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MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, COMBINED JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE – SYRIA


(U) The purpose of this report is to provide the results of an evaluation conducted by the DoD Office of Inspector General, Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments, and to make recommendations based on our observations. This report relates to the overseas contingency operation, Operation Inherent Resolve, and was completed in accordance with the OIG’s oversight responsibilities, as described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. We considered management and technical comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report.

(U) We evaluated Combined Joint Interagency Task Force – Syria (CJIATF-S) vetting procedures to determine whether they effectively identified derogatory information that would keep an individual from participating in the Syrian Training and Equipment (T&E) program. In addition, we reviewed the entire vetting program to determine whether additions or modifications were needed to strengthen the overall T&E effort.

(U) The 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established criteria for designating an individual as appropriately vetted\(^1\) before receiving assistance under the Syrian T&E program. The vetting procedures developed by CJIATF-S meet the NDAA Section 1209 requirements. CJIATF-S has incorporated hard-won lessons the intelligence community learned about vetting from other counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. However, we made a number of recommendations and observations (Attachment A) for the command’s use, which in our view, if addressed could provide additional confidence in the Syrian T&E vetting programs overall effectiveness.

\(^1\) (U) Public Law 113-291, Section 1209 (e), December 19, 2014.
(U) Background

(U) On March 6, 2015, the CJATF-S/J2 submitted a request through the USCENTCOM Inspector General for the OIG to conduct an independent evaluation of the recruiting, screening, and vetting processes developed by CJATF-S to identify personnel for T&E operations in support of the New Syrian Forces (NSF). These processes, which address DoD authorities for foreign and security assistance programs conducted under the auspices of Operation Inherent Resolve, were developed to comply with Congressional legislation:

- (U) The FY 2015 continuing appropriations resolution, enacted on September 19, 2014, authorizes DoD, to provide overt assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to vetted members of the Syrian opposition and other vetted Syrians for select purposes through December 11, 2014, or until the passage of an FY 2015 NDAA.3

- (U) The FY 2015 NDAA states that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, is authorized to "provide assistance, including training, equipment, supplies ... to appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals..."4

- (U) On December 16, 2014, the "Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015," defined assistance as "Defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and securing territory controlled by the opposition; protecting the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria; and promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria."5

(U) Objective

(U) Our objective was to assess the planning and implementation of CJATF-S NSF vetting plans and procedures and their probable usefulness by U.S. and Coalition forces supporting CJATF-S, in accordance with Congressional requirements. Specifically, we determined whether the:

- (U) guidance, standards, procedures, training, resources, and safeguards exist and are sufficient to enable CJATF-S to develop and implement vetting processes to identify, recruit, and accept/reject NSF personnel, including pre-biometric, and counterintelligence vetting of recruit's suitability;

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3 (U/FOUO) CJATF-S J2 E-mail.
4 (U) Continuing Appropriations Resolution, Public Law 113-164, Section 149 (h), September 19, 2014.
5 (U) Section 1209 (a) NDAA for FY 2015.
6 (U) Section 1209 (a) NDAA for FY 2015.
• (U) processes are designed to identify credible information vetted in accordance with applicable law, including but not limited to acts of violence against friendly forces, or political affiliations in conflict with the NSF mission; and

• (U) type and extent of current and planned interagency collaboration in the NSF vetting processes used local sources and reach-back capabilities available to DoD, Department of State (DOS), other government agencies, and non-governmental organizations.

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) This evaluation was conducted from March 2015 through June 2015, in accordance with Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objectives.

(S//REL to USA, FVEY) At the request of the CJIAF-S Director, the team began this evaluation before the execution phase of the NSF T&E operation was implemented.

(U) To accomplish our objective we:

• (U) reviewed all applicable federal statutes and policy about vetting. We also reviewed the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff, USCENTCOM, and CJIAF-S's plans, operational directives, and policies;

• (U) interviewed personnel from the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, and Joint Staff about DoD vetting policy;

• (U) interviewed DOS representatives from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Legal Adviser Office about DoD vetting policies and procedures;

• (U) interviewed CJIAF-S reach-back supporting staff in the National Capital region and other CONUS locations;

• (U) traveled to Qatar, Jordan, and Turkey to interview CJIAF-S personnel; and

• (U) traveled throughout Jordan and Turkey to interview personnel implementing CJIAF-S and supporting staff vetting processes and procedures.
(U) New Syria Force Vetting Process Requirements

(U) Section 1209 (b) of the 2015 NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership of the House of Representatives and Senate; the report should contain a description of the plan for providing assistance as well as the requirements and processes used to determine appropriately vetted recipients. The legislation also requires a description of the mechanisms and procedures that will be used to monitor and report to the appropriate congressional leadership on unauthorized end-use of provided training and equipment and other violations of relevant law by recipients.

