


#31

1 Nov 2000

*USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER*

# *CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL*

*Air University  
Air War College  
Maxwell AFB, Alabama*



*Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.*

*Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at [www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm) for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Lt. Col. Michael W. Ritz, CPC Intelligence/Public Affairs or JoAnn Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538.*

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## **The enemy within**

Date: 21/10/2000

When Dr Ken Alibek, the scientist who used to run the Soviet Union's germ warfare research program, visited Sydney last year, he outlined his former bosses' preferred choices in deadly microbes.

"For the Soviet Union, the best biological weapons were the ones without a possible treatment," he told a scientific conference.

Alibek, who was known as Kanatjian Alibekov before he defected to the US in 1992, said multi-drug resistant strains of bacteria such as anthrax had been developed at the Soviet laboratories and tests had been done with the killer microbe Marburg.

"But Ebola virus was considered the best possible agent," Alibek added.

There is no mystery why, as the world this week witnesses another horrifying outbreak of the tiny natural agent of destruction, this time in Uganda....

<http://www.smh.com.au/news/0010/21/text/review4.html>

Charleston (SC) Post and Courier  
October 26, 2000

## Failed Mission To N. Korea

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's trip to North Korea has ended without coming any closer to clarifying the intentions of its leader, President Kim Jong Il, to the U.S. government and its allies in the region.

Ms. Albright put a brave face on her failure, saying "important progress" was made toward persuading North Korea to "restrain missile development and testing, as well as missile exports." But no final agreement was reached.

Part of Ms. Albright's mission was to explore the possibility of a visit to North Korea by President Clinton before he leaves office. The president would be well advised to stay away unless North Korea forthrightly declares its intention to end missile exports and negotiate agreements on reducing - not merely restraining - military threats and capabilities.

Instead, President Kim delivered ambiguous and teasing answers to Ms. Albright's questions, while exposing her to his own brand of Communist pomp and circumstance - an ordeal that Mr. Clinton should spare himself, and the nation.

Ms. Albright's visit presented an extraordinary spectacle. As described by The Associated Press, our nation's premier diplomat and outspoken advocate of democracy at one point sat through more than an hour of choreographed entertainment that extolled North Korea's one-party government and military might and condemned imperialism. It was standard Stalinist fare from the depths of the Cold War, and conveyed a dissonant message.

President Kim's penchant for joking remarks added further confusion. During one spectacle attended by Ms.

Albright, a photograph of North Korea's multi-stage Taepo Dong missile appeared on a background screen.

According to Ms. Albright, Kim "turned to me and quipped that this was the first satellite launch and would be the last." But no agreement was reached on missiles.

A similar jocular flickered around Ms. Albright's departure. Seeking to keep the talks going, she told Kim to "pick up the phone any time," The Washington Post reported. "Please give me your e-mail address," Kim replied. But the talks in Pyongyang ended inconclusively.

The entire curious encounter suggests that North Korea is seeking a very substantial price for curbing its military programs, and also may be stalling until it can open talks with a new administration. Either way, President Clinton should strike North Korea off his end-of-term itinerary.

New York Times  
October 26, 2000

## Visit Revises Image Of North Korean

By Jane Perlez

PYONGYANG, North Korea, Oct. 25 — When Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright landed here this week, the Clinton administration had closely watched what it viewed as the erratic and threatening behavior of the leader, Kim Jong Il, for more than six years.

A series of crises that concerned the North Korean nuclear program and its ability to build and launch long-range missiles had driven Washington to believe that the reclusive Mr. Kim was determined to destabilize the North Asian region and, possibly, attack the United States.

After negotiating with Mr. Kim over two days, Dr. Albright and her team of North Korea specialists who left the country this morning said they had come away with a different impression. They found, they said, a leader who could be reasoned with and keeps up on events through the Internet and CNN and who has traveled to China, India and Russia.

The assessment of Mr. Kim toward the end of this visit is vastly more positive than it was several months ago, when there was considerable disbelief in Washington, and even some quiet scoffing, at similar descriptions given by President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea after his visit to North Korea in June.

In one of the many conversations with the secretary that ranged over subjects like his annual viewing of the Oscars — presumably by videotape — Mr. Kim said he was examining alternatives to his Communist economy. Specifically, he said he liked the Swedish model.

As the Americans try to fathom what has prompted what is apparently Mr. Kim's new readiness to abandon his missile program on conditions that would be acceptable to the United States, the central theme of the talks here, they have come up with two basic reasons: the economic survival of a country that is teetering on the brink of collapse and the survival of his own dictatorship.

"I think he's beginning to think about how to sustain his economy over time," a senior administration official said. "He has some understanding that missile exports, although they obviously bring in hard currency, also produce problems for him."

Most significantly, the official added, Mr. Kim apparently understood that maintaining a hard-line posture on his missile program and exports prevented any possibility of a relationship with the United States.

