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# INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

July 20, 2016

(U) DoD Effectively Planned and Executed Military Information Support Operations for Operation Inherent Resolve but Needs to Develop Formal Processes and Procedures for Web-Based

# Operations

Classifich By: Michael J. Roark Deputy Assistant Inspector General Contract Management and Payments Denived From. Multiple Sources Collassify On: 20/10720

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#### INTEGRITY \* EFFICIENCY \* ACCOUNTABILITY \* EXCELLENCE

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# (U) Results in Brief

(U) DoD Effectively Planned and Executed Military Information Support Operations for Operation Inherent Resolve but Needs to Develop Formal Processes and Procedures for Web-Based Operations

#### (U) July 20, 2016

## (U) Objective

(U) We determined whether DoD effectively planned and executed Military Information Support Operations (MISO) for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR).



## (U) Finding

(U) CENTCOM and Combined Joint Task Force–OIR effectively planned and executed MISO for OIR. For example, personnel at CENTCOM Operations Directorate– Information Operations (CCJ3-IO) conducted web-based MISO to counter the media operations of ISIL.

(U) CENTCOM developed a process for requesting, conducting, and monitoring web-based MISO. However, the process

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#### (U) Finding (cont'd)

(U) was informal and was not documented in MISO policy and procedures. CENTCOM did not have documented policies and procedures because CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel focused on conducting web-based MISO to meet mission objectives and were waiting for DoD to develop guidance for this emerging capability.

(U) As a result, DoD and CENTCOM do not have assurance that CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel will properly and consistently carry out web-based MISO in support of OIR and other operations in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Formal guidance for web-based MISO will ensure roles and responsibilities are established and will provide Commanders the opportunity to effectively plan and execute MISO efforts and maintain continuity as personnel rotate throughout the CENTCOM AOR.

## (U) Recommendation and Management Actions Taken

(U) We met with the CENTCOM Director of IO to discuss the concerns we identified during our site visits to CENTCOM at MacDill Air Force Base. We recommended that CENTCOM formalize procedures for requesting, conducting, and monitoring web-based MISO.

(U) CENTCOM personnel agreed and began developing standard operating procedures, which they intend to publish in a CENTCOM regulation on July 29, 2016.

(U) The management actions taken during the audit addressed our recommendation; therefore, we are not making any additional recommendations. Additionally, we provided CENTCOM a discussion draft for comment when preparing the final report and they concurred with it as written.

DODIG-2016-111 (Project No. D2016-D000CN-098.000) i

## (U) Recommendations Table

(U) Management	(U) Recommendations Requiring Comment	
(U) Commander, CENTCOM	(U) None	for the second se

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DODIG-2016-111 (Project No. D2016-D000CN-098.000) | ii



INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

July 20, 2016

#### (U) MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

#### (U) SUBJECT: DoD Effectively Planned and Executed Military Information Support Operations for Operation Inherent Resolve but Needs to Develop Formal Processes and Procedures for Web-Based Operations (Report No. DODIG-2016-111)

(U) We are providing this report for information and use. This project relates to the overseas contingency operation, Operation Inherent Resolve. We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

(U) U.S. Central Command and Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve effectively planned and executed Military Information Support Operations (MISO) for Operation Inherent Resolve. U.S. Central Command developed a process for requesting, conducting, and monitoring web-based MISO, but the process was informal and was not documented in MISO policy and procedures. During the audit we notified U.S. Central Command of our concerns. U.S. Central Command took prompt action to resolve our concerns; therefore, we are not requesting comments on the recommendation in this report. We will follow up to ensure actions are completed as discussed. We obtained and considered feedback on a discussion draft when preparing the final report.

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at <u>Michael.Roark@dodig.mil</u>, (703) 604-9187 (DSN 664-9187).

Michael 1.

Michael J. Roark Assistant Inspector General Contract Management and Payments

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Introduction

## Introduction

## (U) Objective

(U) We determined whether DoD effectively planned and executed Military Information Support Operations (MISO) for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). See Appendix A for scope and methodology and prior audit coverage related to the objective.

