



USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal

Issue No. 1127, 08 August 2014

Welcome to the CUWS Outreach Journal! As part of the CUWS' mission to develop Air Force, DoD, and other USG leaders to advance the state of knowledge, policy, and practices within strategic defense issues involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, we offer the government and civilian community a source of contemporary discussions on unconventional weapons. These discussions include news articles, papers, and other information sources that address issues pertinent to the U.S. national security community. It is our hope that this information resources will help enhance the overall awareness of these important national security issues and lead to the further discussion of options for dealing with the potential use of unconventional weapons.

The following news articles, papers, and other information sources do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the Air University, U.S. Air Force, or Department of Defense. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

FEATURE ITEM: "Adherence To and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments". Prepared by the U.S. Department of State; July 2014; 48 Pages.

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf>

This report addresses U.S. compliance with arms control agreements and commitments (Part I), compliance by Russia and other successor states of the Soviet Union with treaties that the United States concluded bilaterally with the Soviet Union and its successor states (Part II) (INF/NEW START), compliance by countries that are parties to multilateral agreements and commitments with the United States (Part III) (BWC-China, Egypt, Iran, NK, Pakistan, Russia, Syria/CFE/NPT-Burma, Iran, NK, Syria/OST), and compliance with commitments made less formally but that bear directly upon arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament issues (Part IV) (Missile Nonprolif-China).

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U.S. Strategic Command – Omaha, NE

U.S. Strategic Command Launches Nuclear Commanders Course

Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class (SW/AW) Byron C. Linder

U.S. Strategic Command Public Affairs

August 1, 2014

OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, Neb. -- U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) leadership welcomed more than 20 Navy and Air Force officers to the inaugural Nuclear Commanders Course at USSTRATCOM July 31.

The new two-day course provided a series of briefings and tours of USSTRATCOM's nuclear deterrence assets to expand upon the existing training given to nuclear commanders and instilled a foundational understanding of USSTRATCOM's role in building and maintaining the nuclear war plan, its nuclear command and control capabilities, and their unit's role in the deterrence mission.

The course traces its origins back to the USSTRATCOM Strategic Weapons Command Course, which was established in 2009 and focused toward the Navy ballistic missile submarine commander and executive officer communities. The current Nuclear Commanders Course expands the audience, course curriculum and scope to include Air Force intercontinental ballistic missile, bomber, and refueling tanker squadron commanders.

Commander, USSTRATCOM Adm. Cecil D. Haney has prioritized the enhancement of up-and-coming nuclear commanders' professional development by providing them with a headquarters-level perspective on the nuclear deterrence mission.

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“Adding a senior leadership perspective will give participants a broader strategic view of how everything for our critical deterrence mission fits together – from priorities and current operations to the planning process, future requirements and funding,” Haney explained. “I also firmly encourage our leaders to personally reinforce the importance of integrity and ethics throughout the entire DoD nuclear enterprise. To accomplish this goal, we must all weave integrity into the fabric of everyday life within our organization.”

Robert Shindel, action officer for planning and developing the Nuclear Commanders Course, explained how this was achieved.

“The headquarters perspective provides more insight into their relationship to the nuclear enterprise. In addition to some of the normal courses, we went into the Global Operations Center to show them an exercise on the commander’s decision brief and show where their particular units interface with the decision the commander makes,” he said. “The idea behind this course is to show that USSTRATCOM is in line with (Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel)’s emphasis on the nuclear deterrence force structure.”

Patrick A. McVay, Director of Joint Exercises and Training at USSTRATCOM, emphasized the benefits of the Nuclear Commanders Course extend beyond the course participants.

“This really is a win-win situation,” he said. “The prospective commanders get to see the importance of what they do every day for the security of the nation. They also get senior leadership’s perspective and guidance. The command gets better leaders in the field because they have a better understanding of their mission – it helps them connect the dots.”

Lt. Cmdr. Bryan Christiansen, Prospective Executive Officer (XO) of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to have personal interaction with USSTRATCOM leadership.

“It’s great to be briefed by the admiral himself. In past courses, I haven’t always had that opportunity, so it was great to hear his thoughts on our position and what’s coming up and how important our role is,” he said. “Making sure the (commanding officers) and XOs are aware of our role and how vital it is in the success of the nuclear enterprise and how focused the government and the DoD are on the nuclear deterrent force is crucial to our success.”

Lt. Col. Maria Hatchell, Commander, 92nd Force Support Squadron at Fairchild Air Force Base, Wash., added her accolades and praised the larger view the course provides.

“It’s very eye-opening, as I thought it would be – this helps expand my knowledge base on how to better support operations. If you don’t know what you’re supporting, how do you know if you’re doing a good job or not?,” she said. “I’m going to recommend this course to some of my peers when I get back. This is going to be very valuable as we move forward.”

McVay noted he was looking forward to future iterations of the course.

"This course will certainly evolve and progress - the quarterly format and student feedback will help us to continuously improve," he said.

USSTRATCOM is one of nine DoD unified combatant commands and is charged with strategic deterrence, space operations, cyberspace operations, joint electronic warfare, global strike, missile defense, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, combating weapons of mass destruction, and analysis and targeting.

http://www.stratcom.mil/news/2014/505/US_Strategic_Command_Launches_Nuclear_Commanders_Course/

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HIS Jane’s Defence Weekly – London, U.K.

USAF Stands Up New Helicopter Group to Support ICBM Forces

Gareth Jennings, London - IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly

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03 August 2014

The US Air Force (USAF) has stood up its newly created 20th Air Force (AF) Helicopter Operations Group (HOG), as it looks to improve the mission effectiveness and morale of its nuclear missile forces.

The 20th AF HOG, which was stood up on 1 August, brings together the three individual helicopter squadrons that currently support the USAF's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force into a single unified command, based at F E Warren Air Force Base (AFB) in Wyoming.

Combining the 37th Helicopter Squadron (HS), 40th HS, and the 54th HS, the 20th AF HOG will retain its provisional status until sometime in 2015, at which time it will assume control of all ICBM-support helicopter operations.

"The mission of the [group], while in provisional status, is to identify, prioritise and create the facility, personnel, communication and process infrastructure required to transfer control of the three helicopter squadrons to the Helicopter Operations Group," Colonel Dave Smith, 20th AF HOG commander said.

According to the USAF, the 20th AF HOG was formed as a result of a recommendation made during the Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) Force Improvement Program (FIP), which was initiated as a means for service personnel to be directly involved in the improvement of force morale.

The initiative is one of a number of a measures recently announced by the USAF in the wake of a series of scandals and failings of its nuclear forces. While these generally include better prospects for promotion, an increase in manning levels, and a greater emphasis on professional development, in the case of the 20th AF HOG it involves the creation of an aviation-focused chain of command equipped to support the ICBM mission for the first time.

The scandals and failings that have befallen the USAF's nuclear forces date back to 2006, when sensitive missile components were inadvertently shipped to Taiwan This was followed in 2007 by the accidental flight of a nuclear-armed Boeing B-52H Stratofortress bomber over the United States.

In 2009 an inspection report into the 377th Air Base Wing and the 498th Nuclear Systems Wing at Kirtland Air Force Base (AFB) in New Mexico found standards to be "significantly deficient", while in 2013 the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom AFB in Montana was given an "unsatisfactory" rating in two of the 13 categories assessed during an Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) inspection.

In June 2013 19 launch personnel assigned to the 91st Missile Wing at Minot AFB in North Dakota were suspended as a result of a "breakdown in overall discipline", with a subsequent USAF investigation resulting in the removal of nine launch officers, and in October of that year the ICBM force commander, Major General Michael Carey, was dismissed following "a loss of trust and confidence in his leadership and judgment".

Though none of these failings were caused by or affected the 20th AF's helicopter community, morale would no doubt have been adversely affected by the Fiscal Year 2013 decision to cancel the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) programme. This programme was designed to replace the Bell UH-1 'Huey' helicopters that have been performing the nuclear support mission since 1969. While an undisclosed number of the current 62 UH-1N helicopters will be upgraded and additional platforms transferred from the US Marine Corps, the cancellation of the CVLSP programme was a disappointment to the USAF's nuclear forces. The USAF will hope that this is somewhat alleviated by the creation of the 20th AF HOG.

<http://www.janes.com/article/41509/usaf-stands-up-new-helicopter-group-to-support-icbm-forces>

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The Japan Times – Tokyo, Japan

Obama to Reduce Role of Nuclear Arms in Security Policy: U.S. Official

Kyodo

August 6, 2014

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WASHINGTON – President Barack Obama remains committed to creating a world without nuclear weapons and his administration will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policy, according to a U.S. government official.

Rose Gottemoeller, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, pressed Obama's case in a recent written interview with Kyodo News ahead of the 69th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

"President Obama has reaffirmed his commitment to making progress down the path toward the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons," said Gottemoeller, who visited Hiroshima and the Marshall Islands last year.

The United States will "continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring nonnuclear attacks" and seek to make deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies "the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons," she said.

Gottemoeller said her visits to the city of Hiroshima and the Pacific island country, where the United States tested nuclear bombs in the 1940s and 1950s, were "moving."

"My visit to the Peace Memorial (in Hiroshima) and my conversation with an atomic survivor re-emphasized the important message to all nations to avoid the horrors of nuclear war," she said.

The United States understands well the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use, the official said.

Gottemoeller said the United States has "more nuclear weapons than we need to maintain a robust deterrent" and "a large arsenal is poorly suited for today's security environment."

Gottemoeller suggested Obama's administration still hopes for an opportunity to negotiate with Russia over cutbacks in all kinds of nuclear arsenals.

"We remain open to seek negotiated reductions with Russia covering all nuclear weapons — strategic and nonstrategic, deployed and nondeployed -when the conditions are conducive for further steps," she said.

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/08/06/world/obama-reduce-role-nuclear-arms-security-policy-u-s-official/#.U-KZYsXARDx>

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Rapid City Journal – Rapid City, SD

Minot Air Force Base Getting More Personnel

Associated Press (AP)

August 8, 2014

MINOT, N.D. (AP) — Minot Air Force Base will be getting 303 more personnel through an effort to strengthen the military's nuclear mission.

U.S. Sen. John Hoeven, R-N.D., said 69 of the new positions will be with the 5th Bomb Wing and 234 with the 91st missile wing.

The Minot base oversees 150 Minuteman III missiles buried in silos across 8,500 square miles in northwest and north central North Dakota. It also is home to B-52 bombers. The two wings are assigned to Air Force Global Strike Command, which oversees nuclear missiles and bombers.

The military has been working to address problems, including morale and training issues, in the nuclear mission. Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson, commander of Global Strike Command, said earlier this year that more than 1,000 personnel would be added to the five bases in the command.

"Minot Air Force Base, with both a bomber wing and a missile wing, is clearly a vital part of that (nuclear) mission, which this increase in personnel signifies," Hoeven said in a statement Thursday.

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Many of the base's bombers have been flying out of Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota and Anderson Air Base in Guam this summer to allow for runway upgrades at the Minot base.

Col. Jason Armagost, commander of the bomb wing, told members of the Minot Area Chamber of Commerce's Military Affairs Committee on Thursday that the \$32 million project will wrap up by the end of September.

"You'll see B-52s flying around here again pretty soon," he said.

Minot bombers and crews routinely deploy to Guam to keep a bomber presence in the South Pacific. Ellsworth was chosen as a temporary site because it is close and has a suitable runway. The southwest South Dakota base houses B-1 bombers.

http://rapidcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/minot-air-force-base-getting-more-personnel/article_e7623fb9-5717-5059-9dc3-3079bdba47cb.html

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The Boston Globe – Boston, MA

US-Russia Work on Nuclear Materials in Jeopardy

By Bryan Bender, Globe Staff

August 03, 2014

WASHINGTON — Over a two-year period concluding in early 2012, the Department of Energy secretly removed enough highly enriched uranium from Ukraine to make nine nuclear bombs — some of it from parts of the country now wracked by violence and lawlessness.

The six shipments, which took years of behind-the-scenes coordination, were executed with help from Russia, which agreed to safely dispose of the material. Ukraine was one of seven countries where the United States and Russia have joined forces to remove dangerous nuclear material since 2009.

But such cooperation aimed at preventing terrorist groups from obtaining the ingredients for a nuclear weapon is jeopardized by the diplomatic showdown over Moscow's support of Ukrainian separatists, according to senior US officials and a range of international security analysts.

The implications, they say, could be catastrophic at a time when the two nations are discussing removing more vulnerable weapons material from former Soviet clients Poland, Uzbekistan, and Belarus, and as Russia's own nuclear facilities still require security upgrades.

