



UNITED STATES AIR FORCE CENTER FOR
**UNCONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS STUDIES**

OUTREACH JOURNAL

Issue No. 1270
30 June 2017

Featured Item

Featured Item: *“The North Korea Instability Project: North Korean Collapse: Weapons of Mass Destruction Use and Proliferation Challenges”*. Written by Patrick Terrell, published by 38 North; June 23, 2017

<http://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/NKIP-Terrell-WMD-Use-and-Proliferation-Challenges-062217.pdf>

Among all the challenges associated with a North Korean collapse, the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or movement of WMD out of the country will have the largest strategic implications. The extensive size and complexity of North Korea’s nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) weapons programs make it virtually impossible for the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) to have 100 percent clarity of intelligence and greatly increases the likelihood that regime forces, individual opportunists, fleeing members of the regime leadership or breakaway separatists could gain access to WMD. Therefore, it is useful to examine these programs, both in terms of historical examples of chemical and biological use in low intensity conflicts, and potential future employment and proliferation scenarios. This approach will permit a better appreciation of the WMD challenge associated with a collapsing North Korea that is grounded not only in plausible speculation but also in historical precedent.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. [Should the US pull its nuclear weapons out of Turkey?](#)
2. [Air Force B-2 to Get New Digital Nuclear Weapons & Air-Ground Missiles](#)
3. [US investigates after lab improperly ships nuclear material](#)
4. [ICBM Country: Ogden Air Logistics Complex restoring Air Force’s nuclear launch facilities](#)

US COUNTER-WMD

1. [Diablo Shield Exercise Tests Response to Biothreat Incidents](#)
2. [Junior Navy Scientists and Engineers Make Early Warning CBR Detection via UAVs a Reality](#)
3. [Blue Grass Army Depot one of state's largest military installations](#)
4. [UN warns of new threats to non-proliferation of WMD](#)

US ARMS CONTROL

1. [Defense bill would limit implementation of nuclear arms treaty with Russia](#)
2. [The back door to a new arms race](#)
3. [US Potential Unilateral Withdrawal From INF Treaty Puts Europe at Risk](#)
4. [Tom Cotton: US has to win nuclear 'arms race' with Russia and China](#)

ASIA/PACIFIC

1. [Imagery Confirms Recent Media Reports of Rocket Engine Test](#)
2. [North Korea can now target Japan with a nuclear missile](#)
3. [Japan eyes U.S. nuclear pact that renews automatically amid Trump administration vacancies](#)
4. [US lawmakers accuse China of helping Pyongyang bypass sanctions](#)

EUROPE/RUSSIA

1. [DON'T BELIEVE THE HYPE ABOUT EUROPEAN DEFENSE](#)
2. [How much of a threat does Russia pose, and to whom?](#)
3. [How US New Short-Range Missile Systems May Provoke New Arms Race](#)
4. [US Not Willing to Withdraw From INF Treaty: Trump's Special Assistant](#)

MIDDLE EAST

1. [US claims warning over possible Syria chemical attack averted strike](#)
2. [Iran targeted Star of David in ballistic missile test, Israel says](#)
3. [German, Iranian Foreign Ministers: Iran Nuclear Deal Must Stay](#)
4. [Iran says sees no cap to missile capability](#)

INDIA/PAKISTAN

1. [U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: DUPLICITY, BETRAYAL, OR NATIONAL INTERESTS?](#)
2. [Growing Nuclear Arsenals Increase Concerns About Possible Pakistan-India War](#)
3. [China wants Pakistan in NSG, therefore obstructing India's entry: Defense experts](#)

AFRICA

1. [The need for Institute of Nuclear Materials Management in Nigeria](#)

COMMENTARY

1. [How a regional nuclear-free-weapon zone can benefit Japan](#)
2. [Cancel the Long-Range Standoff Missile](#)
3. [Iran nuclear deal must be allowed to thrive](#)
4. [Pakistan is a responsible nuclear state and the world needs to stop maligning its efforts with baseless propaganda](#)

US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Washington Examiner (Washington, DC)

Should the US Pull Its Nuclear Weapons Out of Turkey?

By Jamie McIntyre

June 26, 2017

"Welcome to Incirlik AB, Turkey," reads the big gold letters over one of the entrances to a key staging base for the fight against the Islamic State, strategically located in southern Turkey, just 70 miles from the Syrian border.

But this month, Germany learned that the friendly greeting is not written in stone, and that the NATO ally can pull in its welcome mat with little notice or explanation.

After the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan refused to guarantee that members of the German parliament could visit German troops at Incirlik, Berlin announced it was moving its forces and planes to Jordan.

Germany's decision to decamp to more friendly territory starkly illustrates the growing tensions between Turkey and some of its NATO allies, including the United States.

"When our major European ally pulls its forces out of Incirlik because it couldn't be guaranteed access, it should warn you what happened to Germany could happen to us," said Joe Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, a Washington think tank focused on nuclear weapons policy.

"I don't think many people would count Erdogan as one of our more reliable allies. His agenda has shifted so dramatically over the last few years, you have to be concerned where it's going," Cirincione said.

While the U.S. continues to operate out of Incirlik, it too has had contentious relations with Ankara over a long list of issues, including America's backing for Kurdish fighters in Syria who Turkey regards as terrorists, and refusal to extradite U.S.-based Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen, who Erdogan blames for last July's failed coup.

And in January, Turkey's Defense Minister Fikri Isik made a veiled threat about access to Incirlik, after the U.S. withheld air support for a Turkish operation in Northern Syria, which the U.S. thought was more about stopping the Kurds than defeating ISIS.

Turkey's rocky relations with its NATO partners, and Erdogan's increasing tilt toward Russia and Iran, has arms control advocates asking, "Is this really where we want to keep dozens of the most powerful bombs on Earth?"

"I would call Turkey a doubtful ally," said Mark Fitzpatrick, with the International Institute for Strategic Studies. "Turkey has been moving farther and farther away from democratic principles that are part of the nature of NATO."

As a matter of policy, the United States does not confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons at specific locations, but it is an open secret among national security experts that Turkey is among the five NATO nations to have U.S. nukes on its soil.

U.S. European Command, which oversees U.S. operations at Incirlik Air Base, while not acknowledging the presence of nuclear weapons at the base, said there are no security concerns overall. "Our strategic assets are stored under highly secure conditions and under U.S. control," said Air Force Capt. Joe Alonso. "We are confident that they are safe."

Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, considered the foremost authority on the subject, said the U.S. keeps about 50 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs at Turkey's Incirlik base, each with a maximum yield of 170 kilotons, or 10 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

All this just about an hour-long drive from Syria, the most active war zone in the world, where in addition to a raging civil war, the international coalition led by the U.S. is battling ISIS, a terrorist group that would love to get its hands on a nuclear weapon.

"We should be concerned, and it is certainly past time to think about relocating them," Fitzpatrick told the Washington Examiner. "The nuclear weapons in Turkey are not currently under direct threat of seizure, but the circumstances over the past year give strong reason to take them out as a precaution."

Arm control advocates such as Ploughshare's Cirincione said there are many arguments for pulling U.S. nuclear weapons out of Turkey before something goes wrong.

He points to when, during the attempted coup last year, senior Turkish officers were accused of being among the leaders of the coup and flying missions from Incirlik in support of it.

The United States temporarily lost access to the base, and then for several days Turkish forces loyal to Erdogan surrounded Incirlik and cut off power, which Cirincione said effectively trapped some 2,500 U.S. military personnel along with the 50 nuclear weapons.

A week later, he pointed out, the base was again under siege, surrounded this time by thousands of anti-American protesters who burned American flags and demanded the government close the base.

"When you have four or five indicators that are all blinking red, and no sound strategic rationale for keeping the weapons there, you should err on the side of security, you should pull them out," Cirincione said.

The U.S. continues to say publicly that Turkey remains a strong and vital ally.

"I've made nine trips to Turkey in the past 12 months," Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joe Dunford said at a recent appearance at the National Press Club. "I've met with my Turkish counterpart probably no less than 15 times in the last year to try to make sure we maintain a very effective relationship with a NATO ally."

Kristensen, of the Federation of American Scientists, says commercial satellite imagery shows there have been significant security upgrades made at Incirlik in the past two years.

The U.S. B-61 bombs, he said, are stored in 21 underground vaults inside the new security perimeter, with two to three bombs in each vault.

Still, Kristensen wrote in a 2015 blog post, "The wisdom of deploying NATO's largest nuclear weapons stockpile in such a volatile region seems questionable."

But perhaps the strongest argument for moving the bombs to a more stable location is that there is no compelling strategic reason that they have to be in Turkey.

"It wouldn't undermine U.S. deterrence, particularly if the weapons were moved to another country," Fitzpatrick said. "Even taking them out and putting them in the United States wouldn't undermine the deterrence policy. The weapons are there mainly for symbolic purposes, and they still are in four other NATO countries."

Those countries are Belgium, Netherlands, Germany and Italy, according to the Federation of American Scientists.

As for U.S. - Turkey relations, "Turkey is a close NATO ally and a vital member of the counter-ISIL coalition," Alonso said. "The U.S. military has worked very closely with our Turkish allies for decades to counter a wide range of threats to our common security."

CORRECTION: An earlier version of this story stated that the military acknowledges the presence of nuclear weapons at Incirlik. As a matter of policy, the military does not confirm or deny the location of nuclear weapons.

<http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/should-the-us-pull-its-nuclear-weapons-out-of-turkey/article/2626787>

[Return to top](#)

Scout Warrior (Minnetonka, MN)

Air Force B-2 to Get New Digital Nuclear Weapons & Air-Ground Missiles

By Kris Osborne

June 22, 2017

The stealthy B-2 is slated to fly alongside the Air Force's new Long Range Strike - Bomber into the 2050s,

Air Force pilots of the 1980s-era stealthy B-2 Spirit bomber plan to arm the B-2 with new weapons and upgrade the aircraft to fly the aircraft on attack missions against enemy air defenses well into the 2050s, service officials said.

In coming years, the B-2 will be armed with with next generation digital nuclear weapons such as the B-61 Mod 12 with a tail kit and an Long Range Stand-Off weapon or, LRSO, an air-launched, guided nuclear cruise missile, service officials said.

The B-61 Mod 12 is an ongoing modernization program which seeks to integrate the B-61 Mods 3, 4, 7 and 10 into a single variant with a guided tail kit. The B-61 Mod 12 is being engineered to rely on an inertial measurement unit for navigation.

In addition to the LRSO, B83 and B-61 Mod 12, the B-2 will also carry the B-61 Mod 11, a nuclear weapon designed with penetration capabilities, Air Force officials said.

The LRSO will replace the Air Launched Cruise Missile, or ALCM, which right now is only carried by the B-52 bomber, officials said.

Alongside its nuclear arsenal, the B-2 will carry a wide range of conventional weapons to include precision-guided 2,000-pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions, or JDAMs, 5,000-pound JDAMs, Joint Standoff Weapons, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles and GBU 28 5,000-pound bunker buster weapons, among others.

The platform is also preparing to integrate a long-range conventional air-to-ground standoff weapon called the JASSM-ER, for Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, Extended Range.

The B-2 can also carry a 30,000-pound conventional bomb known as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, Maj. Kent Mickelson, director of operations for 394th combat training squadron, told Scout Warrior in an interview.

“This is a GBU-28 (bunker-buster weapon) on steroids. It will go in and take out deeply buried targets,” he said.

“It is a dream to fly. It is so smooth,” Mickelson added.

In a special interview designed to offer a rare look into the technologies and elements of the B-2, Mickelson explained that the platform has held up and remained very effective – given that it was designed and built during the 80s.

Alongside his current role, Mickelson is also a B-2 pilot with experience flying missions and planning stealth bomber attacks, such as the bombing missions over Libya in 2011.

“It is a testament to the engineering team that here we are in 2016 and the B-2 is still able to do its job just as well today as it did in the 80s. While we look forward to modernization, nobody should come away with the thought that the B-2 isn't ready to deal with the threats that are out there today,” he said. “It is really an awesome bombing platform and it is just a marvel of technology.”

The B-2 is engineered with avionics, radar and communications technologies designed to identify and destroy enemy targets from high altitudes above hostile territory.

“It is a digital airplane. We are presented with what is commonly referred to as glass cockpit,” Mickelson said.

The glass cockpit includes various digital displays, including one showing Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) information which paints a rendering or picture of the ground below.

“SAR provides the pilots with a realistic display of the ground that they are able to use for targeting,” Mickelson said.

The B-2 has a two-man crew with only two ejection seats. Also, the crew is trained to deal with the rigors of a 40-hour mission.

“The B-2 represents a huge leap in technology from our legacy platforms such as the B-52 and the B-1 bomber. This involved taking the best of what is available and giving it to the aircrew,” Mickelson said.

The Air Force currently operates 20 B-2 bombers, with the majority of them based at Whiteman AFB in Missouri. The B-2 can reach altitudes of 50,000 feet and carry 40,000 pounds of payload, including both conventional and nuclear weapons.

The aircraft, which entered service in the 1980s, has flown missions over Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan. In fact, given its ability to fly as many as 6,000 nautical miles without need to refuel, the B-2 flew from Missouri all the way to an island off the coast of India called Diego Garcia – before launching bombing missions over Afghanistan.

“Taking off from Whiteman and landing at Diego Garcia was one of the longest combat sorties the B-2 has ever taken. The bomber was very successful in Afghanistan and very successful in the early parts of the wars in Iraq and Libya,” Mickelson added.

The B-2 crew uses what’s called a “long-duration kit,” which includes items such as a cot for sleeping and other essentials deemed necessary for a long flight, Mickelson explained.

B-2 Mission

As a stealth bomber engineered during the height of the Cold War, the B-2 was designed to elude Soviet air defenses and strike enemy targets – without an enemy ever knowing the aircraft was even there. This stealthy technological ability is referred to by industry experts as being able to evade air defenses using both high-frequency “engagement” radar, which can target planes, and lower frequency “surveillance” radar which can let enemies know an aircraft is in the vicinity.

The B-2 is described as a platform which can operate undetected over enemy territory and, in effect, “knock down the door” by destroying enemy radar and air defenses so that other aircraft can fly through a radar “corridor” and attack.

However, enemy air defenses are increasingly becoming technologically advanced and more sophisticated; some emerging systems are even able to detect some stealth aircraft using systems which are better networked, using faster computer processors and able to better detect aircraft at longer distances on a greater number of frequencies.

The Air Force plans to operate the B-2 alongside its new, now-in-development bomber called the Long Range Strike – Bomber, or LRS-B. well into the 2050s.

B-2 Modernization Upgrades – Taking the Stealth Bomber Into the 2050s

As a result, the B-2 fleet is undergoing a series of modernization upgrades in order to ensure the aircraft can remain at its ultimate effective capability for the next several decades, Mickelson said.

One of the key upgrades is called the Defensive Management System, a technology which helps inform the B-2 crew about the location of enemy air defenses. Therefore, if there are emerging air defenses equipped with the technology sufficient to detect the B-2, the aircraft will have occasion to maneuver in such a way as to stay outside of their range.

The Defensive Management System is slated to be operational by the mid-2020s, Mickelson added.

“The whole key is to give us better situational awareness so we are able to make sound decisions in the cockpit about where we need to put the aircraft,” he added.

The B-2 is also moving to an extremely high frequency satellite in order to better facilitate communications with command and control. For instance, the communications upgrade could make it possible for the aircraft crew to receive bombing instructions from the President in the unlikely event of a nuclear detonation.

“This program will help with nuclear and conventional communications. It will provide a very big increase in the bandwidth available for the B-2, which means an increased speed of data flow. We are excited about this upgrade,” Mickelson explained.

The stealth aircraft uses a commonly deployed data link called LINK-16 and both UHF and VHF data links, as well. Mickelson explained that the B-2 is capable of communicating with ground control stations, command and control headquarters and is also able to receive information from other manned and unmanned assets such as drones.

Information from nearby drones, however, would at the moment most likely need to first transmit through a ground control station. That being said, emerging technology may soon allow platforms like the B-2 to receive real-time video feeds from nearby drones in the air.

The B-2 is also being engineered with a new flight management control processor designed to expand and modernize the on-board computers and enable the addition of new software.

This involves the re-hosting of the flight management control processors, the brains of the airplane, onto much more capable integrated processing units. This results in the laying-in of some new fiber optic cable as opposed to the mix bus cable being used right now – because the B-2’s computers from the 80s are getting maxed out and overloaded with data, Air Force officials told Scout Warrior.

The new processor increases the performance of the avionics and on-board computer systems by about 1,000-times, he added. The overall flight management control processor effort, slated to field by 2015 and 2016, is expected to cost \$542 million.

<http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1641631-weekend-feature-attack-missions-in-b-2-bomber>

[Return to top](#)

ABC News (New York, NY)

US Investigates After Lab Improperly Ships Nuclear Material

By Susan Montoya Bryan

June 23, 2017

U.S. regulators said Friday they are launching an investigation into the improper shipment of nuclear material from the laboratory that created the atomic bomb to other federal facilities this week, marking the latest safety lapse for Los Alamos National Laboratory as it faces growing criticism over its track record.

The National Nuclear Security Administration said it was informed by the lab in New Mexico that procedures were not followed when shipping small amounts of "special nuclear material" to facilities in California and South Carolina.