## (U) Background

### (U) Operation Inherent Resolve

(S//REL TO TVEY, MEST)	
	CENTCOM: (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(a)

#### (U) Military Information Support Operations

(U) According to Joint Publication 3-13.2 "Military Information Support Operations," November 21, 2014, MISO are planned operations to convey selected information to foreign audiences to influence their perceptions, attitudes, and objective reasoning, and ultimately to influence the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. CENTCOM is responsible for web-based MISO in support of OIR, while Combined Joint Task Force– OIR (CJTF-OIR), Special Operations Joint Task Force – OIR (SOJTF-OIR), and Military Information Support Task Force–Central (MISTF-C) are responsible for non-web-based<sup>1</sup> MISO for OIR. See Figure 1 for an example of an approved non-web-based MISO product (leaflet) in support of OIR.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> (U) According to CENTCOM personnel, non-web-based MISO products include leaflets, FM radio broadcasts, and text messages.

#### Introduction



(FOUO)

Airstrikes are coming, oil trucks will be destroyed. Get away from your oil trucks

immediately. Do not risk your life."





(FOUO)

(U) Source: CJTF-OIR Non-Lethal Fires Branch.

## (U) Web Operations at Headquarters, U.S. Central Command

(S//REL TO AUS, CAN, GBR, USA)

(U) Figure 1. Approved MISO Leaflet in Support of OIR

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(U) by hand-held devices. According to personnel at CENTCOM Operations Directorate – Information Operations (CCJ3-IO), CENTCOM conducts Web Operations (WebOps)<sup>2</sup> from Headquarters, CENTCOM, at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), Florida. WebOps consists of the:

• (U) Regional Web Interaction Program (RWIP). RWIP was established to counter violent extremist ideology and enemy propaganda, and to amplify messages of credible individuals over the internet.

	(S//RTUF) CENTCOM: (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(a)
•	(S//RTUF) CENTCOM: (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(a)

(U) To conduct WebOps, CENTCOM employed 75 contractors full time at MacDill AFB. In addition, it had 45 subcontractors supporting various functions for conducting IO in general.

## (U) Roles and Responsibilities for Web-Based MISO

(S//NOFORN) CENTCOM: (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(a)	
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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> (U) According to CENTCOM personnel, WebOps includes web-based MISO.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> (U) CENTCOM Execution Order, "Regional Web Interaction Program," July 17, 2009.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense, in June 2007, delegated approval authority of IIA to Geographic Combatant Commanders in support of their operations. IIA are communications through the Internet that are two-way—such as email, blogs, chat rooms, and Internet bulletin boards—on a timely, if not real-time, basis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> (U) Unattributed operations allow a Combatant Commander to disseminate information without clear attribution.

(U) Government Accountability Office Review of Unattributed Web-Based MISO (S//NOFORN) CENTCOM: (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(a)

#### (U) Non-Web-Based MISO Roles and Responsibilities


(U) Several commands have a role in conducting non-web-based MISO in support of OIR. For web-based MISO, forward deployed commands submit requests to CENTCOM Headquarters. CENTCOM Headquarters personnel review, approve, and carry out the requests for web-based MISO on behalf of forward deployed Commanders. See Appendix B for the complete command and control structure related to MISO for OIR.

(U) Combined Joint Task Force–OIR

(S//REL TO FVEY, MESF)	'OM: (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(a)		
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CENTCOM: (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(a)		н Селетична на политична на спорт с на селети со политична на политична на со селети на селети на со селети с Селетична на политична на селети с на селети с со с	
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#### (U) Special Operations Joint Task Force-OIR

(S//REL TO ARE, BHR, EGY, FIN, JOR, KWT, MAR, OAT, SAU, SGP, TUR, NATO, FVEY) (ENTONE (8) (1), EO 1352



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> (U) Attributed operations openly acknowledge U.S. involvement.