The Americans said they believed that Mr. Kim, who inherited the leadership from his father, Kim Il Sung, who died six years ago, needs to shore up his vulnerabilities. He runs a country where the 1.1 million-member military wields a disproportionate degree of authority. But as the indulged child of a powerful man, he never worked his way up through the ranks.

Whether Mr. Kim, whom officials said they found smart but far from being a creative thinker, will actually put into effect any economic changes remains a question. Improving the economy would mean opening the country to foreign investors, much as China has done. But that is a move that could produce profound shocks in one of the most isolated countries in the world.

Asked whether Mr. Kim understood the implications of opening his society to the Internet and a global economy, the administration official replied, "I think that is, in part, why this will be a slow process."

In preparing for Dr. Albright's visit here, possibly the prelude to a trip by President Clinton before he leaves office, Washington has had to build on the little that it knows about Mr. Kim. At home, his life story is murky and subject to wild rumors.

Despite hagiography that insists that he was born in a log cabin on a legendary mountaintop, American officials said they believed that Mr. Kim was born in a military camp in the Far East of the Soviet Union in 1942, when his father was fighting Japanese troops. Mr. Kim's father moved back to Korea at the end of World War II, heading the Korean Communist Party in the Soviet-occupied North and becoming its leader after 1948, when a Communist-led republic was proclaimed, until his death in 1994.

The younger Mr. Kim was educated in Pyongyang, the capital, and graduated from university in political economy, essentially a degree in Marxism-Leninism.

Kim Jong Il then began to rise through the ranks of the Communist Party and was put in charge of agitprop and then the all-important personnel department. In 1980, he was proclaimed the successor to his father, and granted the title of Dear Leader, close but not quite the same as the title of Great Leader that belongs to the senior Mr. Kim.

In his rise to power, rumors abounded about his love affairs. North Korea experts said they believed that he has an official wife, Ko Yong Hui, and that he has had other wives and children with them. There was no sign of a wife at the social occasions with Dr. Albright. But he has told visitors that he has children in their 20's.

Many of the anecdotes about Mr. Kim's personal life came from a South Korean actress and her former husband who were kidnapped in Hong Kong and taken to North Korea on Mr. Kim's orders. After their escape from the North, that couple publicized accounts about Mr. Kim's extravagant spending on movie productions and on his love for luxury, including Mercedes-Benzes.

Those accounts, combined with intelligence reports that implicated Mr. Kim in the bombing of a South Korean airliner and other terrorist acts, encouraged the impression that Mr. Kim was somehow dissolute and, perhaps, a little unstable.

The Americans were apparently relieved to find now that this was not the case. Anyway, they argue, as a senior administration official said today, that the issues of North Korea's building missiles and encouraging nuclear proliferation were too "important to say glibly: 'This guy is kooky. He's out of this world. Who could possibly deal with him?'"

After 12 hours of dealing with him, undoubtedly on his best behavior, the Americans found that there was nothing obviously odd about him. But they also recognized that the enormous cult of personality that surrounds Mr. Kim means that he is treated as an infallible leader, who by definition finds it difficult to make change quickly.

At the core of a change in North Korea's strategic posture is the start of reconciliation with South Korea, a process that began with the visit of President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea to Pyongyang in the summer.

How much investment North Korea welcomes from the South will be one measure of Mr. Kim's intentions. Perhaps more important will be the movement that the two sides make in having their militaries reduce tensions between them.

The Americans said they tried to explain to Mr. Kim some basics about the American political system so that he would understand that the White House, as it considers proposals about how to finalize North Korea's missile contraction, did not act in a vacuum. He was told by Dr. Albright that the administration would consult Congress and its allies and try to build support as it considered any quid pro quo for North Korea to abandon its missiles. Mr. Kim, who does not speak English nor appear to understand it, asked Dr. Albright few political, cultural or social questions about the United States. But toward the end of their first meeting, he did ask Dr. Albright whether she had just seen coverage of their meetings on CNN. She had not. But he had, presumably with the help of an interpreter.

## **Salt Lake used as site to test gas attack risk**

Scientists will measure flow of safe gas as it blows through city

Associated Press

SALT LAKE CITY \_ In what sounds like something out of "The X-Files," scientists are releasing gas on downtown Salt Lake City in experiments aimed at preparing for the possibility of a terrorist attack.

By releasing tiny amounts of a safe gas called sulfur hexafluoride, they are trying to understand the risk of chemical or biological attacks on urban areas. The gas is released on a street corner from a pressurized cylinder with a fan....

