

~~SECRET~~

Report No. D-2010-033 January 21, 2010

Inspector General

United States

Department of Defense



Information Operations in Iraq

Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: February 11, 2019


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Suggestions for Audits (U)

(U) To suggest or request audits, contact the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing by phone (703) 604-9142 (DSN 664-9142), by fax (703) 604-8932, or by mail:

ODIG-AUD (ATTN: Audit Suggestions)
Department of Defense Inspector General
400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801)
Arlington, VA 22202-4704



To report fraud, waste, mismanagement, and abuse of authority.

Send written complaints to: Defense Hotline, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1900
Phone: 800 424 9096 e-mail: hotline@dodig.mil www.dodig.mil/hotline

Acronyms and Abbreviations (U)

COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
IO	Information Operations
IOTF	Information Operations Task Force
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
JCC-I/A	Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan
LOO	Line of Operation
MIST	Military Information Support Team
MNC-I	Multi-National Corps-Iraq
MNF-I	Multi-National Force-Iraq
POTF	Psychological Operations Task Force
PSYOP	Psychological Operations

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
3160 QUINN ST. WASHINGTON, DC 20315-4302

June 15, 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-IRAQ
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Information Operations in Iraq (Report No. D-2010-033) (U)


(U) We are providing this report for review and comment. We performed this audit in response to a request from the Commander, U.S. Central Command. We considered management comments on a draft of the report in preparing the final report.

(U) DOD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. The comments from the Multi-National Force-Iraq were only partially responsive. Therefore, we request additional comments on Recommendation 2 by February 19, 2010.

(U) Copies of the management comments must contain the actual signature of the authorizing official. We are unable to accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to (b) (6) Joint and Southwest Asig Operations at:

(703) 604-(b) (6) (DSN 664) (b) (6)


Mary L. Ugone
Deputy Inspector General for Auditing

Unclassified when separated from classified enclosures.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (U)

~~SECRET~~



Results in Brief: Information Operations in Iraq (U)

What We Did (U)

(U) The Commander, U.S. Central Command, requested this audit. Our objective was to evaluate information operations activities in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Specifically, we determined the process for establishing psychological operations requirements and identified the resources applied against those requirements.

What We Found (U)

(U) There are multiple organizations in Iraq, primarily the Multi-National Force-Iraq (now U.S. Forces-Iraq) and its subordinate commands, that conduct psychological operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical level in support of ongoing operations and the implementation of the Security Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq. Overall, psychological operations in Iraq were well-planned and synchronized. Psychological operations are, and will continue to be, an important tool in achieving a secure and stable Iraq. However, an assessment of the impact of the Security Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq and the evolving mission of U.S. forces on psychological operations is needed. Further, the use of psychological operations is anticipated to increase as the Security Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq is implemented, and the structure and mission of U.S. forces evolves from conducting combat operations to supporting the Iraqi Security Forces. Additionally, U.S. Forces-Iraq could improve internal controls over psychological operations by strengthening control oversight procedures.

What We Recommend (U)

(U) The Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, should determine how ongoing psychological operations requirements will change at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels as the command's structure and mission evolve during implementation of the Security Agreement. The Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, should also assess and plan for additional psychological operations requirements for advisory organizations, such as Advisory and Assistance Brigades, which will be necessary as they replace Brigade Combat Teams.

(U) In addition, the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, should ensure that subordinate organizations that conduct psychological operations identify the need for contract officer's representatives to oversee contracts for psychological operations on applicable Joint Manning Documents, Requests for Forces, or battle rosters.

Management Comments and Our Response (U)

(U) The comments from the Multi-National Force-Iraq Information Operations Chief were partially responsive for recommendation 2. Although not required to respond, we also received comments from the U.S. Central Command and Multi-National Corps-Iraq. Please see the recommendations table on the back of this page.

~~SECRET~~

Report No. D-2010-033 (Project No. D2009-D000JA-0108.002)

January 21, 2010

Recommendations Table (U)

Management	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq	2	1, 3

Please provide comments by February 19, 2010.

~~SECRET~~

Table of Contents (U)

Introduction (U)	1
Objective (U)	1
Background (U)	1
Review of Internal Controls (U)	2
Results. Information Operations in Iraq (U)	3
Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response (U)	14
Appendices (U)	
A. Scope and Methodology (U)	16
Prior Coverage (U)	16
B. Commander, U.S. Central Command Request Letter (U)	18
C. Organizations Conducting Psychological Operations in Iraq (U)	20
Management Comments (U)	
U.S. Central Command (U)	22
Multi-National Force-Iraq (U)	23
Multi-National Corps-Iraq (U)	26

~~SECRET~~

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (U)

~~SECRET~~

Introduction (U)

Objective (U)

(U) Our objective was to evaluate information operations (IO) activities in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Specifically, we determined the process for establishing psychological operations (PSYOP) requirements, and identified the resources applied against those requirements. See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and methodology and prior coverage related to the objectives.