"Effective nuclear security for all stockpiles worldwide will be almost impossible to achieve without Russia and the United States working together," warns a report released last week by a special Department of Energy task force.

Yet the political will in both countries to keep cooperating appears to be at an all-time low.

Both houses of Congress have proposed legislation calling for a freeze in such cooperation, and the Russian government is undertaking a reassessment of its nuclear security efforts with the United States, which have long been unpopular among more hard-line military and political figures in Moscow.

Also in jeopardy is a pact the two nations signed last year to expand reciprocal visits to their nuclear weapons facilities and advance scientific cooperation.

The situation is cause for alarm for nuclear proliferation specialists, who are trying to convince leaders on both sides that keeping the momentum is in their interest despite serious disagreements over a new round of US and European Union sanctions over Russia's aggressive behavior in Ukraine.

"Despite the situation in Ukraine, despite the political winds in both Moscow and Washington, we need to work to sustain nuclear security cooperation with Russia," Matthew Bunn, of the Harvard Kennedy School's Project on Managing the Atom, said at a briefing in Washington last week hosted by the nonprofit Nuclear Threat Initiative.

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At the end of the Cold War two decades ago, the United States and Russia initiated projects collectively known as “cooperative threat reduction” that sought to use American funds and expertise to help Moscow destroy long-range missiles and secure nuclear material in Russia as well as several former Soviet states.

That cooperation has expanded over the years to include adding better security equipment at Russian facilities, providing training for guards, and setting up detection systems at key border crossings across Asia and the Middle East. But while officials say much progress has been made there are still key vulnerabilities that could be exploited by terrorists or smugglers seeking to sell nuclear material.

“The risks these stockpiles posed to US, Russian, and world security have been greatly reduced,” according to a recent report co-authored by Bunn. “But important vulnerabilities remain that a more sophisticated conspiracy might be able to exploit to steal nuclear material.”

For example, the Harvard study says, more needs to be done to address what is called the “insider threat” in Russia, citing a 2012 case in which two senior officials at one of Russia’s largest facilities that processes highly enriched uranium and plutonium were arrested on corruption charges.

The Department of Energy report said that while it is “a legitimate question as to why Russia should not be paying for its nuclear security itself” the reality is that Moscow is not making the necessary investments on its own.

“The work of securing these stockpiles will not get done to the standards necessary unless the United States continues to invest – while simultaneously working aggressively to persuade the Russian government to increase its own investment and strengthen its own rules,” the task force said.

A key area of cooperation between the United States and Russia over the years has been removing weapons-grade nuclear material from other countries — most recently Ukraine.

One of the facilities, in the eastern Ukraine city of Khartiv, “had more than 75 kilograms of fresh weapons-grade” uranium, said Andrew Bieniawski, a former top Energy Department official who oversaw the effort. “What would be the dynamic with that material still left given the conflicts that are going in that part of the country? It would in my opinion change significantly that whole dynamic.”

Overall, the United States has overseen the removal of nuclear material from 27 countries over the past two decades. Since 2009 alone, it has undertaken removal of a total of 5,060 kilograms of highly enriched uranium in a dozen countries, enough to produce more than 200 atomic bombs.

And in seven of those countries the material was handed over to Russia for disposal — the Czech Republic, Hungary, Libya, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, and Vietnam.

“Ending nuclear security cooperation with Russia will only add to the list of dangerous consequences of Russian aggression,” said William H. Tobey, a senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “increasing the danger of nuclear proliferation.”

“Whether the two governments will come to that view and be able to overcome their differences remains quite uncertain,” he added.

The fears are compounded by the fact that the Obama administration is proposing significant cuts in its own nuclear security budgets for next year that are bound to slow or even freeze some joint projects — from about \$700 million in fiscal year 2014 to roughly \$555 million in fiscal year 2015. The biggest cut, amounting to 25 percent, would be in the program that oversaw the removal of nuclear material from Ukraine.

Patrick Ventrell, a spokesman for the National Security Council, said that President Obama believes his nonproliferation and nuclear security priorities are protected in his budget proposal.

“The decreased budget reflects natural and predictable declines based on project completion,” he told the Globe. “The US commitment and capacity to support global nuclear security activities remains strong and unparalleled.”

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One of those priorities is working with Moscow; the administration is still requesting about \$100 million from Congress for nuclear security programs in Russia.

“The United States and Russia have the world’s largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials, and more experience in coping with the challenges of securing and accounting for these stocks than any other countries in the world,” concluded the Harvard Kennedy School report. “They bear a special responsibility for nuclear security.”

But former senator Richard Lugar, one of the original architects of the US-Russia cooperation, predicted the work will now be far more haphazard — “a month-to-month deliberation at this point. ”

He held out hope the cooperation could weather the storm over Ukraine. “I would hope so,” Lugar said in an interview, “in terms of Russian security as well as world security.”

<http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/08/02/russia-showdown-threatens-two-decade-cooperation-securing-loose-nukes/TiNdl1Rftsx33yUhnH1RyL/story.html>

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Stars and Stripes – Washington, D.C.

Exercise Demonstrates International Resolve to End WMD Trafficking

By Wyatt Olson, *Stars and Stripes*
August 7, 2014

FORT SHAFTER, Hawaii — Armed teams from Japan, South Korea and the U.S. boarded a ship Wednesday during a mock search for weapons of mass destruction about 10 miles off the coast of Honolulu.

The at-sea drill was part of the inaugural Fortune Guard exercise, which sprang out of the 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative. President George W. Bush launched the initiative in the wake of growing concern over the inability of nations to legally seize WMDs being smuggled across the seas — even after ships had been stopped and searched.

More than 100 nations have now endorsed the PSI, which seeks to curtail the illegal trade.

Wednesday’s drill, which was observed by about 50 participants from 18 countries in the Pacific region, was held for two reasons, said Lt. Commander David Leather, who works for U.S. Pacific Command on issues involving WMD.

First, the search-and-seize drills demonstrate capabilities that other endorsing nations might want to develop, he said. Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and the U.S. are considered “operational experts” among the endorsing nations of the Pacific.

But the drill is also being held in a public forum because it “demonstrates to possible proliferators that there is a core group of nations out there — likeminded nations — that are not going to stand for proliferation,” Leather said.

For the sea drill, the USNS Henry J Kaiser, a military refueling ship, posed as a commercial tanker.

“This drill is specifically directed at a large commercial ship that may be carrying something that could be used in the production of WMDs,” Leather said. “So it’s not looking for the shiny bomb.”

Boarding was done in three separate phases, with each country’s team working independently.

The U.S. Coast Guard’s Maritime Safety and Security Team-Honolulu wrapped things up by “detecting” uranium-238 in a shipping container.

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The heavily armored and armed Guardsmen each carried a radiation “pager” device that automatically beeps when a certain level of radioactivity is detected, said Paul Frantz, the team’s commander. Some radiation is naturally emitted, while others might emanate from fissile material that could be used for nuclear weapons.

“From there they use the secondary equipment to isolate the isotope and are able to send that back to an agency that can identify it and determine if it’s naturally occurring or not,” Frantz said. “From there you can look at the manifest and determine whether that should be there or not.”

Fortune Guard will be held next year in New Zealand, followed by Singapore, Australia, Japan and South Korea.

“We want to make sure that it’s happening on an annual basis, that the drum beat continues,” Leather said.

<http://www.stripes.com/news/exercise-demonstrates-international-resolve-to-end-wmd-trafficking-1.297068>

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Shanghai Daily.com – Shanghai, China

Russia Rejects U.S. Accusation over Nuclear Treaty Violation

August 02, 2014

MOSCOW, Aug. 2 (Xinhua) -- Russia on Saturday rejected U.S. allegation of Moscow’s violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), and accused Washington of hindering global security.

In a statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry called the U.S. allegation "another attempt to discredit Russia" which "looks biased and brazen, especially in consideration of how loosely the United States itself has applied the INF Treaty provisions on numerous occasions."

It said Washington intended to deploy MK-41 launch systems that can be used for launching intermediate-range cruise missiles in Poland and Romania.

"The issue ... has become especially pressing of late ... their appearance on the ground would grossly violate the INF Treaty," said the statement.

Noting the U.S. government "is surely aware of all these problems," Moscow said by leveling accusations against Russia, Washington was trying to distract attention from its own violations.

It added that the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) in 2001, and has developed the provocative "prompt global strike" strategy.

"The worrisome situation concerning the INF's observance causes special concerns amid the continued purposeful and methodical destabilization of the global strategic stability system by Washington," the statement said.

U.S. President Barack Obama has reportedly warned Russian President Vladimir Putin that Moscow was violating the INF Treaty by testing a new cruise missile.

The INF Treaty, signed in 1987, bars the signatories from possessing, producing or flight-testing such cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km.

The Russian Defense Ministry said Thursday Moscow had been strictly adherent to the treaty, while the country's Foreign Ministry suggested discussing the issue within the NATO framework.

http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=233225

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Great Falls Tribune – Great Falls, MT

Last of Deactivated Malmstrom Missile Silos Eliminated

By Jenn Rowell

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August 6, 2014

The last of the deactivated intercontinental ballistic missile silos operated by Malmstrom Air Force Base were eliminated Tuesday.

The silos were previously activated by the 564th Missile Squadron, which was deactivated in 2008.

Under New START, a nuclear arms-reduction treaty with Russia, those empty silos counted as nondeployed missile launchers. New START, which was ratified in 2011, limits the U.S. and Russia to 800 nondeployed launchers.

To meet that, the U.S. was required to eliminate 103 deactivated ICBM silos, including the 50 at Malmstrom, by February 2018.

The final 10 silos that were eliminated have entered a 60-day observation period to allow Russia to verify their elimination.

Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson was visiting Malmstrom this week with his wife and watched as the last silo was eliminated Tuesday.

The last silo to be eliminated was Launch Facility T-49, located about 25 miles west of Conrad, according to Malmstrom. Contractors used heavy machinery to bury the site's 110-ton launcher closure door and fill the launch tube with dirt, rendering it unusable as a missile launch site, according to Malmstrom.

The initial phase of elimination began in January.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Air Force Civil Engineering Center selected Bryan Construction Inc. of Colorado Springs, Colo., as the demolition contractor.

The silos were eliminated by filling them with earth and gravel. Gravel fill is a more effective and environmentally friendly method of elimination that's also faster and more economical than those used under the original START treaty. The work doesn't pose any threat to public safety or the environment, according to Malmstrom officials.

The second phase began July 21 when concrete caps were poured over the first 40 launchers that had completed the first phase, according to Rick Bialczak, 341st treaty compliance office chief.

The completion of all Phase II work will take several months, according to Malmstrom. The sites will remain in caretaker status by the 341st Civil Engineer Squadron until the final disposition of the properties is determined.

New START also limits deployed launchers to 700 across ICBM fields, submarines and bomber aircraft.

The Pentagon announced in April it would retain all 450 ICBM silos operated by the Air Force, including the 150 at Malmstrom.

The Air Force will remove missiles from 50 silos, but keep them in a warm status, meaning they can be rearmed at any time.

According to defense officials, the expectation is that the empty silos will be distributed among the three missile wings and will rotate depending on maintenance and operational needs.

<http://www.greatfalltribune.com/story/news/local/2014/08/06/last-deactivated-malmstrom-missile-silos-eliminated/13683811/>

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The Christian Science Monitor.com – Boston, MA

Is US Vulnerable to EMP Attack? A Doomsday Warning, and Its Skeptics

Issue No.1127, 08 August 2014

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CUWS Outreach Journal

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Former CIA Director Woolsey tells Congress of a doomsday scenario in which a nuclear-blast-triggered electromagnetic pulse takes down the US power grid, leading to starvation and death. Some experts decry 'hysteria' over EMPs.

By Anna Mulrine, Staff writer

August 1, 2014

Washington — It is an unsettling doomsday scenario: A ballistic missile is launched from a freighter near America's shores, setting off a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere. The blast generates electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) that could take out the nation's electrical grid and bring civilization as we know it "to a cold, dark halt."

This warning comes from the former director of the CIA, James Woolsey, in little-noticed testimony recently before the House Armed Services Committee.

A nuclear weapon would be detonated in orbit "in order to destroy much of the electric grid from above the US with a single explosion," he told lawmakers last week. "Two thirds of the US population would likely perish from starvation, disease, and societal breakdown. Other experts estimate the likely loss to be closer to 90 percent."

