



**USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER**  
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Xinhua News – China

## **U.S. Seeking Direct Nuke Talks with Iran: Report**

July 14, 2013

WASHINGTON, July 13 (Xinhua) -- The Obama administration is seeking to hold direct talks with Iran over Tehran's controversial nuclear program after Iranian President-elect Hassan Rouhani sent out some positive signals, the Wall Street Journal reported Saturday.

Senior U.S. officials were quoted as saying that Washington is preparing to communicate to Rouhani its desire to hold direct negotiations in the coming weeks after the moderate cleric expressed his interest in engaging with the international community on the nuclear issue.

Rouhani, who won the Iranian election in June, is to succeed President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad early next month.

Senior U.S. officials will meet with representatives of the four other permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany, in Brussels on Tuesday to map out a coordinated approach to Rouhani and Tehran, the officials disclosed.

Communications from Washington to Tehran have at times been sent through the office of Catherine Ashton, who is the European Union's foreign policy chief and head of the diplomatic bloc negotiating with Iran in the so-called P5+1 talks.

The U.S. government is "open to direct talks" and wants to reinforce this in any way, said a senior U.S. official who will take part in the Brussels meeting, noting Iran has sent out signals that the new government "might be going in a different direction."

Through intermediaries, Rouhani has told the Obama administration about his wish to bring more transparency to Iran's nuclear program.

The P5+1, referring to Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States, plus Germany, hopes to schedule a new round of negotiations with Iran by September, the report said.

The U.S. government is still waiting for Tehran to formally respond to the diplomatic package that the P5+1 presented to Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili during the last round of talks in February in Kazakhstan.

It included an easing of some economic sanctions against Iran in return for stopping producing near weapons-grade nuclear fuel and agreeing to deposit much of it outside the country.

The P5+1 also is seeking to close Iran's uranium-enrichment facility in the holy city of Qom, which is fortified in an underground bunker and has begun employing faster centrifuge machines, the report added.

Iran has maintained that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful research and energy purposes, while the U.S.-led Western countries suspect that Tehran is trying to acquire a nuclear weapon.

[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-07/14/c\\_132538713.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-07/14/c_132538713.htm)

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The Jerusalem Post – Israel

## **Netanyahu: Iran 'Weeks Away' from Crossing Red Line**

*Prime Minister tells CBS Iran "won't be allowed to cross" uranium threshold, though warns that Iran is closer than ever.*

By HERB KEINON

14 July 2013

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu launched a rhetorical offensive against Iran on Sunday. The move came amid unease that the world might be enticed by a "compromise proposal" that Jerusalem believes Tehran is hatching, and concern that regional turmoil was distracting everyone's attention from Iran's nuclear march.



Senior Israeli officials said the Iranians were considering a proposal whereby they would agree to a temporary halt of uranium enrichment to 20 percent, and even agree to convert some of that enriched material to a lower grade, in return for a partial lifting of sanctions.

“This is an insignificant and meaningless concession,” one senior official said.

“The Iranians have invested a lot in upgrading centrifuges and have the technological ability to replenish their stockpiles within a few weeks. We will totally oppose this sort of proposal because it does not offer a real solution.”

Netanyahu, meanwhile, told an American audience on CBS News’s *Face the Nation* that regarding the 20% enriched uranium, the Islamic Republic was just 60 kilograms short of crossing his “red line.”

He defined this line – beyond which the Iranians should not be allowed to proceed – as being the possession of 250 kg. of 20% enriched uranium, enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb. He said they now had 190 kg., up from about 110 six to eight months ago.

Netanyahu said the Iranians were also building “faster centrifuges that would enable them to jump the line at a much faster rate. That is, within a few weeks.”

“They’re getting closer,” he said. “They should understand that they’re not going to be allowed to cross it.”

Asked when he would make a decision to attack, Netanyahu responded: “I can tell you I won’t wait until it’s too late.” He added that it was “important to understand that we cannot allow it to happen,” and that the Israeli and US clocks on this matter were “ticking at a different pace.”

“We’re closer [to Iran] than the United States,” he said.

“We’re more vulnerable. And therefore, we’ll have to address this question of how to stop Iran, perhaps before the United States does. But as the prime minister of Israel, I’m determined to do whatever is necessary to defend my country, the one and only Jewish state, from a regime that threatens us with renewed annihilation.”

Netanyahu’s tough rhetoric is widely seen as an attempt to reinsert a sense of urgency regarding Iran, urgency that some in Jerusalem feel has been lost due to the election last month of Hassan Rouhani as Iran’s new president, and also because of the tumultuous events roiling the region.

Representatives of the six world powers known as the P5+1 that are negotiating with Iran – the US, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany – are scheduled to meet Tuesday in Brussels to discuss strategy now that Rouhani is about to take over.

“I have a sense there’s no sense of urgency,” Netanyahu said. “All the problems that we have [in the region], however important, will be dwarfed by this messianic, apocalyptic, extreme regime that would have atomic bombs. It would make a terrible, catastrophic change for the world and for the United States.”

Regarding Rouhani, Netanyahu said the Iranian president-elect had criticized his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, “for being a wolf in wolf’s clothing. His strategy is, be a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Smile and build a bomb.”

Iran also figured prominently in comments Netanyahu made earlier in the day at the weekly cabinet meeting, saying that a month after Iran’s elections the Islamic Republic continued to “quickly sail forward” toward nuclear capability.

According to Netanyahu, Iran was expanding and improving its uranium enrichment capabilities, and in parallel was developing a plutonium reactor so it would have two tracks to create material for a nuclear weapon. At the same time, he said, Tehran was expanding its ballistic missile capabilities.

“We believe that now, more than ever, it is important to stiffen the economic sanctions and present Iran with a credible military option,” he said.



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“We are determined to stand firm by our demands [on Iran], which must become the demands of the international community,” he went on. “First, to cease all enrichment. Second, to remove from the country all the enriched uranium. And third, to close the illegal nuclear facility at Qom.”

Israel’s demands are harsher than those of the international community, which – through the P5+1 – has indicated that Iran must cease enriching uranium to 20% but could keep for civilian purposes some of its stockpiles of uranium that had been enriched to a lesser degree.

On other issues in his *Face the Nation* appearance, Netanyahu walked carefully around a direct question posed to him about whether he thought the US should cut off military aid to the new interim government in Egypt.

“Look, that’s an internal American decision,” he said. But then he added a caveat: “Our concern is the peace treaty with Egypt. One of the foundations of that peace treaty was the US aid given to Egypt.”

He said that Israel and Egypt had maintained formal contacts during the past two years since Hosni Mubarak was deposed, “including now.”

Netanyahu also gave an answer that could be interpreted different ways when he was asked about US reports that Israel, as alleged by anonymous US officials, had been behind the attack last week on Latakia in Syria. The strike targeted Russian-made Yakhont antiship missiles that Israel has in the past warned could fall into Hezbollah’s hands.

“Oh God, every time something happens in the Middle East Israel is accused,” Netanyahu said. “I’m not in the habit of saying what we did or we didn’t do. I’ll tell you what my policy is. My policy is to prevent the transfer of dangerous weapons to Hezbollah and other terror groups. And we stand by that policy.”

<http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Netanyahu-trying-to-re-focus-worlds-attention-on-Iran-tells-cabinet-sanctions-need-to-be-stepped-up-319763>

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The Hill

## **Netanyahu: Iran Closer to Nuclear Weapons that can Strike US**

By Ben Goad

July 14, 2013

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Sunday that Iran was moving closer to developing nuclear weapons capable of striking the U.S., and urged the Obama administration to take a harder line.

During an appearance on “Face the Nation,” Netanyahu said that despite a new government in Tehran, Iran’s nuclear program would have intercontinental ballistic missiles that could carry a nuclear weapon to the United States within a few years.

“They don’t need these missiles to reach us,” Netanyahu said. “They already have missiles that can reach us.”

The U.S. has imposed a series of sanctions on Iran, as well as businesses and individuals with alleged ties to its nuclear program.

The Obama administration signaled optimism following the election of new Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, who was the country’s chief nuclear negotiator in 2003-2005 when Iran struck a deal with the European Union to suspend enrichment.

But Netanyahu said little has changed under Rouhani.

“They’re getting closer and closer to the bomb, and they have to be told in no uncertain terms that that will not be allowed to happen,” he said.

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The United States, he said, has a crucial role to play in demanding that Iran cease enrichment efforts and dismantle its nuclear facility.

"You should ratchet up the sanctions and make it clear to Iran that they won't get away with it. And if sanctions don't work, then they have to know that you will be prepared to take military action," Netanyahu said. "That's the only thing that will get their attention."

Asked what would prompt Israel to attack Iran, Netanyahu said "I won't wait until it's too late."

<http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/310875-netanyahu-iran-developing-nukes-to-reach-american-shores>

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Press TV – Iran

## **Israel Says Might Go Solo to Strike Iran**

Monday, July 15, 2013

Israel has threatened to take unilateral action against the Islamic Republic of Iran over the country's nuclear energy program.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on CBS News's Face the Nation on Sunday that Tel Aviv might act against Iran before the United States does.

*"Our clocks are ticking at a different pace. We're closer than the United States. We're more vulnerable. And therefore, we'll have to address this question of how to stop Iran, perhaps before the United States does," the Israeli prime minister said.*

Netanyahu also said Iran is edging up to what he called a red line.

"They're edging up to the red line. They haven't crossed it yet," he said.

On September 2, 2012, Netanyahu called on the international community to set a "clear red line" for Iran over its nuclear energy program.

On September 24, US President Barack Obama said in response that the issue concerned US national security decisions, and that he was "going to block out any noise that's out there."

The US and Israel have repeatedly threatened to take military action against Iran in order to force the Islamic Republic to halt its uranium enrichment program, which Washington and Tel Aviv claim includes a military component.

Iran rejects the allegations, arguing that as a committed signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it has the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

In addition, the IAEA has conducted numerous inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities but has never found any evidence showing that Iran's civilian nuclear program has been diverted to nuclear weapons production.

<http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/07/15/313826/israel-says-might-go-solo-to-strike-iran/>

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The Boston Globe

## **Arabs Draft Resolution Decrying Israel's Alleged Nuclear Arms**

*Renewed effort will insist nation join treaty pledge*

By George Jahn, Associated Press (AP)

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July 16, 2013

VIENNA — After a two-year hiatus, Arab nations are relaunching efforts to single out Israel for criticism at a major international conference by preparing a resolution over the country's alleged nuclear arsenal, suggesting that the Jewish state's refusal to acknowledge it has such arms is threatening Middle East peace.

The Arab push was a mainstay of recent annual meetings of the 159-nation International Atomic Energy Agency, where it was usually narrowly voted down by Israel's allies. It was suspended in 2011 and 2012, in what Arab nations viewed as a concession to keep hopes alive of high-profile talks on banning weapons of mass destruction from the Mideast.

That attempt, co-sponsored by the United States, Russia and Britain, was called off late last year. While Syria's civil war, nuclear tensions with Iran and other Middle East frictions were cited as the official motive for the cancellation, diplomats then acknowledged that the real reason was the failure to bridge Arab-Israeli differences.

Israel has long said that a full Palestinian-Israeli peace plan must precede any creation of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The Israelis refuse to confirm or deny whether they have nuclear weapons. They also describe Iran and its alleged work on nuclear weapons as the real regional menace.

Iran denies wanting such arms, while it and the region's other Muslim nations assert that Israel's undeclared nuclear arsenal presents the greatest threat to peace in the neighborhood. They insist that Israel should declare such weapons and join the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as part of any peace talks.

The renewed Arab push is reflected in a draft resolution seen by The Associated Press on Monday and endorsed by all 18 Arab members of the IAEA.

An official from one of the Arab delegations confirmed that the supporting nations even include Syria, where President Bashar Assad's government is at odds with some of its Arab neighbors — such as Saudi Arabia — over its war with rebels trying to topple him.

The Arab move underscores the failure of attempts from the outside to persuade the Israelis and the Palestinians to compromise.

If submitted for a vote at the September conference, it will exacerbate international divisions on the issue.