Background (U)

(U) We performed this audit in response to a request from the Commander, U.S. Central Command, to evaluate the PSYOP requirements in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The commander asked us to identify and evaluate the process to establish and execute PSYOP requirements and to identify the resources applied to meet those requirements. The commander also asked us to evaluate the contracting process and the use of private contractors in support of PSYOP. See Appendix B for a copy of the request from the Commander, U.S. Central Command.

(U) This is the third in a series of reports that addresses the request from the Commander, U.S. Central Command. It discusses the process for establishing PSYOP requirements and the personnel and resources applied to meet those requirements in Iraq. Previous reports discussed whether the indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity IO contracts awarded by the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) complied with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and provided a list of the number of contracts used for IO in Iraq from FY 2006 through FY 2008.

IO (U)

(U) Joint Publication 3-13, "Information Operations," February 13, 2006, states that IO are the "integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own."

PSYOP (U)

(U) Joint Publication 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations," September 5, 2003, states that PSYOP "are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals." PSYOP are an integral part of military operations and is an inherent responsibility of all military commanders.

~~SECRET~~

United States Central Command (U)

(U) U.S. Central Command was established on January 1, 1983, and is located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. The command has an area of responsibility that consists of 20 countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, with a mission that "promotes cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and nonstate aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity."

(U) Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), formed on May 15, 2004, "conducts operations to defeat remaining noncompliant forces and neutralize destabilizing influences in Iraq in order to create a secure environment."

(U) JCC-I/A, established on July 2, 2005, is responsible for providing responsive operational contracting support to the Chiefs of Mission, MNF-I, and forces in Afghanistan in acquiring vital supplies, services, and construction in support of coalition forces and the relief and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. The commander of JCC-I/A serves as the Head of Contracting Authority throughout the theater.

(U) Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), a subordinate command of MNF-I, is located at Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq. MNC-I is responsible for command and control of operations throughout Iraq. Four commands report to MNC-I including: Multi-National Division-Baghdad, Multi-National Division-North, Multi-National Force-West, and Multi-National Division-South.

Review of Internal Controls (U)

(U) We determined that an internal control weakness in the identification of contracting officer's representatives (CORs) existed as defined by DOD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control (MIC) Program Procedures," January 4, 2006. U.S. Forces-Iraq internal controls over IO activities in Iraq, specifically, PSYOP, could be improved by strengthening contract oversight procedures. Specifically, MNF-I and its subordinate commands have a process in place to assign and train CORs for IO contracts. However, implementing Recommendation 3 will reinforce internal controls, specifically oversight over IO and PSYOP contracts. We will provide a copy of the final report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in U.S. Forces-Iraq.

~~SECRET~~

Results. Information Operations in Iraq (U)

(U) Multiple organizations in Iraq, primarily MNF-I and its subordinate commands, conduct PSYOP at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in support of ongoing operations and the "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq," November 17, 2008 (Security Agreement). Overall, the requirements process, the use of resources, the contracting process, the use of contractors, and the benefits of these PSYOP efforts were well-planned and synchronized. However, contract oversight controls could be improved through more efficient identification of CORs. PSYOP is anticipated to remain an important tool in achieving a secure and stable Iraq as the Security Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq is implemented, and the structure and mission of U.S forces evolve from conducting combat operations to supporting the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Therefore, U.S. Forces-Iraq should assess how these changes will impact future PSYOP requirements.

PSYOP in Iraq (U)

(U) The following sections discuss PSYOP efforts in Iraq and the different organizations that carry out those efforts. A significant portion of PSYOP efforts are in support of the implementation of the Security Agreement, which established timelines for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.

(U) Key milestones in the withdrawal are the removal of:

- (U) U.S. forces from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009;
- (S//REL to USA, MCFI) all combat forces by August 31, 2010; and
- (U) all forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011.

(U) Organizations also conduct PSYOP in support of ongoing operations and other activities, such as in response to current events.


Lines of Operation (U)

(S//REL to USA, MCFI) (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM
[REDACTED]

(S//REL to USA, MCFI) (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM



(U) Figure 1. Lines of Operations



(U) Source: MNF-I

(S//REL to USA, MCFI) (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM



PSYOP Organizations (U)

(U) There are several different organizations that conduct PSYOP in Iraq. MNF-I monitors and synchronizes PSYOP at the strategic level, MNC-I plans and conducts PSYOP at the operational level [including the IO Task Force (IOTF) and PSYOP Task Force (POTF)], and the Multi-National Divisions and subordinate commands (including Brigade Combat Teams) conduct PSYOP at the tactical level. Other organizations, such as the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force and Task Force 714, conduct PSYOP in support of their specialty missions. A Military Information Support Team (MIST) conducts strategic-level PSYOP in support of the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad.

(U) For additional information on organizations that conduct PSYOP in Iraq, see Appendix C.