This dire forecast included warning of an "increasing likelihood that rogue nations such as North Korea (and before long, most likely, Iran) will soon match Russia and China in that they will have the primary ingredients for an EMP attack: simple ballistic missiles such as SCUDs that could be launched from a freighter near our shores."

Mr. Woolsey sprinkled in a bit of intelligence as well. "In 2004," he noted to lawmakers, "the Russians told us that their 'brain drain' had been helping the North Koreans develop EMP weapons."

So, how plausible is this sort of scenario? A number of defense analysts take issue with the idea that an EMP attack on the US is imminent, or even particularly likely. They also suggested the outcome of the attack would not be so dire.

"I think the wild hysteria that's greeted EMP attacks lately is wildly overstated," says James Lewis, director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

"So if you're North Korea, and you've got a nuclear weapon, and you detonate it over the United States, what's going to happen next? The answer is hundreds of nukes will descend on you from the US," he says. "So why would you waste the round? If they're going to shoot a nuke at us, they're not going to bother with this EMP stuff."

What's more, although Woolsey told lawmakers that "modern electronics are a million times more vulnerable to EMP than the electronics of the 1960s," Mr. Lewis argues that radiation hardening has been built into many modern electronics, through chips that have become more sophisticated. "Before, there were vacuum tubes, and now you're using a chip that can withstand a fair amount of radiation," Lewis says.

So what's the bottom line? If a country or terrorist group "were crazy enough to shoot a nuclear weapon up over Washington, D.C. [to try to create an EMP], you might be able to fry 30 percent of the electronics in the city," Lewis says.

Solar flares can create EMPs as well, Woolsey noted, citing a 1989 solar-generated pulse that, he told lawmakers, "effectively destroyed Quebec's electric grid." According to an article on a NASA website that looked back at the event 10 years later, the power was out in Quebec for 12 hours.

While an EMP attack may not be likely, the possibility raises some interesting strategic questions, says Paul Scharre, project director for the 20YY Warfare Initiative at the Center for a New American Security.

"If a nuclear-armed actor, instead of actually killing civilians with a nuclear weapon, lights it off at a high altitude," he asks. "Does that cross the nuclear threshold? What's the appropriate response? How would we respond? There's not really a good answer for that."

<http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2014/0801/Is-US-vulnerable-to-EMP-attack-A-doomsday-warning-and-its-skeptics-video>

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DoD Buzz.com – Washington, D.C.

Firm Developed Ebola Drug with DoD Funding

By Brendan McGarry

Wednesday, August 6th, 2014

A closely held Kentucky firm developed the experimental drug to combat the deadly Ebola virus with funding from the U.S. Defense Department.

Kentucky BioProcessing, based in Owensboro, in recent years received millions of dollars from the Pentagon to develop the drug cocktail that may have saved the lives of two American missionaries who contracted the deadly disease in West Africa.

The company in 2010 received a one-year, \$18 million contract with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to develop “a proof-of-concept platform capable of yielding a purified vaccine candidate using a whole plant-based process,” according to an announcement detailing the agreement.

The highly experimental research involves making a drug cocktail of three antibodies from “specially modified tobacco plants, which are harvested, ground up into a green liquid, purified and turned into tiny doses — perhaps half a gram or a gram,” according to an article on Tuesday by Lenny Bernstein and Brady Dennis of The Washington Post.

Kentucky BioProcessing is the only entity approved by the U.S. government to make the antibodies, though the actual serum given to the American missionaries Kent Brantly and Nancy Writebol is called ZMapp and was produced in collaboration with Mapp Biopharmaceutical, based in San Diego.

That firm has a three-year, \$10 million contract from the Defense Advanced Threat Reduction Agency, the newspaper reported.

It’s unclear how much time or money it would take to develop enough of the medication to help control the worst-ever Ebola outbreak. The article quoted a professor who said 10,000 doses could be produced in a month.

Barry Bratcher, chief operating officer of Kentucky BioProcessing, has said the plant-based system is an advanced method of manufacturing that results in lower costs and minimal production time.

“Our facility can produce these proteins in two weeks at a substantial reduction in cost to other production methods,” he told the Army in a press release last year.

Several other promising vaccines and treatments for Ebola are in various stages of development after three decades of work by researchers, according to The Washington Post.

One of the world’s most virulent diseases, Ebola is transmitted by direct contact with the blood, body fluids and tissues of infected animals or people. Since the outbreak began earlier this year, the virus has infected more than 1,600 people, killing almost 900 of them, in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria.

<http://www.dodbuzz.com/2014/08/06/firm-developed-ebola-drug-with-dod-funding/>

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RT (Russia Today) – Moscow, Russia

Russian Nuclear-Capable Bombers 'Tested' US Air Defenses 16 Times in Last 10 Days

August 07, 2014

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Russian strategic nuclear bombers and other military aircraft entered US air defense identification zones (ADIZs) at least 16 times over the past ten days, American defense officials confirmed on Thursday.

"Over the past week, NORAD has visually identified Russian aircraft operating in and around the US air defense identification zones," said Maj. Beth Smith, spokeswoman for US Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

Smith sought to downplay the incursions that she called *"a spike in activity,"* telling the Washington Free Beacon's Bill Gertz that the flights were assessed as routine training missions and exercises.

But an unnamed defense official familiar with the incursion reports disagreed with Smith's assessment. *"These are not just training missions,"* the official told Gertz, saying that Russian strategic nuclear forces appear to be *"trying to test our air defense reactions, or our command and control systems."*

NORAD scrambled fighter jets several times when Russian strategic aircraft flew along US ADIZs. The planes included a mix of Tu-95 Bear H heavy bombers and Tu-142 Bear F maritime reconnaissance aircraft, as well as one IL-20 intelligence collection aircraft, Smith said.

The bomber flights took place mainly along the Alaskan air defense identification zone that covers the Aleutian Islands and the continental part of the state, and one incursion involved entry into Canada's air defense zone, she added.

"Such aerial bravado has been rare since the fall of the Soviet Union," News.com.au wrote. *"Until now."*

"And it all appears to be a direct result of the cooling of relations between the West and Russia over the invasion of Crimea and the shooting-down of MH17," the Australian News Corp site added.

During the Cold War, Soviet bombers sought to trigger US air defenses as preparation for a potential nuclear conflict.

The recent spike in activity after a surface-to-air missile brought down the Malaysia Airlines plane is not the first time Russian military planes were detected in US ADIZs this summer. On June 9, a pair of Tu-95 Bear H aircraft maintained by Russia came close to US airspace during practice bombing while four of the planes were conducting bombing runs near Alaska, a NORAD spokesman told Gertz.

"After tracking the bombers as they flew eastward, two of the four Bears turned around and headed west toward the Russian Far East," he wrote of the June incident. *"The remaining two nuclear-capable bombers then flew southeast and around 9:30 P.M. entered the US northern air defense zone off the coast of Northern California."*

Those two aircraft, Gertz added, made it within 50 miles of the coast before turning around after a US F-15 intercepted them.

Russian aircraft have also made incursions into other countries' airspace this year. In June, the UK's Royal Air Force scrambled Typhoon fighter jets to intercept four flights of aircraft in the airspace around the Baltic states. The planes included advanced Tu-22M Backfire bombers, Su-27 Flanker interceptors, an A-50 Mainstay radar aircraft and a transport aircraft, News.com.au wrote. Russian-owned Tu-95 bombers skirted UK airspace and have come close to US property in both Guam and California, The Aviationist reported in May.

In an April incident in international airspace between Russia and Japan, two Russian Su-27 Flanker interceptors flew beneath a US Air Force reconnaissance plane, then *"popped up"* ahead of the jet, which was forced to take evasive maneuvers, according to News.com.au.

The United States has been flying spy missions of its own, however. Over the weekend, US officials confirmed Swedish media reports that an American spy plane invaded Sweden's airspace in mid-July. The maverick plane was spying on Russia when it was intercepted, and was evading a Russian fighter jet when it entered Swedish airspace without permission. Air traffic control had denied the Boeing RC-135 Rivet Joint entrance, Svenska Dagbladet (SvD) newspaper said. The incident occurred on July 18, the day after MH17 was shot down.

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Yonhap News Agency – Seoul, South Korea

N. Korea to Continue Nuclear Weapons Development if U.S. Threats Continue: Envoy

August 2, 2014

NEW YORK, Aug. 1 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's deputy chief of mission to the United Nations said Friday the communist nation has no option but to continue the development of nuclear weapons if U.S. threats against the country continue.

Amb. Ri Tong-il made the remark after calling an emergency press conference at U.N. headquarters in New York, claiming that no other country in the world is under constant threats like North Korea, and his country needs nuclear weapons to deter such threats.

Ri also urged the United Nations to take up upcoming joint exercises between South Korea and the United States as an urgent issue. Pyongyang has long denounced such annual drills as a rehearsal for an invasion of the country. Seoul and Washington say such exercises are purely defensive.

"If the U.N. Security Council turns away from this request for an emergency meeting, it will only expose itself as a UN body that has lost its principles, lost impartiality and lost its mandate of peace and security," Ri told reporters.

Ri said the U.S. has staged about 18,000 military exercises in South Korea since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War. He also claimed that the United States is the biggest threat to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

The envoy also said the North would continue rocket and artillery launches.

"It is quite natural, more than justifiable, because this is in response to the grave situation created by the large-scale joint military exercises," he said. "The war danger is being increased."

Ri also criticized Japan for seeking the "collective self-defense right," which empowers the country to use military force to help allies even if the country itself is not attacked. He said the move is "very dangerous" because the North is a target of the defense treaties between the U.S. and Japan.

The envoy also said it is an inhumane act for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to pay a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo that honors the country's war dead, including Class-A war criminals.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/08/02/26/0401000000AEN20140802000251315F.html>

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South China Morning Post – Hong Kong, China

China 'Increasing Number of Missile Warheads'

People's Liberation Army adding to the size of its arsenal to enhance its nuclear deterrent, according to a Chinese military document

Kyodo in Tokyo

Monday, 04 August, 2014

The PLA has been increasing the number of both nuclear and conventional warheads in its strategic missile command, according to an official military document.

The document, official teaching materials for the strategic missile command as well as the air, ground and naval branches of the People's Liberation Army, corroborates suspicions among military experts that China has been beefing up its nuclear arsenal amid a global trend toward a reduction of nuclear arms.

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China's strategic missile command, officially known as the Second Artillery Command, serves as the nation's core nuclear deterrent and underscores Beijing's status as one of the world's major nuclear powers.

To enhance China's nuclear deterrent, the strategic missile command will "appropriately increase the number of nuclear warheads", a military source quoted the document as saying.

The document also says the strategic missile command will strengthen its conventional missile force by increasing the number of conventional warheads and developing more powerful non-nuclear warheads.

While nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles form the backbone of military deterrence among the world's major nuclear powers, military strategists consider missiles armed with non-nuclear warheads as more "usable" weapons.

The PLA document also says the military will increase its capability to attack enemy satellites and destroy enemy missiles.

The document suggests that the PLA is independently bolstering its strategic missile force, while saying China will not be part of an arms race with other nuclear powers.

China set up its strategic missile command in the 1960s with the aim of giving it retaliatory power against the United States and other major nuclear powers.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China has about 250 deployed nuclear warheads. In contrast, Russia has about 4,500 and the United States about 2,100.

Despite the advance of nuclear-weapons technology, nuclear arms have been off-limits in the world's military conflicts since the second world war.

The inhibition against the use of nuclear weapons with their massive destructive power has increased the importance of advanced non-nuclear arms in warfare.

<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1566294/china-increasing-number-missile-warheads>

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NK News.org – Wilmington, DE

North Korea Willing to Use Biological Weapons, Adjusting Nuclear Facilities – U.S. Report

U.S. State Department declassified report critical of North Korea in areas of biological and nuclear proliferation

Hamish Macdonald

August 4th, 2014

North Korea has continued to "adjust and alter" existing nuclear facilities and may still be willing to use biological weapons, according to a U.S. Department of State report made available in July.

The declassified report, which was issued by the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, seeks to assess U.S. and multi-national compliance to international arms control obligations and disarmament agreements.

The "Adherence to and compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreement and commitments" report specifically assessed North Korea's conformity with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), finding failures in both instances.

"The United States continues to judge that North Korea may still consider the use of biological weapons as an option, contrary to the BWC," the report reads.

"North Korea continues to develop its biological research and development capabilities, but has yet to declare any relevant developments and has failed to provide a BWC CBM declaration since 1990," the report added.

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A CBM is a Confidence Building Measure, which is issued by a state “in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and in order to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities”. North Korea’s 1990 declaration remains its only CBM to date.