The resolution "expresses concern about the Israeli nuclear capabilities, and calls upon Israel to accede to the NPT and place all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA" purview.

The Arab official said the document was formally submitted to IAEA chief Yukiya Amano late Monday for inclusion on the conference agenda. An explanatory note from the Arab group accompanying it and seen by the AP said the resolution was timely because "Israel alone possesses nuclear capabilities, which are undeclared and not subject to international control, thus constituting a permanent threat to peace and security in the region."

The official demanded anonymity, saying he was not authorized to discuss the resolution and related matters because the document remains confidential until it is formally published by the IAEA as an agenda item.

In a separate development Monday, hundreds of protesters staged demonstrations in Israel against a plan to resettle nomadic Bedouin Arabs in the southern Negev desert.

Arab rights groups called the protests. They are fighting a bill that would move thousands of Bedouins into government-recognized villages. Bedouins charge that the plan would confiscate their land and destroy their way of life.

Israel says the moves are necessary to provide basic services that many Bedouins lack.

The largest demonstration was in the southern city of Beersheba. Police say 700 people protested, scuffling with police, and 14 were arrested after a group of protesters blocked a road.

Also, police say eight demonstrators were arrested at a demonstration in northern Israel after protesters threw rocks at police. Three officers were injured.



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<http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2013/07/15/arabs-ready-anti-israeli-resolution-over-nuclear-arms-arabs-drafting-resolution-israel-over-nuclear-arms/wlXJaRknLzUueu1yuiXd2O/story.html>

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Al Arabiya – U.A.E.

## **Iran Says to Resume Nuclear Talks after forming New Government**

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

Wednesday, 17 July 2013

Tehran -- Iran said Wednesday it would resume talks with world powers on its controversial nuclear program once president-elect Hassan Rowhani has been sworn in and a new negotiating team formed.

European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, who is negotiating with Iran on behalf of the so-called P5+1 group, on Tuesday urged Tehran to resume the talks "as soon as possible."

She made the comments after hosting talks in Brussels between political directors from the so-called P5+1 group that has been negotiating with Iran and which is made up of the five permanent U.N. Security Council members Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States plus Germany.

"We met to consider our position and to look at how best we can move forward in trying to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue," Ashton said in a video statement.

"Of course we wait now for the team to be appointed by Iran. We very much hope that will be soon and we look forward to meeting with them as soon as possible," she said.

Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi was quoted by the ISNA news agency Wednesday as saying that talks would resume once a new negotiating team is named.

"The negotiations with the P5+1 will certainly continue," Salehi said. "We expect Rowhani to appoint a new team of negotiators," Salehi added.

<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2013/07/17/Iran-says-to-resume-nuclear-talks-after-forming-new-government-.html>

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Bloomberg News

## **Iran's North Korea Links Draw Scrutiny at Nuclear-Weapon Meeting**

By Jonathan Tirone

July 17, 2013

The possibility that North Korea is sharing nuclear-weapon test data with Iran cannot be ruled out and is a proliferation risk, the former chief of a U.S. atomic-bomb laboratory said today at a meeting in Vienna.

"Sharing test information is a very dangerous thing to do," Siegfried Hecker, director emeritus at the Los Alamos, New Mexico, nuclear-weapons lab and a researcher at Stanford University, told a meeting of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization in the Austrian capital. He called the potential sharing "very troublesome."

North Korea has tested three nuclear weapons with the most recent detonation on Feb. 12. Iran, under investigation for a decade over alleged nuclear-weapons work, maintains "strong" weapons ties with the secretive Asian regime, according to U.S. intelligence reports, which add that North Korea "retains the potential for exporting nuclear materials or technology."

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"Iran doesn't need a nuclear weapon and has never claimed it would need to test in the future," Seyed Hosseini, Iran's deputy envoy to the CTBTO, said following Hecker's remarks. "There is no diversion for military purposes."

Hecker, 69, toured North Korean nuclear facilities in 2010 and was first to report on the country's uranium-enrichment program. Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who sold atomic equipment to both North Korea and Iran, may have also provided data on his country's nuclear-weapon tests, Hecker said.

Recognized nuclear-weapons states like Russia and the U.S. have detonated thousands of atomic bombs to increase the reliability and yield of their devices. Data on weapon effectiveness are closely held secrets. The nuclear-test-ban treaty wants to restrict proliferation by eliminating the ability of countries to experiment with new bomb designs.

'Nuclear Option'

"Iran has put all the things in place to build a bomb without taking a decision to do so," said Hecker. "They want the nuclear option."

In order to keep that option without conducting a nuclear test of its own, Iran will need data from other nuclear-weapons countries, Hecker said, adding that North Korea will have to conduct additional testing in order to build a miniaturized nuclear device capable of fitting on a missile.

"They have a tunnel that's ready to go if they want to test again," Hecker said, pointing to satellite imagery showing a test facility south of February's blast.

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-17/iran-s-north-korea-links-draw-scrutiny-at-nuclear-weapon-meeting.html>

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Yonhap News Agency – South Korea  
July 15, 2013

## **S. Korean FM Stresses 'Zero Tolerance' for Nuclear N. Korea**

SEOUL, July 15 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se stressed Monday a strong deterrence based on a zero-tolerance policy against North Korea and asked for international efforts to induce change in its unruly neighbor.

"This about-face to hold talks (by North Korea) raises some doubts about its sincerity," Yun said during a luncheon held in central Seoul with diplomatic corps representing 83 countries, referring to Pyongyang's recent shift to dialogue mode.

"We, along with the international community, will strongly adhere to maintaining deterrence against North Korea and not tolerate its nuclear development," he added.

After months of simmering tensions on the Korean Peninsula triggered by its third nuclear test in February and bellicose threats against South Korea and the U.S., Pyongyang shifted to a charm offensive, offering talks with Seoul and Washington.

Earlier in the day, the two Koreas held their third round of working-level talks in the North Korean border city of Kaesong aimed at resuming operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex that have been halted for more than three months.

The inter-Korean factory zone was suspended in April when North Korea, citing heightened tensions that it said were caused by Seoul, pulled all its 53,000 workers from the complex. South Korean officials in Kaesong also withdrew following North's unilateral decision to shut down the joint complex.

While calling on Pyongyang to walk the path of "genuine change," South Korea's top diplomat also asked the international community "to create an environment in which North Korea has no other option but to change."

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2013/07/15/54/0200000000AEN20130715005800315F.HTML>

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The London Guardian – U.K.

## **Cuba Confirms Arms Bound for North Korea on Ship Seized in Panama**

*Havana says missiles, jets and other weapons were being sent for repair as vessel is held over suspected UN sanctions breach*

By Agencies in Panama City and Havana  
Tuesday, 16 July 2013

Cuba has confirmed a North Korean cargo ship seized in Panama was carrying missiles, fighter jets and other armaments that were loaded in Cuban ports but claimed it was "obsolete defensive weaponry" being sent away for repair.

Panamanian authorities stopped the freighter on Monday when weaponry was found in amongst a load of 10,000 tonnes of sugar. The Panamanian president, Ricardo Martinelli, said the ship, identified as the 14,000-tonne Chong Chon Gang, had been carrying missiles and other arms "hidden in containers underneath the cargo of sugar". He tweeted a photo of some of the equipment, painted in military green.

On Tuesday the Cuban foreign ministry said the 240 tonnes of armaments consisted of two Volga and Pechora anti-aircraft missile systems, nine missiles "in parts and spares", two Mig-21 planes and 15 engines for those planes – all of which had been bound for repair in North Korea.

"The agreements subscribed by Cuba in this field are supported by the need to maintain our defensive capacity in order to preserve national sovereignty," the statement read. It concluded by saying that Havana remained "unwavering" in its commitment to international law, peace and nuclear disarmament.

Under current sanctions aimed at North Korea's nuclear weapons programme, all UN member states are prohibited from directly or indirectly supplying, selling or transferring all arms, missiles or missile systems and the equipment and technology to make them to North Korea, with the exception of small arms and light weapons.

A private defence analysis firm that examined a photograph of the find said the ship appeared to be transporting a radar-control system for a Soviet-era surface-to-air missile system. Neil Ashdown, an analyst for IHS Jane's Intelligence, said a green tube shown in a photograph appeared to be a horizontal antenna for the SNR-75 Fan Song radar, used to guide missiles fired by the SA-2 air defence system found in former Warsaw pact and Soviet-allied nations.

"It is possible that this could be being sent to North Korea to update its high-altitude air defence capabilities," Ashdown said. Jane's also said the equipment could be headed to North Korea to be upgraded.

One container buried under sugar sacks contained radar equipment that appeared to be designed for use with air-to-air or surface-to-air missiles, said Belsio Gonzalez, director of Panama's National Aeronautics and Ocean Administration. An Associated Press journalist who gained access to the rusting ship saw green shipping containers that had been covered by hundreds, perhaps thousands, of white sacks marked "Cuban raw sugar".

The UN security council has imposed four rounds of increasingly tougher sanctions against North Korea since its first nuclear test on 9 October 2006.

The most recent resolution, approved in March after Pyongyang's latest nuclear test, authorises all countries to inspect cargo in or transiting through their territory that originated in North Korea, or is destined to North Korea if a state has credible information the cargo could violate security council resolutions.

"Panama obviously has an important responsibility to ensure that the Panama Canal is utilised for safe and legal commerce," said acting US ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, who is the current security council president. "Shipments of arms or related material to or from Korea would violate security council resolutions – three of them as a matter of fact."

Panamanian authorities believed the ship had been returning from Havana on its way to North Korea, the Panamanian public security minister Jose Raul Mulino told the Associated Press. Based on unspecified intelligence, authorities



suspected it could be carrying contraband and tried to communicate with the crew, who did not respond. Martinelli said Panama originally suspected drugs could be aboard.

The 35 North Koreans on the boat were arrested after resisting police efforts to intercept the ship in Panamanian waters on Thursday as it moved toward the canal and take it to the Caribbean port of Manzanillo, Martinelli told private radio station RPC. The captain had a heart attack and also tried to commit suicide during the operation, Martinelli said.

Panamanian officials were finally able to board the ship to begin searching it Monday, pulling out hundreds of sacks of sugar.

Luis Eduardo Camacho, a spokesman for Martinelli, said authorities had only searched one of the ship's five container sections and the inspection of all cargo would take at least a week. Panama had requested help from United Nations inspectors, along with Colombia and the UK, said Javier Carballo, the country's top narcotics prosecutor.

"Panama being a neutral country, a country in peace, that doesn't like war, we feel very worried about this military material," Martinelli said.

North Korea's government made no public comment on the case.

In early July a top North Korean general, Kim Kyok Sik, visited Cuba and met with his island counterparts. The Cuban Communist party newspaper Granma said he was also received by President Raul Castro and the two had an "exchange about the historical ties that unite the two nations and the common will to continue strengthening them".

The meetings were held behind closed doors and there has been no detailed account of their discussions.

"After this incident there should be renewed focus on North Korean-Cuban links," said Hugh Griffiths, an arms trafficking expert at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Griffiths said his institute told the UN this year it had uncovered evidence of a flight from Cuba to North Korea that travelled via central Africa.

The Chong Chon Gang had a history of being detained on suspicion of trafficking drugs and ammunition, Griffiths said. Lloyd's List Intelligence said the 34-year-old ship, registered to the Pyongyang-based Chongchongang Shipping Company, "has a long history of detentions for safety deficiencies and other undeclared reasons".

Satellite tracking records show it left the Pacific Coast of Russia on 12 April with a stated destination of Havana, then crossed the Pacific and the Panama Canal on its way to the Caribbean. It disappeared from satellite tracking until it showed up again on the Caribbean side of the canal, on 10 July, Lloyd's said.

The disappearance from satellite tracking indicates the crew may have switched off a device that automatically transmits the ship's location after it moved into the Caribbean, Lloyd's said.

Mulino, the Panamanian public security minister, said the ship crossed the Panama Canal from the Pacific to the Caribbean in June carrying a cargo of sheet metal that was inspected by Panamanian authorities.

Griffiths said the Chong Chon Gang was stopped in 2010 in the Ukraine and attacked by pirates 400 miles off the coast of Somalia in 2009.

