Report No. DODIG-2015-100

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INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

March 27, 2015





(U) Information Operations in a Contingency Environment: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued From October 6, 2006, Through November 7, 2013

~~Classified By: Michael J. Roark, Assistant Inspector General for Contract Management and Payments~~
~~Derived From: Multiple Sources~~
~~Declassify On: 20380123~~

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(U) Results in Brief

(U) Information Operations in a Contingency Environment: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued From October 6, 2006, Through November 7, 2013

March 27, 2015

(U) What We Did

(U) We summarized DoD information operations (IO) challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa identified in audit reports issued by the DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG).

(U) What We Found

(U) Since 2006, DoD OIG issued six reports on IO projects in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa. The reports identified areas of compliance with rules and regulations to conduct IO, use contractors to perform IO, and award contracts for IO. However, DoD OIG also identified weaknesses in synchronizing, planning, executing, and assessing IO. Specifically, these reports identified:

- (U) communication activities that were not optimal at the operational level in Afghanistan.
- (U) a set of contracts with a statement of work that did not properly differentiate the intended audiences for military information support operations (MISO) and public affairs in Iraq.
- (U) weaknesses in planning and executing civil-military operations (CMO) and properly integrating MISO in CMO in Africa.
- (U) a lack of a fully integrated IO capability in Afghanistan.
- (U) inadequate contract oversight in Iraq.
- (U) the need for strengthened controls over IO assessments in Afghanistan.

(U) The recurring weaknesses indicate that there is an opportunity to apply lessons-learned for IO to future operations and can serve as a reference for personnel overseeing and conducting IO.

(U) What Was Recommended

(U) Two of the DoD OIG reports contained no recommendations and 4 reports contained 13 recommendations. Overall, the recommendations addressed contract administration, contract surveillance, planning future MISO requirements, staffing IO positions, and properly identifying roles and responsibilities. All 13 recommendations were closed. We will not make additional recommendations because recommendations were contained in the previous DoD OIG reports.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

March 27, 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: (U) Information Operations in a Contingency Environment: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued From October 6, 2006, Through November 7, 2013 (Report No. DODIG-2015-100)

(U) We are providing this report for information and use. This report relates to the overseas contingency operation, Operation Inherent Resolve, and was completed in accordance with the DoD Office of Inspector General's oversight responsibilities, as described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. This report compiles weaknesses identified in six DoD Office of Inspector General reports on information operations—especially, military information support operations—in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Commanders of U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command; and the Director of Joint Staff should read this report to be aware of challenges and opportunities for improvement.

(U) This report contains no recommendations for action. We did not issue a draft report, and no written response is required. We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 604-9187 (DSN 664-9187).

Michael J. Roark

Michael J. Roark
Assistant Inspector General
Contract Management and Payments

(U) Contents

(U) Introduction 1

(U) Objective 1

(U) Background 1

(U) Information Operations 1

(U) Definitions of Information-Related Capabilities 2

(U) Information Operations Responsibilities 3

(U) Results 5

(U) DoD OIG Reports Identified Weaknesses in Planning, Executing, and Assessing IO 5

(U) IO Weaknesses Identified by DoD OIG 6

(U) Better Synchronization of Communication Needed 7

(U) Statement of Work for Set of Contracts Did Not Differentiate Intended Audience for MISO and PA 7

(U) Weaknesses in Planning and Executing CMO and Properly Integrating MISO in CMO 8

(U) Lack of Fully Integrated IO Capability 8

(U) DoD Complied With Laws and Regulations When Officials Awarded Contracts and Used Contractors to Execute MISO But Better Oversight is Needed 9

~~(S//NF)~~ CENTCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [redacted] 10

~~(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ MISO in Iraq Were Effective 10

~~(S//NF)~~ Improved Descriptions Needed to Identify Roles and Responsibilities for MISO Assessment 11

(U) IO Vital to DoD Operations 11

(U) Status of Recommendations 12

(U) Appendix 13

(U) Scope and Methodology 13

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data 14

(U) Prior Coverage 14

(U) List of Classified Documents 15

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations 16

(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) We summarized DoD information operations (IO) challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa identified in audit reports issued by the DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG). Since October 6, 2006, DoD OIG issued six reports related to IO projects in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa.

