.

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"It's an area where I have a significant number of analytic resources attached to it and [this] is still less than adequate, in my personal view," said Shedd during his speech. "I'm trying to think about that in a time of fiscal austerity and all the rest because I'm trading it off with other missions that are critical."

You can bet this issue will see more and more attention as hardware becomes increasingly networked and therefore vulnerable to cyber attack. For all the noise about outsiders hacking American systems, the best way for a foreign adversary to get inside U.S. networks might be to ship some counterfeit parts with the spyware already built in.

*John Reed reports on the frontiers of cyber war and the latest in military technology for Killer Apps.*

[http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/22/the\\_us\\_might\\_be\\_buying\\_weapons\\_with\\_enemy\\_access\\_built\\_in](http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/22/the_us_might_be_buying_weapons_with_enemy_access_built_in)

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The Commentator – U.K.

OPINION/Commentary

## **No real Alternatives to Trident after all**

*The Lib Dems must not be allowed to hold Britain's future security to ransom. Britain needs a full fleet of nuclear submarines*

By Peter Cannon

24 July 2013

After two years of effort, the 'Trident Alternatives Review' study published by the Cabinet Office last week only served to show what had been obvious for some time – that there are no 'alternatives' to Trident worthy of the name. Alternative nuclear deterrent systems exist, of course, but none of them are as effective and none of them would save money.

None of the alternatives would have saved money because they all would have required the design and building of entirely new systems, which would have taken much longer than simply replacing the existing submarines. And none of them would be as effective as the continuous at-sea deterrence provided by Trident.

With all the alternatives discredited, the review turned to keeping Trident but reducing the submarines from four to three. This would end continuous at-sea deterrence, as four submarines is the minimum number required.

The review found: "a 3-boat fleet would risk multiple unplanned breaks in continuous covert patrolling as well as requiring regular planned breaks for maintenance and/or training." The Lib Dems have suggested going further and reducing the fleet to two submarines, an option not even considered by the review.

They now want to keep Trident, but get rid of the most important thing about it: continuous at-sea deterrence. Rather than replacing Trident with something else, they want to downgrade it and undermine its effectiveness.

This is not only a case of shifting from wanting to change the weapons system to wanting to change the UK's nuclear posture, but of wanting to ensure that the UK will no longer have the capability to maintain a continuous deterrent posture.

The Lib Dems fail to explain the logic of renewing a system that can provide continuous nuclear deterrence but choosing to make it incapable of continuous deterrence. Plenty of governments have cut back on and downgraded military capabilities, but the Lib Dem argument is unique, in wanting to downgrade the UK's military capability for the sole purpose of downgrading the UK's military capability.

The financial savings from renewing the Trident system but cancelling one or two of the planned four submarines are negligible and would not be seen for years to come. Nor is there any reason to believe that these marginal savings would be invested in conventional defence forces.

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Danny Alexander has accused those of us who still believe in continuous at-sea deterrence of 'Cold War thinking'. Of course, the threats have changed since the Cold War, but they have not disappeared. The Lib Dems fail to explain how there is a threat which justifies the UK maintaining a nuclear deterrent but not one ready and able to deter all the time.

The review states that a non-continuous posture depends on "political confidence that: a potential aggressor would not launch a no-notice pre-emptive attack when the UK was at a lower posture with no boat deployed." Surely, that is exactly when an aggressor would be most likely to attack, and they would be unlikely to give notice.

The review also states that non-continuous deterrence depends on confidence that "with sufficient warning, the UK could re-constitute back-to-back patrolling before a potential period of heightened tension arises (covering the availability of equipment and suitably trained and motivated civilian, military and industrial personnel); and that such back-to-back patrols could then be sustained long enough to cover any emergent crisis."

Danny Alexander says that continuous patrols could be restored if necessary, if there is a heightened threat, but having only two or three boats ensures that this cannot be maintained. That is the whole point of downgrading from four boats to two or three. The idea of the UK waiting until a time of international tension or crisis and then restarting continuous patrols is fanciful.

The Lib Dems argue that the UK 'stepping down the nuclear ladder' by moving away from a continuous deterrent posture will be a positive contribution to multilateral disarmament, citing recent speeches in favour of nuclear disarmament by Barack Obama.