Griffiths' institute has also been interested in the ship because of a 2009 stop it made in Tartus, a Syrian port city hosting a Russian naval base.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/17/cuba-arms-north-korea-ship>

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AsiaOne News – Singapore

## **N.Korea Has Everything in Place for New Atom Test: US Expert**

Reuters

Wednesday, July 17, 2013



VIENNA - North Korea has strong technical reasons to carry out another nuclear test but may be hesitating because it would anger China, a prominent US scientist who has often visited the reclusive Asian state said on Wednesday.

Stanford University's Siegfried Hecker, who was shown a previously undetected uranium enrichment facility when he was last there three years ago, said the North had "everything in place" for what would be the fourth such explosion since 2006.

The impoverished country conducted its third nuclear test in February, prompting stiffer UN sanctions against it.

Like the United States and South Korea, China - North Korea's sole major diplomatically - has urged Pyongyang to take steps to end its nuclear programme and to return to dialogue.

Hecker said North Korea "needed additional tests in my opinion to miniaturise", referring to the effort to develop a bomb small and robust enough to fit onto a delivery vehicle such as a missile.

The outside world tries to monitor North Korea's nuclear advances largely via satellite images.

Hecker said the North's tunnel preparations had caused speculation that there could be two tests back in February, but this did not happen and one tunnel remained ready.

"There are strong drivers for them to test again," said Hecker, believed to have been the last Westerner to visit North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear complex. "They have a tunnel that's ready to go if they want to test again," he told a seminar held by an international nuclear-test-ban treaty organisation in Vienna.

But China's displeasure was an important reason "why I think they are hesitating now... The price they have to pay is mostly determined by China", Hecker said.

China is North Korea's most important economic and political backer, but the two are uneasy allies and tensions have grown.

Some Chinese banks have frozen out North Korea's main foreign exchange bank amid frustration in Beijing over the North's continued pushing of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes.

Earlier this month, US Secretary of State John Kerry said China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi assured him that Beijing had been "very firm" with Pyongyang on its need to end its nuclear programme.

Hecker said he believed the North was weighing the benefits and costs of further testing: "The important part is to increase the cost ... and the Chinese are absolutely key to that".

North Korea said this month it would not give up its nuclear deterrent until Washington ends its "hostile policy" towards Pyongyang, but it was ready to revive international talks on its nuclear programme frozen since 2008.

Hecker, a former head of the US Los Alamos National Laboratory, said he was concerned about the possibility of cooperation between North Korea and Iran, which denies Western allegations that it is seeking nuclear weapons capability.

Any sharing of the North's test data would be dangerous, he said, adding: "That would be very, very troublesome and indeed could give the Iranian programme a significant boost".

An Iranian diplomat in the audience took issue with Hecker's comment, saying Tehran "does not need any nuclear weapon".

Hecker said he believed Iran had developed a nuclear weapon option. "Iran ... has put all the things in place to be able to develop the bomb should it decide to do so," he said.

<http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/World/Story/A1Story20130717-438060.html>

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Yonhap News Agency – South Korea  
July 18, 2013

## **Defense Chief Admits to Seoul's Offer of OPCON Transfer Delay: Lawmaker**

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, July 18 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's defense minister confirmed Thursday that he had requested the U.S. government to reconsider the date of the planned 2015 transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) to Seoul in light of growing threats posed by North Korea, a ruling party lawmaker said.

Calls have grown to postpone the transfer of OPCON following North Korea's third nuclear test in February and its war-like threats against Seoul and Washington earlier this year. Seoul officials, however, continue to state that preparations are still on schedule to meet the December 2015 deadline.

A top American official recently told Yonhap News Agency that the South Korean government had requested another delay to OPCON transition following this spring's round of North Korean provocations and related organizations are currently looking into the proposal.

In a meeting with ruling party lawmakers at the National Assembly on Thursday, Kim Kwan-jin admitted that he had made such an offer in a meeting with Pentagon chief Chuck Hagel on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in late May, according to multiple participants in the closed-door meeting.

Given that the matter of ongoing discussion was disclosed to media by the senior American official, Kim said he believes the U.S. government is positively considering the proposal.

"Hadn't (the U.S. government) positively reviewed the offer, why would (the official) tell it to media?" a Saenuri Party lawmaker belonging to the parliamentary defense committee quoted him as saying. "U.S. officials are having internal consultations, and it seems that the issue in discussion was released to media."

Kim said he hopes to receive an answer to his request during an upcoming Security Consultative Meeting with his American counterpart slated for October in Seoul.

The defense chief said the proposal reflected rising tension with a nuclear-armed North Korea and the lack of time needed to reinforce South Korean forces' intelligence and combat capability to deter North Korean aggression, participants said.

In the run-up to the scheduled transfer, Seoul has been stepping up its combat capability with an advanced missile defense system and longer ballistic missiles as the South Korean forces are supposed to play a leading role under the new command structure.

South Korea handed over operational control to the U.S.-led U.N. troops during the 1950-53 Korean War. Seoul regained peacetime OPCON in 1994.

Seoul initially agreed to take back wartime OPCON in April 2012, but it requested a delay in the schedule shortly after North Korea's deadly torpedo attack on a South Korean warship in March 2010. Washington accepted it.

The allies have been jointly working to make a new command structure to maintain a combined posture even after the Combined Forces Command, the current joint body, is dissolved following the transfer.

Under the proposed structure, the South Korean military will play a leading role, and American forces will offer support during a potential wartime situation, fighting side by side with their Korean allies.

Conservatives and retired generals, however, raised question over the new structure in which American forces play a supporting role, claiming it would send the wrong signal to Pyongyang. They also expressed concerns that the South



Korean armed forces are not ready to deter a North Korean nuclear threat, citing its heavy reliance on U.S. satellites for monitoring North Korea's nuclear and missile facilities.

Militaries of South Korea and the U.S. earlier agreed to conduct three assessments during their joint drills until summer 2015 before implementing the agreement later that year.

Some raised the possibility that the two sides might reschedule the plan during the assessment process if a need for further postponement rises due to the security situation on the peninsula.

The U.S. Forces Korea said military officials of the two nations are in consultations over the matter, stressing strong joint deterrence against the belligerent communist nation.

"Both sides have long agreed that certain conditions have to be met before OPCON transition is to occur. There is no change in that position," USFK said in a statement. "Both sides have reaffirmed and continue to work to meet (that goal)."

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/07/18/50/0301000000AEN20130718005000315F.HTML>

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Yonhap News Agency – South Korea  
July 18, 2013

## **N. Korea Demands Release of Seized Ship in Panama**

SEOUL, July 18 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Thursday demanded the release of a vessel seized in Panama suspected of carrying banned arms, claiming the weapons were being transported under a legitimate contract with Cuba.

North Korea is under broad U.N. sanctions against arms trafficking with other countries after it defiantly launched a long-range rocket in December and conducted its third nuclear test in February.

The 14,000-ton Chong Chon Gang was seized by Panamanian authorities on Monday en route to North Korea from Cuba. The ship was suspected of trying to cross the Panama Canal with undeclared cargo that appeared to be missile parts, according to the Panamanian government.

"An abnormal incident in which our trade ship Chong Chon Gang was seized by Panamanian authorities on suspicion of carrying narcotics has occurred," an unnamed spokesman of North Korea's foreign ministry said in an interview with the Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang's state media. "The Panamanian authorities should release our crew and vessel without delay."

The spokesman also claimed that Panamanian officers "violently attacked" the ship's captain and crew. When the officers were unable to find any narcotics, they took issue with other cargo on the vessel in order to cover up their violence, he added.

North Korea and Cuba have claimed the shipment consisted of "aging weapons" that were to be repaired and returned to Cuba.

The weapons, manufactured in the mid-20th century, were two anti-aircraft missile complexes, nine missile parts and spares, two MiG-21 Bis and 15 motors for those planes, the Cuban foreign ministry said in a statement Tuesday.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/07/18/51/0401000000AEN20130718002700315F.HTML>

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Aviation Week

## **India Planning Two Agni-V Test Firings This Year**

By Jay Menon,



Source: Aerospace Daily & Defense Report  
July 18, 2013

NEW DELHI — India's Agni-V ballistic missile will be tested twice this year before being inducted into the country's armed forces toward the end of 2014.

The Agni-V, an intercontinental ballistic missile designed to hit targets at distances of up to 5,000 km (3,100 mi.), was test-fired in April 2012.

This year India's Defense and Research Development Organization (DRDO) will carry out two more tests, "the first most likely in September, which would be followed by a second test at the end of the year," a DRDO official tells Aviation Week. "These are among DRDO's high-priority missions. Our aim is to make the missile ready for induction by 2014."

The second test will be carried out from a tightly sealed canister mounted on a launcher truck, the DRDO official says.

A canister-launch system will "provide the forces the requisite operational flexibility to swiftly transport the ballistic missile and launch it from a place of their choosing," he explains.

The missile was initially planned to be tested in May, but was delayed due to heavy rains.

"The trials are usually avoided when sea is rough and weather is not conducive," the DRDO official says. "We conduct thousands of tests through simulation in our labs under different conditions. The actual flight trials are to confirm what is predicted in simulation tests matches the algorithms."

A nuclear-tipped, three-stage missile, the Agni-V was developed by DRDO at a cost of more than 2.5 billion rupees (\$48.4 million).

It is 17.5 meters (57 ft.) tall with a launch weight of 50 tons. The missile is powered by solid propellants and can be transported by road.

The successful 2012 test of the missile brought India closer to joining the small group of nations — including the U.S., China, Russia, the U.K. and France — with the capability to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles.

India is also developing the sixth in its series of Agni ballistic missiles that will be capable of carrying multiple warheads. While Agni-V can carry up to three nuclear warheads, Agni-VI will carry up to 10.

India has said its missile program is not directed against any country.

Agni, meaning fire in Hindi and Sanskrit, is a rocket family India has tested since 2002.

In 2010, India successfully test-fired Agni-II, an intermediate-range ballistic missile with a range of more than 2,000 km (1,250 mi.).

[http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/asd\\_07\\_18\\_2013\\_p04-01-598101.xml](http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/asd_07_18_2013_p04-01-598101.xml)

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

## **Putin Affirms Russia's Focus on High-Precision Weaponry**

13 July 2013

MOSCOW, July 13 (RIA Novosti) – Russia will prioritize the development of powerful high-accuracy weapons whose combat capabilities would be comparable to those of weapons of mass destruction, President Vladimir Putin said.

"We will also continue the development of our nuclear deterrent, of course," Putin said at a Friday meeting with World War II veterans during the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk.



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Taking advantage of high oil and gas prices on global markets, the Russian government has allocated 22 trillion rubles (\$730 billion) for its ambitious armed forces rearmament program through 2020.

The Russian military sees massive deployment of high-precision weapons as part of Russia's response to the proposed European "missile shield," which Moscow considers a threat to its nuclear deterrent.

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said earlier in July that Russia will increase its arsenal of cruise missiles by 30 times by the end of the current decade.

[http://en.rian.ru/military\\_news/20130713/182212886/Putin-Affirms-Russias-Focus-on-High-Precision-Weaponry.html](http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130713/182212886/Putin-Affirms-Russias-Focus-on-High-Precision-Weaponry.html)

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The Herald Scotland – Scotland, U.K.

## **LibDems Urged to Recommend Scrapping Trident by CND**

*The Liberal Democrats should recommend scrapping Trident when they lay out their alternatives to the nuclear deterrent on the Clyde tomorrow, a new report says.*

By Kate Devlin, UK Political Correspondent

Monday, 15 July 2013

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) says that the omission of the "non-replacement option" is an "abdication of responsibility".

Ministers are to outline the conclusions of a long-awaited Coalition review on what to do about the ageing submarine system.

The analysis was a hard-won concession to the LibDems before the party entered government with the Conservatives in 2010.

David Cameron insists his party remains committed to a 'like-for-like' replacement of Trident.

But LibDem Leader Nick Clegg has said it would be wrong to spend £20 billion replacing a Cold War system designed to "flatten Moscow".

In its report CND claims that scrapping Trident would restore confidence in non-proliferation agreements and help put the world on a path to "global abolition" of nuclear weapons.