(U) Background

(U) This report relates to the overseas contingency operation, Operation Inherent Resolve, and was completed in accordance with the DoD OIG's oversight responsibilities, as described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The weaknesses identified in the six DoD OIG reports indicate that there is an opportunity to apply lessons-learned for IO to future operations and can serve as a reference for personnel overseeing and conducting IO.

(U) Information Operations

(U) IO is a key component of all military operations. According to the IO joint publication,[1] IO is the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities (IRCs) working with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp (seize) the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. IRCs are the tools, techniques, or activities that joint forces use to affect the ability of a target audience[2] to collect, process, or disseminate information before and after they make decisions.

(U) DoD and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directives delegate authorities to use IRCs to DoD components. Based on these directives, the combatant commanders have the authority to conduct joint IO, and they may delegate authority to a subordinate joint force commander (JFC). Generally, IO staff synchronize IRCs, plan an action, execute an action, and assess the effectiveness of that action. Each action is defined by the IO joint publication.

(U) [1] Joint Publication 3-13, "Information Operations," November 27, 2012, incorporating change 1, November 20, 2014.

(U) [2] The individual or group selected for influence.

- (U) **Synchronizing**—The IO staff coordinate and synchronize IRCs to accomplish the JFC's objectives. The integration and synchronization of the IRCs require participation from not just information operations planners, but also organizations across multiple lines of operation and lines of effort. Uncoordinated IO efforts can compromise, complicate, negate, and pose risks to the successful accomplishment of objectives. Therefore, objectives require early detailed planning by IO staff to synchronize and integrate IRCs.

- (U) **Planning**—Begins at the earliest stage of the operational planning process. IO planners seek to create an operational advantage that results in coordinated effects that directly support the JFC's objectives. Part of the planning process includes developing measures to determine the effectiveness of IO actions, also known as "assessment."

- (U) **Executing**—Occurs during the operations phase with a mission or action using IRCs. An execution authority is the authority to use IRCs. Normally, the JFC is designated in the execute order as the execution authority.

- (U) **Assessing**—IO staff analyze and inform on the performance and effectiveness of activities to provide relevant feedback to decision makers so they can modify activities to achieve the desired results. Assessment can also provide relevant information about the return on investment and operational effectiveness of IRCs.

(U) Definitions of Information-Related Capabilities

(U) There are many military capabilities that contribute to IO and should be considered during the planning process. Specifically, this report focuses on two IRCs—military information support operations (MISO)[3] and public affairs (PA).

(U) Military Information Support Operations

(U) According to the MISO joint publication,[4] MISO are planned operations that:

- (U) convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives.

(U) [3] Formerly known as psychological operations or PSYOP.

(U) [4] Joint Publication 3-13.2, "Military Information Support Operations," November 21, 2014.

- (U) degrade the enemy's combat power, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral damage, and increase the population's support for operations.
- (U) provide joint force commanders with ways and means to influence political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure aspects of the operational environment that may be as critical to operational success as the traditional orientation focused solely on enemy and adversary military capabilities.

(U) Public Affairs

(U) According to the PA joint publication,[5] PA:

- (U) is public information, command information, and community engagement activities directed toward both domestic and international audiences with interest in DoD;
- (U) distributes timely, truthful, and accurate information regarding U.S. intentions and actions;
- (U) places operational actions into context;
- (U) facilitates the development of informed perceptions about military operations;
- (U) helps undermine adversarial propaganda efforts; and
- (U) contributes to the achievement of national, strategic, and operational objectives through responsive release of accurate information.

(U) It is critical that PA and IO, especially MISO, synchronize their communications efforts with respect to the adversary due to the fluidity of the information environment.

(U) Information Operations Responsibilities

(U) DoD and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directives delegate authorities to DoD components. Based on DoD Directive 3600.01, "Information Operations," and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3210.01, "Joint Information Operations Policy," the authority to conduct joint IO is vested in the combatant commanders, who may delegate authority to a subordinate JFC. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy oversees and manages DoD-level IO programs and activities. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DoD intelligence policy, programs, and guidance for intelligence activities supporting IO.

(U) [5] Joint Publication 3-61, "Public Affairs," August 25, 2010.