In assessing North Korea’s compliance with the NPT, the report cited North Korea’s underground nuclear test in 2013 and subsequent promises to alter its existing facilities as evidence that it was not meeting its current obligations.

“The United States assesses North Korea to have followed through on this announcement by restarting the 5 MW(e) plutonium production reactor and expanding the size of the uranium enrichment facility at its Yongbyon nuclear complex.,” the report said.

“North Korea’s activities violate UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2094, and contravene North Korea’s various international commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks,” it added.

The reports publication comes amid increasing pressure against North Korea for its continued proliferation and military activities.

The UN officially condemned recent short range missile launches from North Korea in July and blacklisted two North Korean shipping companies on July 29 for their part in the attempted trafficking of weapons from Cuba to North Korea via the Panama Canal in 2013.

The U.S. also blacklisted the same two North Korean companies and 18 affiliated vessels in July over the same incident and passed a bill through the House of Representatives on July 31 designed to increase sanction enforcement on North Korea.

<http://www.nknews.org/2014/08/north-korea-willing-to-use-chemical-weapons-adjusting-nuclear-facilities-u-s-report/>

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Defense News – Washington, D.C.

China Developing Capability to Kill Satellites, Experts Say

By WENDELL MINNICK

August 4, 2014

TAIPEI — US defense experts and the US State Department are describing China’s successful July 23 so-called “anti-missile test” as another anti-satellite test (ASAT). It is the third such kinetic strike ASAT launch by China and raises fears the US will be unable to protect its spy, navigation and communications satellites.

“This latest space interceptor test demonstrates a potential PLA [People’s Liberation Army] aspiration to restrict freedom of space flight over China,” said Mark Stokes, a China missile specialist at the Project 2049 Institute.

China’s first two anti-satellite tests, 2007 and 2010, involved the SC-19 (DF-21 ballistic missile variant) armed with a kinetic kill vehicle. Though the first two involved the SC-19, only the 2007 ASAT actually destroyed a space-based platform. The 2010 and July 23 test successfully struck a ballistic missile.

With the destruction of the weather satellite came international complaints that China was unnecessarily creating a debris field that would endanger other nations’ space platforms. This could explain the reason China chose to shoot down ballistic missiles rather than hitting orbiting platforms.

It is still too early to declare whether the third test used an SC-19 or a different missile system. Stokes said it was a “speculative guess,” but it could have been a test of a new solid motor being developed for a space intercept system, possibly designated as the Hongqi-26 (HQ-26). “Engineering research and development on the new solid motor seems to incorporate some interesting capabilities [that] began early last year.”

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Richard Fisher, a China military specialist with the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said after the 2007 test the Army may be trying to mask its anti-satellite program by conveying the impression that it is also testing a lower altitude anti-missile capability. "It is also possible that the SC-19 has ASAT and ABM [anti-ballistic missile] capabilities."

Not everyone is convinced China is developing an ABM system. Hans Kristensen, the director of the Nuclear Information Project for the Federation of American Scientists, is one of them.

"The first [observation] is wondering why China is spending effort and money on developing an anti-ballistic missile defense system given the enormous challenges and expenses the United States and Russia have had to dedicate to their efforts over the years with only partial success to show for it?" He said it seems highly unlikely that Chinese engineers would suddenly be able to overcome those challenges and deploy an effective ABM system.

Kristensen said his second observation is that a Chinese decision to develop and deploy an ABM system seems contradictory to China's well-known opposition to US missile defense plans in the Pacific. He does not believe that a Chinese missile defense system would be able to counter the advanced and large US and Russian nuclear missile forces. It would be a somewhat different matter with India.

"If Indian military planners concluded that a Chinese ABM system was capable enough to threaten the effectiveness of India's small nuclear deterrent aimed at China, it could potentially cause Indian planners to increase the number of long-range missiles it plans to deploy to deter China, or, which would be a worrisome and destabilizing development, begin to develop and deploy MIRVed [multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle] warheads on Indian ballistic missiles to overwhelm a Chinese ABM system," he said. "In that case, a Chinese ABM system would seem to undermine rather than enhance Chinese security."

Fisher contends that China is working on anti-satellite and ABM programs at the same time. It is also possible that the SC-19 has both an ASAT and ABM capability, as demonstrated in the 2007 and 2010 tests. Fisher said the new HQ-19 and the HQ-26 could be similar in capability to the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system. There are also reports out of China indicating Beijing is attempting to procure Russian S-400 low-altitude ABMs, he said.

China has plenty of money to spend and appears to have permission to work on a variety of high-tech and risky projects, Kristensen said. "The interesting question is whether China is working on ABM technology to deploy its own defenses or to better understand and overcome the missile defenses of its potential adversaries."

Fisher said the larger issue could be that after nearly three decades of "scorching harangues" by China on the US missile defense program, China has all along been developing its own ballistic missile defense system.

"We now know that China's second ABM and ASAT program started in the early 1990s. Aside from how all this undermines the credibility of any Chinese strategic nuclear related statements, Washington now has to face the reality that in the 2020s it will be facing a much larger and more capable Chinese nuclear missile force that will have an active missile defense component."

<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140804/DEFREG03/308040014/China-Developing-Capability-Kill-Satellites-Experts-Say?odyssey=nav%7Chead>

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BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) News – London, U.K.

5 August 2014

Japan Security Environment 'Increasingly Severe'

The security environment around Japan has become "increasingly severe" amid tensions with China and concern over North Korea, the Japanese defence ministry's annual white paper says.

The paper was adopted by PM Shinzo Abe at a cabinet meeting on Tuesday.

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It described China's declaration of an air defence identification zone over disputed East China Sea islands as a "profoundly dangerous act".

China's actions, it warned, could result in "unintended consequences".

China and Japan are locked in a bitter dispute over an island chain called Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. Japan controls the islands.

Since the row escalated, Chinese ships and planes have been moving in and out of what Japan says is its territory, leading to fears of a clash.

'Dangerous activities'

The white paper said Japan faced destabilising factors that were becoming "more tangible and acute".

Concerns over issues of territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests were rising amid "clearer trends" among neighbouring nations to modernise and bolster military capabilities.

The report highlighted China's "assertive actions with regard to issues of conflicts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplified by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion".

It pointed to China's declaration last year of an air zone over the disputed East China Sea islands as a particular cause for concern.

Japan said that China, by frequently intruding into Japan's territorial waters and violating its airspace, had "engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unintended consequences".

The number of times Japanese fighters had been scrambled to meet Chinese planes was "increasing dramatically", the paper said.

"As Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities, it will need to pay utmost attention to them, as these activities also raise concerns over regional and global security."

On North Korea, the paper highlighted concerns over missile development which, it said, was "considered to have entered into a new phase as a result of technological improvements through repeated missile launches".

It was also "difficult to eliminate the possibility that North Korea has achieved the miniaturisation of nuclear weapons and acquired nuclear warheads", it added.

North Korea is widely believed to be working on making a nuclear weapon small enough to deliver via ballistic missile but it is not clear how close it is to achieving this goal.

North Korea's weapons' development, the paper said, represented "a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan".

Because of the security challenges, the US military presence remained "extremely important in order to achieve regional stability", the paper stated.

Japan and the US have a long-standing security alliance and Japan is home to large US military bases.

Earlier this year, Japan also approved a landmark change in security policy that could allow its military to fight overseas.

Under its constitution, Japan is barred from using force to resolve conflicts except in cases of self-defence. But a reinterpretation of the law now allows Japan to use force to defend allies under attack.

In the white paper, Japan said the change was a response to a "fundamentally transformed" security environment in which an armed attack against a foreign country could potentially threaten Japan.

There was no immediate response from China to the white paper. South Korea, meanwhile, condemned a Japanese reference to a different group of islands that both Tokyo and Seoul claim.

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<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28654131>

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Yonhap News Agency – Seoul, South Korea

N. Korea Weighing Options Including Nuclear Test: KCNA

August 7, 2014

SEOUL, Aug. 7 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is considering another nuclear test to counter a series of South Korea-U.S. military drills, Pyongyang's official news agency said Thursday.

Washington's growing nuclear war threat is nudging Pyongyang to strengthen its nuclear capability in both quantity and quality, the North's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) claimed in a commentary.

It criticized the allies for their plan to open the Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) exercise on Aug. 18, calling it a rehearsal for a "nuclear invasion."

As the U.S. and South Korea continue such provocative military training, North Korea will take its own self-defense measures, which include missile launches and a nuclear test, said the commentary.

The North carried out three known underground nuclear tests -- one each in 2006, 2009 and 2013.

State intelligence officials here and commercial satellites show the North is ready to conduct another experiment any time at its nuclear test site.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/08/07/54/0401000000AEN20140807005800315F.html>

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International Business (IB) Times – London, U.K.

North Korea 'Making Weapons-Grade Plutonium'

By Hannah Osborne

August 7, 2014

Satellite images suggest North Korea is making plutonium for nuclear weapons, an international security think tank has claimed.

The US-based Institute for Science and International Security said images taken on 30 June show North Korea's five-megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear site continues to be active and that it appears construction and installation work is taking place at the light-water reactor (LWR).

It said several renovations appear to have taken place: "North Korea has apparently made a decision to renovate the aged five-MWe reactor to make plutonium for nuclear weapons for many more years and is expanding the centrifuge plant".

"The satellite imagery ... suggests that North Korea is emphasising the production of weapon-grade plutonium as well as enriched uranium for its nuclear weapons programme," it added.

The institute said the start-up date for the LWR reactor is unclear, but once up and running it will be able to produce several times more plutonium than the current reactor.

Images showed water being discharged from the five-MWe reactor, suggesting it is operational, but the think tank reported that "without more data, such as regular steam production, it is hard to determine the operational status of the reactor and thus to estimate the amount of plutonium produced by the reactor".

"It is reasonable to assume that North Korea is renovating this reactor so as to achieve the reactor's previous level of plutonium production," the institute added.

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It is unclear how advanced North Korea's nuclear programme is, making it a matter of concern for world powers.

Last year, state media announced an underground nuclear test had been conducted - the third of its kind in seven years. Japan summoned an emergency UN meeting and South Korea put its military on alert.

Earlier this year, President Obama warned North Korea about testing its nuclear weapons: "North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons is a path that leads only to more isolation. Anybody can make threats. Anyone can move an army. Anyone can show off a missile. That doesn't make you strong.

"We will not hesitate to use our military might to defend our allies and our way of life."

<http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/north-korea-making-weapons-grade-plutonium-1460174>

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Yonhap News Agency – Seoul, South Korea

Seoul, Beijing FMs Voice Concern over N.K. Nukes, Missile Launches

By Kim Soo-yeon

August 8, 2014

NAYPYITAW, Aug. 8 (Yonhap) -- The foreign ministers of South Korea and China on Friday vowed to work together in easing tension on the Korean Peninsula, given that North Korea's recent missile launches pose a grave threat to peace and stability in the region, a Seoul official said.

South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se met with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi earlier in the day on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia's biggest security forum, slated for Sunday.

"The two foreign ministers reaffirmed zero tolerance against the North's nuclear weapons program," said an official at Seoul's foreign ministry, asking not to be named.

"Yun stressed that the North's missile launches are posing a serious threat to peace and stability on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia, calling for Pyongyang to halt its provocative acts," he added.

The remarks came as the North has ratcheted up tensions on the Korean Peninsula by firing off a series of short-range missiles and rockets in recent weeks and threatening a fourth nuclear test.

Yun said that the money Pyongyang has recently spent on missile launches is equivalent to the combined annual salaries of about 53,000 workers at the inter-Korean industrial complex in the North's border city of Kaesong.

Seoul and Beijing plan to strengthen cooperation in easing tension on the peninsula and make efforts to hold meaningful and practical talks on curbing the North's nuclear threat, according to the official.

The Seoul-Beijing meeting came about one month after South Korean President Park Geun-hye and her Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping held a summit in Seoul, during which they reaffirmed "firm" opposition to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Xi's visit to Seoul was made before his trip to North Korea, China's long-time ally, in an unprecedented move seen as reflecting China's disapproval of the North's last nuclear test in February 2013.

With Seoul seeking to drum up support from member countries to the ARF to counter the North's belligerent behavior, top diplomats from 26 Asia-Pacific countries and the European Union are scheduled to gather together for the ARF and other ASEAN talks.

The ARF draws all members to the six-party talks aimed at ending the North's nuclear weapons program.

When asked about a possible meeting with North Korea, the Chinese envoy told a group of reporters that a final decision has not been made, adding there is not enough time to arrange a meeting.

