

# INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

November 23, 2015



(U) U.S. Africa Command Needs to Improve Planning and Coordination for the Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Embassies and U.S. Citizens



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# Results in Brief

(U) U.S. Africa Command Needs to Improve Planning and Coordination for the Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Embassies and U.S. Citizens

(U) November 23, 2015


### (U) Objective

(U) Our audit objective was to determine whether U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) plans for the protection and evacuation of U.S. embassies and noncombatant U.S. citizens within its area of responsibility (AOR) complied with Federal and DoD evacuation policies.

We nonstatistically reviewed 9 of 53 U.S. embassies in the AFRICOM AOR.

### (U) Finding

(U) AFRICOM's plans for the protection and evacuation of U.S. embassies and U.S. citizens generally complied with Federal and DoD protection and evacuation polices. However, AFRICOM officials did not:



•	AFRICOM; (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(g), OSD/JS; (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. [.4(g)
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(U) During the audit, AFRICOM officials updated the NEO Concept Plan to require country-specific NEO plans only when directed by the AFRICOM Commander, instead of requiring NEO plans for all AFRICOM AOR countries.

### (U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Commander, AFRICOM develop embassy protection and evacuation guidance that clarifies and defines roles and responsibilities for AFRICOM planning in the NN environment, and incorporates the increased role of NN for NEO planning requirements and review emergency action plans and document and coordinate the review results with the Department of State. We recommend that the Director, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, Stability and Humanitarian Affairs [OSD[P] SOLIC/SHA) coordinate with Department of State to establish joint guidance for updating emergency action plans with critical and required NN and NEO information.

# (U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) Comments from the Commander, AFRICOM, addressed all specifics of Recommendations 1.a, 1.b, and 3, and no further comments are required. As a result of management comments, we redirected Recommendation 2 to the Director, OSD(P) SOLIC/SHA. Therefore, we request the Director provide comments on the recommendation by December 22, 2015. Please see the Recommendations Table on the back of this page.

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## (U) Recommendations Table

(U) Management	(U) Recommendations Requiring Comment	(U) No additional Comments Required
(U) Office of the Under Secretary of	2	
Defense for Policy, Special		
Operations/Low Intensity Conflict,		
Stability and Humanitarian Affairs		
(U) Commander, U.S. Africa Command		1.a, 1.b, 3

<sup>(</sup>U) Please provide Management Comments by December 22, 2015.



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

November 23, 2015

- (U) MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
- (U) SUBJECT: U.S. Africa Command Needs to Improve Planning and Coordination for the Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Embassies and U.S. Citizens (Report No. DODIG-2016-024)

(S) AFRICOM: (b) (1), EO 13526	sec. 1.4(a); OSD/JS: (b) (1), EO	13526, sec. 1.4(g)	医连续管 的一点多多的		
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				1.4(g)	
				We conduc	ted this audit in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

- (U) We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments from the Commander, U.S. Africa Command, addressed all specifics of Recommendations 1.a, 1.b, and 3, and no further comments are required. As a result of management comments, we redirected Recommendation 2 to the Director, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, Stability and Humanitarian Affairs. Therefore, we request that the Director provide comments on Recommendation 2 by December 22, 2015. Comments provided on the final report must be marked and portion-marked, as appropriate, in accordance with DoD Manual 5200.01.
- (U) Please send a PDF file containing your comments to PDF file containing your comments to Specific for your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).
- (U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 699-7331 (DSN 312-499-7331).

Carol N. Gorman

Assistant Inspector General

Carol M. Homa

Readiness and Cyber Operations

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(U) Introduction

### (U) Introduction

### (U) Objective

(U) Our audit objective was to determine whether U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) plans for the protection and evacuation of U.S. embassies¹ and noncombatant U.S. citizens (U.S. citizens) within its area of responsibility (AOR) complied with Federal and DoD evacuation policies. See Appendix for the scope and methodology and prior coverage related to the audit objective.