(U) The Joint Staff is the joint IO proponent. The Deputy Director for Global Operations[6] serves as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's focal point for IO and coordinates with the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and other organizations that have direct or supporting IO responsibilities. The Unified Command Plan provides guidance to combatant commanders, assigning missions and force structure, as well as geographic or functional areas of responsibility.

(U) [6] Also known as J-39 DDGO.

(U) Results

(U) DoD OIG Reports Identified Weaknesses in Planning, Executing, and Assessing IO

(U) Since 2006, DoD OIG issued six reports on IO projects in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa that identified areas of compliance with rules and regulations to conduct IO, use contractors to perform IO, and award contracts for IO. However, DoD OIG also identified weaknesses in synchronizing, planning, executing, and assessing IO. Specifically, these reports identified:

- (U) well-synchronized communication activities at the strategic level, but not optimally synchronized communication at the operational level, which resulted in a lack of fully coordinated efforts between all levels of command in Afghanistan.
- (U) a set of contracts with a statement of work that did not properly differentiate the intended audiences for MISO and PA, which resulted in contracts that may not have met user needs in Iraq.
- (U) weaknesses in planning and executing civil-military operations (CMO) and properly integrating MISO in CMO in Africa, which resulted in:
    - (U) underutilized MISO soldiers,
    - (U) missed opportunities to maximize the benefits of MISO to support CMO, and
    - (U) potentially blurring the traditional lines of separation between public affairs, MISO, and their respective audiences.
- (U) the lack of a fully integrated IO capability, which limited DoD's ability to effectively conduct IO in Afghanistan.
- (U) compliance with applicable laws and regulations in the award of contracts and the use of contractors to execute MISO in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, improvement was needed in contract oversight, which resulted in a lack of personnel to ensure the contractor performed adequately in Iraq.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ CENTCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(d) [redacted]

(U) Of the 6 reports, 2 reports did not contain recommendations and 4 reports contained 13 recommendations. Overall, the recommendations addressed contract administration, contract surveillance, planning future MISO requirements, staffing IO positions, and properly identifying roles and responsibilities. All 13 recommendations were closed.

(U) IO Weaknesses Identified by DoD OIG

(U) Since 2006, DoD OIG issued six reports on IO projects in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa that identified areas of compliance with rules and regulations to conduct IO, use contractors to perform IO, and award contracts for IO. However, DoD OIG also identified weaknesses in synchronizing, planning, executing, and assessing IO. See the Table below for a summary of the IO areas identified in each DoD OIG report.

(U) Table. IO Areas Identified in DoD OIG Reports

(U) IO Areas	(U) DoD OIG Reports					
	(U) D-2007-001	(U) D-2009-091	(U) D-2010-033	(U) D-2011-051	(U) DODIG-2013-110	(U) DODIG-2014-008
(U) Synchronizing		▨ X		▨ X		
(U) Planning					▨ X	
(U) Executing	X		X	X	▨ X	
(U) Assessing			X			▨ X

(U) NOTE 1: See Appendix A for a complete list of the reports we summarized.
(U) NOTE 2: Shaded fields represent weaknesses.

(U) Better Synchronization of Communication Needed

(U) DoD OIG Report No. D-2011-051[7] stated that communication activities at International Security Assistance Force Headquarters (strategic level)—including PA, IO, and traditional communication—were generally well-synchronized. However, communication activities were not optimally synchronized at the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC) (operational level).

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ OSD/JS: (b)(1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e) [redacted] This occurred because there were vacancies in key IO positions, cross-functional teams made coordination difficult, and the Combined Joint Psychological Operations[8] Task Force was not fully integrated into IJC. As a result, coordinated effort between all levels of command was not fully realized. Synchronized communication efforts were critical to strengthen support for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and inform and explain coalition objectives to the people of Afghanistan.

(U) Statement of Work for Set of Contracts Did Not Differentiate Intended Audience for MISO and PA

(U) DoD OIG Report No. D-2009-091[9] stated that Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan officials awarded a set of contracts that did not clearly differentiate between MISO and PA. Specifically, the contracts' statement of work included both MISO and PA requirements but did not differentiate between the intended audiences for MISO and PA.

(U) The PA joint publication states that PA can be disseminated to both U.S. and foreign audiences; however, MISO can only be disseminated to a foreign audience. The contracts did not differentiate the audiences for MISO and PA because the original scope of work was for MISO, but contracting officials incorporated PA services into the solicitation.

