



USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal

Issue No. 1143, 26 November 2014

Welcome to the CUWS Outreach Journal! As part of the CUWS' mission to develop Air Force, DoD, and other USG leaders to advance the state of knowledge, policy, and practices within strategic defense issues involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, we offer the government and civilian community a source of contemporary discussions on unconventional weapons. These discussions include news articles, papers, and other information sources that address issues pertinent to the U.S. national security community. It is our hope that this information resource will help enhance the overall awareness of these important national security issues and lead to the further discussion of options for dealing with the potential use of unconventional weapons. **All of our past journals are now available at http://cpc.au.af.mil/au_outreach.aspx.**

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FEATURE ITEM: *"U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Analytic Capabilities: An Assessment of Tools, Methods, and Approaches for the 21st Century Security Environment (2014)"*. Authors, Committee on U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Military Capabilities in the 21st Century Security Environment; Air Force Studies Board; Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences; National Research Council; published by The National Academy Press, November 2014, 135 pages.

<http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18622/us-air-force-strategic-deterrence-analytic-capabilities-an-assessment-of>

Since the early 1960s, the U.S. strategic nuclear posture has been composed of a triad of nuclear-certified long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Since the early 1970s, U.S. nuclear forces have been subject to strategic arms control agreements. The large numbers and diversified nature of the U.S. nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear forces, which cannot be ignored as part of the overall nuclear deterrent, have decreased substantially since the Cold War. While there is domestic consensus today on the need to maintain an effective deterrent, there is no consensus on precisely what that requires, especially in a changing geopolitical environment and with continued reductions in nuclear arms. This places a premium on having the best possible analytic tools, methods, and approaches for understanding how nuclear deterrence and assurance work, how they might fail, and how failure can be averted by U.S. nuclear forces.

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Phys.Org – Douglas, Isle Of Man, U.K.

Scientist Develops Uncrackable Code for Nuclear Weapons

24 November 2014

Mark Hart, a scientist and engineer in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Defense Technologies Division, has been awarded the 2015 Surety Transformation Initiative (STI) Award from the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Enhanced Surety Program.

The STI award aims to stimulate and encourage the development of potentially transformational nuclear weapon surety technologies and explore innovative, preferably monumental shift solutions, to unmet surety needs.

"STI's task is to reach beyond the traditional stockpile stewardship function of maintaining existing nuclear weapon capability in the absence of supercritical testing," said Robert Sherman, enhanced surety federal program manager in NNSA's Technology Maturation Division. "STI is intended not to maintain or polish 'your grandfather's Oldsmobile,' but to go beyond it: to invent devices and technologies that serve the 21st century nuclear security needs of the American people better than they are served by existing Cold War legacy technologies."

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Hart's winning proposal is for Intrinsic Use Control (IUC), a concept that is capable of providing improved quantifiable safety and use control within a nuclear weapon. Nuclear weapons exist, therefore control is essential. Use control of a weapon is focused on providing unencumbered authorized use while restricting unauthorized use. Safety, use control and physical security work in concert for the weapon's surety.

As a basic concept, use control is best accomplished in the weapon itself rather than depending on administrative controls, fences and guards. Using established technology, IUC uses passive use control to resist any attacks or unauthorized use of a weapon at either the component or the fully assembled levels.

"An IUC-class weapon would function reliably as intended, when intended, exclusively under authorization by the National Command Authority," Hart said. "The component use control that IUC provides is sufficiently robust to defeat any unauthorized attempt to make these components function, even by the people who designed and built the arming, firing and initiation components."

This is accomplished by designing the components to function in a way that cannot be replicated by any individual. Using the IUC concept, weapon components would be initialized and made secure during assembly by using the weapon's fluctuating radiation field to generate unique component IDs and use-control numbers, only known to the weapon. Any anomaly in their verification, caused by removal or replacement of any protected component, will cause all protected components to be unusable.

IUC provides a less than 10-18 chance of controlling or operating an individual protected component, and a less than 10-72 chance of controlling or operating the entire protected system.

"Using the random process of nuclear radioactive decay is the gold standard of random number generators," Hart said. "You'd have a better chance of winning both Mega Millions and Powerball on the same day than getting control of IUC-protected components."

<http://phys.org/news/2014-11-scientist-uncrackable-code-nuclear-weapons.html>

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International Business (IB) Times – New York, NY Edition

Russia Testing New Weapons, Foreign Minister Says Country Respecting All International Obligations

By Kukil Bora

November 22, 2014

Russian tests of new military technology, being conducted as the country upgrades its military arsenal, are not violating any international obligations, according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov.

Ryabkov did not specify exactly what kind of weapons the country was testing, but added that his country had not thrown itself into an arms race with the new round of military testing.

"What is being done within the framework of the program of testing new types of weapons is in accordance with our obligations. If some sort of events or occurrences are noticed by other countries, then these events are not included in any obligations and we're not obliged to announce them," Sputnik quoted Ryabkov as saying.

The foreign minister also stated that the tests is a planned program to update the country's arsenal of all the three armed forces of the Russian Federation.

Last week, the head of the Russian Troops of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense (RChBD) said that the Russian army will modernize 70 percent of its weaponry and equipment 2020.

"Shortly, infantry flame units will receive new weaponry with higher fire precision and the penetration before exploding effect, ability to destroy fortified emplacements, armored equipment, and personnel in trenches," Maj. Gen. Eduard Cherkasov, the head of RChBD troops, reportedly said.

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Recent reports also said that Russia is expected to build the first air-launched hypersonic missiles by 2020.

Earlier this month, Russia successfully test-fired an intercontinental missile from a submerged Northern Fleet nuclear submarine from the Barents Sea to the Kura Range on the Kamchatka Peninsula in the country's far east, which is across the Bering Sea from the U.S. state of Alaska.

<http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-testing-new-weapons-foreign-minister-says-country-respecting-all-international-1727955>

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TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia

Russia may Develop Hypersonic Weapons before End of this Decade

Development of these weapons is given a priority, Director-General of the Tactical Missiles corporation said
November 23, 2014

MOSCOW, November 22. /TASS/. Russia may develop hypersonic weapons before the end of this decade, Director-General of the Tactical Missiles corporation Boris Obnosov told Russian News Service radio on Saturday.

Development of these weapons is given a priority, he said. "To create weapons with a speed exceeding Mach 4 (about 4,900 km/h) is a major task. This implies a huge scope of scientific problems," he noted.

The corporation is working on these weapons for Russia to be in parity with many developed countries, Obnosov said.

"Weapons which will reach a speed of Mach 6-8 (about 7,350-9,800 km/h) should be produced before the end of this decade," the corporation chief noted.

<http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/761186>

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Russia Beyond the Headlines – Moscow, Russia

Strategic Forces to be Equipped with Yars Nuclear Missile System

November 23, 2014

By Yuri Gavrillov, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*

The combat effectiveness of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces is being enhanced by the addition of new nuclear weapon systems for stationary and mobile deployment. A number of divisions have already introduced the Yars missile units, which will gradually phase out the older Topol systems.

The commander of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) has announced that its regiments and divisions are to be upgraded with new Yars nuclear weapon systems for stationary and mobile deployment.

"As part of creating a capable group, it is planned to place 16 missile launch sites armed with the Yars missile on operational duty," said General Sergei Karakayev at a session of the SMF's military council on Nov. 14.

This formidable technology is produced in two versions – mobile and stationary. Depending on the location of the unit and their operating zone, missiles can 'serve' based either in silos or from railway tracks. In the latter case, they can be controlled from a mobile command post.

Strike force

The Ministry of Defense has made it clear that the Yars, alongside the Topol-M, will serve as the SMFs main strike force for the next decades. The missiles not only increase its military capabilities but strengthen the potential deterrence of Russia's strategic triad. Furthermore, the Yars will replace several divisions of the reliable but outdated Topol nuclear missile system.

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The Teykovskoye command has already switched to the mobile Yars, and the mobile ground units are now being provided to the Tagilsk and Novosibirsk divisions. The Kozelsk division will shortly introduce a Yars missile system consisting of four silo launchers and a unified command post into operational duty in its missile regiment.

The Yars system was developed based on the Topol but is much more powerful. Its missile, the RS-24, is superior in throw-weight to the Topol's RS-12 by more than 20 percent. Although the Yars carries not one warhead but three to four, the designers have succeeded in keeping the strategic missile's range to greater than 6,200 miles. It uses a three-stage system.

Its body and instrument compartment have been treated with a coating that reduces the impact of various damaging factors, including a nuclear explosion. Furthermore, on launch, the missile can carry out a programmed manoeuvre. This helps it make a relatively safe passage through a nuclear cloud should an enemy attack the Yars' position with a ballistic missile.

According to experts, the breakthrough technological solutions used in creating the RS-24 guarantee the high survivability of the missile when overcoming any missile defense systems. The strategic Yars does not need to fear even layered missile defense systems, including ones based in space.

The Sarmatians are coming

The operational strength of the SMF is now 400 strategic missile launchers with intercontinental ballistic missiles. Since their numbers are limited by Russia's international obligations, the development of the land-based component of its nuclear triad is focused on two areas: Firstly, the modernization of silo-based and mobile missile systems already in use; secondly, the development of a new strategic arsenal.

According to military sources, the SMF will receive a qualitatively new weapon in 2018-2020. They probably have in mind the stationary Sarmat ('Sarmatian') with a heavy intercontinental ballistic missile.

Experimental design work on this project is being carried out by a group of industrial enterprises under the direction of the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau. They plan to complete the work in five to six years. According to the former chief of the General Staff of the SMF Viktor Yesin, the Sarmat will replace the RS-20V Voevoda, which is currently on operational duty.

The former head of the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, General Vladimir Vasilenko believes that the new heavy intercontinental ballistic silo-based missile will possess the capacity to deliver warheads to targets using not only energetically optimal trajectories with direct approach bearings, but also strikes from various directions, including via the South Pole.

http://rbth.com/defence/2014/11/23/strategic_forces_to_be_equipped_with_yars_nuclear_missile_system_41597.html

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Want China Times.com – Taipei, Taiwan

PLA's JL-2 Missile Can Reach US Mainland: Report

Staff Reporter

November 23, 2014

China's JL-2 second-generation intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missile, which has the ability to reach the continental USA, is already believed to be deployable by the People's Liberation Army, reports Huanqiu, the Chinese-language website of the nationalistic Global Times tabloid.

The Julang-2 — literally "Giant Wave 2" — has reached a preliminary level of proficiency, according to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in its report to US Congress on Nov. 20.

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The report, which criticizes China's "unsafe, unprofessional and aggressive" behavior and the intimidation of its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific over the past year, also claims that the new nuclear submarine capable of carrying the JL-2 is planning its maiden voyage before the end of the year.

"The JL-2, when mated with the PLA Navy's JIN-class (SSBN), will give China its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent," the report said.

China is also testing supersonic guided missiles that, if successful, could render America's missile defense system outdated, the report added.

The report estimates that China could have as many as 351 submarines and missile-equipped surface ships in the Asia-Pacific by 2020, while the US Navy plans to only have 67 submarines and surface ships stationed or deployed to the region.

The potential for "security miscalculation" in the Asia-Pacific is rising as China increases its military spending by double-digit percentages every year while the balance of power drifts away from the US and its allies, the report said.

<http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20141123000103&cid=1101&MainCatID=11>

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The Korea Herald – Seoul, South Korea

China Expert Pessimistic on N. Korea's 'Diplomatic Offensive'

November 24, 2014

North Korea's "diplomatic offensive" this year, including a visit by a special envoy of the North's leader Kim Jong-un to Russia, is unlikely to help Pyongyang escape isolation unless it changes course on nuclear weapons, a Chinese expert said Monday.

Zhang Liangui, a professor of Korean studies at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, told the state-run Beijing News that Russia is also unlikely to compete with China in providing economic support to North Korea.