PSYOP Requirements and Resources Used (U)

(U) To address the request from the Commander, U.S. Central Command, we visited organizations that conduct PSYOP in Iraq to determine the process to establish PSYOP requirements, identify resources applied against those requirements, and determine the benefits of PSYOP. We also assessed whether adequate contract oversight controls and authorities were in place, and determined what PSYOP functions required contractor support. Overall, PSYOP efforts in Iraq appeared to be well-planned and synchronized. The following sections directly respond to the request from the Commander, U.S. Central Command.

Requirements (U)

(U) The Commander, U.S. Central Command, requested that we determine the process used by operational commanders to establish PSYOP resources and funding requirements, and to execute those requirements. There are several sources from which PSYOP requirements can be initiated, including current operations, plans, or input from senior leaders.¹ The MNC-I IO division serves as the focal point for handling PSYOP requirements. Specifically, organizations that are not able to satisfy their own requirements submit those requirements to MNC-I which determines whether they will be satisfied using existing Government resources or through contract support. To estimate the resources and funding needed for PSYOP, in June 2009, MNC-I completed a review of PSYOP requirements of \$183.4 million through December 2010.

(U) MNF-I and its subordinate commands submit their requirements for PSYOP products to a centralized MNC-I Targeting Cell (Targeting Cell). The Multi-National Divisions often satisfy their own PSYOP requirements, but can forward their requirements to the Targeting Cell as needed. Other organizations, such as the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, Task Force 714, and MIST, handle their own requirements and synchronize their PSYOP efforts with MNF-I and MNC-I.

~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4c, CENTCOM
[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL to USU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM
[REDACTED]


(U) If a contract is needed for PSYOP, the requesting unit must validate its need for contract support through an additional review and approval process. After this approval process, the unit will obtain funding and request contract support from JCC-I/A. This process is carried out by the Joint Facilities Acquisition Review Board. The board members review the documentation submitted by the requesting unit and provide a recommend action to the MNC-I Chief of Staff. The chief of staff makes the final decision on approval or non-approval.

Resources Allocated (U)

(U) The Commander, U.S. Central Command, requested that we identify funding and personnel resources to meet PSYOP requirements in Iraq. The Commanding General, MNF-I, stated that because PSYOP is executed at all levels of command, it is very difficult to identify all personnel who either directly plan or execute PSYOP or who indirectly support the PSYOP process. Table 1 provides an approximate number of IO personnel (at the time of our site visit) who conduct or support PSYOP at MNF-I, its subordinate commands, and other organizations that conduct PSYOP in Iraq. We obtained this data from personnel documents obtained from each organization, and submitted a data request to MNC-I for three Multi-National Divisions.

(S) Table 1. Personnel Who Directly or Indirectly Plan, Execute, or Support PSYOP in Iraq

(b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM



(U) Of the 11 organizations listed in Table 1, not all organizations had contracts, as of May 31, 2009, to support their PSYOP requirements.² Those organizations without contracts were able to satisfy their PSYOP requirements internally. Table 2 displays the number of contracts and the total value of those contracts for each organization.

² (U) DOD Inspector General Report, D-2009-115, "Summary of IO Contracts in Iraq," September 29, 2009, stated that IO contracts in Iraq had a total value of \$270.1 million during FY 2006 through FY 2008.

(U) We obtained this data from documents obtained from each organization, and submitted a data request to MNC-I for contract information for three Multi-National Divisions.

(U) Table 2. Contracts for PSYOP in Iraq

Organization	Number of Contracts	Total Contract Value
MNC-I	1	\$3,500,000
IOTF	1	61,564,207
POTF	24	73,515,934
Multi-National Division-Baghdad	21	11,677,500
Other Multi-National Divisions	10	725,725
MIST	3	204,540
Total	60	\$151,187,906

Contracting (U)

(U) The Commander, U.S. Central Command, requested that we evaluate the contracting process to determine whether appropriate authorities, oversight, and reviews are in place. Organizations that conduct PSYOP in Iraq primarily use JCC-I/A for contract support to satisfy their PSYOP requirements. We contacted three branches of JCC-I/A that have supported PSYOP contracts: Theatre-Wide Requirements-Commodities, Victory Regional Contracting Center, and Theatre-Wide Requirements-Services. Of the three branches, Theatre-Wide Requirements-Commodities administers the majority of the contracts for IO requirements.

(U) A JCC-I/A official stated that IO contracts account for about 25 percent of the Theatre-Wide Requirements-Commodities branch's total workload. As of May 31, 2009, JCC-I/A had 43 total active contracting vehicles for IO; the Theatre Wide Requirements-Commodities had 38, Theater Wide Requirements-Services had 5, and Victory Regional Contracting Center had no IO contracting vehicles.