The material had been packaged for ground transport. But instead it was shipped via a commercial air cargo service, which isn't allowed under U.S. regulations.

Tests done on the shipments once they arrived at their destinations confirmed no contamination or loss of radioactive material, officials said. But it comes as criticism has been intensifying over the history of safety lapses at Los Alamos as work ramps up to produce key components for the nation's nuclear weapons cache.

"This failure to follow established procedures is absolutely unacceptable," Frank Klotz, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, said in a statement.

The agency oversees the lab and other facilities that make up the U.S. nuclear complex. Contractors who manage the labs, production plants and waste repositories are required to rigorously adhere to what Klotz called the highest safety and security standards as part of their national security work.

Once the investigation of the shipments is complete, the agency said any responsible parties will be held accountable.

Los Alamos officials declined to comment and referred questions to the National Nuclear Safety Administration.

Home to some of the nation's top nuclear scientists and other researchers, Los Alamos has struggled for years to address management and oversight issues along with more recent safety concerns about the handling of radioactive waste and plutonium.

A series published this week by the Center for Public Integrity cited numerous internal reports and other documents outlining federal regulators' concerns about safety lapses at the lab over the years, including a plutonium spill last summer and workers in 2011 positioning plutonium rods in a way that could have been disastrous.

In 2014, a chemical reaction stemming from Los Alamos inappropriately packaging a barrel of radioactive waste caused a radiation leak at the government's only underground nuclear waste repository.

That misstep resulted in costly recovery work and a backlog in the multibillion-dollar program for cleaning up waste from decades of research and bomb-making.

There have also been reports that Los Alamos failed more than once in recent months to accurately document and label hazardous liquid that was shipped to a disposal facility in Colorado.

Klotz noted earlier this week that safety is paramount and that his agency withheld more than \$82 million in contractor payments over safety and operational issues at the lab between 2013 and 2016.

The current \$2.2 billion contract for Los Alamos National Security LLC to manage the lab ends in 2018. Some critics have said putting the contract up for bids will offer an opportunity to make changes at Los Alamos.

Greg Mello, with the Los Alamos Study Group, said the concern with the latest incident is that pressure changes could have compromised the packaging of the nuclear material once it was aboard the cargo plane.

"It's like a cheap ballpoint pen in your shirt pocket," he said. "It turned out fine this time, but the deeper problem is why are there so many kinds of errors."

<http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/us-investigates-lab-improperly-ships-nuclear-material-48247008>

[Return to top](#)

75th Air Base Wing Public Affairs (Hill AFB, UT)

ICBM Country: Ogden Air Logistics Complex restoring Air Force's nuclear launch facilities

By Micah Garbarino

June 26, 2017

Hill Air Force Base units are helping ensure the nuclear triad remains an effective strategic deterrent now and into the future. This is the first in a two-part series.

For more than 50 years, rural American pastures in the Great Plains have housed a key leg in the air-, land- and sea-based strategic deterrent triad – mission-ready Airmen controlling highly survivable, nuclear-armed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Depot-level maintenance of the boosters, launch control centers, launch facilities, and key support equipment for the Minuteman III is performed by Hill's 309th Missile Maintenance Group, part of the Ogden Air Logistics Complex.

The Air Force has 150 launch facilities and 15 associated launch control centers "deployed in place" at each of three locations -- Malmstrom AFB, Montana; Minot AFB, North Dakota; and F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming. The Airmen and ICBMs are "on strategic alert" around the clock to respond to orders from the President.

To comply with the New START treaty, the United States is reducing the number of ICBMs that are on strategic alert from 450 to 400 leaving 50 launch facilities in reserve. This enables the Air Force to plan and execute a Programmed Depot Maintenance, or PDM, effort for the first time in the life of the weapon system.

The launch facilities are underground silos, each with a 110-ton blast door for protection. All of the silos are networked together and controlled by Missile Combat Crew members in underground blast-proof launch control centers.

This is the first time since 1971, when the Minuteman III first became operational at Minot AFB, that a portion of the Minuteman III fleet is being relieved of its combat assignment long enough to receive PDM in the same way aircraft have for decades.

“We’re taking advantage of that drawdown to restore vital hardness-critical systems to full mission capability – repair water leaks, mitigate corrosion, and generally posture the weapons system to remain safe, secure and reliable until the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program (next generation ICBM) can achieve full mission capability in the mid-2030’s,” said Col. Eric Jackson, commander of the 309th Missile Maintenance Group. “These are all things we couldn’t do as effectively – or at all – while the launch facility was on strategic alert.”

The entire Minuteman III fleet will be inspected and restored during the course of an eight-year cycle. The maintenance process takes about 50 days for each launch facility or launch control center.

The effort targets four major areas through an eight-year cycle: launch facility, launch control center, solid-rocket booster (stages 1, 2 and 3), and liquid-propellant propulsion system rocket engine, said Lt. Col. Brian Young, product support technical director, at the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in a recently published Air Force story.

Within the launch facilities and launch control centers, there are a variety of components targeted to ensure the readiness and health of the site, including shock isolators, various launcher closure components, overpressure-protecting blast valves and blast doors, and environmental control system components, Young said.

As each of the 50 launch facilities are placed into the rotating reserve status for maintenance, the booster is removed from the launch facility by Airmen from the operating wing and returned to Hill AFB by 309 MMXG drivers, where they undergo programmed depot maintenance.

After the booster PDM is completed at Hill, it is returned to the field and placed in a newly repaired launch facility which is then returned to strategic alert to make way for the next launch facility to receive PDM.

“As a result of the hard work and diligence of the depot and field maintainers, supported by government and contractor supply-chain partners and guided by exceptional engineers and program managers from the AF Nuclear Weapons Center, the nation can rest easy knowing the Minuteman III and associated systems will remain, ready, alert and combat effective,” Jackson said.

<http://www.robins.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1230266/icbm-country-ogden-air-logistics-complex-restoring-air-forces-nuclear-launch-fa/>

[Return to top](#)

US COUNTER-WMD

Global Biodefense (Seattle, WA)

Diablo Shield Exercise Tests Response to Biothreat Incidents

Author Not Attributed

June 27, 2017

Army Reserve Major Dana Perkins, PhD, an assistant professor in the Global Health Division of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USU) preventive medicine and biostatistics department, recently traveled to Tblisi, Georgia, to participate in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA) DIABLO SHIELD training event and field exercise, in collaboration with the FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) directorate.

Perkins served as a subject matter expert during the exercise, April 24-28. DIABLO SHIELD emphasizes countering biological threats, and is part of the U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) Diablo Pathways series of engagements that support the development of counter-WMD capabilities in the southeast Europe and Black Sea regions.

Working with DTRA, the FBI, and CBRN Military Advisory Teams (CMATs), Perkins observed and provided feedback on the training, which was previously provided by US-trained Georgian instructors from the Department of Emergency Management of Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), via classroom and hands-on training to other MoIA contingency response teams, primarily SWAT and Hazmat response units.

As part of the exercise, Perkins also played a "bad guy," setting up a "clandestine bio lab," in which she made fake anthrax, before the lab was "raided" by SWAT. She also provided a brief demonstration on microbial contamination and human-to-human transmission, and helped answer trainees' questions about biological threats.

In reality, she said, terrorists might use clandestine labs to produce biological or chemical weapons, or explosives – materials that pose unique risks to first responders, so it's important to recognize that a warning of an imminent threat or impending bioterrorist attack might not arrive in time to deter it. Therefore, she continued, it's critical that all countries strengthen their public health systems to be prepared for and to be able to respond to these potential biological incidents, whether natural, deliberate, or accidental.

Perkins is an individual mobilization augmentee as well as a DTRA instructor, regularly teaching the Federal Response to Biological Incidents course. She's also dually certified by the Board of DTRA's CMAT as a master and senior CBRN Consequence Management Specialist. She regularly organized workshops in Georgia to strengthen their biodefense and public health system capabilities. Her participation in these efforts reinforces USU's strategic objective to expand the university's support for uniformed services and operation forces around the world.

<https://globalbiodefense.com/2017/06/27/uniformed-services-university-global-health-faculty-member-participates-diablo-shield/>

[Return to top](#)

Southern Maryland Online (California, MD)

Junior Navy Scientists and Engineers Make Early Warning CBR Detection via UAVs a Reality

By John Joyce

June 22, 2017

Sly Fox Mission 21 has all the trappings of a smash hit reality television series with a technological innovation that may one day save lives of warfighters across the joint services.

Although it was never filmed or broadcast, the drama, technology, and names of the seven junior scientists and engineers are real.

Hundreds of Navy civilian and military personnel witnessed this reality as the mission culminated with a technological capability demonstration on the Potomac River Test Range, June 15.

"One of the secrets to the Sly Fox Program's success is the makeup of the team—using scientists and engineers with fresh perspectives from a wide array of technical disciplines helps identify solutions that otherwise may not be apparent," said Kevin Cogley, head of the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Detection Branch.

Similar to reality TV, the Sly Fox members took time to get to know each other, including their strengths and weaknesses, as they worked to make the warfighter urgent need for an early warning CBR detection capability—adaptable to various unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—a reality.

"The Sly Fox program serves as an outstanding experience accelerator for members our workforce," said Dale Sisson, NSWCDD deputy technical director. "By presenting the Sly Fox teams with real world challenges and schedules, we are able to allow them to gain valuable experience into what it takes to support our warfighters."

The team of mentors—senior NSWCDD scientists and engineers—ensured a strong focus on technical rigor as they taught the Sly Fox team how to perform under pressure.

"The program is challenging, both to the home organization and to the employee," said Mary Collings, head of the NSWCDD Gun Prototyping and Rapid Fielding Branch and supervisor of one of the Mission 21 team members. "It enables employees to experience the development of a system from beginning to end. They start with requirements and finish by demonstrating a product."

The intensive collaboration resulted in a system called SCAPEGOAT, otherwise known as 'Senses CBR Agents Pre-Engagement and Goes Over All Terrain'. The modular CBR detection system accommodates multiple sensor modules across multiple UAV platforms, enabling

Sailors to better protect themselves from the increasing frequency of CBR attacks by relaying threat data to command and control assets.

Throughout the demonstration, spectators looked at the horizon over the Potomac River and viewed monitors to see the SCAPEGOAT system onboard a commercial octocopter UAS platform detect and report the presence of chemical simulants.

"It directly addresses a real warfighter need for low cost, flexible CBR early warning technologies," said Cogley, a Sly Fox process mentor. "While other organizations and industry have demonstrated similar capabilities, the SCAPEGOAT's low cost and ability to operate with multiple UAV platforms and CBR sensors is the unique quality that sets it apart from other solutions."

Early in the design phase, the team decided to integrate existing CBR detection technology into SCAPEGOAT, avoiding major modifications of CBR sensors and UAS platforms that involve strict payload weight limitations. Their decision led to a system design with three interchangeable mission modules—one each for the chemical detection, biological, and radiological detection capabilities.

Moreover, the chemical and radiological detection modules are compatible with currently fielded military sensors. The biological collection unit is a custom NSWCDD-designed module compatible with currently fielded filter media that uses a 12-volt fan to pull air through the system. In addition to CBR detection systems, SCAPEGOAT features modules for communications, a global positioning system, camera, and power.

As the demonstration concluded, team members reflected on their Sly Fox Mission experience and shared lessons learned.

"The primary lesson I learned from Sly Fox is the necessity of technical rigor in concept development, design, and testing," said Joshua Taylor, NSWCDD physicist. "Sly Fox connected me to people and resources around NSWCDD that left me with a deep appreciation of the scope and rigor of the work being done at Dahlgren. Subject matter experts that advised the development of the SCAPEGOAT inspired me to pursue a collaborative environment that is driven by real and present needs of the fleet, where I can be challenged to develop new skills."

"To actually experience the full development of a program in such a short timeframe, from defining requirements to testing and evaluation, has been enormously enlightening," said Charles Miller, NSWCDD scientist. "I learned a lot about the DoD acquisitions and rapid prototyping processes. This entailed striking a balance between the well-defined procurement process and the need for maximum flexibility in rapid prototyping."

"This Sly Fox team was one of the best teams I have ever worked on, and as an ensemble musician throughout most of my life, I've worked in group settings quite often," said Jordan Lieberman, NSWCDD physicist. "I've gained valuable experience in presenting and answering tough technical questions, skills that will be useful for the remainder of my career. The hardest part of this mission was developing requirements, concepts, and early designs for a product in a scientific field I had no previous experience in. I relied heavily on the knowledge and expertise of our mentors and on the members of the team with relevant experience."

The benefit of transitioning technical, project management and leadership knowledge to junior engineers and scientists across organizations is reflected in the careers of Sly Fox Mission members since the first Sly Fox Mission was launched in 2002. The inaugural team successfully developed the Passive Anti-Ship Missile Detection System within the designated six-month timeframe and confirmed the Sly Fox program was an excellent way to develop leadership skills for young engineers and scientists.

"Each and every one of the outcomes from the Sly Fox teams is nothing short of impressive," said Sisson. "The Mission 21 team is certainly no exception. Having had the opportunity to see them in action, I was extremely impressed with the level of professionalism with which the team conducted their mission and excited to see the technical prowess that they collectively demonstrated. I am a huge fan of the Sly Fox Program and feel that the Sly Fox missions are absolutely critical to our workforce development efforts."

DoD and government officials attending the demonstration represented commands and agencies that included the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense, Marine Corps Systems Command, Marine Corps Forces Command, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs,

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Naval Research Laboratory, Pentagon Force Protection Agency, U.S. Coast Guard, Naval Sea Systems Command, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

The Sly Fox program is an NSWCDD Naval Innovative Science and Engineering (section 219) funded rapid prototyping program intended to develop the science and engineering workforce while applying their talents to known technology gaps. Like the previous 20 missions—including efforts in directed energy, radar systems, unmanned systems, and cyber threats—Sly Fox Mission 21 took advantage of the diverse skills of its team members to tackle a mission that is important to NSWCDD and its customers.

As the mission concludes on June 30, team members will depart with new technical experiences, unique perspectives on rapid development, and a network of professional colleagues from across the command that will guide them in their current positions and throughout their careers.

<http://somd.com/news/headlines/2017/21964.php>

[Return to top](#)

Kentucky Today (Louisville, KY)

Blue Grass Army Depot One of State's Largest Military Installations

By M. Blaine Hedges

June 19, 2017

If asked to name the three largest military installations in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, most citizens would come up with the first two pretty quickly, Fort Campbell and Fort Knox. However, many Kentuckians may not be as aware of the Blue Grass Army Depot.

Established in 1941, this military installation, covering 14,594 acres, is the state's third largest. The facility employs over 700 people (60 percent of whom are veterans) and adds \$225 million in economic value to Kentucky. Blue Grass Army Depot fulfills a number of critical missions for the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense.

The Depot supports our joint forces in combat by playing the critical role of storing, issuing, receiving, inspecting, maintaining and destroying conventional munitions. Our nation's warfighters in battle must be properly supplied in a timely manner.

In addition to munitions, the Depot also supplies chemical defense equipment to our warfighters. Overall, the installation supplied some 225,656 warfighters in fiscal year 2016.

In addition to other more sensitive operations, it also serves as a training site for various active and reserve military units.

Contained within the Blue Grass Army Depot is the Blue Grass Chemical Activity, which ensures the safe and secure storage of the installation's chemical weapons stockpile. This tenant organization has as its slogan, "Safe Today, Safer Tomorrow."

The chemical weapons stockpile is housed in 49 earth covered, concrete igloos on 250 acres within the larger Depot. In 1997 the United States signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, agreeing to eliminate all of its chemical weapons and former production facilities.

The key mission of the Blue Grass Chemical Activity section stems from that treaty, namely, the safe storage of the chemical stockpile until demilitarization (safe destruction) is complete.

The Blue Grass Army Depot chemical weapons stockpile has been safely stored for more than 70 years, with mustard agent arriving as early as 1944, and nerve agent arriving in the mid-60s.

Blue Grass Chemical Activity, established in 1995, has been responsible for the ongoing safe and secure storage of these weapons by employing highly trained personnel to ensure this record of safety continues.

These personnel are trained in all necessary protocols and procedures and are provided with state-of-the-art instrumentation to continuously monitor all facets of the chemical storage area. Their monitoring efforts include continuous data gathering for the presence of even trace amounts of chemical agent.

Blue Grass Chemical Activity also continuously monitors weather conditions in order to be able to track the path of a contaminant should a release occur. Most munitions are stored without incident. However, personnel are prepared to handle “leakers” detected inside a chemical storage igloo. A leaker is a munition leaking agent or emitting vapor inside the igloo.

Also contained within the Depot, but operating as a stand-alone facility, is the newly constructed Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant. This facility will safely and compliantly destroy existing chemical agents currently being monitored.

Once this plant is fully operational, it will employ more than 1,000 individuals. Of course, since there is a finite amount of chemical agent stockpiled, this facility will complete its mission. Once all on-site material is destroyed, and the plant is decontaminated, the mission will come to an end.

The desire is that select facilities surrounding the plant can then be repurposed to perform other conventional munitions-related functions with the goal being to maintain a robust workforce with new workload via Public-Private or Intergovernmental Partnerships.

The Blue Grass Army Depot, with its available 3.2 million square feet of storage facilities, and a recent \$57 million investment in capital improvements, should continue to be a valuable contributor to the Kentucky economy.