Yet Barack Obama talking about a world free of nuclear weapons does not make it more likely to happen. It is almost touching to see the level of faith and reverence Lib Dem elder statesmen seem to put in his words. It is also ironic to see the Lib Dems advocating an approach so subservient to the US that it actually involves permanently downgrading our nuclear security for the sake of one president's say-so.

Sir Menzies Campbell pointed out that Obama is considering downsizing the US Trident fleet from eighteen to twelve submarines. The UK only has four already, the minimum for continuous deterrence, so going down to two or three would change the UK's capabilities in a way that the US going down from eighteen to twelve would not. The US also has a large arsenal of silo-based nuclear missiles and bomber-carried nuclear warheads in addition to its submarine-launched Trident missiles.

The UK only has the submarine-launched missiles. Of the five official nuclear weapons states, the UK is the only one with only a single platform for nuclear deterrence.

Moving to a part-time deterrent would therefore put the UK at a serious disadvantage. Whatever the Lib Dems might think, the ending UK continuous at-sea deterrence would be unlikely to impress the US, France or our other NATO allies. The UK's continuous deterrent is after all recognised as part of NATO's nuclear defences, and helps shape the global environment which the Lib Dems think is so safe that continuous deterrence is unnecessary not only now but in decades to come.

The Lib Dems may believe that the UK's 'good example' in 'stepping down the nuclear ladder' will inspire Russia and China to disarm, and North Korea and Iran to stop seeking to develop nuclear weapons capability, but it is doubtful that anyone else does.

The Lib Dems seem obsessed with undermining Trident at all costs – first by advocating replacing it with an unknown alternative system, then when that was shown to be unviable, by advocating making it non-continuous, stripping it of its most important feature.

In the House of Commons debate on the Trident Alternatives Review, both Conservative and Labour MPs, frontbench and backbench, tore apart the illogical and intellectually dishonest position the Lib Dems are taking on Trident. Therein lies the hope for maintaining continuous at-sea deterrence into the future.



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The Lib Dems have made it quite clear that they will seek to make Trident a political issue at the next general election and in any future coalition negotiations.

But there is no reason to delay the 'Main Gate' decision on renewing Trident until 2016, as is currently planned. Instead, this decision should be taken as soon as possible in this parliament, with the support of Conservative and Labour MPs, so that the Lib Dems cannot hold the country's future security to ransom by playing political games with our nuclear deterrent.

*Peter Cannon is a Conservative councillor on Dartford, Kent*

[http://www.thecommentator.com/article/3979/no\\_real\\_alternatives\\_to\\_trident\\_after\\_all](http://www.thecommentator.com/article/3979/no_real_alternatives_to_trident_after_all)

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My San Antonio.com  
OPINION/Commentary

## **Thirty-Year-Old Missile Defense System is a Strategic Necessity**

By C. Dean McGrath Jr., Guest Commentary  
July 24, 2013

North Korea is preparing to test a long-range missile and the defense department believes that the nation may soon be capable of building a nuclear-armed missile.

Meanwhile, Iran remains a serious threat — the nation already has missile capability, it's working to develop inter-continental missiles (ICBMs) and it's committed to developing nuclear weapons.

There is also the very real threat of terrorists gaining these capabilities and radicals around the globe have shown a willingness to use whatever technology is available.

These threats are reminders of why the United States has invested decades of research into developing missile defense systems. While missile defense may have been a politically divisive issue when it was first proposed by President Ronald Reagan 30 years ago, the need for such capability is no longer in doubt.

When Reagan first announced the concept of missile defense in 1983, he envisioned a system that could intercept incoming missiles from the Soviet Union. Until then, the United States relied on Mutual Assured Destruction — or MAD — as the only deterrent.

Today, it makes even more sense. MAD has limited applicability to address the threats posed by rogue nations and terrorists.

Thirty years ago, Reagan's vision was dismissed out of hand — called "Star Wars" — and was considered unrealistic.

Reagan knew that the technological challenges would be enormous, but he never doubted that the United States could succeed.

He challenged the nation to consider whether the world would be better off "if people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation," but rather on our ability to "intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our soil or that of our allies."

Thanks to bipartisan political support and 30 years of effort from scientists, engineers, military and civilian personnel, the skeptics have been proven wrong. Missile defense interceptors are successfully destroying incoming missiles in both test and real-world situations.

The Pentagon recently deployed a defense system to Guam to defend our military bases in the Pacific from North Korean threats, and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel recently announced plans to deploy 14 more ground-based interceptors to California and Alaska.