Introduction


## (U) Military Information Support Task Force–Central (<del>S//REL TO EGY, FIN, KWT, SWE, IRKS, NATO</del>) <sup>CENTCOME (b)(1), EO 13526, see, 14(a)</sup>

(S//REL TO ECY, FIN, KWT, SWE, IRKS, NATO) CENTCOM: (b) (1), EO 13526, sec. 1.4(a)

## (U) Review of Internal Controls

(U) DoD Instruction 5010.40<sup>7</sup> requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. CENTCOM and CJTF-OIR effectively planned and executed web-based and non-web-based MISO for OIR. However, some processes and procedures were not formalized or documented. We identified an internal control weakness related to CENTCOM's lack of documented processes and procedures for conducting attributed web-based MISO. The management actions taken during the audit addressed our recommendation; therefore, we are not making any additional recommendations. We will provide a copy of the final report to the senior official responsible for internal controls at CENTCOM and CJTF-OIR.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> (U) DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013.



# (U) Finding

## (U) CENTCOM CCJ3-IO Personnel Did Not Formalize Procedures for Web-Based MISO

(U) CENTCOM and CJTF-OIR effectively planned and executed MISO for OIR. For example, CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel conducted web-based MISO to counter ISIL media operations. CENTCOM developed an informal process for requesting, conducting, and monitoring web-based MISO; however, that process was not documented.

(U) CENTCOM did not have documented policies and procedures because CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel focused on conducting web-based MISO to meet mission objectives and were waiting for DoD to develop guidance for this emerging capability.

(U) As a result, DoD and CENTCOM do not have assurance that CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel will properly and consistently carry out web-based MISO in support of OIR and other operations in the CENTCOM AOR. Formal guidance for web-based MISO will ensure roles and responsibilities are established and will provide Commanders the opportunity to effectively plan and execute MISO efforts and maintain continuity as personnel rotate throughout the CENTCOM AOR.


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# (U) CENTCOM and CJTF-OIR Effectively Planned and Executed MISO for OIR

(U) CENTCOM and CJTF-OIR effectively planned and executed web-based and non-web-based MISO for OIR. However, some processes and procedures were not formalized or documented for web-based MISO.

(U) CENTCOM and CJTF-OIR effectively planned and executed web-based and non-web-based MISO for OIR

## (U) Web-Based MISO



#### (U) Non-Web-Based MISO

(U) For non-web-based MISO, CJTF-OIR, in coordination with SOJTF-OIR and MISTF-C, established routine coordination of MISO activities. CJTF-OIR personnel met with other OIR Commands weekly to ensure coordination of IO and MISO messaging. For example, CJTF-OIR participates in weekly MISO working group meetings to coordinate and discuss regional efforts. This meeting includes the following commands:

- (U) CENTCOM IO/MISO,
- (U) CENTCOM WebOps,
- (U) SOJTF-OIR,

- (U) Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-OIR, and
- (U) MISTF-C.

(U) According to CJTF-OIR personnel, non-web-based MISO products include leaflets, FM radio broadcasts, and text messages.

## (U) CENTCOM and CJTF-OIR Did Not Formalize Web-Based MISO Procedures

(U) Although CENTCOM and CJTF-OIR personnel effectively planned and executed web-based and non-web-based MISO for OIR, they did not formalize their standard operating procedures for requesting, conducting, and monitoring attributed web-based MISO. For example, we requested standard operating procedures for web-based MISO and CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel stated that formal processes and procedures had not been developed. However, CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel

believed all Components were fully aware of the process for requesting, conducting, and monitoring web-based MISO. CENTCOM, CJTF-OIR, and SOJTF-OIR officials described their processes and procedures for requesting, conducting, and monitoring web-based MISO. CENTCOM, CJTF-OIR, and SOJTF-OIR processes and procedures were high-level and did not outline oversight requirements, specific responsibilities, or

(U) CENTCOM, CJTF-OIR, and SOJTF-OIR processes and procedures were high-level and did not outline oversight requirements, specific responsibilities, or reporting and monitoring requirements.

reporting and monitoring requirements. See Appendix C for the processes and procedures CENTCOM, CJTF-OIR, and SOJTF-OIR personnel followed for web-based MISO requests.