<http://www.spokesmanreview.com/news-story.asp?date=102600&ID=s870893>

InsideDefense.com

October 26, 2000

## **Former Defense Secretary Perry Says Asymmetric Warfare May One Day Involve WMD**

Former Defense Secretary William Perry said today that he believes it is only a matter of time before attacks like the one against the Navy destroyer Cole two weeks ago will involve the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Perry told InsideDefense.com that the Cole bombing in Aden, Yemen, and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia are "really two of a kind" because both were aimed at pushing U.S. forces out of the Middle East.

"Even though we are susceptible to asymmetric warfare, we cannot allow that threat to deter us from performing the missions we have overseas," he said. "It is important to heighten the security measures that we take when we believe there is a danger of [a terrorist attack]."

Perry told InsideDefense.com that although measures have been taken by the Defense Department to deal with the threat of asymmetric warfare, the area requires more attention.

"I'm sure there are going to be specific measures introduced, in terms of ships visiting ports," Perry said, referring to the aftermath of the Cole attack. "In the case of Khobar Towers we moved our airmen from apartments in the city out into the deserts. It is very inconvenient and expensive to do it that way, but they were safer."

"The real danger in the future is that asymmetrical warfare might include weapons of mass destruction, biological weapons being the most obvious. And that dramatically increases the danger. The best we can do, we are doing already, but maybe not intensively."

Perry added that improving U.S. intelligence should also be examined, but he acknowledged its shortcomings.

"We could do more, but that's relative . . . when dealing with places like the Middle East we can't have complete confidence that we know what is going on. It is a risk we take when we're in that part of the world."

"The important conclusion I came to at the time with Khobar and the important conclusion to come to now with the Cole, [is] we will not let that risk drive us out. Because that's the purpose of the people who are planning to bomb [us]."

Along with former Deputy Defense Secretary John White and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Ashton Carter, Perry has written a new book outlining national security recommendations for the next administration. Titled "Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future," the

book was released this morning. The book is a publication of the Preventative Defense Project through Harvard and Stanford Universities.

-- *Gail Kaufman*

Washington Post  
October 27, 2000  
Pg. 2

## **Pentagon To Add 450 Experts To Protect Defense Secrets**

By Walter Pincus and Vernon Loeb, Washington Post Staff Writers

The Pentagon is hiring 450 counterintelligence specialists to protect defense secrets after learning that China has obtained classified U.S. missile technology, including critical information about the heat shield that keeps America's most advanced missiles from burning up as they reenter the atmosphere, senior defense officials said.

While applauding the attempt to boost security, members of Congress said it was long overdue, coming more than five years after the Defense Department was told of the suspected Chinese espionage.

A trove of Chinese military documents, given to the CIA in 1995 by a former Chinese missile specialist, showed that Beijing had gathered some classified data about U.S. nuclear weapons and a great deal of secret information about America's ballistic missiles, according to officials familiar with the material.

The Energy Department reacted quickly to the apparent loss of nuclear secrets, launching a probe that focused on Los Alamos National Laboratory and scientist Wen Ho Lee. But the Defense Department has been slower to respond to what officials now say was the far more substantial evidence that China had obtained significant missile technology.

Over the past two years, Congress has pressed the Energy Department to take drastic measures to tighten security at the national laboratories, such as requiring polygraph or "lie detector" exams for thousands of employees. But little congressional pressure has been applied to the Pentagon, which now is moving to tighten its control over missile technology at military installations and private defense contractors.

Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon said this week in response to inquiries from The Washington Post that it will take until 2002 to bring on board all 450 counterintelligence specialists, roughly the same number eliminated since the end of the Cold War for budgetary reasons.

"All the new specialists will work to protect technical secrets at the Defense Department laboratories and defense contractors," Bacon said, adding that "other procedural techniques and monitoring tools" will be used to improve security.

The counterintelligence officers are being hired through the Pentagon's civil service procedures and are expected to come primarily from the military, local police forces and the ranks of former government employees, according to a Pentagon official. Some will work in Washington and others at defense facilities around the country.

Sen. Richard C. Shelby (R-Ala.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said in an interview that his committee staff has been urging the Pentagon to add counterintelligence positions since 1997.

Shelby called the Pentagon's failure to investigate the loss of missile technology "a big concern." China's apparent theft of missile secrets from the Defense Department or its contractors is at least as troubling as the Energy Department's alleged loss of secrets related to nuclear warheads, he said.

Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-Fla.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said the slow response reflects broader security problems at the Pentagon, including a backlog of about 1 million people awaiting routine re-investigations of their security clearances.

"It is such a huge problem," Goss said. "They are whittling away at the pile there."

Most of the approximately 60 espionage cases in the Defense Department over the past 20 years have involved people who had been cleared to handle classified documents. Top-secret clearances are required to be re-investigated every five years, secret clearances every 10 years and confidential clearances every 15 years.

Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.), chairman of a House select committee that investigated Chinese espionage at the national laboratories, said he believes the CIA and the entire U.S. intelligence community share responsibility for the Defense Department's failure to conduct a prompt investigation of the loss of missile technology.