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The United States isn't the only country that has recognized the necessity of strong missile defense.

Friends and allies — including Israel, Japan, South Korea and the UAE — have come to rely on these systems. Several others, including Poland and Turkey, are in the process of assessing their missile defense options.

The global consensus has shifted so far in favor of missile defense that the NATO alliance has adopted territorial missile defense as an operational priority. This commitment could enable countries to pool their expertise and resources, allowing some smaller nations to acquire and use missile defense systems that would otherwise be unaffordable if pursued independently.

Thirty years ago, President Reagan initiated "a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles."

He noted that "Our only purpose — one all people share — is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war."

We have made much progress toward that end. It is indisputable that a strong, practical missile defense system will be needed in the coming years to protect the United States, our friends and allies. It is not a political or diplomatic bargaining chip. Neither is it a budgetary luxury. It's a strategic necessity.

But despite 30 years of progress and achievement, we cannot stop our support of missile defense until we achieve the "ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by nuclear missiles."

*C. Dean McGrath Jr. was an associate counsel to President Ronald Reagan (1986-1989) He is an attorney with McGrath & Associates and an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University.*

<http://www.mysanantonio.com/community/bulverde/article/Thirty-year-old-missile-defense-system-is-a-4684224.php>

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Foreign Policy  
OPINION/Article

## Why We Don't Need to Worry About a 'Nuclear Handoff'

By Stephen M. Walt  
Thursday, July 25, 2013

After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. national security establishment started focusing on the various ways that "international terrorism" might pose a threat to U.S. interests or the United States itself. Unsurprisingly, experts began to dream up all sorts of frightening scenarios and worry about all sorts of far-fetched scenarios. I remember this period well, and I recall sitting through seminars and workshops at which lots of very smart and creative people were imagining various nasty things that groups like al Qaeda might try to do. Hijack gas trucks and blow up the Lincoln Tunnel? Take over the Mall of America and create carnage on a big shopping day? Commandeer a supertanker and smash it into the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge? Wait until summer and then set forest fires all over the American West? The list of *conceivable* dangers was infinitely long, but if you sat in enough of those seminars, you could easily become convinced that it was only a matter of time before somebody did something really nasty to you or your loved ones.

Imagination is one thing, but disciplined risk assessment is another. It's easy to dream up bad things that could conceivably happen, but intelligent public policy should rest on a more careful and sustained appraisal of how likely those various scary things are. And that's why I suggest you read Keir Lieber and Daryl Press's recent article in the journal *International Security* on "Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists."

The fear that nuclear-armed states would hand weapons to terrorists has been a staple of U.S. threat-mongering ever since 9/11. It was a key part of the justification for invading Iraq in 2003, and it forms part of the constant drumbeat for military action against Iran. But it never made much sense for two reasons. First, a nuclear-armed state has little incentive to give up control over weapons it has labored long and hard to acquire, for what could the state possibly gain

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from doing so? Second, a state giving nuclear weapons to terrorists could never be sure that those weapons would not be traced back to it and thereby invite devastating retaliation.

Lieber and Press examine the historical record and show that it is almost impossible to conduct a major terrorist operation and not be blamed for it. Here's the abstract for their article:

*"Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran's nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely is it that the perpetrators of nuclear terrorism could remain anonymous?"*

*Data culled from a decade of terrorist incidents reveal that attribution is very likely after high-casualty terror attacks. Attribution rates are even higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally -- 97 percent for incidents in which ten or more people were killed. Moreover, tracing a terrorist group that used a nuclear weapon to its state sponsor would not be difficult, because few countries sponsor terror; few terror groups have multiple sponsors; and only one country that sponsors terrorism, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons or enough material to manufacture them. If leaders understand these facts, they will be as reluctant to give weapons to terrorists as they are to use them directly; both actions would invite devastating retaliation."*

I might add that this is the kind of important, nonpartisan, policy-relevant work that more social scientists ought to be doing. It is also important to disseminate these findings widely, so that 1) U.S. policymakers won't keep chasing phantom dangers, 2) the leaders of nuclear-armed states understand that their arsenals are good for deterrence and not much else, and 3) said leaders also understand the need to keep whatever weapons they might have under very reliable control.

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[http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/25/why\\_we\\_dont\\_need\\_to\\_worry\\_about\\_a\\_nuclear\\_handoff](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/25/why_we_dont_need_to_worry_about_a_nuclear_handoff)

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