The leadership at the Depot are ready and willing to meet with investors who are interested in leveraging extensive resources to benefit their businesses.

Gov. Matt Bevin has made his administration’s commitment to Kentucky’s military installations clear. Likewise, the Kentucky Commission on Military Affairs has as one of its primary goals to expand the economic impact of Kentucky’s defense-related industry.

The Blue Grass Army Depot, their local economic development partners, and the Kentucky Commission on Military Affairs will continue to work together to ensure that this military installation will maintain its great economic impact on the commonwealth of Kentucky far into the future.

<http://kentuckytoday.com/stories/blue-grass-army-depot-one-of-kentuckys-largest-military-installations,7776>

[Return to top](#)

Kuwait News Agency (Kuwait City, Kuwait)

UN Warns of New Threats to Non-Proliferation Of WMD

Author Not Attributed

June 28, 2017

A senior UN official warned on Wednesday of new threats to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction encouraging the Security Council to be proactive to ensure disarmament commitments.

The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu took part on Wednesday at the open debate held by the Security Council on the global efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD by non-state actors.

She affirmed that the possibility of non-state actors, including terrorists, acquiring WMD remains a significant threat to global security, and the international community must step up its efforts to ensure that the disastrous scenario of WMD terrorism is avoided.

Although substantial progress has been made by member states in their efforts to minimize proliferation risks, however, she said new and even more complicated threats in this area is increasing.

She called the international to closely examine the emerging nexus between rapidly advancing technologies and WMDs in the globalized and connected world, and identify actions to grapple with its impact on non-proliferation.

The UN official stressed on the importance of international cooperation, and the need for "continuous and enhanced" dialogue with industry.

Nakamitsu said that recent terrorist attacks have revealed shortcomings in interactions among security agencies, even in countries whose policies are otherwise deeply integrated. "Coordination and information-sharing will be vital to overcoming these shortcomings," she added.

The UN senior official strongly encouraged the council to use today's debate to be "proactive and devise" effective solutions to ensure full and universal implementation of member states' disarmament and non-proliferation commitments.

<http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2621837&Language=en>

[Return to top](#)

US ARMS CONTROL

The Hill (Washington, DC)

Defense Bill Would Limit Implementation of Nuclear Arms Treaty With Russia

By Rebecca Kheel

June 22, 2017

The annual defense policy bill would limit the implementation of an arms treaty with Russia after Democrats failed to remove the provision in a subcommittee markup Thursday.

The strategic forces subcommittee portion of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) would ban funds from being used to extend the implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty, which limits the number of deployed Russian and U.S. nuclear warheads, unless the president certifies that Moscow is in compliance with a separate arms treaty, known as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

An amendment to strike the provision, offered by Rep. Jim Cooper (D-Tenn.), the subcommittee's ranking member, failed in a voice vote that appeared to be along party lines.

"It seems to me illogical and nonsensical to punish them by limiting the New START Treaty renewal," Cooper said. "The violation has to do with the INF Treaty, and that primarily has to do with the security of Europe. So to punish Russia by not allowing us to consider an extension of the New START Treaty, which protects America, needlessly involves the safety of our nation. Plus, it's just completely illogical."

The 2010 New START Treaty requires both the United States and Russia to draw down to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads by February 2018. It is due for extension in 2021.

The separate INF Treaty, a landmark 1987 deal between Russia and the United States, bans ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

The United States has accused Russia of repeated violations of the INF Treaty, including the deployment a nuclear-tipped cruise missile.

At the same, the U.S. military has supported keeping the New START Treaty in place.

"I've stated on the record multiple times — I'll say it on the record again today — I support the limits that are in the New START Treaty," Gen. John Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, said in April. "I also look out to the future and understand there are nonaccountable weapons, especially on the Russian side, that we need to start addressing. But from a strategic weapons perspective, I support the limits of the New START Treaty."

Still, President Trump has dismissed New START as one of former President Barack Obama's "bad deals," calling it "one-sided."

On Thursday, Republicans on the subcommittee said the provision is meant to put Russia on notice and would not interrupt the implementation of New START since it does not come up for renewal until 2021.

"This amendment does not undermine the New START Treaty, which does not expire until 2021," subcommittee Chairman Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) said. "It does, however, tell the Russians that they will be made to pay a price for the violation of the INF Treaty."

Rep. Doug Lamborn (R-Colo.) added the United States should not trust Russia to adhere to New START if the Kremlin is not following the INF Treaty.

"It's not a matter of punishment; it's a matter of trust," Lamborn said. "If they're violating the INF Treaty, showing disregard for treaties they've entered into with the United States, that should give us pause about their willingness and ability to with another treaty."

But Democrats argued that New START has stricter inspection provisions than the INF Treaty and that doing away with those inspections would hurt the U.S. New START allows for 18 facilities inspections per year.

"The INF did not have a robust inspection process built into it, and over the years the current violations occurred without our direct knowledge," Rep. John Garamendi (D-Calif.) said. "The New START Treaty has an extremely important element in it, and that is the inspection mechanisms that

are in the treaty. If we do not renew the New START, extend it and renew it, the inspections cease. It is not in the interest of the United States that those inspections stop. But it is in our interest that we continue to inspect and gain knowledge as to what is going on with regard to the Russian nuclear enterprise.”

<http://thehill.com/policy/defense/338975-defense-bill-would-limit-implementation-of-nuclear-arms-treaty-with-russia>

[Return to top](#)

Pollico (Washington, DC)

The Back Door to a New Arms Race

By Thomas Graham and Bernadette Stadler

June 28, 2017

The military hailed a successful missile defense test in May. Here's why it could make us less safe.

On May 30, after years of planning, the Department of Defense intercepted a mock intercontinental ballistic missile, the first successful test of its ground-based program against an ICBM-range target. Top Pentagon officials hailed the test, with Vice Adm. Jim Syring, the director of the Missile Defense Agency, calling it “an incredible accomplishment for the [Ground-based Midcourse Defense] system and a critical milestone for this program.”

An effective missile defense system could, in the short term, offer an extra layer of protection against North Korea. But the gradual buildup of the United States' missile defense program could lead to something much more dangerous: a new arms race with Russia.

The truth is that successful arms control was built not just on controlling offensive weapons, but on restraining defense systems, as well. However, over the past 30 years we've seen the U.S.-Russian consensus on the importance of limiting missile defense dissolve — and though it gets less attention than nuclear weapons, this represents a destabilizing development that could hinder cooperation on arms reductions.

Ground-based missile defense is an attractive technology because, in theory, it could protect America from limited missile attacks. It uses radar to detect an incoming missile and then launches an interceptor to collide with the missile and destroy it on impact. Although this method, known as hit-to-kill, seems simple, it is extremely challenging to execute, as both the missile and interceptor move more than 20 times faster than the speed of sound. Experts have likened successfully intercepting an incoming ICBM to hitting a bullet with another bullet.

For that reason, it's very hard to successfully intercept an ICBM, even after lots of testing. Instead of protecting the homeland, missile defense systems provide a false sense of security and undermine crisis stability by giving each side an incentive to strike first and encouraging adversaries to deploy additional offensive weapons to offset each other's defenses.

During the Cold War, Russia and the United States understood the counterintuitive risks posed by missile defense systems. In 1972, President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limited the number of missile defense systems that each country could deploy initially to two sites per side and subsequently to one. And it worked: Over the next 30 years, the ABM Treaty helped create the conditions for nuclear stability and

thereby enabled the negotiation of a number of important arms control agreements. Those agreements led to reductions of 50 percent in the American and Soviet strategic arsenals.

In 2002, however, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to develop a Ground-based Midcourse Defense. At the time, the Pentagon wanted a homeland missile defense capable of defeating a “limited ballistic missile attack,” likely from a rogue state like North Korea or Iran. When the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty, the Russian response was muted: President Vladimir Putin called the move “a mistake” but said it “does not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.”

Since then, both the number of interceptors the United States deploys and the projected role of missile defense have expanded. Last December, Congress broadened the role of national missile defense to “maintain and improve an effective, robust layered missile defense system” that can defend the United States, allies and other assets abroad. This was a marked contrast to the previous “limited” mission of ground-based missile defense and raised the possibility that the United States would try to defend itself against an attack from a country like Russia.

In March, a group of senators introduced a bill that would increase the number of interceptors the United States deploys from the 44 scheduled to be deployed by the end of 2017 to 72 and potentially up to 100. The bill also requires the Missile Defense Agency to accelerate the completion of a third interceptor site to defend against increased North Korean missile and nuclear capabilities. Although the authors of the bill have not gone so far as calling for the use of missile defense against small-scale attacks from Russia, other proponents of missile defense have.

Not only are these ideas dangerous, but they are also unproven at best. Despite the successful test in May, it’s not clear that our missile defense system could successfully intercept a North Korean missile, much less neutralize the entire Russian arsenal. According to current and former government officials, it would likely take four or five interceptors to destroy one incoming ICBM even in the best-case scenario. Currently, Russia has more than 1,700 deployed strategic nuclear weapons. We will have 44 interceptors by the end of 2017. Simply put, our present ground-based missile defense system poses virtually no threat to Russia.

Yet, if Congress expands the system, it will increase the odds of an arms race and decrease the chances of future nuclear arms reductions. High-level Russian officials have stated on numerous occasions that they may respond to any major expansion of American ballistic missile defense capabilities by building more offensive weapons. In a 2015 interview, for example, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty “a destabilizing factor of global significance” that “provokes an arms build-up.” After the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed in 2010, Russia claimed that the treaty would be “effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States of America.” It is unclear whether Russia’s concerns about ground-based missile defense represent a legitimate fear or political posturing; regardless, these concerns have hindered cooperation on arms control.

Of course, North Korea has been rapidly developing the capability to strike the United States. But the truth is that our anti-missile defense system won’t be able to stop a North Korean missile attack. Should North Korea attain the ability to mass produce ICBMs, it would be easier and cheaper for Pyongyang to deploy more missiles than we have interceptors, despite our financial and military advantages.

Even if we could somehow keep up with Pyongyang, it would be a mistake. The goal of our missile defense system isn’t simply to protect against North Korea. It’s to keep Americans safer overall, and a huge increase in our missile defense capabilities will only create additional tension with Russia,

which would increasingly believe that the build-up threatened its strategic stability with the U.S. Thus, if the U.S. actually builds an “effective, robust layered missile defense system,” as some in Congress hope, there is only one logical conclusion: an arms race.

<http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/06/28/missile-defense-arms-race-russia-000467>

[Return to top](#)

Sputnik (Moscow, Russia)

US Potential Unilateral Withdrawal From INF Treaty Puts Europe at Risk

Author Not Attributed

June 29, 2017

Washington's potential unilateral withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Moscow might lead to a buildup of missiles on both sides, with Europe and the rest of the world risking getting caught in the crossfire, experts told Sputnik.

On Saturday, Politico news outlet reported that the current US administration was under pressure from some members of the Republican Party to start developing new types of missiles that are banned under the INF Treaty, thus effectively terminating it. The US House Armed Services Committee Chairman's mark summary on the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act proposes the allocation of \$50 million to counter Russia's alleged violations of the treaty, with half of this sum slated for the development of US intermediate range systems.

EUROPE AS POTENTIAL BATTLEGROUND

Political scientist Heinz Gaertner, who is a member of the Advisory Board of International Institute for Peace, told Sputnik that breaking from the nuclear disarmament treaty could create a situation reminiscent of the 1980s, at the time of the nuclear arms race between the USSR and the United States.

"If the US withdrew from the Treaty, it would give Russia a free path to deploy new ground based missiles. They could basically cover all Europe. The US itself would not be prohibited to deploy intermediate cruise missiles on European soil ... Europe could become a potential nuclear battleground," Gaertner said.

According to Gaertner, Washington's withdrawal will result in Russia boosting its conventional and missile capabilities to offset NATO's strength.

"A new Treaty on conventional weapons would become from unlikely to impossible. The new START-Treaty would unravel since the difference between strategic and non-strategic missiles will be blurred," Gaertner added.

The INF Treaty, signed in 1987, significantly reduced the arsenal of non-strategic missiles available to the United States and Russia, by prohibiting all nuclear and conventional missiles and their launchers with range between 310 and 3,420 miles.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between Russia and the United States, signed in 2010 and significantly limiting the number of strategic nuclear missile launchers, expires in 2021. In February, US President Donald Trump called the treaty a "one-sided deal" in an interview to Reuters, suggesting it was not fair to the United States.

Francesco Calogero, Italian physicist and an active supporter of nuclear disarmament, sees the potential consequences of the break-up of the INF Treaty as a global disaster that would hit Europe as well as the two treaty signatories: Russia and the United States.

Tom Sauer, an associate professor at the University of Antwerp, also pointed out that the withdrawal by either the United States or Russia might result in "the build-up of more weapon systems in Europe, the US and Russia."

"Nobody gains in this scenario, except the defense industry in the US and Russia," Sauer told Sputnik.

Sauer argued that the treaty issues are a symptom rather than the problem itself.

"To resolve the issue, the best would be to look at the root causes, which is finding a better political/geostrategic relationship between Russia and the West," Sauer said.

In his February 2017 article for the Global Policy Journal, the expert wrote that the West had failed to include Russia in a collective security architecture following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and suggested that remedying that is an urgent task.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The best solution for the INF treaty would be to use the Special Verification Commission, which was suggested in the text of the agreement as a procedure for resolving compliance-related issues, Sauer said.

"Russia could show the Russian missile (SSC-8) to the Americans, and Americans could allow control on its missile defense system in Romania to the Russians," the expert suggested.

In February of this year, the US media reported, citing an official from US President Donald Trump's administration, that Russia had covertly deployed the ground-launched SSC-8 cruise missile in breach of the INF Treaty. Vice Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul Selva reiterated the accusation in March. In response, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov refuted the allegations, stressing that Russia was fully committed to the 1987 treaty and intended to keep up its commitment to all its international obligations.

"Moscow could offer better and improved verification measures to allay suspicions that Russia is violating the INF-Treaty," Gaertner said.

The initial verification procedure allowed as many as 20 annual short-notice inspections by each party for the first three years. The right to conduct inspections expired in 13 years since the signing of the agreement. At the moment, the Special Verification Commission is the main platform for discussing and solving compliance issues.

"The leaderships of the two participants (USA and Russia) should realize the disaster they are about to cause and step back from the brink, heeding the message just sent to them by 4 responsible statesmen: [former British defense secretary Des] Browne, [Chairman of the Munich Security Conference Wolfgang] Ischinger, [former Russian Foreign Minister Igor] Ivanov, [former Democratic US senator Sam] Nunn," Calogero told Sputnik.

In an op-ed published in the Project Syndicate outlet in February, the four statesmen offered recommendations on reducing the nuclear threat. One such suggested was to begin discussions between the United States and Russia on eventually and significantly reducing the percentage of strategic nuclear forces from prompt-launch status. Another recommendation was the penning of a joint declaration by the two countries' leaders on the futility of a nuclear war.

"Another constructive idea would be to negotiate a multilateral treaty with respect to medium-range missiles: open up this bilateral treaty to other states in the world; that would fit the global disarmament agenda," Sauer added.

According to Gaertner, Washington should back Russia in turning the Treaty into a multilateral agreement to alleviate Moscow's fears of "intermediate range missiles from Asia."

Calogero also spoke in favor of a multilateral treaty rather than a bilateral one, explaining that "otherwise there will always be strong pressure within the USA and within Russia emphasizing the fact that only these two countries are bound by the INF Treaty."

A number of other countries with considerable arsenals could become a party to such an agreement. US Pacific Command (PACOM) head Adm. Harry Harris suggested in April that Washington should look into renegotiating the treaty, adding that certain aspects of the treaty that prevented the United States from being able to effectively counter China and other countries were "problematic."

Sauer pointed out that arms control could serve as a means to improve relations in general, but someone would have to take the first step.

"The US could for instance unilaterally withdraw the US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as a result of the NW Ban treaty, something states like Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium (and even Italy and Turkey) would agree with. It would then be up to Russia to reciprocate positively by withdrawing the Russian tactical nuclear weapons further east (to the Urals or further)," Sauer suggested.

An even better solution, according to him, would be to conclude a bilateral treaty on tactical nuclear weapons.

Calogero suggested that the INF treaty was "one of several fundamental subjects on which the strategic interests of the USA and Russia coincide," adding that "reasonable responsible leaders should take due note of these facts and work consequently towards cooperation rather than confrontation."

Sauer also proposed that Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin could use their possible meeting on the sidelines of the upcoming G20 summit in Hamburg, slated for July 7-8, to mend the relationship between Moscow and Washington, on the issue of arms control, among others.

A senior Russian Foreign Ministry nonproliferation department official said earlier in the day that US exit from the treaty would threaten the entire nuclear arms control regime. Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control (DNAC) Deputy Director Vladimir Leontiev said that Russia could not rule out the possibility of Washington unilaterally pulling out of the agreement. Leontiev added that Moscow would welcome a conversation with the United States on strategic balance.

<https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201706291055065875-usa-inf-withdrawal-europe-risk/>

[Return to top](#)

Washington Examiner (Washington, DC)

Tom Cotton: US Has to Win Nuclear 'Arms Race' With Russia And China

By Joel Gehrke

June 26, 2017

U.S. military researchers "are on the cusp of some pretty major breakthroughs" in missile defense that are necessary to win potential wars with China and Russia, according to a leading Republican lawmaker.