It also points out that Britain currently faces "no nuclear threat" and "no other security threat" can be countered by nuclear weapons.

A decision on Trident is not due until 2016 meaning that a way forward will form a core part of all the parties' manifestos for 2015 general election.

With the Conservatives unwilling to budge, senior LibDem sources have made clear that they are keen to convince Labour to back one of a number of options due to be set out this week.

Labour sources say that while the party has an open mind on the issue it has yet to be persuaded of the security case for anything less than a full-scale replacement. Yesterday former defence secretary Liam Fox predicted that a like-for-like replacement would go ahead after 2015.

The senior backbencher said that the Conservatives and Labour would both back such an option,

And he dismissed some of the options expected to be outlined by LibDem chief secretary to the Treasury Danny Alexander tomorrow as "quirky at best".

"The Cold War may be over but that's not stopping very dangerous countries like North Korea getting nuclear weapons and countries like Iran trying to get them," he said.

**Issue No. 1066, 19 July 2013**

*United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL  
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"The bottom line is that we don't know what the world will look like in another 50 years and it is prudent to make sure we have a minimum credible deterrent to ensure that no weapons of mass destruction are used against the people of the United Kingdom, that's what deterrence is." Meanwhile, reports suggest that the cost of removing nuclear weapons from Scotland could be less than the billions previously estimated.

SCND said that removing and dismantling the current stockpile of about 200 nuclear warheads would cost "less than £150m".

What would run into the billions would be building a new base and replacing the ageing submarine system, the organisation said.

The SNP's defence spokesman Angus Robertson has also written to the Defence Secretary Philip Hammond demanding a full investigation into Ministry of Defence plans for Trident, following reports this week that the UK Government would attempt to retain the nuclear deterrent on the Clyde if Scotland became independent.

Mr Robertson said: "Instead of potentially running into tens of billions of pounds as was claimed this week, it would actually cost less than the amount Scotland is forced to pay each year to run and replace Trident.

"If we achieve a Yes vote next September, these figures underline that the UK Government would do well to ... scrap Trident altogether, rather than waste money dumping it anywhere else."

<http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/political-news/libdems-urged-to-recommend-scraping-trident-by-cnd.21592314>

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The Daily Mail – U.K.

## **Lib Dems' 'Naive and Reckless' Plan to Cut Nuclear Deterrent will Leave UK Vulnerable to Iran or Russia, Defence Secretary Warns**

- *Philip Hammond says Lib Dem plan is 'either naive or reckless'*
- *Danny Alexander 'wants to cut number of Trident submarines from 4 to 2'*
- *Critics have warned it would lead to an ineffective deterrent*
- *Both the Tories and Labour back Trident's renewal in the 2020s*

By Matt Chorley and Tim Shipman  
15 July 2013

The Liberal Democrats have been dismissed as 'naive or reckless' by the Conservatives for demanding a huge downgrade in Britain's nuclear deterrent.

The Trident missile system could take weeks to launch under Lib Dem proposals for the country to take a 'step down the nuclear ladder'.

Tory Defence Secretary Philip Hammond warned the plan failed to take account of possible future threats from Iran, North Korea and Russia.

Treasury Chief Secretary Danny Alexander has drawn up Lib Dem plans to cut the number of Trident submarines from four to two – and send them to sea without nuclear warheads.

A leaked document reveals that the party plans to have just 'one submarine in a state of readiness measured in weeks' while the other is being used for training or undergoing maintenance.

But Mr Hammond said there was no way of knowing who Britain's future enemies will be, and warned Russia, Iran and North Korea could all pose threats up to 2060.

**Issue No. 1066, 19 July 2013**

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He told BBC Radio 4: 'I think it's frankly either naïve or reckless just because we don't perceive an immediate threat today doesn't mean there won't be a threat over the 60-odd year time horizon we're looking at here.

'We've got countries like Iran and North Korea attempting to build nuclear weapons and already possessing long-range missiles.

'We can't say who the potential adversary might be in the future – Russia is investing \$150 billion in renewing its forces, we can't say where the threats will come from.

'We have had for 45 years now a continuous at-sea defence posture that has served this country very well and we do not believe that with nuclear threats if anything proliferating, with more countries seeking to get nuclear weapons, this is a time to downgrade, certainly not to go to a part-time deterrent.'

The Trident fleet is designed so at least one submarine is continuously at sea so that Britain's enemies know it could retaliate if attacked.

Both the Tories and Labour back Trident's renewal in the 2020s.

But Mr Alexander used a speech today at the Royal United Services Institute to reveal the results of a Lib Dem study on the next generation of Trident subs.

He argued that the UK should save money because it no longer needs a Cold War-type defence posture.

He acknowledged it would mean accepting a 'different calculation of risk' but said he believed such a change was now justified.

'If continuous-at-sea deterrence is an insurance policy, we're paying too high a premium for our needs,' he said.

'The argument that a current adversary would take the opportunity to target the UK during a period when no boat is covertly deployed and launch an overwhelming nuclear strike against Britain is, frankly, not supported by any analysis I have seen.

He added: 'This is the ultimate guarantee we often talk about. But the reality is that in the current circumstances - and for the foreseeable future - that guarantee does not need to sit on a hair trigger.'

The Liberal Democrat Trident Policy document reveals the party is 'wholly unconvinced' the UK needs its existing fleet and envisages a future government issuing 'a declaratory policy of going to sea with unarmed missiles' – meaning subs would have to return to base in the event of an international crisis to get the necessary armaments.

And, in a clear sign that the Lib Dems want to abolish Britain's nuclear arsenal altogether, the leaked paper argues that the UK should start 'identifying a long-term exit route' from their ownership.

'Surely we now have an opportunity at least to "step down the nuclear ladder",' the document states.

Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg said he hoped the report would open a 'fact-based debate' on Trident, ahead of the key decisions on the submarine replacement programme due to be taken in 2016, after the general election.

'It clearly shows that there are options for our country that do not simply involve us sticking to the same strategic positions that were taken in the Cold War,' he said.

But he was slapped down by Downing Street who insisted David Cameron was committed to retaining the full deterrent.

'The Prime Minister believes in continuous at-sea deterrence. It is as simple as that,' Mr Cameron's official spokesman said.

'He has seen no evidence that there are credible alternatives.'



Mr Alexander mapped out the plan for two Trident submarines after the Lib Dems' preferred option – cruise missiles mounted on ships, subs and aircraft – was comprehensively junked by Ministry of Defence officials as ruinously expensive.

The Lib Dem document admits: 'Alternative systems, such as cruise missiles in tactical submarines or surface vessels, or air-launched systems, were found to be technically viable but very expensive.'  
Defence experts last night rubbished the plan as liable to leave Britain open to attack.

Labour peer Lord West, the former First Sea Lord, told the Mail: 'I find this extraordinary.

The reason we picked this system [Trident] was because it is undetectable and almost invulnerable.

'These plans are a mechanism for making something invulnerable very vulnerable. Once you have to come back to fit warheads, or spend long periods lying alongside, it gives your enemies the chance to kill your deterrent.'

A Conservative source said: 'Deploying a so-called nuclear deterrent without nuclear warheads wouldn't deter anyone.

'We'd have submarines rusting away in port doing nothing, protecting nothing and vulnerable to a first-strike attack.

'It would be a massive gamble with our national security.'

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2364775/Lib-Dem-plan-cut-Trident-nuclear-deterrent-dismissed-naive-reckless-Defence-Secretary.html>

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British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) – U.K.

16 July 2013

## Trident Review: At-a-Glance

The government has published a review, instigated by the Lib Dems, on "alternatives" to the Trident nuclear weapons system.

The UK's existing four ballistic missile submarines have to be renewed from the late 2020s and a final decision is due in 2016.

Here is a summary of the main points.

### NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

- Nuclear weapons will remain a "political tool of last resort" and be considered only "in the most extreme circumstances"
- Their rationale is to deter extreme threats to the UK or to prevent an escalation that may risk "national survival"
- The credibility of any weapons system is "crucial" but it must also be safe and secure and affordable
- UK not able to conduct live tests of new warheads as signatory to Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

### DELIVERY MECHANISMS

- Modifying civilian aircraft to carry nuclear missiles "very high risk"
- Stealth bomber expensive and would need support aircraft
- Low orbit vehicles "too risky" for conversion to nuclear platforms
- Mobile land-based missile launchers hard to protect and "operationally risky"
- Missiles based at fixed silo locations "more vulnerable" to pre-emptive attack
- Reconfiguring ballistic missile submarines to carry cruise missiles "discounted on cost grounds"
- New "dual use" submarines could be built but fleet size would have to be expanded



## MISSILES

- Subsonic cruise missile potentially deliverable by 2035 despite technical challenges
- Supersonic cruise missiles "vulnerable" as may have to be located too close to adversary
- Hypersonic cruise missiles involve "extreme technical challenge" and multiplicity of platforms
- Hyper glide vehicles too much of a "technical challenge"
- Shorter range of cruise missiles could lead to "significant constraints" on UK options
- Ballistic missiles could potentially target any country due to long range

## WARHEADS

- Cruise missile warhead twice as expensive as ballistic one - at up to £10bn
- Length of time needed to develop cruise warhead and delivery system means two new ballistic submarines would have to be built in the interim to prevent a capability gap

## POSTURES

- Report distinguishes between high, medium and low readiness
- Credibility based on readiness, reach, survivability and resolve
- Only a fleet of four ballistic missile submarines and missiles housed in silos could provide 30-year continuous deterrent
- For other platforms it would be "prohibitively expensive"

## SUBMARINES

- Cruise missile submarines more "vulnerable" to attack while on operations
- Only a sophisticated adversary can "locate, track and engage" ballistic nuclear submarines
- Three boats would not be sufficient to maintain continuous patrols and could lead to "multiple unplanned breaks"
- Less regular patrols could be maintained with three or two boats based on Royal Navy priorities

## INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

- Any change may have wider implications for UK strategic interests
- Reduced capability may increase reliance on allies for nuclear security
- Cruise missile based system would be seen as "less capable" than a ballistic system
- Increasing readiness from a non-continuous posture might lead to "misunderstanding"
- Perceptions of the UK's commitment to multilateral nuclear disarmament may be increased
- Any new system would have to comply with treaty obligations

## COSTS

- The reliability of estimates varies widely due to the long time period involved
- Cruise missile platforms generally cheaper than ballistic ones
- But added expenditure on missiles and warheads mean keeping ballistic submarines more cost-effective
- Building three rather than four new Trident submarines would save money but only between 2025 and 2035

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23333606>

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Bloomberg Businessweek

## Cameron Believes in Continuous At-Sea Deterrent, Spokesman Says

By Thomas Penny



July 16, 2013

U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron is committed to the like-for-like replacement of the Trident nuclear-weapons system, his spokesman said after a review of alternatives was published today.

“The PM believes in continuous at-sea deterrence,” Jean-Christophe Gray told reporters in London today. “He has seen no evidence that there are credible alternatives.”

The review was carried out by government officials at the request of the Liberal Democrats, the junior partner in the coalition government, after a disagreement with Cameron’s Conservative Party over the replacement of Britain’s nuclear weapons. It concluded that other options would be too expensive and would not offer the level of deterrence that the U.K. requires.

“The costs of delivering an alternative system could theoretically have been cheaper than procuring a like-for-like renewal of Trident were it not for timing and the fact that the U.K. deterrent infrastructure is finely tuned to support a submarine-based Trident system,” according to the review.

“In particular, the time it would take to develop a new warhead (itself a costly and high risk exercise) is judged to be longer than the current Vanguard-class submarines can safely be Trident Alternatives Review 11 operated,” it said.

“Bridging the resulting gap in deterrence capability would involve procuring two Successor SSBNs so that a Trident-based deterrent remains available until at least 2040,” it said. “Doing that at the same time as investing in the development of a new warhead, new missile, new platform and new infrastructure means that transitioning to any of the realistic alternative systems is now more expensive than a 3 or 4-boat successor SSBN fleet.”