Hong Lei, a spokesman at China's foreign ministry, added that "We are open (to such talks)."

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North Korea's new foreign minister Ri Su-yong is expected to arrive in Naypyitaw on Saturday after visiting Laos and Vietnam, according to officials. He will make his debut at the ARF after becoming the North's top diplomat in April.

North Korea's nuclear weapons, territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the Ukraine crisis are likely to top the agenda for this year's regional forum, Seoul officials said.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/full/2014/08/08/26/1200000000AEN20140808000254315F.html>

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ITAR-TASS News Agency – Moscow, Russia

Russian Army to Get Iskander-M Systems, other Latest Weapons by 2018

Iskander-M ballistic missile systems can effectively engage two targets within a minute at a range of up to 280 kilometers

August 05, 2014

MOSCOW, August 5./ITAR-TASS/. Iskander-M ballistic missile systems and other latest weapons will be provided to all Russian Ground Forces missile brigades by 2018, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said on Tuesday.

Shoigu said the construction of new infrastructure is needed for the systems to be operated effectively.

Iskander-M ballistic missile systems can effectively engage two targets within a minute at a range of up to 280 kilometers.

<http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/743550>

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BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) News – London, U.K.

6 August 2014

Scottish Independence: Government 'Determined' to Remove Trident

Scottish ministers want immediate discussions to remove Trident from Scotland if there is a referendum "Yes" vote, Keith Brown has said.

The veterans' minister said the Scottish government was "absolutely determined" to start talks straight after the referendum.

Labour's Iain Gray called the SNP "hypocritical" for favouring nuclear disarmament but wanting to join Nato.

He accused the SNP of using the nuclear debate as "a referendum tactic".

The UK's nuclear weapons system, currently made up of four Vanguard-class submarines which carry nuclear-armed Trident missiles, has been based at HM Naval Base Clyde on Scotland's west coast since the 1960s.

The Scottish government has backed the removal of Trident from Scotland if voters support independence in the referendum on 18 September.

'Determined'

Opening a Holyrood debate on Trident, Mr Brown said the Scottish government was "absolutely determined to begin in six weeks' time the discussion that would lead to the removal of nuclear weapons from Scotland".

He claimed that the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties in Westminster "have signalled their support for a new fleet of submarines carrying Trident missiles" and independence was the only way to ensure disarmament.

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The Scottish government motion for debate backed "the speediest safe withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Scotland".

It also called on the UK government "to set out which major defence procurement projects, or other areas of public spending, will have to be cut to pay for Trident renewal".

Mr Gray argued that the Scottish government's policy would not result in nuclear weapons being scrapped but simply moved to another part of the UK.

"What there is not a moral case for is moving nuclear weapons a few hundred miles south," he said.

"That's not disarmament, that's redeployment".

He alleged it was "hypocritical to say we shouldn't have nuclear weapons but we want to join Nato", adding: "To reduce it to a referendum tactic as this motion does is simply wrong and we will vote against it."

'Less influence'

Conservative MSP Annabel Goldie said: "At present, as part of the UK, we have a strong defence capability. An independent Scotland's defence capability would be much more limited, giving it much less clout, and much less influence, on the international stage.

"What we all want to achieve - multilateral disarmament - cannot be negotiated from a position of weakness."

Scottish Liberal Democrat leader Willie Rennie said MSPs "are all disarmers" - some unilateral, some multilateral.

He claimed it was "unfair" that the SNP questioned other MSPs' commitment to disarmament if they did not favour independence.

He added: "Glasgow and the west of Scotland would not be any safer if we move the nuclear weapons south of the border."

However, Scottish Green Party co-convener Patrick Harvie said the UK was planning "unilateral rearmament".

He added: "Scotland can lead the way by voting 'Yes' to independence and then giving an unequivocal 'No' to nuclear weapons."

MSPs accepted an amendment from Mr Harvie calling for "a constitutional ban on nuclear weapons in Scotland" before voting to back the Scottish government motion by 68 votes to 47.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-28678102>

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Xinhua News Agency – Beijing, China

Respect to Iran's Nuclear Rights Prerequisite to Success of Talks: Negotiator

August 3, 2014

TEHRAN, Aug. 2 (Xinhua) -- Iran and the world powers can reach a final nuclear deal if the six world powers acknowledge Tehran's nuclear rights, the senior Iranian nuclear negotiator, Abbas Araqchi, was quoted as saying by IRAN Daily on Saturday.

Although major differences still remain, Iran and the P5+1, including Britain, France, the United States, Russia, China and Germany, made "good progress" in their negotiations over the past six months, Araqchi said, adding that in case Iran's nuclear rights are respected, an agreement is possible before the November 24 deadline.

Both sides have demonstrated political will to reach an agreement and have come to the conclusion that dialogue is the means to end the dispute over Iran's nuclear program, he said on Friday.

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"There is always a possibility of reaching an agreement provided that the other side recognizes Iranian nation's nuclear rights," he stressed.

Iran and the six world powers have not made any agreement on Iran's heavy water nuclear power plant of Arak and the underground bunker of Fordow uranium enrichment establishment, Araqchi said on Thursday.

"In principle, no agreement has been made on any topics pertaining to the nuclear issues of Iran yet. And the difference over Arak heavy water reactor and Fordow uranium enrichment are still in place," Araqchi said reacting to some media speculations on recent remarks of Wendy Sherman, undersecretary of state for political affairs, who said that in the past six months, Iran and powers have made significant and steady progress on key issues.

Under an interim deal reached between Iran and the P5+1 that went into effect on January 20, Iran would suspend some sensitive nuclear activities in exchange for limited sanction relief, and the two sides would negotiate over a comprehensive deal within six months.

After six months of negotiations, Iran and the six world powers agreed on July 19 to extend their talks until Nov. 24, as disagreements remained over Tehran's uranium enrichment capacity, its Arak heavy water reactor and the sanctions following a 16-day negotiations in Vienna.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2014-08/03/c_126825963.htm

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FARS News Agency – Tehran, Iran
Wednesday, August 06, 2014

Iran Plans to Unveil Mid, Long-Range Missile Defense Systems

TEHRAN (FNA) - Iran plans to unveil its latest achievements in area of missile technology on September 22, Commander of Khatam ol-Anbia Air Defense Base Brigadier General Farzad Esmayeeli announced on Wednesday.

"The latest mid- and long-range missile defense systems will be unveiled on September 22," Esmayeeli told FNA today.

"These missile systems will include combined systems, artillery and radar systems, other new systems," he continued, adding that "the long-range missiles to go on display on September 22 are the ones which have been optimized by Iranian weapons experts and specialists".

The General further noted Iran's aerospace programs, and said the needed budget has been allocated for building "new (manned) planes and pilotless drones".

In relevant remarks in mid-May 2013, Esmayeeli said Iran's air defense capability is so advanced that it is not comparable to what it could do during the Iraqi imposed war on Iran in 1980s.

"At present, the air defense unit's capability, capacity and expertise can defuse any threat existing in the region," Esmayeeli stressed, adding that the air defense forces enjoy a "desirable" level of preparedness.

In September 2013, the Iranian Armed Forces displayed the country's latest home-made military tools, weapons and equipment in large military parades in Tehran and across the country.

The annual September 22 parades mark the start of the Week of Sacred Defense, commemorating Iranians' sacrifices during the 8 years of Iraqi imposed war on Iran in 1980s.

During the parades last year, the Iranian armed forces displayed different weapons and military tools and equipment, including different kinds of fighters, choppers, drones, ground-to-ground missiles, air-to-ground missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, tactical and armed vehicles, surface and underwater vessels, electronic and telecommunication equipment, light and mid-light weapons, different kinds of artillery and mortar-launchers, air defense systems and engineering and logistic equipment.

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The Iranian armed forces also displayed the tactical troposcatter system which is an advanced home-made communications system unveiled by Esmayeeli last year.

Also, Nebo tactical radar system, Kasta surveillance radars, Matla' al-Fajr local radar system, national radar, a model of Shahab (Meteor) cosmic radar, a model of Samen radar, optimized Sky Guard radar system, high-altitude S-200 missile system, home-made Mersad missile system armed with indigenous Shahin (Eagle) missiles, mobilized Hag missile system, home-made mid-altitude Ya Zahra 3 missile system, and the low-altitude Rapier missile system were among the other weapons and military equipment on display.

The Iranian Armed Forces also displayed Saafaat electro-optic tracking system, mobile 35 and 23 mm cannons, mobile tactical communications vehicle, vehicle equipped with chemical decontamination system, DZ vehicle and communication system, Kheybar tactical vehicle, Same' van built by the air defense base and central communication shelter manufactured by Khatam ol-Anbia Air Defense Base in the September 22 parades.

Various units of the Islamic Republic Army, Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), Basij (volunteer) forces and the Islamic Republic of Iran's Law Enforcement Police were present in the military parades in downtown Tehran to commemorate the start of the Week of Sacred Defense.

The Iranian Armed Forces have recently test-fired different types of newly-developed missiles and torpedoes and tested a large number of home-made weapons, tools and equipment, including submarines, military ships, artillery, choppers, aircrafts, UAVs and air defense and electronic systems, during massive military drills.

Defense analysts and military observers say that Iran's wargames and its advancements in weapons production have proved as a deterrent factor.

<http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930515000598>

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Gulf News.com – Dubai, U.A.E.

Iran, US officials Hold Nuclear Talks in Geneva to Narrow Gaps

They met for the first time since world powers agreed to extend talks

Reuters

August 7, 2014

Geneva: Iranian and US officials met in Geneva on Thursday for the first time since the Islamic state and six world powers agreed to extend talks to resolve a decade-long dispute over Iran's nuclear ambitions.

When they last met on July 19, Iran, the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China agreed to extend the deadline to reach a comprehensive agreement under which Iran would curb its nuclear activities in exchange for the easing of economic sanctions to November 24 from July 20.

Announcing the talks in Washington on Wednesday, the State Department said Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns would lead the US delegation, which also includes Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser to Vice President Joe Biden.

Burns and Sullivan are expected to leave the Obama administration this year.

Iran's state news agency IRNA said on Thursday the talks had started, with deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi leading the Iranian delegation.

"The talks between Iran and America in Geneva will help overcoming differences over the remaining disputes," an unnamed Iranian nuclear negotiator told IRNA.

Among the disputed issues are the permissible scope of Iran's nuclear fuel production capacity and how to address the country's suspected past atomic bomb research.

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Iran and the powers penned a preliminary deal in Geneva in November 2013 to buy time for talks on a long-term deal. Under the interim accord Iran suspended higher-grade enrichment, a potential route to bomb-making, in exchange for some easing of sanctions that are battering its oil-dependent economy.

Western nations fear Iran's nuclear programme may be aimed at developing a nuclear weapons capability, demanding Tehran to significantly scale back its nuclear enrichment programme to make sure it cannot yield nuclear bombs.

Iran says its nuclear programme is solely aimed at generating power and wants sanctions that have severely damaged its oil-dependent economy to be lifted as soon as possible.

More talks are likely to be held on the sidelines of the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September, according to Iranian and European diplomats.

<http://gulfnnews.com/news/region/iran/iran-us-officials-hold-nuclear-talks-in-geneva-to-narrow-gaps-1.1369389>

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Press TV – Tehran, Iran

Geneva Talks on Iran Nuclear Program Constructive: US

Friday, August 8, 2014

The United States says American and Iranian officials held "a constructive discussion" over Tehran's nuclear energy program in the Swiss city of Geneva.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi met with US Deputy Secretary of State William Burns in Geneva on Thursday to discuss ways to bridge differences in the course of talks over Tehran's nuclear work.

"It was, I would say, a constructive discussion," US State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf told reporters in Washington. "We're not going to get into details," she added.

The Thursday talks was the first round of negotiations between the two sides after Vienna negotiations during which Iran and the P5+1 countries agreed to extend a July 20 deadline to reach a comprehensive nuclear agreement.

The US official also said that Iran and the P5+1 will hold talks ahead of this September's UN General Assembly in New York, adding, however, that the location for that meeting has yet to be decided.

Meanwhile, Iran's Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Marzieh Afkham said on Wednesday that talks between Tehran and the Sextet of world powers over the Islamic Republic's nuclear energy program may resume before September.

Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – the US, France, Britain, Russia and China – plus Germany have been holding talks to sort out their differences and achieve a final deal that would end the decade-old dispute over Iran's nuclear energy program.

They sealed an interim deal in Geneva, Switzerland, on November 23, 2013. The deal came into force in January and expired six months later.