"It's better to win an arms race than lose a war," Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., told the Center for the National Interest on Monday.

Cotton, an Army infantry veteran who sits on the Armed Services Committee, anchored that statement in Russia's ongoing violation of arms control treaty governing the development of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. But that violation is emblematic of a broader problem. Technological advances have rendered the Cold War principle of mutually-assured-destruction insufficient to avert the nuclear war. Russia and China, he said, have already developed plans for "limited" use of nuclear weapons to win conventional wars. And that requires an overhaul of U.S. defenses, according to the lawmaker.

"We need to be able to stop an attack from near-peer adversaries as well," Cotton said.

A bipartisan group of senators, including Cotton, has proposed legislation to ramp up the development of intercontinental ballistic missile interceptors and even space-based sensors to detect launches. Cotton also called for a repeal of the defense spending caps that Congress adopted in 2011, as part of a standoff over debt ceiling and spending legislation. "The Budget Control Act was passed in 2011 in a very different world than we face now," Cotton said.

Watch Full ScreenLawmakers and national security experts cite North Korea and Iran as the threats that require missile defense development, but China and Russia have often insisted that U.S. officials were hiding their true intentions. Cotton's admission that he's concerned about Russia and China could strengthen their resolve to oppose the deployment of ballistic missile defense systems in South Korea, for example.

But the Arkansas lawmaker argued that the ground has already shifted, as Russia is in violation of a nuclear weapons treaty negotiated during the Reagan era, while much of China's nuclear capabilities remain hidden from the United States.

"If our adversaries are contemplating the use of nuclear forces as part of normal warfare, then I would suggest we'd be best advised to develop ballistic missile defenses instead of clinging to a deterrence framework that they have already discarded," Cotton said.

Some of the proposals evoke the Ronald Reagan-era Strategic Defensive Initiative that, at the time, was derided by Democratic leaders as a "Star Wars" fantasy. Cotton, for instance, suggested the development of long-range, high-endurance drones armed with lasers that could intercept and destroy nuclear weapons over the nation that fired them.

"The experts who do this work at the Missile Defense Agency and more broadly within the Pentagon or outside experts are pretty confident that with higher levels of investment ... we are on the cusp of some pretty major breakthroughs," Cotton said.

<http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/tom-cotton-us-has-to-win-nuclear-arms-race-with-russia-and-china/article/2627148>

[Return to top](#)

ASIA/PACIFIC

38 North (Washington, DC)

Imagery Confirms Recent Media Reports of Rocket Engine Test

By Joseph Bermudez

June 27, 2017

Recent commercial satellite imagery confirms media reports that North Korea conducted a rocket engine test at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station on, or about, June 22. While it was reported that this test “could be for the smallest stage of an ICBM rocket engine,” and the June 22 imagery shows evidence of a recent small rocket engine test, it is not possible to confirm whether this test was for an ICBM engine using imagery alone.

Evidence of an Engine Test

Both natural-color and color-infrared imagery of the vertical engine test stand from June 22 show numerous tire tracks on the test stand’s apron and at the nearby garage that were not previously present in a June 10 image, indicating recent heavy vehicular traffic. Such traffic is similar to that seen for previous engine tests. More significantly, the image shows widespread, but minor, damage to vegetation surrounding the base of the test stand where rocket engine exhaust is directed during tests. The minor damage suggests that the recently conducted test was of a relatively small engine. Whether the engine test was “for the smallest stage of an ICBM rocket engine” or some other system cannot be determined from the imagery alone. No vehicles or personnel are observed in or around the test stand.

The fact that this test was conducted only twelve days after the June 10 image showed no evidence of test preparations reinforces that North Korea possesses the technical and logistical capabilities to conduct such tests with little or no advance warning.

Construction Activity at Launch Pad

As noted previously, since March 2017, the North Koreans have undertaken a construction project located approximately 50 meters southeast of the launch pad. The June 22 image shows that this construction continues slowly, as what appears to be building footings and the beginnings of walls are evident. The planned purpose of the new structure is unknown, however, its proximity to the launch pad suggests it will likely be used to support launch operations.

Other Activity

With the exception of what appear several small vehicles, no activity of significance is observed elsewhere in the facility in the June 22 image.

<http://www.38north.org/2017/06/sohae062717/>

[Return to top](#)

Nikkei Asian Review (Tokyo, Japan)

North Korea Can Now Target Japan With a Nuclear Missile

By Tetsuro Kosaka

June 25, 2017

Behind the scenes, Russia pulls the strings in a proxy fight with the US

One of North Korea's missile test firings in May suggests that the country's ballistics development program is nearly complete.

On May 14, Pyongyang launched an intermediate-range missile, what it calls a Hwasong-12. The projectile reached an altitude of more than 2,000km -- well out of the Earth's atmosphere, which is about 480km thick -- then hit the Sea of Japan while traveling at least Mach 15.

Mach 1 is the speed of sound. Mach 2 is twice that.

That the missile did not disintegrate upon its re-entry into the atmosphere shows that it is capable of carrying and delivering a warhead.

Furthermore, it is believed that the missile's electronics were able to keep measuring the inside temperature, flying speed and perhaps other data -- and send the information back to ground control.

Sometime later, a national security source who is familiar with Japan's missile defense circumstances told me, "North Korea appears to have completed the development of a Japan-targeted nuclear missile."

Ballistic missiles typically fly in three phases: slowly gaining altitude, remaining in space and finally re-entering Earth's atmosphere.

There are missile defense systems designed to target a missile at each of these stages. The Aegis anti-missile system used by Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force tries to intercept missiles at the second stage. Just not at 2,000km. An advanced Aegis system can send an intercept missile up to 1,000km.

Japan could possibly consider deploying a land-based missile defense system like Aegis Ashore, but such systems offer no guarantees. Moving targets are hard to hit, especially when they're moving at Mach 15.

The Self-Defense Forces also have Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air intercept missiles at their disposal. These are designed to intercept a missile as it re-enters the atmosphere -- but not those traveling as fast as the Hwasong-12.

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems, also known as THAAD, could be deployed in Japan one day, but even their probability of interception is low.

Even though Japan has spent massive amounts deploying U.S.-made missile defense systems, it still has no shield against North Korea's latest missile.

Let's look at a related matter: How did North Korea manage to accelerate its missile development program? I believe another country is aiding Pyongyang.

A national security source recently told me Russia has been inviting young, talented North Korean engineers to its research facilities, then teaching them about key ballistic missile technology.

During the Cold War, China imitated Soviet-made short-range Scud missiles. Pyongyang obtained blueprints from China and began making its own Scuds. Later, after their country collapsed, a number of suddenly jobless Soviet engineers found work in North Korea.

So today's North Korean engineers are at least familiar with Soviet and Russian missile technologies.

Earlier this month, Russian President Vladimir Putin defended Pyongyang's nuclear development program, saying that a small country like North Korea has no other option but to possess nukes if it wants to maintain its independence and security.

Russia has also OK'd a cargo-passenger ship route between the two countries.

Moscow seems to be becoming increasingly supportive of Pyongyang. But its military aid to the country goes way back.

Time for another question: What could Russia hope to gain by helping to arm North Korea with nuclear missiles?

We have to take in the big picture here. Russia has been supporting the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, while the U.S. and other Western powers oppose Assad. This is why the Syrian conflict is often referred to as a proxy war between Russia and the U.S.

Moscow is also building up its military presence on its borders with Estonia and Latvia -- two former Soviet states that chose independence after the Soviet Union disintegrated and later became members of NATO.

NATO's founding principle is collective self defense by all members should one be attacked by external forces. It began in 1949 with 12 member states and now has 29.

From our broad perspective we see Russia is applying pressure in the Middle East as well as in Eastern Europe. If it can do the same in Northeast Asia, it can dilute the U.S. military's focus. In this sense, North Korea is a tool Russia is using -- and with little effort -- to annoy the U.S.

Like NATO, the U.S. and Japan have a security pact that calls on the U.S. to defend Japan should the Asian nation come under attack.

Russia could also be using North Korea as a testing ground for its missile capabilities. The treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces, agreed to between the U.S. and Russia, bans both parties from possessing such weapons. Why break such a treaty when North Korea is willing to test your technology for you?

Meanwhile, Japan is obsessed with the idea of enhancing its missile defense systems -- despite the apparent impossibility of such a mission.

The 2011 earthquake and tsunami revealed that Japan lacks satisfactory quartermaster and field support capabilities. There have been no improvements in the intervening years. This is largely because the government has focused on acquiring extremely expensive -- not to mention fallible -- anti-missile systems. But without sufficient field support, how can the country's self defense forces take on enemies in a conventional war?

The government should be able to oversee all of its defense and security needs.

<http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/North-Korea-can-now-target-Japan-with-a-nuclear-missile>

[Return to top](#)

The Japan Times (Tokyo, Japan)

Japan Eyes U.S. Nuclear Pact That Renews Automatically Amid Trump Administration Vacancies

Author Not Attributed

June 20, 2017

Japan will seek a nuclear energy pact with the United States that renews automatically while it continues reprocessing spent fuel and enriching uranium, government sources said Tuesday.

The government plans to forgo a long-term pact similar to the 30-year bilateral agreement that expires in July next year, according to the source. Officials want the new type of agreement because they have little time for talks amid vacancies in U.S. departments tasked with negotiations under President Donald Trump's administration, the sources said.

Furthermore, the government apparently wants to avoid facing potentially harsh demands from Washington over such matters as the large stockpiles of plutonium that have built up over years of reprocessing under the current pact. The plutonium can be used to produce nuclear weapons, posing a potential proliferation risk, which worries Washington.

The bilateral agreement that entered into force in July 1988 authorizes Japan for 30 years until July 2018 to establish a nuclear fuel recycling system in which spent fuel from nuclear reactors is reprocessed to extract uranium and plutonium. The two can then be recycled into fuel called mixed oxide, or MOX, for use in fast-breeder reactors or conventional nuclear reactors.

But the reprocessing project has faced growing uncertainty as most nuclear plants have suspended operations amid safety concerns following the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 plant caused by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami.

The trouble-prone Monju prototype fast-breeder nuclear reactor in Fukui Prefecture will also be decommissioned despite its envisioned key role in the fuel recycling plan.

Despite the setbacks, the government wants to extend the agreement in its current form — with the ability to reprocess spent fuel and enrich uranium for nuclear fuel. But the prospect of a further buildup of plutonium could prompt calls for caution from some in the United States.

If the pact is renewed with the automatic extension clause, it could be terminated at a later date if either party gives notice six months in advance. But the government has judged that the U.S. is unlikely to greatly change its policy given that officials in charge of such negotiations at the State and Energy departments have yet to be named, the sources said.

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/06/20/national/japan-eyes-u-s-nuclear-pact-renews-automatically-amid-trump-administration-vacancies/>

[Return to top](#)

South China Morning Post (Hong Kong, China)

US Lawmakers Accuse China of Helping Pyongyang Bypass Sanctions

By Robert Delaney

June 29, 2017

US congressmen claim China is hindering efforts to halt Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programme by funnelling hard currency to North Korea

US congressmen accused China of undermining international efforts to halt Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programme by funnelling hard currency to North Korea.

Responding to the allegations, Washington's ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, said she would support "secondary sanctions" to stop North Korea's military from producing a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile, a move that would target Chinese companies helping to funnel hard currency to its neighbour. Secondary sanctions target companies or organisations conducting any kind of exchanges with countries already subject to punitive UN Security Council resolutions.

Pyongyang is likely to make such ICBMs operational sooner than many experts think, Haley said, due to weapons trade facilitated by China and income produced by North Korean citizens doing forced labour in other countries.

"You are more optimistic saying it is multiple years before an ICBM comes forward. I think it's going to happen sooner because they are on target to do that and they continue to use their people for those violations," Haley said in a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing in Washington, in response to questions from the committee's chairman, Representative Ed Royce.

The Congressional hearing was called to learn how the lawmaking body should evaluate funding for the US mission at the UN and how Haley can encourage more cooperation from other UN members on priorities including North Korea's nuclear weapons programme and efforts to fight against terrorist organisations like ISIS and Hamas.

Representative Ted Yoho, one of the most strident congressmen in the hearing when it came to Beijing, said China-based businesses are "behind the smuggling of record cargoes of North Korean weapons to the Middle East. So China is funding and allowing North Korea to gain access to these weapons, selling them to the Middle East, going into the hands of terrorists fighting our troops".

As of 2016 – before UN sanctions against North Korea were expanded or strengthened – just over 5,000 companies in China represented about 85 per cent of North Korea's total foreign trade, according to the Centre for Advanced Defence Studies, a Washington-based think tank. By contrast, more than 67,000 Chinese firms exported to South Korea.

"The big weapons in the sanctions chest would be secondary sanctions on firms that trade with North Korea or provide financing for North Korea," Thomas Byrne, president of the New York-based Korea Society, said in an interview with the South China Morning Post. Pyongyang has started to feel the impact of sanctions since China's imports of coal have largely stopped, he added.

Secondary sanctions against Iran, which penalised any companies buying Iranian oil, helped bring the Iranian government to the negotiating table with the US in a deal that froze the Middle Eastern country's nuclear programme, Byrne said.

Citing the US State Department's recent downgrade of China in its ranking of states in terms of efforts to halt human trafficking, members of the House committee and Haley also characterised China as a human rights violator.

Haley said "all levels" of the administration of President Donald Trump are working on a plan to bring Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, who was just released from detention after a diagnosis of advanced liver cancer, to the US for medical treatment.

The UN Security Council has issued a series of resolutions against North Korea since 2006, after six-nation talks involving Pyongyang, China, the US, Japan, South Korea and Russia broke down.

Last month, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to expand sanctions against North Korea in retaliation for its recent ballistic missile tests by barring travel by more of its government officials and blacklisting additional state-owned companies.

The resolution added 14 North Korean government officials to the list of those already prohibited from travelling to UN member states as per a resolution passed by the Security Council in 2006. The move also prohibits four more companies, including Koryo Bank and Kangbong Trading Corp, from conducting transactions with UN member-state entities.

Money continues to flow from China to Pyongyang even after Beijing voted in favour of the most recent rounds of UN Security Council sanctions against its neighbour, Orville Schell, the Arthur Ross director of the Asia Society's Centre on US-China Relations, said in an interview.

Recent sanctions have all but halted China's purchases of North Korean coal, but concern about the consequences of an economic collapse of North Korea has made the Chinese government reluctant to cut off all economic exchanges.

China "could shut down the airline [since] the only significant route out of Pyongyang is through Beijing", Schell said. "There are some 400,000 North Koreans working in China and all remittances for their salaries paid by the Chinese go to the North Korean government."

<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2100465/us-lawmakers-accuse-china-helping-pyongyang-bypass>

[Return to top](#)

EUROPE/RUSSIA

War on the Rocks (Washington, DC)

Don't Believe the Hype About European Defense

By Luis Simon

June 27, 2017

If you're a Europe-based think tanker, policy wonk, or commentator, Donald Trump and Brexit are great for business. Just about every Brussels pundit is leading off his musings about Europe's future with some sort of Trump or Brexit hook. If you haven't heard by now that either Trump, Brexit, or

— ideally — both offer historical windows of opportunity for European defense cooperation, you're way outside of the Brussels bubble.

Those invested in the notion that the European Union can become strategically autonomous interpret pretty much whatever happens out there as a catalyst for greater European defense cooperation. Every time there is some sort of global crisis or “external shock,” catalyst-related narratives pop up — there are just too many politicians, officials, and pundits in Europe who lust after such narratives.

We have been here before. Many times. Think about the Balkan Wars triggering all that talk about the hour of Europe; of the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 being widely viewed as wake up calls for Europe; or how Obama's 2010 announcement of a pivot to Asia or reluctance to lead on Libya supposedly left Europeans no choice but to take security matters into their own hands. And let us not forget the 2003 Iraq War, when millions of Europeans took to the streets to protest against George W. Bush and Tony Blair's mischiefs. That irresponsible, trigger-happy, and condescending American cowboy — not to speak of his British “poodle” — was supposed to be the mother of all catalysts for greater European defense cooperation.

And yet, no serious push for European strategic autonomy ever came about. E.U. defense die-hards have been left at the altar again and again. What they typically acknowledge, by way of consolation, is that these things take time and patience — Rome was not built in a day. They also argue important steps are being taken, and these things (i.e. the articulation of a serious E.U. defense policy) tend to move forward one step at a time. Yet, it is not easy to keep count on how many allegedly “important steps” have been taken along the long and winding road to European strategic autonomy. But perhaps the next catalyst will be the real thing that many seem to be waiting for. Enter Trump and Brexit.

Some say Trump is just too unstable and untrustworthy to look after European interests or be entrusted with the defense of the international liberal order. Others argue his emphasis on greater allied burden-sharing means Europeans need to step up their defense efforts. No matter which of these arguments you prefer, the conclusion is similar: Europeans have no option but to get their act together.