(U) The NDAA further stated that the following definitions must apply: “The term appropriately vetted means, with respect to elements of the Syrian Opposition and other Syrian Groups and individuals, at a minimum, assessment of such elements, groups, and individuals for associations with terrorist groups, Shia militias aligned with or supporting the Government of Syria, and groups associated with the Government of Iran. Such groups include, but are not limited to, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jabhat al Nusrah, Ahrar al Sham, other al-Qaeda related groups, and Hezbollah.”

(U) On January 30, 2015, DoD provided a report to Congress detailing its plan to, among other requirements, appropriately vet Syrian Opposition Forces for inclusion into the NSF T&E program. That plan states:

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4 (U) NDAA for FY 2015.
(U) **Pre-Biometric Screening Phase**

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) We began our independent assessment of these processes by comparing the Vetting Narrative and the Vetting SOP for compliance with congressionally mandated appropriately vetted requirements.

(U) An extract from the Vetting Narrative states:

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(3) (U) CJATF - Syria T&E Vetting Narrative, February 26, 2015.

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(U) CJATF-Syria T&E Vetting Narrative, February 26, 2015.
Table – Pre-Biometric Screening Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(g)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(U) OIG Assessment of the Pre-Biometric Phase

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) CJIAF-S assign additional analysts to the CSC. We noted that plans for adding analytic personnel to the screening cell when the first unit rotations are programmed for CJIAF-S HQ could alleviate this shortfall, but were unable to evaluate this change at the time of our evaluation.
(U) Combined Joint Interagency Task Force - Syria Response

(U) DoD request authorities for the CJIAF-S Director to initiate direct contact with Syrian opposition commanders in order to independently increase the number of potential candidates for the Syrian T&E program.
(U) Our Response

(U) Mission Support Site Screening/Biometric Enrollment Phase

(U) Screening Node SOP.
(U) Finally, to comply with the congressional requirement for each recruit to commit to promoting the respect for human rights and the rule of law, the MSS staff requires each recruit to formally sign and pledge in Arabic (Attachment C) their commitment to the law of armed conflict, human rights, and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{16}
(U) OIG Assessment of the Mission Support Site Screening/Biometric Enrollment Phase

(U) Recommendation 3

(U) Combined Joint Interagency Task Force - Syria Response

(U) Our Response

Comments from CJIAFT-S are responsive and the actions meet the intent of the recommendation. No further action is required.

(U) Training Phase (Monitoring and Assessment)
(U) OIG Assessment of the Training Phase (Monitoring and Assessment)

(U) Recommendation 4

(U) CJIATF-S J2 ensure that IIR's being produced at the training sites are being circulated throughout CJIATF-S and the intelligence community.

(U) Combined Joint Interagency Task Force - Syria Response

(U) Our Response

Comments from CJIATF-S are responsive and the actions meet the intent of the recommendation. No further action is required.
(U) Conclusions
(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. Please direct any questions to:

- DOD IG Office: (703) 699-4991, DSN 499-4991
- NIPRNET or SIPRNET

or JWICS at (703) 699-4991, DSN 499-4991

A formal briefing on our evaluation can be provided upon request.

Anthony C. Thomas
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments

Attachments:
- Other Matters of Interest for the Train and Equip Program (U)
- MSS Screening Phase Interview Questions (U)
- Pledge of New Syrian Forces (U)
- CJIATF-S Vetting Process Documentation (U)
- Acronyms and Abbreviations (U)
- CJIATF-S Response to Draft Evaluation Report (U)

cc:
- Secretary of Defense
- Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Commander, U.S. Central Command
- Commander, U.S. European Command
- Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command
(U) Other Matters of Interest for the Train and Equip Program

(§/REL TO USA, FVEY) While USG interagency partners are contributing to the overall CJATF-S vetting program, there appears to be a lack of unity of effort. The planned change in the may impact the vetting program. The current Vetting SOP and Vetting Narrative establish this as a CJATF-S HQ level responsibility. We were unable to evaluate the effect this change in procedure might bring, but we encourage the Command to include a feedback mechanism in updates to the Vetting SOP.
(U) Mission Support Site Screening Phase Interview Questions

- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(a)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(b)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(c)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(d)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(e)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(f)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(g)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(h)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(i)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(j)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(k)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(l)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(m)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(n)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(o)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(p)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(q)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(r)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(s)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(t)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(u)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(v)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(w)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(x)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(y)
- CENTCOM (b)(3), 50 USC § 1024(z)
(U) Pledge of New Syrian Forces

"I swear by my God, as a member of the Syrian Revolution and the New Syrian Forces, to defend the Syrian people from Da'işh. I pledge that I will fight Da'işh to free the Syrian people from their tyranny. In contributing to this effort, I understand that I must act in a responsible manner. Therefore, I announce my unconditional commitment to the rule of law and following rules of the law of armed conflict:

I will fight only combatants. I will not harm civilians who are not directly participating in the fight, the wounded and sick, detainees, and parachutists of disabled aircraft, people performing medical duties, relief workers, chaplains, or journalists.

