



**USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER**  
**CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL**  
MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

**Issue No. 1065, 12 July 2013**

Articles & Other Documents:

**Featured Article:** [China Has World's Most Active Missile Programs, U.S. Says](#)

1. [Syria Claims Discovery of Enough Chemical Weapons to "Destroy a Country"](#)
2. [FM Spokesman: No Date Decided for Iran-IAEA Talks](#)
3. [Syria Rebels Made own Sarin Gas, says Russia](#)
4. [Saudi Arabia 'Targeting Iran and Israel with Ballistic Missiles'](#)
5. [Iran Exile Group Claims Evidence of Hidden Nuclear Site](#)
6. [Iran Dismisses MKO Allegation of Secret Nuclear Site Near Tehran](#)
7. [Some Experts See North Korean Nuclear Arms as Here to Stay](#)
8. [China Using Force, Defense Report Says](#)
9. [Pyongyang's Nuke Envoy Returns Home from Russia Visit](#)
10. [China Has World's Most Active Missile Programs, U.S. Says](#)
11. [North Korea Tested Rocket Engine: Think-Tank](#)
12. [Russia to Field 30 Times More Cruise Missiles by 2020](#)
13. [Alexander Nevsky Submarine to Be Handed Over to Russian Navy Nov 15](#)
14. [First 2 Russian Student Military R&D Units Begin Service](#)
15. [New Russian Air Defense System to Detect Missiles at Blastoff](#)
16. [U.S. Seaborne Missile Defense Endangers Russian Security - Expert](#)
17. [Government to Annex Trident Base in Independent Scotland? Not Credible, Says No 10](#)
18. [Trident Alternatives Review to be Published Despite MoD Opposition](#)
19. [US ABM Test Failure Mars \\$1bn N. Korea Defense Plan](#)
20. [Lawmakers Want Answers from Pentagon Over Missile Test Failure](#)
21. [House Rejects Effort to Trim \\$23.7M in Funding for B61](#)
22. [Snowden: US, Israel Created Virus to Destroy Iran Nukes](#)
23. [Better Late than Never: Russia to get Cyber Troops](#)
24. [Deterring an Asia Nuke Race](#)
25. [Ready Deterrence VS Recessed Deterrence](#)
26. [Why the Defense Industry Is Always Sinking](#)
27. [Obama's Key Nuclear Deal with Russia](#)
28. [Still Preparing for Nuclear War: The U.S. Government Continues the Policies of the Past](#)
29. [Glimpse Inside Air-Sea Battle: Nukes, Cyber At Its Heart](#)
30. [Air Force Intelligence Report Provides Snapshot of Nuclear Missiles](#)

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**Issue No.1065, 12 July 2013**

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Xinhua News – China

## Syria Claims Discovery of Enough Chemical Weapons to "Destroy a Country"

July 9, 2013

UNITED NATIONS, July 8 (Xinhua) -- Syria has invited the United Nations top Syrian chemical weapons investigator and the UN high representative for disarmament to Damascus following the discovery of enough rebel-held chemical weapons to "destroy a whole country," the Damascus envoy to the world body said on Monday.

Bashar Ja'afari, Syria's permanent representative to the United Nations, told reporters the head of the team, Swedish scientist Ake Sellstrom who has been waiting to enter Syria to investigate the use earlier this year of chemical weapons by both the government and the opposition, was invited along with UN High Representative for Disarmament Angela Kane.

"This invitation proves once again the openness of the Syrian government with regard to cooperation with the United Nations in revealing the truth behind the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria," he said. "We as always have dealt with transparency in dealing with the UN and its agencies."

However, he side-stepped the question of whether the talks would be about investigation of all allegations or only those made by the Syrian government about the alleged use of chemical weapons by rebels.

The Syrian government in March accused the rebels in northern Syria of firing a chemical rocket at the town of Khan al-Asal that killed more than 26 people, while Britain, France and the United States alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon then established the team to investigate all allegations.

Asked whether new Sellstrom-Kane talks with the Syrians would cover investigation of all allegations, Ja'afari replied, "We are here talking only about the agreement that we are intending to reach with the secretary-general because the secretary-general was the one who established the team. So we deal with the secretary-general."

A spokesman for Ban said he welcomed Syria's offer for discussions on the investigation.

"He remains seriously concerned about all allegations on the use of chemical weapons in Syria," said the spokesman in a statement.

"Sellstrom, will travel to New York this week to update the secretary-general on the status of his activities," the statement said. "Pending its on-site access in Syria, the mission has continued to monitor developments as well as to collect and analyze information made available by member states. The mission has also conducted fact-finding activities in a neighboring country."

"The secretary-general hopes that Syria will grant access to the mission to conduct its comprehensive on-site investigation," the spokesman said. "Cooperation from Syria in this regard will be essential for the mission to establish facts in a credible manner regarding any use of chemical weapons in Syria."

The talks would take place within the Foreign Ministry and involve "specialized, competent experts" and involve "the mechanism and terms of reference of the mission," Ja'afari said.

As for the latest trove of chemical weapons reported, Ja'afari said, they were just discovered Sunday.

"The Syrian authorities have discovered yesterday in the city of Baniyas 281 barrels filled with dangerous, hazardous, chemical materials .. capable of destroying a whole city, if not a whole country and the investigation is still undergoing," he said.

"These various other chemical materials were found in a secret storage controlled and monitored by the armed terrorist groups," he added.

**Issue No. 1065, 12 July 2013**

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The industrial chemicals were listed as 79 barrels of polyethylene glycol (PEG), 67 barrels of mono ethylene glycol, 25 barrels of mono ethanol (or ethanolamine) and 68 barrels of diethanolamine (DEA) and 42 barrels of triethanolamine (TEA).

In addition to the cache of chemicals found in the coastal town of Bania, Ja'afari recalled that "Turkish authorities" announced about two weeks ago the arrests of 12 people he identified as terrorists headed for Syria "carrying with them 2 kilograms of sarin gas. These terrorists were coming from Libya and they had the gas, sarin, aboard the civilian airline that transported them from Libya to Turkey."

[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-07/09/c\\_132523266.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-07/09/c_132523266.htm)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

FARS News Agency – Iran

## **FM Spokesman: No Date Decided for Iran-IAEA Talks**

Tuesday, July 9, 2013

TEHRAN (FNA) - Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Seyed Abbas Araqchi underlined that no exact date has been set for the new round of talks between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

"No definite decision has been taken and no agreement reached for holding talks between Iran and IAEA," Araqchi said on Tuesday.

"As long as Iran's president-elect has not taken office and his cabinet members have not been selected no negotiations can take place between the two sides ...," the Iranian diplomat added.

Araqchi's remark came as western diplomats said earlier this week that Iran and the IAEA might hold their new round of nuclear talks in August.

A diplomat in Vienna, where the International Atomic Energy Agency is based, said on Monday he believed the aim was for an Iran-IAEA meeting in mid-August but that no decision had yet been taken.

"I think that no meeting in August would be a bad sign," another Western envoy said.

That would be shortly before the IAEA issues its next, quarterly report on Iran's nuclear program in late August and ahead of a weeklong session of the UN agency's 35-nation governing board in September.

The IAEA-Iran discussions are separate from, but still closely associated with, broader negotiations between Tehran and six world powers aimed at a political solution to the dispute.

The IAEA, in an e-mailed response to a Reuters question, said it had no news to report about any future discussions with Iran. They last met in May in Vienna.

International hopes for a resolution of the nuclear dispute were boosted by the election of Rouhani because he has promised a different approach to foreign relations, and specially the country's nuclear standoff with the West, than incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, yet he has underlined that access and use of the nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment, is an indispensable part of Iran's rights.

But Western officials know well that it is Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei who decides nuclear policy.

Iran says it is enriching uranium only to fuel nuclear power stations, and for medical purposes. But the Western states claim that Iran intends to ultimately make a nuclear bomb, although they have never presented any corroborative evidence to substantiate their allegations.

IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano told Reuters last month he remained committed to dialogue with Iran to address the UN agency's concerns.



<http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13920418000662>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Al Jazeera – U.A.E.

## **Syria Rebels Made own Sarin Gas, says Russia**

*Russia hands evidence to UN which its envoy says indicates Syrian opposition used chemical weapons on regime forces.*  
10 July 2013

Russia has presented evidence to the UN it says shows Syrian rebels attacked regime forces with sarin gas that was produced in "cottage industry" conditions.

Ambassador Vitaly Churkin said Russian experts had been to the scene of the attack at Khan al-Assal near Aleppo and gathered firsthand evidence.

Churkin said the attack killed 26 people, including 16 military personnel, and injured 86 others. Rebels have blamed government forces for the attack.

The samples taken from the impact site of the gas-laden projectile were analysed at a Russian laboratory certified by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Churkin said.

He said the analysis showed that the unguided Basha'ir-3 rocket that hit Khan al-Assal was not a military-standard chemical weapon. He said the samples indicated the sarin and the projectile were produced in makeshift "cottage industry" conditions, and the projectile was "not a standard one for chemical use".

He added that, according to information gathered by Russia, production of the projectiles started in February by the "Basha'ir al-Nasr' brigade", which is affiliated with the Free Syrian Army.

The Russian action risks reigniting an international dispute over the use of chemical weapons in the 26-month-old war, in which the United Nations says up to 100,000 people have been killed.

### **US rejects claim**

The United States has rejected Russian claims raised at the United Nations that Syrian opposition fighters had used chemical weapons.

"We have yet to see any evidence that backs up the assertion that anybody besides the Syrian government has the ability to use chemical weapons, [or] has used chemical weapons," White House spokesman Jay Carney said on Tuesday.

The Syrian government has refused to let a UN inspection team into the country, but this week invited UN officials for talks on the investigation.

Carney again called on the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, to allow foreign investigators to probe claims of chemical weapons use.

"The way to answer this question is to allow the United Nations to investigate," he said.

"Our ability as an international community to investigate the use of chemical weapons in Syria is hampered by Assad's refusal to allow a United Nations investigation."

Britain, France and the United States say they have handed over evidence to UN experts indicating that Assad's forces have used chemical weapons in the conflict.

*Source: Agencies*

<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/20137920448105510.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)



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**CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL**  
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The London Daily Telegraph – U.K.

## **Saudi Arabia 'Targeting Iran and Israel with Ballistic Missiles'**

*Saudi Arabia is targeting both Israel and Iran with powerful ballistic missiles, new satellite photography shown by military experts to The Telegraph suggests.*

By Colin Freeman

10 July 2013

Images analysed by experts at *IHS Jane's Intelligence Review* has revealed a hitherto undisclosed surface-to-surface missile base deep in the Saudi desert, with capabilities for hitting both countries.

Analysts who examined the photos spotted two launch pads with markings pointing north-west towards Tel Aviv and north-east towards Tehran. They are designed for Saudi Arabia's arsenal of lorry-launched DF 3 missiles, which have a range of 1,500-2,500 miles and can carry a two-ton payload.

The base, believed to have been built within the last five years, gives an insight into Saudi strategic thinking at a time of heightened tensions in the Gulf.

While Saudi Arabia does not have formal diplomatic relations with Israel, it has long maintained discreet back channel communications as part of attempts to promote stability in the region.

The two countries also have a mutual enemy in Iran, though, which has long seen Saudi Arabia as a rival power in the Gulf. Experts fear that if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would seek to follow suit.

Analysts at *IHS Jane's* believe that the kingdom is currently in the process of upgrading its missiles, although even the DF3, which dates back to the 1980s, is itself potentially big enough to carry a nuclear device.

The missile base, which is at al-Watah, around 125 miles south-west of the Saudi capital, Riyadh, was discovered during a project by *IHS Jane's* to update their assessment of Saudi Arabia's military capabilities.

It serves as both a training and launch facility, with the missiles stored in an underground silo built into a rocky hillside. To the north of the facility are two circle-shaped launch pads, both with compass-style markings showing the precise direction that the launchers should fire in.

The Chinese-made missiles, which date back to the 1980s, are not remotely-guided and therefore have to be positioned in the direction of their target before firing.

"One appears to be aligned on a bearing of approximately 301 degrees and suggesting a potential Israeli target, and the other is oriented along an azimuth (bearing) of approximately 10 degrees, ostensibly situated to target Iranian locations," said the *IHS Jane's* article, which is published on Thursday.

While the lorry-launched missiles can theoretically be fired from any location, the idea of having pre-planned directional markers is to ensure that they can be deployed in accurate fashion as quickly as possible, said Allison Puccioni, an image expert at *IHS Jane's*.

"There is a marked out spot for the launch truck to park in, which will facilitate an expedited launch," she said.

Robert Munks, deputy editor of *IHS Jane's Intelligence Review*, said: "Our assessment suggests that this base is either partly or fully operational, with the launch pads pointing in the directions of Israel and Iran respectively. We cannot be certain that the missiles are pointed specifically at Tel Aviv and Tehran themselves, but if they were to be launched, you would expect them to be targeting major cities.

"We do not want to make too many inferences about the Saudi strategy, but clearly Saudi Arabia does not enjoy good relations with either Iran or Israel."

**Issue No. 1065, 12 July 2013**

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Officials at the Saudi Embassy in London did not get back with a response when contacted by *The Telegraph*. The Israeli Embassy in London said: "We have no comment on this matter."