### (U) Background

(U) The Department of State (DOS) is responsible for the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens in a foreign country. DOS can request assistance from DoD for the protection of U.S. citizens and facilities and the evacuation of U.S. citizens.

### (U) DOS Protection of U.S. Citizens

(U) DOS can take steps to protect embassy personnel and U.S. citizens if their safety is at risk. DOS normally initiates evacuations as a result of hostile action and may also initiate an evacuation in response to natural or manmade disasters. The DOS Chief of Mission<sup>2</sup> (COM) can implement an authorized departure of personnel. This allows for the voluntary departure of all family members and selected employees or an ordered evacuation that requires mandatory departure of all family members and designated employees. If the COM believes the political or security environment has deteriorated, where U.S. citizens' safety is threatened, the COM can order the evacuation of U.S. Government personnel and provide evacuation assistance to private U.S. citizens. DOS will use commercial or chartered transportation as the primary mode to evacuate personnel to a safe haven. DOS can also request U.S. military assistance in evacuating personnel if commercial or chartered transportation is inadequate, or the threat warrants.


<sup>(</sup>U) The audit objective only included embassies; however, our review includes both embassies and consulates. For this report, the term "embassy" will represent either an embassy or consulate.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> (FOUC) The Chief of Mission, in the capacity of ambassador, is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government executive branch employees in the country and for embassy management, including the protection of U.S. citizens, property, and interest.

### (U) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

(U) In 1998, DOS and DoD established a memorandum of agreement<sup>3</sup> that set roles and responsibilities regarding the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens and nationals from threatened areas overseas. DoD conducts Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) to assist DOS in evacuating U.S. citizens from foreign nations to safe havens. DOS may request DoD assistance in an evacuation based on the nature of the threat or the lack of alternative forms of transportation. During a NEO, the COM is the senior authority for the evacuation and is ultimately responsible for the successful completion of the NEO and the safety of all evacuees.

### (U) New Normal




<sup>3 (</sup>U) DOS/DoD Memorandum of Agreement, "Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Nationals and Designated Other Persons From Threatened Areas Oyerseas," July 14, 1998.

<sup>4 (</sup>C) AFRICOM: (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(g), OSD/JS: (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(g) (Secret//NOFORN)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> (U) Joint Staff NN Global Unrest Execute Order, April 2013. (Secret)

### (U) AFRICOM



### (U) U.S. Embassies

(FOUO) The DOS emergency action plans (EAP) state Emergency Action Committees at each U.S. embassy plan and prepare for crises by updating and maintaining an EAP. The EAP provides procedures to respond to emergencies such as bombs, fires, civil disorder, and evacuations. The committee members include subject-matter experts who provide the COM with guidance to prepare for and respond to threats, emergencies, and other crises. According to the EAP, the committee should consist of representatives from all U.S. Government agencies located at the embassy, which include the Deputy COM, Regional Security Officer,7 and Defense Attaché.8 The committee also conducts vulnerability assessments; develops decision points and actions to take when decision point thresholds are met; assesses threats, dangers, or vulnerabilities; and implements the EAP when circumstances warrant.

<sup>6 (</sup>U) Commander USAFRICOMDoD OIG (b) (7)(E) (Secret

<sup>7 (</sup>U) The Regional Security Officer is a DOS security officer responsible for embassy security.

<sup>8 (</sup>U) The Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché serves under the joint oversight of the combatant commander concerned; the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency; and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. Defense Attachés are the COM's principal military advisers on defense matters and defense aspects of national security.

(U) Introduction

### (U) Review of Internal Controls

(U) DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013, requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls.

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addition, AFRICOM officials did not ensure required information was included in DOS EAPs. We will provide a copy of the report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in AFRICOM.