The comments from Zhang come as Kim's special envoy, Choe Ryong-hae, is wrapping up a week-long visit to Moscow. Choe met Russian President Vladimir Putin at a time when the international community is moving to censure the pariah regime for its human rights record.

In protest against a United Nations resolution condemning its grave human rights violations, North Korea has threatened to conduct a new nuclear test, claiming that the U.N. move is part of a U.S.-led plot to topple its regime.

"North Korea is committed to the development of nuclear weapons, while China adheres to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," Zhang told the Chinese newspaper.

"No one can accept a nuclear North Korea. From this point of view, the effect of North Korea's diplomatic offensive is zero," Zhang said.

North Korea is China's only formal treaty ally, but a series of provocations by the North, including last year's third nuclear test, have strained political ties between the two nations.

Still, many analysts believe that Beijing will not put strong pressure on Pyongyang due to the risk of aggravating the current situation. (Yonhap)

<http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20141124000631>

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Yonhap News Agency – Beijing, China

N. Korea, Russia Agree to Push for Six-Way Nuclear Talks: KCNA

November 25, 2014

SEOUL, Nov. 25 (Yonhap) -- Top North Korean and Russian officials agreed to redouble efforts to revive the six-party talks on Pyongyang's nuclear program when they met in Moscow last week, the North's official news agency said Tuesday.

President Vladimir Putin and Choe Ryong-hae, special envoy of the North's leader Kim Jong-un, also agreed to improve political, economic and military exchanges between the two countries in 2015, reported the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Next year, Korea will commemorate the 70th anniversary of its liberation from Japan's colonial rule and Russia will mark the 70th anniversary of victory in World War II.

The KCNA said that Choe conveyed Kim's letter to Putin but stopped short of revealing details.

Speculation has grown about the possibility of summit talks between Putin and Kim early next year in the wake of Choe's weeklong trip to Russia.

The KCNA summarized the results of Choe's meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

The two sides decided to step up efforts to restart the six-way talks without any preconditions and discussed ways to create the mood for that, it said. The now-suspended negotiations also involve South Korea, the U.S., China, and Japan.

The North has called for the immediate resumption of the talks but the U.S. has insisted it to take initial steps towards denuclearization.

Choe, the Workers' Party of Korea secretary, and Lavrov also agreed to bring Pyongyang-Moscow relations to a higher level including closer cooperation on the global stage, according to the KCNA.

Pyongyang is under growing international pressure for its human rights problem and weapons of mass destruction program.

Choe, one of the closest aides to the North Korean leader, traveled to Russia from Nov. 17-24. He was accompanied by Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan, Vice Economy Minister Ri Kwang-gun, and No Kwang-chol, deputy chief of the General Staff of the North's military.

Kim Kye-gwan has long handled Pyongyang's nuclear negotiations with Washington and other members of the six-way talks.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/11/25/74/0301000000AEN20141125009800315F.html>

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Korea Herald – Seoul, South Korea

USFK Chief Concerned by N.K. Asymmetric Threats

November 25, 2014

U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti on Tuesday expressed concern over North Korea's development of asymmetric military capabilities, noting that Pyongyang was making "progress."

"Kim Jong-un, unlike his father, is overconfident and unpredictable. Realizing he cannot win in a conventional war, he has focused his military's development on training on asymmetric capabilities", he said during his lecture at the Association of the Republic of Korea Army.

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“Our top concern is that we have very little warning of an unprovoked asymmetric attack which could start a cycle of action and counter-action, leading to an escalation. This underscores the need for the alliance to maintain a high level of readiness and vigilance.”

Asymmetric capabilities include nuclear arms and cybercapabilities that cannot easily be countered with conventional weapons. Amid its international isolation that has damaged its economy, North Korea has pushed to raise those capabilities.

Touching on the allies’ recent agreement on a “conditions-based” transfer of wartime operational control, the commander listed a series of capabilities the allies should work on together to enable the South to retake control.

These critical capabilities include command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, or C4I; ballistic missile defense, or BMD; critical munitions; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or ISR.

“Through close consultation, we will continue to develop capabilities that are effective, interoperable, and timely, in order to maintain our readiness and deterrence against North Korea,” said Scaparrotti, who also heads the allies’ Combined Forces Command and the U.N. Command.

As to the recent agreement to temporarily station the CFC in its current location until the OPCON transfer takes place, which may not happen before the mid-2020s, the commander pointed out that the CFC will keep only the “minimum necessary personnel and infrastructure.”

After the agreement was announced last month, some critics raised concerns that the plan to station it in the current location, albeit temporarily, could get in the way of a plan to build a national park there.

Asked if the commander could consider stationing the CFC in South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff building in Seoul instead of retaining it in the current position, the commander noted that there would be some operational difficulties should the CFC be moved into the JCS building.

“I would tell you that there are some unique requirements in order to command and control this theater that can’t be met by simply moving into the JCS headquarters,” he said. “But this alliance is built on trust and candid communication, and I am confident that together, we will find the right solution.”

Speaking of the long-standing alliance, the USFK chief portrayed it as “unique.”

“I am really struck by the quality of the alliance. I have been in several alliances in my career and this is a unique one because of the length of this alliance and the fact that it was born in combat and stood the test of the time and many sacrifices together,” he said.

Gen. Scaparrotti has been in the current post since October 2013. He has served in key leadership positions at the tactical, operational, and strategic level of the U.S. military to include Director of Operations, the U.S. Central Command. He has commanded forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Bosnia and Liberia.

<http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20141125000954>

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Yonhap News Agency – Seoul, South Korea

China's Envoy Opposes Possible THAAD Deployment in S. Korea: Lawmaker

November 26, 2014

SEOUL, Nov. 26 (Yonhap) -- China's top diplomat to Seoul said Wednesday he is opposed to the possible U.S. deployment of an advanced missile-defense (MD) system in South Korea as it would hurt Sino-Korean ties, a lawmaker said.

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The United States has said it is considering deploying a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery, an integral part of its MD system, to South Korea, citing evolving threats from North Korea. It is designed to shoot down short, medium and intermediate ballistic missiles at a higher altitude in their terminal phase using a hit-to-kill method.

The possibility has been a focus of media attention as it is seen as part of a broader U.S. attempt to get the Asian ally to join its air defense system and could spark tensions with China and Russia, who see it as a threat to their security interests.

"The THAAD would have a range of around 2,000 kilometers, which goes beyond the goal of countering missiles from North Korea," Chinese ambassador to South Korea Qiu Guohong was quoted as saying by Rep. Won Hye-young of the main opposition New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD).

Won, who leads the parliamentary special committee on the development of inter-Korean relations and exchange, had a meeting with the ambassador earlier in the day in Seoul.

"The deployment of the THAAD will badly influence the relations between South Korea and China ... It would harm China's security system," Qiu said.

Refusing to join the U.S. air defense system also participated in by Japan, South Korea has been working on developing its own Korea Air and Missile Defense system (KAMD), but the Seoul government has said that it does not oppose Washington's possible plan to bring THAAD here to protect its troops.

About 28,500 U.S. troops are currently stationed in South Korea, a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War.

Touching on the six-party talks aimed at persuading North Korea to denuclearize, Qiu stressed the need for the parties involved to put forth "conditions that North Korea could accept," adding that his country "is considering informal discussions to tune up conditions everyone can accept," according to the lawmaker.

The multilateral forum involving the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan have been stalled since late 2008, with Seoul and Washington calling on Pyongyang to take sincere, concrete actions before the resumption of any talks.

Noting that North Korea has been sending a message of giving up its nuclear ambition, the ambassador said China will put pressure on its communist ally "if it continues its nuclear development while dialogue is under way."

Qiu, however, voiced clear opposition to a recent United Nations resolution condemning North Korea's dire human rights situation. The highly symbolic move by the international community last week calls for the referral of the North to the International Criminal Court for punishment.

"Sanctions and isolation do no good to resolve North Korea's nuclear issues," Qiu was quoted as saying. "I stand against taking the human rights issue as political issues or as any leverage against the North."

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/11/26/57/0301000000AEN20141126008900315F.html>

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The Korea Herald – Seoul, South Korea

Can Iranian Nuke Talks Affect N.K. Issue?

November 26, 2014

North Korea may be closely watching the ongoing nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West as it explores the most beneficial way to gain concessions from the U.S. and other parties, analysts said Wednesday.

Some observers argue that the talks involving the Islamic republic could help forge the mood for the resumption of the long-stalled talks over Pyongyang's nuclear program. But others say the Iranian talks may not be helpful to resolve the North Korean issue.

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“The Iranian nuclear talks may not be that helpful to facilitate the North’s complete dismantlement of its nukes given that the West has moved toward recognizing parts of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities and has eased its sanctions for the negotiations,” said Chang Yong-seok, a senior researcher at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University.

“Carefully looking at the Iranian nuclear talks, the North could seek the suspension of sanctions and the right to continue to enrich uranium (to the extent that it can’t be weapons-grade), in return for resuming its negotiations.”

After failing to reach a deal over the Iranian issue before the Monday night deadline, Iran and the so-called P5+1 countries — the U.S., Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany — have set March 1, 2015, as the new deadline for a political agreement. It also set July 1 as a deadline for a final deal including annexes.

The two sides still remain poles apart on how and when to lift sanctions. Iran wants the West to lift banking sanctions and other punitive measures right away, while the West insists on a step-by-step removal of sanctions to ensure that Iran sticks to its denuclearization commitments.

Should there be a breakthrough in the negotiations with Iran, calls within the Obama administration to resume the talks with the North and seeking an agreement with it could grow, analysts noted.

<http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20141126000957>

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Xinhua News – Beijing, China

Britain to Move 2 more Nuclear Submarines to Scotland

November 25, 2014

LONDON, Nov. 24 (Xinhua) -- Britain will move two more nuclear submarines from England to Scotland by 2020, making Scotland home to all of Britain's submarines, British Defense Secretary Michael Fallon confirmed Monday.

HMS Talent and HMS Triumph, the country's two Trafalgar Class nuclear submarines, will move from Devonport in the southwestern English county of Devon to the naval base Clyde in Scotland by 2020, making the latter the submarine center of specialization for British Royal Navy, the British Ministry of Defense (MoD) said in a statement.

The move could trigger new tensions between the British military and the Scottish government led by the Scottish National Party (SNP), which have long been opposed to the deployment of nuclear weapons in Scotland.

"We expect that local communities will welcome HMS Talent and HMS Triumph and their crews and families when they arrive in Scotland later this decade," Fallon said.

The British Royal Navy's other two T-Boats, HMS Torbay and HMS Trenchant, are to remain at their current home in Devonport until they are decommissioned in 2017 and 2019 respectively, according to the MoD.

There is no change to the decision to make Her Majesty's Naval Base Clyde "the single integrated submarine operating base and submarine center of specialization by 2020," Fallon confirmed.

The defense secretary added that the decision "balances the Royal Navy's operational requirements with giving more clarity to our servicemen and women to plan their family lives," and will bring hundreds of jobs and investment to the West of Scotland.

However, the deployment of nuclear equipments in Scotland has been constantly hitting the nerves of Scottish residents, particularly among the SNP supporters who have pushed for removal of all unwanted nuclear presence in the region.

The SNP has been committed to a constitutional ban on nuclear weapons being based in Scotland, highlighting nuclear disarmament as a major motivation for splitting from Britain in the run-up to its unsuccessful Scottish independence campaign.

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Pravda.Ru – Moscow, Russia

Russia's New Subs can Shoot Bulava Missiles while Moving under Arctic Ice

25 November 2014

In the middle of December, the Navy of Russia will receive the third of eight state-of-the-art submarines of Project 955 Borei, a strategic nuclear cruiser. The new sub will be called Vladimir Monomakh.