In July, the two sides agreed on the extension of their discussions until November 24 in an effort to achieve a permanent nuclear deal.

<http://www.prestv.ir/detail/2014/08/08/374482/iran-us-hold-constructive-ntalks/>

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U.S. News & World Report – Washington, D.C.

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World Health Organization: Spread of Ebola in West Africa Is an International Health Emergency

By MARIA CHENG, Associated Press (AP) Medical Writer
August 8, 2014

LONDON (AP) — The World Health Organization on Friday declared the Ebola outbreak in West Africa to be an international public health emergency that requires an extraordinary response to stop its spread.

It is the largest and longest outbreak ever recorded of Ebola, which has a death rate of about 50 percent and has so far killed at least 961 people. WHO declared similar emergencies for the swine flu pandemic in 2009 and for polio in May.

The WHO chief, Dr. Margaret Chan, said the announcement is "a clear call for international solidarity" although she acknowledged that many countries would probably not have any Ebola cases.

"Countries affected to date simply do not have the capacity to manage an outbreak of this size and complexity on their own," Chan said at a news conference in Geneva. "I urge the international community to provide this support on the most urgent basis possible."

The agency had convened an expert committee this week to assess the severity of the continuing epidemic.

The current outbreak of Ebola emerged in Guinea in March and has since spread to Sierra Leone and Liberia, with a suspected cluster in Nigeria. Since it was first identified in 1976, there have been more than 20 outbreaks in central and eastern Africa; this is the first one to affect West Africa.

The impact of the WHO declaration is unclear; the declaration about polio doesn't yet seem to have slowed the spread of virus.

"Statements won't save lives," said Dr. Bart Janssens, director of operations for Doctors Without Borders. "For weeks, (we) have been repeating that a massive medical, epidemiological and public health response is desperately needed. ... Lives are being lost because the response is too slow."

"I don't know what the advantage is of declaring an international emergency," added Dr. David Heymann, who directed WHO's response to the SARS outbreak and is now a professor at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.

"This could bring in more foreign aid but we don't know that yet," he said.

In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention already recommends against traveling to West Africa. The agency has also put U.S. hospitals on alert for symptoms to spot potential cases as quickly as possible.

Two Americans infected with Ebola recently received a drug never before tested in people and seem to be improving slightly, according to the charity they work for.

Next week, WHO will hold another meeting to discuss whether it's ethical to use experimental treatments and drugs in the current outbreak. There's no evidence in people that the experimental treatments work and it would take months even to have a modest amount. There is no licensed drug or treatment for Ebola.

Other experts hoped the WHO declaration would send more health workers to West Africa.

"The situation is very critical and different from what we've seen before," said Dr. Heinz Feldmann, chief of virology at the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease. "There are so many locations with transmission popping up and we just need more people on the ground."

WHO did not recommend any travel or trade bans but said people who had close contact with Ebola patients should not travel internationally. For countries with Ebola, WHO issued various recommendations, including exit



screening at international airports and border crossings to spot potential cases. It also discouraged mass gatherings.

WHO said countries without Ebola should heighten their surveillance and treat any suspected cases as a health emergency.

This week, two of the worst-hit Ebola countries — Liberia and Sierra Leone — brought in troops to enforce quarantines and stop people infected with the disease from traveling. Liberian authorities said no one with a fever would be allowed in or out of the country and warned some civil liberties could be suspended if needed to bring the virus under control.

Chan said while extraordinary measures might be necessary to contain the outbreak, it is important to recognize civil rights.

"We need to respect the dignity of people and inform them why these measures are being taken," she said.

The disease spread from Liberia to Nigeria when a man apparently sick with Ebola boarded a plane, according to the Nigerian government. Nigerian authorities say the man, who later died, was not placed into isolation for at least 24 hours after he was hospitalized. A nurse who treated him has since died from Ebola and authorities are monitoring seven other cases among people who had contact with the first victim.

<http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2014/08/08/who-ebola-outbreak-is-a-public-health-emergency>

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

America's CDC At Least One Year Away From Ebola Drugs or Vaccine

8 August 2014

WASHINGTON, August 8 (RIA Novosti) - The United States Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is at least one year away from drugs or a vaccine to treat and prevent Ebola, according to CDC Director, Thomas Frieden, testifying on Thursday before an emergency hearing by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

"Right now we are months or at least a year away, from everything I have seen and heard, from significant quantities of ... drugs or a vaccine. If everything goes well, that could change," Frieden said.

Last week, two American health care workers were evacuated from Liberia after contracting Ebola and were given an experimental serum. Under intense medical supervision, they have shown signs of improvement.

California Representative Karen Bass asked Frieden about the course of drugs noting "a lot of concern that we have access [to a cure] and are not providing it."

"We really don't know. I think that really has to be emphasized," Frieden said about the experimental course of drugs.

"Whatever happens to these two individuals...we will not know from their experience whether these drugs work," he added. "We cannot know until it has been rigorously studied."

Addressing the concerns that more of the drugs used to treat the two Americans exist, Frieden said, "I also cannot tell you how many courses there are. There are a handful. I have heard there are fewer than the fingers of one hand."

As of August 4, there were 1,711 reported cases of Ebola across four West African nations with 932 deaths. That number is likely to increase as the disease just recently made its first appearance in the densely inhabited city of Lagos, Nigeria. Despite these complications, the CDC emphasizes that Ebola can be stopped. The essential considerations to stopping the outbreak is finding the disease, responding to it largely through quarantines, and preventing its spread.

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<http://en.ria.ru/society/20140808/191830500/Americas-CDC-At-Least-One-Year-Away-From-Ebola-Drugs-or-Vaccine.html>

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The National Interest.org

OPINION/Article

The INF Treaty and Russia's Road to War

"Russian military leaders fear that they will be defeated in any major conventional engagement, and so must rely on nuclear deterrence to prevent an enemy from taking advantage of a battlefield victory."

Tom Nichols

August 2, 2014

After many months of provocative Russian missile tests, the United States has finally accused the Russian Federation of violating the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The INF Treaty is a landmark 1987 agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States that prohibits the possession on both sides of "theater" nuclear missiles – that is, weapons with a range too short to be considered part of a stable intercontinental strategic deterrent, but too long to be considered tactical arms for use on a battlefield during wartime. The treaty doesn't actually ban any nuclear warheads themselves, but rather only any system capable of delivering them at distances between 500 and 5500 kilometers.

In terms of the military balance between East and West, none of this matters a whit. But in terms of what it says about how the Russians (and not just President Vladimir Putin) view a future war in Europe, it's deeply troubling.

To understand all this, we have to go back to the Cold War, and think about why both the U.S. and the USSR found intermediate range nuclear missiles so worrisome. Although nuclear theology is no longer in fashion these days, there is no way to understand the gravity and danger of what Moscow is doing without reviewing why the INF Treaty exists in the first place.

During the Cold War, the USSR's Warsaw Pact alliance was poised directly along the borders of America's NATO allies in Europe. No matter what might start World War III, and no matter where in the world Soviet and Western forces would first collide, Soviet planners intended to move against Europe in order to bring the conflict back to an arena of overwhelming Soviet conventional dominance. (We thought about similar moves as well.) Accordingly, Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces were structured for a major offensive designed to capture swaths of then-West Germany, and then to drive on toward the Atlantic coast in the hopes of shattering NATO with a sudden, traumatic defeat.

The U.S. and NATO, of course, had no hope of stopping this kind of Soviet conventional attack. Outgunned and outnumbered, NATO's strategy was to convince Moscow that the Alliance would have no choice but to blunt the Soviet invasion with the use of short-range nuclear weapons on the battlefield against the advancing Warsaw Pact columns. NATO's hope was that the Kremlin, faced with no option but nuclear retaliation against the U.S. and its European partners, would realize it was gaining nothing by sparking an all-out nuclear war.

The Soviets – or at least the Soviet military – counted on NATO's nuclear powers (the U.S., Britain and France) to make good on their threats: every Soviet military exercise until 1967 began with a simulated NATO nuclear strike. Subsequent exercises discarded this opening salvo, but all assumed *eventual* nuclear use, and thus stressed the need for speed and shock before the West could reach for the nuclear trigger. The Soviet regime for years promised never be the first to use nuclear weapons (as China does now, by the way), but in reality the Soviets were planning their own crippling tactical strikes on NATO communications, command and control, airfields, and other assets if they believed the military situation required them.

Both Washington and Moscow faced a conceptual problem with nuclear escalation. The Soviets, understandably, did not prefer to fight in a nuclear environment if they could help it, but NATO's nuclear forces would be overrun in any Soviet invasion, making them "use or lose" weapons, and so Soviet success on the battlefield ran the risk of

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provoking the outcome they feared the most. The Americans, for their part, had tied U.S. strategic nuclear weapons to the defense of NATO, promising that escalation in Europe would lead to central nuclear war between the superpowers. This threat, however, required Moscow to believe that a U.S. president would jump from tactical nuclear war in Western Europe to strikes launched from U.S. submarines or from North America itself against the Soviet heartland.

Throughout the 1960s, both sides fielded short and intermediate range nuclear forces until Europe was bristling with nuclear arms. Despite their preference for a conventional conflict, however, the Soviets made a baffling blunder in the mid-1970s by deploying a mobile, multiple-warhead missile called the SS-20. This was supposedly only a replacement for older Soviet weapons in Europe, but those older systems were less accurate, and more importantly, relied on liquid fuel, which required hours of preparation. The new SS-20s, by contrast, represented a huge improvement in range and accuracy, and were powered by solid fuel boosters that made them available for use on almost instant notice. Every European capital was now in range of a theater nuclear system whose purpose was to paralyze NATO under the threat of immediate and accurate surprise nuclear attack.

This blunt threat was a mistake. NATO's response was to upgrade its own theater missiles, a program initiated by Jimmy Carter and brought to fruition by Ronald Reagan. Along with ground-launched cruise missiles (which were relatively slow but were small and could fly under Soviet radar), the Americans deployed the Pershing II, an intermediate range ballistic missile that could reach the USSR from West Germany in a matter of minutes. These deployments were tremendously controversial in Europe, and sparked mass protests. But European leaders of both the right and left were sufficiently alarmed by the increased Soviet nuclear threat that the deployments continued in the early 1980s. (Even the French referred to the SS-20 as *le grand menace*.) This renewed sense of purpose in NATO – Vladimir Putin, take note – reversed years of Soviet diplomacy after the steady deterioration in relations between the U.S. and its NATO partners during the Vietnam-era 1970s.

The SS-20s and the Pershings were highly destabilizing weapons, reducing the time for a nuclear decision by U.S. or Soviet leaders during a conventional war to minutes, if not seconds. Each side felt deeply threatened, and understandably so. We now know that the Soviet military insisted on the SS-20 over the objections of the Soviet diplomatic establishment, who saw it as an unnecessary provocation. (They were right.)

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev inherited this mess from his predecessors, and he considered the responding U.S. Pershing deployments, as he later wrote in his memoirs, a "gun to the [USSR's] head." Reagan, for his part, had pushed the deployments despite his hopes – shared by Gorbachev – of eliminating all nuclear weapons. Both leaders – as part of the "triumph of improvisation," to use James Wilson's description of the way the Cold War ended – instead settled for getting rid of the most destabilizing arms in their inventories. The 1987 treaty was the first to eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms, rather than merely capping their numbers as in previous U.S.-Soviet arms treaties. The removal of these weapons created a breathing space for further negotiations in Europe, and helped pave the way to the end of the Cold War.

Why does any of this matter today? The Warsaw Pact no longer exists. Indeed, its members are now part of NATO. The conventional equation has been completely reversed, with Russia now the inferior conventional power, its armies no longer massed along NATO's borders and completely incapable of a lightning dash to the Rhine, let alone the English Channel. NATO (as I have argued many times elsewhere) does not need tactical nuclear weapons, since their former targets are now in NATO itself. So what's the point?

The danger is that Moscow may be coming back to theater-range nuclear weapons as some sort of imagined equalizer against NATO. Russia no longer has a strategy of blitzkrieg; rather, Russian military leaders fear that they will be defeated in any major conventional engagement, and so must rely on nuclear deterrence to prevent an enemy from taking advantage of a battlefield victory. This is the Kremlin's bizarre strategy of "nuclear de-escalation," in which the use of just a few nuclear weapons convinces a putative "aggressor" to back off.

This all raises the question of just why the Russians think they would have to fight, or why they'd be in such a dire situation in the first place. One possibility is that the Russian high command is so paranoid that it really believes that NATO – an alliance that can barely be bothered to engage in sanctions, much less war – would actually attack

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Russia. I knew Soviet officers during the Cold War who swore that they believed that NATO really would invade the Warsaw Pact even at something like a 1-to-6 inferiority, but it is hard to imagine that there is anyone in Russia's senior ranks who still thinks that way.