David Butter, an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, the London-based foreign affairs think-tank, said there was "little surprise" that the Saudis had the missiles in place.

"It would seem that they are looking towards some sort of deterrent capability, which is an obvious thing for them to be doing, given that Iran too is developing its own ballistic missiles," he said.

He added, though, that the Saudis would know that the site would come to the attention of foreign intelligence agencies, and that the missile pad pointed in the direction of Israel could be partly just "for show".

"It would give the Iranians the impression that they were not being exclusively targeted, and would also allow the Saudis to suggest to the rest of the Arab world that they still consider Israel a threat."

Oil-rich Saudi Arabia considers itself one of the pre-eminent powers in the Gulf region, but its Sunni Islam leadership has long been at loggerheads with the Shia mullahs of Iran. The ongoing conflict in Syria, which Saudi Arabia has backed the Sunni-dominated rebels and Iran has backed the Shia-dominated regime of President Bashar al-Assad, has heightened fears of a wider sectarian conflict.

A confidential diplomatic cable revealed in the "W---Leaks" disclosures of 2010 said that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia repeatedly exhorted the United States to launch military strikes against Iran's nuclear programme and "cut off the head of the snake".

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiArabia/10172463/Saudi-Arabia-targeting-Iran-and-Israel-with-ballistic-missiles.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Al Bawaba – Jordan

## **Iran Exile Group Claims Evidence of Hidden Nuclear Site**

July 11th, 2013

An exiled Iranian opposition group claimed on Thursday to have evidence of a hidden nuclear site located in tunnels beneath a mountain near the town of Damavand, 70 kilometres (44 miles) northeast of Tehran.

The Paris-based militant group the People's Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), alleges the site has existed since 2006 with the first series of subterranean tunnels and four external depots recently completed.

The group also claims the recently elected president Hassan Rohani, a former nuclear negotiator, had a "key role" in the programme.

Founded in the 1960s to oppose the rule of the Shah, the MEK was considered a terrorist organisation by the United States until last year, and has provided information about the Iranian nuclear programme on several occasions.

"The organisation of the People's Mujahedin of Iran (MEK) has discovered credible evidence of a secret new nuclear site, gathered over a year by 50 sources in various parts of the regime," said a statement from the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the umbrella group of which MEK is a part.

"The codename of the project is 'Ma'adane-e Charq' (literally 'the mine of the east') or 'Project Kossar'. This site is hidden in a series of tunnels under a mountain near the town of Damavand," it said.

The report added that Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a senior official in Iran's Revolutionary Guard, is also a managing director of a company the MEK claims is overseeing the project's "nuclear, biological and chemical programmes."

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has attempted to speak to Fakhrizadeh in the past without success.



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**CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL**  
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The "next phase" of the project will be the construction of up to 30 tunnels and 30 depots, the report added.

The report concluded: "These revelations demonstrate once again that the Mullahs' regime has no intention of stopping or even suspending the development of a nuclear weapon," the MEK said, calling on the IAEA to visit the secret site.

<http://www.albawaba.com/business/iran-nuclear-site-505927>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Press TV – Iran

## **Iran Dismisses MKO Allegation of Secret Nuclear Site Near Tehran**

Friday, July 12, 2013

The Iranian Foreign Ministry has rejected allegations by the terrorist Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) accusing Tehran of building a secret nuclear site.

Reacting to the allegation on Friday, the ministry's spokesman, Seyyed Abbas Araqchi, dismissed the claim as mere lies by the "desperate" terrorist group.

On Thursday, the MKO claimed to have evidence of an underground nuclear site built under a mountain near the city of Damavand, 70 kilometers (43 miles) northeast of Tehran.

The terrorist group alleged that the site had existed since 2006 with the first series of underground tunnels and four external depots recently completed.

*"This report is by no means true and is denied [by the Islamic Republic of Iran]," Araqchi said, adding, "The terrorist MKO has been so discredited that the publication of such stories by them is not worth a response," he added.*

The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization - blamed for the assassination of many Iranian people and officials after the 1979 Islamic Revolution - fled to Iraq in the 1980s, where they enjoyed the support of former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, and set up a military base near the Iranian border in Diyala Province.

Members of the anti-Iranian group currently live at Camp Liberty, a former US military camp near Baghdad Airport, after their relocation from their former Camp Ashraf under growing pressure from the Iraqi government and people for the terrorist group to leave the country.

The US, Israel and some of their European allies have frequently accused Iran of pursuing military goals in its nuclear energy program with the US and EU using that pretext to impose illegal unilateral sanctions against the Islamic Republic.

Tehran has categorically rejected the accusation, arguing that as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it is entitled to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Also, during its numerous inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities, the IAEA has never found any evidence that the Iranian nuclear energy program has been diverted toward non-civilian purposes.

<http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/07/12/313469/iran-rejects-secret-nsite-allegation/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

National Journal

## **Some Experts See North Korean Nuclear Arms as Here to Stay**

By Rachel Oswald

July 8, 2013

**Issue No. 1065, 12 July 2013**

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A number of independent U.S. analysts are saying the Obama administration appears to be reluctantly accepting that the North Korean military might never be fully denuclearized.

Since the last round of regional nuclear talks in 2008, the North has substantively advanced its nuclear weapons program -- carrying out two underground atomic tests; launching several long-range rockets, one of which made it into space; showing off a prototype for a road-mobile ICBM; declaring a uranium enrichment program; and initiating efforts to reopen a disabled plutonium production reactor.

All of this illustrates, according to some issue experts, just how much ground has been lost in nearly five years of unsuccessful international efforts to resume negotiations on an end to Pyongyang's nuclear program.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry last week in an appearance with his South Korean and Japanese counterparts in Brunei told journalists, "We join you in making it absolutely clear that the policy of the United States, together with the Republic of Korea and Japan, is the denuclearization of ... North Korea."

The Obama administration has shown little interest in responding to recent overtures by Pyongyang asking for unconditional bilateral security talks. Washington has said it is willing to return to the six-party aid-for-denuclearization talks, but it has qualified that on the requirement that North Korea first demonstrate a willingness to halt its prohibited weapons work. The six-nation talks also involve China, Japan, South Korea and Russia.

While the U.S. demand would seem to represent proof that the Obama team would not accept continued North Korean nuclear arms work, some analysts say maintenance of the status quo, without talks, suggests Pyongyang's military efforts simply will proceed forward.

Victor Cha, the Bush administration's former special envoy for North Korea policy, in an e-mail said he does not see an explicit policy shift on the part of Washington. However, "having said that, a policy of non-action on the diplomatic front, with everyone sitting on their hands, is tantamount" to acquiescence of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, he said.

"Objectively, the North Koreans are just making progress and as the North Korean program advances, I suspect that -- particularly in the U.S. and South Korea and Japan -- there is a declining confidence that we will be able to get them to bargain it away," said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

"I wouldn't represent it as a kind of [policy] discontinuity. It isn't that something changed overnight. It is that there has been this gradual accumulation of North Korean capabilities," said Lewis, who writes for the Arms Control Wonk blog and *Foreign Policy* magazine. "I think when they came into office, [Obama administration officials] were in this whole benign neglect mode. They didn't press very hard and the North Koreans went kind of crazy with the tests."

Pyongyang has signaled that its plan in any new diplomatic talks will be to attain some form of recognition of its status as a nuclear-armed nation, according to observers.

"Part of North Korea's diplomatic strategy is working -- carving out a space where it's tacitly accepted as a nuclear weapon state," said Joel Wit, editor of the website 38 North, at an event at the American Security Project in late June.

"To me, all of this is leading to a reality, whether we want to acknowledge it or not, that we are acquiescing to North Korea as a nuclear power," argued Wit, a onetime State Department official who, in the 1990s, supervised an ultimately failed U.S.-North Korea denuclearization accord.

Not all analysts agree with the view that the Obama administration, by not aggressively pushing for new negotiations, is implicitly accepting the North's nuclear weapons status.

Anthony Cordesman, a former director of Defense intelligence assessments at the Pentagon, in an interview last week emphasized the idea that language remains important.



While Washington "recognizes the very nature of North Korea's nuclear efforts," the Obama administration has not "undertaken any diplomatic efforts that would signal, even tacitly, that the United States accepts" the isolated state as a nuclear weapon country, he said.

Peter Hayes, executive director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, in an e-mail said he sees it both ways: "We keep on saying [North Korea's nuclear work is] not acceptable."

On the other hand, there is an implicit recognition of Pyongyang's strategic status "in terms of how we respond to their nuclear threat ... which, de facto, recognizes that they are a nuclear-armed state, if not a nuclear weapons state, under international law," he wrote.

The U.S. State Department did not respond by press time to a question about whether it is moving toward tacit recognition that North Korea's nuclear weapons program is here to stay.

Lewis in a Tuesday phone interview said the problem the Obama administration is confronting, as it ponders whether to re-engage with Pyongyang, is how politically unpalatable it has become to negotiate freezes to the East Asian country's nuclear and missile programs, which were signature characteristics of previous aid-for-denuclearization efforts.

"In the past, we were negotiating with the North Koreans to freeze their program and give up things they hadn't yet built," such as a uranium enrichment capability and longer-range ballistic missiles, Lewis said. The negotiations inevitably always stumbled when the United States and its allies pushed Pyongyang to dismantle or surrender nuclear weapon technology it already possessed, he said.

Now that North Korea has advanced its weapons of mass destruction efforts so much, the prospect of getting it to agree to permanently give up all of its new capabilities seems even more remote, according to Lewis.

"The old formula of freezing the program just looks less appealing," he said.

Still, Lewis said he believes it is better to negotiate freezes to North Korea's nuclear weapons work -- even if they end up being temporary -- than to have no moratorium in place at all.

The last freeze Washington negotiated with Pyongyang, the so-called 2012 Leap Day deal, never even got off the ground. The aborted accord would have provided North Korea with a limited quantity of U.S. food aid in exchange for its moratorium of all nuclear and long-range missile tests and a halt on its uranium enrichment work. The United States walked away from the deal after the North fired a space rocket in April 2012.

Michael Green, an East Asia specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said there is no "clear option" for ending the North's nuclear work.

Participants in the six-party talks "will probably go for some second-best solution, which involves sanctions and pressure to impose a cost on the regime, slow down their program, dissuade other proliferators, and strengthen the net needed to prevent [weapons] leakage."

Such an outcome is not satisfactory but is the "reality," Green, a former National Security Council staffer under President George W. Bush, said in an e-mail.

Wit said he would like to see more coercive diplomacy on the part of the Obama administration. What currently exists, he said, is coercion in the form of deepening international sanctions and interdictions of smuggled weaponry but no substantive diplomacy, which could involve routine contacts through both official and semi-official channels.

The United States must also be persistent when engaging with Pyongyang, he said.

"We need to have the patience to sustain a dialogue with North Korea," Wit said. "Even if we get traction, it's going to be long and difficult, so we need to be able to stay with it."



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Additionally, the Obama administration should be open to sending high-level "diplomatic assets" to engage with the North, said Wit, who is a visiting scholar at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. "We need to lead from the front of the pack on this issue, not from way behind, which is what we are doing now."

<http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/some-experts-see-north-korean-nuclear-arms-as-here-to-stay-20130708>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Japan Times – Japan

## **China Using Force, Defense Report Says**

*Actions near Senkaku Islands could spark full crisis, officials warn*

Kyodo

July 9, 2013

Japan is concerned that China's potentially dangerous maritime activities around the Senkaku Islands could lead to an emergency and Beijing should act according to international rules rather than use force, the Defense Ministry said Tuesday in its white paper for 2013.

The report also expresses concern over North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, saying the country's ballistic missiles are potentially capable of reaching the U.S. mainland — a sign that the missile program has entered a new stage.

The annual report, the first to be published under the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, emphasizes an increasingly assertive China and defiant North Korea.

Abe is eager to revise the U.S.-drafted pacifist Constitution so Japan can exercise the right to collective self-defense, while trying to solidify the strength of his Liberal Democratic Party in the Diet by sweeping the Upper House election in two weeks.

China's activities in the sea and air include "dangerous actions that could cause a contingency situation" and are "extremely regrettable," the report states.

Citing a January incident in which Japan said a Chinese navy frigate locked its weapons radar on a Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer in the East China Sea, the white paper criticizes Beijing for denying use of the radar and accuses it of giving false explanations over the incident.

It was also reported that a Chinese frigate locked its weapons radar on an MSDF helicopter in the area the same month.

Tokyo and Beijing have been at odds over the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands and tensions have heightened since the government last September effectively nationalized the territory, which Japan first took control of in 1895.

China has since continued to send surveillance vessels near the uninhabited islets, which it claims, putting Japanese authorities on alert. Chinese aircraft have also encroached on the area.

To address issues of conflicting interests, "China has attempted to change the status quo by force based on its own assertion, which is incompatible with the existing order of international law," the report says.

One of China's objectives is to "weaken the effective control of another country over the islands" and strengthen its claim to territorial rights "through various surveillance activities and use of force," it adds, calling on China to increase the transparency of its defense policy.

The paper also refers to the unresolved dispute over Russia-held islands that Japan has wanted back since the end of World War II and the row with Seoul over South Korea-held islets in the Sea of Japan. Seoul refers to the rocky outcroppings as Dokdo, and Japan calls them Takeshima and says in the report they are part of Japanese territory.