<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-07-16/cameron-believes-in-continuous-at-sea-deterrent-spokesman-says>

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DefenseNews.com

## **US Missile Defense Chief Backs East Coast Radars, More Interceptor Sites**

July 17, 2013

By PAUL McLEARY

WASHINGTON — US Vice Adm. James Syring, director of the Missile Defense Agency, confirmed today that the controversial Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept a dummy rocket over the Pacific on July 5 because “the kill vehicle did not separate” from the booster rocket, as has been speculated.

Testifying before the Senate defense appropriations subcommittee, Syring also told the panel that while his funding for fiscal 2014 is adequate for the testing and modernization programs that his shop envisions, the current base budget might not be adequate as threats change.

While never coming after the witness specifically, Sen. Dick Durbin, D-Ill., lobbed some harsh criticisms against the overall missile defense program, complaining that even after spending \$150 billion over 30 years on missile defense, the US government hasn’t been able to conduct a successful test in five years.

Syring responded simply that continued testing is imperative to improve the program, and that for 2014, “we’re budgeted properly to do that. I won’t say that additional money won’t be required, but the budget as it’s currently structured has adequate funding to complete the development” of the older Capability Enhancement (CE) I kill vehicle and the newer, untested CE II kill vehicle.

Durbin shot back that “there are still serious questions whether or not we have a missile defense system that can protect America against threats that we believe could be coming our way,” adding that “this committee and Congress are being asked by some to expand the amount of money we spend on the systems at a time when testing has not proven that tests systems are effective.”



Of particular concern to the senator is the fact that the US missile defense system has yet to be tested against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and that the planned CEII kill vehicle has not been tested outside of simulations, despite the fact that it is currently installed on 10 of 30 rockets in the US arsenal.

Syring assured him that “we have extensive modeling and simulation capability that projects the results of our conducted intercepts testing” and the modeling tests “indicate that we would be successful” in hitting an intercontinental ballistic missile launched at the United States.

He also said that the CE II kill vehicle is on track for a March 2014 test, and that “we’re in the process of manufacturing a target” to conduct ICBM tests by 2015, and there are eight ICBM tests scheduled by 2020.

While Syring sought to assuage the worries of the panel about his modeling and simulation capacities, some analysts were not comforted.

Syring “confirmed that the tests of the ground based midcourse defense system are undertaken in a ‘controlled, scripted environment’ and that the system has never been tested against an ICBM-class target” said Kington Reif, director of nuclear non-proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

“So even the successful tests don’t prove that the system would work under real world battlefield conditions.”

In March, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that the Pentagon would spend \$1 billion on 14 new missile interceptor sites in Alaska, bringing the nation’s total up to 44 sites.

Syring said that might only be the beginning.

“The 44 addresses [is for] what we see with North Korea today,” he said, but there is the real potential “to go beyond 44 as we start to evaluate the threat from Iran and from other nations.”

There will be contracts released this summer to begin the work on the 14 intercept sites at Fort Greeley in Alaska, Syring announced. The price tag will be about \$75 million per interceptor.

Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Ak., who represents the state that hosts 26 of the current 30 missile interceptor sites — as well as all 14 of the new sites — questioned the admiral about how he would use the money he receives in the next budget.

“I would spend our next dollars on discriminating sensors, meaning big radars west and east to give us the capability [to meet] where I see that threat going in the next five to 10 years.”

That made Sen. Susan Collins happy, since she supports the installation of additional interceptor sites on the East Coast, particularly in her state of Maine.

“I know my state of Maine is a very welcoming place for military installations of this sort,” she said.

Syring confirmed that the Pentagon is considering two sites in Maine among other locations, and when Collins asked if his office is taking local support into consideration, he assured her that “it will be a factor in our decision.”

The Republican-controlled House Armed Services Committee has voted to fund an East Coast missile defense system, but the Senate Armed Services Committee may well block the move again this year, as it did in the 2013 budget.

<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130717/DEFREG02/307170025/US-Missile-Defense-Chief-Backs-East-Coast-Radars-More-Interceptor-Sites>

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Chicago Tribune

## **Pentagon Wants more Regular Testing after Failed Missile Test**

By Andrea Shalal-Esa, Reuters

July 17, 2013



WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. defense officials affirmed their commitment to a \$1 billion expansion of a Boeing Co ground-based missile defense system despite a test failure this month, but called for more regular testing to get a grip on nagging quality control issues.

James Miller, undersecretary of defense for policy, and Missile Defense Agency Director Vice Admiral James Syring, on Wednesday underscored the importance of the missile defense program, citing the escalating threat posed by advances in missile development by North Korea and Iran.

Miller told an event sponsored by the Air Force Association that the July 5 failure of the only U.S. defense against long-range ballistic missiles, the third consecutive intercept test failure, was surprising and involved an "unusual anomaly."

He confirmed that the interceptor, which is built by Raytheon Co, failed to separate from the third stage of the rocket, but gave no further details. It is designed to hit and destroy the target warhead outside the Earth's atmosphere.

Reuters last week reported an industry source familiar with the probe said a faulty battery may have prevented the interceptor's separation from the rocket.

Republican lawmakers have seized on the test failure to argue against reductions in spending on missile defense by the Obama administration. While the failure has sharpened concerns about the program voiced over the years by Democrats.

Senator Richard Durbin, the Illinois Democrat who heads the defense appropriations subcommittee, told a hearing that the U.S. government had spent about \$150 billion on missile defense systems since the 1980s, and lawmakers wanted to see successful tests before agreeing to an expansion.

"What troubles me is this is a system that still hasn't been proven to be able to protect America," Durbin said.

Miller said he believed the failure to separate was "something that ought to be relatively easily resolvable" and he remained confident in the overall missile defense system.

He said the Pentagon still planned to add 14 ground-based interceptors, or GBIs, to the 30 interceptors already in place in Alaska and California by fiscal 2017, and was keeping its options open to add more.

'FLY BEFORE WE BUY'

Miller said he favored more frequent testing "both as a matter of good acquisition and maintenance practice, and as a demonstration that these systems work."

But he chafed at suggestions by Republicans that funding cuts had contributed to the recent test failure, telling Reuters after his speech, that the Missile Defense Agency had determined the pace of testing.

The previous test to intercept a dummy warhead was in 2008, although other non-intercept tests have been done since then.

Miller said he would like to see both the CE-I interceptor involved in the failed July test and a newer CE-II interceptor, which has suffered two test failures of its own, tested again within the next 12 months, and preferably sooner.

Syring, the missile defense agency's director, told the Senate panel an extensive review was underway to find out why the test failed and that better quality control was a top priority.

He vowed to conduct more regular testing and accelerate upgrades of the CE-II interceptor, or to redesign and upgrade the current CE-I interceptor, depending on the outcome.

"Regardless of the path we embark on, we will aggressively attack any substantiated quality control problems coming out of the failure review board that need to be corrected through the program," Syring said in testimony prepared for the hearing.



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"In light of the last three (ground-based mid-course defense) failures, I recognize that quality and reliability in our GBIs must be our top concern," he said.

The Pentagon's latest budget request proposed two flight tests in fiscal 2014, each at an estimated cost of around \$214 million. Syring declined to rule out the need for additional funding as a result of the failed intercept test.

He said the next test of the CE-II interceptor was planned for March, and officials were deciding whether to re-test the CE-I interceptor involved in the recent test failure first.

But he sought to assure Durbin and other lawmakers that the Pentagon was committed to "flying before we buy any more" and would not buy more interceptors until more tests were done.

The Pentagon has been upgrading its oldest interceptors that were fielded in the early 2000s, and Syring said the failed test earlier this month involved one of the upgraded rockets.

Durbin quizzed Syring about the reports that half of the 30 interceptors now in use included obsolete parts, while a third not operational because of a known design flaw.

Syring declined to be specific, but said the military had "a number" of interceptors available.

In fiscal 2015, he said the Pentagon would begin testing the system against longer-range missiles, with eight long-range intercept tests scheduled in the following five years.

*Reporting by Andrea Shalal-Esa; editing by Jackie Frank.*

<http://my.chicagotribune.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-76651810/>

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National Journal

## **Air Force Starts Large-Scale Retrofit of B-52**

By Global Security Newswire Staff

July 17, 2013

A senior U.S. Air Force official said that a large-scale project to overhaul the service's entire fleet of B-52 heavy bombers and to enhance their weapons-carrying capabilities has begun, DOD Buzz reported last week.

The service's B-52 modernization efforts are planned to provide the long-range, nuclear-capable aircraft with more computing and communications equipment that the flight crew can access from the cockpit, according to Eric Single, who heads the Air Force acquisition office's global strike division. The project will also enable the planes to carry a greater number of precision-targeted weapons.

The Air Force sees a continued role for the B-52 long into the future.

"Their structure, service life and air frames are good until around 2040," Single said. "They are built very strong structurally. This is not a structural modification, but upgrades to the capabilities and the avionics."

The electronic improvements will provide "a digital architecture in the airplane," Single said. "Instead of using data that was captured during the mission-planning phase prior to your takeoff 15 to 20 hours ago, you are getting near-real-time intelligence updates in flight."

The retrofit comes with an anticipated \$1.1 billion total price tag and is expected to take several years to complete. Monies to upgrade 30 bombers have already been allocated. Going forward, the Air Force intends to budget for 10 B-52 retrofits each year until the project is complete, according to the service official.

<http://www.nationaljournal.com/global-security-newswire/air-force-starts-large-scale-retrofit-of-b-52-20130717>

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U.S. News & World Report

## Officials Say new Anti-Leak Measures set at NSA

By KIMBERLY DOZIER, Associated Press (AP)

July 18, 2013

ASPEN, Colo. (AP) — The National Security Agency is implementing new security measures because of the disclosures by former NSA-systems-analyst-turned-fugitive Edward Snowden, top defense officials said Thursday.

NSA chief Keith Alexander said his agency had implemented a “two-man rule,” under which any system administrator like Snowden could only access or move key information with another administrator present. With some 15,000 sites to fix, Alexander said, it would take time to spread across the whole agency.

“Some of your sites are small ... and you only have one system administrator, so you've got to address all of those, and we are working our way through it,” he said after speaking to an audience at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado.

Alexander said that server rooms where such data is stored are now locked and require a two-man team to access them — safeguards that he said would be implemented at the Pentagon and intelligence agencies after a pilot program at the NSA.

Snowden leaked to the media information revealing that the NSA was gathering millions of U.S. phone records and intercepting some U.S. Internet traffic.

“This was a failure to defend our own networks,” Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said at the forum.

“In an effort for those in the intelligence community to be able to share with each other, there was an enormous amount of information concentrated in once place. That’s a mistake,” Carter said. “The loading of everything onto a server creates a risk.”

Carter said they are also looking at how to better monitor individuals with access to that kind of information and suggested the Pentagon might monitor intelligence workers just as it monitors staff at nuclear installations.

“When it comes to nuclear weapons, you watch people’s behavior in a special way. We don’t let people all by themselves do anything,” he said. “There is always some aberrant individual and you've got to recognize that.”

Alexander said he hoped to more quickly implement a new intelligence sharing system in which all such information uploaded to a server was encrypted, such that only analysts that needed access to certain information would have the code to read it.

Alexander, Carter and National Counterterrorism Center director Matthew Olsen all said the Snowden leaks damaged national security. Olsen said during the forum that al-Qaida and related groups are seeking to change how they communicate to avoid U.S. detection and surveillance because of Snowden’s leaks. Previously, U.S. officials have said anonymously that Snowden’s leaks to the media have been damaging and prompting terrorists to change their ways.

“We have concrete proof that terrorist groups and others are taking action, making changes, and making our job tougher,” Alexander said.

His comments and those of the other officials seemed at odds with testimony only a day earlier by John C. Inglis, the deputy director of the NSA. He told the House Judiciary Committee on Wednesday that while the impact of Snowden’s disclosures can be very harmful, “it’s too soon to tell whether, in fact, adversaries will take great note of the things that he’s disclosed.”

Alexander defended the surveillance and data collection programs Snowden disclosed, one that gathers U.S. phone records and another that monitors U.S.-based Internet servers for foreign terrorist or espionage-related activity.

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He told the Aspen audience that the secrecy about how the programs work was needed “not to hide it from you, it’s to hide it from those who walk among you and are trying to kill you.”