(U) [7] DoD OIG Report No. D-2011-051, "DoD Needs Synchronized Communication Activities and an Integrated Information Operations Capability in Afghanistan," March 21, 2011.

(U) [8] Psychological operations are now called military information support operations.

(U) [9] DoD OIG Report No. D-2009-091, "Information Operations Contracts in Iraq," July 31, 2009.

(U) During the audit, we did not obtain evidence that MISO were intended for a U.S. audience. However, the contract requirements were not clear, which resulted in a set of contracts that were not optimal and may not have met initial MISO requirements or user needs.

(U) Weaknesses in Planning and Executing CMO and Properly Integrating MISO in CMO

(U) DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2013-110[10] reported weaknesses in planning and executing MISO in support of CMO. Specifically, the report stated that Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) officials did not adequately integrate MISO when they planned and executed CMO, as required by the CMO joint publication.[11] Instead, they referred to strategic communication[12] as a form of MISO. Officials did not clearly define the mission and responsibilities of MISO soldiers embedded in civil affairs teams to support CMO.

(U) This occurred because command publications, such as the U.S. Africa Command Theater Campaign Plan and East Africa Campaign Plan,[13] contained only broad guidance, and CJTF-HOA officials did not develop and disseminate formal guidance to further direct the activities of MISO soldiers embedded in civil affairs teams. As a result, CJTF-HOA officials did not fully use MISO soldiers and missed opportunities to maximize the benefits of MISO to support CMO. In addition, without effective integration, MISO soldiers could be perceived as conducting activities other than MISO, which may unintentionally blur traditional lines of separation between public affairs, MISO, and their respective audiences. Without adequate guidance, CJTF-HOA could not ensure that the MISO capability was adequately integrated into CMO.

(U) Lack of Fully Integrated IO Capability

~~(S//REL TO USA, ACGU)~~ DoD OIG Report No. D-2011-051 identified personnel challenges. Specifically, the report stated that several DoD organizations provided IO support to fill capability gaps in Afghanistan; however, they faced challenges in obtaining personnel for both non-MISO and MISO positions. For example, in

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(U) [10] DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2013-110, "Guidance Needed to Adequately Integrate Military Information Support Operations in Civil-Military Operations in the Horn of Africa," July 26, 2013.

(U) [11] Joint Publication 3-57, "Civil-Military Operations," September 11, 2013.

(U) [12] On November 28, 2012, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, issued a memorandum stating that the term "strategic communication" causes confusion and the more accurate terminology is "communication synchronization." The memorandum further states that most things previously termed "strategic communications" are PA responsibilities.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ACGU)~~ [13] Campaign plans are intended to contain strategic-level guidance that creates the need for additional guidance to detail how to integrate MISO into CMO.

(~~S//REL TO USA, ACGU~~) September 2009, U.S. Central Command officials submitted a request for forces to support International Security Assistance Force Headquarters and IJC in public affairs, strategic communications, and for an IO unit. However, of the CENTCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [redacted]

(~~S~~) OSD/JS: (b)(1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e) [redacted]

(U) DoD Complied With Laws and Regulations When Officials Awarded Contracts and Used Contractors to Execute MISO But Better Oversight is Needed

(U) DoD OIG Report Nos. D-2007-001,[14] D-2009-091, and D-2010-033[15] reported that multiple organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan complied with applicable laws, regulations, and guidance when officials awarded contracts and used contractors to conduct MISO. However, DoD OIG Report No. D-2010-033 reported that contract oversight controls could be improved through more efficient identification of contracting officer's representatives.

(U) DoD OIG Report No. D-2010-033 stated that the lack of contract oversight controls occurred because, according to a Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan official, there was a high volume of contracts to administer, but a lack of trained contracting officer's representatives to provide contract oversight. In addition, contracting officer's representatives were not trained before arrival in Iraq. A Psychological Operations Task Force official stated that it is important to train contracting officer's representatives before arrival. Specifically, he noted that individuals often do not complete the necessary training and gain experience until their tour began. As a result, contracts did not have the appropriate personnel or appropriately trained personnel to conduct oversight to ensure the contractor performed adequately.