**Issue No. 1065, 12 July 2013**

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The report touches on other topics, including cybersecurity, an area Japan sees as necessary to improve to counter cyberattacks.

The Abe administration is planning to compile defense guidelines to define the nation's longer-term defense policy by the end of the year, and the report provides insights into the country's future defense posture.

"It is not necessarily possible to prevent invasions from outside by nonmilitary means such as diplomatic efforts," the report says, noting defensive capabilities are "the nation's ultimate guarantee of security" and of "Japan's will and capacity to defend itself against foreign invasions."

The white paper touches on the possibility of enabling Japan to attack an enemy base as an effective "deterrence" against ballistic missile threats.

The report says that in the security environment, the Japan-U.S. bilateral security alliance is essential and the deployment to Okinawa of the MV-22 Osprey aircraft will contribute to peace and stability in the region.

The tilt-rotor aircraft's safety record sparked worries when the first 12 units arrived at the Futenma base in Okinawa last year, exacerbating local opposition against the airstrip. The base is expected to get 12 more Ospreys this summer.

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/07/09/national/defense-white-paper-airs-concern-over-chinas-possible-use-of-forceful-action/#.Ud3tulAo5Dx>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Global Post – Boston, MA

## **Pyongyang's Nuke Envoy Returns Home from Russia Visit**

Yonhap News Agency

July 9, 2013

SEOUL, July 9 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's point man on nuclear issues has returned home after a week-long trip to Russia, the North's state media reported on Tuesday.

The North's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) did not give specifics on the purpose of Kim Kye-gwan's trip to Moscow, but Russia's foreign ministry had said earlier that the trip centered on how to handle the Korean Peninsula's nuclear issue.

In an earlier report, the KCNA had said that during the trip to Moscow that began on July 2, Kim, who serves as Pyongyang's first vice minister, met with high-ranking Russian officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov and First Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov.

Pyongyang's nuclear program has raised tensions on the Korean Peninsula and forced the United Nations to slap fresh sanctions on the North following its third underground nuclear test on Feb. 12.

North Korea watchers in Seoul said Kim's trip to Russia, following a similar visit to China, is a sign that Pyongyang is moving toward dialogue with regional powers over the nuclear standoff.

Seoul and Washington have made clear on numerous occasions that the North must show it is serious about giving up its nuclear weapons before any talks can take place.

The North, meanwhile, has long insisted that it cannot give up its nuclear deterrence in the face of what it calls continued hostilities by the United States.

<http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/130709/pyongyangs-nuke-envoy-returns-home-russia-visit>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)



Bloomberg News

## China Has World's Most Active Missile Programs, U.S. Says

By Tony Capaccio

July 11, 2013

China's military has the world's "most active and diverse ballistic missile program," with an expanding inventory of nuclear warheads that can reach the U.S., according to a Pentagon intelligence report.

The arsenal includes a new submarine-launched JL-2 ballistic missile that will for the first time let Chinese submarines target parts of the U.S. from near China's coast, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center said in a new assessment obtained by Bloomberg News.

China is expanding its missile program under a broader military modernization plan that's seen the country's defense spending more than double since 2006. China's neighbors including Japan and the Philippines have expressed concern that its government is becoming more aggressive in the region, as the U.S. also puts new emphasis on forces in the Asia-Pacific.

Some of China's weapons are "specifically designed to prevent adversary military forces' access to regional conflicts," according to the report, an update to one released in 2009.

Admiral Samuel Locklear, head of the U.S. Pacific Command, told reporters in Washington today that China's "sophisticated ballistic missile programs" were under way long "before there was ever any discussion about a strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific" by the U.S.

China is developing and testing new missiles, upgrading older systems, forming new missile units and working on ways to counter missile defenses, the report said. The number of Chinese nuclear warheads capable of hitting the U.S. "could expand to well over 100 within the next 15 years," it said.

### Territorial Disputes

China is in territorial disputes across the region, with nations including Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam. A Japanese defense report released June 9 said China is trying to change the regional status quo by force. China Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying responded by saying Japan has been "spreading the so-called China threat, creating regional tension."

The conclusions on China are part of a Pentagon report that surveys world developments in ballistic-missile technology and trends, including in North Korea, Iran, India and Pakistan.

The National Air and Space Intelligence Center, located at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, is the Pentagon's top provider of aerospace intelligence.

### Iran's Launches

The report repeats the intelligence community's long-standing assessment that Iran could develop and test an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting the U.S. by 2015.

It also recounts Iran's recent history of missile launches and modification of the Shahab-3 medium range missile that's capable of reaching Israel.

"Iran has ambitious ballistic and space-launch development programs and continues to attempt to increase the range, lethality and accuracy" of its missile force, it said.

Iranian military units "continue to train extensively in highly publicized exercises" that enable these forces to "hone wartime operational skills and evolve new tactics," the report said.

Iran also is fielding "increased numbers of theater ballistic missiles, improving its existing inventory and is developing the technical capability to produce an ICBM," it said.



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## North Korea

North Korea, the report said, recently unveiled the new, road-mobile Hwasong-13 ICBM and continues to develop the Taepo Dong-2 "which could reach the United States if developed as an ICBM."

The nation also maintains a large inventory of short-range missiles and is developing an intermediate-range weapon, said the report.

Both the Hwasong-13 and Taepo Dong-2 have maximum ranges of at least 5,500 kilometers (3,420 miles).

"Continued efforts to develop the TD-2 and the newly unveiled ICBM show the determination of North Korea to achieve long-range ballistic missile and space launch capabilities," the report said. "North Korea has exported ballistic missile systems and will probably continue to do so."

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-10/china-has-world-s-most-active-missile-programs-u-s-says.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Channel NewsAsia – Singapore

## North Korea Tested Rocket Engine: Think-Tank

*North Korea tested a rocket engine earlier this year in a potential bid to further develop its missile capability, a US think-tank said Thursday after reviewing new satellite images.*

Agence France-Presse (AFP)

July 11, 2013

SEOUL: North Korea tested a rocket engine earlier this year in a potential bid to further develop its missile capability, a US think-tank said Thursday after reviewing new satellite images.

Images of the Tongchang-ri rocket base in the country's northwest indicated the North conducted at least "one or more rocket engine tests" in late March or early April, the US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University said.

The site -- also known as Sohae Satellite launch station -- was the base for the communist state's successful rocket launch last December, after a failed attempt in April of the same year.

Pyongyang claims both were peaceful science projects aimed at putting its Unha satellite into orbit. The international community, which widely condemned the December launch, views them as disguised long-range ballistic missile tests banned under United Nations resolutions.

Nick Hansen, an expert on imagery analysis, said engine tests were "a key part" of efforts to develop long-range missiles.

He said the latest images showed activities including movements of fuel tanks around a launch pad and a seven-car train potentially carrying the engine, other equipment and technicians to the test site.

They also showed a new distinctive orange-coloured stain in the flame trench -- designed to protect a rocket from exhaust gases -- on the launch pad that is similar to those shown in previous rocket launches, he said.

"Rocket engine tests, while less visible, are also important in technology development," wrote Hansen on the institute's blog, 38 North.

"The recent engine test indicates that Pyongyang continues to move forward with its... long-range missile programmes despite continuing United Nations sanctions and China's public expression of displeasure with the North's efforts to further develop nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them," he wrote.

December's rocket launch prompted further tightening of UN sanctions on the impoverished but nuclear-armed state.

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Pyongyang responded by staging its third nuclear test in February -- a move that even irritated its sole major ally, China. The isolated North's economic prop made the rare move of joining other UN Security Council members in slapping more sanctions on the regime in March.

Angered by new sanctions and what it called Seoul's hostile policy, the North mounted a series of apocalyptic threats, including of nuclear attacks on Seoul and Washington, sharply raising tension on the peninsula.

In April, Pyongyang withdrew its workers from a joint industrial complex, citing military tensions.

The crisis subsided after Pyongyang changed tack and made a series of reconciliatory gestures towards Seoul and Washington in recent months, though initial talks held over the weekend to discuss reopening the industrial complex were fruitless.

<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/north-korea-tested-rocket/741546.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

## **Russia to Field 30 Times More Cruise Missiles by 2020**

July 5, 2013

MOSCOW, July 5 (RIA Novosti) – Russia will increase its number of cruise missiles by 30 times by the end of the current decade, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said Friday.

“We will boost the number of cruise missiles fivefold in the next three years and by 30 times by 2020,” Shoigu told reporters after a meeting of Russia’s Security Council.

Russia currently fields an undisclosed number of air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles.

The Russian Air Force said last year that it would accept into service in 2013 the new Raduga Kh-101 cruise missile, capable of delivering precision strikes with a conventional warhead at a long distance.

Shoigu's announcement could be seen as part of Russia’s response to the proposed European “missile shield,” which Moscow considers a threat to its nuclear deterrent.

[http://en.ria.ru/military\\_news/20130705/182076980/Russia-to-Field-30-Times-More-Cruise-Missiles-by-2020.html](http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20130705/182076980/Russia-to-Field-30-Times-More-Cruise-Missiles-by-2020.html)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

ITAR-TASS News Agency – Russia

## **Alexander Nevsky Submarine to Be Handed Over to Russian Navy Nov 15**

6 July 2013

ST. PETERSBURG, July 6 (Itar-Tass) - The strategic nuclear submarine Alexander Nevsky will be handed over to the Russian Navy on November 15, Sevmash shipyard Secretary-General Mikhail Budnichenko said.

Prior to that, the Project 995 Borei-class submarine will fire a Bulava ICBM in September, Budnichenko told ITAR-TASS at the 6th International Maritime Defence Show in St. Petersburg on Saturday, July 6.

“The submarine started its second trial run yesterday. It will then return to Severodvinsk for working operations. Practical work with a Bulava is scheduled tentatively for September. This will be followed by inboard works and examination of mechanisms. The naval flag will be hoisted on November 15,” Budnichenko said.

“The second serial Borei and the third in succession, Vladimir Monomakh, is finishing mooring trials. It has undergone a degaussing procedure. It will go for a trial run in the White Sea after Navy Day on July 29,” he said.

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The sea trials are to be completed on December 12 and the submarine will be handed over to the Navy on December 25-27.

“In July 2012, the fourth Borei-class submarine Knyaz Vladimir was laid down under updated Project 955A,” Budnichenko said.

The Alexander Nevsky’s sea trials will include manoeuvre tests, electromagnetic field measurements, torpedo tests and others. The tests will be crowned by the firing of a Bulava ICBM in July on command from Moscow to be transmitted by a new automatic combat missile launch control system.

If the launch is successful, the Alexander Nevsky will have to undergo an overhaul at Sevmash upon return, after which, just like with the Yuri Dolgoruky, the customer - the Navy Main Staff - will sign the acceptance certificate for the submarine.

“The Alexander Nevsky, a second serial craft, will join the Navy this year and will be followed by the Vladimir Monomakh, the Knyaz Vladimir and other submarines, which will join our Northern and Pacific Fleets,” presidential chief of staff Sergei Ivanov, who used to be a defence minister, said earlier.

He noted that Russia intends to build eight serial strategic submarines with new weapons by 2020. The Yuri Dolgoruky is the first in this series.

The Alexander Nevsky is the second Borei-class submarine. Its construction at the Sevmash shipyard began in 2004 and the submarine is a fourth generation strategic underwater missile cruiser.

The fourth generation Alexander Nevsky nuclear submarine ended a round of sea trials in the White Sea and returned to the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk in October 2012.

During the trials, the submarine’s systems were examined in different modes. “The assignments were fully completed,” Sevmash’s spokesperson Yekaterina Pilikina told Itar-Tass.

Previous sea trials had proved the submarine's excellent seaworthiness and manoeuvrability, Marat Abizhanov, who is in charge of the shipyard's military production, said.

“After the end of the sea trials, the Alexander Nevsky will move on to a new stage - state trials,” Pilikina said.

The Project 955 submarine is the first serial strategic rocket carrier of the Borei class. It is 170 metres long, 13.5 metres wide, maximum operating depth is 450 metres, and underwater speed is 29 knots.

The leading craft of the series, the Yuri Dolgoruky submarine, is ready to be transferred to the Navy.

Following the Alexander Nevsky, Sevmash laid down two other submarines of the same series - Vladimir Monomakh and Knyaz Vladimir.

Borei-class submarines are designed by the St. Petersburg-based Naval Design Bureau Rubin. Each submarine can be armed with 12 ICBMs with MIRVs. They will also have an escape capsule for all crewmembers. A Borei-class submarine is 170 metres long and 13.5 meters wide, it can sink to a depth of 450 metres and has a crew of 17 sailors.

The Borei claims to be a state-of-the-art submarine, featuring characteristics superior to any submarine currently in service, such as the ability to cruise silently and be less detectable to sonar. Advances include a compact and integrated hydrodynamically efficient hull for reduced broadband noise and the first ever use of pump-jet propulsion on a Russian nuclear submarine.

Borei class submarines are designed to serve as the basis of Russia's strategic nuclear capabilities for the decades to come.

<http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/798587.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)



RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

## **First 2 Russian Student Military R&D Units Begin Service**

9 July 2013

MOSCOW, July 9 (RIA Novosti) - Russia's first two military research units made up of science students have taken up their posts, a Moscow college chief said on Tuesday.