Yet, the notion that an irresponsible or disengaged America forces Europeans to take care of their own security could re-open old divisions on fundamental questions. One such question is nuclear deterrence. This is a question many could pretend to ignore during the two decades that followed the end of the Cold War, as the so-called peace dividend gave way to repeated European attempts to integrate Russia into the West. However, Russia's annexation of Crimea has put deterrence and defense back in Europe's security agenda. And Moscow resorting to nuclear saber-rattling as a means of intimidation, and its ongoing efforts to modernize its nuclear arsenal, underscore the renewed importance of nuclear weapons for European security. Any serious discussion on European strategic autonomy must square the nuclear circle.

This leads to a critical and highly uncomfortable question: Given widespread reluctance around the idea of a German nuclear deterrent, are Paris and Berlin ready to reach some sort of sharing agreement over the French nuclear deterrent? Most unlikely. The idea of national strategic autonomy is embedded in France's political DNA, and an independent nuclear deterrent is the jewel of France's autonomy crown. Germany, for its part, might have come to terms with its de facto strategic subordination to the United States through NATO. But it is unlikely to sign off on a serious European defense scheme if its role is to be relegated to playing second fiddle to France, let alone Britain. This red line was already set by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt during the Cold War. For Brandt, any European defense scheme independent from NATO would require a serious discussion about the modalities for including West Germany in the process of decision-

making concerning the French nuclear deterrent: Germany's role could not be "restricted to infantry tasks." This continues to reflect German thinking.

As long as a shared nuclear deterrent is off limits, Berlin is unlikely to reject any sort of French (or British) nuclear umbrella, both for strategic and political reasons. Therefore, and for all the rhetoric about Trump having done more for European defense cooperation than anyone else, once the electoral fog clears in Germany, we should expect key European leaders to re-emphasize the centrality of the United States to Europe's security and geopolitical architecture, and put their energies on co-opting the United States (mainly through NATO) and re-stating its commitment to European security.

Now let's turn to Brexit and the myth that "British recalcitrance" has been responsible for the misfortunes of "European defense" over the last few decades. With the British out of the E.U. — or so the argument goes — the path is finally clear for European strategic autonomy. Never mind the sorry state of European military capabilities, or that Britain has actually been one of the leading advocates of greater military spending in Europe, and of investing in modern capabilities, having partnered with France to that effect. Never mind that, when it comes to defense, the French are just as likely to hold Germany's hand and release Britain's as Trump is to get a standing ovation in the European Parliament. And never mind the gulf between France and Germany, the supposed engine of an alleged European security enterprise.

France looks at military force not just through the lens of defense and deterrence, but also as a means of advancing its foreign policy and economic interests. And it makes a proactive use of it. Germany rejects that vision. It sees the military as a last resort defensive instrument. These are deeply ingrained differences of strategic culture. And any serious effort on the part of Germany to overcome its cautious and defensive attitude towards military power is likely to cause discomfort amongst some of its European partners, France included. In many ways, when it comes to defense spending and its attitude towards the use of force, Germany is damned if it does and damned if it doesn't.

At any rate, the differences in French and German attitudes toward military force are not just philosophical. They project into virtually any debate on European security cooperation, whether it relates to capability development, new institutional structures, or launching E.U. military missions.

The never-ending debate over the establishment of an operational headquarters for the planning and conduct of E.U. military operations give us an example that is both critical to any debate about European strategic autonomy and highly illustrative of the extent to which Franco-German differences can cripple the idea of a serious E.U. defense policy. The French have traditionally pushed for a fully staffed European Union military headquarters geared for planning and conducting expeditionary missions. The Germans have advocated for a more modest civilian-military planning facility focusing on low-intensity, peacekeeping, and stabilization missions. Despite numerous institutional reshuffles in the European Union's planning and conduct structures, French and German red lines have barely moved since the CSDP was launched in 1999.

As a result, it has taken nearly 20 years of allegedly significant steps for the European Union to establish a "Military Planning and Conduct Capability" composed of up to 25 staffers, devoted to assisting with the planning and conduct of so-called non-executive (i.e. training and assistance) missions. By way of comparison, it took NATO barely a few years to set up a permanent, integrated military command structure with a strategic level command and several joint force and specific component commands capable of planning and conducting all types of operations.

All in all, ongoing differences amongst the European Union's key member states suggest that neither Brexit nor Trump are likely to prove to be real game changers for E.U. defense cooperation, let alone lead to European strategic autonomy.

<https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/dont-believe-the-hype-about-european-defense/>

[Return to top](#)

BBC News (London, UK)

How Much of a Threat Does Russia Pose, and to Whom?

By Jonathan Marcus

June 29, 2017

Nato defence ministers are reviewing progress in what's known as the alliance's "enhanced forward presence" - its deployment of troops eastwards to reassure worried allies, and deter any Russian move west.

Nato has dispatched four battalion-sized battle groups, one deployed in Poland and one in each of the three Baltic Republics.

The US has also begun to bring back heavy armoured units to western Europe.

The whole effort is prompted by the shock emanating from Russia's seizure and subsequent annexation of the Crimea, and its continuing support for rebel groups in eastern Ukraine.

If Moscow could tear up the rule-book of security in post-Cold War Europe by carving off a slice of Ukraine (as it previously did in Georgia), many feared the Baltic Republics - also territory of the former Soviet Union - could be next.

Russia says that in response to these Nato moves it is making new deployments of its own. But the reality is rather more complex. I've been speaking to some of the leading Western experts on the Russian military to get a sense of what is behind Russia's modernisation effort, and to determine what threat it really poses and to whom.

"Russia would like us to think that its current militarisation and preparations for conflict are a response to Nato doing the same, but it's simply not true."

That's the view of Keir Giles, director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre, and probably Britain's leading watcher of Russian military matters.

"Russia's enormously expensive reorganisation and rearmament programme," he told me, "was already in full swing well before the crisis over Ukraine, while Nato nations were still winding down their militaries.

"As late as 2013, the US withdrew all its armour from Europe - while Russia was already busy investing billions in upgrading its forces."

Analyst Dmitry Gorenburg of Harvard University dates the start of the Russian modernisation programme to 2009. A response, he says, to the evident shortcomings in the Russian military campaign against Georgia.

He says the main focus was "the improvement of the speed of decision-making and communication of decisions to the troops, and interoperability among military branches, followed by the replacement of Soviet-era equipment that was rapidly reaching the end of its service life".

The results have been significant. According to Michael Kofman of the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute, "by 2012 Russia had reorganised its armed forces from a Soviet mass mobilisation army into a permanent standing force, and began improving quality across the board".

This was coupled with an intense regimen of snap-readiness checks and countless exercises, to the extent that "by 2014 the Russian military was markedly improved compared to its lacklustre performance in the Russia-Georgia war in 2008," he says.

All the experts I spoke to insist that the initial focus of the Russian effort has been on Ukraine, not the Baltics. Indeed, Michael Kofman argues that the war in Ukraine imposed unexpected requirements on Russia's military, which found itself lacking permanently stationed forces on the country's borders, and ill-positioned for the conflict.

"Russian armed forces," he says, "were, and still are, in transition."

To address the prospect of war with Ukraine in the medium to long-term, he says, Russia "has spent much of the past three years repositioning units around Ukraine, building three new divisions, rebasing several brigades, and creating an entire new combined-arms army. The intent is for Russian ground forces to be in place just across the border should they need to reinforce proxies in the Donbas, invade from several vectors, or simply deter Kiev from thinking it could quickly retake the separatist regions by force".

Ukraine may be the immediate strategic concern of the Russian general staff. But as Keir Giles notes, "Russia is developing its military infrastructure all the way along its western periphery - not just opposite Ukraine, but also Belarus, the Baltic states and even Finland. They have re-organised in order to be able to deliver combat troops to the western border as rapidly as possible".

This includes "setting up new heavy road transport units in order to reduce their traditional reliance on railways to deliver armour to the operational area. That gives them a lot more flexibility to move in areas where road networks are better developed - primarily the west of Russia, including across the border in Russia's western neighbours," he tells me.

Given Moscow's focus on Ukraine, have some Nato countries over-reacted to the perceived Russian threat? Not at all, says Keir Giles. On the contrary, he insists, the concern is that Nato has under-reacted.

"The direct military challenge from Russia, and confirmation of Russia's willingness to use military force against its neighbours," he argues, "with few exceptions, hasn't translated into European countries taking a serious interest in defending themselves."

He adds that the failure of many Nato allies to meet even symbolic commitments like the pledge to spend 2% of GDP on defence, let alone urgent real measures like regenerating the capacity for high-intensity warfare to match Russia's developing capabilities, "speaks of an unwillingness to recognise politically inconvenient reality".

That reality, according to Michael Kofman, is nothing short of a transformation of the Russian military. "Reform, modernisation and the combat experience gleaned from Ukraine and Syria will have lasting effects on the Russian armed forces," he told me.

"Russia," he says, "retains the ability to deploy decisive force anywhere on its borders, overpowering any former Soviet republic. In terms of its strategic nuclear arsenal, Russia is not

only a peer to the United States, but actually ahead in modernisation and investment in non-strategic nuclear weapons.

"Meanwhile Russia's conventional forces are now capable of imposing high costs on even a technologically superior adversary such as Nato in a high-end conflict - i.e. a fight would be quite bloody for both sides."

That is hopefully an unthinkable situation. At root, though, Dmitry Gorenburg believes that "Russia's conventional capabilities will be nowhere near as strong as those of the US military or Nato forces as a whole".

Above all it is readiness, proximity, and the ability to mass fire-power quickly that gives Russia an immediate local advantage. But Nato needs to get the threat into perspective.

As Michael Kofman notes, "Russia is a Eurasian land power, bringing a lot of firepower to the fight, but its strength shines when fighting close to home."

Nato's defence and research budget dwarfs Russia's, as does the base capacity of the Alliance to generate forces and equip them in a prolonged conflict.

"The bottom line," he says, is that "while NATO has genuine worries on what a short-term conflict with Russia might look like, the reality is that this is the world's pre-eminent military alliance, at the core of which is still an incredibly potent military power, and a sustained fight would probably end disastrously for Moscow."

The Russian military is simply not structured to hold substantial territory, or to generate the forces needed for a prolonged conflict. Nato needs to be ready, in the view of experts. If deterrence is going to be credible it needs to restore its ability to fight high-intensity combat, a capacity that has atrophied during the counter-insurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The consensus among the experts seems to be that Ukraine was a warning bell. Russia's new-found assertiveness is not to be confused with a desire to launch a military attack westwards.

Indeed, the immediate Russian threat may come from its information warfare and cyber campaigns directed against the West. That's a battle that has already been joined. And it is one the West is equally ill-prepared for.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40428132>

[Return to top](#)

Sputnik (Moscow, Russia)

How US New Short-Range Missile Systems May Provoke New Arms Race

Author Not Attributed

June 28, 2017

Using Russia's military modernization as a pretext to increase the US military budget, the Pentagon is boosting its short-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) capabilities. Sputnik contributor Andrei Kots noted that once deployed in Eastern Europe these weapons may pose a serious challenge to Russian military infrastructure.

NATO officials are ringing alarm bells over Russia's "growing military prowess"; speaking at a Politico Brussels Playbook breakfast chairman of the NATO Military Committee General Petr Pavel

highlighted that the alliance was trying to thwart the development of Russia's military capabilities "on virtually every level."

"When it comes to capability there is no doubt that Russia is developing their capabilities both in conventional and nuclear components," the NATO official told the Politico event, admitting, however, that "when it comes to intent... we cannot clearly say that Russia has aggressive intents against NATO."

According to Sputnik contributor Andrei Kots, the US efforts to modernize its short-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) could be regarded as an attempt to "counterbalance" Russia.

Indeed, during his speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. in May 2016, would-be National Security Adviser Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster bemoaned the fact that the Russians have outstanding firepower capabilities, especially when it comes to short-range missile systems.

"We spend a long time talking about winning long-range missile duels," McMaster said.

"When an Army fires unit arrives somewhere, it should be able to do surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, and shore-to-ship capabilities. We are developing that now and there are some really promising capabilities," he added.

The US Army Acquisition Support Center (USAASC) website says that the US army is determined to bolster its capabilities with new Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) missiles.

"The LRPF will replace the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) capability, which is impacted by the age of the ATACMS inventory and the cluster munition policy that removes all M39 and M39A1 ATACMS from the inventory after 2018," the website reads, adding that the new missiles would be able to reach targets at distances of more than 300 km (186 miles).

To accomplish the task, in August 2016 the Army tapped America's third-largest defense contractor, Raytheon, and the country's largest defense contractor, Lockheed Martin, to assist in product development.

A \$5.7 million risk-mitigation contract was awarded to Raytheon for the LRPF program, according to Scout Warrior's report published in September 2016.

"The emerging Long Range Precision Fires, slated to be operational by 2027, is being designed to destroy targets at distances up to 500 kilometers," the media outlet wrote, citing Dan O'Boyle, spokesman for Program Executive Office, Missiles & Space.

The crux of the matter is that the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) struck by the US and the USSR back in 1987 stipulated the elimination of both nuclear and conventional missiles, as well as their launchers, with ranges of 500-1,000 kilometers (310-620 miles) and 1,000-5,500 km (620-3,420 miles). However, the treaty did not cover sea-launched missiles.

According to Raytheon's official website, its new DeepStrike missile, intended for the Army's Long-Range Precision Fires requirement, will "defeat fixed land targets at 300-499 kilometers," formally complying with the INF Treaty requirements.

"Raytheon's DeepStrike missile will integrate with the M270 MLRS and M142 HIMARS rocket launchers. The range and speed of the new missile will enable Army combat units to engage targets over vast geographic areas in high-threat environments," the site says.

But that is not all.

On June 21, the United States Army official website reported that "field artillery soldiers will soon be ready to test-fire the modernized Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico."

Kots noted that the new modernized M57A1 ATACMS, developed by Lockheed Martin, has reportedly boosted its operational range from 165 km to 300-450 km.

The journalist noted that the new US weapons could be compared to Russia's Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems which can hit a target at a distance of 400-500 km (250-310 miles).

He drew attention to the fact that once deployed in Eastern Europe near Russia's borders these missile system would pose a significant challenge to the Russian military infrastructure and air-defense positions.

"New short-range ballistic missile defense [systems] could significantly strengthen NATO's strike capability on the eastern border of the North Atlantic Alliance. To date, there are actually no ground-based complexes capable of hitting 300-500 kilometers," Kots stressed.

The journalist expressed his deep concerns over Monday's Politico report which said that US lawmakers had sent a proposal to the White House urging the administration to withdraw from the INF arms control treaty.

However, on Wednesday, Special Assistant to the President and National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Counterproliferation Christopher Ford specified in his interview with Sputnik that Washington does not want to withdraw from the INF Treaty.

Meanwhile, Russia's military modernization and especially Moscow's successes in the development of hypersonic weapons is being used by the Pentagon as a pretext to bolster the US military budget.

"Recently, the American leadership says that it is necessary to revise the military budget in the upward direction," Vladislav Shurygin, military expert and deputy editor-in-chief of the newspaper Zavtra, told Radio Sputnik.

"Actually, it has been increasing [in the US] for all 80 years. But the Trump administration has adopted a course, strikingly similar to that of the Reagan era, to hyper-increase the military budget. Therefore, such phobias and 'horror stories' of Russian and Chinese super-weapons have [recently] emerged. Consequently, America, they say, needs to rearm," Shurygin stressed.

However, the problem is that the US efforts to bolster its military prowess may result in yet another arms race.

Speaking to Sputnik, political scientist and professor at the Academy of Military Sciences Sergei Sudakov, underscored that the US continues to implement the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) military concept, which envisages thwarting an adversary's potential to retaliate.

"The United States has consistently implemented the concept of a global disarming strike. It envisions a non-nuclear missile attack on the military infrastructure, air defense positions, command posts — everything that will give Russia a chance to inflict a retaliatory massive volley with nuclear weapons," Sudakov stressed.

America's new modernized ATACMS and LRPFs could be regarded as part of this strategy: Sudakov noted that if launched from Estonia's capital of Tallinn they could reach the Russian city of St. Petersburg.

"This can only be countered by building up [Russia's] air defenses on the western borders," the political scientist emphasized.

<https://sputniknews.com/politics/201706281055044121-us-missile-systems-arms-race/>

[Return to top](#)

Al Manar News (Beirut, Lebanon)

US Not Willing to Withdraw From INF Treaty: Trump's Special Assistant

Author Not Attributed

June 29, 2017

The United States does not want to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), Special Assistant to President Donald Trump, Christopher Ford told Sputnik.

On Saturday, the Politico media outlet reported citing several congressmen that the US presidential administration was considering the proposal of the US Congress to withdraw from the INF Treaty.

"The Politico article really bothered me because it made it sound as if the responsible people in the expert community really think that it will be better if we remained constrained and let the Russians do whatever they want. It strikes me as if that is actually a desirable situation, there is no reason to have treaties in the first place because we just can refuse to do anything while they can go ahead and do whatever they want. That's not what we want it to be, we want to be in an INF-constrained world," said Ford, who is also National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Counterproliferation.

Highlighting the challenge of one side violating the treaty while the other side is constrained by it, Ford stressed that the US hoped that Russia would come back to compliance with the INF Treaty.

"Our concern is that not enough has been done to put them [the Russians] in a place where they are incentivized to return to compliance ... At some point we think you need to move beyond wagging the finger at the violator and actually give them reasons to think differently about the course they are on. We are hoping to give Russia reasons to think differently about building INF range ground based systems ... and with a bit of luck that will get them to a place where they agree to come back into compliance because we like the agreement," the assistant said.