I will treat humanely all who surrender or are captured. I understand all detainees must receive medical treatment, food, water, shelter, basic hygiene, basic clothing, and adequate conditions. I will treat women and children with respect.

I will not kill or torture detained personnel. It does not matter what the person has done in the fight. I recognize that courts are the only bodies sanctioned to apply justice. No form of punishment will be advanced unless it has been mandated by such courts. Collective punishment is strictly forbidden.

I will collect and care for the wounded, including those who have fought against us.

I will not attack protected persons or protected places. I am obligated to protect all religious buildings and places, and all historical monuments and sites, regardless of religion or sect, unless used for a military purpose. I will facilitate relief efforts and humanitarian work. Accordingly, I will protect hospitals, ambulances, and humanitarian and relief workers. I will also protect journalists to the best of my ability.

I will destroy no more than the mission requires.
I will treat all civilians humanely. I understand that attacks against civilians are strictly forbidden, as is terrorizing or otherwise compelling civilians to abandon their homelands. I will not harm anyone on the basis of their religion, political affiliation, or gender. Under no circumstances will I resort to the taking of hostages. I will not harm women or violate their dignity.

I will respect private property and possessions. I understand that the theft of any private property is strictly forbidden.

I will prevent violations. I understand that every fighter must know and follow the rules and help ensure that his fellow fighters follow the rules. If I am uncertain about the rules, I will ask. Any order to violate these rules is invalid.

I will report violations to my chain of command. If in command, I will investigate all credible complaints regarding violations and take all necessary measures to prevent violations and to discipline those responsible for any violations.

I understand that I am duty bound to protect the principles and the responsibilities noted above and that failure to do so will subject me to discipline and possible expulsion from the New Syrian Forces.”
(U) Attachment D

(U) Combined Joint Interagency Task Force – Syria Vetting Process Documentation

2. (U//FOUO) CJIA-TF-J2 E-mail, March 2, 2015
4. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1)(i), sec. 1.4(c)
5. (U) CJIA-TF-Syria T&E "Vetting Narrative", February 26, 2015
6. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1)(i), sec. 1.4(c)
7. (U) Screening Node SOP
8. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1)(i), sec. 1.4(c)
9. (U) CJSTF-S Commander MFR, Subject: Commitment of New Syrian Forces, May 11, 2015
10. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1)(i), sec. 1.4(c)
11. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1)(i), sec. 1.4(c)
(U) Attachment E

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

BEWL  Biometrically Enabled Watch List
BIMA  Biometrics Identity Management Activity
CI    Counter Intelligence
CJIATF-S Combined Joint Interagency Task Force - Syria
CJSOTF-S Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Syria
CSC   CJIATF-S Screening Cell
DIA   Defense Intelligence Agency
DOS   Department of State
IED   Improvised Explosive Device
IIR   Initial Intelligence Report
ISIL  Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
J2    Director of Intelligence
J2-X  Counter-Intelligence and HUMINT Directorate
MOS   Military Occupational Specialty
MSS   Mission Support Site
NDAA  National Defense Authorization Act
NGIC  National Ground Intelligence Center
NSF   New Syrian Forces
NTR   Name Trace Request
OIG   Office of the Inspector General
PCASS Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System
POI   Person of Interest
SEEK Secure Electronic Enrollment Kit
SOF   Special Operations Forces
SOP   Standard Operating Procedures
MEMORANDUM FOR Inspector General, Department of Defense, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22350-1500

SUBJECT: (U) Response to Evaluation of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force - Syria (CJIATF-S) Vetting Process of New Syrian Forces (Project No. 2015-DISPA1-0155.000)

1. (U) This memorandum is the CJIATF-S response to the draft report, Project No. 2015-DISPA1-0155.000. Paragraphs 1-8 address recommended changes to the report and 9-12 are responses to recommendations from the inspection team.

2. (U) Portion classification markings are required for the following:
   a. (Secret//REL TO USA, FVEY) Page 4, 3rd and 4th paragraphs.
   b. (Secret//REL TO USA, FVEY) Page 5, all paragraphs.
   c. (Secret//REL TO USA, FVEY) Page 6, 1st paragraph.