The units, made up of several dozen students from the Bauman Moscow State Technical University, and other technical colleges and universities, have been deployed in Moscow Region and the city of Voronezh, Bauman University's first deputy rector Boris Padalkin said.

Demand for such specialists is strong and the number of such units is likely to increase, Padalkin said.

The idea of military scientific research units was first proposed in March by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who suggested that initially the time spent by undergraduate students in defense R&D projects could count toward their mandatory one-year military service.

Last Thursday he said his ministry was starting a wide-ranging "head hunt" for young computer programmers to develop new software for the armed forces, and must spend more money on scientific units, which he extolled as "incubators for naval and aerospace enterprises."

Russia's defense industry has suffered a serious loss of skilled middle-age staff due to poor wages in the sector in the last two decades. In June, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who oversees the sector, said measures to stop the loss of workers in Russia's defense industry were starting to take effect.

"Grounds for optimism have appeared. The drain of staff from the sector has practically ceased," he told a meeting of the Military-Industrial Commission. "Now, almost a third of the defence sector workforce is under 35."

[http://en.rian.ru/military\\_news/20130709/182140762/First-2-Russian-Student-RD-Units-Begin-Service.html](http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130709/182140762/First-2-Russian-Student-RD-Units-Begin-Service.html)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

## **New Russian Air Defense System to Detect Missiles at Blastoff**

9 July 2013

MOSCOW, July 9 (RIA Novosti) – Russia's new aerospace defense system will ensure guaranteed detection of enemy ballistic and long-range cruise missiles at blastoff, a top military official said Tuesday.

General Staff chief Valery Gerasimov said the system would feature advanced information-gathering, data-processing and attack capabilities with an early-warning radar system to be deployed along the entire Russian border.

Other measures will include the modernization of existing surface-to-air missile systems and the provision of advanced S-400 and S-500 air defense systems, "capable of reliably protecting critical installations against air and missile attacks," he said.

That will significantly enhance the survivability of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, he added.

Priority in the organizational development of Russia's armed forces through 2020 will be given to the strategic nuclear forces and the aerospace defense system, Gerasimov said.

Russia's Strategic Missile Forces will continue to be equipped with advanced Yars ballistic missile systems featuring higher capabilities in overriding enemy missile defense systems, he said.



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In mid-June, Russia's prototype medium-range air defense system that should replace the S-300 was demonstrated to President Vladimir Putin. The Vityaz system, manufactured by the Almaz-Antei corporation, which will have a more advanced radar and a launcher with 16 missiles, compared with only four on the S-300, should enter service next year, Almaz-Antei chief designer Igor Ashurbeili previously told RIA Novosti.

The Vityaz will complement the Morfey, S-400 and S-500 air defense systems in Russia's future aerospace defense network to engage targets at ranges from five to 400 kilometers, and at altitudes from five meters to near outer space.

In late May, Russia's Aerospace Defense Forces conducted a series of snap drills that checked the combat readiness of aerospace defense units, air force units and air defenses in the Western Military District, as well as military transport and long-range aviation command. The exercises involved 8,700 people, 185 aircraft and 240 military vehicles.

[http://en.rian.ru/military\\_news/20130709/182147766/New-Russian-Air-Defense-System-to-Detect-Missiles-at-Blastoff.html](http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130709/182147766/New-Russian-Air-Defense-System-to-Detect-Missiles-at-Blastoff.html)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Russia Beyond the Headlines (RBTH) – Russia

## **U.S. Seaborne Missile Defense Endangers Russian Security - Expert**

July 12, 2013

Interfax

The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) stipulates reinforcing seaborne components, which will eventually develop into the backbone of the U.S. global missile defense network, consultant of the Russian Strategic Research Institute director, expert board member of the Russian presidential administration's interdepartmental working group for liaison with NATO in missile defense Vladimir Kozin said.

"The U.S. military command and political administration believe that missile defense deployment on the World Ocean will bring significant military-strategic advantages to the U.S. Armed Forces," Kozin wrote in his latest monograph, "U.S. Missile Defense Evolution and Russian Stance".

In the opinion of Kozin, seaborne missile defense units "may be assigned to prepositioning missions": either rapidly moved to conflict zones or prepositioned in the areas of anticipated conflicts."

According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, the U.S. Navy had 29 ships carrying Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (Aegis BMD) and various types of interceptor missiles, among them five Ticonderoga class cruisers (starting from CG-47) and 24 Arleigh Burke class destroyers (starting from DDG-51), as of April 2013.

Thirteen ships are stationed on the Atlantic coast and 16 at Pacific bases (the correlation was 11 to 18 in 2012), the monograph said.

The U.S. will have 43 cruisers and destroyers of the kind by 2022, when the EPAA plan is accomplished. Their number will continue to grow.

A long-term development program of the U.S. Navy (for the period from 2011 through 2041) says 84 ships will be equipped with Aegis BMD, including 22 cruisers and practically all (62) destroyers.

[http://rbth.ru/news/2013/07/12/us\\_seaborne\\_missile\\_defense\\_endangers\\_russian\\_security\\_-\\_expert\\_27999.html](http://rbth.ru/news/2013/07/12/us_seaborne_missile_defense_endangers_russian_security_-_expert_27999.html)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Independent – U.K.

## **Government to Annex Trident Base in Independent Scotland? Not Credible, Says No 10**

Issue No. 1065, 12 July 2013

United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL  
Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530



By Oliver Duggan  
Thursday, 11 July 2013

The Government has downplayed reports that it is considering controversial plans to annex its Trident nuclear base in Scotland amid a storm of protests from Scottish politicians.

According to reports, Ministry of Defence officials are exploring the idea of classifying the Faslane naval base on Gare Loch as a sovereign UK territory ahead of a potential 'yes' vote in the upcoming referendum on Scottish independence next year.

The Trident outpost, which houses Britain's fleet of Vanguard nuclear submarines, has been a political focal point for Scotland's 'yes' campaign, which has struggled to capitalise on initial, short-lived excitement surrounding the referendum.

As a result, the Scottish Independence Party (SNP) has pledged to expel nuclear weapons from the country should they secure independence, reportedly leaving the Coalition in the difficult position of choosing to relocate the base or co-opt the area into the new UK.

The latter would leave the military dock with the same status as similar bases in Cyprus, which have long been treated as sovereign territory.

Suggesting the creation of contingency plans for a Scottish vote to withdraw from the Union, a government source told *The Guardian*: "The sovereign base area is an option - it is an interesting idea because the costs of moving out of Faslane are eye-wateringly high."

However, Number 10 this morning said it was not "credible or sensible" to designate Faslane as sovereign UK territory in the event of Scottish independence. Downing Street later Tweeted: "This gov't has not commissioned contingency plans over Faslane. No such ideas have come to SoS [Secretary of State] or PM. They would not support them if they did."

The reversal follows a string of attacks from leading SNP figures. Speaking yesterday, Angus Robertson, leader of the party in Westminster, said: "This is an extraordinary attempt by Westminster to bully Scotland. Neither the people nor parliament of Scotland want nuclear weapons dumped here, and we are clear that Trident would have to be removed as quickly as possible."

"Only a yes vote next September will empower Scotland to get rid of Trident, and the money saved help build a fairer society and stronger economy."

Scotland's Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon added such a move could not go ahead without the agreement of the Scottish Government, which would be unlikely.

"This seems to me to be an outrageous attempt at bullying by the UK Government," Ms Sturgeon told BBC Radio's Good Morning Scotland programme. "I can't see how they could do that without the agreement of the Scottish Government and speaking for my party that is not an agreement that would be forthcoming."

She insisted it was a "preposterous threat from the UK Government" and added: "I think it would be far better for the UK Government, rather than issuing threats via the media, if they were to sit down round a table with us now and have a sensible, grown up discussion about what we need to do to get rid of Trident in the event of a Yes vote."

Ms Sturgeon continued: "Politicians, often and sometimes justifiably, get criticised for a lack of principle - getting rid of Trident is an issue of principle, certainly for the party and government that I represent."

"It's not a bargaining chip. Trident nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction that we're supposedly trying to get rid of from the rest of the world, are not right, they're immoral, they don't serve any useful purpose, they take up obscene amounts of money that would be better spent on conventional forces, on social and public services."

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/government-to-annex-trident-base-in-independent-scotland-not-credible-says-no-10-8701485.html>



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[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The London Guardian – U.K.

## **Trident Alternatives Review to be Published Despite MoD Opposition**

*Ministry of Defence resisted release of any material that might be used against its ambition to upgrade nuclear system*

By Richard Norton-Taylor

Thursday, 11 July 2013

In the face of fierce opposition from the Ministry of Defence, next week the government will publish a long-promised document on alternatives to the Trident nuclear missile system in a move that will set the terms for an intense debate about Britain's military and diplomatic status.

MoD resistance to the release of any material that might be used against its ambition to upgrade the existing Trident system at a cost of tens of billions of pounds provoked a bitter dispute in Whitehall, the Guardian has learned. One well placed source described the row as "pretty bloody".

So serious was the dispute that David Cameron told the cabinet secretary, Sir Jeremy Heywood, to bang heads together to reach an agreement on what information should be released and what should remain classified.

The result will be revealed in the Trident alternatives review, a key plank in the 2010 coalition agreement, due to be released on Tuesday, two days before the Commons rises before its long summer recess.

The review was triggered by the belief within the Liberal Democrat leadership that a like-for-like replacement of Trident based on continuous deployment of up to 40 nuclear warheads ready to fire, underpinned by a requirement to flatten Moscow, was no longer needed. A smaller, cheaper system that reflected contemporary strategic threats and economic realities was more appropriate, it argued.

Lib Dem leaders are understood to have abandoned initial proposals to place nuclear warheads on cruise missiles in submarines, on planes or on missiles based in silos on land. These options are widely regarded as too expensive, unreliable and ineffective.

Instead, the document to be published next week will focus on how to slim down a system based on some new Trident submarines whose design has already been paid for, equipped with missiles supplied at cut-price by the US.

This could be achieved by reducing the number of submarines and missiles but, crucially, by abandoning Britain's posture of continuous at sea deterrent, known as CASD. There is an increasingly widespread view in parliament, and among independent defence experts, that CASD is no longer viable and may never have been so, even during the cold war.

This year Sir Nick Harvey, a Lib Dem MP and former defence minister, described plans to spend billions of pounds on a like-for-like replacement of Trident as based on "outdated and ludicrous" ideas about deterrence.

Harvey, whose job overseeing the Trident review was taken over by Danny Alexander, the Treasury chief secretary, last year, strongly questions the need for CASD. "A great national debate, with the focus on likely alternative postures, not alternative systems, is needed," he told the Guardian on Thursday.

Lord Des Browne, Labour's defence secretary when the Blair government decided to replace the existing Trident system – and had to depend on Conservative support in the subsequent Commons vote – in 2007, has made it clear he believes a CASD posture is no longer needed.

"Important things have changed and it is time for a more honest debate about the defence choices facing the country," he wrote in the Daily Telegraph in February. "Nuclear deterrence is decreasingly effective [and] increasingly risky," he said.

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Alternatives to replacing Trident with a like-for-like system include cutting the number of submarines from four to two, having a "reduced readiness" posture, maintaining a "virtual" nuclear capacity – that is, maintain the know-how but not a permanently available weapons system – or running down Trident towards complete nuclear disarmament.

Opponents of CASD say other nuclear powers, including Russia and China, do not always maintain a nuclear weapons submarine at sea. Supporters, notably the defence secretary, Philip Hammond, and senior navy chiefs, do not dispute that four new submarines in like-for-like Trident replacement would cost at least £20bn, would account for around 35% of the total defence equipment budget by 2021/22, and could cost £80bn-£100bn over their lifespan.

However, they say this would amount to a relatively small proportion of the overall defence budget over this period. Some senior military officers, particularly in the army, privately question the relevance of nuclear weapons and say the money should be spent on conventional equipment and weapons.

The Labour leader, Ed Miliband, is said to be in no hurry to make a decision on Trident but is more sympathetic to an alternative nuclear weapons posture than his frontbench defence team, which is regarded as hawkish on the issue.

Some MPs say there is a real prospect of a common Lab-Lib position, or at least "common language", by the time of the 2015 general election. The first political test will be the Lib Dem conference in Glasgow in September where the party grassroots are expected to call for a far more radical attack on the Trident project than the leadership is prepared for.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk-news/2013/jul/11/trident-alternatives-review-ministry-defence>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

RT (Russia Today) – Russia

## **US ABM Test Failure Mars \$1bn N. Korea Defense Plan**

July 06, 2013

A \$214-million test launch of the only US defense against long-range ballistic missile attacks failed to hit its target over the Pacific Ocean, according to the Missile Defense Agency. There have been no successful interceptor tests since 2008.

In Friday's test, a ground-based interceptor missile was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and was expected to hit its target – a missile launched 4,000 miles away from the Kwajalein Atoll.

It's the third consecutive failure involving the interceptor system managed by Boeing Co.

The military has tested the so-called ground-based midcourse defense system sixteen times. It has succeeded eight times, with the last intercept in December 2008.

The recent failure comes several months after the Pentagon announced plans to spend \$1 billion to add 14 new interceptors along the West Coast in response to threats from North Korea.