"The problem could have been alleviated if any member of the intelligence community had shown special initiative," Cox said.

In 1995, according to senior intelligence officials, a Chinese missile specialist approached the CIA with an unsolicited offer to provide secret Chinese military documents. Over a period of months, this "walk-in" agent handed over about 13,000 pages, The Post reported last week.

One of the first sections to be translated contained physical data about the W-88, a nuclear warhead on U.S. submarine-launched missiles. This triggered a 1996 probe by the Energy Department and the FBI, which the Justice Department later concluded had focused too narrowly on Lee.

The government never charged him with espionage, and he was freed last month after nine months in jail when he pleaded guilty to a single felony count of downloading classified data to computer tapes.

While the Energy Department and the FBI may have moved precipitously, at least in singling out Lee, the Defense Department hardly reacted at all. Government officials have suggested two reasons: The intelligence community was slow to translate all 13,000 pages from Mandarin to English, completing that work only last year, and the CIA suspected on the basis of a failed polygraph exam that the walk-in defector was a Chinese double agent.

But after the FBI brought the defector to the United States for further questioning, it concluded that he was legitimate, and senior intelligence officials said the information he provided has proved accurate.

Cox said this week that the CIA assured his committee in late 1998 that the untranslated portions were "mundane." Senior intelligence officials conceded that there were delays in translating the documents, but they said the Pentagon, the FBI and the Energy Department were informed in 1995 that China apparently had obtained classified information about the Trident II reentry vehicle on U.S. nuclear missile submarines.

"The Pentagon knew that in 1995, the FBI knew that in '95, DOE knew it," the official said.

The intelligence officials also said that since the fall of 1996, the CIA's Counterintelligence Center sent about five separate "crimes reports" to the FBI as the gradual translation of the documents yielded evidence that missile and warhead secrets had been compromised by the U.S. military or its contractors.

One former senior Pentagon official who was briefed on the walk-in documents in 1997 said the Trident II information obtained by China was "extremely accurate." It included a description of the sophisticated mating, or attachment mechanism, of the nuclear warhead inside the Mark-5 reentry vehicle, as well as of the materials that make up the heat shield.

Whether China was able to improve its own missiles because of the U.S. data remains unclear. "China's technical advances have been made on the basis of classified and unclassified information derived from espionage, contact with U.S. and other countries' scientists, conferences and publications, unauthorized media disclosures, declassified U.S. weapons information, and Chinese indigenous development," a CIA damage assessment said last year. "The relative contribution of each cannot be determined," it concluded.

But whatever its practical value, such information "should not be in Chinese hands" and most likely got there through espionage, a U.S. intelligence official said.

USA Today  
October 27, 2000  
Pg. 13

## **U.S. Had Considered Force To End N. Korea's Nuke Program**

The United States once considered using force to shut down North Korea's nuclear weapons program, a senior administration official said Thursday. "We had a close call," Leon Fuerth, chief foreign policy adviser to Vice President Gore, said at a foreign service seminar at the State Department. He didn't specify what action was contemplated or when but said North Korea's nuclear program "was a threat to the security of our allies and a threat to our security. The ground was beginning to shift in the direction of a military confrontation."

The White House is pursuing a policy of reconciliation with North Korea. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was there this week, and President Clinton is expected to visit next month. In 1994, though, tensions were high until North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear weapons program in exchange for civilian-style reactors and energy supplies. It also has agreed to stop exporting weapons technology.

# Figures on Gulf War Gas Exposure Revised

By Pauline Jelinek

Associated Press

Saturday, October 28, 2000; Page A04

**About 30,000 Persian Gulf War veterans who were told in 1997 that they were not exposed to nerve gas will soon be notified that they probably came in contact with low levels of the substance, Pentagon officials said yesterday.**

Austin Camacho, the Pentagon's spokesman on Gulf War illnesses, said the exposures "are very low levels--low enough that there is no expectation of a health risk."

Still, the revision will again "raise questions of credibility" among critics of the government's now decade-long effort to answer health questions of veterans who served, said Vinh Cam, an immunologist and member of the Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigation of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents....

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30611-2000Oct27.html>

Washington Post

October 29, 2000

Pg. B7

## Iran And The Bomb

By Reuel Marc Gerecht

During America's war against Iraq, Iranian clerical circles were abuzz with a nuclear debate. If Saddam Hussein had had the bomb, the mullahs wondered, would the United States have challenged his conquest of Kuwait?

With the Islamic Republic's recent test firing of the Shahab 3 intermediate-range missile--whose primary mission is unquestionably as a delivery vehicle for a nuclear warhead--the clerical regime has again clearly told us its answer. Tehran understands, as does Baghdad, that nuclear-tipped missiles will go a long way toward neutralizing the naval power of the United States.