Project 955 submarines thus replace strategic submarine cruisers of projects 667BDRM and 941, the construction of which was conducted before early 1990s. The development of this type of submarines of the 4th generation, Borei-1 (project 955), was started in mid-1980s at Rubin Design Bureau. In the middle of December, the Navy of Russia will receive the third of eight state-of-the-art submarines of Project 955 Borei, a strategic nuclear cruiser. The new sub will be called Vladimir Monomakh. In the middle of December, the Navy of Russia will receive the third of eight state-of-the-art submarines of Project 955 Borei, a strategic nuclear cruiser. The new sub will be called Vladimir Monomakh.

The first cruiser of this series, Yury Dolgoruky, was founded in 1996 at the Severodvinsk machine-building enterprise. The construction of the first cruiser was supposed to be completed in ten years. However, the Yury Dolgoruky was launched much later.

During the process of construction, the design of the cruiser was amended against the backdrop of failures that occurred to Bark missile complex. Submarines of this series became lighter after it was decided to equip them with lighter Bulava missiles. The missile bay of the submarines was changed too.

In 2006, Borei (Northwind) project almost ceased to exist as a carrier of strategic ballistic missiles. Due to a series of failures in testing the Bulava ballistic missile, Navy officials believed that it was time to redesign the submarine yet again for the use of cruise missiles.

In the long run, the Yury Dolgoruky, and the Alexander Nevsky subs were launched and passed into naval service.

Currently, domestic steel production can fully satisfy the need in submarine steel, even though Russia experienced the shortage of this type of steel not that long ago.

The Vladimir Monomakh is the third sub in the series and the first one that corresponds to design appearance most. The next vessel in the series - Knyaz Vladimir - carries the letter "A" in the project name - Borei-A. According to unconfirmed information, this may mean that with this ship, Russia will begin the production of submarines with 20, rather than 16 Bulava missile pits.

Specialists of the Severodvinsk machine-building enterprise are currently involved in the construction of several other submarines of Project 955: "Knyaz Vladimir", "Knuaze Oleg" and "Knyaz Suvorov". According to the state program of armaments before 2020, the Russian Navy is said to receive eight nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines of Project 955 / 955A, Borei and Borei-A. The subs of Borei-A project, as representatives of Rubin Design Bureau said, will have a lower level of physical fields and, respectively, improved stealth and more advanced communication and detection systems. The subs will also have such features as improved crew habitability and survivability. The contract for the development of new submarines is evaluated at 39 billion rubles.

Project 955 is a new page in the development of the Russian nuclear submarine fleet. The subs are five times less noisy than vessels of 971 Pike-B and 949A Antey projects. Borei class submarines are first Russian nuclear submarines that move with the help of single-shaft water-jet propulsion system of high propulsion performance. Similarly to Pike-B project subs, Borei-class submarines have two hinged thrusters and retractable horizontal bow planes with flaps.

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The hydroacoustic equipment is represented with a new station called "Irtysh-Amphora-B-055." This is a single automated digital sonar system that performs regular functions, such as noise-direction finding, echo-ranging, classification of targets, communication. The station also performs the functions of small acoustics, such as measuring ice thickness and speed of sound, mine-detection, search for ice openings and ice leads, detection of torpedoes. The new station exceeds the range of a similar system installed on USA's state-of-the-art Virginia type submarines.

In addition, all Borei submarines are equipped with ascending rescue chambers for the whole crew. Unlike all predecessors, 955 project subs are capable of launching ballistic missiles while moving. To crown it all, a Borei submarine can launch a Bulava from under the Arctic ice.

http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/25-11-2014/129124-russia_borei_class_submarine-0/

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TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia

Bulava Missile to Be Launched from Alexander Nevsky Submarine in Late November — Source

The launch is due on November 28-30

November 25, 2014

MOSCOW, November 25. /TASS/. Russia's Borei class strategic submarine, the Alexander Nevsky, is due to launch the Bulava missile later this month, a source in the headquarters of the Russian Navy told TASS on Tuesday.

"It is planned that in late November the Alexander Nevsky will fire the Bulava from the Barents Sea at the Kura test range on the Kamchatka Peninsula," the source said. The launch is due on November 28-30.

The Alexander Nevsky is to fire the only missile that will be on board. In October, the Yuri Dolgoruky submarine carried out the launch with a full load of Bulava missiles on board.

"Compared with the lead vessel of the project, the Yuri Dolgoruky, which is in operational service of the fleet, the Alexander Nevsky, the first series vessel of the project, continues conducting tests, including deep-water ones, that's why arming it now with 16 intercontinental ballistic missiles is premature and even dangerous," the source said.

The Alexander Nevsky will receive the full load in 2015 before being put into service in the Pacific Fleet.

"If everything goes as normal when Bulava is fired, this will be the first successful missile launch conducted by the Alexander Nevsky," the source stressed.

The launch of Bulava, conducted in early September 2013 from the Alexander Nevsky submarine, failed because of a defect in the mechanism that extends the nozzle from the missile's body.

According to NOTAM, a notice filed with aviation authorities to alert of potential hazards, Russia has closed the area for flights over a certain zone of the Barents Sea.

The zone will be closed from 11:30 a.m. Moscow time (0830 GMT) on November 28 until 11:30 p.m. Moscow time (2030 GMT) on November 29.

Apart from that, a flight route will be closed over the Kamchatka Peninsula, in Russia's Far East, near the Kura test range. The ban enters in force the same time as over the Barents Sea.

In early November, Russia's Defence Ministry rejected media reports that the test launch of Bulava planned until year-end has been postponed. The ministry's official spokesman Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov said the missile will be launched from the submarine until the end of this year. The spokesman added that in line with the plan for 2015, two launches of sea-based Bulava are to be conducted.



FARS News Agency – Tehran, Iran

Saturday, November 22, 2014

AEOI Spokesman: Iran Ready to Give IAEA Access to Marivan N. Site

TEHRAN (FNA) - Spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Behrouz Kamalvandi announced the country's readiness to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors controlled access to its nuclear site in Marivan, Western Iran, saying that Tehran and the IAEA have already settled most of their issues.

"Iran declares its preparedness for managed (controlled) inspection of Marivan in order that they come to understand the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities," Kamalvandi said on Saturday.

He voiced regret that the IAEA cites the fake information that is provided by Iran's enemies about the country's nuclear installations in its reports, and criticized the UN nuclear watchdog for raising demands from Iran which are in accordance with the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) while Tehran is not a signatory to the Protocol.

"We do not implement the Additional Protocol and therefore, using Additional Protocol-related literature in our country's case is not correct," Kamalvandi said.

He also announced that Iran and the IAEA have resolved 16 out of 18 cases of difference, and that the last two issues have remained unresolved due to the deficiencies existing in the mechanism of the UN nuclear watchdog.

In relevant remarks last week, Kamalvandi underlined that the country had provided the IAEA with correct information, and blamed the agency for its incorrect and biased new report on Iran's nuclear program.

"Iran has given correct information to the IAEA and it was the agency which has not entered the information correctly in the report," he said.

Referring to the IAEA's revision of its report on Iran's nuclear activities, he said, "The information that Iran has given to the Agency is completely correct; we reminded them of their mistakes and then the Agency corrected them."

Kamalvandi also blasted the IAEA for releasing reports on Iran and other countries' nuclear activities to the media before their circulation at the Agency's Board of Governors.

<http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930901001417>

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The Times of Israel – Jerusalem, Israel

Iranian Hardliners Protest Nuclear Talks

Crowd gathers around Tehran nuclear facility in rare demonstration against government negotiators

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

November 23, 2014

TEHRAN, Iran — Tensions over a possible nuclear deal between Iran and world powers were on display Sunday outside an atomic facility in Tehran where a rare protest saw hardliners criticize government negotiators.

While the crowd was small — about 200, mostly students, gathered at the entrance to the Tehran Research Reactor — the event was the first such officially approved demonstration in months.

It coincided with the penultimate day of talks in Vienna between Iran and the United States and other leading states about a permanent nuclear deal.

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“Nuclear energy is our absolute right,” and “Sanctions won’t stop us,” read placards held by protesters, many of them suggesting there should be no compromise on Iran’s disputed atomic activities.

They chanted “Death to America” while a designated speaker rounded on the conduct of the year-long negotiations which entered their final 36 hours with a deal hanging in the balance.

Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif, the foreign minister who is leading the talks in the Austrian capital, “do not know how to do diplomacy,” the speaker said.

One woman held a banner that said: “The centrifuges are not working, nor is the economy,” alluding to Rouhani’s pledge to restart talks with the West to help Iran’s sanctions-hit economy recover.

One demonstrator, a medical student who did not want to give her name, said she was “pessimistic about the Americans involved in the negotiations.”

“We want an agreement where if we give something we get something in return, and what we want is a total removal of sanctions,” she said.

Despite the protest back home, an Iranian source in Vienna signaled openness to extending the talks by six months or even up to a year.

Such an extension would be under terms of an interim deal reached in Geneva a year ago that traded a temporary freeze on some of Iran’s nuclear activities for limited sanctions relief, the source said.

“We are still focused on agreeing to a kind of political” understanding which would not be written but which would allow for negotiators to fine-tune technical aspects of the agreement later, the source said.

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council — Britain, China, France, Russia and United States plus Germany — the so-called P5+1 — have been locked in talks with Iran since February to turn the interim Geneva accord into a lasting agreement.

Such a deal is aimed at easing fears that Tehran could develop nuclear weapons under the guise of its civilian activities.

The Islamic republic denies it wants to build an atomic bomb and insists its nuclear program is entirely peaceful.

<http://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-hardliners-hold-protest-over-nuclear-deal/>

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Press TV – Tehran, Iran

Iran Will Not Bow to Pressure, Sanctions: Rouhani

Monday, November 24, 2014

Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani says the Iranian nation will never bow to sanctions and pressures and will keep its nuclear facilities under any agreement.

“Today, the opposite negotiating sides have reached the conclusion that pressure and sanctions on Iran will not bear fruit,” Rouhani said in a live television interview on Monday after Iran and the six countries agreed to extend the nuclear talks for seven months.

He added that the Islamic Republic would never give up its nuclear rights, saying that the country’s nuclear facilities would certainly remain operational and Iran would never stop its centrifuges.

He noted that Iran pursues two main objectives in its talks with the P5+1 group, which include keeping its nuclear technology and lifting sanctions on Tehran.

“At present, no one in the world has any doubt that Iran must have nuclear technology, including enrichment on its soil, and no one has any doubt that sanctions must be lifted,” Rouhani added.

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The Iranian president also pointed out that the Iranian nation will be the final winner in the negotiations with the P5+1 countries over Tehran's nuclear program.

Rouhani emphasized that the path of nuclear negotiations would lead to a final agreement, noting that all the sides in the nuclear talks had consensus on the extension of the nuclear talks as an effort to reach a final goal.

"Iran's logic is one of negotiations and dialog; and nuclear talks will be continued with seriousness until a final agreement is struck," he said.

Stressing that the latest round of nuclear talks in Vienna was positive, Rouhani added that although the negotiating sides failed to reach a final agreement, they managed to take steps forward because the conditions now are "completely different from [what they were] three months and six months ago, logics have come closer together and may of gaps have been filled."

The sides took steps to reach an understanding and a final agreement "but reaching a written and final agreement needs time," he added.

In their last round of talks before a November 24 deadline for reaching a comprehensive nuclear deal, Iran and the P5+1 countries -- the United States, Russia, China, Germany, France and Britain -- held nearly a week of intense negotiations in Vienna on how to tackle the remaining obstacles that exist in the way of reaching an agreement.

At the end of the talks, the two sides agreed to extend the Joint Plan of Action to July 1, 2015.

<http://www.prestv.com/detail/2014/11/24/387378/iran-will-not-bow-to-pressure-sanctions/>

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Al Jazeera.com – Dubai, U.A.E.

Iran Nuclear Talks Extended till July 2015

Diplomats say talks on Tehran's nuclear programme will resume next year after negotiators fail to clinch final deal.
24 November 2014

Nuclear negotiators have failed to meet a Monday deadline for a deal that would ease international concerns about Iran's atomic programme and are poised to extend the negotiations for a comprehensive agreement until July 2015, diplomats said.