The US currently has 26 interceptors deployed at Fort Greely in Alaska and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base, northwest of Santa Barbara, in California. Earlier this year the Obama administration said the number of ground-based interceptors would reach 44 by 2017.

*"An intercept was not achieved,"* the Defense Department said in a statement, adding that program officials will conduct an *"extensive review"* to determine the cause of *"any anomalies which may have prevented a successful intercept"*.

<http://rt.com/usa/us-missile-interceptor-fails-737/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Defense News

## **Lawmakers Want Answers from Pentagon Over Missile Test Failure**

**Issue No. 1065, 12 July 2013**

United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL  
Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530



July 10, 2013

By JOHN T. BENNETT

WASHINGTON — Congress wants answers from the Pentagon about a failed missile interceptor test, and several prominent senators say it should slow efforts to build an East Coast shield.

The Defense Department announced on Friday that a missile interceptor failed to hit a target over the Pacific Ocean, the latest setback for a pricey program that has not had a successful test since George W. Bush occupied the White House.

The missile interceptor was supposed to launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and shoot down a ballistic missile launched from a site in the Marshall Islands. It did not, however, and was the latest in a string of failures going back to 2008.

Lawmakers with oversight of the US missile defense program say Pentagon officials owe them some answers.

"I read the story, and I'm looking forward to getting a briefing. I haven't drawn any conclusions yet," Sen. Mark Udall, D-Colo., chairman of the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, said during a brief interview on Wednesday.

"I don't think I should until I hear what the Pentagon has to say," said Udall, whose subcommittee has legislative jurisdiction over the missile defense program's plans, schedule and budget.

One senior lawmaker with even more power than Udall to impose restrictions on the missile defense program said the failure gives him new worries about America's ability to shoot down an adversary's missile.

"I've got plenty of concerns about the whole program," said Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., chairman of the full Armed Services Committee.

Levin has yet to be briefed by Pentagon officials on the failed test launch.

"But I've asked for one," he told Defense News.

New concerns were not limited to Democratic members, however.

"It has to be reviewed," said Senate Armed Services Committee member Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. "Obviously, that's a very expensive failure."

Some key defense-focused lawmakers, however, told Defense News the underlying missile interceptor technology is sound, adding existing interceptors like the Capability Enhancement-II (CE-II) should do the job.

"I don't think we need to put the brakes on anything," said House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash. "We need a missile defense system. Rogue actors, from North Korea to Iran, are developing missiles. We need to improve our missile technology.

"We need to figure out what went wrong and fix it," Smith said.

Asked if he has confidence the Missile Defense Agency and its private-sector contractors have the expertise to "fix it" given the spate of failed tests since 2008, Smith was confident.

"Absolutely I think they can fix it," he said. "Just look at the success they've had with Iron Dome in Israel. Missile defense technology has improved dramatically."

SASC Ranking Member Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla., said the US missile defense technology is sound — despite the run of failed test intercepts.

"I believe we should be entering into more tests," Inhofe said. "The CE-II [interceptor] is going to be what we have to rely on."

Lawmakers said they intend to press the Pentagon for details of what went wrong last week.



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“We have to get certain benchmarks,” McCain said, “and we have to review what remedial steps have to be taken.”

While Smith was bullish about the missile-defense program, he told Defense News that Congress and the Pentagon “need to re-look at our options and figure out what the best ones are.”

The Pentagon has around 30 interceptors on the West Coast, and intends to build 14 more in Alaska and California. Collectively, the price tag for erecting and operating those is in the tens of billions of dollars.

And GOP lawmakers in both chambers are fighting hard to secure legislative language that would require the Pentagon to build a missile shield on the East Coast.

“We’re going to study the East Coast,” Udall said. “But we need to finish the West Coast, I think.”

McCain did not rule out slowing efforts to erect the East Coast site.

“It’s too early to tell because we haven’t determined the reason for the failure,” he said on Wednesday.

“I think the East Coast proposal should not proceed until a number of other things have happened,” Levin said.

“Number one, until there’s a requirement for it; and number two, until there’s an environmental assessment, which has not yet been made but is required by law.

“So there’s a lot of other reasons to have that proposal meet certain standards before we go ahead with it,” Levin said. “This [failure] is just ... on top of all that.”

<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130710/DEFREG02/307100019/Lawmakers-Want-Answers-from-Pentagon-Over-Missile-Test-Failure>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Albuquerque Journal - Albuquerque, NM

## **House Rejects Effort to Trim \$23.7M in Funding for B61**

By Michael Coleman, Journal Washington Bureau

Thursday, July 11, 2013

WASHINGTON – The U.S. House on Wednesday rejected an attempt to scale back spending on B61 bombs maintained at Sandia and Los Alamos national laboratories, setting up a possible spending showdown with the U.S. Senate.

Rep. Mike Quigley, D-Ill., introduced an amendment late Tuesday that would have cut \$23.7 million from the proposed \$551 million B61 Life Extension Program in the House Energy and Water Appropriations budget. The measure was defeated 227-196 on Wednesday, with all three of New Mexico’s U.S. House members voting against the spending cut.

In a floor speech, Quigley said the program is too expensive.

“At a time when we are slashing funds for disease research at the NIH, failing to fund our crumbling infrastructure, and underinvesting in our children’s education, we are increasing funding to keep hundreds of nuclear bombs in operation that we will never use,” Quigley said. “The Cold War is over.”

The versatile B61 bomb is carried aboard Air Force planes for a variety of missions. Its most noteworthy role is its presence in a stockpile based in Europe as part of NATO’s strategic counter to Russian nuclear and conventional forces. Officials say the bombs, built in the 1960s and ’70s, need refurbishment to extend their useful life. The B61 life-extension work is one of the largest programs for the Sandia and Los Alamos labs.

Rep. Doug Lamborn, R-Colo., said the B61 program deserved the full \$551 million House budget request, especially because the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia requires reductions in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. “The B61 weapons are 30 or more years old, they are degrading and they are not as secure as they used to be,” Lamborn said, adding that cutting the \$23.7 million as Quigley proposed “would be harmful to our national security.”

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Meanwhile, 31 other Republicans voted for the spending cut in Quigley's amendment.

Last month, the Senate Appropriations Committee slashed funding for the B61, approving \$369 million for the work at Sandia and Los Alamos National laboratories and elsewhere, but left open the possibility that the program could draw an extra \$168 million if the project proves to be on time and on budget.

Sen. Tom Udall, a New Mexico Democrat who sits on the Senate Appropriations Committee, pressed for the additional \$168 million, which was suggested in President Barack Obama's budget request, and threatened to vote against the entire energy and water appropriations bill if it was not included.

Under the Senate bill, the additional \$168 million will be contingent on B61 project managers meeting certain cost and schedule requirements. Under the Senate bill, that money could not be released unless the secretaries of energy and defense certify that the benchmarks have been met.

The full Senate has not voted on its energy and water appropriations budget yet.

Rep. Ben Ray Lujan, D-N.M., said he supported the full \$551 million for the B61 Life Extension Program because it is a national security priority.

"This funding is important for Los Alamos and Sandia labs' effort to ensure the safety of the nuclear weapons stockpile, and cuts to that funding impact the ability to keep it secure," Lujan said.

<http://www.abqjournal.com/main/219749/news/house-rejects-effort-to-trim-237m-in-funding-for-b61.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Jerusalem Post – Israel

## **Snowden: US, Israel Created Virus to Destroy Iran Nukes**

*Whistleblower says that Israel and US co-wrote 'Stuxnet' virus.*

By JTA

9 July 2013

Whistleblower Edward Snowden told a German magazine that Israel and the United States created the Stuxnet computer virus that destroyed nuclear centrifuges in Iran.

Snowden made the statement as part of an interview with the German news magazine *Der Spiegel* in which he answered encrypted questions sent by security software developer Jacob Appelbaum and documentary filmmaker Laura Poitras. Excerpts of the interview were published Monday on the *Spiegel* website.

Snowden was asked if the US National Security Agency partners "with other nations, like Israel?" He responded that the NSA has a "massive body" responsible for such partnerships called the Foreign Affairs Directorate.

He also was asked, "Did the NSA help to create Stuxnet?" Snowden responded, "NSA and Israel co-wrote it."

Stuxnet in 2010 wrought havoc on equipment at Iran's Natanz nuclear plant and complicated the manufacture of highly enriched uranium, which the West suspects is intended for making atomic weapons. The virus temporarily disabled 1,000 centrifuges being used by the Iranians to enrich uranium.

Snowden, a former technical contractor for the NSA and employee of the CIA, last month revealed the existence of mass surveillance programs by the United States and Britain against their own citizens and citizens of other countries.

He said Germany and most other Western nations are "in bed together" with the NSA.

Snowden said a private citizen would be targeted by the NSA based on Facebook or webmail content.

"The only one I personally know of that might get you hit untargeted are jihadi forums," he said.

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Snowden is a fugitive of the United States who is believed to be in Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport. Three Latin American countries — Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia — have offered him asylum, NBC reported.

<http://www.jpost.com/International/Snowden-US-Israel-created-virus-to-destroy-Iran-nukes-319226>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Russia Beyond the Headlines (RBTH) – Russia

## **Better Late than Never: Russia to get Cyber Troops**

July 11, 2013

By Anastasia Petrova, *Vzglyad*

Russia's Armed Forces will get a new service branch responsible for information security by the end of this year. Officers serving in the branch will be required to have a linguistic background. The news doesn't come out of nowhere, while just a week ago president Vladimir Putin said that the 'firepower' of information attacks could be higher than that of conventional weapons.

*"We have to be prepared to counter threats in cyberspace effectively – to improve the level of protection of the relevant infrastructure, above all information systems of strategic and mission-critical facilities,"* the head of state told a Security Council meeting dedicated to improving Russia's military organisation through 2020.

Putin reminded his audience that so-called 'information attacks' were already being used to achieve military and political goals, and noted that their 'firepower' could be higher than that of conventional weapons.

A source at the Ministry of Defence told RIA Novosti that a service branch responsible for the nation's information security would be added to the Russian Army as soon as this year.

He said the new service's key tasks would include monitoring and processing information coming from the outside, as well as countering cyber threats, *"in other words, something along the lines of the United States Army Cyber Command."*

Officers preparing to serve in this branch will require linguistic training, that is, they will have to learn a foreign language, primarily English.

This matter was first brought up for broad discussion last spring, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin announced at the time. Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu asked several General Staff divisions last February to complete the development of a cyber command.

Aleksandr Sharavin, Director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis and member of the Academy of Military Sciences, claims that the Ministry of Defence received proposals on creating such a command ten years ago.

*"We had a rather heated discussion about it back then, and as far as I know, we should get this command very soon. Protecting our cyber networks is not only a task for our Armed Forces; it's a task for the entire state, for our security services. A cyber war is already on, so such commands are tasked not only with protecting, but also with delivering counter strikes if needed,"* the expert told RIA Novosti, adding that Russia could outstrip its rivals in this area by listening to experts, because it was an urgent task *"yesterday and the day before yesterday"*.

*"A concept for using cyber weapons was developed six or seven years ago. Today, this sort of weapon is second in importance only to nuclear arms,"* Anatoly Tsyganok, Director of the Center for Military Forecasting and lecturer at Moscow State University's Global Policy Department, told *Vzglyad*.

*"Cyber weapons are widely used in military conflicts, most recently during the US intervention in Libya, where they controlled not only airspace [...], but also telecommunication networks. They were hacking into Libyan TV networks to broadcast programmes for the local population."*

According to Tsyganok, Israel leads the way in this area, having implemented advanced digital technology in 2005. *"The American protection ranks second, followed by Western Europe's,"* he said.



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During the same week, Shoigu asked his associates to locate the students of one St Petersburg university that won a global computer programming championship for the fifth time.

*"I heard on the TV today that students at a St Petersburg university won the global computer programming championship for the fifth time. We have to find them. We have to work with these guys somehow, because we need them badly,"* the minister said at a meeting on Thursday with university rectors and the public on the subject of science units in the Army.

*First published in Russian by Vzglyad*

[http://rbth.asia/news/2013/07/11/better\\_late\\_than\\_never\\_russia\\_to\\_get\\_cyber\\_troops\\_47891.html](http://rbth.asia/news/2013/07/11/better_late_than_never_russia_to_get_cyber_troops_47891.html)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Japan Times – Japan  
OPINION/ Commentary

## **Deterring an Asia Nuke Race**

By Michael Richardson  
July 8, 2013

SINGAPORE – How many nuclear weapons and delivery systems does a country need as an effective deterrent against the threats of attack? Finding an acceptable balance is critically important in Asia, where four of the world's nine nuclear-armed states are located.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported in June that all four Asian nations with nuclear weapons — China, India, Pakistan and North Korea — appeared to be expanding their arsenals while the United States, Russia, France, Britain and Israel were either reducing them or holding the number static.

Asia may be sliding into a nuclear arms race, aggravated by underlying tensions and mistrust. As one nuclear weapons state enlarges its arsenal, other regional atomic powers do the same. SIPRI estimated that China, India and Pakistan had each added about 10 warheads to their operational stockpiles in 2012.

Meanwhile, as the SIPRI report noted, each is improving delivery systems: the ballistic or cruise missiles or bomber aircraft that could carry nuclear warheads.

Without mutual restraint in Asia, other regional countries with civilian nuclear reactor experience and the necessary resources and skills could also decide to protect themselves by developing their own nuclear arms. Such potential "threshold" countries include South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam.