According to Ford, "the INF problem raises questions about the future of the arms control enterprise."

<https://english.almanar.com.lb/294512>

[Return to top](#)

MIDDLE EAST

The Guardian (London, UK)

US Claims Warning Over Possible Syria Chemical Attack Averted Strike

Author Not Attributed

June 28, 2017

Russia warns US of proportional response to any preemptive measures against Syrian forces as US official calls intelligence behind warning 'far from conclusive'

US defence secretary James Mattis has said that Syria appears to have heeded a warning from Washington not to carry out a chemical weapons attack.

Meanwhile Russia, the main backer of President Bashar al-Assad, warned that it would respond proportionately if the US took preemptive measures against Syrian forces.

The White House said on Monday it appeared the Syrian military was preparing to conduct a chemical weapons attack and said that Assad and his forces would “pay a heavy price” if it did so.

The warning was based on intelligence that indicated preparations for such a strike were under way at Syria’s Shayrat airfield, US officials said.

“It appears that they took the warning seriously,” Mattis said. “They didn’t do it,” he told reporters flying with him to Brussels for a meeting of Nato defence ministers.

He offered no evidence other than the fact that an attack had not taken place.

Asked whether he believed Assad’s forces had called off any such strike completely, Mattis said: “I think you better ask Assad about that.”

The intelligence that prompted the administration’s warning was “far from conclusive”, said a US official familiar with it. “It did not come close to saying that a chemical weapons attack was coming,” the official said.

The intelligence consisted of a Syrian warplane being observed moving into a hangar at the Shayrat airbase, where US and allied intelligence agencies suspect the Assad government is hiding chemical weapons, said a second US official.

Mattis said Syria’s chemical weapons threat was larger than any single location. “I think that Assad’s chemical program goes far beyond one airfield,” he said.

US and allied intelligence officers had for some time identified several sites where they suspected Assad’s government may have been hiding newly made chemical weapons from inspectors, another US official familiar with the intelligence said.

The US launched a cruise missile strike on Shayrat in April following the deaths of 87 people in what Washington said was a poison gas attack in rebel-held territory.

The Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, said on Wednesday that Moscow will respond if the US takes measures against Syrian government forces.

Speaking at a news conference with his German counterpart, Lavrov said he hoped that the US was not preparing to use its intelligence assessments about the Syrian government’s intentions as a pretext to mount a “provocation” in Syria.

Russian officials have described the war in Syria as the biggest source of tension between Moscow and Washington and say the April cruise missile strike ordered by Donald Trump raised the risk of confrontation between them.

In Washington, the US ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, credited Trump with saving Syrian lives.

“Due to the president’s actions, we did not see an incident,” Haley told US lawmakers. “I would like to think that the president saved many innocent men, women and children.”

Although the number of people killed in suspected chemical attacks is a small portion of the total dead in Syria’s civil war, estimated at close to half a million, footage of victims writhing in agony has caused particular revulsion.

On the Syrian battlefields, Turkish artillery bombarded and destroyed Kurdish YPG militia targets after the group’s fighters opened fire on Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria.

The US supports the YPG in the fight against Islamic State in Syria, while Nato ally Turkey regards them as terrorists indistinguishable from militants from the outlawed PKK (Kurdistan Workers party), which is carrying out an insurgency in south-east Turkey.

The Turkish army said YPG machine-gun fire on Tuesday evening targeted Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army rebels south of the town of Azaz. Artillery struck back in retaliation, a Turkish military statement said.

In Geneva, the UN human rights chief said at least 173 civilians have been killed in air and ground operations against Islamic State in Raqqa this month.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/28/us-syria-chemical-weapons-attack-assad-russia>

[Return to top](#)

The Times of Israel (Jerusalem, Israel)

Iran Targeted Star of David in Ballistic Missile Test, Israel Says

Author Not Attributed

June 28, 2017

Israel complains to UN as satellite imagery shows impact crater from weapons test next to Jewish symbol target carved in the desert

Iran used a Star of David as a target for missile test last year, Israel said Wednesday, distributing satellite images of the site to the United Nations Security Council on Wednesday.

“This use of the Star of David as target practice is hateful and unacceptable,” Israel’s Ambassador to the United Nations Danny Danon wrote in a complaint to the Council.

Grainy photos provided to UN members showed what Danon said was the Jewish and Israeli symbol as the target in a test of a ballistic missile carried out last year with the impact crater visible next to it.

“The missile launch is not only a direct violation of UNSCR 2231, but is also a clear evidence of Iran’s continued intention to harm the State of Israel,” Danon said, adding that “the targeting of a sacred symbol of Judaism is abhorrent.”

“It is the Iranians who prop up the Assad regime as hundreds of thousands are killed, finance the terrorists of Hezbollah as they threaten the citizens of Israel, and support extremists and tyrants throughout the Middle East and around the world,” he added.

Earlier this month Iran fired missiles at Syria, targeting Islamic State positions in the first missile attack by Iran outside its own territory in 30 years, since the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988.

The medium-range ballistic missiles Iran said it fired at the eastern Syria’s Deir el-Zour region were ostensibly in retaliation for the twin terror attacks carried out by the group on June 7 in Tehran’s parliament, and at the grave of Ayatollah Khomeini in which 17 people were killed. Revolutionary Guards officials warned that other assaults on Iran would lead to similar retaliatory attacks, describing the missiles as a message to its enemies.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said after the attack, “I have one message for Iran: Don’t threaten Israel.”

Iran has in the past test-fired missiles with anti-Israel messages written on them in Hebrew. In March 2016, it test-fired two ballistic missiles, which an Iranian news agency said were inscribed with the phrase “Israel must be wiped out.”

After Iran test-fired a ballistic missile in January, the US-imposed sanctions on a number of entities involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program, and US President Donald Trump warned the Islamic Republic it had been “put on notice.”

Although Iran maintains that the testing of ballistic missiles is not banned by the 2015 nuclear deal designed to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, the US said that the sanctions were imposed for Iran’s violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2331, which calls upon Iran “not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.”

Since January’s test-firing of a ballistic missile, Iran has carried out a number of other tests of cruise and submarine-based missiles.

<http://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-targeted-star-of-david-in-ballistic-missile-test/>

[Return to top](#)

World Politics Review (Washington, DC)

German, Iranian Foreign Ministers: Iran Nuclear Deal Must Stay

By Jefferson Chase

June 28, 2017

After meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif, Sigmar Gabriel said Germany would resist any questioning of the deal. Zarif also commented on the US travel ban, but human rights issues went unmentioned.

As one of a group of signatories to the so-called Iran Nuclear Deal, in which international sanctions against the country have been lifted in return for Tehran agreeing to forgo nuclear weapons,

Germany has been unsettled by intimations by US President Donald Trump that the US might pull out of the arrangement. So it was no accident that German Foreign Minister Gabriel spent much of the press conference following talks with Zarif addressing the issue.

Gabriel said the deal had prevented an "unrestricted nuclear arms race" in the Gulf region and described his country's support for it as unwavering.

"We stand behind this agreement and want to support all the parties in their efforts to fulfill it," Gabriel said. "As the Federal Republic of Germany and as Europeans we would oppose any attempts to call it into question."

Gabriel added that according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has been meeting its obligations under the deal. Zarif thanked Germany for helping lift what he called the "unjust sanctions."

"From the very beginning, Germany played an important role in the negotiations," Zarif said. Aside from Germany, the nuclear deal included all the permanent members of the United Nations and the European Union.

In a statement German Economy Minister Brigitte Zypries echoed Zarif's calls for economic ties between the two countries to be further expanded. German exports to Iran in 2016 totalled around 2.6 billion euros (\$2.9 billion).

Punished for the Deeds of Others?

The Iranian foreign minister also commented on the Supreme Court decision in the US that partially sanctioned Trump's entry ban on people from six Muslim-majority countries, including Iran, that the US president claims sponsor terrorism.

Using the colloquial name for Trump's executive order, Zarif said that the "Muslim ban" would encourage rather than deter terrorism and was aimed at the wrong groups.

"It's regrettable," Zarif said. "The citizens from the countries on the list have never participated in any acts of terrorism against the United States and yet they are punished for acts of terrorism by the citizens of other countries. The problem is that, for some, support for terrorism is measured by how much money they spend buying arms from the US and not by actual acts of terrorism."

Gabriel Did Not Comment on the Issue.

Gabriel and Zafir said that they had also discussed the Middle East diplomatic crisis that has seen Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates break off relations and impose embargoes on Qatar.

Ahead of his visit to Berlin, Zafir had urged Europe to take a greater role, but Gabriel was somewhat non-committal, saying only that Germany, together with the US, supported efforts by the emir of Kuwait to get the two sides to the negotiating table.

Iran has supported Qatar in the conflict, but Zarif said that both sides in the conflict had no choice but to learn to live side by side.

"Neighbors are not a choice - they're a fact," said Zarif. "A fact of geography is a fact of geography."

Worlds Apart

Critics of Iran accuse Zarif of being a slick diplomat who conceals the harsher policies of his government behind a media-friendly smile.

Gabriel acknowledged that on a range of issues, including Iran's consistent calls for the eradication of Israel, the two countries were "worlds apart."

"But that shouldn't lead us to question an area in which we've achieved success," Gabriel added. "We shouldn't misuse conflicts in other areas, many of which existed before the nuclear deal, to call the nuclear deal into question."

Outside the German Foreign Ministry anti-Iranian demonstrators erected mock gallows to protest against Tehran's human rights abuses and support for Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad in that country's bloody civil war. They chanted "Zarif must go" and held up signs calling for an end to state executions in Iran.

<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/22579/german-iranian-foreign-ministers-iran-nuclear-deal-must-stay>

[Return to top](#)

Tehran Times (Tehran, Iran)

Iran Says Sees No Cap to Missile Capability

Author Not Attributed

June 21, 2017

Iran said it won't hesitate to shore up its missile capability and presses ahead with the program in the future, its government spokesman said on Tuesday.

"As explicitly stipulated by president, the government backs all missile activities of the Guards (IRGC) and (other) armed forces," Mohammad Bagher Nobakht told a press conference in Tehran.

"The government sees no cap to boosting defense and missile capability, and backs up missile launches and research," he added.

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fired missiles at Islamic State's major strongholds in eastern Syria, killing at least 50 ISIS militants, what Nobakht acclaimed as "a symbol of national clout."

The IRGC had vowed revenge for the Tehran terrorist attacks which killed 18 people and accused Saudi Arabia and the U.S. of being indirectly behind the raids.

Backing the missile operation, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted: "Iran's missile capability protects its citizens in lawful self-defense & advances common global fight to eradicate ISIS and extremist terror."

Iran's missile capability have been a challenging issue between Washington and Tehran.

The U.S. says Iran's missiles are a potential threat to the Middle East's peace and stability. Iran, while rejecting the claims, says its missiles are for defense only.

Back in February, the White House said it had put Iran "on notice" for test-firing a ballistic missile, taking an aggressive posture toward Tehran.

Later in May, President Hassan Rouhani highlighted that Tehran would continue its ballistic missile program, striking a defiant note after Washington's strong criticism of the Islamic Republic.

"The Iranian nation has decided to be powerful. Our missiles are for peace and for defense ... American officials should know that whenever we need to technically test a missile, we will do so and will not wait for their permission," Rouhani said in a news conference.

Iran's missiles are a focus of the new sanctions bill for which the U.S. Senate voted unanimously last week.

<http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/414481/Iran-says-sees-no-cap-to-missile-capability>

[Return to top](#)

INDIA/PAKISTAN

Arms Control Wonk (Washington, DC)

U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Duplicity, Betrayal, or National Interests?

By Michael Krepon

June 23, 2017

In the hard-edged world of international relations, the pursuit of one's national interests is called Realpolitik. In U.S.-Pakistan relations, it's called duplicity and betrayal. Pakistan's decision makers continue to seek leverage for favorable (or to avoid unfavorable) outcomes in Afghanistan and to maintain ties with anti-India extremist groups that cost one penny for every dollar required for Indian countermeasures. These policies have been deeply injurious to Pakistan, but carrots and sticks won't change them if Rawalpindi remains convinced that they are essential.

What's most galling to one U.S. administration after the next is that Pakistani officials deny what they are so obviously doing – and hence the charge of duplicity. Yes, this is duplicity. But for duplicity to succeed for so long, Washington must be willingly gullible. U.S. national security calculations have led one administration after the next to continue working with Pakistan on important common interests, despite being repeatedly stiffed on militant groups active in Afghanistan and India.

Washington got something in return for its military assistance to Pakistan, in addition to its grief. American officials and Members of Congress can be outraged that they overpaid, and still more outraged that Pakistan's assets in an endless war have killed U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan and civilians in Mumbai. Inevitably, the Congress has begun to cut Pakistan's military assistance. More is in the offing. But as long as U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan and are resupplied through Pakistan, there are limits to downsizing.

The diminishment of U.S. military assistance is widely viewed in Pakistan as a betrayal – part and parcel of Washington's decision to switch horses on the subcontinent. Realpolitik bites back. Pakistanis understand that what they can offer the United States pales in comparison to what New Delhi can. And yet, Pakistanis viscerally believe they deserve better for helping the United States to force the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan greatly benefited from this collaboration, but in the retelling of this tale, its national sacrifices came at the behest of Washington.

The biggest U.S. betrayal in Pakistani narratives was the imposition of the Pressler Amendment in 1990, bringing down a raft of sanctions soon after the Soviet decision to withdraw. When the United States needed Pakistan's help – or so this narrative goes – the George H.W. Bush Administration looked the other way about Pakistan's nuclear program. When Pakistan was no longer useful to the United States, Bush invoked the Pressler Amendment.

Rabia Akhtar, a Pakistani scholar, has debunked this narrative. The truth of matter is that the language of the Pressler Amendment was purposely drawn so as to help rather than harm Pakistan

by allowing the Executive Branch's waivers. Capitol Hill was, however, balking at providing military and economic assistance to Pakistan because of its nuclear weapon-related programs. Thus, continuing assistance to Pakistan and continuing to work together in Afghanistan required two artful compromises.

The first was between the Reagan Administration and Zia. No one in the Reagan Administration took Zia's denials of a nuclear-weapon program seriously because there was compelling evidence to the contrary. Thus, promises were sought and given. Zia promised not to "embarrass" the Reagan Administration. Pakistan was believed to possess all but one of the key elements of a nuclear bomb at this time. The missing ingredient was highly enriched uranium. It was commonly understood by Zia and the Reagan Administration that Pakistan would not "embarrass" Washington by enriching the uranium in its possession to weapons grade.

A second compromise was needed on Capitol Hill to continue the covert Afghan campaign while looking the other way from Pakistan's nuclear activities. This is where the Pressler Amendment and its tortured language came into play: assistance to Pakistan could not be provided if the executive branch could not certify that Pakistan was not in a possession of a nuclear weapon. As contortions of the English language go, it's hard to beat the three negatives embodied in the Pressler Amendment. But these three negatives served the intended purpose of the drafters. As long as Pakistan refrained from enriching uranium to weapons grade, President Bush the Elder could technically avoid imposing the Pressler Amendment.

This invites the question of why the George H.W. Bush Administration finally brought the hammer of the Pressler Amendment down on Pakistan in 1990. Was this a betrayal of Pakistan by the United States after succeeding in Afghanistan, as most Pakistanis think? My investigations are incomplete on this matter, but they point to a very different reason for invoking sanctions. There was a crisis with India in 1990 – a crisis that prompted Pakistan's leaders to raise enrichment to weapons grade. I suspect that Pakistan's own actions during the 1990 crisis removed the last fig leaf preventing the Pressler Amendment from being invoked.

I regret to say that the blinders that often accompany arguments between Americans and Pakistanis over "betrayal" and "duplicity" have spilled over into debates among the community of South Asia experts in the United States. Chris Fair has come to the conclusion that Moeed Yusuf of the U.S. Institute of Peace is a "proxy" for the Government of Pakistan because his analysis is cognizant of, and sometimes sympathetic to – when he is not criticizing – Pakistan. Shall we also label experts whose analyses are sympathetic to Indian perspectives as proxies for the Government of India?

At the risk of enflaming Chris further, I am not going to be silent when she impugns the integrity and work of a valued colleague. If that makes me a proxy for Pakistan as well, it will come as a surprise to those in the region who view my work as terribly biased and downright anti-Pakistan.

<http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1203396/u-s-pakistan-relations-duplicity-betrayal-or-national-interests/>

[Return to top](#)

Voice of America News (Washington, DC)

Growing Nuclear Arsenals Increase Concerns About Possible Pakistan-India War

By Shabbir Gilani

June 26, 2017

India and Pakistan have fought three wars and have been on the brink of another several times, a worrying prospect given that both have growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and questions about how secure they are.

The arms race between the South Asian neighbors has moved to enhancing the delivery systems for the warheads, which could annihilate the subcontinent several times. India's recent launch of more than 100 satellites with a single rocket foreshadows the capability of sending up a missile with multiple nuclear weapons.

The volatility of the situation is further exacerbated because neither country has a national missile defense system, and it likely would take several years to get one in place.

While the policy of mutually assured destruction has kept hostilities from overheating so far, experts believe that a misunderstanding or misadventure could escalate to a full-fledged war with nuclear weapons in play.