(U) [14] DoD OIG Report No. D-2007-001, "Information Operations in Southwest Asia," October 6, 2006.

(U) [15] DoD OIG Report No. D-2010-033, 'Information Operations in Iraq," January 21, 2010.

~~(S//NF)~~ CENTCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ DoD OIG reported in DoD OIG Report No. D-2010-033 and DODIG-2014-008[16] CENTCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [redacted]. Specifically, DoD OIG Report No. D-2010-033 reported that Multi-National Forces–Iraq assessments showed an increase in support of CENTCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b) [redacted]. However, DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2014-008 stated that Military Information Support Task Force–Afghanistan officials did not prepare performance work statements, quality assurance surveillance plans, or procedures that contained specifics on the roles and responsibilities of the contractor in the assessment process of MISO.

~~(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ *MISO in Iraq Were Effective*

~~(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ DoD OIG Report No. D-2010-033 stated that statistics gathered by Multi-National Forces–Iraq to measure the perceptions of the Iraqi people and gauge the contributions of MISO showed a positive trend. The data were categorized in these five areas:

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ CENTCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [redacted]
- ~~(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ CENTCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [redacted]
- ~~(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ CENTCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [redacted]
- ~~(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ CENTCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [redacted]
- ~~(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ CENTCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [redacted]

~~(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ According to Multi-National Forces–Iraq officials, MISO products contributed to an increase in support for the CENTCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), 1.4(b) [redacted]. In addition, Multi-National Forces–Iraq and Multi-National Corps–Iraq general officers stated that MISO had a big impact on the turnaround in Iraq. The Commanding General, Multi-National Forces–Iraq, noted that MISO was a critical resource of commanders in Iraq to enhance security, which saved lives. The Multi-National Forces–Iraq Director for Strategic Communications noted that the U.S. has learned the limits of kinetic (lethal) operations in counterinsurgency, and MISO efforts contributed to the decrease in violence in Iraq.

(U) [16] DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2014-008, "Contract and Controls Over Information Operations Assessments in Afghanistan Should Be Strengthened," November 7, 2013.

~~(S//NF)~~ *Improved Descriptions Needed to Identify Roles and Responsibilities for MISO Assessment*

~~(S//NF)~~ DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2014-008 stated that Military Information Support Task Force–Afghanistan officials did not prepare performance work statements, quality assurance surveillance plans, or procedures that contained specifics on the roles and responsibilities of the contractor to assess MISO. Military Information Support Task Force–Afghanistan's officials used informal procedures to define the different responsibilities of development and assessment personnel and began to formalize the procedures in December 2012. Without a clearly defined assessment process, it may appear that the contractor was assessing their own work, which increased the risk that the objectivity of the assessments may be questioned.

(U) IO Vital to DoD Operations

(U) IO is a vital capability for JFCs. According to the IO Joint Publication, the ability to share information in near real time, anonymously or securely, is a capability that is both an asset and a potential vulnerability to the United States, its allies, and its adversaries. Information is a powerful tool to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp (seize) an adversary's ability to make and share decisions. As the strategic environment continues to change, so does IO.

(U) The Secretary of Defense now characterizes IO as the integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. If JFCs adequately synchronize, plan, execute, and assess IO, they will more effectively conduct IO in the full range of operations to achieve their objectives.

(U) Although DoD organizations generally complied with rules and regulations to award contracts for IO and use contractors to execute IO and effectively used IO, DoD OIG Reports identified weaknesses in:

- (U) synchronizing communication;
- (U) identifying roles and responsibilities in contracts;
- (U) planning and executing CMO and properly integrating MISO in CMO;
- (U) integrating the IO capability; and
- (U) conducting contract oversight.

(U) These weaknesses indicate that there is an opportunity to apply lessons-learned for IO to future operations and can serve as a reference for personnel overseeing and conducting IO.