# (U) Finding

### (U) AFRICOM Did Not Complete All NEO Requirements and Ensure NEO and NN Planning Was Incorporated in DOS EAPs


(U) The AFRICOM Combatant Commander's plans for the protection and evacuation of U.S. embassies and U.S. citizens generally complied with Federal and DoD protection and evacuation polices. However, AFRICOM J3 and J5 officials did not:

•	AFRICOM: (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(g), OSD/IS: (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(g)
•	
•	AFRICOM: (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS; (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(g)
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# (U) AFRICOM's NN Plans Generally Complied With DoD Policy




(FOUO) Figure. High-Risk Facilities Within AFRICOM AOR



(U) Source: DoD OIG



<sup>9 (</sup>U) The combatant commander develops the plans in anticipation of a potential crisis. There are four levels and each level requires more detail. Level II describes the major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission.



# (U) AFRICOM's NEO Plan Complied With Federal and DoD Policies

(U) AFRICOM J5 officials completed the AFRICOM NEO CONPLAN in accordance with Federal and DoD policy.<sup>11</sup> The Memorandum of Agreement, Joint Publication,<sup>12</sup> and DoD Directive<sup>13</sup> requires DoD to prepare and implement plans for the protection and evacuation of DoD noncombatants worldwide. AFRICOM J5 officials created the

<sup>10 (</sup>C) AFRICOM: (b) (1), EO [3526, sec. 1.4(a), OSD/JS: (b) (1), EO [3526, sec. 1.4(g)]

<sup>11 (</sup>U) Federal and DoD NEO policy were non-descriptive and general regarding what the NEO plans should include; therefore, we limited our analysis to general plan completeness.

 $<sup>^{12}</sup>$  (U) Joint Publication 3-68, "Noncombatant Evacuation Operations," December 23, 2010.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> (U) DoD Directive 3025.14, "Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad," February 26, 2013.


(U) Finding

- (U) NEO CONPLAN as the functional plan that provides the AFRICOM AOR theater strategic framework for NEOs as required by Federal and DoD policy. The NEO CONPLAN serves as a guide for the NEO planning team during crisis evacuation planning.
- (U) AFRICOM officials also developed a NEO CONOPS template and guide to create a country-specific NEO CONOPS. The template and guide provides AFRICOM officials with detailed descriptions of the information needed in a NEO CONOPS. For example, the template and guide provide the layout for including flight times and distances to the recommended temporary safe havens. AFRICOM officials completed NEO CONOPS for seven of the nine countries included in our audit. See the Appendix for the nine countries.


# (FOUC) NEO CONOPS Not Developed for NOTO CONOPS Not Developed for NOTO CONTROL OF CONTRO

(FOUO) AFRICOM officials did not develop NEO CONOPS for AFRICOM (NOTIFICIALITY) as required by the AFRICOM NEO CONPLAN. The NEO CONPLAN required the AFRICOM J3/4 Directorates to prioritize, create, file, and update NEO CONOPS for all countries within the AFRICOM AOR.

# (U) NEO CONPLAN Was Not Updated to Account for NN Requirements



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> (U) AFRICOM NN EXORD Order 001, April 2013.




- (U) collaborate and clearly define NN and DoD roles and responsibilities under the NN mission, and
- (U) update existing interagency and department guidance pertaining to DoD's increased role under the NN mission.

(U) DoD and DOS agreed with the recommendations and are updating existing guidance. Because of the GAO report's findings and recommendations, we did not review or make any recommendations related to Federal and DoD guidance. However, we determined that AFRICOM should assess current requirements for embassy protection and evacuation plans, develop or update internal guidance to clarify and define its roles and responsibilities for NN and NEO planning in the current NN threat environment, and

<sup>15 (</sup>U) GAO Report GAO-15-219C, "DoD and State Need to Clarify DoD Roles and Responsibilities to Protect U.Ş. Personnel and Facilities Overseas in High-Threat Areas," March 2015.

(U) incorporate the increased role of the NN security environment into NEO planning requirements.