Iran and six powers - the US, China, Russia, Britain, France plus Germany (P5 1) - have been negotiating for six days to turn an interim accord reached with the Islamic Republic a year ago into a lasting agreement.

The six nations want Tehran to scale back its nuclear programme in exchange for a lifting of sanctions.

Quoting a Western diplomat close to the talks, the Reuters news agency had earlier reported that negotiators were hoping that a deal on "political pieces" could be reached by March.

"Some progress has been made," said the diplomat involved in the talks. "But we need to discuss some issues with our capitals. We will meet again before the new year. This is an ongoing process."

"It's important that they're continuing negotiations to reach an agreement, but there is big disappointment at missing the deadline, and the environment will be more doubtful, unforgiving in both Washington and Tehran," Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council told Al Jazeera from Vienna.

'Serious gaps'

US Secretary of State John Kerry had earlier said in Vienna that "serious gaps" remained between them and Iranians.

He met with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif several times over the past few days in Geneva.



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After 12 years of rising tensions, negotiators sought to reach a deal by Monday midnight aimed at easing fears that Tehran will develop nuclear weapons under the guise of developing energy for civilian use - an ambition Iran denies.

Iranian officials have refused to reduce the volume of uranium they are capable of enriching, a stand western officials say is unacceptable as this would potentially allow the country to amass enough fissile material for an atomic bomb in little time.

A second sticking point is the pace and sequencing of sanctions relief. Iran wants them terminated swiftly, not suspended and gradually scrapped, depending on the degree of Iranian compliance with the deal terms, as the West wants.

Another dispute is over the deal's duration: Western countries want it to be up to 20 years but Iran wants it much shorter.

Israel reaction

Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, welcomed a lack of progress at the Vienna talks.

"No deal is better than a bad deal. The deal that Iran was pushing for was terrible. A deal would have left Iran with the ability to enrich uranium for an atom bomb while removing the sanctions," Netanyahu said.

"The right deal that is needed is to dismantle Iran's capacity to make atomic bombs and only then dismantle the sanctions.

"Since that's not in the offing, this result is better, a lot better," he said, in response to news the Vienna talks were likely to break off and resume next year.

Source: Al Jazeera and Agencies

<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/11/iran-nuclear-talks-likely-adjourned-20141124111048750699.html>

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RT (Russia Today) – Moscow, Russia

Iran Cuts Uranium Gas Stockpile, Complies with Interim Nuclear Deal – IAEA

November 24, 2014

Iran has reduced its stockpile of low-enriched uranium gas to comply with the terms of the interim nuclear agreement signed with the six world powers in 2013, a report by a UN nuclear agency has said.

The paper was released on Monday, the same day as the P5+1 bloc (China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and the US) agreed to prolong the talks on Iran's controversial nuclear program until the end June.

Reuters has obtained a confidential monthly report on the implementation of the preliminary deal, issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its member states.

According to the document, Tehran's stockpile of uranium gas currently amounts to just under 7,400 kilograms, which is below the limit agreed last year.

The reduction of supply must've taken place in the last couple of weeks as it was above the limit earlier in November.

Under the interim deal, Iran agreed to convert a significant part of its low-enriched uranium gas into oxide, which is less suitable for processing it further into weapons-grade material.

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Tehran also promised it would halt its most sensitive nuclear operations in exchange for easing of international sanctions.

The preliminary agreement between Iran and the six world powers was signed to buy time for the current talks on a final settlement of the 12-year dispute over Iranian nuclear program.

Despite Tehran saying that it is refining uranium to fuel its nuclear power plants, the West is concerned that further enrichment may result in Iran creating a nuclear bomb.

<http://rt.com/news/208443-iran-iaea-nuclear-uranium/>

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Sputnik News.com – Russian Information Agency

Kerry: No Sanctions Relief for Iran Until Questions on Nuclear Issue Remain

Sanctions imposed by the US on Iran will not be terminated until questions remain on Tehran's nuclear program, US Secretary of State Kerry said Monday

24 November 2014

VIENNA, November 24 (Sputnik) – The United States is willing to lift its sanctions against Iran, but they will remain in place until the Islamic Republic answers the global community's questions about its nuclear program, US Secretary of State John Kerry said Monday.

"We want to terminate the sanctions... We want the people of Iran to get the economic relief they seek," the top US diplomat said.

"But the world still has serious questions about Iran's nuclear program," he continued. "And for the sanctions to be terminated we need Iran to take steps to answer those questions, that's the bottom line."

"The interim agreement was not violated, Iran has hold up its end of the bargain, and the sanctions regime has remained intact," Kerry added.

Iran's uranium enrichment program sparked controversy as the West accused the country of developing a nuclear weapon and imposed a range of sanctions against the Islamic Republic. Iran has consistently denied the accusations, claiming the uranium enrichment program is serving purely peaceful purposes and is designed to cover the country's growing demand for energy.

During a breakthrough Geneva meeting in November 2013, the P5+1 group struck an interim agreement with Iran, which in particular outlined a limited sanctions relief. In exchange Iran vowed to restrict its nuclear activities.

<http://sputniknews.com/politics/20141124/1015110314.html>

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Tasnim News Agency – Tehran, Iran

Final Nuclear Deal to Ensure Iran's "Actual" Enrichment: Zarif

November 25, 2014

VIENNA (Tasnim) – Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif asserted that a comprehensive nuclear accord with world powers will definitely stipulate an "actual" nuclear enrichment program for Tehran as well as the removal of sanctions.

"Any final agreement will include an actual, not decorative, enrichment (program) for Iran and the removal of the (anti-Iran) sanctions," Zarif told reporters in a press conference in Vienna on Monday night, after a week of



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intensive talks between Iran and group of six world powers (Russia, China, the US, Britain, France and Germany) came to an end.

The talks started on November 18, bringing together foreign ministers from the parties in the hope of breaking a deadlock and secure a final agreement before the November 24 self-imposed deadline.

After a whole host of meetings, the last of which held among the foreign ministers and EU's envoy Catherine Ashton, the parties decided to extend an interim nuclear deal they signed last year (the Joint Plan of Action) into July 1, 2015.

Elsewhere in his comments, Zarif expressed the confidence that parties can reach a consensus on the "framework" of a lasting accord within weeks, or even within days if "political will" is exercised.

"We believe that a negotiated solution is within reach," he asserted.

He said four months are enough to resolve outstanding issues in the nuclear negotiations, noting that the rest of the newly set seven-month deadline would be used to put complicated technical issues into a final agreement.

<http://www.tasnimnews.com/English/Home/Single/568411>

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FARS News Agency – Tehran, Iran

Tuesday, November 25, 2014

Supreme Leader Underlines Enemies' Failure in Defeating Iran in N. Talks

TEHRAN (FNA) - Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei underscored the enemies' failure in forcing Iran to accept their illegitimate excessive demands during the nuclear talks.

"Iran's nuclear issue is another instance of the enemy's weakness," Ayatollah Khamenei said, addressing the political and religious figures participating in the 'International Congress on Takfiri Streams in the Eyes of the Islamic Ulema' in Tehran on Tuesday.

"The US and the hegemonic European countries gathered to bring the Islamic Republic of Iran to its knees, but they failed and they cannot succeed in future either," he added.

His remarks came one day after Iran and the six world powers ended six days of negotiations and decided to meet again in the next 7 months after missing the November 24 deadline to clinch a final deal to resolve their 12-year standoff over Tehran's nuclear program.

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and EU coordinator Catherine Ashton announced last night that the talks had been extended until July 10, and the world powers had taken up to release \$700 million of Iran's frozen assets on a monthly basis.

The 10th and last round of negotiations between Iran and the six world powers was held in Vienna from November 18 to 24.

In July, Tehran and the six countries agreed to extend negotiations until November 24 after they failed to reach an agreement on a number of key issues.

After the Monday talks, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister and senior negotiator Seyed Abbas Araqchi announced that major differences are still in place between Tehran and the world powers, including the details of Iran's enrichment program and mechanisms for removal of the sanctions.

"The issue of enrichment and its limits, extent and capacity, as well as the mechanisms needed for the removal of sanctions are two key issues," Araqchi said in an interview with the state-run TV on Monday night.

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"In addition, there are also several other issues that might not be among the key issues, but are sufficiently important and if they are not resolved, we will not reach any agreement," he added.

Noting that the negotiations are now being held in a more rational atmosphere, Araqchi said, "The result of the negotiations will be something which would meet our redlines and safeguard whatever we have, enrichment will continue and certainly all sanctions will be annulled in the form and sequence (that they have been imposed)."

<http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930904001370>

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Al Arabiya – Dubai, U.A.E.

Iran Can Build 'Any' Weapon: IRGC

By Staff writer, Al Arabiya News

Tuesday, 25 November 2014

An Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps official has hinted at Tehran's nuclear weapons capabilities, after saying there are "no weapons that the military cannot manufacture."

Brig. Gen. Mohammad Rida Naqdi's comments were carried by Fars news agency, on the same day that Iran and six world powers failed for a second time this year to end the dispute over Tehran's suspect nuclear program. The parties agreed to a seven-month extension to the negotiations.

"Despite the military embargo on the Islamic Republic, there is no weapon that our military is not able to manufacture," he said during a forum on Monday titled the "economic resistances' vanguards."

"In comparison with the production of cars and petrochemicals, we have achieved the greatest advances possible at the lowest cost in the defense sector," he added.

Also Monday, Fars quoted the IRGC commander Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari as warning that any U.S. aggression against the Islamic Republic would prompt Tehran to send its troop to liberate the occupied Palestinian territories.

"Americans have very clearly surrendered to Iran's might and this is obvious in their behavior in the region and in the negotiations, and the enemies' reservations vis-a-vis Iran are completely felt," said Jafari, referring to the nuclear talks that were held in Vienna.

He warned that if the United States and its allies dared to launch a military strike against Iran, then "our war will end by conquering Palestine."

<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/11/25/Iran-can-build-any-weapon-Revolutionary-Guards.html>

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Press TV – Tehran, Iran

Talks on Iran Nuclear Issue Showed US Not Trustworthy: MP

Wednesday, November 26, 2014

A senior Iranian legislator has said that nuclear talks between the Islamic Republic and the six major world powers revealed that the United States is not a reliable country.

Chairman of Iranian Parliament's (Majlis) National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Alaeddin Boroujerdi said on Wednesday that Iran's negotiating partners – Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States, and Germany – must live up to their commitments based on the Joint Plan of Action, signed between the two sides in the Swiss city of Geneva last November.



"The Islamic Republic of Iran displayed its sincerity with respect to this accord, but America is trying to weaken the pillars of this agreement by announcing new sanctions [against Iran]," Boroujerdi said during a meeting with chair of the European Parliament's delegation for relations with Iran, Tarja Cronberg, in Tehran.

The top Iranian lawmaker further noted that Washington does not respect the rights of the Iranian nation and tries to influence Iran's position and the result of the talks through sanctions.

Boroujerdi also underscored that such sanctions have helped Iran base its economy on domestic capabilities.

Cronberg, for her part, expressed hope that the Geneva nuclear deal is respected in its entirety.

The latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 group of countries ended in the Austria capital, Vienna, on November 24, with the two sides agreeing to extend the Joint Plan of Action to July 1, 2015.

Under the Joint Plan of Action reached between the two sides in November 2013, a final comprehensive deal aims to give assurances that Tehran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful and, at the same time, lift all sanctions imposed against the Iranian nation over the country's nuclear program.

Iran has repeatedly said its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, including generating electricity and making radioisotopes for its cancer patients.

<http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/11/26/387625/iran-ntalks-revealed-us-unreliability/>

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Tehran Times – Tehran, Iran

Enrichment and Sanctions are Key Issues in Nuclear Talks, Iranian Negotiator Says

Political Desk

Wednesday, November 26, 2014

TEHRAN - Major differences still remain between Iran and the world powers, particularly those pertaining to the details of Iran's enrichment program and the mechanism for lifting of the sanctions, senior Iranian negotiator Seyed Abbas Araqchi has announced.