(U) A JCC-I/A official stated that the contracting process begins once a customer presents them with a requirement. Although not required, JCC-I/A assists its customers by reviewing the statements of work and verifying that a COR has been identified before the requirement is reviewed by the Joint Facilities Acquisition Review Board. After the board approves the requirement, the customer provides the contracting officer with copies of the documentation submitted to the board as well as approval documents. The contracting officer reviews the statement of work and if necessary, recommends changes to the customer. Once the statement of work is finalized, the contracting officer prepares the solicitation and posts it, if required. The contracting officer receives proposals, reviews them in accordance with the criteria established in the solicitation, and determines which contractor(s) will be awarded the contract.

Contracting Officer's Representatives (U)

(U) We found controls implemented by JCC-I/A over the contracting process for PSYOP to be adequate; however, one contract oversight control could be improved. A JCC-I/A

(U) official stated that due to the volume of contracts JCC-I/A administers, it relies heavily on the CORs to help in providing contract oversight. JCC-I/A ensures that those individuals who serve as CORs complete the necessary training as well as training specifically geared towards the type of contracts the COR will be overseeing.

(U) As CORs rotate, their replacements are identified, trained, certified, and appointed once they arrive in Iraq. Officials from several organizations we visited indicated that CORs are frequently not trained prior to their arrival in Iraq. A Multi-National Division-Baghdad official stated that it is difficult to find CORs who are trained prior to their assignment in Iraq. A POTF official also stressed the importance of having CORs trained before arrival. Specifically, he noted that individuals often do not complete the necessary training and gain COR experience until they begin their tour. To address this inefficiency, the POTF has engaged with the COR's relief unit to inform it of the importance of having trained CORs to oversee PSYOP contracts, and also took steps to adjust the POTF's battle roster to ensure CORs are included. The Commander, MNF-I, should ensure that subordinate organizations that conduct PSYOP identify the need for CORs on applicable Joint Manning Documents, Requests for Forces, or battle rosters.

Use of Contractors (U)

~~(S//REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM
[REDACTED]

(U) PSYOP organizations we visited used contractors to carry out the following functions:

- ~~(S//REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM [REDACTED]
- ~~(S//REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM [REDACTED]
- ~~(S//REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ CENTCOM [REDACTED]
- ~~(S//REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ [REDACTED]
- ~~(S//REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM and [REDACTED]
- (U) product dissemination.

(U) We contacted representatives of the 4th PSYOP Group and John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFK Center) to determine whether those critical skills have been integrated into training and career development programs for PSYOP personnel.

~~SECRET~~

(U) JFK Center officials mentioned that they have a seven-step PSYOP curriculum that includes the following phases:

- (U) Phase 1: Planning;
- (U) Phase 2: Target Audience and Analysis;
- (U) Phase 3: Series Development;
- (U) Phase 4: Production Development;
- (U) Phase 5: Approval;
- (U) Phase 6: Production, Distribution, Dissemination; and
- (U) Phase 7: Evaluation.

(U) PSYOP training is a blend of both cultural and language education to improve individual capabilities and field performance. JFK Center training courses focus on educating soldiers about religion, values, behavior, politics, laws, and everyday tasks in a foreign environment.

(U) Forces from 4th PSYOP Group are sent to the JFK Center to obtain language and cultural training. Officials from 4th PSYOP Group informed us that they provide their forces with additional in-house pre-mission training including cultural, language, and command and control. In addition, 4th PSYOP Group and JFK Center officials both stated that Signal Corps personnel are the subject matter experts on training PSYOP forces for satellite television, video, and radio production.

Benefits of PSYOP (U)

(U) Although the commander requested a cost benefit analysis of the effectiveness of PSYOP in relation to total operational expenditures in Iraq for FY 2008, we were not able to determine the total expenditures for PSYOP in Iraq. However, a previous DOD Inspector General report, D-2009-115, "Summary of IO Contracts in Iraq," September 29, 2009, stated that IO contracts in Iraq had a total value of \$270.1 million during FY 2006 through FY 2008. During our visit to Iraq, we determined that PSYOP contracts active as of May 31, 2009, had a total value of \$151.2 million. While we were not able to provide a cost-benefit analysis, we were able to gather more information on the benefits of PSYOP through other indicators such as consistent testimonials from general officers and statistics developed by MNF-I.

(U) MNF-I and MNC-I general officers stated that PSYOP has had a big impact on the turnaround in Iraq. The Commanding General, MNF-I, noted that PSYOP has been a critical resource of commanders in Iraq to enhance security, which has saved lives. The MNF-I Director for Strategic Communications noted that the U.S. has learned the limits of kinetic (lethal) operations in counterinsurgency, and PSYOP efforts have contributed to the decrease in violence in Iraq.

(S//REL to USA, MCFI) (b)(1)1.4a. CENTCOM

- (S//REL to USA, MCFI) (b)(1)1.4a. CENTCOM
- (S//REL to USA, MCFI)

~~SECRET~~

- ~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM [REDACTED]
- ~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ [REDACTED]
- ~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM .

~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4c, CENTCOM [REDACTED]

~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4c, CENTCOM [REDACTED]

~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ Table 3. PSYOP Products to Increase Popular Support of ISF

(b)(1)1.4c, CENTCOM [REDACTED]

~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM [REDACTED]

- ~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM [REDACTED]
- ~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM [REDACTED]
- ~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM [REDACTED]

- ~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM [REDACTED]
- ~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM [REDACTED]
- ~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM [REDACTED]

~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ The following figures illustrate MNF-I data regarding Iraqi support for the ISF and Iraqi Army. Figure 2 demonstrates how the confidence and trust in the Iraqi Police has increased dramatically from December 2006 to February 2009.

~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ **Figure 2. Trust in the Iraqi Police to Provide Security to the Iraqi Population**



(U) Source: MNF-I

~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4c, CENTCOM [REDACTED]

~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ Figure 3. Trust in the Iraqi Army to Provide Security to the Iraqi Population

(b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM



(U) Source: MNF-I

(U) There is no metric that quantifies the impact that PSYOP had on increasing Iraqis' support for the ISF. However, a significant amount of PSYOP products were disseminated to enhance perception of ISF. As a result, MNF-I concluded that PSYOP positively contributed in the change in perception of the Iraqi population.

Future of PSYOP in Iraq (U)

~~(S//REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM



- ~~(S//REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ the drawdown is being conducted responsibly,
- ~~(S//REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ U.S. forces are shifting from combat operations to stability operations, and
- ~~(S//REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ the drawdown will be done in accordance with the Security Agreement.

~~(S//REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ (b)(1)1.4c, CENTCOM



~~(S//REL to USA, USA, AUS, CAN, GBR/MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM
(b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM



~~(S//REL to USA, USA, AUS, CAN, GBR/MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM




Force Structure Changes (U)

~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM



Change in Mission (U)

~~(S//REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM



Conclusion (U)

(U) There are several organizations that conduct PSYOP in Iraq at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in support of ongoing operations and the implementation of the Security Agreement. We visited these organizations, reviewed the requirements process, the contracting process, the use of resources, and the benefits of PSYOP and determined that these efforts were well-planned and synchronized. However, contract oversight controls could be improved through more efficient identification of CORs. In addition, we assessed the use of contractor support and determined that contractors provide critical skills that are not resident within DOD. PSYOP is, and is anticipated to remain, an important tool achieving a secure and stable Iraq. For the future, as U.S. forces implement the Security Agreement, U.S. Forces-Iraq should plan and assess how PSYOP requirements will change as the command's mission and structure evolves to ensure that PSYOP efforts continue to be well-planned and synchronized and also identify the need for CORs.

Management Comments on the Results and Our Response (U)

U.S. Central Command Comments (U)

(U) Although not required to comment, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command, provided comments on behalf of U.S. Central Command that incorporated comments from its subordinate commands (MNF-I and MNC-I). Specifically, U.S. Central Command's response included comments from the MNF-I IO Chief and MNC-I Inspector General.

(U) The Chief of Staff, the MNF-I IO Chief, and the MNC-I Inspector General agreed with the recommendations in the report. The MNF-I IO Chief suggested wording changes to the report.

Our Response (U)

(U) Although the most current version of the Joint Campaign Plan is dated June 19, 2009, and MNC-I activities are currently aligned under MNC-I's Operations Order 09-02, we referenced the versions of these documents that were in effect at the time of our site visit in May 2009.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response (U)

(U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq:

1. (U) Determine how ongoing psychological operations requirements will change at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels as the command's structure and mission evolve during the implementation of the "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq," November 17, 2008.

Multi-National Force-Iraq Comments (U)

~~(S)~~ The MNF-I IO Chief agreed and stated that as responsible drawdown occurs, there will be fewer tactical PSYOP units to conduct PSYOP in conjunction with Iraqi units. As Iraqis gain more control and the U.S. mission transitions, attributable PSYOP will be phased out. In the future, MNF-I expects that more unattributed or delayed attribution PSYOP will be conducted. Multi-National Divisions will continue to rely on MNF-I and MNC-I authorities to support their PSYOP plans.

Our Response (U)

(U) The comments are responsive. Upon completion of your determination, please provide additional information on the revised PSYOP requirements.

2. (U) Assess and plan for additional psychological operations requirements for advisory organizations, such as Advisory and Assistance Brigades, that will be necessary as they replace Brigade Combat Teams.

Multi-National Force-Iraq Comments (U)

(b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM
[Redacted]

Our Response (U)

(U) The comments are partially responsive. We request additional comments to explain why PSYOP requirements for Advisory and Assistance Brigades remain unchanged if their mission differs from that of Brigade Combat Teams.

3. (U) Ensure that subordinate organizations that conduct psychological operations identify the need for contracting officer's representatives to oversee contracts for psychological operations on applicable Joint Manning Documents, Requests for Forces, or battle rosters to make certain contract officer's representatives are trained prior to deployment.