# (U) Management Actions Initiated to Update NEO CONPLAN



# (FOUO) DOS EAPs Did Not Include Essential Protection and Evacuation Planning Information

(FOUO) The AFRICOM J3 and J5 officials did not ensure that the nine DOS EAPs contained essential information that would enable DoD and DOS to protect and evacuate U.S. citizens. Specifically, the plans did not include planning information from NN plans and critical elements from the NEO CONOPS plans.

### (U) EAPs Did Not Include NN Planning Information



### (U) EAPs Did Not Include Critical Elements From NEO CONOPS

(FOUO) The nine DOS EAPs did not include critical elements to support military operations from AFRICOM country-specific NEO CONOPS. DoD Directive 3025.14 requires DoD to integrate protection and evacuation plans into the EAPs. AFRICOM officials completed NEO CONOPS for seven of the nine countries included in our audit, but critical information from the NEO CONOPS was not included in the EAPs. None of the seven EAPs referenced military protection or evacuation information from the NEO CONOPS. For example, the NEO CONOPS contained DoD airlift capabilities that included type, range, passenger capacity, and flight times; location and size of response forces such as allied forces; and details of specific port and airfield locations in each country where extraction was possible. The EAPs contained none of this information.

# (FOUO) DoD and DOS Lacked Joint Guidance Requiring DOS to Update EAPs

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# (FOUO) Protection and Evacuation Guidance and Planning Needed to Improve DoD and DOS's Abilities to Respond to Crisis

(FOUC) Without adequate protection and evacuation plans and guidance, there is an increased risk that DoD and DOS will not successfully protect, evacuate, and respond to embassy personnel and U.S. citizens in case of an emergency in the AFRICOM AOR.

(FOUC) The goal of protection and evacuation planning is to reduce to a minimum the number of U.S. citizens subject to the risk of death or seizure as hostages. For AFRICOM to adequately address this risk, it must update plans to address the current security environment and incorporate DoD protection and evacuation planning information into DOS plans. In addition, if the information necessary to make critical decisions is not readily available, delays may occur and ultimately risk the lives of U.S. citizens.


# (U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response


### (U) Renumbered Recommendations

(U) As a result of management comments, we redirected draft report Recommendation 1.b to the Director, OSD(P) SOLIC/SHA, and renumbered it as Recommendation 2. In addition, we renumbered draft report Recommendations 1.a (1), 1.a (2), and 1.c as Recommendations 1.a, 1.b, and 3 respectively.

### (U) Recommendation 1

- (U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Africa Command develop embassy protection and evacuation guidance that:
  - a. (U) Clarifies and defines roles and responsibilities for U.S. Africa Command's new normal and noncombatant evacuation operations planning in the current new normal threat environment.
  - b. (U) Incorporates the increased role of new normal for noncombatant evacuation operations planning requirements.





- (U) Our Response
- (U) The comments from the Chief of Staff addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

### (U) Redirected Recommendation

(U) As a result of management comments and discussions with OSD(P) SOLIC/SHA, we redirected Recommendation 2 to the Director, OSD(P) SOLIC/SHA, who is in the process of updating the Memorandum of Agreement for Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens with DOS.

### (U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Director, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, Stability and Humanitarian Affairs coordinate with the Department of State to establish a joint memorandum for updating emergency action plans within the U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility with critical and required new normal and noncombatant evacuation operations information. The agreement should identify specific critical elements within DoD protection and evacuation plans and Joint Staff new normal requirements that should be included in the emergency action plans.

#### (U) U.S. Africa Command Comments


(U) The Chief of Staff, AFRICOM, responding for the Commander, AFRICOM, agreed, stating that it is not the combatant command's responsibility to coordinate with the Secretary-level headquarters. The Chief of Staff recommends that the Joint Staff coordinate with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and DOS.

#### (U) Our Résponse

(U) Based on the Chief of Staff comments, we redirected Recommendation 2 to the Director OSD(P) SOLIC/SHA. We request that the Director OSD(P) SOLIC/SHA provide comments on the final report.