"The issue of enrichment and its limits, extent and capacity, as well as the mechanisms needed for the removal of sanctions are two key issues," Araqchi said in a TV interview on Monday night.

"There are also several other issues that might not be among the key issues, but are sufficiently important and if they are not resolved, we will not reach any agreement," he added.

Noting that the negotiations are now being held in a more "rational" atmosphere, Araqchi said the result of the negotiations will meet Iran's red lines and safeguard its nuclear rights.

Enrichment program by Iran will continue and sanctions will be annulled in the same way and sequence that they were imposed, said Araqchi who is the deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs.

'Settlement of nuclear issue possible in a short period'

Araqchi also said differences between Iran and the 5+1 group (the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany) have been "narrowed down" and attainment of a final nuclear deal is now possible in a few weeks.

"During the past six months, we have had intensive negotiations and good progress has been achieved in that period, and more common grounds were established compared with the past," he stated.

"This 7 month extension [of the agreement reached in Geneva last year] does not mean that we need that much time, as all sides have agreed that a few weeks will suffice."



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The 10th and last round of negotiations between Iran and the six world powers was held in Vienna in a bid to strike a final deal. However, after the sides failed to agree on a final deal they decided to extend the negotiations until July 1, 2015.

Accordingly, the world powers have taken up to release \$700 million of Iran's frozen assets on a monthly basis.

<http://tehrantimes.com/politics/119770-enrichment-and-sanctions-are-key-issues-in-nuclear-talks-iranian-negotiator-says>

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The Boston Globe – Boston, MA

Wide Gulf Facing Iran Nuclear Talks

By George Jahn, Associated Press (AP)

November 26, 2014

VIENNA — The United States and Iran said a new deadline in nuclear talks could allow them to reach a deal, but Tehran's apparent reluctance to compromise may soon leave US negotiators without ideas on how to reduce Iran's capacity to make nuclear arms.

Western diplomats familiar with the talks said Tuesday that they have agreed on little more than to keep talking until June 30, after failing to substantially narrow differences by Monday's deadline in Vienna.

Based on information from the diplomats, progress thus far has mostly stemmed from the United States and its allies revising positions closer to the minimum of what they may be able to accept. Iran's demands have changed less — and the country may be digging in as the next round approaches.

While Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, has backed the nuclear negotiations, he signaled on Tuesday that his country would stand firm, saying Washington and its European allies will be unable "to bring the Islamic Republic to its knees."

Washington's mantra has long been "no deal is better than a bad deal," and extending the talks has put off a decision on whether to walk away rather than give up too much.

But while the US administration may opt for more wiggle room on the size and capacity of Iran's nuclear program, that may not be the case for powerful skeptics of too much US compromise.

Members of the incoming Republican-controlled Congress have threatened to impose additional sanctions on Iran and may have enough votes to overturn an expected veto by President Obama. That would almost surely push Tehran away from the table.

Shortly after the extension announcement, Senator Mark Kirk, an Illinois Republican whose work with Democratic Senator Bob Menendez of New Jersey on oil sanctions helped drive Iran to the negotiating table, pledged to offer a new bipartisan sanctions package.

Menendez suggested similar action, saying he would work "to ensure that Iran comprehends that we will not ever permit it to become a threshold nuclear state."

For the United States, capping Iran's uranium enrichment program is key to an agreement.

Iran denies any interest in atomic arms and says it needs enrichment to make reactor fuel and for other peaceful uses. But the West fears that Tehran could ramp up the program and enrich to levels used for the fissile core of nuclear weapons.

Iran now has nearly 10,000 centrifuges enriching uranium. Washington began negotiations 10 months ago demanding that Tehran pare that number to less than 2,000, which would increase the time Iran would need to make enough weapons-grade uranium from a few months to a year or more.

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The United States is now ready to accept just over 4,000, the diplomats said on condition of anonymity. Iran now is floating the idea of around 8,000.

In addition, Washington originally it wanted the enrichment restrictions in place for 20 years or more. Now, it may be ready to accept 15 years.

Iran, however, wants limits substantially below 10 years, while continuing to insist on expanding the program immediately after constraints are lifted. It is aiming for enriched uranium output at that point that would equal nearly 200 percent more than the centrifuges it now has. That is unacceptable to the Americans.

With centrifuge numbers in dispute, the United States and its six negotiating partners, including Russia and China, have proposed other ways to push Iran's time for making enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb to a year or more.

One way would be to persuade Tehran to ship out much of its stockpile of uranium gas, reducing it from about seven tons to no more than half a ton. Iran appeared interested at least until Wednesday, said the diplomats, negotiating with Russia as the possible recipient.

But in a potential complication last week, Iran's nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi, said: "There is no reason to send our fuel to Russia."

<http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2014/11/25/iran-nuke-talks-face-obstacles-even-with-more-time/RiV5CDciLtwQtfr1ZVbsGK/story.html>

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The Express Tribune.com – Karachi, Pakistan

Pakistan Has Fastest Growing Nuclear Weapons Programme in the World: Report

Pakistan could produce as many as 200 nuclear devices by 2020, Council on Foreign Relations report notes

By Hassaan Khan

November 24, 2014

Pakistan has the fastest growing nuclear weapons programme in the world and could have enough fissile material to produce more than 200 nuclear devices by 2020, an influential American think tank said in a report.

The special report by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) titled "Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age", also identified South Asia as the region "most at risk of a breakdown in strategic stability due to an explosive mixture of unresolved territorial disputes, cross-border terrorism, and growing nuclear arsenals."

Pakistan, the report said, has deployed or is developing 11 delivery systems for its nuclear warheads, including aircraft, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

"Pakistan has not formally declared the conditions under which it would use nuclear weapons but has indicated that it seeks primarily to deter India from threatening its territorial integrity or the ability of its military to defend its territory," the report added.

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Pakistan Nuclear Delivery Systems, 2013

Delivery system	Year deployed (first tested)	Range (km)	Payload (kg)	Status
Aircraft				
F-16A/B	1998	1600	4500	-
Mirage V	1998	2100	4000	-
Ballistic Missiles				
Abdali - Hatf-2	2012	-180	200-400	Under development
Ghaznavi - Hatf-3	2004	290	500	Fewer than 50 Hatf-1,3,4 & 9 launchers combined
Shaheen I - Hatf-4	2003	650	750-1000	Fewer than 50 Hatf-1,3,4 & 9 launchers combined
Ghauri - Hatf-5	2003	>1200	700-1000	Fewer than 50 launchers
Shaheen II - Hatf-6	2011	2500	-1000	Unknown number of launchers
Nasr - Hatf-9	2013	-60	Unknown	Fewer than 50 Hatf-1,3,4 & 9 launchers combined
Cruise Missile				
Babur - Hatf-7	2005	600	400-500	Under development; ground launched
Ra'ad - Hatf-8	2007	350	Unknown	Under development; air launched

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2013

Further, the report said, while Pakistan is focused predominantly on the threat posed by India, it is reportedly also concerned by the potential for the United States to launch a military operation to seize or disarm Pakistani nuclear weapons.

“This concern is based in part on reported contingency planning by the US military to prevent Pakistani nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists,” said the report. Pakistani officials, however, deny that these concerns affect Pakistan’s nuclear force posture or plans.

The report, authored by George Mason University’s Gregory Koblenz, notes that India and Pakistan face more severe security challenges than those of the other nuclear weapon states due to their history of high-intensity and low-intensity conflicts, higher levels of domestic instability, geographic proximity, the dispute over Kashmir that has existential implications for both countries, and the history of cross-border terrorism.

“The next crisis between India and Pakistan could be sparked by a cross-border military incursion, a mass-casualty terrorist attack or a high-profile assassination,” the report added.

Further, the report said, the size and composition of Pakistan’s nuclear forces appear increasingly dictated by India’s growing conventional military capabilities.

“Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for its conventional inferiority will likely be an enduring feature of the nuclear balance in South Asia,” said the report.

The report also highlights a ‘worrisome’ development that the Indian and Pakistani practice of storing their nuclear warheads separately from launchers, which has provided a strong barrier to nuclear escalation in the past, may be eroding.

Pakistan’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on short-range missiles and India’s development of a sea-based deterrent may lead both states to loosen their highly centralised command and control practices, the report notes.

“The short flight times of ballistic missiles between India and Pakistan exacerbate these tensions by sharply reducing decision-making timelines for government officials during a crisis,” said the report.



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The CFR special report calls for a long-term negotiating effort by the United States with the other six recognised nuclear states (China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United Kingdom) to address specific sources of instability, including missile defense, antisatellite weapons, and conventional counterforce systems.

Further, to improve the prospects for stability in South Asia, the report recommends encouraging official and Track II dialogues among China, India, and Pakistan on nuclear issues, and building scientific and diplomatic capacity in India and Pakistan to enable discussions on these subjects.

The report also urged the Obama administration to deepen bilateral and multilateral dialogues with the other nuclear weapon states on strategic stability and build capacity within India and Pakistan to participate in such dialogues.

<http://tribune.com.pk/story/796359/pakistan-has-fastest-growing-nuclear-weapons-programme-in-world-report/>

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The Express Tribune – Karachi, Pakistan

Pakistan more than Capable of Securing its Nuclear stockpiles: Pentagon

CFR report states that Pakistan could produce more than 200 nuclear devices by 2020

By Web Desk

November 26, 2014

WASHINGTON: The US on Tuesday reiterated its belief that Pakistan has the capability to secure its expanding nuclear stockpiles.

During a Department of Defense briefing at the Pentagon on Tuesday, Press Secretary Rear Admiral John Kirby was asked about Pakistan's expanding nuclear arsenal and the fear that some of it may fall into the wrong hands.

"We've long said that we believe Pakistan is more than capable of securing their stockpiles," Kirby replied.

A report by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) released on Monday, titled 'Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age', said that Pakistan harbours the fastest growing nuclear weapons programme in the world which could have enough fissile material to produce more than 200 nuclear devices by 2020.

Pakistan, the report said, has deployed or is developing 11 delivery systems for its nuclear warheads, including aircraft, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

It also identified South Asia as the region "most at risk of a breakdown in strategic stability due to an explosive mixture of unresolved territorial disputes, cross-border terrorism and growing nuclear arsenals."

<http://tribune.com.pk/story/797374/pakistan-more-than-capable-of-securing-its-nuclear-stockpiles-pentagon/>

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Bloomberg View.com – New York, NY

OPINION/Editorial

Chuck Hagel's Nuclear Disaster

By The Editors

November 24, 2014

The shenanigans that have been going on at U.S. nuclear bases are almost too clownish to believe: officers running a drug ring across six facilities, widespread cheating on monthly proficiency tests, blast doors on missile silos too rusty to properly seal, six nuclear-armed missiles accidentally loaded onto a plane that then flew across the country, and a curious story of crews at three bases FedExing one another an apparently magical wrench used to connect warheads to intercontinental ballistic missiles.

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Given such blatant management problems, it's also hard to swallow the \$1.5 billion funding demand for the program from Chuck Hagel, who is expected to step down as defense secretary today. Rather than pad budgets, the defense secretary should bring the nuclear program up to snuff, in part by scaling it down to best meet the security needs the U.S. faces today.

The principal strategy behind the existing nuclear program is deterrence. But what makes for effective deterrence has changed since the end of the Cold War. No longer does it make sense to keep an enormous arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles, with their powerful warheads capable of blowing up cities. The chances that the U.S. would ever use these doomsday weapons are so negligible that it has little deterrent effect on such threats as a nuclear-armed Iran or North Korea, or even a resurgent Russian superpower. Smaller "tactical" weapons, such as a plane-carried bomb with a variable-yield warhead (it can be "dialed down" to a small blast size), are not just better suited to taking out an enemy nuclear-weapon delivery system, but they also are a far more believable threat, because they would cause far less collateral damage than an ICBM.