3. (U) Page 8, Last Paragraph:

   (Secret//REL TO USA, FRA, JOR, SAT, SAE, TUR, FVEY)

   a. (Secret//REL TO USA, FRA, JOR, SAT, SAE, TUR, FVEY)
   b. (Secret//REL TO USA, FRA, JOR, SAT, SAE, TUR, FVEY)

   (Centcom (1) 14a 14b) 14c 14d

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
(U) CJIATF-S Response to Draft Report (cont'd)

4. (U) Page 9, 5th Paragraph: "...a CENTCOM (6/13) file is created...
   a. (U) CENTCOM is the software system currently used to capture data pertaining to Vetted Syrian Opposition. The captured information is stored on a
      While many government agencies utilize CENTCOM access to data is dependent on the organization's desired level of information sharing. Some organizations, allowing information access and contribution from outside sources. Conversely, others such as CJSOTF-S, allow access only through controlled user accounts.
   b. (U) Currently, the CJSOTF-S
      does not distribute information, but is integrated with multiple message traffic systems to collect and consolidate information. The collected data stored on the server and is secured with limited permissions and access controls set by
      who maintains granting authority for account access. Although possible, the CJSOTF-S database does not currently share information with other CENTCOM accounts.

5. (U) Page 10, Bottom of Page: "All initial interview responses are recorded in the recruits CENTCOM file." (See para 4)

6. (U) Page 11, Last Paragraph references CENTCOM again (See para 4).

7. (U) Page 12, Top Paragraph: "...were unsure if this information was distributed outside of CJSOTF-S." - This references data previously captured in CENTCOM and now in CENTCOM. It is necessary to identify requirements for sharing information from CENTCOM with outside agencies and potentially other nations.
   a. (U) Non-concur.
   b. (U) No additional systems or software necessary. Information sharing can be accomplished through CENTCOM although it is currently access controlled and limited distribution.
   c. (U) CENTCOM In addition to CENTCOM files, CENTCOM

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
7. (U) Page 13, Last Paragraph: "We are unable to provide an assessment, at this time, on the impact of these changes to the overall program."

   a. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (0) (1) sec. 1.4(a)

   b. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (0) (1) sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

8. (U) Recommendation 1: CJIATF-S assigns additional analysts to the CSC. It was noted that plans for adding analytic personnel to the screening cell when the first unit rotations are programmed for CJIATF-S HQ could alleviate this shortfall; however, there are no means to evaluate the change at this time.

   a. (S//REL TO USA, FRA, JOR, TUR, GUA, CAT, FVEY) Partially concur.

   b. (S//REL TO USA, FRA, JOR, TUR, GUA, CAT, FVEY)

      1) (S//REL TO USA, FRA, JOR, TUR, GUA, CAT, FVEY) The total number of analysts assigned to the screening & vetting cell is as follows: CENTCOM (0) (1) sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

      2) (S//REL TO USA, FRA, JOR, TUR, GUA, CAT, FVEY) CENTCOM (0) (1) sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)
CJIA TF-SYRIA-S/DP
SUBJECT: (U) Response to Evaluation of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force - Syria (CJIA TF-S) Vetting Process of New Syrian Forces (Project No. 2015-DISPA1-0155.000)

When complete, a recommended course of action will be presented to the CJIA TF-S Decision Board for approval.

9. (U) Recommendation 2: DoD request authorities for the CJIA TF-S Director to initiate direct contact with Syrian opposition commanders in order to independently increase the number of potential candidates for the Syrian T&E program.
   a. (REL TO USA, FRA, JOR, TUR, SAU, QAT, FVEY) Concur.
   b. (REL TO USA, FRA, JOR, TUR, SAU, QAT, FVEY) It is understood this recommendation refers to the ability of

10. (U) Recommendation 3: We believe that this would increase the overall effectiveness of the screening process. CENTCOM (01T), 59 USC § 3024(i)
   a. (REL TO USA, FRA, JOR, TUR, SAU, QAT, FVEY) Concur.
   b. (REL TO USA, FRA, JOR, TUR, SAU, QAT, FVEY) CENTCOM (01T), sec. 1.4(c)

11. (U) Recommendation 4: CJIA TF-S J2 ensures that TIR's being produced at the training sites are being circulated throughout CJIA TF-S and the intelligence community.
   a. (REL TO USA, FRA, JOR, TUR, SAU, QAT, FVEY) Concur.
   b. (REL TO USA, FRA, JOR, TUR, SAU, QAT, FVEY) CENTCOM (01T), sec. 1.4(c)
CJIATF-S Response to Draft Report (cont’d)

SUBJECT: (U) Response to Evaluation of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force – Syria (CJIATF-S) Vetting Process of New Syrian Forces (Project No. 2015-DISPA1-0155.000)

CENTCOM (0111) sec 1.4(4)

12. (U) The point of contact for this memorandum is Inspector General at VOIP.

TOD J. WILSON
Deputy Director CJIATF-S
Whistleblower Protection
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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For more information about DoD IG reports or activities, please contact us:

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