### (U) Recommendation 3

- (U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Africa Command review emergency action plans, in whole, for adequacy of supporting military operations and account for critical and required DoD new normal and noncombatant evacuation operations information. Document and coordinate the results of the reviews to the Department of State Chiefs of Mission.
- (U) U.S. Africa Command Comments




- (U) Our Response
- (U) The comments from the Chief of Staff addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

### (U) Appendix

### (U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from October 2014 through September 2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) We identified 53 embassies, which included the 15 high-risk embassies in the AFRICOM AOR, and nonstatistically selected the following nine embassies to include in our audit.



(U) AFRICOM separates its AOR into five regions: North, South, East, West, and Central. Therefore, we nonstatistically selected one high-risk and one non-high-risk location from each region except the South region because it did not have any high-risk embassies. The four high-risk embassies selected were

- (U) We obtained, reviewed, and analyzed protection and evacuation-related documents for the nine embassies to determine whether AFRICOM's protection and evacuation plans complied with Federal and DoD protection and evacuation policy. We did not test and review every policy requirement or all aspects of AFRICOM's protection and evacuation planning. Our testing was limited to whether AFRICOM completed plans that complied with protection and evacuation plan requirements identified in the Federal and DoD policy. Specifically we reviewed:
  - (U) NEO CONPLAN for compliance with the Memorandum of Agreement, Joint Publication 3-68, and DoD Directive 3025.14;
  - (U) NEO CONOPS for compliance with the NEO CONPLAN;
  - (U) NN CONOPS for compliance with Joint Staff NN EXORD; and
  - (U) AFRICOM briefing slides provided to embassy personnel for evidence that AFRICOM communicated NN to the DOS embassies.
- (U) In addition, we obtained and reviewed DOS EAPs for the nine embassies to determine whether the EAPs contained information from the military protection and evacuation plans as required by the following guidance.
  - (U) Memorandum of Agreement, "Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Nationals and Designated Other Persons From Threatened Areas Overseas," July 14, 1998;
  - (U) Joint Publication 3-68, "Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,"
     December 23, 2010;
  - (U) DoD Directive 3025.14, "Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad," February 26, 2013; and
  - (U) Joint Staff New Normal Global Unrest Execute Order, April 2013.
- (U) We interviewed personnel from the following AFRICOM Directorates.
  - (U) J2 Intelligence and Knowledge Development;
  - (U) J3 Operations and Cyber;
  - (U) J5 Strategy, Plans, and Programs; and
  - (U) J7 Joint Training, Readiness, and Exercises.

(U) Appendix

- (U) We also interviewed personnel from Marine Forces Europe Africa to discuss NN planning, the Joint Staff about the Joint Staff EXORD, the DOS Liaison located at AFRICOM, and the DOS Regional Security Officer and the Defense Attaché from all nine embassies to inquire about communication from AFRICOM regarding protection and evacuation planning.
- (U) We coordinated our audit efforts with GAO and DOS audit teams that were conducting concurrent embassy protection and evacuation-related audits.

### (U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

### (U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, GAO issued one restricted report discussing DOS and DoD guidance pertaining to military assistance to overseas posts.

### (U) GAO

(U) Report No. GAO-15-219C, "Interagency Coordination, DoD and State Need to Clarify DoD Roles and Responsibilities to Protect U.S. Personnel and Facilities Overseas in High-Threat Areas (SECRET//NOFORN)," March 2015

#### (U) Management Comments

### (U) Management Comments

### (U) Commander, U.S. AFRICOM

Final Report Reference



# HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND Office of the Chief of Staff

Office of the Chief of Staff UNIT 29951 APO AE 09751-9951

9 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR ADDRESSEE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL (DODIG)

SUBJECT: Response to DoDIG Audit Report: "U.S. Africa Command Needs to Improve Planning and Coordination for the Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Embassies and U.S. Citizens", (Project No. D2015-D000RE-0008.000)