A more likely explanation is that Russia's military planners are trying to think through their options in case Russian conventional aggression fails and Russia ends up losing a war that Moscow started. Russian exercises as long ago as 1999 postulated kooky scenarios like a NATO land grab in the Baltic region. These games included a handful of nuclear strikes – including two against North America – that then terminated the conflict. If any Russian general really believes this is what would happen after a nuclear strike on the United States, we're all in a lot more trouble than anyone realizes.

It may also be the case that the Russians are testing prohibited INF-range missiles as a warning to NATO: the Kremlin, including Putin and his military coterie, has never accepted the collapse of the USSR and the expansion of the West into former Warsaw Pact territory. (Just ask the Ukrainians.) These treaty violations may be a signal that they are looking, yet again, to decouple any regional conflict in Europe from the U.S. strategic deterrent by threatening European NATO with nuclear weapons, but without resorting to Russian strategic forces and thus averting a U.S. response.

It is also possible, to use a traditional term of strategic analysis, that the Russians are just yanking our chain to see what will happen. Putin's Kremlin is now accustomed to the passivity of Barack Obama's White House, and so the Russians may be violating the INF Treaty simply because they can. There's really not that much of a military point in Russia's tests, nor do they change the strategic calculus, because there isn't anything the Russians can do with ground-launched cruise missiles that they couldn't already do with other nuclear weapons in their inventory.

But if Moscow can shred a key arms agreement with no real consequences, the Russians will have succeeded in sending the message that America's ongoing global disengagement now even includes NATO. At the least, turfing the INF Treaty is yet another way for Putin to show that he is dumping the entire post-Cold War settlement and that he intends to carve out a better deal than the one his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, bequeathed to him.

At least where nuclear arms are concerned, the American response to this should be to do nothing, as paradoxical as that sounds. As Ambassador Steven Pifer and others have noted, if NATO, as some have suggested, starts arming its own cruise missiles with nuclear warheads and answers Russia's INF violations in a tit-for-tat exchange, we will have succumbed to Moscow's bait. We will end up not only legitimizing their abrogation of the treaty, but closing off opportunities for further talks.

Instead, the West should emphasize what the Russians fear most: NATO's considerable conventional edge. Washington should accelerate the halting steps we've taken since the invasion of Ukraine and the seizure of Crimea, and work with our NATO partners to build up stronger conventional forces in Europe. If the Russians are keeping nuclear arms as insurance against losing a conventional war, it's only because they still think they have some kind of a shot at a conventional fight in the first place. We can close that loophole, and must, soon.

If we continue to adhere to the INF Treaty even as Moscow violates it, we will demonstrate our strength and confidence even as Putin and his cronies parade their paranoia. Putin is known, like many Russians, to hold former Soviet leader Gorbachev in low regard. When it came to stemming the tide of nuclear arms, however, Reagan and Gorbachev were stronger men, and his petulant violation of a treaty that made the world – Russia included – a safer place is testimony only to the weakness and insecurity of the men who govern Russia today.

Tom Nichols is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and an adjunct at the Harvard Extension School. His most recent book is No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security (University of Pennsylvania, 2014). The views expressed are his own.

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-inf-treaty-russia%E2%80%99s-road-war-11001?page=show>

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Global Times – Beijing, China

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OPINION/Observer

Nuclear Weapons Development Must Be Consistent

Source: Global Times

August 4, 2014

A report on the official website of the Shaanxi Province's Environmental Surveillance Center mentioned projects related to the DF-41 strategic missile, which has widely been considered confirmation from Chinese authorities of the existence of the DF-41 intercontinental strategic missile. Western intelligence organizations have speculated about China's latest nuclear weapons, and some even believe it will profoundly influence how China and the US view each other.

Strategic nuclear missiles relate to China's core strategic capabilities, which influence the attitude of major powers toward China.

The DF-41 seems to have made breakthroughs in terms of survival capacity and penetration capacity. If, as Western intelligence institutions speculated, the DF-41 is projected to use solid fuels and have the capacity to be road-mobile with multiple warheads, then it will be a powerful strategic weapon which would not be easily destroyed in the first round of a nuclear strike and which American anti-missile systems cannot intercept.

The West doesn't take seriously Russia's economic record, but held its unique strategic capability in awe. The fundamental reason is that Russia inherited a huge nuclear arsenal from the Soviet era. The West can isolate Moscow politically and economically, but carrying out military actions against Russia is nearly an impossible option. Nuclear weapons have been the key factor.

China should not stress too much about nuclear weapons because it would bring about intense geopolitical turbulence. Compared with China's other kinds of capabilities, its nuclear one is neither a severe disadvantage nor a strong advantage. Herman Cain, a Republican presidential candidate, was reportedly ignorant of China's presence as a nuclear weapons state. That means nuclear strength hasn't become a strong factor shaping the US public's view over China.

China will not show off its nuclear build-up, but the build-up should be sensed by the outside world. China needs to upgrade the quality of its nuclear weapons and the number of warheads should increase gradually.

The US' nuclear capability far exceeds that of China. The US lacks the imperative to criticize China's development of nuclear weapons. Although Washington is not willing to see the advancement of China's nuclear capabilities, it doesn't fuss about it in the same way it fusses about human rights. This shows that there's room for China to speed up its nuclear capability.

China is a big country that acts prudently, and the US is quite aware of this. As China's nuclear capability increases, there is the possibility that the US will take nuclear deterrent action against China, either explicitly or implicitly.

China needs determination to develop nuclear powers, which also requires technological and political capacities. We don't want to add complexity to China's strategic environment. It requires the wisdom of decision-makers to strike a balance.

<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/874080.shtml>

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Breaking Defense – Washington, D.C.

OPINION/Strategy & Policy

A Second Chance on Nuclear Modernization

By Bob Butterworth

August 04, 2014

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The DC debate on the Navy's new nuclear missile submarines has been about how we can possibly pay for them. In this op-ed, however, frequent Breaking Defense contributor Bob Butterworth takes a step back to look at a much bigger picture. The Navy's recent admission that it can't afford the Ohio Replacement Program (ORP) is an opportunity, he argues, a moment of clarity that should force the administration to rethink its plan for the future of the entire nuclear enterprise. In an increasingly dangerous world, he says, we still need nukes, but the world is dangerous in a different way than the Cold War and requires a different kind of thinking about nuclear weapons. — Sydney Freedberg, deputy editor.

Thanks to the Navy, we now have a chance to build a force posture better suited to meeting our future nuclear challenges.

To recap: In 2009 the then-new Obama Administration prepared a Nuclear Posture Review that set out to conclude the country would be safe with fewer deployed nuclear forces. The following year the Administration presented the New START agreement for Senate advice and consent, soon coupling it with a plan to modernize the classic triad by building new ICBMs, new submarines to launch SLBMs, and new nuclear-capable bombers, all to be fielded during the early 2030s and 2040s. New SLBMs for the new “boomers” would then follow. The next year brought a reduced version of this plan, delaying the start of the submarine program by two years and indefinitely deferring the work to make the new bombers capable of delivering nuclear bombs. This year brought a three-year delay in beginning work on a new air-launched cruise missile.

All this was expected to be very costly, as the delays and deferrals suggest. The Navy's effort alone was likely to run almost to \$100 billion and to take up nearly half the shipbuilding program for several years. And, sure enough, the Navy told Congress in July that the plan to build new subs is “not supportable” without giving the service a lot more money.

And so there may now be a chance to reconsider the whole modernization scheme. With or without delays, the Administration's plan would simply recapitalize the force posture that had emerged from inter-service competition half a century ago. Is that the best achievable posture for meeting the threats and challenges of the next fifty years? Maybe, but there was not much strategic analysis offered to justify it, and the arguments offered to support it have a distinct superpower-vs.-superpower Cold War flavor. It is hard to see the plan as more than a replay of bureaucratic politics, in which the Air Force and the Navy each surrendered some deployed missiles and outside “blue ribbon” panels reported they could not agree on a better alternative.

While the bureaucratic environment may have remained the same, however, the strategic environment has *not*. The deterrence targets are different from those of the Cold War. The objectives, calculations, and assessments of regional powers with nuclear weapons — North Korea, Pakistan, India, and soon, perhaps, Iran — are obscure but are definitely different. The operational environment is different, affecting the understanding and evaluation of threats and commitments. The demands for and of extended deterrence are different. The connections between regional conflict and great power interests are different.

Crisis management and escalation control will also be different. Confronting the United States, a regional power with only a few nuclear weapons might use them to start the war, perhaps then quickly suing for peace and expecting international pressures to limit the US response. Or perhaps they might save them to use once our ground forces are deployed or high-value targets are concentrated at ports or airfields.

Our calculations will be different too. If nuclear weapons are first used by the aggressor, whether large or small, the US might not respond in kind, perhaps to keep others from suffering fallout and residual nuclear effects or, in the case of the smaller nuclear aggressors, from provoking others to give them help. The President would have to consider how well our conventional forces might operate in the nuclear environment, whether we had a nuclear weapon with delivery options and effects appropriate to the circumstances at hand, and whether American lives could be saved by using it.

American calculations about nuclear deterrence and defense will also have to account for how our *non-nuclear* capabilities are being transformed by developments in space and cyberspace. Innovative operations in these domains could provide not only better intelligence but even “non-kinetic effects” — e.g. computer hacking — that

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deny effective command and control to the aggressor. We need to figure out what these capabilities might mean for nuclear scenarios: how they might be used, what vulnerabilities they might present, how they might be coordinated and controlled, what operational synergies might be obtained from the unified command of these operations, whether these US advantages could be neutralized by a weaker adversary's nuclear weapons.. In particular, we must to assess what policies and strategies would be enabled or precluded by alternative force structures.

Space and cyber operations have also been increasing the "jointness" of the US conventional forces, but that has not seriously included planning for theater nuclear operations. The result may well be failure to develop appropriate options that might strengthen both deterrence and defense. Would our nuclear plans enable us to engage time-urgent battlefield targets? Or could the US only use nuclear weapons, if at all, against more strategic objectives? Any use would call for careful attention to anticipated effects on the target country, other states in the region, the concerns of other, nuclear powers, especially the larger ones, and the effects on future US military operations in the area.

A careful review of all these changes might endorse the current plan as most likely to provide the deterrence and defense forces best suited to the future. But I doubt it. And pressing ahead with outdated rationales to invest heavily in last century's force posture could provoke further disaffection with the nuclear weapons enterprise. A more flexible structure and posture, more options for adaptive planning and versatile response, would better meet the surprises we are sure to encounter, offer Presidents more options for controlling events, and perhaps even help remedy the oft-decried lack of consensus about our strategic nuclear forces.

Bob Butterworth, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, is a consultant and expert on nuclear issues and intelligence. The president of Aries Analytics, Butterworth has been a senior advisor to the head of Space Command, a staffer on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and a staff member on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

<http://breakingdefense.com/2014/08/a-second-chance-on-nuclear-modernization/>

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Albuquerque Journal.com - Albuquerque, NM

OPINION/Editorial

Editorial: Now, a Wake-Up Call on Nukes

By Albuquerque Journal Editorial Board

Monday, August 4, 2014

With all the major problems facing the world right now, from the spread of warfare to the spread of deadly disease, it would be easy to overlook the very serious accusation the Obama administration is making that Russia has violated a 26-year-old nuclear weapons treaty.

A recent State Department report on compliance of arms control agreements accuses Russia of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that President Ronald Reagan signed with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987.

The administration has not said where or when the violation occurred, but retired Russian Lt. Gen. Yevgeniy Buzhinsky said the accusations date back to 2009 and claimed the current complaints were part of an "information war ... being waged against Russia."

In a page right out of the Cold War, Buzhinsky accused the United States of also falling short of its treaty obligations, but the Pentagon said the United States is in full compliance.

Now that negotiations aimed producing a multinational agreement that would curb Iran's nuclear ambitions have been put on hold for several months, the administration would be wise to consider the current problems with the Russian accord as a wake-up call.

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It should remember that treaties are good only when they can be monitored and are followed.

This editorial first appeared in the Albuquerque Journal. It was written by members of the editorial board and is unsigned as it represents the opinion of the newspaper rather than the writers.