And there are plenty of risks.

Kashmir a flashpoint

Kashmir has been a flashpoint since the subcontinent was partitioned in 1947 and caused the most recent flare-up last November. Both sides accuse each other of harboring terrorists who launch cross-border attacks. Therefore, the question is whether the nukes in South Asia could fall into the wrong hands during mobilization in the fog of war.

Nuclear arms experts Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris estimate that Pakistan has 120-130 nuclear warheads compared with India's 110-120. India is said to have a stockpile of 540 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium, enough to produce 130 warheads. Pakistan has 3,100 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, sufficient to build 300 warheads. That's a lot to keep an eye on.

"The nukes were safe when these were in storage areas in both countries," Michael Krepon, co-founder and senior associate at Stimson Center, said in an interview with VOA's Urdu Service. "But when these have to be moved around in a state of war, it surely raises a red flag about their security on many counts.

Serious concerns

"The biggest concern was about Pakistan's tactical weapons, which have a very short range," Krepon said. "It means that these will have to be moved very close to the battlefield. There are fears that independent groups who want to settle scores with either Pakistan or India could attack them.

"Secondly, these could be attacked by Indian warplanes. Thirdly, since the fissile material has to be transported separately to combine with the main structure, this fissile material could also come under attack. These factors pose greater concerns, especially in the United States."

Professor Scott Sagan of Stanford University adds: "The plausible place to move these tactical nuclear weapons would be to roads where these would be less vulnerable to Indian attack due to

their flexibility. However, this also generates a fear that these could become vulnerable to terrorists' seizure in whole or in part. The same was true for India."

The countries have continued to expand their nuclear capacity long past the stated goal of a "credible deterrence" the vow of no first use. "No first use policy in India was a misnomer, and India would opt for the first strike if it deemed necessary," said Mueed Yousuf of the United States Institute for Peace.

Professor Paul Kapoor of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School added: "If India used nuclear weapons, it would use them in massive way to inflict an unacceptable harm to adverse countries."

A two-pronged policy

Zamir Akram, a former Pakistani ambassador and U.N. representative, said Pakistan's nuclear doctrine initially was based on India's much larger superiority in conventional weapons. However, in response to India's "Cold Start" doctrine, allowing it to attack Pakistan with conventional weapons to prevent nuclear retaliation, Pakistan changed its policy of minimum credible deterrence to full spectrum response with tactical weapons armed with low-grade nuclear material for use in the battlefield, Akram said.

Kapoor says that results in a two-pronged policy: use low-grade tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional war, and use nuclear weapons in case of an imminent nuclear attack by India.

"While Pakistan had a bigger stockpile of nukes as compared to India, the induction of very short-range tactical weapons into its conventional warfare mechanism was a worrying factor," Krepon said.

India developed its first strategic ballistic missile in 1996 with a range of 250 kilometers. During the last decade, it has added medium- and long-range missiles that can reach Pakistan and China.

Pakistan has missiles capable of carrying conventional and nuclear warheads up to 2,750 kilometers, enough to target all major Indian cities, and cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

<https://www.voanews.com/a/growing-nuclear-arsenals-increase-concerns-about-possible-pakistan-india-war/3917123.html>

[Return to top](#)

Business Standard (New Delhi, India)

China Wants Pakistan in NSG, Therefore Obstructing India's Entry: Defense Experts

Author Not Attributed

June 24, 2017

As China continues to obstruct India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the defence experts on Saturday were of the view that Beijing has set its condition that if New Delhi becomes a member of the body, so should Pakistan.

Defence expert Uday Bhaskar said he was not surprised by China's stance, saying, "The Chinese position on NSG should not come as a surprise to India because Beijing has made it very clear that they are not going to review their position."

"They have set out what they think of their principles, which really means that if India gets into NSG, so should Pakistan," he added,

Even defence expert Qamar Agha iterated the same, saying that China wants Pakistan to become a member of the NSG.

"China has been doing this for quite some time for two reasons. They do want India to play a greater role in the body (NSG) which controls nuclear trade. Secondly, they want Pakistan also to become a member of the NSG, for which the international community is not very prepared," Agha told ANI.

Commenting on India as a nuclear power, he said its record in nuclear non-proliferation is clear.

"India's nuclear weapon is controlled by the elected government whereas Pakistan's nuclear weapon is controlled by its military establishment. India has never been involved in any nuclear proliferation besides this. India has also declared that it will not use nuclear weapon against those countries which do not have nuclear weapons. So, by action, deeds, India has proved its credibility," he said.

However, Agha expressed confidence over India becoming a member of the NSG soon because other members of the Security Council are now looking for other means to let New Delhi become a member of it.

China, once again yesterday, said there is no change in its stance on India's admission into the NSG.

The comment on the same was made by Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang in the NSG plenary taking place in Bern, Switzerland.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be visiting U.S. on June 25-26 and his discussions with President Donald Trump are likely to find a common approach on matters related to South Asia, particularly the rise in infiltration from the neighbouring Pakistan, terrorism and India's case for a seat at the NSG.

http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/china-wants-pakistan-in-nsg-therefore-obstructing-india-s-entry-defence-experts-117062400105_1.html

[Return to top](#)

Swarajya Magazine (New Delhi, India)

India's Surgical Strikes: What They Can And Cannot Achieve

By Arka Biswas

June 27, 2017

Nine months after the surgical strikes inside Pakistan-held Kashmir by the Indian Army, what is the verdict on their efficacy to deter Pakistan from its sub-conventional warfare?

On his first day of the visit to the United States of America, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke of how India conducted surgical strikes on terror launch-pads in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and that the world did not question them, realising that while "India practices restraint," it "can show power when needed." This was another instance when the Indian government showcased surgical strikes conducted by the Indian Army in September 2016 as a military response to terrorism and Pakistan for using terrorists as proxies against India.

Do the surgical strikes of September 2016 meet the two primary objectives with which India seeks to militarily respond to Pakistan – deter Pakistan’s sub-conventional war, and assuage domestic public anger?

Based on the assessment of developments that followed the surgical strikes in India and Pakistan, this article concludes that while surgical strikes fail as a tool of sub-conventional deterrence, they meet the objective of pacifying Indian public anger. It also argues that in looking at their utility in response to all forms of terrorist activities, they must be seen not just as a standalone tool but a part of New Delhi’s larger approach to dealing with issues of national security, especially with regard to Pakistan.

India’s objectives behind the surgical strikes

Apart from the primary objective for having conducted the surgical strikes in September 2016 – eliminate and destroy terror launch-pads in PoK across the Line of Control (LoC), there are two objectives which can be derived, from not just the assessment of these surgical strikes, but the larger Indian quest for military response to Pakistan’s sub-conventional war. These are—to deter Pakistan’s sub-conventional war and to pacify Indian public anger.

The initial reaction of former Indian National Security Advisor, Shivshankar Menon, then as Foreign Secretary of India, following the Mumbai terror attack of 2008 captures this well. In a conversation with then Minister of External affairs, Pranab Mukherjee, Menon had stated that “we should retaliate, and be seen to retaliate, to deter further attacks, for reasons of international credibility and to assuage public sentiment.”

Although Menon, in his book *Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy*, goes on to explain how not retaliating militarily against Pakistan following the Mumbai terror attack was the right decision, he admits that “should another such attack be mounted from Pakistan, with or without visible support from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) or the Pakistan Army, it would be virtually impossible for any Government of India to make the same choice again.”

While another 2008 Mumbai-style terror attack has not happened, the pressure on the Indian government to militarily respond to other smaller terror attacks perpetrated by actors based out of Pakistan has increased over the years.

The challenge for New Delhi has been to develop a military response that does not cross Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, owing to the latter’s credible nuclear deterrence. It was the reason why the Indian army started planning a doctrine of waging a low-scale and swift conventional attack, known as the Cold Start doctrine, as early as 2004. While doubts have been raised on whether India has the wherewithal to implement such a doctrine and while the civilian government in New Delhi is yet to acknowledge the existence of it, Pakistan has attempted to block the possibility of India implementing it in future by lowering its nuclear threshold and introducing tactical nuclear weapons.

It is in this context that surgical strikes must be seen as the Indian military response to Pakistan that does not cross the latter’s nuclear threshold. But while not crossing Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, owing to their controlled nature, do surgical strikes meet India’s objectives of deterring Pakistan’s sub-conventional war and of assuaging Indian public anger?

In answering this question, the ground impact of the surgical strikes and various reactions from Pakistan must be assessed.

As far as the real impact on Pakistan is concerned, the surgical strikes did not have any to be labelled significant. As serving and retired Indian Army officials have mentioned in interviews with the author, the terror launch-pads targeted are essentially small huts and tents where terrorists are

stationed before they attempt to infiltrate into India and their destruction, thus, would inflict negligible infrastructural costs on the terrorist groups using them.

On the number of terrorists killed, while the Indian government and army did not disclose any figure officially, media reports claimed the death of 38, including two regular soldiers of the Pakistani army. This number too remains insignificant. It is also unlikely that Indian army commandos, conducting the surgical strikes, managed to either secure or destroy all arms and ammunitions present at those terror launch-pads. Considering claims of Indian intelligence reports that Pakistan invested more than Rs 100 crore in creating unrest in Kashmir in the year 2015-16 alone, real damage inflicted by Indian surgical strikes of September 2016 appears negligible.

Meanwhile, apart from few Pakistani security analysts remaining doubtful over India's claim of conducting surgical strikes, most, including from within and outside the Pakistani establishment dubbed the Indian claim as fabrication of the truth. This includes reactions from the Pakistan army's official mouth-piece, the Inter Services Public Relations, then Chief of the Pakistani Army, General Raheel Sharif, and Defence Minister of Pakistan, Khawaja Asif, among others. While calling Indian claims false, they also hinted that Pakistan would conduct surgical strikes if provoked. Along similar lines, the chief of the Jamat-ud-Dawah, Hafiz Saeed, accused by India of having masterminded the Mumbai terror attack, and announced at a public rally in early November 2016 that Mujahideen would carry out such surgical strikes which India would remember.

Thus, considering both the military and political impact of Indian surgical strikes against Pakistan, it cannot be argued that they had any impact which can be construed to capture their utility in deterring Pakistan's sub-conventional war.

Did Surgical Strikes Pacify Indian Public Anger?

The short answer is yes.

Going back to Menon's argument on the need for India to militarily respond, he too stresses that "we should...be seen to retaliate." That is precisely what the Narendra Modi government did in September 2016. While media reports note that Indian army has conducted similar strikes in the past as well, it was the first time following the strikes of September 2016 that the Indian government publicly claimed to have sanctioned them. This certainly helped New Delhi pacify Indian public anger which was at a high following the terror attack at the Indian army headquarter in Uri on 18 September, 2016.

Illustrating the success of surgical strikes in pacifying Indian public anger, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), ruling at the Centre, won assembly elections held soon thereafter in most states with huge margins, including the most populous Uttar Pradesh. The success of surgical strikes in avenging the Uri terror attack was used in the election campaign of the BJP and political pundits credited BJP's victory to surgical strikes, among other achievements of the Modi-led government in New Delhi.

Would surgical strike be an appropriate response to a Mumbai-style attack?

Perhaps not. It is important to note here that the targets of the surgical strikes of September 2016 were terror launch-pads. Unless Indian intelligence is able to credibly prove that terrorists gathered across the LoC belong to the same terrorist organisation which perpetuates a Mumbai-style terror attack in future, the Indian government would not be able to justify another set of surgical strikes as the appropriate response.

It is another matter that India conducts surgical strikes with deeper penetration into the Pakistani territories, de jure or de facto, and eliminates key figures from the perpetrating terror group. That would, however, require capabilities and intelligence which India may not have at this point in time.

Also considering that the real damage inflicted is so low, New Delhi may not be able to claim that through surgical strikes it managed to significantly hurt the larger terror framework that exists in Pakistan.

Surgical strike is not a standalone tool for New Delhi

While a surgical strike may not be the appropriate response to a Mumbai-style terror attack, it must not be seen as a standalone tool available to New Delhi. Looking at it in the larger context of India's evolving approach to national security, especially vis-à-vis Pakistan, surgical strikes can be seen as India's attempt to make its response to Pakistan's sub-conventional war unpredictable – unpredictability traditionally being Pakistan's forte in the dyad.

It also forms a part of the shift in India's approach from defensive to defensive-offence which was articulated by the current National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, at a public speech just before he assumed office in 2014. In the same speech, Doval had also issued a threat that if Pakistan conducts or is found involved in another Mumbai-style terror attack, then it will face consequences in Balochistan – a direct reference to India supporting the ongoing secessionist movement therein.

Indian government's open acknowledgement of having sanctioned surgical strikes in September 2016 mark the beginning of an era when India and Pakistan will both engage in asymmetrical war as deterrence freezes prospects of conflicts at nuclear and conventional levels. While the risk of escalation remains, the same risk would ensure that India and Pakistan continue to limit their military operations well short of a conventional war.

<https://swarajyamag.com/defence/indias-surgical-strikes-what-they-can-and-cannot-achieve>

[Return to top](#)

AFRICA

Daily Trust (Abuja, Nigeria)

The Need For Institute of Nuclear Materials Management in Nigeria

By Jonah Abu Zaria

June 24, 2017

INMM is a non-profit technical organization with worldwide membership of engineers, scientists, technicians, managers, policymakers, analysts, commercial vendors, educators, and students. The Institute promotes research and development as well as the practical application of new concepts, approaches, techniques and equipment for managing nuclear materials. As a fundamentally technically-focused organization, the INMM is an invaluable resource for expert assessments and consultation.

INMM is dedicated to the professional quality, ethics, and advancement of its membership. The INMM was formed in 1958 in the USA, and has since grown to a membership of over 1000. It hosts an annual meeting in July which draws a wide attendance for key plenary talks, many sessions of contributed technical presentations, commercial exhibitors, and numerous opportunities for related side meetings. INMM has members in more than 30 countries. The Institute supports 41 professional and student chapters in 14 countries.

The Nigeria chapter was created in 2012 at the 53rd INMM Annual meeting in Orlando, USA by the International Executive Committee through a petition by 7 members. It is worthy to note that the Nigeria chapter is the second regional chapter in Africa after Morocco, which was created in 2011. Following the creation of the professional chapter in Nigeria, a student chapter has also been established at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Strengthening the Nigeria chapter will promote research and academic work in the field of nuclear science and technology in Nigeria and ultimately the critical mass needed in terms of manpower for nuclear power. It will also provide the opportunity to attend international conferences and exchange of knowledge. Membership of the INMM comprises of corporate, individual and students. Nuclear materials management involves the production, use, storage, transport, handling, protection, accounting and other essential aspects involved with the essential elements of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, most notably, uranium and plutonium.

Water, Food, Energy and Health are corner-stones of modern daily life. They can be protected, provided and preserved through the use of nuclear technology. Access to safe water sources is essential to supporting growing populations, accelerating economic development and meeting the demands of changing lifestyles. Nuclear technology can be deployed to benefit life through food preservation by irradiation, efficient agricultural produce via mutation and soil fertility mapping of arable land.

As the peaceful application of nuclear technology increases around the world, managing nuclear materials in a professional manner is vital for sustainability. This is in tandem with the vision of President Muhammadu Buhari with respect to the application of nuclear technology in the country. While welcoming the Iranian Vice President to the State House, the President said, "Nigeria under my leadership will continue to support the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and development only."

Nuclear security is a concept beyond guns, gates and guards, which entails the prevention, detection and response to malicious acts involving nuclear and radiological materials.

<https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/editorial/the-need-for-institute-of-nuclear-materials-management-in-nigeria/202984.html>

[Return to top](#)

COMMENTARY

The Japan Times (Tokyo, Japan)

How a Regional Nuclear-Free-Weapon Zone Can Benefit Japan

By Ramesh Thakur

June 27, 2017

Between June 21-25, in two back-to-back conferences, there was intense discussion of Mongolia's national nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ), the best means of containing and reversing North Korea's growing nuclear and missile programs and capabilities, and the possibility of doing so by establishing a regional Northeast Asian NWFZ. Some of the Japanese participants asked: what would Japan gain from such a zone? Before answering that, the key attributes of a NWFZ must first be described.

NWFZs are legal mechanisms for buttressing nuclear nonproliferation, and political stepping stones toward nuclear disarmament. The concept predates and supplements the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The first NWFZ in a populated region was set up in Latin America by the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 and came into force in 1969. This was followed by the Treaty of Rarotonga in the South Pacific (1985/1986), the Treaty of Bangkok in Southeast Asia (1995/1997), and the Treaty of Pelindaba in Africa (1996/2009).

Thus the southern hemisphere is covered by a patchwork of NWFZs. In the northern hemisphere, the Central Asian NWFZ was adopted by the Treaty of Semipalatinsk in 2006 and went into force in 2009. The total number of states parties of the five NWFZs spread across four continents is almost 100 — more than half the world's total.

All NWFZs share the elements of prohibiting forever the acquisition, deployment, use, testing and hosting of nuclear weapons on territorial land, sea and airspace; requiring no-use assurances from the nuclear powers; setting up verification systems; and obtaining the endorsement of the international community through a U.N. General Assembly resolution. Thus while the NPT permits the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of states parties as long as they do not exercise jurisdiction and control over them, a NWFZ prohibits such stationing. It goes beyond the NPT also in requiring commitments from the nuclear weapons states not to use nuclear weapons against zone members — unlike unilateral declarations of non-use, treaty commitments are legally binding on the NWS; and in setting up regional verification machinery to complement the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to check cheating.