# (U) CENTCOM CCJ3-IO Personnel Focused on Conducting Web-Based MISO

(U) Formal processes and procedures were not developed because CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel focused on conducting web-based MISO to meet mission objectives and were waiting for DoD to develop guidance for this emerging capability. The Deputy Secretary of Defense issued guidance<sup>8</sup> authorizing web-based MISO and requiring U.S. Special Operations Command to develop best practices for web-based MISO. However, best practices were never developed. Instead of developing web-based MISO guidance for CENTCOM, CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel focused on operating web-based MISO in support of OIR and other AOR mission objectives.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Policy for Department of Defense (DoD) Interactive Internet Activities," June 8, 2007.


(U) On September 1, 2013, the policy authorizing web-based MISO expired. Despite the policy being expired, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict official stated that CENTCOM was authorized to conduct Regional MISO over the Internet because MISO is the same activity regardless of the medium it is carried out on. On June 13, 2016, DoD issued updated MISO guidance<sup>9</sup> authorizing MISO using all emergent technologies. The policy provides overarching guidelines and oversight responsibilities; however, as of June 9, 2016, U.S. Special Operation Command was conducting a capabilities-based assessment to determine training, organization, and materials, among other requirements, for bringing web-based MISO capabilities into the force.

(U) According to CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel, CENTCOM is in charge of several contingency operations and is the lead combatant command conducting web-based MISO to counter violent

(U) Rather than develop formal procedures for conducting web-based MISO, CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel focused on developing capabilities and conducting web-based MISO to meet mission requirements. extremist organizations. CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel are continually developing and refining web-based MISO capabilities. Rather than develop formal procedures for conducting web-based MISO, CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel focused on developing capabilities and conducting web-based MISO to meet mission requirements. Without formal procedures, CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel may not have

adequate controls over program operations or reasonable assurance that web-based MISO will meet mission objectives. We suggested Headquarters CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel develop formal processes and procedures for requesting, conducting, and monitoring web-based MISO.

<sup>9</sup> (U) DoD Instruction O-3607.02, "Military Information Support Operations," June 13, 2016.



## (U) Without Formal Procedures, CENTCOM Does Not Have Assurance That Web-Based MISO Is Properly Executed

(U) DoD and CENTCOM do not have assurance that
CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel will properly carry out
web-based MISO for the remainder of OIR and for future
operations in the CENTCOM AOR without formal procedures
because procedures serve as controls over program
operations and provide reasonable assurance that the
program will meet its objectives. Formal procedures for
web-based MISO will ensure roles and responsibilities are
established and will provide Commanders the opportunity to
effectively plan and execute MISO and maintain continuity
(U) as personnel rotate throughout the CENTCOM AOR.

(U) DoD and CENTCOM do not have assurance that CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel will properly carry out web-based MISO for the remainder of OIR and for future operations in the CENTCOM AOR without formal procedures because procedures serve as controls over program operations and provide reasonable assurance that the program will meet its objectives.

Even though the web-based MISO processes described by CENTCOM, CTJF-OIR and SOTJF-OIR personnel were consistent, MISO in support of Overseas Contingency Operations in the CENTCOM AOR could be improved with the development of formal procedures.

## (U) Recommendation

(U) We recommended that CENTCOM formalize procedures for requesting, conducting, and monitoring web-based MISO.

## (U) Management Actions Taken

(U) We met with the CENTCOM Director of Information Operations to discuss the concerns we identified during our site visits to CENTCOM, MacDill AFB. We suggested that CENTCOM formalize procedures for requesting, conducting, and monitoring web-based MISO. CENTCOM personnel agreed and began implementing our suggested actions. CENTCOM CCJ3-IO personnel began developing standard operating procedures that include processes and procedures for requesting, conducting, web-based MISO, which they intend to include in a CENTCOM regulation.