Backed by such weapons, Iran or Iraq could cajole, intimidate or even invade its neighbors, reasonably betting that Washington wouldn't eagerly play nuclear poker over oil wells. America's alliances with Saudi Arabia and the other Arab gulf states, in particular Bahrain with its critical port facilities for the U.S. Navy, could start to weaken.

The Clinton administration, though always quick to underscore its intention to militarily stop the rebuilding of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, has been far less quick and clear about what's to be done about Iran's nuclear aspirations. The administration has tried repeatedly to influence Iran's weapons-related high-tech suppliers--Russia, China and North Korea--but the regular repetition of its entreaties and protests, and the obvious advance of Iran's medium- and long-range missile programs, don't lead one to believe that these countries fear American retaliation.

It will most likely be Iran, not Saddam Hussein's Iraq, that first challenges the United States with nuclear Realpolitik in the Middle East. Contrary to what the Clinton administration has hoped, the "moderate" Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami, and his "leftist" clerical allies are no less, perhaps more, of a strategic challenge to the United States than are the "conservative" forces behind Iran's more powerful but weary revolutionary leader, Ali Khamenei. Khatami and his clerical allies passionately want to reanimate Iran's Islamic revolution by reconnecting it to the people through limited democracy. "Moderation" at home may well mean more action abroad. Refreshed, the Islamic Republic could more capably defend its religious and national interests against its principal foreign foes--the United States, Israel, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

The serious divisions within the clergy on domestic affairs have repeatedly inclined the ruling mullahs to unite on foreign policy. There is probably no issue among them that has more unifying appeal than an Iranian nuclear bomb. It is the ultimate guarantor of the Islamic Republic's survival against foreign threat.

Though Saddam Hussein probably has made progress in "reconstituting" his weapons of mass destruction programs, the Iranians may well have leapfrogged their Iraqi enemy. President Khatami's nonthreatening personality combined with Europe's and East Asia's commercially based foreign policies have brought back to Iran a wide variety of European and Asian businessmen.

It wouldn't be at all surprising to learn that while the United States focused on Saddam Hussein, the developed world's businessmen have supplied Iran with a growing variety of dual-use technologies.

Though the Islamic Republic hasn't been kind to its intellectual elites, regularly purging its best and brightest for ideological deficiencies, this zealotry has definitely cooled against the scientific and technocrat types. Internet-savvy, commercially inclined and larcenous, clerical Iran has, in nuclear-related fields, probably surfed, bought and stolen as much as possible from the West--not to mention from the Russians, Chinese and North Koreans. Although an Iranian nuclear missile is preferable to an Iraqi one--the clerics, unlike Saddam Hussein, are not Hitlerian predators--its strategic impact on the projection of U.S. military force doesn't differ from Iraq's. A review of congressional debates and testimony before the Gulf War quickly reveals the extreme shakiness of our resolution to fight in the Middle East. Always attentive to the American scene, Tehran, armed with nuclear missiles, would likely become immensely fond of intimidating the oil-rich, pro-American and religiously distasteful Arab Gulf states. The possible ramifications of this on the Middle East's always explosive politics would be electric. We should anticipate nuclear cooperation between Israel and Turkey. If the United States hasn't deployed a ship-born anti-ballistic-missile system by the time Iraq and Iran go nuclear--the only credible way we can both spook our enemies and gird our own loins--then the Middle East will certainly give us a new, provocative "dialogue of civilizations." We won't care for the conversation.  
*The writer is a former Mideast specialist in the CIA.*

## **Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project**

*Stimson Center Report No. 35*

### **Ataxia**

#### **The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response**

*Ataxia* is a comprehensive research report that examines the many facets of the unconventional terrorism issue in the United States. The first sections examine the actual threat of terrorism involving chemical and biological weapons, including technical feasibility, statistical trends, and a re-examination of the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack in the Tokyo subway system. From there, *Ataxia* inventories the various federal response assets and training and equipment programs, and airs widespread feedback from the front lines on these federal efforts. Chapter 6, "Metropolis, USA," offers chronological descriptions of local responses that would follow a chemical or biological terrorist attack and shares innovative ideas from local emergency personnel on coordination, plans, tactics, and capabilities for dealing with these type of incidents. Finally, the report concludes with an extensive series of observations and recommendations for policy makers in Washington and beyond....

<http://www.stimson.org/cwc/ataxia.htm>

### **Invented to be a pesticide, sarin is 'a horrible way to die'**

By [Ann Imse](#)

*Denver Rocky Mountain News Staff Writer*

Sarin nerve gas was invented as a pesticide in 1930s Germany, and acts like a massive dose of Raid on humans. Victims stagger and jerk as all muscles convulse, and they die of respiratory arrest, said Jason Pate, a senior research associate at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute....