Alexander said the congressional intelligence committees were looking at whether it was feasible in terms of cost for the private companies to hold the data themselves instead of handing it over to the NSA. He said it would take an act of Congress to require them to hold the data, and added that he thought his agency could figure out how to process and analyze the information if that’s what Congress deemed necessary.

In a separate development, Alexander and Carter both said the Pentagon is close to launching a 4,000-person cybersquad of both offensive and defensive teams that would both protect Defense Department systems and launch cyberattacks against enemy networks when the White House orders it.

<http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2013/07/18/officials-say-new-anti-leak-measures-set-at-nsa>

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National Journal

## **Pentagon Studies Aegis Antimissile System for Potential East Coast Use**

By Rachel Oswald, *Global Security Newswire*

July 18, 2013.

WASHINGTON -- The head of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency on Wednesday said that Aegis antimissile technology is being studied for use at a possible new missile-interceptor site on the U.S. East Coast.

“It’ll be ... a capability that we examine in conjunction with examining the third site,” Vice Adm. James Syring said in response to a lawmaker question during a Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee hearing. He declined to offer further detail in a public setting.

Senator Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) had asked whether the Pentagon antimissile agency was studying any “sea-based option” in its ongoing review into the merits and feasibility of establishing a third U.S. interceptor site for homeland long-range ballistic missile defense.

The Missile Defense Agency is in the middle of conducting a comprehensive study of possible areas at which to establish a possible third interceptor site on the East Coast at the direction of Congress. MDA officials expect to winnow down options and make a recommendation before the year is over regarding where a new interceptor site could be built, though no official decision to build the antimissile site has been made.

The two existing interceptor sites are on the West Coast. A main site at Fort Greely, Alaska, is populated by 26 long-range interceptors and another at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California has four similar interceptors.

Thus far, many have speculated that were an East Coast missile defense site to be built, it would involve silo-based Ground-based Interceptors, as is the case with the two existing West Coast locations. However, the long-range GBI missile has had a problematic testing track record and some Democrats continue to doubt the merits of expanding use of the technology.

The Aegis system -- which employs a variety of developed and developing Standard Missile 3 interceptors and could be based on land or at sea -- has had a more solid testing record.

Syring praised the technology to senators, saying it was a “fantastic system.”

“The Aegis system ... has been extremely successful. The hit- to-kill technology and the hit-to-kill theory I think has been proven over and over again,” the vice admiral said.

A ground-based version of the Aegis system, known as Aegis Ashore, is planned for fielding in coming years in Romania and Poland as part of the U.S. contribution to NATO efforts to establish a ballistic missile shield to cover all of Europe.

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The idea of deploying Aegis Ashore on the U.S. East Coast has been touted in the past by its manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, and by some issue specialists.

Peter Huessy of the consulting firm Geostrategic Analysis, for one, said last month that he supports having a “mixed defense” for the East Coast that could involve Aegis Ashore, Aegis-equipped U.S missile destroyers deployed along the coast, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system and GBI missiles.

Huessy emphasized the importance of getting some kind of missile defense architecture quickly established for the East Coast to respond to a perceived future threat of Iran’s emerging ICBM program. The mix of antimissile technologies can be tinkered with down the road, he said.

A number of Republican lawmakers have cited Tehran’s growing long-range missile capabilities as the impetus for rushing establishment of the East Coast site. The Defense Department has said Iran could test-fire its first ICBM as early as 2015, if it is supplied with outside help.

The Aegis system was not originally designed to deal with ICBM threats but rather short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Still, the technology has proven more reliable in testing than the GMD system, which was designed to focus on neutralizing long-range threats launched by North Korea and Iran.

Past plans to develop an Aegis capability capable of countering ICBMs have been canceled. Still, Aegis and its current family of SM-3 interceptors could be strategically deployed to provide coverage to major East Coast cities, even though the technology cannot comprehensively protect the entire eastern half of the nation, said former MDA head Trey Obering. He spoke to *Global Security Newswire* last month.

“The net outcome is the Aegis system is reliable, and we count on it to protect our nation. The [GBI] ground missile defense system has not reached -- not produced that level of confidence,” Subcommittee Chairman Senator Richard Durbin (D-Ill.) said at the hearing.

<http://www.nationaljournal.com/global-security-newswire/pentagon-studies-aegis-antimissile-system-for-potential-east-coast-use-20130718>

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Las Cruces Sun-News – Las Cruces, NM

## **Fort Bliss Official Says More Radiation Possible**

By Diana Washington Valdez, El Paso Times  
July 19, 2013

Aside from what has already been found, there may be more radioactive waste buried at Biggs Airfield stemming from Air Force maintenance activities involving nuclear weapons from the 1950s and 1960s, a spokeswoman for the Air Force Safety Center at Kirtland, A.F.B., in Albuquerque, said Thursday.

"The specific quantity of maintenance waste buried is not known due to incomplete records for Biggs," Darlene Y. Cowser, spokeswoman for the center, said in a statement. "During that period of time, waste was commonly placed in small boxes or metal containers and buried."

Officials did not have any information immediately available on where at Biggs all such containers were buried.

"Bases with first generation nuclear weapon systems used the waste disposal methods that were in accordance with the Atomic Energy Commission and Air Force procedures at the time," she said. "However, environmental investigations are completed to identify buried waste prior to turning any Air Force property over for public use."

Cowser said the center's Weapons Safety Division reviewed past records it had on the site, and contacted an Air Force veteran who had worked at Biggs to gather additional information.

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"Strategic Air Command had a bombardment wing assigned to Biggs AFB from 1952 to 1966," Cowsert said. "The type and numbers of nuclear weapons maintained at U.S. installations remains classified."

Military officials have not disclosed the building where the actual maintenance on nuclear weapons was done.

"Mid to late 1950s, mitigation activities involved painting the floor of one of the storage areas; that paint appears to have remained largely intact, thereby minimizing a hazard to workers," said Cowsert, referring the epoxy paint used to contain radioactive waste.

The Air Force 810th Air Division and the 95th Bombardment Wing operated at Biggs from about the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, according to Global Security.

Under the Air Force, pilots at Biggs flew the B-47 Stratojet, the B-52 Stratofortress and the B-36 bomber.

Fort Bliss officials said a veteran provided the tip about the possible radioactive waste inside a bunker in the Biggs Snakepit area.

The bunker was used in the past to store nuclear weapons. In recent years, the Army used it to store and issue conventional weapons for training.

"A safety center expert in radiological material then coordinated with the Fort Bliss Installation Safety Office to visit the site and evaluate current conditions with respect to information provided by the veteran," Cowsert said.

Fort Bliss officials called a news conference Tuesday to notify the public that the Air Force Safety Center had detected the presence of low-level radiological contamination in the bunker, which could have resulted from Air Force maintenance activities in the latter 1950s.

Officials allowed the media to view the exterior of the Snakepit bunker where the contamination was found.

Officials also set up a call center to handle questions from former workers. The numbers are 744-1255, 744-1962, 744-8263 and 744-8264.

Army Environmental Command investigators are conducting a more extensive examination of the area to determine if there is any more radioactive waste buried at the Army installation.

The Air Force left and released Biggs to the Army in 1966.

"The Air Force Safety Center is unaware of any specific health problems associated with individuals working at Biggs AFB," Cowsert said. "The (center) does not know the number of individuals who worked in the weapons storage area."

[http://www.lcsun-news.com/las\\_cruces-news/ci\\_23690386/official-says-more-radiation-possible](http://www.lcsun-news.com/las_cruces-news/ci_23690386/official-says-more-radiation-possible)

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The Daily Mail – U.K.

OPINION/Op-Ed

## **No Time to Lower our Guard: The Defence of this Country Means Being Ready for the Unexpected**

By Philip Hammond, Mp Defence Secretary

14 July 2013

The first duty of any British Government is to defend this country. For 45 years, Britain has kept a ballistic missile submarine at sea, silent and invisible, providing the ultimate guarantee of security against nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail, 24 hours a day, 365 days per year.

Now those submarines need replacing over the next 25 years to maintain that deterrent patrol.

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The Liberal Democrats have consistently opposed the like-for-like replacement of our tried and tested deterrent. So the Coalition Agreement pledged to undertake a Trident Alternatives Review to assist them in examining the possible alternatives. It has considered a range of different weapons systems, such as nuclear tipped cruise missiles, and their deliverability.

Tomorrow, the Prime Minister will publish the declassified findings of the Review. The Government remains 100 per cent committed to maintaining and renewing the Trident system.

The logic for this commitment is clear: there is no alternative to Trident that provides the same level of protection and ability to deter an aggressor. The alternatives are less capable, less credible and more expensive.

There will be those who seek to use this Review to argue that, even if we continue with Trident, we can downgrade to a part-time deterrent – claiming that our potential adversaries will always give us months of advance warning of an intention to strike.

I believe that taking such a risk would be reckless. The number of nuclear weapons in the world remains at well over 17,000. Russia is spending \$150billion upgrading its forces. And there are states, such as Iran, which already have ballistic missiles and are seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. How can anyone be confident that the global security environment will not change in the next ten years? This is not the time to let down our guard.

Reducing our fleet of nuclear armed submarines and making our deterrent part-time, would be a false economy. The cost savings would be minuscule compared to the erosion of our national security and the threat to our submarine building industry.

Indeed, the evidence shows that building three new submarines rather than the four that would be needed to sustain continuous patrols would save, on average, less than 0.17 per cent of the annual Defence budget over their lifetime.

A part-time deterrent carries obvious risks: the risk it may not be available when it's needed, either as a result of equipment failure, insufficient trained crew or maintenance requirements; the risk that taking the decision to deploy a submarine at a time of nuclear tension would itself make the situation worse; and the risk that an adversary would be tempted to strike first at our deterrent while it is sitting helplessly in its home port, knowing that we have no submarines at sea that could respond.

In a world which is getting more, not less, dangerous, it is clear to the Prime Minister and to me that there are no alternatives to the current Trident system that offer the level of protection and security that this country needs.

History teaches us that the defence of this country means being ready for the unexpected. That means a full-time, not a part time, nuclear deterrent; a round-the-clock deterrent; not one that clocks off for weeks, months or years at a time.

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2363613/PHILIP-HAMMOND-The-defence-country-means-ready-unexpected.html>

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Project Syndicate.org  
OPINION/Commentary

## **Obama's Russian Roadblock**

By Richard Weitz  
July 16, 2013

MOSCOW – In a recent speech in Berlin, US President Barack Obama reaffirmed his commitment to nuclear disarmament and proposed steps toward achieving that goal. But Russia has made clear that it does not plan to pursue further reductions to its nuclear arsenal any time soon.

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In the speech – delivered nearly 50 years after President John F. Kennedy addressed the then-divided city, highlighting the value of arms control between adversaries – Obama announced that the United States is prepared to cut its nuclear arsenal by up to one-third. He also proposed major reductions in the number of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) deployed in Europe. Moreover, he called upon the international community to renew its efforts to prevent Iran and North Korea from developing nuclear weapons; to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty into force; and to make nuclear energy safer.

Three years ago, Russia seemed to share Obama’s aspiration to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures, with both countries agreeing to limit their deployed weapons to 1,550 as part of the New Strategic Arms-Reduction Treaty. In fact, Russia considers New START to be a “gold standard” treaty, based on core principles – modest and balanced reductions over an extended time period, adequate but not excessive verification measures, and recognition of the connection between strategic offense and defense – that should be applied to all future arms-control treaties.

But Russian officials have since reaffirmed their hardline position, stating in various settings – including at the recent European Security Conference in Moscow – that Russia will not consider further cuts to its nuclear arsenal until the US addresses certain issues affecting Russian interests. In fact, many of the Kremlin’s demands may well be beyond the Obama administration’s capacity to deliver.