So rather than repair every one of those rusty silo doors and spend billions to maintain 450 nuclear-armed land-based missiles, as Hagel has proposed, the Pentagon should scale back to fewer than 100. And instead of developing a new generation of ICBMs, it should focus on extending the life of the current Minuteman III missiles.

The other two legs of the U.S. nuclear triad -- air- and sea-based weapons -- don't require such radical cuts. But the existing fleet of 14 Ohio-class submarines, each capable of carrying 24 Trident II missiles, could be pared by two or three without sacrificing capability. The Navy should also consider scaling back its request for 12 next-generation subs, expected to cost a cumulative \$100 billion.

The Pentagon could also save money by slowing development of the Long-Range Strike Bomber, meant to replace the B-2 stealth craft sometime in the 2020s at a potential cost of more than \$50 billion. Some of the savings could go toward maintaining the B-2 and the Air Force's 90 or so remaining B-52s, still the workhorse of the skies after 60 years in service.

One other much-discussed money-saving step, however, would be shortsighted: removing the 180 or so B61 tactical bombs now deployed at airfields in Europe. They should be kept in place and modernized -- in part to remind Russian President Vladimir Putin that the U.S. still has Europe's back.

It's hard to put an exact price tag on the savings such changes would achieve. But a less ambitious plan by Republican Senator Tom Coburn, which envisioned keeping 300 ICBMs, had projected savings of \$79 billion over a decade. That would pay for a whole bunch of new magic wrenches.

<http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-11-24/the-pentagons-nuclear-disaster>

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Defense News.com – Washington, D.C.

OPINION/Commentary

Nuclear Arsenal: Best US Investment

By Adam Lowther and Michaela Dodge

November 24, 2014

With Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel recently announcing he will provide an additional \$10 billion to improve the nation's nuclear forces, advocates of nuclear abolition are undoubtedly upset.

Over the past five years these detractors have published a series of reports decrying the cost of the nuclear force, largely without realizing that because the nuclear arsenal has been starved of funding for two decades that recent problems, at least in part, developed.

Thus, Hagel's decision is unfortunate news for disarmament advocates, who spent the past two weeks making tired and inaccurate arguments. These critics are misleading when they discuss the costs of nuclear weapons and

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their delivery systems because they consistently fail to provide necessary context to understand just how much the US spends on the nuclear arsenal.

With proponents of the nuclear arsenal offering little response, it is no wonder some Americans see the nation's nuclear forces as too expensive to maintain.

Nuclear Arms in Defense Budget

The 2014 Department of Defense base budget amounted to \$526.6 billion, a steady decline from the height of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Some nuclear abolitionists have sought to incorporate a variety of expenses that are not directly related to the American nuclear arsenal (non-proliferation efforts, bombers performing conventional strike missions, and military personnel performing non-nuclear work) in order to inflate arsenal costs. The most accurate estimates suggest taxpayers spend about \$15 billion on nuclear-force related activities and \$11.8 billion on the National Nuclear Security Administration, for a total of \$27 billion.

The nuclear arsenal (weapons and delivery platforms) accounts for 5.1 percent of the base defense budget. In other words, \$95 out of every \$100 the US spends on defense goes to non-nuclear programs and activities. To argue that devoting 5 cents of each defense dollar to an insurance policy that has effectively prevented World War III for seven decades is a bad investment is a specious argument.

Even at twice the cost — 10 percent of defense spending — nuclear weapons are the greatest value in the defense budget.

Some in the Pentagon and Congress claim each dollar spent on nuclear weapons is a dollar wasted because "we never use nuclear weapons," but such arguments show a fundamental ignorance of the role nuclear weapons play in deterring peer competitors from challenging the United States directly. We use nuclear weapons every day.

The fact that the greatest threat facing the United States comes from a terrorist group like the Islamic State is a testament to the effectiveness of nuclear weapons in deterring countries that have an actual ability to threaten US sovereignty.

Nuclear Arms in Federal Budget

In the context of the larger federal budget, the incongruity of the arguments offered by nuclear abolitionists becomes even more evident. In fiscal 2014, the federal government spent \$3.78 trillion. The arsenal accounted for 0.7 percent of federal spending, less than one penny of each dollar the federal government spends.

According to a Government Accountability Office report released in April, the agency that oversees Medicare estimates that in fiscal 2013 almost \$50 billion in improper payments, some of which was fraud, were made to the program. Improper and fraudulent payments to Medicare, then, were nearly double that of the budget for the nuclear arsenal. Reducing fraud and other errors in this federal program would more than pay for the arsenal's sustainment and modernization.

Nuclear Arms in Your Budget

Admittedly, discussions of billions and trillions of dollars are largely unfathomable for most people. If, as we suggest, nuclear weapons are the ultimate insurance policy, it may be more appropriate to compare the cost of nuclear weapons to the cost of, for example, health insurance.

According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, the average American family spent \$16,351 on health insurance (premiums and company contributions) in 2014. That same family will spend between \$152 and \$304 for the ultimate protection the nuclear arsenal provides. Giving up one Starbucks coffee each week more than covers the average US family's contribution to the maintenance of our greatest defense.

Thus, when nuclear abolitionists suggest the nuclear arsenal is unaffordable, they are dead wrong. No other federal or defense programs provides Americans with a greater return on their investment.

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Adam Lowther is a Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base. Michaela Dodge is Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation. The views expressed are those of the authors alone.

<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20141124/DEFFEAT05/311240020/Nuclear-Arsenal-Best-US-Investment?odyssey=nav%7Chead>

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The Buffalo News.com – Buffalo, NY

OPINION/Editorial

Staggering Problems in Nuclear Force Demand Nation's Immediate Attention

November 24, 2014

Remember the Air Force cheating scandal involving missile officers? Well, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has two independent reports in hand detailing the struggles to keep this country's nuclear arms safe, secure and at the ready, and it won't be cheap.

Fixing the numerous problems will cost the Pentagon billions of dollars over the next five years, and that's just to make emergency repairs to its nuclear weapons infrastructure, according to reporting by the New York Times.

The problems are "systemic," according to senior defense officials.

America got a hint of that much following the scandal at the start of the year in which at least 34 officers responsible for launching the nation's nuclear missiles were suspended and had their security clearances revoked. They had been accused of cheating on monthly proficiency tests, something that turned out to be routine because of the intense pressure to get perfect scores to report up the chain of command.

There have also been reports of drug use, attitude problems and rock-bottom morale. Defense experts linked part of the cause to the end of the Cold War, which has seen counterterrorism rise in status above the nuclear force.

Known as missileers, the job of these sentries is stressful and apparently not very interesting these days. In May 2013, the Air Force disclosed that it removed 17 officers assigned to stand watch over nuclear-tipped Minuteman missiles after finding safety violations, potential violations in protecting codes and attitude problems. That November, the Associated Press reported that Air Force officers with nuclear launch authority had twice been caught napping with the blast door open. That is the door designed to keep terrorists from entering the sites.

The reports Hagel just received find fault with the state of the Pentagon's nuclear weapons facilities, silos and submarine fleet. Blast doors that would not seal shut and, ridiculously in one instance, crews maintaining the nation's 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles having only a single wrench that could tighten the bolts on their nuclear missiles.

The solution? FedExing the one tool to three bases spread across the country.

This is a sad and scary situation. For decades, Americans have thought themselves protected by a state-of-the-art nuclear umbrella that would deter others from using nuclear weapons against us. The latest revelations show how compromised that umbrella is.

The results of Hagel's two studies, one by senior Pentagon staff members and one led by two retired officers, puts the president in an awkward position. On the one hand, he is busily promoting global elimination of nuclear weapons and prodding Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program, while his top defense official is saying America needs to spend billions to upgrade its own system.

That spending will be necessary. As more nations acquire or improve their nuclear arsenals – North Korea comes to mind – the United States becomes a bigger target. In response, the Obama administration is upgrading nuclear laboratories and extending the life of aging warheads.

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And there is much more to be done. The president will have to persuade Congress to spend even more money on the nuclear force. And the Pentagon has to deal with the myriad problems associated with discipline, protocols and morale of a burned-out military workforce in charge of our nuclear arsenal.

<http://www.buffalonews.com/opinion/buffalo-news-editorials/staggering-problems-in-nuclear-force-demand-nations-immediate-attention-20141124>

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The Daily Signal.com – Washington, D.C.

OPINION/Commentary

Chuck Hagel Learned to Love the Bomb. Will His Successor?

By Michaela Dodge

November 24, 2014

When Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel entered the Obama administration, he was a proponent of U.S. unilateral nuclear weapons reductions. He believed that nuclear weapons are irrelevant and that the U.S. would be better off getting rid of them.

Now, he's resigned—and his change of opinion on nuclear weapons might surprise you.

Hagel leaves after having proposed to spend an additional \$1.5 billion a year on nuclear forces to mitigate issues identified in this month's Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise (the Independent Review) and the Pentagon's own review. The increase in investment is overdue and must be maintained by the next secretary of defense. Indeed, the problem the next secretary will face is President Obama's commitment to reducing the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

In 2009, President Obama declared his desire for a world without nuclear weapons. Although he promised to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent, he negotiated the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia and then retreated on his nuclear modernization promises when the first opportunity presented itself. New START failed, and Russia today deploys more nuclear warheads than the United States. The president promised to speed up the Chemical Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility at Los Alamos, but the administration cancelled the plan a year after New START entered into force. The president promised to deploy all four phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, a missile defense plan for the protection of the United States and the European allies, but the administration canceled the last phase of the EPAA last year.

In Berlin in 2013, Obama declared his desire to further reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal by a third. Reality interfered yet again when it became clear that Russia is increasing the number of its deployed nuclear weapons under New START and massively modernizing its nuclear arsenal, including building new nuclear warhead designs. In comparison, the newest nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal are built based on designs from the 1970s. The reality is that nuclear deterrence remains extremely relevant in the current world and the United States has not been serious in thinking about its deterrent for some time.

The Independent Review identified a significant gap between the soldiers who operate the nuclear system and the leadership as one of the core problems of forces that operate U.S. nuclear weapons. The report emphasizes that the issue needs "to be addressed quickly and effectively."

The problem starts in the White House and its dedication to nuclear disarmament ideology. The next secretary of defense will have to deal with the world as it is, not as the president imagines it. A strong nuclear deterrent remains a cornerstone of a sound U.S. nuclear weapons policy and deserves an attention as such.

Michaela Dodge specializes in missile defense, nuclear weapons modernization and arms control as policy analyst for defense and strategic policy in The Heritage Foundation's Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies.

<http://dailysignal.com/2014/11/24/chuck-hagel-learned-love-bomb-will-successor/>

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Cato Institute.org – Washington, D.C.

OPINION/Cato at Liberty

Bring China and Its Neighbors under the INF Missile Treaty

By Doug Bandow

November 24, 2014

As U.S. relations with Russia go from bad to worse, even old agreements seem at risk. Such as the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty.

The 1987 pact essentially cleared Europe of mid-range missiles (between 500 and 5500 kilometers). But the State Department recently charged Moscow with violating the treaty.

The INF treaty has been to America's advantage, since it does not cover U.S. military allies, such as Britain and France. Even more important, the U.S. has no potentially hostile neighbors with such a capability, while Russia faces China, India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.

Moscow officials have suggested that they may leave the agreement at some point. To forestall that possibility the U.S. and Moscow should seek to include China and other regional powers in the pact.

Although relations between Moscow and Washington obviously are strained, the U.S. should approach Russia about amending the INF Treaty to allow deployments in Asia, unless otherwise agreed. The two governments should simultaneously propose that Beijing and its neighbors accede to the pact.

Admittedly, winning signatures from other nations, especially China, would not be easy. The PRC believes its short- and medium-range missiles serve a significant security role.

However, the PRC's more aggressive approach to Asia-Pacific territorial issues has antagonized neighboring states. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in particular, are likely to become increasingly interested in developing countervailing missile capabilities.

In the future the PRC may face a plethora of countervailing weapons deployed by several states. Then Beijing might view a ban as more to its liking.