All NWFZs established to date have been instruments to reinforce the nonproliferation obligations of their members. A Northeast Asia NWFZ would be pointless without the inclusion of a denuclearized North Korea. The resulting difficulties of successfully negotiating a zone as a disarmament measure are beyond the scope of this article. It is time to instead return to a consideration of the benefits it would bring to Japan and thus the reason why the government should actively promote it.

The first, most obvious and most important is indeed that it would denuclearize North Korea. Given the multiple security risks posed by a nuclear-armed North Korea, this is a substantial plus. Moreover, the North's denuclearized status would be embedded in an additional legal instrument, subject to regional and global verification and inspections, and reinforced by additional legally binding obligations on all outside powers not to provide any assistance to Pyongyang's nuclear weapon programs.

Second, Japan would gain legally binding negative security assurances from all five nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, Britain and the United States) against nuclear attack by any of them. Given the reality of territorial disputes with China and Russia, this is not inconsequential. Moreover, these could be obtained without Japan having to renounce U.S. nuclear weapons as the guarantee of its own national security, as long as they were not used first in an attack on another nuclear power. This is important because while legal guarantees add to the barriers against nuclear attack, they do not guarantee such non-attack: They remain paper guarantees.

Third, Japan also has territorial and other political disputes with South Korea and in recent times influential voices have been raised in Seoul calling for re-introduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and perhaps even the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Seoul directly. A Northeast Asia NWFZ would pose a substantial additional legal, normative and political barrier to Seoul crossing the nuclear threshold and thereby contribute to further stabilization of the regional security situation.

Fourth and as a complement, the zone would equally reinforce Japan's non-nuclear status. For Japan, too, has heard calls for consideration of an independent deterrent on the grounds that, particularly with the Trump administration's focus on "America First" security and trade policies, the U.S. nuclear umbrella could develop a leak when bombs start raining on Japan. And the discussion of the independent deterrent option in Japan has in turn further heightened regional tensions and deepened regional trust deficits.

A nuclear war in Northeast Asia could directly involve four nuclear weapon states (North Korea, China, Russia, and the U.S.) as well as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as U.S. allies. Bringing together all the above considerations, a Northeast Asia NWFZ could prove valuable in de-escalating regional tensions and reversing the growing trust deficit: between countries in the region, between regional countries and external powers, and finally between the external powers directly. For example a regional NWFZ with North Korea denuclearized, built-in credible inspection and verification machinery, and protocol-based guarantees of non-use from nuclear powers, would remove the need for the deployment of missile defense systems that have been extremely provocative when seen through China's eyes.

In other words, a regional NWFZ is a treaty-based instrument to quarantine a zone from the real risks of nuclear war. It does so by delinking regional tensions, disputes and conflicts from the geopolitical equations between the nuclear powers, aiming to prevent any cross-contamination of regional and global quarrels. It does not guarantee national security and therefore does not preclude the need for independent national security policies and measures. But it does add a further firewall between regional quarrels and nuclear war. In any region of high risk, that is not a minor achievement.

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/06/27/commentary/japan-commentary/regional-nuclear-free-weapon-zone-can-benefit-japan/#.WVSD5mRKVTZ>

[Return to top](#)

The National Interest (Washington, DC)

Cancel the Long-Range Standoff Missile

By Steven Pifer

June 26, 2017

Over the coming fifteen years, the Pentagon plans to spend many billions of dollars modernizing the strategic nuclear triad—when the defense budget faces competing demands. On June 14, Secretary of Defense James Mattis indicated to a Senate Appropriations subcommittee that he had not yet made up his mind about the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon, a new nuclear-armed, air-launched cruise missile. He should think carefully, as a convincing case for the LRSO has not been made.

To be sure, the United States needs to modernize its triad. Building Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarines to replace aging Ohio submarines, a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to replace the Minuteman III, and the B-21 strategic bomber make sense—though one can question the planned numbers. The 1,550 deployed strategic warheads that the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) allows to the United States could be carried on fewer strategic delivery vehicles, of which the United States has significantly more than Russia.

The arguments for the LRSO, however, are not compelling. The Air Force developed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in the 1970s due to concern that the B-52 presented a large target on Soviet radar screens and could not penetrate increasingly sophisticated Soviet air defenses. B-52s armed with nuclear-armed ALCMs had no need to penetrate; they could launch their cruise missiles from well outside of Soviet airspace (in those days, the Air Force did not have conventional standoff weapons).

Things have changed. The B-2 was the first U.S. stealth bomber. The B-21 will have both stealth and advanced electronic-warfare capabilities to deal with adversary radars. It is intended to operate in contested skies. Moreover, in order to arm the B-21 and other aircraft, the Department of Energy is producing a new variant of the B61 gravity bomb that will be highly accurate and have a variable yield of 0.3 to 50 kilotons. The Air Force does not need the LRSO to have a variable-yield weapon.

If the B-21 can penetrate sophisticated air defenses and deliver an accurate weapon with a low yield, the LRSO seems redundant. Moreover, the B-21 will get a standoff capability with conventional cruise missiles. Canceling the LRSO and its nuclear warhead could produce significant savings, in the range of \$15–30 billion. (LRSO advocates would assert that the cost of the program over a thirty-year lifetime is a small fraction of total defense spending. True, but one can say that about every major Defense Department weapons purchase. Those “small fractions” add up to bust the budget.)

Some argue that the LRSO is necessary to equip the B-52 as the current ALCMs are retired around 2030. By that time, however, there should be a number of B-21 bombers to take on the nuclear mission. The remaining B-52s (which at that point will be almost seventy years old) could shift to conventional missions, as have other B-52s.

Exactly which target, or set of targets, could the LRSO hold at risk that other weapon systems—submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), ICBMs, or B-2 and B-21 bombers armed with B61 bombs—could not?

Others note that the LRSO will be faster than a B-21 with a gravity bomb, which would have to overfly or get close to the target. For most long-range missions, however, the time savings would be marginal. The B-21 would still have to haul the LRSO most of the way. If a mission were time sensitive, the military would have to use an ICBM or SLBM.

It seems that the strongest argument LRSO supporters can muster is that the B-21 might not be able to operate in a contested air-defense environment. If that is truly a problem, it would be more logical to go forward with the LRSO and cancel the B-21, replacing it with a less expensive nonstealth bomber to launch LRSOs offshore. And yet, the Air Force maintains its faith in the stealth and electronic-warfare attributes of the B-21.

At a minimum, it would make sense to delay procurement of the LRSO until such time—if ever—as the B-21’s survivability appears to be coming into question, and the Pentagon concludes that the targets cannot be held at risk with other nuclear weapons. Delaying procurement would reduce the large “bow-wave” of spending requirements for strategic force modernization in the mid-2020s.

A related issue is the number of LRSOs the Air Force wishes to procure: 1,000–1,100. That looks like a significant increase in the number of air-launched cruise missiles available for bomber missions. While the Air Force does not say how many ALCMs or nuclear gravity bombs it deploys for its bombers, there are strong clues.

The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) limited the United States and Russia each to no more than 1,700–2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. While the treaty did not define an operationally deployed strategic nuclear warhead (one of its many shortcomings), the U.S. government had its definition: ballistic-missile warheads on SLBMs and ICBMs plus the number

of bomber weapons—ALCMs and gravity bombs—kept in storage areas at nuclear-capable-bomber bases.

Each year through 2010, the State Department sent a report to the Senate on SORT's implementation. The 2010 report stated that, as of December 31, 2009, the number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads was 1,968.

Shift forward thirteen months. According to a State Department fact sheet, as of February 5, 2011—the date when New START entered into force—the United States had 1,800 deployed strategic warheads. Of course, New START uses different counting rules from SORT. New START counts the actual number of warheads on SLBMs and ICBMs, but counts only one warhead for each deployed strategic bomber, regardless of how many weapons might be stored at bomber bases.

As of February 5, 2011, the United States counted 196 deployed strategic bombers. (That number quickly fell to 125 as of September 1, 2011. Once the B-1 was exhibited to the Russians in accordance with New START procedures, the B-1s were treated as conventional-only bombers and no longer subject to the treaty's limits or counting rules.) The 196 deployed strategic bombers would translate to 196 deployed strategic warheads under New START counting rules. Deducting that from 1,800 yields the actual number of deployed strategic warheads on U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs that the United States had on February 5, 2011: 1,604.

Unless there was a significant change in the number of deployed warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs between December 31, 2009 and February 5, 2011—nothing suggests there was—deducting 1,604 from the SORT total of 1,968 operationally deployed strategic warheads should yield a fairly accurate picture of the number of ALCMs and gravity bombs at bases for U.S. nuclear bombers. Admittedly, this is a bit of an apples and oranges comparison, but 364 seems very much in the ballpark.

Assume that one-fourth of those weapons were gravity bombs for the B-2s, which are not equipped to carry ALCMs (though the plan is to make them capable of carrying the LRSO). That would mean about ninety bombs, enough to arm each B-2 in the force with four or five weapons (B-2s can carry up to sixteen nuclear bombs). That would leave about 275 ALCMs.

If the Air Force has 275 ALCMs for its deployed B-52s, why does it seek to procure 1,000–1,100 LRSOs? Some LRSOs will be needed for development and reliability tests. Say forty for development tests and six per year for reliability tests for thirty years. That would translate to a testing requirement of 220 missiles. Add in fifty for spares. That brings the total to 545—half of what the Air Force has requested. Hans Kristensen at the Federation of American Scientists has estimated a total of five hundred ALCMs at nuclear bomber bases and in storage elsewhere. Even if one takes that number and adds in test and spare missiles, the total would still fall well short of 1,000–1,100.

The LRSO raises many questions. The Pentagon should take a long, hard look. Much-needed resources should be preserved to meet other pressing defense requirements.

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/cancel-the-long-range-standoff-missile-21322>

[Return to top](#)

The Guardian (London, UK)

Iran Nuclear Deal Must Be Allowed to Thrive

By T Douglas Reilly & David Gleeson

June 26, 2017

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal) is excellent; it is far better and more extensive than I ever expected (Don't upset the balance of power in the Middle East, 23 June). If followed by all parties, it blocks all avenues for Iran to develop nuclear explosives. To be sure, it is vehemently opposed by Israel's prime minister Netanyahu and Republicans in Congress.

I am a physicist who worked in nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation for 38 years at the Los Alamos national laboratory; the majority of my efforts were for and with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that has the responsibility of inspecting the nuclear facilities of states signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). Among other things, I developed programmes that have been part of the initial IAEA inspectors' training since 1980. I've trained many of the inspectors who inspect Iran today, and have inspected Iran's facilities since it signed and ratified the NPT shortly after it came into force in 1970.

There are only three nations that have not signed the NPT: India, Israel, and Pakistan. All three have large nuclear arsenals and effective delivery capabilities. Israel has over 400 nuclear weapons of all types and the ability to deliver them anywhere in the world, including the US. Israel also has a policy known as the Samson Option that implies it will destroy the world if ever it feels in danger of falling.

Dr T Douglas Reilly

Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA

Ali Akbar Salehi's piece was a calm, reasoned argument for the JCPOA to be allowed to thrive, despite the expected noises from Trump and his ilk. Why is Iran so often seen as the enemy? The country is stable and calm and – much to the annoyance of its detractors – has regular elections that the Iranian people deem worthwhile participating in. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand...

David Gleeson

London

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/26/iran-nuclear-deal-must-be-allowed-to-thrive>

[Return to top](#)

The Express Tribune (Karachi, Pakistan)

Pakistan Is a Responsible Nuclear State and the World Needs to Stop Maligning Its Efforts With Baseless Propaganda

By Ali Raza

June 27, 2017

History testifies to the fact that Pakistan was a great supporter of the Atoms for Peace initiative and had no designs to acquire nuclear weapons. Pakistan strictly adhered to a no-nuclear weapon policy for years. But India's nefarious designs, which were constantly threatening the existence of Pakistan, compelled Pakistan to take serious steps towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

It is also a known secret that Pakistan's nuclear program has constantly been ardently supported by Pakistanis. They reject any external opposition or criticism regarding the nuclear program. They are fully aware of the fact that in the presence of a stringent enemy in the neighbourhood, it is Pakistan's nuclear program that guarantees their existence and freedom. Pakistanis have always rejected criticism of their nuclear program, since they know about the strategic environment of South Asia and are familiar with the notion that such criticism is only intended to put Pakistan at a disadvantageous position in the current strategic realm.

An article published in The New York Times titled 'The World Must Secure Pakistan's Nuclear Weapon' illustrated how once again, a malicious and baseless propaganda has been initiated against Pakistan. The writer of the said article, on the basis of ridiculous and frivolous grounds, has questioned the security of Pakistan's nuclear program.

Furthermore, he has referred to a letter allegedly written by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Strategic Plans Division, immediately after the deadly terrorist attack in an army school in Peshawar, whereby the former has asked the latter to devote more resources to ensure the monitoring of those persons who hold knowledge and information of the nuclear program.

The writer on the basis of the aforementioned reasons and other unreasonable frivolous grounds concludes that the US and the United Nation's Security Council (UNSC) must step in for securing Pakistan's nuclear arsenals. In response to this maligning, baseless and frivolous accusation, it can be said that firstly, the veracity and existence of this letter has not yet been verified. Secondly, even if we suppose that this letter has been written, it only denotes the vigilance and seriousness of the respective institutions towards nuclear security.

A similar step was taken by Germany in the wake of the terrorist strikes in Brussels in 2016, whereby access privileges to nuclear facilities from various employees were withdrawn when they came to know that terrorists had spied on nuclear power plants. Rather than raising eyebrows, the initiation of these serious steps should be applauded. The author states,

"Despite all of this, the Pakistani authorities continue to insist in public that their nuclear assets are safe."

However, it has been affirmed in the past by Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that Pakistan's nuclear arsenals are well secured. Thus, he is basing his facts on thin air.

Another malicious argument concocted by the author of the said article is based on the policy paper called the National Internal Security Policy 2014-2018 issued by the Ministry of Interior, which outlined the security priorities of Pakistan. The said paper identifies and points out terrorist groups operational in various areas of Pakistan. Again, an honest and positive effort of Pakistan to

eradicate the curse of terrorism is taken negatively, and on the same basis, the author is calling the world at large to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

The author has failed to take into account that Pakistan has developed and put in place credible long-term and short-term policies regarding its nuclear program. The credibility of Pakistan's nuclear security is evident from the fact that to date, not even a single incident of theft or misuse of nuclear material has been reported. This fact manifests the efficiency and effectiveness of the policies of institutions responsible for Pakistan's nuclear program. These institutions are successfully countering the security challenges to our nuclear program.

Pakistan has also adopted and put in place the measures as required by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. These measures pertain to the prevention of theft and sabotage of nuclear material during transportation. Furthermore, Pakistan not only participates, but also complies with international endeavours to prevent nuclear terrorism. Our contribution and commitment towards nuclear safety and security cannot be overlooked as Pakistan not only encourages but is also a part of the leading global efforts aimed at countering and combating nuclear terrorism.

For example, Pakistan is part of the Nuclear Security Summit, and actively participated in two of its summits, which were held in 2010 and 2012 respectively. In addition, Pakistan has also joined the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and is also fulfilling international obligations as required by UNSCR 1540.

If viewed from the backdrop of recent skirmishes between Pakistan and Afghanistan, one can easily deduce that the issues raised by the author in the said article appear to be agenda driven.

Moreover, the author should take into account Afghanistan's security situation rather than worrying about our current security situation. With the recent attacks which left Afghanistan reeling, the Afghan government must reconsider revamping their security structure, rather than blaming Pakistan for every terrorism-related incident.

The issues are an off-shoot of the anti-Pakistan campaign that has been launched by India, especially in Balochistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan. The author miserably failed to build a cogent case against Pakistan's nuclear program and it seems that he is working on the agenda of India, which has been constantly trying to weaken the position of Pakistan since its creation.

The author claims,

"Pakistan must be forced to stop playing a double game, supporting extremist groups while publicly proclaiming that it is fighting terrorism."

He has forgotten that Pakistan is a responsible country, which was and is still fighting on the forefront of the war against terrorism. Pakistan has launched major operations such as Zarb-e-Azab and Radd-ul-Fasaad against terrorism, and has caused irreparable damage to the terrorists. Instead of encouraging Pakistan, and urging other states to join hands with Pakistan, the author is deliberately trying to initiate a malicious propaganda against Pakistan.

The international community not only acknowledges, but is also mindful of the fact that Pakistan is complying with the international obligations with respect to the security of its nuclear arsenals, and recognises Pakistan as a responsible state. The international community must take notice of such activities that put hurdles in the way of a responsible state, which is fighting day and night to ensure peace and stability in the Pakistan and the world.

<http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/51039/pakistan-is-a-responsible-nuclear-state-and-the-world-needs-to-stop-maligining-its-efforts-with-baseless-propaganda/>

[Return to top](#)

ABOUT THE USAF CUWS

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation.

The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence.

In February 2014, the Center's name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term "unconventional weapons," currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards.

The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation - counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.