One of Russia’s main concerns is America’s efforts to build up its ballistic missile defense system (BMDS). Although experts have disputed the capacity of America’s BMDS, Russian leaders remain convinced that it could seriously undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

Russian officials intimate that the US is using the threat of a North Korean or Iranian attack on the US with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles as a pretext to erect defenses against Russia (and probably China). Despite Obama’s assurances (and those of his predecessors), Russia asserts that America’s BMDS is actually intended to expand NATO’s role in Europe, complicate Russian diplomacy, and facilitate US military interventions.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has even warned that, left unchallenged by Russia’s nuclear deterrent, the US would be tempted to intervene militarily in more countries, as it did in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya. These concerns have driven Russia to demand that the US sign a binding treaty that limits the speed, location, and capabilities of its missile defenses and includes mandatory transparency provisions – even as Russian officials acknowledge that the US Senate would never ratify such a treaty.

Another issue constraining nuclear disarmament is Russia’s view that, without nuclear weapons, its military capabilities would be no match for the conventional forces of the US and NATO. Indeed, many in Russia worry that a US attack against Russia’s nuclear deterrent and other defense assets that relies on America’s growing stock of long-range, precision-guided conventional weapons would be as devastating as a nuclear strike.

These fears are exacerbated by Obama’s declared intention to work alongside NATO in seeking to reduce by as many as 5,000 Russia’s arsenal of TNWs – which dwarfs NATO’s holdings of roughly 200 – and to have the remaining warheads relocated away from NATO members’ territory. Many in Russia view their country’s dominance in this area as essential to offsetting imbalances in conventional weaponry.

In fact, no formal arms-control treaty directly covers these non-strategic weapons; nor have they been the subject of targeted NATO-Russia negotiations. And, as long as the US has TNWs deployed near Russia’s border, Russian officials insist they will not initiate such talks.

Even if the US managed to get Russia to the negotiating table, convincing it to accept sizable cuts in its TNWs arsenal could require the US to fulfill additional demands, such as limiting NATO’s military concentrations and facilities near Russia’s periphery and resurrecting the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe on the Kremlin’s terms. Moreover, Russian leaders demand that other nuclear-armed states accept comparable limits on their TNWs stocks.

Indeed, Russia wants to replace the predominately bilateral nuclear arms-control processes of the last 50 years with multilateral negotiations aimed at constraining the offensive capabilities of other nuclear states, including the United



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Kingdom, France, and China – and maybe other countries. But convincing these states to participate in arms-reduction negotiations, much less to accept new constraints on their relatively small nuclear arsenals, would be difficult. Like the Obama administration, they believe that the next round of cuts should focus on Russia and the US, which still possess almost all the world's nuclear weapons.

The fundamental challenge is that Russia's leaders do not share Obama's aversion to nuclear weapons. On the contrary, they believe that, while the likelihood of a nuclear war has fallen sharply since the end of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence has become more valuable for Russia and other countries that are outmatched by America's conventional military power. This might prove to be an insurmountable obstacle to realizing the Obama administration's vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world.

*Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute.*

<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-rejects-obama-s-nuclear-disarmament-agenda-by-richard-weitz>

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Reuters – U.S.

OPINION/The Great Debate

## Let's End Bogus Missile Defense Testing

By Yousaf Butt

July 16, 2013

Immediately following the Fourth of July fireworks, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) tried out some fireworks of its own. By trying to hit a missile with a missile they attempted a demonstration of the defensive "shield," designed to protect the U.S. from North Korean and Iranian nuclear missiles. It turned out to be a dud. As with the two previous attempts, the Ground Based Missile Defense system once again failed. This failure happened despite the fact that the demonstration was essentially rigged: the intercept team knew ahead of time when to expect the incoming missile and all its relevant flight parameters. Such luxury is obviously not available in real-life combat. But even if the \$214 million "test" had worked it would not prove much.

Now some GOP hawks — led by "Buck" McKeon, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee — are calling for more fake "testing" of the system. Their request should be denied as it would only throw more good money after bad.

These are not real tests at all, but better described as controlled "experiments" or scripted "demonstrations." It's like "testing" how good a hunter one is by shooting a deer tied to a tree — at ten paces. Successfully shooting the deer wouldn't prove a thing about one's hunting skills. Failing such a "test," however, would underline just how unprepared one is.

For instance, the team assigned to intercept the incoming missile knows the timing, trajectory, speed and radar signature of the missile. And, typically, contractors from the companies who built the missiles and interceptors are holding the hands of the military staff during these scripted demonstrations. In the real world, one would have no idea which day an attack might occur — nor the precise trajectory, speed or radar signature that the missile might take.

Moreover, our adversaries will surely also use countermeasures during the attack, rendering the system ineffective. The enemy may also choose to launch a simultaneous salvo attack with several live warheads distributed among many decoys. The time of attack could also be planned such that the sun is located in an unfavorable location in the sky, possibly blinding or confusing the defensive sensors. For the sea-based "Aegis" missile defense system, another complication is if the enemy chooses to attack during rough weather when interceptors cannot safely be launched from the ships. None of these complicating factors are incorporated in the MDA's demonstrations.

But the main problem is that the type of missile defense the United States and NATO are fielding — "midcourse" missile defense — is particularly easy to defeat using simple decoys and countermeasures. The simplest countermeasures are cheap inflatable balloon decoys. Because the missile-defense interceptors try to strike the missile warheads in the

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vacuum of space, these balloons and any warheads travel together, making it impossible to tell them apart. An enemy bent on delivering a nuclear payload to the United States could inflate many such balloons near the warhead and overwhelm the defense system by swamping it with fake signals.

Even the new director of the Missile Defense Agency, Vice Admiral James Syring, cited this key problem during House Armed Services Subcommittee hearings last month. He explained that the defense system is both costly and ineffective: Syring talked about “the very difficult problems of lethal object discrimination, limited inventory and cost per kill.” If the missile interceptors can’t discriminate between the lethal object — the warhead — and the decoys, then limited (and costly) inventory is used up chasing the fakes.

The Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation, Michael Gilmore, reaffirmed this challenge during the same hearings. “If we can’t discriminate what the real threatening objects are,” Gilmore said, “it doesn’t matter how many ground-based interceptors we have, we won’t be able to hit what needs to be hit.”

Similarly, the Pentagon’s own scientists reported “the importance of achieving reliable... discrimination [between the warhead and any decoys or debris] cannot be overemphasized.” Missile defense, the scientists point out, is “predicated on the ability to discriminate” real warheads from other targets, “such as rocket bodies, miscellaneous hardware and intentional countermeasures.” If “the defense should find itself in a situation where it is shooting at missile junk or decoys, the impact on the regional interceptor inventory would be dramatic and devastating!”

So the central conundrum of midcourse missile defense remains that while it creates incentives for adversaries and competitors of the United States to increase their missile stockpiles, it offers no credible combat capability to protect the U.S. from this weaponry.

If the system is so straightforward to defeat, why is Washington spending extraordinary sums on it? What propels the system is a mixture of institutional inertia, lobbying by contractors, fear of political intimidation (labeling opponents “weak on defense”); and of course, the prospect of pork — both domestic and foreign. European allies are quite happy to go along with fielding the system, just so long as Uncle Sam foots the bill and they don’t have to pay a cent.

Unfortunately, no amount of scripted demonstrations will prove that the system works — but failures in these rigged tests (like the last three for the ground-based system) will highlight some of the many reasons why it won’t work in real combat.

So what would a realistic test look like? Firstly, there has to be *at least* several days uncertainty in when the target missile will be launched. The team launching the target missile must not be allowed to communicate with the one firing the defensive interceptor — just like in real life. During these few days the intercept team would need to be on a round-the-clock watch in anticipation of a launch, as in a real conflict.

Secondly, the speed and trajectory that the target missile flies should be unknown to the intercept team.

Thirdly, no contractors should be allowed to participate in the test in any way: the staff is part of the system being tested and no outside help should be given.

Next, the radar signature of the missile and warhead should also be an unknown to the defense. And, lastly, a salvo of missiles should be launched together with decoys and countermeasures to make the scenario similar to actual combat.

Such a test could be deemed a realistic trial of any given incarnation of missile defense. However, in the case of midcourse missile defense — the type we are fielding in Europe and in Alaska and California — we can save ourselves the effort and money involved in testing. We already know that the problem with this incarnation of missile defense is fundamental — specifically, that it can be rendered ineffective by decoys — so elaborate testing is neither required nor useful. Unless a fundamentally new type of missile defense is proposed, further testing is not needed.

A better use of limited defense dollars would be to spend them on port security or the Coast Guard: any adversary crazy enough to carry out a nuclear strike against the U.S. will likely do so using a sneaky clandestine delivery — for example by boat — rather than using a missile with a known return address.



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<http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/07/16/lets-end-bogus-missile-defense-testing/>

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The Brookings Institution  
OPINION/Up Front

## **Allegations of Russian Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Violations—Where’s the Beef?**

By Steven Pifer  
July 16, 2013

Arms control critics frequently charge that the Russians are violating previous agreements. Often these charges are made with little or weak evidence, as with the current claim that Russia has violated the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. On examination, this claim has no basis.

The State Department last week released its annual reports on compliance with arms control agreements. That led House Armed Services Committee Chairman Howard “Buck” McKeon to complain that the reports failed to address concerns he had raised about possible Russian treaty violations. He did not specify what the violation was—one of the frustrating challenges in examining these kinds of charges is that critics often offer few or no specifics—but press reports suggest that McKeon had in mind allegations about a Russian violation of the INF Treaty.

The INF Treaty, signed in December 1987 by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, banned all U.S. and Soviet land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. By the end of the treaty’s reduction period in June 1991, the Soviet Union had eliminated 1846 missiles, while the United States had eliminated 846. We know this: U.S. inspectors watched as the Soviet missiles were destroyed.

The treaty was seen as a landmark agreement, the first ever to ban an entire class of nuclear weapons. In particular, the treaty required that the Soviets eliminate all of their SS-20s, a mobile, multiple-warhead missile with a range of 5000 kilometers that provoked major security concerns within NATO and among Asian allies such as Japan.

The basis for the current allegation appears to be tests conducted in October 2012 and June 2013 in which a Russian Yars-M ballistic missile flew a distance of about 2100 kilometers. That would appear to make the Yars-M a prohibited INF missile ... except that the Yars-M had previously been tested to a range of 5800 kilometers, which makes it an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) under the terms of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).

New START defines an ICBM as “a land-based ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5500 kilometers.” The INF Treaty bans missiles with ranges “in excess of 500 kilometers” but “not in excess of 5500 kilometers.” Those definitions clearly mean that the Yars-M is an ICBM, and that is how Russian military officials have described it.

Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists explains this in detail in an excellent July 3 blog posting. He cites Russian defense officials as explaining the shorter flights as aimed at testing “the capability of the Yars-M payload to evade ballistic missile defense systems.” That is not an illogical test for the Russian military to conduct, given U.S. interest in developing missile defenses.

The U.S. Air Force National Space and Intelligence Center recently released a report on ballistic and cruise missile threats. That report concluded “neither Russia nor the United States produce or retain any MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile] or IRBM [intermediate-range ballistic missile] systems because they are banned by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which entered into force in 1988.” That supports the State Department report of no violation of the INF Treaty.

The fact is that ballistic missiles can be flown to less than their maximum ranges. The United States has flown a Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile to a relatively short range. I have not been able to find out whether the U.S. Air

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Force over the past 40 years has ever flown a Minuteman III ICBM to less than 5500 kilometers. If so, by the logic of this allegation, the United States would be in violation of the INF Treaty. The point, however, is that flying permitted ICBMs to less than intercontinental range does not mean that they are banned INF ballistic missiles.

Indeed, when the INF Treaty was signed in 1987, the expectation in the Reagan administration was that the Soviets would re-aim some of their ICBMs to cover targets in Asia and Europe that previously had been targeted by their INF ballistic missiles. That was because, as the Soviets eliminated their SS-20s, they had no ballistic missiles to cover time-urgent targets at intermediate ranges.

Time-urgent targets—targets that the Soviets might want to strike quickly in the event of a conflict—included Chinese land-based ballistic missiles, French intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and U.S. and NATO dual-capable aircraft and their associated nuclear bombs. The Soviets could go after those targets with aircraft, but planes have far longer flight times than ballistic missiles (measured in hours vs. minutes) and would have to contend with air defenses.