Negotiations over expanding the INF Treaty would make Beijing a full global partner on arms control, recognizing the country's rising international status. Although the PRC has tended to view such limits as a means of maintaining U.S. "hegemony," Washington could suggest accession as the best means to forestall any further increase in U.S. military presence in the region as part of the famed "pivot" or "rebalance."

Some analysts instead advocate responding to the PRC's military build-up by withdrawing from the pact and introducing comparable missiles. As an alternative, David W. Kearns, Jr. of St. John's University suggested enhancing U.S. offensive capabilities in the region and defensive responses to missile attacks.

However, as I point out in China-US focus, "nearby nations should be responsible for maintaining regional security. American policymakers should use expansion of the INF Treaty as a means to reduce U.S. defense obligations."

China's growing missile force challenges America's dominance in Asia—most directly the ability to project power—not America's survival at home. The most likely contingency is an attack on Taiwan, which is quite different from a strike on the U.S. The Cold War justification for America's extensive military presence in the region has disappeared.

America's friends and neighbors, no less than China, have prospered and are able to defend themselves. That obviously is best for the U.S., since Beijing will always have an incentive to spend and risk more in its own neighborhood than will America.



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Restricting Washington's role also would reduce the potential for a superpower confrontation over less than vital interests. Ironically, America's conventional superiority inflates the danger of a great power confrontation. Explained Kearn: "in a crisis or a conflict, regional adversaries may have incentives to escalate (or threaten escalation) against U.S. forces in the region or U.S. allies to de-escalate the crisis and ensure regime survival once the United States has become involved."

Expanding the INF Treaty to Asia would help reduce growing military tensions and dampen geopolitical competition, especially over territorial issues. Achieving this end won't be easy, but it is an area where the U.S. and Russia can cooperate. While China might initially be wary of joining such an effort, a new arms control regime would ultimately offer Beijing significant benefits as well.

Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry.

<http://www.cato.org/blog/bring-china-its-neighbors-under-inf-missile-treaty>

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International Relations and Security Network (ISN) - Zurich, Switzerland
OPINION/Article

The Case for Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Are tactical nuclear weapons outdated relics of the Cold War? Should they be phased out of the US' and NATO's arsenals? On the contrary, says John Klein. As he sees it, the deterrence value of these weapons remains as powerful as ever.

By John J. Klein for ISN

November 25, 2014

Nuclear weapons and deterrence continue to be topics of heated discussion among arms control advocates and policy makers within the United States and abroad, as exemplified by the ongoing diplomatic dialogue to limit Iran's nuclear capability. Within the arms control community, some view nuclear deterrence as being an antiquated remnant of the Cold War, with no utility in today's more multilateral security environment. Still others see tactical nuclear weapons as being especially counterproductive to peace and stability, and argue that they should be phased out of U.S. and NATO military strategies. Yet this view is incorrect. Because tactical nuclear weapons are at times a more credible response under the principles defined by customary international law, these weapons enhance deterrence and subsequently improve international peace and security.

Background

Tactical nuclear weapons are frequently defined as non-strategic nuclear weapons, or nuclear warheads not currently covered under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. In particular, the U.S. B-61-aircraft-released gravity bomb is categorized as a tactical nuclear weapon, and this weapon is currently an integral part of U.S. and NATO military plans. U.S. tactical nuclear weapons typically have lower detonation yields—reportedly ranging from 0.3-300 kilotons—compared to strategic warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which reportedly have yields upwards of 1.2 megatons. While the United States forward deploys tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as part of a sharing agreement with NATO, their numbers have been reduced from a peak of 8,000 to about 200 today. In contrast, Russia is estimated to have upwards of 6000 tactical nuclear weapons in its arsenal.

The most current U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provides guidance related to both nuclear strategy and tactical nuclear weapons. Released in 2010, the NPR reaffirms existing strategic guidance that the primary role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is to deter a nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, and partners. Accordingly, the United States will maintain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and heavy bombers and will proceed with a full scope life extension program for the B-61 bomb. The United States will

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also continue and, where appropriate, expand consultations with allies and partners to address how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrent.

What the critics say

Despite their current role in support of extended deterrence to allies and partners, critics of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons argue for their reduction or elimination. In May 2012, the arms control group Global Zero called for eliminating all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons over the next ten years, stating that their strategic utility is practically nil. Global Zero believes that the extended deterrence commitment to partners or allies could be met by either U.S. strategic nuclear and conventional forces, instead of tactical nuclear weapons. Additionally, a 2013 report by the Stimson Center states that having tactical nuclear weapons will likely increase the proliferation of the weapons by other countries. The report concludes that tactical nuclear weapons add little to deterrence, complicate safety and security, and invite military preemption. Still other arms control advocates see tactical nuclear weapons as leading to conflict escalation through the eventual use of larger, strategic nuclear weapons. Hence, tactical nuclear weapons are said to never be a suitable response and should not be part of any deterrence strategy.

Despite the criticisms, tactical nuclear weapons still play a role in the U.S. extended deterrence promise to partners and allies, and this promise helps limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons in other countries around the globe. Without extended deterrence, U.S. partners or allies might feel compelled to develop their own nuclear weapons, in order to guarantee their security against future nuclear power aggressors. Moreover, tactical nuclear weapons actually enhance extended deterrence, when considered within the international norms of armed conflict.

The law of armed conflict

Deterrence works only if a credible threat of retaliatory force exists, and for the U.S. defense community, credibility is typically governed by what is known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), which is an extension of that part of customary international law regulating the conduct of armed hostilities. When considering the utility of tactical nuclear weapons, two LOAC principles are most germane: the principles of military necessity and lawful targeting. The principle of military necessity calls for using only that degree and kind of force required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy, while taking into consideration the minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources. This principle is designed to limit the application of force to that required for carrying out lawful military purposes. Although the principle of military necessity recognizes that some collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians may occur when a legitimate military target is attacked, it does not excuse the wanton destruction of lives and property disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained. For the employment of nuclear weapons, therefore, the weapons used should not cause more destruction than necessary to achieve military objectives. Consequently, a smaller yield nuclear weapon may be preferred over a larger yield warhead, if the military objectives can still be achieved.

In contrast, the principle of lawful targeting requires that all reasonable precautions be taken to ensure the targeting of only military objectives, so that damage to civilian objects (collateral damage) or death and injury to civilians (incidental injury) is avoided as much as possible. When considering the size of nuclear yields under this principle, an excessively large nuclear warhead could be more difficult to successfully employ against a more localized target, with non-combatants located nearby.

Implications

In order to have a credible nuclear deterrent—one that is able to deter potential future threats—the United States must have a variety of nuclear weapons that are able to deliver from minor to severe military effects. The U.S. nuclear arsenal, therefore, should include an ample number of low-yield nuclear weapons, so that the president is provided with the best choice of potential response options following an adversary's attack. The application of the principle of military necessity to any potential U.S. nuclear response following an act of aggression means that the response should not exceed the kind or degree of force needed to accomplish the military objective. Additionally, the application of the principle of lawful targeting means that a nuclear response should discriminate between military objectives and civilian objects to mitigate collateral damage and incidental injury. For these reasons, low-



yield tactical nuclear weapons may prove to be the preferred nuclear response option vice larger and potentially more indiscriminate nuclear warheads.

If an adversary used a low-yield nuclear weapon against a NATO member and a commensurate low-yield nuclear weapon was not readily available for a response to the attack, NATO leadership would need to weigh other options, such as employing a higher-yield nuclear weapon or conventional weapons with a similar destructive effect. Both options pose challenges for policymakers. Using a significantly higher-yield, strategic nuclear weapon might greatly increase the possibility of conflict escalation, which is seldom a preferred outcome. The employment of a higher-yield nuclear response option might also exceed the degree of force needed to accomplish the military objective and, therefore, could violate the principle of military necessity under the LOAC. Additionally, because these strategic weapons are carried aboard ballistic missiles, employment of strategic nuclear weapons proves more problematic because of their potential overflight of other countries, which can miscommunicate the missile's intent and target. As for planning for and relying on a conventional response to a nuclear strike, U.S. policymakers would be required to consider how this might undermine allied perceptions of Washington's resolve, commitment to the idea of extended deterrence, and the credibility of the American nuclear arsenal.

Final thoughts

Nuclear weapons and deterrence are important topics that deserve to be debated among the international community. Such debate is especially meaningful because of the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea, along with ongoing pressure to modernize the U.S. nuclear forces. Any reduction in the number of tactical nuclear weapons in either U.S. or NATO shared stockpiles, however, should be made with serious consideration of the risks posed by such an action. Tactical nuclear weapons—under some scenarios—provide a more credible threat of retaliatory force to a potential nuclear attack when compared to strategic nuclear weapons. As a result, these weapons improve the viability of extended deterrence and therefore help limit the proliferation of nuclear programs. Also, low-yield tactical nuclear weapons can help limit conflict escalation and avoid unnecessary civilian casualties. For all these reasons, tactical nuclear weapons still have a critical role to play in U.S. and NATO security measures.

John J. Klein is a Principal Analyst at Analytic Services in Falls Church, Virginia and writes frequently on national security, military strategy, and the Law of Armed Conflict.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Analytic Services or those of the United States Government.

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The New York Times – New York, NY

OPINION/The Opinion Pages

America Musn't Neglect Its Nukes

By ELBRIDGE COLBY

November 25, 2014

WASHINGTON — Earlier this month the Pentagon released a devastating assessment of its own management of the nation's nuclear arsenal. The report, authored by two widely respected former four-star officers, judged that America's nuclear weapons complex — particularly the personnel who operate and maintain it — is near its breaking point, worn down by years of neglect, lack of funding and unnecessarily invasive and inquisitorial screening of employees. This malaise has been exacerbated by bouts of apathy and even hostility on the part of prominent voices in and out of government: The prevalent attitude is that there are more important national security priorities and, among some, that nukes are useless and should be left to rust.

The situation is considerably worse than we thought — even worse than in 2007 when it was revealed that the Air Force had inadvertently transported six live nuclear weapons from North Dakota to Louisiana. Last week a senior

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Pentagon official claimed in a background briefing that unless immediate and substantial action is taken to modernize antiquated infrastructure, prioritize the issue, and relieve suffocating bureaucratic pressure, the nation's nuclear complex risks coming apart at the seams.

To avert this, the Pentagon has identified roughly 100 remedial actions, steps estimated to cost around one to two billion dollars annually, on top of the \$15-\$16 billion per year the department anticipates spending on nuclear forces in the coming half-decade.

That's a pretty penny. And so voices have quickly been raised to say that this would be a foolhardy waste of money. Aren't nuclear weapons becoming obsolete? Shouldn't we welcome this review as a step toward a nuclear-free world? Shouldn't we spend this money on conventional forces we might actually use? Aren't nukes a monetary sinkhole and a strategic dead-end?

The answer to all these questions is no. Spending this money and making these changes is not just advisable, it's essential.

First, the world is becoming more dangerous. America and the allies it has pledged to defend face challenges from a resurgent Russia, an increasingly assertive China, a bellicose North Korea and a recalcitrant Iran. At the same time, Russia, China and North Korea have all been modernizing their nuclear arsenals with a view toward using them in the event of conflict with the United States. Moreover, as the Pentagon is making more and more clear, non-nuclear military buildups, especially in Russia and China, are jeopardizing America's conventional military advantages — advantages that had until now allowed America to reduce its emphasis on its nuclear arsenal.

These dynamics are also leading non-nuclear allies of the United States to worry, prompting them to make growing noises about pursuing nuclear arsenals of their own. Together, these factors mean that the United States' nuclear arsenal is becoming more, not less, relevant.

At the same time, the problems identified in the report and the consequent need for money and attention are not the product of some irremediable defect in the nation's nuclear arsenal. They arose, as the Pentagon review made clear, because America's nuclear weapons have suffered from a quarter century of neglect from the Pentagon, the Air Force and Congress.