Multi-National Force-Iraq Comments (U)

(U) The MNF-I IO Chief agreed that the responsibility of the COR should be included in Joint Manning Documents, Request for Forces, or battle rosters. With an increased emphasis on pre-deployment COR training, contract oversight will be greatly improved.

Our Response (U)

(U) The comments are responsive, and no additional comments are required.

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology (U)

(U) We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 through October 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our results and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our results and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) We visited, contacted, or conducted interviews with current or former officials from the following organizations:

- (U) U.S. Central Command; MNF-I; JCC-I/A; MNC-I; and Multi-National Division-Baghdad;
- (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
- (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence;
- (U) Joint Staff;
- (U) U.S. Embassy-Baghdad; MIST-Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq;
- (U) John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School; and
- (U) the 4th Psychological Operations Group.

(U) We reviewed Joint Publication 3-13 to determine joint doctrine for IO. We reviewed Joint Publication 3-53 to determine joint doctrine for PSYOP.

(U) We met with the Commander and the Chief of Staff, MNF-I; the Chief of Staff, MNC-I; and the Director of Strategic Communications, MNF-I, to obtain their testimonials on the benefits and importance of PSYOP in Iraq. We reviewed MNF-I and its subordinate commands' plans for drawing down forces in Iraq. We obtained and reviewed key documents from organizations performing PSYOP at the strategic, organizational, and tactical levels to establish the basis under which PSYOP is conducted and to determine ongoing PSYOP efforts in Iraq. We also reviewed Joint Manning Documents to estimate the number of personnel performing PSYOP in Iraq.

Use of Computer-Processed Data (U)

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

Prior Coverage (U)

(U) During the last 5 years, the DOD Inspector General (IG) and Air Force Audit Agency have issued seven reports discussing IO or PSYOP. Unrestricted DOD IG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports>.

(U) Air Force Audit Agency reports can be accessed from .mil domains over the Internet at <https://afkm.wpafb.af.mil/ASPs/CoP/OpenCoP.asp?filter=OO-AD-01-41> by those with Common Access Cards.

~~SECRET~~

DOD IG (U)

(U) DOD IG Report No. D-2009-115, "Summary of Information Operations Contracts in Iraq," September 29, 2009

(U) DOD IG Report No. D-2009-091, "Information Operations Contracts in Iraq," July 31, 2009

(U) DOD IG Report No. D-2009-090, "Information Operations Career Force," July 2, 2009

(U) DOD IG Report No. 07-INTEL-06, "DoD Involvement with The Rendon Group," March 6, 2007

(U) DOD IG Report No. D-2007-001, "Information Operations Activities in Southwest Asia," October 6, 2006

(U) DOD IG Report No. D-2006-083, "Information Operations in U.S. European Command," May 12, 2006

Air Force (U)

(U) F2005-0003-FD3000, "Information Operations Personnel Data Verification," April 1, 2005

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Appendix B. Commander, U.S. Central Command Request Letter (U)

24 November 2008

Honorable Gordon S. Heddell
Acting Inspector General
Department of Defense
400 Army Navy Drive
Arlington, VA. 22202-4704

Dear Mr. Heddell,

I greatly appreciate the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) contributions to United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in assessing critical mission areas and in providing CENTCOM with functional recommendations in a timely manner. Based on the DoDIG's ability to quickly respond to commanders' requirements for information, I would like to request your assistance in determining the validity of the Commander's Information Operations (IO) requirements in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and whether the resources applied against the IO requirements meet established statutory guidelines.

I request the DoDIG undertake a review of the funding requirements and personnel resources applied to IO efforts in Iraq. To better understand the level of effort, the review of funding expended on IO in OIF should extend back three fiscal years. While I am not looking for a historical perspective of how the IO requirements process worked over the past several years, a thorough understanding of the current process would be most helpful.

Information Operations and, as a subset of IO, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are "traditional military activities" of U.S. Forces and are required to successfully accomplish the mission of the Commander. My main focus areas for the DoDIG to consider are:

1. Determine the process used by operational commanders to:
 - a. Establish Information Operation resources and funding requirements;
 - b. Execute those requirements in support of the Multi National Force-Iraq mission.
2. Evaluate the requirement process(es) and the execution of Information Operations mission in Iraq against the doctrinal foundations of Information Operations.
3. Identify the funding and personnel resources applied in Iraq to meet annual Information Operations requirements.
4. Evaluate the contracting process used in Iraq to meet Information Operations requirements to determine whether appropriate authorities, oversight, and reviews are in place.
5. Evaluate the validity of the use of private contractors to support Information Operation in Iraq, as balanced against existing unformed Information Operation capability and capacity.

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

-2-

6. Provide a cost/benefit analysis of the effectiveness of Information Operations expenditures in relation to total operational expenditures in Iraq for FY08. ("Resources" includes dollars expended, military personnel and organizations involved, and civilian contractors employed.)