Former U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn, a driving force for a nuclear threat reduction group of security specialists and former senior officials from 18 countries, cautions that when "a large and growing number of nuclear-armed adversaries confront multiple perceived threats, the risk that deterrence will fail and that nuclear weapons will be used rises dramatically."

Another prominent member of the group, former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, says that there is only a short time left to pull back from the edge of a nuclear precipice. "Asia is an important backdrop for this discussion, as a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens regional stability and could spark a new wave of proliferation," he warns.

Their comments follow a recent call by U.S. President Barack Obama for America and Russia to open new arms control talks to further cut their deployed long-range nuclear arms by as much as one-third.

The last bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed by Moscow and Washington in 2010, requires each nation by 2018 to cap its stockpile of fielded nuclear warheads at 1,550. So under Obama's proposal, a new ceiling could become approximately 1,000 deployed strategic warheads apiece.

Under the current START pact, the two former Cold War adversaries also agreed to limit fielded nuclear delivery vehicles, including bombers and missiles based on land and at sea, to 700, with an additional 100 allowed in reserve.

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But the START deal does not cover all nuclear warheads or delivery systems, only those classed as long range. Nor does it encompass all nuclear armed states, although at least 90 per cent of atomic arms belong to the U.S. and Russia.

The SIPRI report estimates that at the start of 2013, eight of the nine nuclear armed nations had approximately 4,400 operational atomic weapons, with nearly 2,000 “in a state of high operational alert.”

North Korea was assessed to have perhaps six or eight nuclear bombs, none of them operational. This evidently means they cannot yet be made small enough to be carried by North Korean missiles or bombers.

SIPRI said that if all the nuclear warheads held by the nine nations with atomic weapons were counted, the total would amount to approximately 17,270 nuclear weapons, with a variety of short-, medium- as well as long-range delivery systems. The total warhead count includes spares, those in both active and inactive storage, and intact warheads set to be dismantled, as well as operational warheads.

Obama also called for the reduction of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons in Europe. These have never been officially counted or limited by any international treaty.

One reason Russia gives for being reluctant to negotiate further bilateral nuclear cuts with the U.S. is that some other nuclear-armed countries are strengthening their warhead and missile capabilities. This is an evident reference to China among others, even though Moscow and Beijing have formed a “strategic partnership” to oppose U.S. and Western domination.

China’s position is that the U.S. and Russia have the overwhelming majority of strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems, meaning those capable of traveling intercontinental distances and causing massive destruction. So Washington and Moscow should continue to make “drastic” cuts in their stockpiles in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

Cheng Jingye, China’s top envoy to a U.N. nuclear nonproliferation conference, said last year that once this was done, “other nuclear-weapon states, when conditions are ripe, should also join the multinational negotiations on nuclear disarmament.”

But when might that be?

One of the concerns of U.S. critics of Obama’s latest proposals is that China could use any extended new round of START negotiations that involve only America and Russia to enlarge and modernize its own nuclear arsenal in secret. Some U.S. analysts say that this is already happening.

The critics argue that if the size of the U.S. and Russian arsenals keep dropping, China might be able to achieve numerical parity, or near-parity, quite quickly with the today’s two dominant nuclear powers.

Nonnuclear Asian states, such as South Korea and Japan, look to their ally, the U.S., to protect them from nuclear attack under Washington’s extended deterrence policy. If U.S. nuclear strength and resolve appears to be weakening, they might become so alarmed at the heightened nuclear threats they face, whether from North Korea or China, that they would make their own dash for atomic arms.

Supporters of Obama’s proposals dismiss such concerns, saying that Beijing would not want to incur the heavy financial costs of moving beyond minimum credible deterrence and risk triggering a full-scale nuclear arms race in Asia that would threaten China’s own security.

SIPRI estimates that China has about 250 nuclear warheads, compared with 300 for France and 225 for Britain. It reckons that India has 90 to 110 atomic warheads, Pakistan has 100 to 120, and Israel 80.

These are well within minimum credible deterrence limits. Keeping them there will be the key to preventing a post-Cold War nuclear arms race in Asia.

*Michael Richardson is a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore.*

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/07/08/commentary/deterring-an-asia-nuke-race/#.Ud3i7IAo5Dx>



[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The News International – Pakistan  
OPINION/Commentary

## Ready Deterrence VS Recessed Deterrence

By Zia Siddiqui  
Monday, July 08, 2013

Nations develop nuclear capability for power, prestige, and security, etc. Great powers acquire nuclear weapons to enhance their stature in the international system, influence their adversaries to submit to their will, and to further their national interests. However, relatively smaller nations acquire nuclear capability for the sole purpose of security and safeguarding their vital national interests. On the regional setting, India claims to have acquired nuclear weapons capability as a counter to China's growing military prowess, but always projected its military power towards Pakistan and not China. Though India has active territorial disputes with China and occasionally experiences cross infiltration in the disputed areas yet India's doctrinal developments as well as employment strategies remain directed towards Pakistan.

Pakistan, on the other hand, developed its nuclear capability exclusively to safeguard its territorial integrity and sovereignty and ensure its security and survival against extreme aggressions, primarily from India. Pakistan fully understands that nuclear weapons are extremely dangerous tools against humanity and are only meant to deter the adversary from any misadventure. However, India continues to harp upon the mantra of space for a limited war even under the nuclear overhang. India's Cold Start doctrine developed after Kargil and twin peak crisis of 2001-02, which India plans to operationalise as proactive operations, is based on the premise that Pakistan must be taught a lesson for its alleged support to Non State Actors (NSAs) acts of terrorism inside the Indian territory, including its areas of control in Jammu & Kashmir.

Pakistan, on the other hand, on multiple occasions and multiple tracks tried to convince India that there is no space for war between the two nuclear neighbours, no matter how tense the relations are, and all disputes including that of Jammu & Kashmir needs to be resolved through dialogue, either bilaterally or through the active participation of international players, and organisations. India's doctrinal developments aimed at pushing Pakistan against the wall, particularly in an environment of ever-increasing conventional asymmetry and economic disparity, somehow compelled Pakistan to develop Low Yield Weapons (LYWs) to plug the gap in respective capabilities.

India not realising the gravity of the situation has further intensified its rhetoric of nuclear response through massive retaliation against Pakistan if it uses its LYWs. The question is that why does India fear a situation that Pakistan would use LYWs against its forces, when Pakistan is consistently advocating no space for war and need of peaceful settlement of all the disputes including Jammu & Kashmir. It is evident from India's call of massive retaliation (a US doctrine during early days of Cold War when US had a monopoly over nuclear weapons), that India has contingency plans ready to launch proactive offensive operations in case of NSAs acts of terrorism (Mumbai-like), without actually confirming the sources of perpetrators.

India appears to be spring-loaded to retaliatory response to any such situation in future as it remains dissatisfied with Pakistan's actions against the alleged supporters of those heinous crimes, which have been condemned ever since at all levels in Pakistan. The situation appears to be extremely complex and uncertain; because Pakistan wants to move on and improve its relationship with India in the entire spectrum of international relations, whereas India not only threatens Pakistan of massive nuclear retaliation if Pakistan contemplates using LYWs against the invading forces.

Under the given circumstances, one wonders if Pakistan can continue to adhere to Jasjit Singh's theory of 'Recessed Deterrence', to which George Perkovich had referred to as 'Non-weaponised Deterrence'. In fact the deterrence of this type in which only the plans, procedures and organizations were put in place, are the concepts of the past and have outlived their utility for South Asian nuclear powers which have overcome these aspects successfully. Such concepts prohibited mating of nuclear weapons with delivery vehicles and meant a very low level of readiness. These concepts



worked well in the initial days of nuclearisation of South Asia and only until the Indians understood that there is no space for a conventional military conflict with Pakistan due to transformed environment.

It is time that Pakistan unveils its nuclear doctrine in specific terms. While remaining within the ambit of Minimum Credible Deterrence, Pakistan should adopt a more comprehensive and a clearer policy based on the concept of 'Ready Deterrence' instead of 'Recessed Deterrence'. This would help communicate India in clear terms that space for war between nuclear adversaries does not exist because of the cost associated with military offensive of any kind and scale violating Pakistan's red line of territorial integrity, would so high that none would gain anything out of the conflict. Once the nuclear policy is announced in unambiguous terms, which is primarily to deny space for war to India, and for the survival of relatively smaller state, I am certain that international community would also convince India to look for other options of negotiated settlement of all disputes instead of adopting an offensive approach.

While it is easy to coin terms like 'Ready Deterrence', one is cognizant of the fact that it has its own implications and therefore it is urged that intelligentsia initiates a debate on this issue with a view that should Pakistan leave a space for war to India even after having acquired the ultimate weapons of peace and continue to prepare for a war which may spread either vertically and horizontally without provocation or intent? How long can Pakistan remain reactive to India's developing doctrines and strategies that keep coming from its military and civilian think tanks?

The opaqueness of our nuclear policy has served us well for over two decades, but now that India has adopted a threatening approach only after seeing the development of LYWs by Pakistan, a policy with clear message may be more helpful in making the adversary understand the consequences of its threats instead of keeping it close to our chest and in the bargain look for the re-establishment of deterrence after it has failed in its purpose. However, this aspect must be debated vigorously at all levels before taking any official position.

<http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-6-188427-Ready-deterrence-vs-Recessed-deterrence>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Moscow Times – Russia  
OPINION/Commentary

## Why the Defense Industry Is Always Sinking

08 July 2013 | Issue 5164

By Alexander Golts

Even the most talented playwright couldn't have written this scenario. Take, for example, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who apparently hoped to set an example of transparency and openness. Not only was he one of the first to fulfill President Vladimir Putin's order last year to develop a plan for modernizing the armed forces, but he even posted portions of his modernization plan on his website.

The section devoted to upgrading the army was particularly interesting. Rather than spell out what quantities of which weapons would be delivered each year, the plan offered only one strange figure: the percentage of new equipment for each type of weapon. Of course, this number should increase from year to year. But it is almost impossible to ascertain exactly how many weapons must be delivered, making it easy to conceal future failures and shortfalls. But Valery Gerasimov, head of the General Staff, clarified that to fulfill the plan, Russia had to produce 70 to 100 aircraft, more than 120 helicopters, eight or nine submarines and up to 600 armored vehicles by 2020.

Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who oversees the defense industry, has been quick to explain how that industry would be able to carry out such an over-ambitious plan, basing his optimism on past production growth in the defense sector. At the same time, he did not indicate whether that growth had been maintained during the current economic stagnation and whether it applied to the actual production of aircraft, helicopters and tanks. The growth figures could be misleading if they are based only mainly on the increase in end costs, as Finance Minister Anton Siluanov has suggested. What's more, Deputy Economic Development Minister Andrei Klepach sounded somewhat out of place



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when he said, "If you realistically analyze the financial condition of almost all leading Russian defense companies, you see that they are either close to bankruptcy or not far from it."

To deflect attention away from production shortfalls, Rogozin has focused on the country's supposed vulnerability to a U.S. attack. According to Rogozin, the U.S. Prompt Global Strike program — which, if realized, is supposed to place conventional warheads on high-precision strategic delivery vehicles — will be able to destroy up to 90 percent of Russia's nuclear forces. This is complete nonsense. Moreover, Rogozin also argues that this attack could be delivered in an hour's time by the 4,000 or so strategic delivery vehicles that the United States possesses. But in reality, the U.S. has only about 1/4 of this number.

This begs the question: Why try to fulfill the modernization plan if the U.S., through its Prompt Global Strike and missile defense capabilities, can supposedly nullify any advantage gained from Russia's latest technologies?

Rogozin all but admitted this when he said last week at a conference devoted to Putin's presidential campaign article titled "Be Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia" published in early 2012: "The Russian economy is 10 times smaller than the U.S. economy. Moreover, Russia's scientific potential was practically destroyed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving it decades behind leading Western countries in a number of critical core technologies."

No sooner had Rogozin uttered these words than the Proton-M rocket launched from Baikonur exploded last week only seconds into its flight. The situation has become so bad with Russia's space program that these kind of human disasters are becoming the norm, while successful launches are the exception. And failed rocket launches are only the tip of the iceberg. Incompetence, corruption, substandard construction and inefficiency permeate the entire defense industry. In short, Russia is suffering a systemic crisis in defense technology and production. It cannot produce any complex product, whether it be ships, aircraft, reactors, turbines or engines. The main reason is that the state has not been able to make the industry function under market conditions. Instead, it corralled hundreds of separate companies into state corporations, which have become enormous, unwieldy behemoths.

When the Proton-M rocket exploded, the Vesti 24 television reporter covering the event live made the understatement, "Something seems to have gone wrong." Those words will undoubtedly go down in history alongside Putin's infamous quip in 2000, "It sank," when he answered U.S. talk show host Larry King's question, "What happened to the Kursk submarine?" But something always seems to be sinking or otherwise going wrong in the country's defense industry.

*Alexander Golts is deputy editor of the online newspaper Yezhednevny Zhurnal.*

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/why-the-defense-industry-is-always-sinking/482871.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Brookings Institution

OPINION

July 8, 2013

## **Obama's Key Nuclear Deal with Russia**

By Michael E. O'Hanlon and Steven Pifer

President Barack Obama recently unveiled in Berlin a new proposal to have the United States and Russia reduce their long-range deployed nuclear weapons by roughly one-third, relative to levels under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).