<http://insidedenver.com/news/1021side2.shtml>



## **NK, US To Open Missile Talks In Malaysia**

North Korea and the United States are tentatively scheduled to open expert-level talks on Wednesday in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur for holding discussions on how to reach a deal on the suspension of the North's development of long-range missiles and exports of short- and medium-range missiles.

Jang Chang-chon, director general of the North Korean Foreign Ministry, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn will represent each delegation for the talks, which is a follow-up to a meeting in Pyongyang between North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

"However, the whole schedule is still volatile because it is not yet set when the North Korean delegation will arrive there," a Foreign Affairs-Trade Ministry official said.

During the Kim-Albright meeting, the National Defense Commission Chairman exhibited "flexibility" over a missile deal, brightening the chances for a breakthrough.

Kim hinted at the possibility that North Korea would suspend tests of long-range missiles in case outside assistance is provided to help it launch satellites.

With regard to the exports of missiles to the Middle East and other areas, North Korea also dropped its insistence that the United States pay cash compensation of \$1 billion a year for its halt of missile exports.

## **Army defends spraying of safe bacteria at Fort Leonard Wood**

By [Virginia Baldwin Gilbert](#)

Of The Post-Dispatch

[Tina Hesman](#) Of The Post-Dispatch Contributed Information For This Story.

The Army has sprayed bacteria outdoors at Fort Leonard Wood during two biological-warfare training exercises in the last year, in February and August.

The releases into the air conformed to permit restrictions required by the Missouri Department of Natural Resources. And state and federal officials say the spray -- using a common soil bacteria -- presents no health hazard.

But a Persian Gulf War veteran in central Missouri has questioned the Army's low profile in obtaining the permit and fears that it is not coming clean about potential hazards. The veteran, Joyce Riley vonKleist, called a public meeting Thursday night that officials and environmentalists planned to attend.

State and Army officials now find themselves in a rear-guard action, trying to defend the decision to use the spray and the process for issuing the air-pollution permit....

<http://www.postnet.com/postnet/stories.nsf/ByDocID/957D4BF5C125414586256985003634F2>

## **Homeland Defense: Assumptions First, Strategy Second**

"During the 20th century, two oceans, two friendly neighbors, and a strong military protected the American homeland. Today, however, emerging asymmetric threats, primarily cyber and biological, are immune to borders, great distances, and traditional defense forces. New concepts, technologies, and partnerships are required to meet this challenge, but America seems to be stuck in the 'let's appoint a new commission' phase. The new Administration that will take office in January 2001 needs to move forward and develop a national strategy for homeland defense - a strategy that will include federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector. A clear statement of assumptions from the President is the first step required to build consensus within the widely divided homeland defense community."...

<http://www.bu.edu/ussi/currentissue/feature.html>

## **Iranian ballistic missile test fails, says Jane's**

LONDON, Oct 30 (AFP) - 22:43 GMT - Iran's third flight test of its Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile was a failure, according to the specialised British monthly Jane's Intelligence Review (JIR).

In its November issue, the magazine cites a US defence official as saying the United States was not yet sure what caused the problem, but suspected possible engine problems or difficulties with the missile's guidance system.

The test on September 21 was initially announced by Iranian defence minister Admiral Ali Shamkhani, who said it was a successful trial of a Shahab-D satellite launcher.

But Robert Walpole, US national intelligence officer for strategic and nuclear programmes, insisted the test was a failure, and that it involved a ballistic missile, according to JIR.

The magazine also quoted Walpole as saying the test was conducted near the city of Semnan, unlike the first two Shahab-3 test flights, which were carried out south of Tehran.

Walpole added that Iran had hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles, including a small number of Shahab-3s available for use in conflict, the magazine said.

Pentagon officials said Iran has carried out only one successful flight test of the Shahab-3, the magazine reported. But that missile flew only 800 to 900 kilometres, not the 1,300 kilometres that Iran claims, the magazine added.

## **India Can Produce High Yield Nuclear Weapons - Scientist**

Monday, October 30 5:33 PM SGT

BOMBAY (AP)--A top government scientist said Monday that India was capable of producing nuclear weapons of high yields of up to 200 kilotons.

The nuclear tests two years ago "gave us the capability to design and fabricate nuclear weapons of yields from low-yields up to around 200 kilotons," said R. Chidambaram, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had declared India a nuclear weapons state after the nuclear tests.

"That was in May 1998 and a great deal of scientific and technological development has taken place since then," said Chidambaram, a key scientist behind those explosions, which provoked similar tests by hostile neighbor Pakistan.

Monday, Chidambaram for the first time gave details of India's nuclear capability in his speech to a gathering of nearly 3,000 people, mostly nuclear scientists, engineers and other staff working at India's key Bhabha Atomic Research Center in Bombay.

The scientists paid tributes to Homi Bhaba, who pioneered nuclear science in India, on his 91st birth anniversary.