- Reference: (a) Department of Defense Inspector General, Draft Report, (S) (Project No. D2015-D000RE-0008.00)
- 2. (U) DoDIG Recommendations:
- a. (U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Africa Command in cooperation and coordination with the Joint Staff, develop embassy protection and evacuation guidance that clarifies and defines roles and responsibilities for U.S. Africa Command's New Normal and noncombatant evacuation operations planning in the current New Normal threat environment.



b. (U) Incorporate the increased role of New Normal for noncombatant evacuation operations planning requirements. Coordinate with the Joint Staff and Department of State to establish a joint memorandum for updating Emergency Action Plans within the U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility with critical and required New Normal and noncombatant evacuation operations information. The agreement should identify specific critical elements within DoD protection and evacuation plans and required by DoD guidance that are to be included in the emergency action plans.

<u>USAFRICOM Response</u>: (U) Concurs with comment. We recommend that the JS coordinate with OSD and DoS to establish a joint memorandum. It is not the Combatant Command's responsibility to coordinate the activities of Secretary-level headquarters.

**CECRET** 

Classified by: PDUSD (P)
Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20391020

Renumbered draft Recommendations 1.a(1) and 1.a(2) as Recommendations


1.a and 1.b

Redirected and Renumbered draft Recommendation 1.b as Recommendation 2

### (U) Commander, U.S. AFRICOM (cont)

#### SFORET

c. (U) Review Emergency Action Plans, in whole, for adequacy of supporting military operations and account for critical and required DoD New Normal and noncombatant evacuation operations information. Document and coordinate the results of the reviews to the Chiefs of Mission



MICHAEL J. KINGSLE Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

#### Attachment(s)

- 1. Announcement Memo-D2015-D0000RE-0008
- 2. GAO-15-219-C

2 SEGRET Renumbered draft Recommendation 1.c as Recommendation 3

### (U) Classified Sources

- (U) Department of Defense. Joint Staff. New Normal Global Unrest EXORD. April 12, 2013. Declassify on: April 31, 2023 (S)
- (U) Department of Defense. U.S. Africa Command. USAFRICOM New Normal EXORD 001. April 26, 2013. Declassify on: April 26, 2023 (S)
- (U) Department of Defense, U.S. Africa Command, USAFRICOM New Normal EXORD 002. October 7, 2014. Declassify on: October 7, 2039 (S)
- (S) AFRICOM (b) (1), FO 13526, sec. 1.4(a); OSD/JS: (b) (1), FO 13526, sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

  January 15, 2015. Declassify on:

  January 15, 2040 (S//NF)
- (U) Department of Defense, U.S. Africa Command, CONOPS Level III March 2014, Declassify on: March 21, 2039 (S//NF)
- (U) Department of Defense. U.S. Africa Command. J3. Operation Oaken Sonnet. December 17, 2013, Declassify on: December 17, 2038 (S//NF)
- (S) AFRICOM (b) (1), EO 13526, Sec. 1.4(a), OSDJIS. (b) (1), EO 13526, Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

  January 23, 2013. Declassify on: January 23, 2038
  (S//NF)
- (U) Government Accountability Office. Report No. GAO-15-219C, "Interagency Coordination, DoD and State Need to Clarify DoD Roles and Responsibilities to Protect U.S. Personnel and Facilities Overseas in High-Threat Areas." March 2015. Declassify on: October 20, 2039 (S//NF)

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

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AFRICOM U.S. Africa Command

AOR Area of Responsibility

**COM** Chief of Mission

**CONOPS** Concept of Operations

CONPLAN Concept Plan

**DOS** Department of State

EAP Emergency Action Plan

**EXORD** Execute Order

GAO Government Accountability Office

**NEO** Noncombatant Evacuations Operations

NN New Normal

OSD(P) SOLIC/SHA Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Policy, Special Operations/Low Intensity

Conflict, Stability and Humanitarian Affairs

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
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4800 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, VA 22350-1500 www.dodig.mil Defense Hotline 1.800.424.9098

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