<http://www.abqjournal.com/440271>

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Deccan Chronicle – India

OPINION/Commentary

Nuclear Deterrence Stability Is a Mirage

By Michael Krepon

August 05, 2014

Nuclear deterrence was conceptualised in the US even before the Soviet Union produced atomic weapons. Anticipating that the Kremlin would acquire the “ultimate” weapon, brilliant minds devised a strategy to dissuade Moscow from using nuclear weapons in warfare or for leverage.

Thomas Schelling, one of the founding fathers of nuclear strategy, wrote that the essence of deterrence was the threat that left something to chance. Nuclear threats were supposed to prevent bad outcomes. If deterrence failed, there would be worse outcomes.

There were other paradoxes and weaknesses in deterrence theory. Strategy had to be rooted in psychology, but this wasn't easy because adversaries, by definition, think differently. If a bluff were called, one side would have to back down or both would lose. No one had a credible explanation of escalation control.

The ransom notes associated with mutual hostage-taking came with rising price tags because deterrence always needed to be strengthened in response to adversarial moves. Failure to compete might imply a weakening of will.

Despite all this, deterrence theory became an article of faith. A key tenet of this faith was that nuclear-armed adversaries have never used the ultimate weapon against each other, despite close calls. Adherents of deterrence theory took refuge in the belief that, as arsenals grew and when adversaries possessed assured retaliatory capabilities, deterrence would become more stable.

The evidence so far strongly suggests that this is wishful thinking. Deterrence stability is a myth, except in cases where nuclear-armed states have little, if anything, to fight about. In contrast, deterrence stability between nuclear-armed adversaries is a mirage. Neither the US nor the Soviet Union achieved deterrence stability during the Cold War.

Instead, they demonstrated that when interests are sharply adversarial, additional nuclear firepower on both sides only increases concerns. Insecurities grew even when incremental capabilities appeared to be best suited for use in retaliation instead of pre-emption or when the competitors sought to improve defences against nuclear attack.

What about nuclear-armed adversaries with smaller arsenals? The same dynamic seems to apply, although on a reduced scale. When a nuclear competition begins, even small increments of capability are unsettling because they are novel.

When countries with serious security dilemmas transition from small to mid-sized arsenals, as is now the case in Pakistan and India, their sense of insecurity grows. Every move generates countermoves.

India and Pakistan are producing more nuclear weapons, diversifying launch capabilities, growing fissile material stockpiles, increasing targeting options and developing more complex command arrangements. These steps do not help resolve friction; they magnify them. But they are taken to avoid feeling even more disadvantaged by failing to compete.



This dynamic has been characterised by another Western construct — the “action-reaction syndrome”. Pakistan and India are now enmeshed in this, despite their initial desire to be content with credible, minimum deterrence. India considers deploying missile defences, making Pakistan feel less secure. Pakistan states a requirement for short-range delivery systems for nuclear weapons because of Indian conventional military advantages.

The battlefield use of nuclear weapons would create havoc with Pakistani military operations and make Indian air strikes a better option. Pakistan builds up fissile material stocks, as does India. Depending on decisions made over the next five to 10 years, the action-reaction syndrome could also apply much more to China and India, with spill-over effects on Pakistan.

There are several off-ramps for competitors that wish to avoid the pitfalls of a nuclear arms competition. One way is to resolve disputes in mutually reassuring ways. Another is to negotiate treaties limiting or reducing the most destabilising aspects of a nuclear competition. This option seems most unlikely in a triangular nuclear competition among states with very different military potential.

A third way is for one of the contestants to voluntarily drop out of a nuclear competition, feeling it has sufficient firepower, enabling it to redirect resources elsewhere. A fourth way is for one of the contestants to involuntarily drop out of the competition because of economic duress or state failure.

This is what happened to the Soviet Union. A fifth way is to reach confidence-building and nuclear risk-reduction agreements, tacit or explicit, to defuse the most destabilising aspects of a nuclear competition. These choices are not mutually exclusive.

The writer is the co-founder of the Stimson Centre in Washington, D.C. By arrangement with Dawn

<http://www.deccanchronicle.com/140805/commentary-columnists/article/nuclear-deterrence-stability-mirage>

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The Diplomat – Tokyo, Japan
OPINION/The Pulse

The Paradox of India’s ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’

India’s policy of deterrence may be exacerbating regional tension instead of preventing conflict.

By Amit R. Saksena for *The Diplomat*

August 06, 2014

Since its initiation by the Prime Minister’s Office in 2003, India’s nuclear doctrine, for all official purposes, has revolved around the doctrine of credible minimum deterrence (CMD). However, the recent developmental strides in missile technology made by the Defense Research and Development Organization (including the Agni V, BrahMos and Dhanush missiles) raises a question: Just how much is a “credible minimum?”

History will tell us about the perceived Chinese threat, which was the catalyst for India to test its first nuclear device in 1974. However the 1998 tests, conducted under the auspices of the newly instated BJP government, were more in line with regional prestige than with national security. This was also New Delhi’s *hamartia* (mistake). A threatened Pakistan, already on the fast-track to nuclear weapons, responded by testing its own devices, thus turning an already fractious region into one of the world’s most dangerous. As a counter, India’s leadership, still riding the wave of “peaceful nuclear explosions,” drafted a hurried and unplanned nuclear doctrine, which has since been subjected to ridicule.

A nuclear doctrine is primarily a containment strategy, as opposed to a standard operating procedure. When CMD was first found to be in tandem with New Delhi’s “peaceful objectives,” policymakers had to choose which of their two belligerent neighbors would be the focus of India’s nuclear posture. Unsurprisingly, China was expected to fill that role. However, given events already underway, India is now faced with an even greater threat in the form of a nuclear Pakistan, complete with a first use, India-centric nuclear strategy. New Delhi’s rhetoric of no first-use (NFU) notwithstanding, India is the catalyst for the arms race now underway for nuclear supremacy in the region, as it is



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practically impossible to gain “credible minimum” deterrence against both of its geopolitical opponents. China’s nuclear power, far surpassing India’s own, would require much more extensive measures and a larger arsenal to be credibly deterred. And this development would be anything but minimal with respect to Pakistan’s nuclear portfolio. To catch up to China, India will constantly be challenging Pakistan to an unintended nuclear defense dilemma.

India’s nuclear strategy mainly draws its deterrence from the clause on punitive retaliation. Theoretically, New Delhi wants to neutralize any threat of a nuclear attack by amassing the “credible minimum” firepower and capability required to deliver a punitive retaliatory measure, which can ensure gross destruction of the opposing forces, conforming to the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). New Delhi has achieved considerable success on that front by having worked to prove India’s credibility regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, having successfully signed a nuclear deal with the U.S., and making enormous development strides in its defense research and development with the induction of the *Prithvi* Air Defence System, the *INS Arihant*, and the Agni series of ballistic missiles. However, as discussed earlier, these developments have not contributed significantly to enhancing India’s own relative posture in the region. Pakistan has been drawn into playing catch-up, thus posing a serious risk to the entire region, while Beijing has started taking notice of this development, and could possibly step up its border defense network.

Pakistan for its part has a completely viable nuclear strategy, which pivots on India. The provision for a first strike can be attributed to Pakistan’s fear of a conventional attack by the full might of the Indian armed forces, which might easily overrun its borders without bringing nuclear weapons into the equation. However, Islamabad’s ‘Option-enhancing Policy (OeP),’ relies to a great extent on the rationality of the Indian political leadership. The question becomes whether a limited, tactical nuclear attack on a single battalion of the Indian Army, 50 km away from Lahore, merits the destruction of the entire state of Pakistan. It is this rationality that has kept India from engaging Pakistan militarily on occasions such as the Parliament attack in 2004 and the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008. To this extent, a CMD has only proved to be detrimental to India’s deterrence stand.

China officially does not recognize India as a nuclear power, and in the past has not paid much attention to New Delhi’s development curve. However, there has been considerable literature from Chinese academia recently concerning India’s foray into the manufacturing and setting up of its indigenous air defense system. Recently India and Israel concluded an agreement to jointly develop a ballistic missile defense shield against nuclear attacks from Pakistan and China. This would be of much interest in Beijing, as it shows India’s pursuit of a multi-layered defense, as opposed to its conventional military strategy regarding China. India’s first indigenous nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the *INS Arihant* is also expected to start operations from early 2015, and will be directly concerned with the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. Given these circumstances, New Delhi may have alerted Beijing to the presence of a rising geopolitical threat, and the containment measures planned by the Chinese may prove detrimental to India. In this case too, the CMD has only aggravated problems for India.

In hindsight, nation states often produce weapons before drafting and adopting sound, feasible policies to dictate their utility. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War learned this the hard way. It is for this reason that the U.S. and Russia together account for more than 75 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world today. Although not entirely the same context, unless the nation states of South Asia amend their internal policies to bring them in tandem with the fast evolving geopolitics of the region, the threat of a nuclear conflict appears considerable.

Amit R. Saksena is a postgraduate scholar at the Jindal School of International Affairs. The views expressed in this article are his own.

<http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/the-paradox-of-indias-credible-minimum-deterrence/>

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The Hill – Washington, D.C.
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Arms Control: Don't Throw the Baby Out with the Bathwater

By Matthew Bunn

The Obama administration has released a report formally charging Russia with violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This comes in the midst of a drumbeat of negative Russia news, from arming rebels in Ukraine and annexing Crimea to propping up the brutal dictatorship in Syria and hosting Edward Snowden. To some, the INF issue will be seen as more evidence that it's impossible to deal with Vladimir Putin's Russia.

But it's important to keep some context in mind. First, the INF Treaty – one of President Reagan's proudest arms control accomplishments – has been extremely successful overall. It verifiably eliminated the entire class of intermediate-range ground-based missiles from the U.S. and Soviet arsenals, including the three-warhead SS-20s that had posed a terrifying threat to Europe and the Pershing II and cruise missiles NATO had deployed in response. It introduced on-site inspection as a major tool in U.S.-Russian (or, then, U.S.-Soviet) arms treaties for the first time. In that way, it laid the foundation for the START, START II, and New START nuclear reductions treaties – and the administration has confirmed that Russia continues to follow through on the nuclear arms reductions it committed to in New START.

Second, while the Russian actions in question are real and troubling, they do not pose an immediate military threat. Press reports and congressional testimony suggest that Russia tested a cruise missile developed for use as a sea-launched system (which the treaty permits) from a launcher designed for ground basing (which the treaty prohibits). There is no indication yet that Russia has yet deployed substantial numbers of this weapon. The United States is demanding that any items tested in a prohibited way be eliminated, though given the current state of U.S.-Russian relations, no one should hold their breath waiting for that to happen.

Third, this Russian testing does not eliminate the substantial benefits for the world that the INF Treaty or the larger process of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control have provided. We live in a safer world with fewer nuclear weapons and less risk that they will be used because of the arms control treaties that are in place today. But there's more to be done, as the roughly 17,000 nuclear weapons that still exist in the world – most of them many times the size of the weapons that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki – are still far more than needed for deterrence, an excess that results in both unnecessary dangers and unjustified costs.

So where do we go from here? The U.S. government should do what it can to convince Russia not to deploy any prohibited ground-launched cruise missiles. It should work with countries in Europe and Asia, who would face the main military threats such weapons might pose, to join in pressuring Russia not to take this step. At the same time, it should prepare shifts in the U.S. military posture – not necessarily nuclear ones – to ensure that Russia gets no military advantage if it does move ahead. This could include, for example, expanded air defense assistance to U.S. allies within range. Since the United States and its allies already have to cope with cruise missiles launched from the sea and the air, a Russian potential to add ground-launched cruise missiles to the mix will pose only a modest additional threat.

Finally, the U.S. government should continue to pursue arms control agreements that are judged to benefit the security of the United States and the world – taking into account how well they can be verified, the odds of cheating, and our options for responding to any cheating that does occur. President Reagan negotiated arms control agreements with the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War not because they were our friends, but because they were our enemies. That's why we wanted to limit their nuclear forces. President Reagan was forceful in dealing with Soviet violations – some of which negotiation managed to reverse – but that did not stop him from moving forward with arms control agreements. As relations with Russia grow more frosty, the same rules apply.

This INF Treaty violation is reason to be careful in our nuclear dealings with Russia – as if any more reasons were needed. But it is not reason to ignore the very real risks to the American people posed by the thousands of unneeded Cold War nuclear weapons still in the U.S. and Russian arsenals, or the role negotiated restraints can still play in reducing those risks.

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<http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/214517-arms-control-dont-throw-the-baby-out-with-the-bathwater>

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ABOUT THE USAF CUWS

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation .

The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence.

In February 2014, the Center's name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term "unconventional weapons," currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards.

The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation - counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.

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