Analysts say India has enough plutonium to produce 85-90 nuclear weapons and Pakistan possesses sufficient highly enriched uranium for 40 nuclear warheads.

The nuclear tests by the two countries in May 1998 shocked the world and the Western nations responded with economic sanctions.

In May, the government ended monitoring of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center by a watchdog agency, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board.

The BARC, India's foremost nuclear body, took to internal monitoring, which Chidambaram said was necessary for the secrecy and safety of India's strategic nuclear weapons development.

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## What To Make Of Kim Jong Il's Unexpected Charm Offensive

By George Melloan

On Madeleine Albright's return flight from Pyongyang last week a reporter asked her if she had felt like Nixon in China.

"No," she snapped. "I never feel like Nixon anywhere."

Too bad. Nixon won a singular distinction for his 1972 trip to Beijing to gratify Mao Tse-tung's wish to begin opening China to the outside world. He was immortalized in an opera, "Nixon in China," a rather atonal work but still an honor never accorded any other president. Ms. Albright need not have been so snappish 28 years later after having just broken through to another dictator, Kim Jong Il. But apparently cabinet secretaries are under orders from above to show no quarter to Republicans, even dead ones, in this election year.

Of course, the whole point of her trip was to prepare the way for Bill Clinton to visit North Korea in mid-November to toast Kim and declare a final end to the Cold War. So it would be more appropriate to call the next opera, "Clinton in North Korea." The only problem is that opening up a country with only 22 million people isn't quite on a par with helping a truly historic tyrant, Mao, unlock the doors for hundreds of millions of poor Chinese souls. The 58-year-old Kim Jong Il doesn't even measure up to his late father, Kim Il Sung, let alone Mao. But you take what you can get when you are badly in need of a "legacy."

Mao opened China's doors because his intelligent prime minister, Chou En-lai, persuaded him that he was badly in need of a friend. With the Cultural Revolution Mao had unleashed violent forces to counter threats to his rule, but those forces ended up threatening him as well. An imperialistic Russia, China's age-old enemy, was waiting to gobble him up with the help of out-of-control Red Guard dissidents.

Kim Jong Il's reasons are simpler. He needs money. The North Korean economy literally doesn't function, so the only way he can get money to pay for the comforts of the ruling elite and stave off famine among the masses is through blackmailing the U.S., South Korea and Japan. This he has done by hinting strongly that he has some nuclear weapons tucked away and by proving that he has missiles capable of delivering them. One, the Taepodong, is capable of hitting U.S. soil. Your money or your life, in other words. Another thumb in the eye has been the shipment of missiles to such troublesome states as Iran and Syria.

The 1994 "Agreed Framework" negotiated with Pyongyang by the Clinton administration was the initial blackmail payment. Concerned that the North Koreans really did have nukes, the U.S. offered a payoff in return for a shutdown of reactors capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. The South Koreans would build the North two relatively harmless light-water power reactors at a cost of \$4.5 billion to replace the existing ones and the U.S. would meanwhile supply heavy fuel oil for power generation.

The only problem was that North Korea never sent the baby back to its parents. It was never learned whether or not they really do have nukes and the new reactors still aren't built, thanks to obstructionism by the Korean military. Under the circumstances, Congress has been reluctant to cough up money for the oil and the North Koreans have been crying foul.

Now the deal being proposed by Kim, according to reports, is that he would give up missile-building in return for a \$3 billion payoff. That would seem to be a concession. Last summer he was demanding \$1.3 billion for every year he suspended missile sales. Word is that he told Ms. Albright that since his missiles are really for launching peaceful satellites, he could use some U.S. help for that purpose if he gives up his own missiles. Apparently he has noticed how much U.S. technology the Chinese have been able to gather up by cooperating with the U.S. on satellite launches.

For a dictator bent on winning friends and influencing people, the show Kim put on for Ms. Albright last week was hardly endearing. One of his favorite exercises is to gather great masses of people, Nazi style, to honor (who else?) himself and that creature of folklore, papa Kim Il Sung. This he did again last week in the giant May Day stadium, showing off 100,000 of his disciplined subjects marching and dancing. One of the special features of these events is a card section in the bleachers much like those that spell out slogans at U.S. college football games. Except Kim's is more advanced. His can do elaborate pictures. Ms. Albright was treated to a depiction of a Taepodong missile launch. He whispered to her, no doubt with some amusement, that the launch pictured was the first and the last. Such charm.

The big display commemorated 55 years of communism and the 50th anniversary of the North's launching of the Korean War, which claimed the lives of 33,667 Americans. What a price Ms. Albright had to pay to try to set up a "legacy" for her boss.