The small amount of spending has been miserly. For instance, missileers at Minot, Malmstrom, and the F.E. Warren Air Force bases have had to resort to Fedexing a 1960s-era tool necessary for the maintenance of intercontinental ballistic missiles among the three bases where they are housed.

Nor has the problem been limited to money. Nuclear personnel have been subjected to a near-Orwellian inspections system and a degree of micromanagement far beyond what security and effectiveness require. For instance, the review reported that some especially conscientious personnel forgo important medical treatments because they fear that doing so will lead to their being suspended from work for weeks since even the most minor medical exams bureaucratically trigger the requirement for full-scale review of the individual's reliability. Even a broken finger or sprained ankle is reason for temporary suspension from duty.

Little wonder, then, that there have been mistakes and a general decline in the quality of performance. Indeed, as the review made clear, it's a testament to the dedication and skill of the armed forces' nuclear specialists that things have stayed together as well as they have — but there is no margin left for continued jury-rigging.

If a nation needs something, it should be willing to pay for it. And strategic circumstances make clear that the United States will need a powerful and first-rate nuclear arsenal for years to come. Ensuring we have one won't be cheap — but it also won't break the bank.

At its peak, recapitalizing the nation's nuclear arsenal and the facilities that sustain it would only consume around 7 percent of the defense budget. But a lot of that bill will hit in the coming 10 to 15 years, and so Congress and the executive branch will need to make special efforts to allocate the resources required now. One way to do so might be through a dedicated national deterrent fund fenced off from the rest of the defense budget.

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But this is not only about money. It's also a question of political and institutional support. The president and major officials in both parties have been neglectful, and many on the left in particular talk openly about the need to sideline and get rid of nuclear weapons.

This needs to change. Instead, the executive branch and Congress should demonstrate clear and consistent support for the American nuclear deterrent and should ensure that the military services — and particularly the Air Force — focus on maintaining and modernizing it.

In an increasingly hazardous and unstable world, allowing America's nuclear weapons to atrophy is a luxury we can no longer afford. Last week's review is a gentle wake-up call. We should take this opportunity to fix the problem rather than wait for a ruder jolt.

Elbridge Colby is the Robert M. Gates Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He previously worked in the Pentagon and for the Congressional Strategic Posture on nuclear issues.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/26/opinion/america-musnt-neglect-its-nukes.html? r=0>

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The Diplomat – Tokyo, Japan

OPINION/Feature

Dr. Strangelove's Advice to U.S. and Russian Nuclear Planners

A recent report offers some disturbing advice for nuclear weapons policy.

By Walter C. Clemens, Jr. for *The Diplomat*

November 26, 2014

Relations between Washington and Moscow are strained for many reasons. And advice from the ivory tower, no matter how well intentioned, can sometimes make things even worse. This year, a working group of U.S. and Russian academics deliberated on how to make their two countries' strategic forces more "compatible." The lead authors, a American and a Russian professor – neither a specialist in security issues – looked for ways to assure stable deterrence despite a widening gap in each country's economic and technological capabilities. Their report takes for granted that Russia has come to rely heavily on nuclear weapons rather than on modernized conventional forces to defend its borders (against whom is not clear, perhaps Estonia or Afghanistan?). As if taking its cues from a resurrected Dr. Strangelove, the report asserts:

Reliance on a first-strike nuclear capability, missile defenses, launch-on-warning systems, and other security policies considered destabilizing during the heightened tensions of the Cold War are much more stabilizing in the current context, and would be feasible ways to reduce nuclear arsenals while providing greater security and transparency.

It is strange to find seekers of strategic compatibility endorsing plans to launch on warning, if only because radar screens can mislead and have on occasion nearly provoked a nuclear first strike. The report could instead have backed calls to terminate such plans.

The folly of continuing a posture of launch on warning is underscored by a recent Pentagon report detailing the material and human shortfalls of America's strategic missile forces. Crews have one wrench to affix warheads for 450 intercontinental missiles. Aging blast doors for sixty year-old silos do not seal shut. Submarine lack spare parts. Human weaknesses are probably more serious. Poor morale and boredom are also issues. Looking to bolster spirits, some reviewers recommended restoring "select crew" patches.

Last year, Maj. Gen. Michael Carey, commander of the entire ICBM force, was fired after an investigation into a drinking binge and other misconduct while he was in Russia as head of a visiting U.S. government delegation. Last March, nine officers were fired at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, which is the third of the three nuclear missile bases, in response to an exam-cheating scandal there. This November, the Air Force fired two commanders and disciplined a third in response to internal investigations of leadership lapses and misbehavior at two of its three intercontinental ballistic missile bases.



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An even deeper problem, of course, is that a single human being, perhaps tired and frustrated, can choose to launch these missiles with no oversight from Congress or the public. Thus, the fate of humanity has rested on the good sense and calm nerves of leaders such as Nikita Khrushchev and George W. Bush, as it does now on Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin. To empower potentially frail chief executives with such power is madness.

If material and human weaknesses plague the American strategic forces, is there any reason to doubt that similar issues trouble the Russian as well – probably exacerbated by a culture that approves “*pei do dna* – drink to the bottom?”

And while American and Russian academics hope for “compatibility” of their countries’ strategic forces, Russian authorities announced in November 2014 that Russia will skip the international security summit to be hosted by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2016. The head of Russia’s state nuclear company, Sergei V. Kiirienko, also announced that Russia did not contemplate expanded cooperation with the United States to safeguard Russia’s nuclear materials, even though they are still widely scattered and vulnerable to theft. Meanwhile, Russia has not only invaded Ukraine (and lied about it) but also sent bombers and ships to menace Sweden, Estonia, Spain, the United States, and even Australia.

Given all this, should Washington and Moscow follow the working group’s advice to devote greater effort to missile defense? No. This is another recommendation that is not only useless but probably dangerous.

Hope that ABM systems could fend off Armageddon has been a chimera since the 1960s. Little has changed since 1965 when a panel headed by Jerome B. Wiesner, science adviser to presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, warned the White House that efforts to defend against missile attack would goad the other side to bolster its offensive forces. Despite huge investments since 1983, when President Reagan launched a Strategic Defense Initiative, *The Economist* concluded in 2014 that: “Even with new technology, America’s multi-billion dollar efforts to build a shield against long-range missiles looks doomed.” The article gave dozens of reasons and quoted many experts to explain its conclusion.

If diplomacy fails, the best defense remains a strong offense. For the foreseeable future, defenses will never be able to cope with decoys and other penetration aids launched by any actor capable of firing an ICBM. The defenses now deployed in Alaska and California would do nothing to stop cruise missiles launched from offshore. They would not stop weapons of mass destruction smuggled into the country on trucks or in containers from cargo ships. The Germans easily skirted the Maginot Line in 1940. The U.S. Secret Service in September 2014 could not even stop a knife-wielding invader from traipsing through the White House. Missile defense pretensions spur illusions. Most Americans have believed for years that the United States already possesses an effective defense. Some industries lobby for more R&D outlays no matter the prospects. Some Americans assume America needs only to improve Patriot and Israeli Iron Dome systems, which – despite PR exaggerations – have intercepted only some artillery shells and a few tactical ballistic missiles, which are much slower than ICBMs and rise to much lower trajectories. Some Americans want to be tough on North Korea and Iran, counting on U.S. defenses to stop their ICBMs if they acquire them. All these hopes are unwise and unfounded.

Missile defense has been a fantasy for decades – especially among Republicans. With Republican majorities in both houses, strong voices in the U.S. Congress will be tempted to cite the “Harvard” recommendations and demand more investment to protect the United States from missile attack.

Starting with Andrei Sakharov, many Russian scientists have advised the Kremlin that America’s ABM efforts are futile. Indeed, the U.S.-Russian working group report affirms: “Given current technology and the size of Russia’s missile forces,” Russia’s missile forces will remain “robust” against all foreseeable missile defenses (p. 14). Still, Russian planners have naturally been cautious about the potential of American technology, fearing that the Pentagon might find a way to neutralize Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Even the Pentagon’s plan for a limited defenses based in Eastern Europe to counter an Iranian missile attack on Europe raised major worries in Moscow. Russian planners have been neurealgic about Star Wars and its successors. Chinese also perceive a limited defense ostensibly against North Korea as really aimed at China.

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The report's American author, Keith Darden, associate professor at American University's School of International Service, responded to my critique in an e-mail dated September 8, 2014: "Whether missile defenses reach the point where they are effective against slower, smaller, and less sophisticated arsenals is certainly open to dispute, but not terribly relevant to our paper. If anti-ballistic missile defenses of any type prove to be an illusion, then the U.S. will rely solely on deterrence, much as Russia does. Perhaps we could have added a line to this effect in the paper, but most of the pressure on us has come from the other direction – e.g. Russian generals arguing that the defenses are going to be effective against their nuclear arsenal." But an outsider must wonder: Could ivory tower analysis alter the anxieties and ambitions of Russian generals?

The bottom line is that missile defenses will never do their assigned task but, at the same time, they will foster daydreams in America and add to the frosty relations between Washington and Moscow. Their main "contribution" is to profits for military contractors in each country. Those Americans who want to invest in more missile defense can cite the "Harvard" report to buttress their case. The very title of the report, "Sword and Shield," implies a constructive role for missile defense.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. The report fails to recognize continuities in the strategic balance. It errs in claiming that earlier arms accords between Washington and Moscow were based on symmetry. To be sure, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in the 1970s demanded equality but he never got it. Instead, both "superpowers" relied on permutations of asymmetry. The USSR had more soldiers and tanks but no aircraft carriers and a highly constrained long-range bomber force. Soviet warheads were larger; American, more accurate. The U.S. submarine fleet could be on station for much longer periods than the Soviet. The Americans had reliable allies and few foes – not so the USSR. The U.S. had great soft power; the Soviets, practically none. Still, joint overkill provided a sort of deterrent. Precise equality was not needed. It was unnecessary and unwise to demand symmetry during the Cold War. This is not a new situation. Policymakers as well as policy analysts need to know what factors are of long standing and which are novel, possibly requiring innovative solutions.

The working group's assertion that Russia's military power relies mostly on nuclear weapons is also wrong. Putin's operations in Crimea and southeastern Ukraine, along with large-scale exercises along Russia's western regions and increasing sorties by Russian planes into or close to NATO air space, reveal a different picture. They also undercut any assertions about an end to the Cold War.

Whatever the Russian General Staff thinks about other aspects of the compatibility study, it should be pleased to see that the working group describes Russia's operations in Georgia in 2008 as "peace enforcement [*sic!*]." American and Russian Sinophobes will welcome the report's unfounded claim that China "has expanded its territory through purchase or conquest multiple times in recent decades." To be sure, China may eventually occupy much of Siberia, but such expansion will probably not require or use military means.

Last but not least, the report says nothing about the political culture of the two countries. Russia's seems to incline most Russians to back their iron fisted, revanchist, and revisionist leader. Russian political culture along with the contradictory impulses in American culture make it hard to search for compatibility. Most Americans prefer to stay at home but can also be stirred to resist bad guys real or imagined.

Instead of endorsing dangerous atavisms such as launch-on-warning and ABM, the report might have called for changes in the status quo: for example, withdrawal and perhaps abolition of all tactical nuclear weapons. It could have reinforced demands for a reduction of each actor's weapons to a modest nuclear umbrella. It could have recommended continuation and deepening of U.S.-Russian cooperation to control nuclear material. It could do everyone a favor by calling for a freeze on Pakistani and Indian as well as North Korean and Iranian weapons development. Russians and Americans need to do something to restore a positive peace – not just maintain the absence of war. Updating practices from the bad old days will not help.

Walter Clemens is Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Boston University, and Associate, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University. His most recent book is Complexity Science and World Affairs (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2013).

<http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/dr-strangeloves-advice-to-u-s-and-russian-nuclear-planners/>

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ABOUT THE USAF CUWS

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation .

The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence.

In February 2014, the Center's name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term "unconventional weapons," currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards.

The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation - counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.

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