I appreciate your attention to this matter, and, more importantly, DoDIG's ongoing support and partnership as we address together the many challenges of the region.

Sincerely,



DAVID H. PETRAEUS
General, U.S. Army
Commanding

cc:
MNF-I
MNR-I

(U)

~~SECRET~~

Appendix C. Organizations Conducting Psychological Operations in Iraq (U)

(U) Multiple organizations in Iraq conduct PSYOP at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, primarily in support of ongoing operations or the implementation of the Security Agreement. MNF-I and its subordinate commands conduct the majority of PSYOP in Iraq. However, there are other organizations that perform PSYOP in support of other activities.

Multi-National Force-Iraq (U)

~~(S//REL MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM
[Redacted]

Multi-National Corps-Iraq (U)

~~(S//REL MCFI)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM
[Redacted] The MNC-I IO division has two subordinate organizations: IOTF and POTF.

IOTF (U)

~~(S//REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ The IOTF (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM
[Redacted]

POTF (U)

~~(S//REL to USA, MCFI)~~ The POTF (b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM
[Redacted]

Multi-National Divisions (U)

~~(S//REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ (b)(1)1.4c, CENTCOM
[Redacted]

~~(b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM~~
~~(b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM~~
[Redacted]

Other Organizations (U)

~~(b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM~~
[Redacted]

~~(b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM~~
~~(b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM~~
[Redacted]

~~(b)(1)1.4a, CENTCOM~~
[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

U.S. Central Command Comments (U)




UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
3100 AIR FORCE DRIVE
WASHINGTON, DC 20330

9 November 2009

FOR: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: DODIG Draft Report, "Information Operations in Iraq" (D2009-1000)A-0198,002) (U)

1. (U) Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the recommendations presented in the DODIG draft report.
2. (U) USCENTCOM, MNF-I and MNC-I concur with the recommendations in the report. MNF-I and MNC-I provide additional comments in the attached responses.
3. (U) The Point of Contact is [REDACTED]


JAY W. HORD
Major General, U.S. Army

Enclosures:

Tab A: MNF-I Response (~~SECRET~~ TO LISA AUGUST GRINA)

Tab B: MNC-I Response (U)

~~SECRET~~

Multi-National Force-Iraq (U)

DoDIG DRAFT REPORT – DATED 19 October 2009
DoDIG Project Number D2009-000JA-0108.002

“Information Operations in Iraq”

MNF-I COMMENTS TO THE DRAFT REPORT

RECOMMENDATION 1 (page 14, DODIG Draft Report)

(U) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, in consultation with the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq:

1. (U) Determine how ongoing psychological operations requirements will change at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels as the command's structure and mission evolve during the implementation of the "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq," November 17, 2008.

MNF-I RESPONSE: MNF-I concurs with information provided in this report. As responsible drawdown occurs, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) requirements will become more operational with low-level strategic emphasis. There will be less tactical PSYOP units to conduct PSYOP in partnership with Iraqi units. As Iraqis exert greater control over their sovereignty, and as the U.S. mission transitions to stability and eventually a normalized security cooperation construct, attributable PSYOP will essentially be eliminated. MNF-I envisions PSYOP will become more un-attributed/delayed attribution—meaning more PSYOP at the higher operational/lower strategic level (USF-I). MNDs work by, with, and through their Iraqi partners and do not have authorities to conduct delayed or un-attributed PSYOP. MNDs rely on MNF-1/MNC-1 authorities to support their PSYOP plans—a trend that will continue. When combat forces pulled out of the cities on 30 June, the operating environment required units to consolidate into fewer and larger bases and movements were restricted, which resulted in the ability to reach out and interact with the populace becoming more limited. Anticipated timeline for this will initially occur at the stand-up of USF-I (N/T O) January 2010 and continue through Change of Mission at the end of August 2010.

RECOMMENDATION 2 (page 14, DODIG Draft Report)

(U) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, in consultation with the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq:

2. (U) Assess and plan for additional psychological operations requirements for advisory organizations, such as Advisory and Assistance Brigades, that will be necessary as they replace Brigade Combat Teams.

MNF-I RESPONSE: MNF-I concurs with information provided in this report. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) requirements for Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AAB) will remain unchanged; however, effort to conduct joint training with Iraqi forces will increase. The first out of six AABs has arrived in theater, with the last AAB due NLT August 2010.

RECOMMENDATION 3 (page 14, DODIG Draft Report)

(U) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, in consultation with the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq:

3. (U) Ensure that subordinate organizations that conduct psychological operations identify the need for contracting officer's representatives to oversee contracts for psychological operations on applicable Joint Manning Documents, Requests for Forces, or battle rosters to make certain contracting officer's representatives are trained prior to deployment.