(U) CENTCOM intends to publish the regulation by July 29, 2016. The management actions taken during the audit addressed our recommendation; therefore, we are not making any additional recommendations.

(U) We interviewed personnel from the following offices to obtain information on the planning and execution of MISO for OIR:

- (U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
- (U) Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- (U) CENTCOM;
- (U) SOCOM;
- (U) SOCCENT;
- (U) CJTF-OIR;
- (U) SOJTF-OIR; and
- (U) MISTF-C.

(U) We conducted site visits to MacDill AFB to interview CENTCOM, SOCOM, and SOCCENT personnel to determine roles and responsibilities related to the MISO program for OIR. We also conducted site visits to CJTF-OIR at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, and SOJTF-OIR and MISTF-C at Al Udeid, Qatar, to review the planning and execution of the MISO program for OIR. For non web-based MISO, there were documented processes for development and approval. We obtained evidence of recurring coordination and product approval documentation to determine whether CJTF-OIR and SOJTF-OIR followed these processes. For web-based MISO we obtained request forms, execution reports, and discussed the process with CENTCOM, CTJF-OIR, and SOTJF OIR personnel to determine whether it was consistently implemented.

## (U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

(U) We interviewed personnel from the following offices to obtain information on the planning and execution of MISO for OIR:

- (U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
- (U) Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- (U) CENTCOM;
- (U) SOCOM;
- (U) SOCCENT;
- (U) CJTF-OIR;
- (U) SOJTF-OIR; and
- (U) MISTF-C.

(U) We conducted site visits to MacDill AFB to interview CENTCOM, SOCOM, and SOCCENT personnel to determine roles and responsibilities related to the MISO program for OIR. We also conducted site visits to CJTF-OIR at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, and SOJTF-OIR and MISTF-C at Al Udeid, Qatar, to review the planning and execution of the MISO program for OIR. For non web-based MISO, there were documented processes for development and approval. We obtained evidence of recurring coordination and product approval documentation to determine whether CJTF-OIR and SOJTF-OIR followed these processes. For web-based MISO we obtained request forms, execution reports, and discussed the process with CENTCOM, CTJF-OIR, and SOTJF OIR personnel to determine whether it was consistently implemented.

## (U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

Appendixes

## (U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, GAO and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) issued 5 reports on MISO relating to our objective. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <u>http://www.gao.gov</u>.

## (U) GAO

(U) GAO-15-383C, "Regional Web Interaction Program: DoD has Established Measures and Controls to Oversee U.S. Central Command's Program," April 2015 (Report is Secret//NOFORN)

(U) GAO-13-426SU, "Military Information Support Operations: Improved Coordination, Evaluations, and Training and Equipping Are Needed," April 2013 (Report is For Official Use Only)

## (U) DoD IG

(U) Report No. DODIG-2015-100, "Information Operations in a Contingency Environment: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued from October 6, 2006, Through November 7, 2013," March 27, 2015 (Report is Secret//NOFORN)

(U) Report No. DODIG-2014-008, "Contract and Controls Over Information Operations Assessments in Afghanistan Should be Strengthened," November 7, 2013 (Report is Secret//NOFORN)

(U) Report No. D-2011-051, "DoD Needs Synchronized Communication Activities and an Integrated Information Operations Capability in Afghanistan," March 21, 2011 (Report is Secret//REL to NATO/ISAF)


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Appendixes

# (U) Appendix C

## (U) Web-Based MISO Product Approval Process

(U) According to CENTCOM, CJTF-OIR, and SOJTF-OIR personnel, the following process is used for web-based MISO requests for OIR.



Sources of Classified Information

# (U) Sources of Classified Information

(U) The documents listed below are sources used to support information within this report.