Arms control skeptics swiftly attacked his plan. They asserted that reducing deployed U.S and Russian strategic warheads to about 1,000 each would risk U.S. and allied security — especially when other countries are now modernizing their nuclear forces. They also claim that Russia will not take up the offer.

These critics, however, fail to make a persuasive case that Obama's proposed cuts go too far. In fact, 1,000 deployed strategic warheads is a solid proposal. The case is compelling:

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First, this strategic nuclear force allows Washington to retain a robust, reliable and even redundant nuclear deterrent. It is hard to imagine, even in the most Strangelovian war fighting scenario, that more than tens of nuclear warheads would ever wisely be employed against an adversary.

Second, what drives Russia and the United States to keep thousands of nuclear warheads are Cold War-legacy war plans based on destroying each other's nuclear forces. These plans are entirely unrealistic — since neither side could disarm the other. They also have a circular logic: The more weapons each side possesses, the greater the case for the other to retain excess capacity. This is exactly the dynamic in which negotiated mutual cuts make sense.

Third, while Russia may not like additional cuts, given its diminished conventional military forces, long land borders and shrinking population, there is no reason to give up on the negotiability of the idea in advance. The Russians often say “no, no, no” — until they say “yes.”

Moscow may also wish to save the money required to stay at New START levels as its Soviet-era systems age and require replacement. It is at least worth testing the waters. Even with Obama's proposed cutbacks, the United States and Russia would remain at least an order of magnitude ahead of everyone else in the size and capabilities of their nuclear forces.

Fourth, not incidentally, this accord could save Washington money too. We estimated in our book that it could save \$2 billion to \$3 billion a year — not enough to pay down the national debt, but real money nonetheless. These savings could also increase in subsequent years, if a new arms control deal meant Washington had to buy fewer missiles, bombers and submarines.

Fifth, critics complain that Obama wants to cut even as other countries are modernizing their nuclear forces. Nuclear powers are at different points in their modernization cycles. Consider, in a decade's time, the Pentagon will likely be building a new bomber and seeking to extend the life of its intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Sixth, some cite North Korea and Iran's recent actions to assert that Obama's earlier nuclear cuts have been counterproductive. But North Korea broke out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty during the George W. Bush administration, and Iran began its secret nuclear program during the Reagan administration. The point is not partisan; Bush and Reagan, in fact, also pursued nuclear cuts.

But the idea that the world's nuclear troubles can be linked to Obama's pursuit of lower levels of nuclear arms and, ultimately, a nuclear-free world — a goal he shares with Ronald Reagan — does not hold water. (Countries like the Soviet Union, China and Pakistan built up their nuclear programs at times in the past when we were expanding ours, too — so the linkages between U.S. nuclear weapons policy and nonproliferation are not so simple.)

In fact, the Bush and Obama administrations' success in convincing the world community to apply stronger sanctions against Iran and North Korea in response to their nuclear shenanigans was aided by the fact that both presidents could credibly argue they were trying to contain nuclear dangers by curbing the U.S. arsenal.

All that said, some arguments critical to Obama's proposal do merit attention by the administration. A future accord, for example, should ideally include capture of tactical and reserve strategic warheads too.

In addition, it would be desirable to ask medium nuclear powers to make politically binding promises not to expand their arsenals while Moscow and Washington are reducing theirs. And any further round of arms control beyond what is envisioned in this new Berlin proposal probably will need to be multilateral.

The Obama administration's new nuclear plans offer a pragmatic and sensible set of next steps for enhancing U.S. security — and curbing the most dangerous weapons ever invented by man.

*Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Steven Pifer is director of the Brookings Arms Control Initiative. They are co-authors of "The Opportunity: Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms."*

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/07/08-obama-key-nuclear-deal-russia-ohanlon-pifer>



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[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Huffington Post  
OPINION/Commentary

## Still Preparing for Nuclear War: The U.S. Government Continues the Policies of the Past

By Lawrence Wittner  
July 9, 2013

Nearly a quarter century after the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. government is still getting ready for nuclear war.

This fact was underscored on June 19, 2013, when the Pentagon, on behalf of President Barack Obama, released a report to Congress outlining what it called the U.S. government's "Nuclear Employment Strategy." Although the report indicated some minor alterations in U.S. policy, it exhibited far more continuity than change.

In 2010, the administration's Nuclear Posture Review declared that it would work toward making deterrence of nuclear attack the "sole purpose" of U.S. nuclear weapons. The 2013 report, however, without any explanation, reported that "we cannot adopt such a policy today." Thus, as in the past, the U.S. government considers itself free to initiate a nuclear attack on other nations.

In addition, the 2013 "Nuclear Employment Strategy" continued U.S. government reliance on a "nuclear triad" of ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, and bomber-launched nuclear weapons. Although the need for one or more legs of this "triad" has been debated since the early 1990s, the 2013 report concluded that "retaining all three triad legs will best maintain strategic stability."

The 2013 "Nuclear Employment Strategy" also retained another controversial aspect of U.S. nuclear policy: counterforce strategy. Designed to employ U.S. nuclear weapons to destroy an enemy nation's nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and associated installations, counterforce is potentially very destabilizing, for it provides an incentive to nations caught up in a crisis to knock out the opponent's nuclear weapons before they can be used. And this, in turn, means that nations are more likely to initiate nuclear war and to desire large numbers of nuclear weapons to avoid having their weapons totally destroyed by a preemptive attack. Consequently, as Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists has noted, the report's emphasis on counterforce "undercuts efforts to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons."

Furthermore, despite a growing desire among Western nations to have the U.S. government remove an estimated 200 nuclear-armed B61 gravity bombs -- weapons dating back to the 1960s -- deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, the Pentagon report made no proposal along these lines. These Cold War relics, too, remain untouchable.

One shift in emphasis indicated in the "Nuclear Employment Strategy" is a presidential directive to Pentagon officials to "reduce the role of 'launch under attack.'" Currently, it is U.S. policy to fire nuclear weapons at an opponent on short notice if there are signs that a nuclear strike is under way against the United States or its allies. But this reduction in the likelihood of sliding into a full-scale nuclear war would be more reassuring if the president's directive did not also command the Pentagon to retain a launch-under-attack capability, in case the president decided to use it.

But what about Obama's lofty rhetoric of April 2009, in Prague, where he stated that the U.S. government was committed to building a nuclear-weapons-free world? Also, didn't he renew that approach in his Berlin speech of June 19, 2013, only hours before the issuance of the Pentagon's "Nuclear Employment Strategy," when he called for nuclear disarmament negotiations with the Russians?

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Yes, the rhetoric of 2009 was very inspiring, landing Obama a Nobel Peace Prize and raising hopes around the world that the nuclear menace was on the verge of extinction. But fairly little came of it, with the modest exception of the New START Treaty with Russia.

The Berlin speech, too, was substantially overrated. Although many media reports implied that Obama had proposed decreasing the Russian and American nuclear arsenals by a third, the reality was that the president suggested his readiness to support a reduction of "up to" a third of *deployed* Russian and American *strategic* nuclear weapons. Under the New START Treaty, the limit to the number of these kinds of weapons in each nation is 1,550. Thus, in reality, Obama announced that he favored an agreement for each nation to eliminate 1 to 517 of them. From the standpoint of nuclear disarmers, that reduction would certainly be welcome -- if, in the face of Republican resistance, it is ever consummated. But, it should be noted that, at present, the U.S. government possesses approximately 7,700 nuclear weapons.

Another indication that the Obama administration is in no hurry to fulfill its promises about building a nuclear weapons-free world is found in its fiscal 2014 budget proposal to Congress. Here, amid sharp cuts for a broad variety of programs, there is a proposed 9 percent increase in federal funding for the Energy Department's U.S. nuclear weapons activities, including upgrading nuclear warheads (like the B61 gravity bomb, slated for a \$10 billion makeover) and modernizing nuclear weapons production facilities.

This administration unwillingness to discard the immensely dangerous, outdated nuclear policies of the past flies in the face of public support for abolishing nuclear weapons, whether expressed in public opinion polls or in the resolutions of mainstream bodies like the National Council of Churches and the U.S. Conference of Mayors. But, unless there is a substantial public mobilization to end the American government's reliance on nuclear war, it seems likely that U.S. officials will continue to prepare for it.

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[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/still-preparing-for-nuclear-war\\_b\\_3558851.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/still-preparing-for-nuclear-war_b_3558851.html)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Breaking Defense  
OPINION/Analysis

## **Glimpse Inside Air-Sea Battle: Nukes, Cyber At Its Heart**

By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.  
July 09, 2013

PENTAGON: In intellectual terms, Air-Sea Battle is the biggest of the military's big ideas for its post-Afghanistan future. But what is it, really? It's a constantly evolving concept for high-tech, high-intensity conflict that touches on everything from cyberwar to nuclear escalation to the rise of China. In practical terms, however, the beating heart of AirSea Battle is eleven overworked officers working in windowless Pentagon meeting rooms, and the issues they can't get to are at least as important as the ones they can.

"It's like being a start-up inside a great, big, rigid corporation," one Air-Sea Battle representative told me in an exclusive briefing last month. The Air-Sea Battle Office (ASBO) has just 17 staff: those eleven uniformed officers, drawn from all four services, plus six civilian contractors. None of them ranks higher than colonel or Navy captain. Even these personnel are technically "on loan," seconded from other organizations and paid for out of other budgets. But those 17 people sit at the hub of a sprawling network of formal liaisons and informal contacts across the four armed services and the joint combatant commands.

"Air-Sea Battle has left the building," said a second officer at the briefing. "We've reached the grass roots, and we're getting ideas from the grass roots."

**Issue No. 1065, 12 July 2013**

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So the good news is that the Air-Sea Battle Office isn't just another big Pentagon bureaucracy, let alone the anti-China cabal it's sometimes accused of being. Instead, in essence, it is an effort to develop compatible technologies and tactics across all four services for a new kind of conflict: not the Army and Marine-led land war against low-tech guerrillas we have seen since 9/11, but an Air Force and Navy-led campaign against "anti-access/area denial" forces that could fry our networks, jam GPS, and hit our planes, ships, bases, and even satellites with long-range missiles. China is the worst case scenario here, but not the only one.

The bad news is, precisely because ASBO is *not* a big bureaucracy, the smart, earnest, small staff of the "start-up" can only really focus on existing weapons and organizations. They are deluged by the near-term nitty gritty of getting existing organizations and weapons programs to work together in a future war. That leaves little time to explore potentially revolutionary new technologies not already embedded in the Pentagon's seven-year plan, the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). That also leaves them little time to think through the often scary strategic implications of how the next war will be waged.

In fact, the ASBO was very carefully set up *not* to handle war planning, strategy, or high-level policy. By design, it is only a collaboration between the four armed services – originally just the Air Force and Navy, but now joined by the Army and Marines. It is deliberately distinct from the Joint Staff and the joint combatant commands. "That's not to say we're divorced from the Joint Staff, [let alone] fighting against each other," said one officer, but "the benefit for the service chiefs is they can reach right down to us," without going through joint intermediaries.

That leaves the Air-Sea Battle Office to focus on the services' Title X responsibilities to "train, organize, and equip" the force, while leaving how, when, and why to use the force up to the joint world. "We're working on making sure that a rifle has interchangeable magazines and ammunition," another officer said, as an analogy. "We're not worried about how it's going to be used. Those policy decisions are not really what this office considers."

It's not that they're blind to those bigger issues. Originally, "when the concept was written, we put a boundary on it and we said, 'hey, we're not going to address nuclear weapons,'" said another officer. "Since then we've realized, 'hey, we *do* need to deal with nuclear operations.'"

Most military officers are as reluctant as the rest of us to contemplate nuclear war, and since the Berlin Wall came down, they've largely been able to ignore it as we fought relatively low-tech foes. But Air-Sea Battle is driven – though few will say so on the record – by threats from Iran, which may soon have the bomb, from North Korea, which has had it since 2006 and is working on fitting nuclear warheads into an ICBM, and from China, which has had nukes since 1964 and already has a sizable arsenal of nuclear missiles. Air-Sea Battle envisions a clean campaign of precision non-nuclear strikes, but, paradoxically, the more effective such conventional operations become, the more likely a hard-pressed adversary is to resort to nuclear weapons in response.

China, Iran, and the US itself are also all increasingly aggressive in cyberspace, a brave new war whose ramifications are as little understood today as nuclear radiation was in the early 1950s. Unlike nukes, cyber operations – both offensive and defensive – have been at the heart of Air-Sea Battle from the beginning, since it envisions future warfare as a clash not just between missiles, ships, and aircraft but between the computer networks linking them. Why shoot down planes or satellites one at a time when frying the enemy's network can neutralize all his hardware at once?

Even here, however, the Air-Sea Battle Office keeps its approach carefully and consciously constrained. Wargames have explored what kinds of cyber capabilities might be useful in what scenarios and how quickly military decision makers need to be able to react. But there remain huge unanswered questions about who has the legal authority to do what in a cyber conflict. ASBO makes recommendations, said one officer, but "who makes the decision, ultimately, to authorize the release [of a cyber weapon such as a virus] is not in this office's wheelhouse."