MNF-I RESPONSE: MNF-I concurs with information provided in this report. The responsibility of the Contracting Officer's Representative should be included in Joint Manning Documents, Requests for Forces, or battle rosters (pg. 8). Contract oversight controls could be improved through more efficient identification of CORs (pg. 3). With an increased emphasis on pre-deployment COR training, contract oversight will be greatly improved.

GENERAL COMMENTS
TO THE DRAFT REPORT

1. (U) Page 1. "Previous reports discussed whether the indefinite-delivery, indefinite quantity IO contracts awarded by the Joint Contracting-Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-IA) complied with the Federal Acquisition Regulation." We recommend naming the specific contract in question, "Media and Advertising Services" and referencing the contract number: W91GDW-08-D-4013. Alternatively, the sentence could simply read "... discussed whether one multiple-award indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity IO contract awarded by Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-IA) complied with the Federal Acquisition Regulation."
2. (U) Page 3. The report lists an incorrect date for the Joint Campaign Plan. The most current version of the Joint Campaign Plan is June 19, 2009.
3. (U) Page 4. The report references MNC-I Operations Order 09-01. MNC-I activities are aligned under the most current MNC-I Operations Order, 09-02.
4. (U) Page 5. The report states that, "MNC-I completed a review of PSYOP requirements and associated costs of \$183.4 million through December 2010." The total \$183.4M was a total of current contract costs, without extending the Period of Performance through Dec 2010. All of the contracts in that briefing will have expired by Dec 2010, requiring additional funding

Revised Page 5

Final Report
Reference (U)

to support mission requirements. We recommend changing the sentence to read "MNC-I completed a review of PSYOP requirements through December 2010." The associated costs are reflected on page 9 of the DoD IG report, under the section entitled "Benefits of PSYOP."

5. (1) Page 7. Change "The contracting officer reviews the statement of work and makes any necessary modifications" to "The contracting officer reviews the statement of work and if necessary, recommends changes to the customer".

Revised Page 7

6. ~~(U) (M) (S) (A) (C) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N) (O) (P) (Q) (R) (S) (T) (U) (V) (W) (X) (Y) (Z)~~ Page 8. The report states that, "PSYOP products commonly developed by contractors include television commercials, print products (newspapers, billboards, banners), and radio products (regarding opinion editorials)." The phrase "regarding opinion editorials" does not apply to "radio products," but rather applies to print products. Recommend delete "(regarding opinion editorials)" and adding "opinion editorials" to the list of example print products.

Revised Page 8

APPROVED BY:



PREPARED BY:



Multi-National Corps-Iraq (U)

DoDIG DRAFT REPORT - DATED 19 October 2009
DoDIG Project Number D2009-D000JA-0108.002

"Information Operations in Iraq"

MNC-I COMMENTS TO THE DRAFT REPORT

RECOMMENDATION 1 (page 14, DODIG Draft Report)

(U) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, in consultation with the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq:

1. (U) Determine how ongoing psychological operations requirements will change at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels as the command's structure and mission evolve during the implementation of the "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq," November 17, 2008.

MNC-I RESPONSE: Concur.

RECOMMENDATION 2 (page 14, DODIG Draft Report)

(U) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force Iraq, in consultation with the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq:

2. (U) Assess and plan for additional psychological operations requirements for advisory organizations, such as Advisory and Assistance Brigades, that will be necessary as they replace Brigade Combat Teams.

MNC-I RESPONSE: Concur.

RECOMMENDATION 3 (page 14, DODIG Draft Report)

(U) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, in consultation with the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq:

3. (U) Ensure that subordinate organizations that conduct psychological operations identify the need for contracting officer's representatives to oversee contracts for psychological operations on applicable Joint Manning Documents. Requests for forces, or battle rosters to make certain contracting officer's representatives are trained prior to deployment.

MNC-I RESPONSE: Concur.

GENERAL COMMENTS
TO THE DRAFT REPORT

1. (U) Page 1. "Previous reports discussed whether the indefinite-delivery, indefinite quantity IO contracts awarded by the Joint Contracting-Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-IA) complied with the Federal Acquisition Regulation." We recommend naming the specific contract in question, "Media and Advertising Services" and referencing the contract number: W91GDW-08-D-4013. Alternatively, the sentence could simply read "... discussed whether one multiple-award indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity IO contract awarded by Joint Contracting Command-Iraq-Afghanistan (JCC-IA) complied with the Federal Acquisition Regulation."
2. (U) Page 5. The report states that, "MNC-I completed a review of PSYOP requirements and associated costs of \$183.4 million through December 2010." The total \$183.4M was a total of current contract costs, without extending the Period of Performance through Dec 2010. All of the contracts in that briefing will have expired by Dec 2010, requiring additional funding to support mission requirements. We recommend changing the sentence to read "MNC-I completed a review of PSYOP requirements through December 2010." The associated costs are reflected on page 9 of the DoD IG report, under the section entitled "Benefits of PSYOP."

APPROVED BY:



PREPARED BY:



~~SECRET~~



Inspector General
Department of Defense

~~SECRET~~