(U) Status of Recommendations

(U) Of the 6 DoD OIG reports, 4 reports had 13 recommendations and 2 reports[17] did not have recommendations. Overall, the recommendations addressed contract administration, contract surveillance, planning future MISO requirements, staffing IO positions, and properly identifying roles and responsibilities. Specifically,

- (U) DoD OIG Report No. D-2009-091 recommended that officials improve contract administration;
- (U) DoD OIG Report No. D-2009-091 and D-2010-033 recommended that officials improve contract surveillance;
- (U) DoD OIG Report No. D-2010-033 recommended that officials plan and assess future MISO requirements and determine how those requirements would change with the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Iraq;
- (U) DoD OIG Report No. D-2011-051 recommended that officials adequately staff IO to fill vacancies and integrate personnel to operate and plan IO; and
- ~~(S//NF)~~ DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2014-008 recommended that officials modify the contract performance work statement to describe contractor roles and responsibilities and to include measurable performance standards.

(U) All of the recommendations were closed. We will not make additional recommendations because recommendations were contained in the previous DoD OIG reports.

(U) [17] DoD OIG Report No. D-2007-001 and DODIG-2013-110.

(U) Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this summary work from January 2015 through March 2015. We followed generally accepted government auditing standards, except for the standards of planning and evidence because this report summarizes previously released reports. We believe the information obtained provides a reasonable basis for our conclusions based on the project objectives.

(U) This report summarizes DoD IO challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa identified in six reports issued by DoD OIG from October 6, 2006, through November 7, 2013. To prepare this summary, we reviewed the six DoD OIG reports:

(U) 1. Report No. DODIG-2014-008, "Contract and Controls Over Information Operations Assessments in Afghanistan Should Be Strengthened," November 7, 2013 (Classified)

(U) 2. Report No. DODIG-2013-110, "Guidance Needed to Adequately Integrate Military Information Support Operations into Civil-Military Operations in the Horn of Africa," July 26, 2013 (Classified)

(U) 3. Report No. D-2011-051, "DoD Needs Synchronized Communication Activities and an Integrated Information Operations Capability in Afghanistan," March 21, 2011 (Classified)

(U) 4. Report No. D-2010-033, "Information Operations in Iraq," January 21, 2010 (Classified)

(U) 5. Report No D-2009-091, "Information Operations Contracts in Iraq," July 31, 2009[18]

(U) 6. Report No D-2007-001, "Information Operations in Southwest Asia," October 6, 2006 (Classified)

(U) We reviewed the findings and conclusions from these reports. We did not review the supporting documentation for the reports.

(U) [18] This unrestricted DoD OIG report can be accessed at http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm?office=Audit.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data for this report.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, DoD OIG did not issue reports summarizing problems specific to IO in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa. We did not consider reports from the Government Accountability Office, Army Audit Agency, or Air Force Audit Agency.

(U) List of Classified Documents

(U) DoD OIG Report No. D-2007-001, "Information Operations Activities in Southwest Asia:" SECRET

Declassified Date: X-4
Generated Date: October 6, 2006

(U) DoD OIG Report No. D-2010-033, "Information Operations in Iraq:" SECRET

Declassified Date: February 11, 2019
Generated Date: January 21, 2010

(U) DoD OIG Report No. D-2011-051, "DoD Needs Synchronized Communication Activities and an Integrated Information Operations Capability in Afghanistan:" SECRET

Declassified Date: March 17, 2035
Generated Date: March 21, 2011

(U) DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2013-110, "Guidance Needed to Adequately Integrate Military Information Support Operations into Civil-Military Operations in the Horn of Africa:" SECRET//REL TO USA, ACGU

Declassified Date: October 10, 2037
Generated Date: July 26, 2013

(U) DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2014-008, "Contract and Controls Over Information Operations Assessments in Afghanistan Should Be Strengthened:" SECRET//NOFORN

Declassified Date: January 23, 2038
Generated Date: November 7, 2013

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
IJC	International Security Assistance Force Joint Command
IO	Information Operations
IRC	Information-Related Capability
JFC	Joint Force Commander
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
PA	Public Affairs

Whistleblower Protection

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 requires the Inspector General to designate a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman to educate agency employees about prohibitions on retaliation, and rights and remedies against retaliation for protected disclosures. The designated ombudsman is the DoD Hotline Director. For more information on your rights and remedies against retaliation, visit www.dodig.mil/programs/whistleblower.

For more information about DoD IG reports or activities, please contact us:

Congressional Liaison
congressional@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

Media Contact
public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

Monthly Update
dodigconnect-request@listserve.com

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

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4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500
www.dodig.mil
Defense Hotline 1.800.424.9098

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