Nor has anyone worked out what counts as escalation or provocation in cyberspace. In the nuclear and espionage arenas of the Cold War, the equivalent questions took academics, strategists, and diplomats decades to work out. Cyber conflict is at least as complicated, but if anyone's working out the game theory, it isn't the Air-Sea Battle Office.

**Issue No. 1065, 12 July 2013**

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“We’re providing the capabilities for the combatant commanders so the president has options,” said one officer. “Escalation is a policy decision.”

### **Unrestricted Warfare**

What ASBO does deal with is scary enough. Air-Sea Battle is typically depicted as a doctrine for long-range exchange of missiles with China in the troubled Western Pacific or with Iran in and around the Persian Gulf: US air and sea forces try to push their way in while battling enemy “anti-access/area denial” (A2/AD) forces trying to keep us out. But that’s just part of it.

To start with, it’s nigh impossible to keep such conflicts safely contained “over there,” in some distant war zone. Any enemy that wants to defeat US forces at its front door must attack the global networks that support them, especially the worldwide “Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance” (C4ISR) system, whose backbone is satellites in orbit.

“There’s no range associated with cyber and space effects,” said one officer, “and the longer and longer range of the sophisticated technologies drives you to be ready when you deploy.” That’s actually an understatement, however. An enemy savvy enough to hack our global computer networks – or just send a suicide bomber to, say, the Navy base in San Diego – can bring our forces under attack *before* they deploy.

Even in the foreign war zone, US forces won’t start outside the reach of enemy weapons and work their way in, as they did in the Pacific and European campaigns of World War II. Modern cruise and ballistic missiles are so long-ranged that our forward forces may well be *inside* the enemy’s A2/AD defense zone when the bad guys turn it on.

So even if Iran can’t hack our global networks, our ships in the Gulf and our ground bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar may be in missile range as soon as the shooting starts. They’ll be under threat and quite possibly cut off. The same holds for US ships in the Western Pacific and for forces based in South Korea and Japan in a conflict with China. So the opening phases of an Air-Sea Battle may look a lot less like Douglas MacArthur’s island-hopping campaign, with US forces advancing across the Pacific, and much more like MacArthur’s doomed defense of the Philippines, with US forces unprepared, under siege, and fighting for their lives.

This, incidentally, is where the ground forces come in to Air-Sea Battle, not just as targets but as the first line of defense. The Army is responsible for land-based missile defense, so Patriot and THAAD batteries will play a crucial role in defending the Air Force’s forward bases. Even Navy ships at sea may well find it advisable to fall back towards friendly shores so they can augment their own Aegis anti-missile systems with the Army’s land-based defenses. Just getting all these systems to work together is a major technical challenge.

(There’s also a significant minority that wants the Army to revive the offensive intermediate-range ballistic missile capability that it had during the Cold War, albeit this time with non-nuclear warheads, to give missile-shooting enemies a taste of their own medicine).

The Marines don’t do missile defense, but they do provide short-ranged airpower, especially airpower that doesn’t depend on long runways or full-sized aircraft carriers. V-22 Osprey tilt-rotors might rescue downed Air Force and Navy pilots, while F-35B jump jets can operate from roads, parking lots, and other ad hoc airfields too numerous and low-profile for the enemy to easily target, offered one officer.

Both Army and Marine ground troops may also be essential to defending forward bases and missile-defense batteries against terrorist-style strikes, seaborne raiders, or even conventional ground attack. US ground troops may stage their own amphibious strikes to seize sites for new forward bases, which was their main role in the Pacific in World War II. Special operators may slip ashore to pinpoint targets for long-range strikes and to inflict damage and confusion behind the enemy’s front lines.

So while Air-Sea Battle may be mostly about the air and sea, one officer said, “it’s going to interlink with land throughout. You can’t think of a place where you’re going to fight where there isn’t going to be a single atoll, peninsula, or some form of a land mass” that can serve as a forward base for one side or the other.



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The trick, of course, will be surviving. Big US bases in Afghanistan and Iraq were immune to anything but harassing fire from the insurgents, but being a large, stationary target in range of sophisticated missiles is another matter. “In Gulf War I [in 1991], we had the SCUD... a land-attack ballistic missile,” said one officer. “We were worried about those, but we weren’t very worried because they weren’t too accurate.” (That said, a single lucky SCUD strike on a US barracks in Dhahran killed 27 soldiers). “With the advances in technology, these systems are now becoming more precise and more lethal.”

As a result, there’s real anxiety among some allies who live inside the range of, for example, Chinese missiles that the US will simply pull back and fight from a safer distance. “One of the questions you commonly get from the Japanese [about Air-Sea Battle is] they wonder if it’s about moving back to a defensible perimeter, withdrawing from the Japanese islands, withdrawing from forward positions,” one officer said. “We’ve told them actually it’s quite the opposite, it’s about being able to maintain forces forward deployed under a threat.”

If we get Air-Sea Battle right, it will reassure friends and deter adversaries. If we get it wrong, though, it will unnerve friends and provoke adversaries instead. The problem is that getting it right depends on much more than tactics and technology – and it’s not clear who, if anyone, is answering the crucial strategic questions.

*Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. is the Deputy Editor at Breaking Defense.*

<http://breakingdefense.com/2013/07/09/glimpse-inside-air-sea-battle-nukes-cyber-at-its-heart/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Federation of American Scientists (FAS)  
OPINION/FAS Strategic Security Blog

## **Air Force Intelligence Report Provides Snapshot of Nuclear Missiles**

July 10, 2013

By Hans M. Kristensen

The U.S. Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) has published its long-awaited update to the Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat report, one of the few remaining public (yet sanitized) U.S. intelligence assessment of the world nuclear (and other) forces.

Previous years’ reports have been reviewed and made available by FAS, and the new update contains several important developments – and some surprises.

Most important to the immediate debate about further U.S.-Russian reductions of nuclear forces, the new report provides an almost direct rebuttal of recent allegations that Russia is violating the INF Treaty by developing an Intermediate-range ballistic missile: “Neither Russia nor the United States produce or retain any MRBM or IRBM systems because they are banned by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty, which entered into force in 1988.”

Another new development is a significant number of new conventional short-range ballistic missiles being deployed or developed by China.

Finally, several of the nuclear weapons systems listed in a recent U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command briefing are not included in the NASIC report at all. This casts doubt on the credibility of the AFGSC briefing and creates confusion about what the U.S. Intelligence Community has actually concluded.

### **Russia**

The report estimates that Russia retains about 1,200 nuclear warheads deployed on ICBMs, slightly higher than our estimate of 1,050. That is probably a little high because it would imply that the SSBN force only carries about 220 warheads instead of the 440, or so, warheads we estimate are on the submarines.

**Issue No. 1065, 12 July 2013**

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“Most” of the ICBMs “are maintained on alert, capable of being launched within minutes of receiving a launch order,” the report states. This excessive alert posture is similar to that of the United States, which has essentially all of its ICBMs on alert.

The report also confirms that although Russia is developing and deploying new missiles, “the size of the Russia missile force is shrinking due to arms control limitations and resource constraints.”

Unfortunately, the report does not clear up the mystery of how many warheads the SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24, Yars) missile carries. Initially we estimated three because the throw-weight is similar to the U.S. Minuteman III ICBM. Then we considered six, but have recently settled on four, as the Strategic Rocket Forces commander has stated.

The report states that “Russia tested a new type of ICBM in 2012,” but it undercuts rumors that it not an ICBM by listing its range as 5,500+ kilometers. Moreover, in an almost direct rebuttal of recent allegations that Russia is violating the INF Treaty by developing an Intermediate-range ballistic missile, the report concludes: “Neither Russia nor the United States produce or retain any MRBM or IRBM systems because they are banned by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty, which entered into force in 1988.”

The report also describes how Russian designers are working to modify missiles to overcome U.S. ballistic missile defense systems. The SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) deployed in silos at Tatischevo was designed with countermeasures to ballistic missile systems, and Russian officials claim that a new class of hypersonic vehicle is being developed to overcome ballistic missile defense systems, according to NASIC.

The report also refers to Russian press report that a rail-mobile ICBM is being considered, and that a new “heavy” ICBM is under development.

One of the surprises in the report is that SS-N-32/Bulava-30 missile on the first Borei-class SSBN is not yet considered fully operational – at least not by NASIC. The report lists the missile as in development and “not yet deployed.”

Another interesting status is that while the AS-4 and AS-15 nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missiles are listed as operational, the new Kh-102 nuclear cruise missile that Russian officials have said they’re introducing is not listed at all. The Kh-102 was also listed as already “fielded” by a recent U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command briefing.

Finally, while the report lists the SS-N-21 sea-launched cruise missile as operational, it does not mention the new Kalibr cruise missile for the Yasen-class attack submarine that U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command recently listed as having been “fielded” within the past five years.

## **China**

The NASIC report states that the Chinese ballistic missile force is expanding both in size and types of missiles.

Deployment of the DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) ICBM continues at a slow pace with “more than 15” launchers deployed six years after the system was first introduced.

Despite many rumors about a new DF-41 ICBM, the NASIC report does not mention this system at all.

Deployment of the shorter-range DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) ICBM, on the contrary, appears to have stalled or paused, with only 5-10 launchers deployed seven years after it was initially introduced (see my recent analysis of this trend here). Moreover, the range of the DF-31 is lowered a bit, from 7,200+ km in the 2009 report to 7,000+ in the new version.

Medium-range nuclear missiles include the DF-21 (CSS-5) (in two versions: Mod 1 and Mod 2, but with identical range etc.) and the old DF-3A (CSS-2), which is still listed as deployed. Only 5-10 launchers are left, probably in a single brigade that will probably convert to DF-21 in the near future.

An important new development concerns conventional missiles, where the NASIC report states that several new systems have been introduced or are in development. This includes a “number of new mobile, conventionally armed MRBMs,” apparently in addition to the DF-21C and DF-21D already known. As for the DF-21D anti-ship missile, report states that “China has likely started to deploy” the missile but that it is “unknown” how many are deployed.



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More dramatic is the development on five new short-range ballistic missiles, including the CSS-9, CSS-11, CSS-14, CSS-X-15, and CSS-X-16. The CSS-9 and CSS-14 come in different versions with different ranges. The CSS-11 Mod 1 is a modification of the existing DF-11, but with a range of over 800 kilometers (500 miles). None of these systems are listed as nuclear-capable.

Concerning sea-based nuclear forces, the NASIC report echoes the DOD report by saying that the JL-2 SLBM for the new Jin-class SSBN is not yet operational. The JL-2 is designated as CSS-NX-14, which I thought it was a typo in the 2009 report, as opposed to the CSS-NX-3 for the JL-1 (which is also not operational).

NASIC concludes that JL-2 “will, for the first time, allow Chinese SSBNs to target portions of the United States from operating areas located near the Chinese coast.” That is true for Guam and Alaska, but not for Hawaii and the continental United States. Moreover, like the DF-31, the JL-2 range estimate is lowered from 7,200+ km in the 2009 report to 7,000+ km in the new version. Earlier intelligence estimates had the range as high as 8,000+ km.

One of the surprises (perhaps) in the new report is that it does not list the CJ-20 air-launched cruise missile, which was listed in the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command briefing as a nuclear cruise missile that had been “fielded” within the past five years.

Concerning the overall size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, there have been many rumors that it includes hundreds or even thousands of additional warheads more than the 250 we estimate. STRATCOM commander has also rejected these rumors. To that end, the NASIC report lists all Chinese nuclear missiles with one warhead each, despite widespread rumors in the news media and among some analysts that multiple warheads are deployed on some missiles.

Yet the report does echo a projection made by the annual DOD report, that “China may also be developing a new road-mobile ICBM capable of carrying a MIRV payload.” But NASIC does not confirm widespread news media rumors that this system is the DF-41 – in fact, the report doesn’t even mention the DF-41 as in development.

As for the future, the NASIC report repeats the often-heard prediction that “the number of warheads on Chinese ICBMs capable of threatening the United States is expected to grow to well over 100 in the next 15 years.” This projection has continued to slip and NASIC slips it a bit further into the future to 2028.

## **Pakistan**

Most of the information about the Pakistani system pretty much fits what we have been reporting. The only real surprise is that the Shaheen-II MRBM does still not appear to be fully deployed, even though the system has been flight tested six times since 2010. The report states that “this missile system probably will soon be deployed.”

## **India**

The information on India also fits pretty well with what we have been reporting. For example, the report refers to the Indian government saying the Agni II IRBM has finally been deployed. But NASIC only lists “fewer than 10” Agni II launchers deployed, the first time I have seen a specific reference to how many of this system are deployed. The Agni III IRBM is said to be ready for deployment, but not yet deployed.

## **North Korea**

The NASIC report lists the Hwasong-13 (KN-08), North Korea’s new mobile ICBM, but confirms that the missile has not yet been flight tested. It also lists an IRBM, but without naming it the Musudan.

The mysterious KN-09 coastal-defense cruise missile that U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command recently listed as a new nuclear system expected within the next five years is not mentioned in the NASIC report.

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**Issue No. 1065, 12 July 2013**

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*weapons. He specializes in using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in his research and is a frequent consultant to and is widely referenced in the news media on the role and status of nuclear weapons.*

<http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/07/nasic2013/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

**Issue No. 1065, 12 July 2013**

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