Now of course there will be those who insist that this time around the North Korean dictator is sincere, that he truly wants to clean up the mess his daddy left him. It is indeed a fine mess. Reporters accompanying Ms. Albright noted the remarkable absence of traffic, other than pedestrian, in the capital. Electric power is used sparingly and some of the high-rise buildings are empty because there's no power for the elevators. North Korea is, in essence, a huge wasteland whose people long ago were bent to the will of Kim Il Sung and his mad dream of communist self-sufficiency, or "juche."

In fact, the younger Kim doesn't sound very repentant. Last summer he boasted to a group of South Korean businessmen that he doesn't have to travel abroad. Why should he, he asked, when I can sit in Pyongyang and everyone comes to me? The self-confidence of a blackmailer can be enormous.

In a new Brookings study, researchers Kongdon Oh and Ralph C. Hassig use an interesting metaphor. Opening up North Korea, they say, "will be like opening a spring-hinged door; the wider it is opened the greater the force building up to slam it shut." It is not even clear that South Korea wants to open the door to the extent of reunification. It has too many economic problems already without taking on a huge new burden.

As for Mr. Clinton, he would be well advised to think of Kim Jong Il as Yasser Arafat, treacherous behind the false charm. Successful blackmailers seldom get tired of the game.

International Herald Tribune

November 1, 2000

## **Iran Denies North Korea Helped With Missiles**

By The Associated Press

TOKYO - Iran on Tuesday dismissed concerns by Japan that it was developing missiles with technology provided by North Korea, the Japanese Foreign Ministry said.

Foreign Minister Yohei Kono of Japan told his Iranian counterpart, Kamal Kharrazi, that Tokyo was worried about the similarity between Iran's ballistic missiles and those of North Korea, the ministry said.

But in his reply, Mr. Kharrazi said that Iran was developing missiles on its own and that help from the North was not necessary, the ministry said.

The United States and other Western countries long have feared that North Korea was supporting its feeble economy through sales of arms and, even more worrisome, missile technology.

Mr. Kharrazi's comments came as he and President Mohammed Khatami of Iran arrived in Tokyo on a four-day visit to Japan. It was the first official trip by an Iranian leader to the country in 42 years.

Mr. Khatami was scheduled to meet Wednesday with the Japanese prime minister, Yoshiro Mori.

Also Tuesday, the two nations moved closer to a deal for Japan to secure priority bidding rights to develop Iran's Azadegan oil field, a key goal for resource-poor Japan. A deal was expected Wednesday, Japan's Trade Ministry said.

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# Clinton Trip To N. Korea Hinges On Missile Intentions

By Ellen Nakashima and Steven Mufson, Washington Post Staff Writers

President Clinton won't decide whether to visit North Korea until after talks between American and North Korean officials that begin today in Kuala Lumpur on the sensitive issue of the communist country's missile program. Clinton met Monday with Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, who reported on her visit to Pyongyang last week and told him that North Korea had indicated it was willing to give up its missile program in exchange for help launching communications satellites.

U.S. officials said they believe the proposal made by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is "serious," and one said Kim even tried to answer technical questions during his meetings with Albright. Nonetheless, a senior administration official said Clinton would want to know "the specifics" before committing to a state visit. Robert J. Einhorn, assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, will lead the U.S. team trying to nail down those specifics in Kuala Lumpur. At issue is which categories of missiles would be prohibited, what types of research would be barred, and what guarantees there would be against the export of missile parts and technology. The talks are scheduled to last three days.

"Ultimately, the question comes down to what are they willing to give up, and what do they think they need as a substitute?" said the official, speaking on the condition of anonymity.

North Korea, starved for revenue, has indicated that it would expect to be compensated for the loss of export earnings if it agreed to halt exports to countries such as Iran and Pakistan.

But U.S. officials argue that North Korea's missile exports might bring in as little as \$300 million. That could be offset by increased trade and tourism with South Korea alone, and reconciliation with Japan could result in reparations for World War II.

The administration has not decided exactly how much movement by North Korea would justify a presidential visit, the senior official said. "Missiles is probably the most paramount issue that we face," he said. "That will be a cornerstone of a judgment [whether] to go, and we don't know enough yet." Another key issue is for Pyongyang to take steps to reduce tensions on the border between North and South Korea.

It is possible that a presidential visit could be made to mark significant progress, even if a formal agreement is not ready for signing, the senior official said. "We haven't made that decision," he said.

The trip also has a political dimension, since Clinton must weigh the risk of appearing to give in to missile blackmail against the opportunity to defuse a threat from a country whose border he once called "the scariest place on earth."

Albright has been criticized since her return for turning a blind eye to human rights abuses in North Korea.

"We all recognize that we want to capture this moment," said the senior administration official. "Chairman Kim is clearly indicating that he wants a different kind of relationship with the United States and the rest of the world in the future. That is certainly something we should nurture and advance. If this continues, there will at some point in the future be a visit by the president of the United States to Pyongyang. The question is whether now is that time. . . . You won't know that until you really evaluate all of the substance."