The Reagan administration thus assumed that the Soviets would reallocate some of the ICBM warheads against targets previously covered by SS-20s. NATO and Asian allies understood this as well. No one saw it as a big deal—and certainly not as a violation of the INF Treaty.

Compliance with arms control treaties needs to be closely monitored. This is a critical part of arms control. But compliance assessments and charges of treaty violations should be made in a serious manner, based on facts and evidence, not on allegations that border on the frivolous.

*Steven Pifer is director of the Brookings Arms Control Initiative and a senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and the Center on the United States and Europe in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings.*

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/07/16-allegations-russian-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-treaty-violations-pifer>

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The London Independent – U.K.  
OPINION/Comments

## **Trident: Does Britain Need a Submarine-Based Nuclear Missile System that will Cost £100 Billion?**

*Ministers argue that having nuclear submarines permanently patrolling our waters has “served us well”*

By Caroline Lucas

Wednesday, 17 July 2013

So, the Lib Dems’ long-awaited review of alternatives to Trident is Here.

Having pledged to “say no to the like-for-like replacement” in their election manifesto in 2010, then being forced to cede ground in order to enter into power, the review was always going to represent something of a fudge. Essentially it outlines a slimmed down version of the current system, which would deliver a bit less firepower and very little in the way of savings to the taxpayer. It’s done little to paper over the cracks in the Coalition with the Defence Secretary condemning the plans as “reckless”, and the Prime Minister flatly rejecting them.

Most importantly the review fails to address the blindingly obvious question of whether Britain, decades after the Cold War and in the grip of austerity, actually needs a submarine-based nuclear missile system that will cost an estimated £100 billion over the next 30 years. I’ll be raising this point in a debate in Parliament today.

In any case, what the Lib Dems think seems to be of little relevance.

The Government, regardless of the views of its coalition partners, Parliament, or the public has been ploughing money into a replacement.

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In response to a parliamentary question I tabled in 2010, the MoD revealed it was already spending billions on enriched uranium components and high explosives.

Ministers argue that having nuclear submarines permanently patrolling our waters has “served us well”. But has our security really been greater than other nations that have chosen not to spend billions on a permanent flotilla of nuclear submarines? Do we sleep safer in our beds than the Germans or the Japanese?

The fact is that the Liberal Democrats, like the Conservatives and like Labour, refuse to accept the major strategic and economic benefits that non-renewal would offer. These include improved national security (with flexibility to spend elsewhere on the armed forces) and improved global security. Britain’s moral authority in global multilateral disarmament initiatives depends on its own behaviour. How can we dictate to Iran or other nations seeking to join the nuclear club while we remain wedded to Trident?

This is a time when growing numbers of our citizens are relying on food banks. When public sector workers are having their pay frozen. When vital services that the most vulnerable in our society depend on are being cut daily. And when the armed forces themselves are under strain.

It’s not lefty-pacifist propaganda to ask whether we should be refusing to move on from a past era of warfare. Four former senior military commanders have voiced concerns that “replacing Trident will be one of the most expensive weapons programmes this country has seen” and highlighted concerns about its impact on defence equipment budget.

You might reasonably ask, like the former Prime Minister John Major: “In what circumstances, and upon whom, is Trident likely to be used?” The Government’s own National Security Strategy has downgraded the threat of state on state nuclear warfare, while highlighting the emergence of new 21st Century threats - including climate change, pandemics, organised crime and cyber warfare – as well as terrorism, the threat of which is arguably heightened by the kind of posturing that Trident represents.

But instead of facing up to the real threats of the modern world, the Government sadly seems determined to lock the UK into the costly technologies of the past.

*Caroline Lucas is Member of Parliament for Brighton Pavilion and leader of the Green Party of England and Wales.*

<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/trident-does-britain-need-a-submarinebased-nuclear-missile-system-that-will-cost-100-billion-8713541.html>

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Huffington Post – U.K.

OPINION/The Blog

## **Ending Nuclear Testing: Waiting for the US Senate to Take the Lead**

By James Kearney, Hans Blix, Lord Browne and Sir Jeremy Greenstock

July 18, 2013

The United States is at its best when it is leading by example. When it became the first country to sign the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, ratification by the US Senate was not taken for granted, but was certainly hoped for. Alas, that was not to be, as in 1999 the Senate voted 51-48 against the treaty with only four Republican Senators voting in favour (Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, Jim Jeffords of Vermont, Gordon Smith of Oregon and Lincoln Chaffee of Rhode Island).

President Obama's declared commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, in Prague in 2009, and his administration's work on securing the new START treaty, once more raised expectations that the President would use his second term to persuade the Senate to move where it failed to go in 1999 and gain the required 67 votes to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a treaty that makes it very difficult for countries to develop nuclear bombs for the first time, or for countries that already have them, to make more powerful devices.

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As acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Rose Gottemoeller stated in 2012: "A lot has changed since 1999, and people have not had a chance to really look at the CTBT and understand what it can accomplish for U.S. national security."

To overcome partisan divisions in the Senate and counter much misinformation concerning the treaty, numerous civil society reports by, for example, the Arms Control Association, National Academy of Sciences and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, have been produced in the last three years to acclimatise Senators ahead of an informed and constructive debate, potentially leading to a vote. Once again, this case must be made clear, and this case must be made now. Ratifying the treaty is in the national security interests of the United States - not only would it complete work begun by President Eisenhower and continued by President Kennedy, but it would marginalise any country that chooses to remain on such a political trajectory.

For the treaty to come into effect, the United States and 7 other countries - China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan - must ratify and join the 159 countries that already have signed on, including every NATO ally of the United States, and Russia. With the threat of nuclear proliferation growing, the case for ratifying has never been stronger.

If the US ratifies the treaty, its current stockpile would remain intact, without any requirement for testing, as was clearly argued in the 2012 National Academy of Sciences report which stated: "Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place, the committee judges that the United States has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons..."

It is also worth noting that the US has not tested a single nuclear weapon in more than 20 years, while no signatory country has conducted a nuclear test explosion since signing. The CTBT would be a seal on what the United States and most other countries are already doing.

As Senator John McCain has intimated, the situation vis-à-vis monitoring and verification is also different than the situation in 1999. The largely completed International Monitoring System has proved its worth, detecting and identifying the 2006 and 2013 North Korean nuclear tests - the former at a juncture when only two-thirds of the system was operational.

Such international monitoring will help protect the United States - not hinder its security. As the National Academy of Sciences report conveyed, constraints placed on nuclear-explosion testing by the monitoring capabilities of the International Monitoring System and the capabilities of the US National Technical Means, "will reduce the likelihood of successful clandestine nuclear explosion testing, and inhibit the development of new types of strategic nuclear weapons." This can only create conditions for enhancing international stability while reinforcing US national security.

In the highly unlikely situation in which the United States deemed it necessary to return to test a new type of weapon meant to counter a particular type of nuclear threat, the United States could invoke the standard "supreme national interests" clause, withdraw from the CTBT, and conduct whatever testing might be required.

In his 2013 State of the Union speech, President Obama commented that "our ability to influence others depends upon our willingness to lead." The opposite may also be true. When the US refuses to lead, others may feel free or even motivated to stay out. However, there is little reason to believe that China would refrain from ratifying if the US did ratify, and the pressure would be strong on the remaining non-ratifying states to follow-suit.

By leading through example, President Obama and the Senate would be demonstrating political strength while opening the door for the other remaining states to ratify. In the end, ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty would demonstrate the United States' commitment to global leadership and strategic foresight. Ultimately, ratification would bolster US national security and make its citizens safer.

*Dr Hans Blix is a former Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs and former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Des Browne (Lord Browne of Ladyton) is a former British Defense Secretary, and convener of the European*

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[http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/james-kearney/nuclear-testing-america\\_b\\_3610106.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/james-kearney/nuclear-testing-america_b_3610106.html)

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The Canberra Times – Australia

OPINION/Comment

## **As Britons Posture on Nuclear Needs, Reflect on what is Happening at Home**

July 20, 2013

By Nicholas Stuart

Imperial hubris dies hard. Britain still can't quite get used to the idea that it is no longer "Great". This week five former Conservative and Labor defence ministers, together with their force's chiefs, warned the country it must never, ever, abandon its own nuclear deterrent. Even though Australia remains the only country on which Britain has ever successfully detonated a bomb, a small and vociferous lobby group of apoplectic lords, sirs and doctors have joined bewhiskered admirals and fuming former military chiefs to demand and insist that Britain must never reduce its own independent fleet of nuclear submarines.

We are not talking about abandoning the bomb, mind you. The proposal on the table is simply to reduce the number of missile-carrying submarines to two, instead of four. A mere 96 nuclear-tipped warheads, instead of 192. The ability to utterly destroy a continent, rather than the world. And why? Lest anyone attempt to ruffle the head of a new, unborn, heir to the throne, that's why. After all, this event is important enough to occasion febrile television reporters camping outside a London hospital so they can be among the first to bring the happy news of the birth of a child to a grateful world. So perhaps that's why, facing the creeping impotence of old age, the retired secretaries of state have sprung to life.

They must suddenly feel as invigorated as they did when they first glimpsed *Playboy*, or saw the bottom of their fag at school as he carried their bags from prep.

"It would be unthinkable", the retired officers foamed, slamming down their pink gins in fury (as the servants brushed the froth away from their wobbling lips). "Impossible", they thundered (as lightning flashed from under their brows on remembering the latest insult when a member of the lower orders failed to grovel appropriately when admitted to their presence). "We'd become as irrelevant as a, as a ..." Lord Bill and Ben paused in spluttering incoherence as he searched for an appropriate insult. Could he still use the word "kaffir"? No, best not. It was the 21st century now. He thought again. "I know!" He had it, now. "We'd become as irrelevant as colonials", he insisted derisively.

Because it's true. There's nothing like possessing your own atomic bomb to make you feel as if you actually belong at the high table, even if you are still wearing nappies. This much is perfectly understandable. And it explains why Pyongyang and Tehran want to join Paris, London, Moscow and Beijing (and Tel Aviv and New Delhi and Islamabad). Everyone wants personal ownership of the ability to become "Death, the destroyer of worlds". Not (they all, quickly, insist, shuffling quickly as they do so and never quite looking you in the eye), that they'd ever use the bomb themselves, you understand. It's just the others who can't be trusted.

Watching the British pretending they remain superior is as sordid a spectacle as ever. It is the longest-running show on Shaftsbury Avenue, beginning in 1815 and still playing, even as the threadbare mechanisms working the scenes are becoming increasingly apparent to the dwindling crowds in the stalls. Yet the point is, it's not the grand "United" Kingdom alone that is suffering from the need to carry a big stick.

All those who sit in power - whether it's in Tokyo or on Adelaide Avenue - seemingly can't quite resist the temptation to hold their own firm, erect missiles. And this is the reality that lurks behind the submarine debate here in Australia.

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The idea of spending \$38 billion or \$42 billion (pick a number, your guess is as good as mine) to make our own home-grown submarine is, quite frankly, laughable - except for one thing. It preserves the possibility, at some ill-defined point in the future, of acquiring our own nuclear missiles. Nobody is admitting it, but the reality is the new submarine project is actually all about an Australian bomb. Otherwise it just doesn't make sense.

If we just needed to defend our own shores we could make do very handsomely with far cheaper German, Swedish or Spanish boats. In 20 years' time there will be no need to send commerce raiders out into the mid-Pacific ocean to torpedo whatever is sailing across the seas rather than flying through the air. That is why we have brought out Britain's own David Gould to manage our submarine project. He has supervised the redesign of Britain's nuclear-powered boats and although these do not carry the ultimate deterrent of ballistic missiles, they do have other smaller ship-to-shore missiles that are quite capable of being tipped with (admittedly much smaller) nuclear devices.

And that is the whole point of the bigger submarines our politicians are determined to buy. They aren't being designed for carrying nuclear missiles, of course, but they will be able to do so. Particularly as weapons become smaller and more capable. I'm informed women insist to their men that it is not the size that matters. But just feel the power.

*Nicholas Stuart is a Canberra writer.*

<http://www.canberratimes.com.au/comment/as-britons-posture-on-nuclear-needs-reflect-on-what-is-happening-at-home-20130719-2qa4t.html>

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