Source 1	(U) USCENTCOM FRAGO 23-04 – Delegation of MISO Authorities
	Classification: SECRET REL TO USA, FVEY Derived From: USCENTCOM, 20150319 Declassification Date: 20250319
Source 2	(U) EXORD: Operation Inherent Resolve
	Classification: SECRET Derived From: Joint Staff Deputy Director Regional Ops, 20141017 Declassification Date: 20391017
Source 3	(U) GAO-15-383C: "Regional Web Interaction Program: DoD has Established Measures and Controls to Oversee U.S. Central Command's Program
	Classification: SECRET//NOFORN Derived From: CENTCOM, 201504 Declassification Date: 20400402
Source 4	(U) USCENTCOM Concept of Operations for Information Operations in Iraq and Syria in support of Operation Inherent Resolve
	Classification: SECRET//REL to USA, FVEY Derived From: USCENTCOM, 20141104 Declassification Date: 20391104
Source 5	(U) CJTF-OIR FRAGO 148 (CJTF RIP/TOA) to OPORD 15-001 (Operation Inherent Resolve)
	Classification: SECRET//REL to USA, MESF Derived From: CJTF-OIR, 20150720 Declassification Date: 20400720
Source 6	(U) Regional Web Interaction Program (RWIP) EXORD MOD 1
	Classification: SECRET//AUS, CAN, GBR, USA, ACGU Derived From: USCENTCOM, 20130318 Declassification Date: 20380318

Sources of Classified Information

Source 7 (U) USCENTCOM OPORD to degrade ISIL OPORD 23 **Classification: SECRET** Derived From: USCENTCOM, 20141115 Declassification Date: 20391115 Source 8 (U) Approval of USCENTCOM Operation Inherent Resolve MISO Program (OIRMP) Classification: SECRET//REL to USA, MESF Derived From: USCENTCOM, 20150406 Declassification Date: 20400406 Source 9 (U) USCENTCOM OPORD to Dismantle Daesh OPORD 24 Classification: SECRET//REL to USA, ARE, BHR, EGY, FIN, JOR, KWT, MAR, QAT, SAU, SGP, TUR, NATO, FVEY Derived From: USCENTCOM, 20151125 Declassification Date: 20401125 Source 10 (U) CFSOCC OPORD to Dismantle Daesh OPORD 16-001 Classification: SECRET//REL to USA, EGY, FIN, KWT, SWE, IRKS, NATO Derived From: CJTF-OIR, 20160121 Declassification Date: 20410121 Source 11 (U) Military Information Support Task Force- Central DoDIG MISO-OIR Audit Briefing Classification: SECRET//REL to USA, FVEY Derived From: MISTF-C, 20160422 Declassification Date: 20410422

Source 12

2 (U) WEBOPS Iraq-Syria Daily

Classification: SECRET//REL to USA, MESF Derived From: CENTCOM, 20160419 Declassification Date: 20410411

Sources of Classified Information

Source 13 (U) Regional Web Interaction Program

Classification: SECRET// REL to AUS, CAN, GBR, USA Derived From: USCENTCOM, 20090717 Declassification Date: 20340717

Source 14

(U) OPORD 24 C2 Chart

Classification: SECRET// REL to USA, EGY, FIN, KWT, IRKS, NATO Derived From: SOJTF-OIR, 20151125 Declassification Date: 20401125

Acronyms and Abbreviations

# (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

(U) CENTCOM U.S. Central Command (U) CCJ3-IO **CENTCOM** Operations Directorate – Information Operations (U) CJTF-OIR Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve (U) GAO Government Accountability Office (U) IO Information Operations (U) ISIL Islamic State and the Iraq Levant (U) MISO Military Information Support Operations (U) MISTF-C Military Information Support Task Force - Central (U) OIR **Operation Inherent Resolve** (U) RWIP **Regional Web Interactive Program** (U) SOJTF-OIR Special Operations Joint Task Force - Operations Inherent Resolve (U) WebOps Web Operations

## **Whistleblower Protection** U.S. Department of Defense

The Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman's role is to educate agency employees about prohibitions on retaliation and employees' rights and remedies available for reprisal. The DoD Hotline Director is the designated ombudsman. For more information, please visit the Whistleblower webpage at www.dodig.mil/programs/whistleblower.

# For more information about DoD IG reports or activities, please contact us:


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